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THE
AMERICAN
CATHOLIC QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat
invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantium sive confitentum.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

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PRETENDED UNITY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, vertheidigt von Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., 2 Bände, Münster, 1860.

Dr. Th. A. Rixner's Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, III. Band, Sulzbach, 1850.

Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie von Dr. Albert Stöckl, Zweite Auflage, Mainz, 1875.

AT the end of a former article in which idealism with its various phases was explained we promised to examine the foundations of this system, and of others, either flowing from it immediately, or that in any other way owe to it their origin, in order to see if they are really reducible to that unity which is given out as *prima facie* evidence of their truth. The present article will examine and dispose of that claim.

In the criticism of idealism let us follow the three respects mentioned in the beginning, under which, according to the saying of the idealists themselves, philosophy ought to be one. Systematic philosophy should first draw all conclusions from one supreme and immediately certain principle, by strict deduction, without admitting or requiring any presupposition. Now, the truth of reason is said to be the main presupposition which has always been implied by ancient, and was replaced with strict demonstration by modern philosophy. Chiefly Des Cartes and Kant pretend to have reached this result, one by proving the other by criticising the truth of reason.

Des Cartes, beginning with universal doubt, admitted only our own existence to be immediately certain, and proceeded from this

one fact to demonstrate God's existence and infinite perfection, and thence the truth of our cognoscitive powers. But if he, at the very outset of his reasoning, denies the immediate certainty of the first principles,¹ and doubts even the truth of reason, how can we be certain of our own existence? If, as to all other things, even as to the existence of our body, however so necessarily admitted, we may be deceived by an evil spirit, or misled by the human mind itself, why could error not be enforced on us as to the existence and the nature of our thoughts and our reason? Moreover, if even the principle of contradiction does not hold good, what firmness can the conviction that we exist have? Can he affirm it undeniably certain, if it can together agree with the objective order and not agree, and if the object appearing itself can together be and not be? As long as he supposes the first principles still doubtful he cannot claim for the cognizance of our existence any insight into truth or objective evidence; he must consider it as a mere subjective bent of our mind. The same is to be said of the general criterion that all is certain that we clearly and distinctly perceive; the first principles not yet being certain, it cannot have but mere subjective certainty, not connected at all with the objective order of things. Then, starting from our existence, and led only by the standard of clear perception, Des Cartes has to go through a long series of conclusions, nearly through the whole of natural theology, before he arrives at the truth of our cognoscitive powers, founded on the fact that they are a participation of God's infinite perfections. I shall not even mention that in the course of his demonstration he bases his deductions on the theory of innate ideas and the ontological proof for the existence of God, which certainly do not extort our assent by their clearness, since they are rejected by the majority of philosophers for very good reasons. But what validity can he claim for his argumentation? Conclusions rest not only on material principles, the premises, but also on formal ones, the laws of consequence; the former being frequently, the latter always, those of contradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. But

¹ Des Cartes sometimes says that we are not to doubt the first principles of reasoning, but only the conclusions drawn from them. In his work, however, *De Principiis Philosophiæ*, Part I. n. 5, he plainly asserts the contrary. He says: "Dubitabimus etiam de iis principiis, quæ hactenus putavimus esse per se certa. Cum autem advertimus, nos esse res cogitantes, prima quædam notio est, quæ ex nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque enim cum quis dicit: ego sum sive existo—existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, ut patet ex eo, quod si eam ex syllogismo deduceret, novisse prius debuisset istam majorem: illud omne, quod cogitat, est sive existit; atqui profecto ipsam potius discit ex eo, quod apud se experiatur, fieri non posse ut cogitet, nisi existat."

The truth of reason being still doubtful, also its first principles must be doubted and cannot yet be admitted as certainly true,

for Des Cartes they are still doubtful. As often, then, as he appeals to them he supposes what he intends to prove. His method is still more perplexed by the necessity either to admit or to doubt the truth of reason in the course of his deductions. If he admits reason to be true he supposes his own conclusion. If he still doubts it all his reasoning is doubtful, too; for how can reason, which, by its own nature, may be deceitful, be trusted and relied on surely? Wherever he turns himself he cannot evade this dilemma. But let us even suppose he could, what would he attain? Not science, but faith. As in his system the firm conviction of our first cognition arises not from an objective motive but from a merely subjective bent of the mind, so, the truth of our cognoscitive powers does not rest on objective evidence or intrinsic reasons, but on the impossibility that God can be deceived in his cognitions or deceive in his manifestations. But this is the motive of faith and not of science. For this reason he and his followers have justly been accused of dogmatism in philosophy.

It might, however, be answered that we present Des Cartes's case too weakly. Let us, then, make any allowance he may ask. He sometimes says that we ought not to doubt of the first principles, but only of the conclusions drawn from them. This saying of his is based on the theory of doubt which he later adopted, in order to extricate himself from difficulties. He divided our certainty from the actual cognition of all the reasons which evidence a proposition, and, on the contrary, our doubts from the impossibility to have always present all the premises from which a conclusion is drawn. The remedy now to attain certainty also in the latter case he imagined to have found in the remembrance of God's truth. Let us, as I said, grant every word of this theory. But then arises the question how we acquire the certain knowledge of the first principles. It may be said that they are implied in the cognition of the first concrete or individual fact known to us. Des Cartes took for such our own existence. Let us not question whether he is right or wrong in doing so. We are, indeed, not conscious of those distinct acts by which we understand, first, the abstract principle that what thinks must exist, then are cognizant of our thoughts, and at last infer that we exist. We are certain of our existence by one act of judgment. But how can the first principle be implied in it? This may happen in two different ways: either the principle is inferred from the individual fact as its reason, or the individual fact is known in the light of the first principle. The latter means that by one act we judge, immediately and with certitude, of an individual object in which the principle is made concrete, so however that what enlightens and moves our mind is, not the concrete form of the object as such, but the principle invested in it.

Des Cartes seems to think such principle is inferred from the individual fact; for he says that one knows the principle, "what thinks must exist," from the experience he has that he cannot think without existing. But such an inference would be quite unlawful, because we would thus simply and immediately make a general rule of one single case. If, on the contrary, we know the individual fact in the light of the general principle, then the latter furnishes the reason or the motive for which we pass a certain judgment on the former. So, in reality, our judging proceeds. We do not, for instance, infer the principle of contradiction from the experience that we cannot together exist and not exist; for, by the by, this is not even an object of experience; but rather we understand it directly and immediately, whether it be proposed to us in an abstract or in a concrete form. Yea, if we analyze any certain cognition and resolve it into its last motive, we give as the reason of our certitude the general principle of contradiction. It is this that furnishes firmness to our conviction and makes doubt impossible; whilst, on the contrary, it not yet being admitted, the assent to any judgment of a particular fact could be withheld for a good reason. What we have said of the principle of contradiction may be applied also to those of identity, of sufficient reason, and to all the others. Now this being so, evidently not our existence or any other individual fact, but the first principles are the first truths known to us, the foundation of certainty, and the starting-point of all our reasoning. Des Cartes's doctrine on self is thus completely overthrown.

But even the remedy with which, his theory of doubt supposed, he supplied us for the attainment of certainty in our reasonings, is quite insufficient. As he thinks, a judgment is certain only then, when we actually understand all the principles on which it rests; but not when we know them habitually, though with the remembrance of their former actual cognition. But if a proposition might be false, when we clearly and distinctly remember to have understood its reasons, it may also be false when we actually penetrate them. To gainsay this, it would be necessary to deny the truth of memory. This, however, Des Cartes does not do. Moreover, if, as he says, no judgment is certain, unless we actually see through all its reasons, also the truth of God is not certain, and consequently no motive of certainty; for at no time and in no reasoning have we actually present in our minds all the syllogisms by which Des Cartes, starting from our existence, proves God's existence, infinite perfection, and truth. Even generally in all our deductions, when we arrive at the conclusion, we have no longer an actual understanding, but only a remembrance of the premises. We must, therefore, either grant the truth of the memory and sufficiency of reasons, which we do not see through actually, but

remember to have understood formerly, or we must give up all certainty. The solution, then, which Des Cartes tried to give of the objections urged against his system furnishes a new support to skepticism. To give the result of his theory in few words, he begins with universal doubt, and never succeeds in overcoming it and restoring certainty.

Kant, still more anxious to lay a solid foundation of philosophy without presuppositions, commenced with criticising reason. As to the result of his speculation he differs from Des Cartes. The French philosopher tried at least to prove the truth of reason; but the German Aristotle, as Kant was sometimes called, ends by maintaining its falsity. He, therefore, is liable to much greater objections. First of all, if he claims objective validity for his critical researches, he already supposes or admits reason to be true; for he undoubtedly makes them by reason, and will not say that deceitful reason surely attains or manifests truth. But his criticism merely results in proving that we cannot know anything as it is in itself; that all our conceptions of time, space, existence, reality, and so on, and all our reasonings about the final cause are mere illusions. He, consequently, has either to renounce the objective validity of his criticism, or to acknowledge that by his tenets he together denies and asserts the truth of reason. But had he even proved its falsity without contradictions, thus he would have obtained no enviable result. He would start with cognoscitive powers proved by himself to be utterly deceitful and necessarily leading to error. Philosophy thus indeed would not be based on a solid foundation, but completely destroyed. What he adds about the practical reason, in order to save some truths, entangles him no less. The practical knowledge of which he speaks is based on no objective evidence and on no influence from any object, but, like the theoretical, on a mere subjective necessity of the mind. Now if this pure reason cannot attain truth, because it is as to its form independent of any outward object, why should the practical, being in just the same condition, do better? What undermines the truth of one overturns also that of the other.

Kant's new method of philosophy is as solid and radical as that of a physiologist who begins his researches with pulling out his eyes, in order to examine them under the microscope and to correct his observations from the faults discovered in them. It is worthy of notice by what reasoning he came to admit inborn forms of the mind. First, as space and time are apprehended by all our sensible perceptions, he thought that they must be forms of our organs. Had he said that only material objects, which as such exist in time and space, make an impression on our material senses and determine them to action, he would have both accounted for the form

and saved all trouble about our sensual cognitions. Then, because possibility, necessity, universality, and other categories can, as such, neither exist in contingent, individual, and changeable beings, nor act on our senses, he concluded that all these predicaments must be derived from the mind alone, and by no means from the objects. Consequently he denied also the objective truth of our conclusions, because our reasoning is founded on the relations of things, and relations are pure forms of the mind. Others had been aware of the difficulty of accounting for our universal conceptions long before Kant. From their existence they had concluded that there must be in man, besides the sensual, also an immaterial power of perception, by which he, abstracting from individual notes, obtains the universal, and penetrating the phenomena arrives at the essence, necessity, possibility, substance, and cause. Thus they had fully explained our universal and abstract cognitions, not injuring the truth of the mind, but disclosing its higher spiritual power. Kant would, on the contrary, acknowledge but a material or sensual perception in man. This reason alone compelled him to declare all our intellectual notions and reasonings to be illusions. However much he seems to extol human reason, he takes materialism as the basis of his system. We ought, then, not to be astonished if the modern materialists have recourse to Kantism.

The idealists, after Kant, based the unity and solidity of their systems, not on criticism, but on a new method and on quite new principles of reasoning. The ancient philosophers, following the analytical method, had proceeded from the effect to the cause, from the contingent to the absolute; the modern tried to proceed by the synthetical method, from the cause to the effect, from the absolute to the contingent. True, they considered the absolute from different points of view. Fichte calls it the absolute ego: that is, nothing but pure being; Schelling, the absolute identity of subject and object, first indifferent in itself and to be predicated of all things; Hegel, the universal, identical with thought. But, after all, the idea of the absolute is, as to the substance, the same in all their systems. Now, two questions must be discussed: first, whether they can reach the absolute without any presupposition? secondly, whether they can attain such an idea of the absolute as may be the distinctive principle of all philosophical conclusions? for this was laid down as the first condition of unity.

As to the first question, it is clear the absolute must be known either by immediate intuition or by inference, else it would be necessary to resort to a supposition. If it is known by inference, it is not the first principle. They must consequently say that they know it by immediate intuition; and so, indeed, they say. But now since this intuition is generally rejected by other philosophers,

because as our own consciousness attests, our cognition begins with sensual objects and proceeds from the contingent to the absolute, may the idealists not object against it that their first principle is based on an act of cognition, doubtful not only as to its truth, but even as to its existence? How will they justify their proceeding without implying a presupposition? They distinguish in man a twofold intuition: that of common understanding and that of higher reason. Common understanding, they grant, cannot attain the absolute immediately; nay, it detects in it only contradictions. Reason alone can, as they say, arise to the height of the absolute, and penetrating its depth see it to be both thinking and being, both spirit and nature. This answer, however, intricates the difficulty still more. Why should we, again, like Kant, think one power, the human mind, common understanding, to be false and unfit for truth, and take the other, high reason, for infallibly true and endowed with the immediate insight into the infinite? Why was, during many centuries, only the deceitful common understanding active, and why did higher reason not awake before our days, and is found even now not in mankind in general, but in a few idealists? Ought we not ask for some reason for so strange a distinction of our intellectual powers and so marvellous an event in history? Ought we to grant all such assertions on account of their immediate evidence? We may confidently say, no philosophical system has ever commenced with a presupposition that is so startling and does such wrong to all mankind. The idealists themselves would overcome this repugnance by the fair hopes they gave or the great results to be obtained from their system. The philosophy of the absolute they promised would give so satisfactory a solution of the most difficult questions, and afford so full and so deep an understanding of all truth, so complete a reduction of all things to perfect unity, that mankind could not but find therein a proof of the immediate intuition of reason they had asserted. If, indeed, so perfect a science were obtained by their method, we ought not to quarrel with them about one or the other postulate, and might take the result as a warrant for the truth of their principles. But where is that satisfactory solution of all philosophical questions, that full insight into all truth given by idealism? Was it Fichte who gave it? He was severely attacked by Schelling. His system had to be changed, but even so was soon rejected. Did Schelling accomplish this task? He himself had to own that he was generally misunderstood, and his hearers and scholars, though they wondered at his poetical flights, had to complain of the confusion and the many contradictions of his doctrine. His system needed to be reduced to order by some one else. Has Hegel reached that pretended height of perfection? Even Hegel-

ism soon got out of fashion. Before Schelling's death modern philosophy was tired of all these systems, and tended toward atheism, materialism, and nihilism on a much shorter way. Arthur Schopenhauer, a follower of Kant and a materialist himself, avowed that the modern sophists, among whom he reckons chiefly Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, by their obscure silly talk, empty of sense but full of pretensions and contradictions, have brought disgrace on German philosophy abroad and at home. Even the three great geniuses and founders of idealism themselves were not contented with their philosophical theories. They had to change them continually and could never come to a satisfactory end. They were, moreover, idealists only in their lecture halls and at their writing-tables. In their practical life they could not be induced to follow their philosophical views. Their affairs of the greatest importance were decided according to the common understanding, not according to the pretended immediate intuition of higher reason. At last, though they were closely connected and kindred as to the main ideas of their systems, they nevertheless accused one another of sophistry, deceit, nonsense, and stupidity.¹ Idealism thus having rather disgusted mankind than given the satisfaction alleged as a proof for the immediate intuition of reason, rests on a mere supposition, not only not probable, but utterly repugnant to experience and monstrous in its very conception.

Let us now answer the question whether the idealists can attain such an idea of the absolute as may be the first deductive principle of all conclusions. From the systems expounded we know that they call the absolute, universal; indeterminate, indifferent, first void of reality, and then to be realized by determinations. But such is the abstract not the absolute being. This will be evident from a short comparison. The abstract being which our mind obtains by prescinding from all particular or individual notes of an object is, just on account of this abstraction, indeterminate, and, on account of its indetermination, universal, that is, predicable of all things; it is indifferent in itself, because it is neither this nor that, but can be contracted to everything by determinations added. Though it can be said of all things that exist, it, nevertheless, cannot exist as such but only under determinations, since whatsoever exists is individual and determinate, and though it is so universal that it can and must be predicated of all things existing and possible, it does not imply a high but rather the lowest degree of entity, for it has no other note than simply that of being, which if

¹ With what contempt Schelling and Hegel spoke of each other we may see from their own letters, *vide* Johannes Jansen, *Zeit und Lebensbilder*, Freiburg. Herder, 1875, pp. 80-93.

we should abstract too, we should arrive at nothing.¹ The absolute being, on the contrary, is individual, since whatsoever exists is such, and, consequently, universal (not as to its predicability, but as to its causality); it is not indeterminate, but, rather, necessarily determined in every respect; not void of reality, but the fulness of all perfections; not unable to exist, as such, but bearing the sufficient reason of existence in itself, and, therefore, self-existing. From this we evidently see that the attributes which the idealists give to their first principle are directly repugnant to the absolute, and agree only with the abstract being. They consequently, only by a strange confusion of two widely different conceptions, pretended to have attained the absolute by immediate intuition; for they did not reach the absolute but the abstract; not the fulness of perfection, but the most indeterminate entity. Therein lies the paramount falsehood of their theory of the first principle, the source of a great many other errors and mistakes. Some of them I shall point out. First, such a confusion being made, the idealists ascribe to the abstract being self-existence and infinity. Now, not only are such attributes repugnant to the abstract being, but from them also false and contradictory principles are deduced as a basis of further speculation. Then, by the same confusion, they make the being from which they would start quite unfit to be the principle of all deductions. Any principle must contain what is to be deduced from it, else deduction would be absurd in its very conception. But mere being, indifferent, and void of any determination, does not contain any determinate truths. It is true there are some general laws and principles, founded on the single conception of being, but they are as abstract and indeterminate as being itself. Like this, they are applicable to everything possible and existing, but do not involve any concrete element, and serve, on this account, rather indirect demonstration, by which the contradictory of a proposition is shown to be absurd, than direct deduction, by which a new truth, quite unknown before, is disclosed. It is also true, abstract being can become everything; but the determinations by which it is contracted are not developed or conceived from it, since it does not contain them, but are taken from determinate beings presented to our mind. To make, therefore, the indeterminate being the general principle of all deductions is the most startling contradiction ever set forth; for, by supposing it to be indeterminate it is made void, and by assuming it as the principle of all deductions it is declared to be full of all conceivable determinations.

This consideration will supply us also with the answer to the question whether idealism connects all things as they are, in them-

¹ St. Thomas, *Summa c. gent.* cp. 26: *Summa Theol.* p. 1, q. 3, art. 4, ad 1.

selves, in perfect unity, by deriving them from and reducing them to one supreme ontological principle. This has been said to be the second respect under which philosophy ought to be one. Ancient philosophy, it was objected, introduced a fatal dualism everywhere. It distinguished in the body matter and form, in man soul and body, and put between the world and its cause an infinite distance. Idealism, on the contrary, is thought to have discovered that all things grow from the absolute as its organs or determinations, and, though distinct and even opposite to one another, return not only to perfect harmony but even to absolute identity. Has idealism, indeed, obtained this result?

As the idealists maintain being and thinking to be identical, the development of thought is, in their systems, the same as that of nature or reality. Accordingly, as all philosophical conclusions are ultimately derived from the conception of being as the supreme logical principle, so all the reality of the world springs forth from being as its first ontological source or origin, thought being either the activity by which reality is produced, or the form under which it is put into existence, or the principle from which it is developed. This supposed, it is first clear that the evolution of the world from the absolute is liable to the very same objections as the logical development of science. They both have, in common, not only the same first principle, but also the same confusion of the absolute and the abstract. From indeterminate being, therefore, as no determinate knowledge, so no concrete and determinate reality can spring forth. The same reason shows the impossibility of both the one and the other. Any deduction, whether logical or physical, supposes that the thing to be deduced is contained in the principle from which it proceeds, else we should have a product without a sufficient reason or cause. But indeterminate being is void of any determination, and by its very conception excludes any determinate reality. The development of the universe from it is, for this reason, a contradiction in itself, a monstrous absurdity. The idealists, however, try to illustrate its possibility by the growth of organic beings. But there is an immense difference between these two evolutions. Organic beings grow from a seed already determined to a certain species, if the latter is influenced from several outward agents, and receives from without the food to be transformed into organs. One of these conditions not being fulfilled, no plant or animal whatsoever will be developed. But the evolution of indeterminate being, as taught by the idealists, neither begins with a determinate germ nor admits an outward cause which may act on it or furnish the matter to be assimilated, since without the universal, as they say, nothing can exist. From the very comparison alleged we must rather infer the absolute impossibility of the evolution in

question. Another illustration has been taken from mental development. This, however, leads to the same conclusion. Can we imagine that one secluded from the outside world, blind to the beauties of nature, in no contact with other beings, yea, not even developed as to his intellectual faculties themselves, will, little by little, enlarge the narrow compass of his knowledge, and enrich himself with all accomplishments of art and science? Must we not, on the contrary, judge that during this life he will be doomed to darkness and utter ignorance? Just so we must think, also, of the indeterminate or abstract being. It wants all elements necessary to self-development. There is in it no sufficient reason for evolution; neither an impulse from without nor a determination from within as effective causes, neither matter nor form as constituent parts. Its self-development is as inconceivable as an effect without a cause, or a compound without components.

Many other absurdities must follow from such suppositions. First, the idealists admit, like other philosophers, that the absolute is infinite, eternal, necessary, self-existent, independent, in short, endowed with consummate perfection. Now, as they confound the absolute with the abstract, they are compelled to predicate all these attributes also of indeterminate being. They add, however, that this is possessed of infinite perfection, not at once and from eternity, but successively and by evolution. Its infinity is a tendency to an endless struggle for perfection, a cause of continual progress. Thus they thought both to justify the confusion they made of the absolute and the indeterminate, and to give a correct and adequate idea of infinite perfection. Progress, they said, is a perfection in itself; consequently, the absolute must be viewed as progressing, it seems, full of life and energy, whilst if endowed with immutability, as described by ancient philosophy, it must be conceived as dead and motionless. However striking and new this idea seemed to be, it, nevertheless, implies a monstrous contradiction. The infinity of the absolute cannot consist in progress. The being which exists by itself determines by its own essence its actual perfections as well as its existence, for, without the former the latter cannot be thought of at all. But, perfections which a being has by its own essence can neither be changed nor destroyed in it, because they depend on the same essence both as to their substance as to their degree. Were they ever changed in any way, the essence itself would cease to be. But then the latter would not be absolute, as it was supposed, but contingent, and would, if self-existing, arise from non-existence into existence by its own activity exerted before existing. The absurdity of this nobody will deny; but one might say that an alteration of perfections or determinations supposes the essence of the absolute to be only modified, and not cease to be.

This, however, is an error. Any essence is, as such, unchangeable, and any increase or diminution of its reality destroys it and constitutes another one. Moreover, the sufficient reason for a perfection is either contained in the essence or not. If it is contained it can never fail in a being of that essence. If not contained in the essence, and, nevertheless, once to be obtained, the perfection must either be laid in it from without, which is repugnant to the absolute being determining itself by its own essence, or must arise in it from nothing, which is the same as being put into existence without a sufficient reason. Nor can such a perfection of the absolute be effected by its own operation, because this neither can bring forth more than what is contained in the essence by which it is constituted. It is therefore evident that the absolute being is unchangeable, both as to its existence and to its perfections, and that with absolute necessity it is such as it is, and can neither decrease nor increase, neither acquire nor lose anything. But what degree of perfection does it thus possess? The fulness of all perfection: for, as it possesses those perfections which it actually has, so it excludes those which it has not by virtue of its essence, and, consequently, with absolute necessity. Now, it does not exclude any perfection by virtue of its essence, but rather admits them all; for the union of all perfections which we positively conceive to be possible cannot be realized in a contingent being, and hence must be realizable in the absolute. We then conclude that the latter really possesses all perfections from eternity and forever without any wane.

Now we may easily judge, whether progress is possible in the absolute or infinite being. Evolution is not a simple, but a mixed perfection. It involves finiteness; for it necessarily supposes a being which possesses first a lower and then acquires a higher degree of perfection; which by virtue of its essence is not endowed with the fulness of perfections, but tends towards higher accomplishments; which is not stationary on account of its being determined in every respect, but always moves on, because never completely actuated. There is, consequently, between essential infinity and growth in perfection, between absolute necessity and evolution, an irreconcilable contradiction.

Pantheism is another absurdity of idealism. The idealists maintain that there is nothing without the absolute, that it is all, and that it gets infinite and enriched with all reality by the development into our individual egos or into nature and spirit. They plainly avow, that God himself is the process of evolutions and becomes first the world, then man, at last spirit. Again, according to their views, the world is either the appearance of the absolute, or the opposite into which the latter turns itself, and by which it is determined and realized. There is no doubt, God is, as they say, the

universe, and the universe is God. But as they on one side avow all moments and stages of evolution in the universe to be imperfect, changeable, transient, finite, distinct from one another, produced; so they must admit on the other that God, whom they term self-existing and absolute, is infinite, absolutely necessary and unchangeable as to his perfections, eternal, unproduced, simple, and free from any composition. Accordingly, in their system God is together finite and infinite, together unproduced and produced, together absolutely necessary and contingent, together unchangeable and subject to continual changes, together entirely simple and compound of many parts, together most perfect in every regard and imperfect as to the elements of which he consists, together existing from eternity and arising in time into complete existence and reality. Can there be contradictions more evident and striking?

What we have said so far might induce any one to reject the unity devised by idealism. What is unity worth if founded on contradictions and falsehood? We shall, however, show directly and from their own tenets, that they have not built up, but destroyed unity. By unity things are perfected and accomplished. If, therefore, it is proved that idealism tends toward nihilism or denies the reality of things, its destruction of unity will be evident. But idealism results necessarily in nihilism. We might first say that all the contradictions already disclosed must end by negation and destruction. Notes contradicting one another cannot constitute being, but nothing; for, if the very elements of which being consists, destroy one another by contradiction, nothing can result from their combination. Now as all the perfections of God are contradicted by the imperfections of the world, which he is said to be, his necessity by its contingency and so on, the foundation of all reality is annihilated. Moreover, being which has no sufficient reason, is to be conceived as nothing. But indeterminate being has in itself neither the sufficient reason for its own existence nor that for evolution; consequently, the universe said to be developed from it is mere nothingness. Still more evidently, nihilism follows from the nature of evolution taught by the idealists. According to Fichte, the absolute is determined by the limitation which the hindrance or the non-ego produces in it. But this limitation is negation. Therefore, not only the matter or the hindrance is nothing, as Fichte, in order to avoid dualism, is compelled to grant, but also the determination of the absolute or the abstract. Schelling, in the first and third period of his speculation, says that each particular being or each degree of evolution consists of two opposite elements: one positive, the other negative, and that by being reduced to indifference they constitute absolute identity. But the result of a struggle between positive and negative elements is de-

struction, just as by the collision of two bodies, equally strong, motion is stopped and rest ensues. In his second period, when imitating Platonism, he plainly avows both that the sensible world has no reality in itself, being nothing but an unreal appearance, and that the absolute develops itself by such unreal images. In Hegel's system the universal turns itself in each stage of evolution into its opposite, that is, into nothing, which, however, it withdraws and combines again with itself. By this combination of nothing with itself he thinks the universal becomes determined and filled with reality. It is, for this reason, an outspoken axiom of his speculation, that the absolute is the identity of contradictions, and that by them it becomes real. But how can being grow in reality by turning itself into nothing, and by uniting nothing to itself? Who can imagine existence in what consists of being and not being, of entity and its negation? The result of such a combination cannot be thought to be anything else than nothing or annihilation. It is not to be overlooked for what purpose the idealists resorted to such a theory. Having put the absolute in opposition to its appearance or to its reality, they, in order to overcome dualism again and return to absolute identity, let the two opposite elements destroy each other. Dualism then has indeed ceased to be, but things have returned not to the same entity, but to the same nothingness. The Indian pantheism comes to just the same result; it, too, plainly terms the return to the divinity annihilation.

We have not drawn consequences from the tenets of the idealists of which they did not think themselves, and which, if aware of them, they would have abhorred. Nihilism is so closely connected with pantheistic idealism that the latter without the former can scarcely be conceived. Nihilism was, moreover, in reality the last issue of Hegel's teachings, and has been warmly embraced by his followers as the consequence of his tenets. But also Hegel himself professed it, when as the main proposition to be expounded and proved by philosophy he laid down the following: "All is one and all is nothing," or, "God is all and God is nothing." Could nihilism be taught more openly and be stated as the result of idealism more plainly? Now I think, nothing is more shocking than the very idea of a system which is avowedly based on contradiction, which implies both pantheism and nihilism, which combines things in unity by reducing them to nothingness, which pretends to derive all beings from one principle that is void and barren, by an evolution that is destructive, which avouches the absolute to contain everything by identity, and declares it to be nothing. Such contradictions being stated, everybody must see, I will not say the falsity, but the extreme absurdity and foolishness of idealism; so much the more as the idealists, notwithstanding its repugnance to

sound reason, boast of having found the most complete system of science, and of having by far surpassed all former centuries in wisdom.

On Des Cartes's and Kant's systems it is not necessary to dwell ; for they did not and could not pretend to have reduced things known to their objective unity. Kant denies the capacity of our mind to show anything as it is in itself, and consequently also the possibility to attain the objective order. Des Cartes made not only no progress towards unity, but even widened the dualism for which scholastic philosophy was blamed.

Having spoken of the oneness of the logical and the ontological principle, we may now pass over to the union of them both, which is the third condition of perfect unity. In this respect, too, the idealists glory in having made quite new and wonderful discoveries. By establishing the identity of thinking and being, they pretend not only to have accounted satisfactorily for the transition from the subject to the object, but also to have reached the highest degree of unity possible. Indeed we cannot conceive unity more complete than identity. But identity would, according to idealism, exist between the logical principle and its deductions, between the ontological and its evolutions, and between the logical and ontological principles themselves. The question is, however, whether such identity of thinking and being is real.

Let us first hear the reason alleged by the idealists for its truth. Because the abstract or indeterminate being is indifferently predicated of all things, of the mind thinking as well as of the object thought of, Schelling thinks it contains subject and object, both reduced to identity. This reasoning is evidently a sophism. Indeterminate being is predicated of all things indifferently, not because it contains all their determinations, but because it abstracts from them. Now subject and object, the ideal and the real, if thought of as such, already imply some determinations. Therefore, Schelling's argumentation is the following : " Because being excludes all determinations, and is thus predicated of all things, therefore it includes the determinations of both the subject and the object." Really a very solid foundation of idealism ! Fichte reasons with the same fallacy. " If the mind," says he, " affirms a proposition absolutely true, it must itself put into reality both the subject and the predicate and the connection between them ; for, if it were in judging dependent on an outward object, its assertion would not be absolute, but hypothetical." The mind, therefore, he imagines, is both the subject and the predicate, both that which thinks and that which is thought. True, whenever we form a judgment, its subject and predicate and the connection between them is within us through the activity of our mind, as far as this represents them ; for cogni-

tion is vital representation. But representation is not necessarily identical with the thing represented; they may be and are indeed often distinct from each other, just as the portrait differs from the person portrayed, and real differs from pictured gold. We can, therefore, pronounce an absolutely true sentence without putting into reality its subject and predicate and their connection; we need only bring forth a representation of them in our mind. Fichte's saying would have some truth if an absolute sentence meant a representation formed without any dependence or presupposition. But this is false; for such a proposition does not mean a representation which exists with absolute necessity and without dependence, but an object which is necessary in itself and independent of our thought. One might, nevertheless, answer, quite in accordance with Fichte's views, that the mind cannot represent an object without containing its very entity. But we may ask in return: Can a photograph not represent a man without containing his very substance or nature, that is, without being a man, too? Is it, in order to produce a resemblance, not enough that the object to be photographed makes an impression on a susceptible plate through the rays of light? In the same way, the mind is sufficiently enabled to represent any outward object, as soon as this directly or indirectly determines our cognoscitive powers. Fichte's reasoning, then, rests on the confusion of the object and its representation.

This reminds us of Schelling's Platonism, which was intended to evidence the identity of thinking and being by a quite new theory. "The absolute," said he, "forms by intuition an idea or a likeness of itself, which likeness, inasmuch as it is produced, is dependent, and inasmuch as it a resemblance, is absolute, independent, and endowed with the power to reproduce its own image. Considering itself as absolute, it falls off from God, and, thus losing its entity and its productive power, brings forth unreal representations of its own nothingness, the sensible world." Let us test the validity of this proof. First of all, it is by no means necessary that the likeness constituting cognition should equal, as to entity, either the object which is known by it, or the intellect which has produced it. That there must not be equality between the object and its likeness as to entity, that one thing can be represented by another of a quite different nature, we know from daily experience. Great statesmen and poets are represented in marble; plants and animals in gold, silver, or iron; fluid by solid bodies. If we reflect on ourselves, and find our thoughts to be transient affections, and our soul the permanent substance in which they inhere and from which they arise, we are certainly conscious of a very great difference between our ideas and our soul as to their entity. To speak, therefore, in general, it is untrue that a living being and its ideal resemblance have necessarily the

same absolute entity and the same productive power. As to divine cognition it is true the divine essence and the idea, which it forms of itself, have absolutely the same entity on account of the absolute simplicity of the Divine Being. But if it is impossible to make an absolute distinction between God and the idea he has of himself, it is also absurd to put an opposition between them, or to say, as Schelling does, that the idea, if considered as absolute, falls off from God and comes to nought. To use the same argument against him in a somewhat different form, we may ask him, whether he admits or not a distinction between the absolute and its idea as to entity. If he admits no distinction, no opposition between them and no falling off from God is possible. If he admits a distinction, he intricates himself in other contradictions; for, if he supposes the idea to be inherent in the absolute, he must say that the latter is compound and lacks the simplicity of the infinite being; if he, on the contrary, thinks it exists without the absolute, this cannot be rendered cognizant or intrinsically enriched by its entity. Again, we must suppose the idea either to be equal or not to be equal to the absolute in perfection. If he considers it to be equal, it is also unproduced; for there is no equality, but an immense difference between being produced and unproduced. But if the idea is, as to its entity, unproduced, it must be identical with the absolute and indistinct from it; because a plurality of absolute beings is absurd. Moreover, it could also not be conceived how unproduced being could fall off from the absolute by considering itself as such. If, on the contrary, he says that the idea is unequal to the absolute in perfection, it has its own entity, inasmuch as it is distinct from any other being, even from the absolute, but remains essentially dependent on the latter. Schelling seems to think that what is distinct from another being is also independent of it. But distinction is one, and independence is another thing. A slave, even, inasmuch as he is such, is certainly distinct from his master, and nevertheless quite dependent on him. The idea, therefore, cannot, in this supposition, consider itself as independent and absolute. Did it judge so of itself, it would produce not its likeness, but its unlikeness, which would neither be cognition nor constitute the ideal development of the absolute. Many other questions, not less perplexing, might be put to Schelling. If the likeness of the absolute participates as such of its productive power and its absoluteness, how can it, by forming a conception of its own entity, bring forth an image of its own nothingness? Again, things have productive power not only by nothingness, but by their intrinsic perfection, and are actually productive, not when they bring forth something unreal or nothing, but when they put some real entity into existence. How, then, shall we understand Schelling, when he says, that the idea, inasmuch

as it is absolute, and has productive power by itself, is nothing and produces only unreal images? Schelling's Platonic system is a labyrinth of contradictions.

We have still to hear Hegel's proof for the identity of being and thinking. It may be rendered in the following syllogism: The universal alone is being; but the universal undergoes a process of evolution which is possible only in thought or conception; therefore, being and thinking are the same. Let us test one premise after the other. The universal alone is being. Universality as such arises from indetermination. The universal predicability of a note increases inasmuch as determinations are abstracted from it, and decreases inasmuch as they are left in it. Hegel must, consequently, say that determinations are non-entities, and says, indeed, that the particular or individual is nothing. But how can the indeterminate being which means nothing but mere entity get determined by a negation added to it? Or, to illustrate the matter by an example, how shall we conceive that, if we contract the universal being to a particular by adding the note "rational," the former alone implies entity, and the latter means nothing but a negation of being? Whether Hegel, by the immediate intuition of his reason, can see this, we do not know; but certainly the common-sense of mankind cannot perceive anything else in such assertions but contradictions. As long, therefore, as we cannot root out the understanding we have at present from the bottom of our nature, we cannot admit Hegel's first principle that the universal alone is being. A clue, however, to unriddle Hegel's propositions, may be found in the confusion of the absolute and the abstract. The absolute is by itself and illimited, and is, for this reason, also called pure being, or simply, the being; any other thing is limited, implies imperfections, and differs from the absolute by negation. Now compounding the absolute and the indeterminate, the pure and the abstract being, he maintained, first, that the universal alone is being, and secondly, that it is contracted or determined by negation. Fichte and Schelling use quite the same language, evidently for the same reason. But the confusion made being unlawful, also the consequence, drawn from it, is false. Though the infinite is alone *the being*, the finite does not, therefore, cease to be *a being* involving real entity, with dependence, however, on the absolute and with negation of some higher perfection; it cannot, consequently, be considered as nothing. Again the limited being must be conceived as determined not by the perfection which it excludes, but the reality which it actually possesses; for, indeed, one is this and no other being, this and no other person, not because he is nobody, but because he is somebody. Determination, then, results, not from negation, but from perfection.

Hegel's first premise, therefore, is false, and rests on confusion of conceptions.

As to the second premises, by which he intended to prove the identity of thinking and being, we grant that the object is universal as it is in our thought, not as it is in itself. But we deny the reason alleged by him, to wit, that the process of evolution which the universal has to undergo cannot be found but in thought. The self-development of the indeterminate is, as we have shown, absurd and impossible. The true reason why the universal exists only in conception is the fact that, on one hand, whatsoever exists is determinate, and, therefore individual, and that, on the other, the mind can abstract the individual notes or determinations and thus attain an indeterminate and universal object. The consequence drawn by Hegel from such premises is necessarily absurd. A remark, however, on his reasoning might still be added. As he maintains that being in itself cannot exist but in the mind, or, as an intellectual abstraction, he does not, as it was pretended, establish the reality of things, but returns to skepticism, according to which the outward object is nothing else than an appearance to the mind, or an effect, or form of its operation. Yea, one might justly doubt the existence of the mind itself, for this also is either universal or individual. If it is individual it does not exist, or it is false that nothing but the universal is being. If it is universal, then Hegel should have explained why the universal in the mind alone and not outside it can exist, for this not being proved, the identity of thinking and being does not follow. There he evidently confounded the thought with its object. By abstraction a universal object is attained, but the mind, or the thought itself, which attains it, is, as to its entity, determinate and individual, and can just as little be universal as a head, or hand, or mountain. Every step of idealism rests on confusion and tends toward destruction.

But, now, we might be asked for what reason have we said that cognition is representation. Is not this a mere supposition, too, which the idealists may reject as well as we rejected theirs? It will, therefore, be necessary to search into the nature of thought. This research we shall base on the judgment of consciousness, which, I suppose, the idealists will not refuse, they, themselves, giving it out as the highest evolution of our mind, and, even, as absolute philosophy. Indeed, if we could not know our own thoughts we ought to despair of our capacity to attain any truth. What, then, does our consciousness pronounce on the connection between the mind and its object? First, it distinguishes a twofold series of objects; one of them it really places within ourselves, as, for instance, our own existence, our ideas, and affections; but the other it places without us and declares them to be distinct from us,

as, for instance, other intelligent beings, the mountains, the sea, the stars. But even the inward objects it distinguishes from thought itself, and considers them always as prior to it. Now this distinction of objects within and without ourselves appears to us so clear that under no circumstances can it be seriously denied; it is forced on us with so stringent a necessity that nobody, not even the most outspoken idealist, can part with it; it is so general that no man having the use of reason is found to be without it, and so fundamental in our life that on it nearly all our actions, even those of the highest importance, are based. If we dare gainsay such a judgment of our consciousness, we have to fall back to skepticism. If, on the contrary, we admit its truth, then the identity of thinking and being must be denied, and thought must be conceived to be representation; for, if things are without us and if, nevertheless, our mind apprehends their notes and qualities, they must needs be present in us, not by their reality but by their likeness.

Another consideration will throw still more light over this matter. According to idealism thought is either the cause or the form of being, and consequently prior to it. But, if thought is representation, it is evidently posterior to being, which is its object. Now it is not difficult at all to see for which side consciousness will decide. If being resulted from cognition we should be independent of the object, or, rather, this would be dependent on us. But we experience just the contrary. We cannot form truth as we like, but must admit it as it is in itself. We cannot think that two and two are five, or that poverty is wealth, or that virtue is vice. If we should so judge, we should evidently depart from truth. We feel truth will not yield to us; we must conform to it. We are, as to true cognition, quite dependent and put under a stern necessity. Nor is this subjective, but rather it is evidently objective, for we perceive things to have certain attributes and to form certain truths, before our cognition, without our conception, before we existed, and also if we should exist no longer. Moreover, if that necessity were subjective we should be enabled, by ourselves, and even forced against our will, to bring forth certain appearances or certain cognitions. But we are conscious that frequently we are neither forced to perform certain acts of cognition, but, rather, can prevent them, as we like, nor enabled to attain other ones, by ourselves, without the influence of outward objects. Shutting our eyes and our ears we shall not see the mountains and cities about us, or hear the words addressed to us; but being on the high sea we cannot perceive mountains or hear the noise of the cities. Why, then, should this be so, if the world were only the product of our cognoscitive powers, or our cognition itself, to which we are determined by nature? Again, if the firmament, the stars and their laws of motion,

the earth and its beauty and order, is simply the work of our mind, we ought to be conscious of having produced them, as we are aware of the labor we spend on a book we write or on a machine we construct. Or should we believe that we cannot perform some trifling work without consciousness, and yet have brought the whole world into existence without our knowing it? The process of our cognition is not accounted for by the theories of the idealists. But it finds its full explanation in the single principle that thought is representation, and therefore posterior to its object. Representation does not feign but imitates, does not produce but presupposes the object to be exhibited. On this account our cognoscitive powers are dependent on it, and cannot act without being either directly or indirectly determined by its influence. Therein lies the reason why we can prevent cognition by withdrawing our senses from all contact with outward things and obtain it by exposing them to their influence; and again, why we have not certain cognitions if certain objects cannot reach us. By a similar reasoning Kant's inborn form might be refuted. The necessity under which we are to perceive things in time and space, or to pass certain judgments on them, cannot be but objective, for frequently our perceptions or our judgments on the very same thing change, not because our faculties or organs have been changed, but because the outside thing has undergone an alteration either in itself or in its relations. Else Kant would be obliged to saddle all the changes which we perceive in the outside world on our organs and our cognoscitive powers; which is certainly repugnant to our consciousness as well as to critical researches. Then, of the several things without us we have different perceptions as to time and space, and form different judgments as to their reality, existence, necessity, and so on. Whence, we ask, does this difference arise? From the influence which the object exerts on us; for our senses and our mind remaining, in themselves, the same, are forced to vary in their cognition, just as the objects vary which are brought into contact with us.

We may, then, sum up the result of our reasoning in the following statement: The identity of thinking and being is not proved by reason, but upheld only by sophisms; consciousness, the truth of which cannot be denied, enforces on us the firmest conviction that there is a wide distinction between the thought and the object; experience attests in many daily instances that things within us are not dependent on us, but rather that our mind depends in its acts on their influence.

The theoretical tenets of idealism thus being refuted, its practical doctrine is evidently deprived of its foundation. The moral system of the idealists is founded on the absoluteness of reason, on the evolution of all from one indeterminate being, on the identity

of being and thinking. But all this is utterly false and absurd. The foundations being overturned, the tenets based on them can subsist no longer. This remark alone would suffice to refute their moral doctrine. But we may, directly from the contradictions contained in its first principles, and from consequences drawn from its tenets, show that idealism, instead of bringing about the unity of ethics, destroys all morality. For this purpose I shall first prove that it denies either the moral law or the freedom of man, which, both, are essentially necessary for morality. The moral law can be imposed on us only by a power or authority that is over us, and, consequently, distinct from us. But Kant, and the idealists after him, deny positively that, as to morality, man ought to be subject to an outward lawgiver. It is, therefore, evident that they also deny the existence of the moral law. But our first premise, saying that the moral law can be imposed on us only by a higher power, is gainsaid by the idealists, and must, for this reason, be proved. The moral law is a restriction of our free will. According to our nature, we can tend towards every object containing what good soever, and of all the good proposed to us choose what we like. Law restrains our will from a certain class of objects, and binds us to a certain order of goods; it lays on us a kind of necessity, so, however, that we are not forced to obey it, but have the possibility to do what it forbids and to omit what it commands. Now from what can such a restriction of the ample range of our free will arise, and how can we conceive a necessity laid on us without injuring our freedom? The restriction cannot originate with ourselves, neither with the dictates of reason nor with our free acts. Reason, left to itself, may declare some of the several goods which allure us to be more or less agreeing with our nature, for what is good in one may be harmful in another respect. But, though finding an object less suitable for us, it cannot deprive it of all its goodness, and, for this very reason, not lay a necessity on the will to abstain from it. Neither can the will by its own act bind itself; for, from what it has freely and by itself resolved on, it may also by itself again desist; it has as much power to desist from as to resolve on a purpose. To illustrate the matter by an example: an absolute monarch is, as to his person, not bound by his laws; he can follow or not follow, issue or repeal them, as he likes; whatever he does is right and lawful. Now idealism, above all, maintains the sovereignty and independence of the will; it cannot, consequently, be understood how it should lay a binding necessity on itself. This is more evident if we still further consider the nature of man's free will. The human will leads toward good, not toward one or the other good, but toward all good, toward the fulness of good, so that not yet having reached this it cannot rest, but is driven by an

inward impulse to further pursuit, and having reached it, it necessarily finds therein rest and complete happiness. Thus far our will is not free, but necessitated intrinsically or by its own nature.

If, however, any particular object does not appear with strictly compelling evidence to contain the fulness of all good, or to be quite necessary for the attainment of the latter, other sufficient means being supplied, there is no reason why the will should be under the necessity to strive after it; on the contrary, we concede it to be free, that is, to have the power to act or not to act. Such indifference as to a particular good in regard to the attainment of the supreme good is the real root of freedom. This supposed, we may now answer the question how human will may be bound or restrained with necessity, and nevertheless remain free. Two conditions are required; first, a particular good must be in a necessary connection with the supreme good, being either the object in which this is found, or a means or condition, without which this cannot be embraced; and, secondly, this connection must be disclosed to us with certainty, but not with compelling evidence. If there is such an object, then, indeed, the will is under a kind of necessity, and is nevertheless not forced to obey it, neither by an outward power nor by its own nature. Another way of binding the will with necessity and leaving it nevertheless free we cannot imagine. But now who can bring a particular object or act into a necessary connection with the supreme good? Certainly He alone who has power over all things, that is, He who can freely dispose of the supreme good itself and set down the conditions under which it may be attained. Such power we evidently do not possess; we feel and experience, on the contrary, that neither is the highest good found within our limited nature nor in any other object than the infinite being, nor do the conditions and means necessary to attain it depend on our own will. Therein, as even Kant agreed, we are entirely dependent on an outward power, which must be the infinite being; because this alone can both dispose of itself and set down the conditions under which it ought to be embraced. The chain of this reasoning must convince us that moral law originates only with God. But Kant denied the very first principle from which our conclusion is drawn. "Moral actions," says he, "ought not to be performed through the motive of good, but through that of duty or necessity." This assertion supposes a complete ignorance of the nature of the will. The will is not and cannot be moved or allured by anything else but by good; such is its very nature as our own consciousness witnesses in every one of our actions. Duty itself does not move the will but by the good it implies or to which it leads; its pure necessity binding our freedom rather shocks than attracts us. No higher being, then, laying a law on our free will and thus restrict-

ing or binding it with necessity, there is neither a distinction between moral good and evil nor order in our actions; whatsoever in this supposition the will desires or does is allowed and good, yea the better, the more it promotes the independence and freedom of self.

If, nevertheless, the idealists insist upon a moral necessity which does not originate with an outward power, but arises from human nature itself, they destroy freedom; because they must resort to intrinsic dispositions of the will, which so regulate its actions as Kant's inborn forms determine the mind in its perceptions, judgments, and reasonings. But then the will is just as much necessitated by its very nature to a certain way of acting as the mind is forced by its forms to a certain way of thinking. This Kant and the idealists grant in plain terms. To retain a kind of freedom nevertheless, they place its essence in the absence of outward compulsion. But what becomes of morality if inward freedom is denied? It is no longer that self-determination according to reasons, perceived by an immaterial power of the mind; that noble tendency towards good, yea toward the infinite good, which attracts us by the splendor of its perfections; that love of right and justice which leads us without compelling us, and which we cherish in our hearts of ourselves, not being determined to it by nature. Morality then is a blind necessity inborn in us, a bent of our nature forcing us to a certain course of action, as gravity causes the stone to fall, or the instinct impels the birds to build their nests. Man and brute then differ only in the object toward which they tend, but as to the nature of their tendency they are perfectly equal; and morality is attributed to one for no better reason than to the other. Such a moral deeply lowers the dignity of man, and contradicts both the consciousness of all mankind, each individual of which knows itself to be free from inward necessity and the practice of all human societies, which regulate the actions of their members by laws, rewards, and punishments, not indeed because they think them to be necessarily determined by nature, but because they perceive them to have their actions in their power so as to be able to choose between them.

Other reasons might be alleged as a proof that idealism destroys morality, but for the sake of brevity I shall only hint at them. The moral law puts an intrinsic distinction between good and evil, and commands the one to be done, the other to be avoided. This idea of morality is common to all men, and, therefore, we all conceive him who is perfect to be free from sin and to be adorned with virtue. But idealism makes sin necessary, and puts it in God himself as a moment necessary for the attainment of infinite perfection. Vice is thus rendered divine just as well as virtue, which is at least

nothing but the combination of good and evil. Again, mankind has always considered God as the source of morality, He being the centre and foundation of all order, the main object of our love, the first principle from which all things flow, and to which all should return by their subjection. But Kant says that it is immoral to do anything out of love or obedience towards him, or to refer our actions to another aim than ourselves. The idealists confounding God with the world degrade him to man's wickedness and lift up man, not to subordination unto, but to equality or identity with God. What has been said of the morality of each individual may also be applied to all human society. There is no outward law which can bind man's free will, no supreme lawgiver as the source of inviolable right, no rule of true and inward honesty. Society is to be governed by outward compulsion. Whatsoever is thus extorted is right, whatsoever cannot be so reached is done justly and lawfully. The morality of public life thus becomes the policy of the iron hand and the sword, the tyranny of the stronger over the weaker. What every honest and noble-minded man considers most unjust, iniquitous, and base, is, according to idealism, highly just, praiseworthy, and divine. Certainly it was no exaggeration to say that the ethics of the idealists is the destruction of all morality.

To recapitulate our criticism of the several systems spoken of, we may now make the following brief statement. Des Cartes and Kant, in order to part with the presupposition which they thought ancient philosophy had made, have completely destroyed science, the former by falling into skepticism, the latter by denying the truth of reason. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in order to reduce philosophy to complete unity, commenced with a presupposition absurd in itself, set up one principle of logical deduction, which, resting on the confusion of the absolute and the indeterminate, is void of any determinate truth, but teeming with contradictions, and established another also of ontological evolution, which, being stripped of any determination and bringing forth only conflicting elements, results in universal destruction or nihilism; then combined them both to a kind of unity, which is not only not proved but repugnant to the experience and the consciousness of mankind; and ended at last with a moral system, which is the abolition of morality.

Would to God that in our day, as the false principles of idealism can be denied no longer, and the abstruseness of its tenets and its method is rather laughed at than admired, so too the prejudices which it has produced against scholastic philosophy may pass away; may its baneful consequences, already so apparent both in

science and in public life, convince mankind of the necessity to return to a sounder system!

In conclusion I should like to say still a few words on subjective tendency, which, though it has proved so fatal in idealism, is nevertheless sometimes looked upon as a great progress of our time, and as the principal means to reduce ancient philosophy to more complete unity. Subjective tendency, under what form soever it may be adopted, destroys both the unity and the truth of science.

Self may be considered either as the criterion, the last motive of certainty, or as the source, that is the deductive principle of all cognition. In both suppositions truth perishes. True cognition represents, and this manifests the object as it is in itself; certain cognition is the firm conviction that the object is in itself as it is apprehended by the mind. Now, as cognition, like any other thing, must have its sufficient reason, there must be a cause which first determines the mind to a representation agreeing with a certain object, and secondly produces in us the conviction of an agreement existing between the object and its representation. This cannot be but in the object. If the mind could form ideas merely by itself, why should it be necessary that there be a thing without us answering the representation within us? Why should then our thoughts rather be likenesses of real objects than mere fictions like the dreams of fancy? As the object would not be contained at all in the mind, the latter would produce the appearance according to its own peculiarity, and stamp on it only the form of its own subjective framework. But such appearance must either entirely disagree with the thing outside, especially if this is quite different from the nature of the mind, or, being in no connection with it at all, agrees with it only by chance. Were cognition nothing else, we should be compelled to espouse skepticism like Kant. Was he not forced to take the result of our mental operations for mere illusions, just because he imagined the forms of our perceptions, judgments, and reasonings to arise from the mind alone and not from the object? Cognition necessarily implies and represents the object only then when the latter determines our faculty to produce its likeness. We come to the same conclusion if we consider the nature of our faculties. Any cognoscitive power of ours, because in itself indifferent and determined to no act in particular, is but a remote and incomplete capacity of knowledge. Another element must, therefore, still be joined to it, which makes it complete and proximate by determining it to the representation of a particular object. What may this be? What can take off from it that indifference and incline it to that individual likeness of an outside thing? What else than the object itself by its direct or indirect

influence? No other course can do it, because no other can be thought to contain such an effect.

True cognition, then, originates with the object; this must determine our faculties, being present in them either by its own entity, or by its effects, or by its resemblance, or by its archetype. The cognoscitive power is but the material, the object the formal principle of our acts of cognition. Even God himself, therefore, knows all things from eternity, because His essence is their cause and their archetype, and so contains them all either eminently or virtually. It is thus that he is determined to infinite, illimited knowledge.

The criterion of certainty must likewise be objective, and not subjective. As cognition is true or agreeing with a certain object, not on account of its mere existence in the mind, or the qualities and peculiarities it has within us and from us, but on account of its being determined by the object, we cannot find the last reason of our certitude in ourselves. If we would do so, we should rely on a motive not connected with truth. We must derive certainty from the formal principle of our cognition, from an object determining our mind. But how shall we base on this the firm conviction, that our cognizance agrees with a certain thing outside? The appearance, being that which is known of an object, implies and indirectly manifests also our own act of cognition. This supposed, we may also say that we are certain as soon as we perceive the object to be necessarily so as it appears. That necessity of the object we understand in the following way. The object is in itself, in the respect under which it determines us, and consequently appears to us, just as it is and cannot be otherwise; not because it cannot be changed, if it is contingent, but because, if it has a determinate perfection, it cannot be likewise deprived of it. Moreover, if it has certain determinations, there must be also sufficient reasons within or without it which constitute or produce them. Now as cognition consists in the conformity of the subject with the object, and as the latter determines our faculties to conformity with itself by its influence, it makes known to us the reasons why it is such in itself and cannot be otherwise. We consequently see through the appearance itself the necessity of the object to be such as it appears, and also the reasons why it is so. This shining forth of the necessity of the object into our mind makes up evidence and founds alone solid and infallible certitude.

It might, however, be said that, nevertheless, ourself being a microcosm, or at least reflecting all the perfections and phenomena of the outside world, determines us to all cognition whatsoever, and is thus the deductive principle of all our knowledge. In this supposition we would directly and immediately know only ourselves, our soul, and our body; but outward objects, on the contrary, only

mediately and by reasoning. But this is utterly false, for we directly perceive the outside world itself, and not a mere likeness of it produced on our senses. Moreover, it is an undoubtable fact, attested by our consciousness and by daily experience, first, that we cannot know the substance of our soul immediately as it is in itself, but only as far as it manifests itself in our thoughts and our affections; secondly, that the series of our ideas begins with the outward objects which make an impression on our senses; thirdly, that we know the things and phenomena without us much better and more distinctly than those within us. All this points to the outward world as the main and the first source of our knowledge.

The destruction of truth by subjective tendency may be also illustrated by the divergence of men's minds which it necessarily produces. True cognition, being the representation of an object as it is in itself, must be the same in all minds; for the ideas or judgments, which two or more intellects form of the same object under the same respect, are either agreeing with the latter or not. If they are not agreeing, they are not true; if they are agreeing, they agree also with one another, and are, consequently, reduced to specific unity, according to the principle of identity. Two terms agreeing with one and the same third term agree with each other. Now, if self were the source of true cognition, the latter would vary just as much as the former. But self varies in each individual; and so indeed does cognition, whenever we are not compelled by evidence, or whenever our individual peculiarity exerts an influence on our judgments. It is an old and very true Latin proverb: "*Quot capita, tot sententiæ.*" Now it would be necessary either to give all the different and contradicting opinions of men the same claim on truth, or none at all; because they all arise equally from self. To give them no claim on truth would be inconsistent with the supposition that makes self the source of true cognition, and would moreover lead to skepticism by overturning the principle, that two contradictory judgments cannot be together false. If we would give them all the same claim on truth, then contradictory opinions would be together and equally true. Polytheism would be as true as Monotheism, and Theism as true as Atheism; and, in matters of moral, injustice would be as good as justice, if he who practices it thinks it to be so. But this is evidently false. Two contradictory propositions cannot be together true. Should this fundamental principle of logic be overthrown, certainty could subsist no longer. Moreover, if disagreeing opinions were together true, we should gainsay the axiom already proved and granted, that two cognitions agreeing with the same object must also agree with each other.

For this reason, it cannot be denied, that if self be established as

the source of all cognition, both truth and unity of science are necessarily destroyed.

True science reduced to perfect unity we cannot attain but in God. He being the last cause of all, in Him all our reasoning must end; He, possessing infinite perfection together with absolute unity and simplicity, can alone fill our minds, and by the likeness of Himself which he produces in us, reduce them all to complete agreement.

VOCATIONS TO THE PRIESTHOOD.

THERE is no subject more important than the securing of a well-trained clergy, and none demands greater thought and care on the part of superiors. The salvation of immortal souls depends, in a large measure, on the piety and zeal, health, strength, and learning of those whose vocation it is to labor in the mystical vineyard of Christ.

It is, therefore, with feelings very much akin to awe that we, on request of those whose wishes deserve respect, enter upon this subject, which ought to be treated by better and more competent hands than ours, and which should be discussed in an open and generous manner suited to the needs of our country. Lessons, moreover, should also be drawn from past experience for the furthering of the increasing work in our extensive and surely well-disposed field of missionary labor. We take it, indeed, for granted that our first duty is to preserve intact those who already possess "the faith once delivered to the saints" (St. Jude, 3d v.); but we may also add that, among our dissenting brethen, many bitter prejudices of past years have been, comparatively speaking at least, broken down, and that the "harvest is fully ripe" (St. John iv. 35) for the earnest labors of the energetic and untiring reaper.

The grace of a vocation to this highest office among men comes necessarily from "the Giver of every good and perfect gift, the Father of light" (St. James i: 17). It requires no special definition, since the word *vocation* makes itself clearly understood by virtue of its signification. St. Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, whilst speaking of the priesthood of Christ, says: "Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is *called* by God, as Aaron was" (Heb. v. 4). And our Lord and Saviour says most distinctly to His disciples: "You have not *chosen* me, but I have *chosen* you" (St. John xv. 16). Again, speaking of a vocation to the faith, He says: "No man can come to me except the Father,

who hath sent me, draw him" (St. John vi. 44). And he repeats the same teaching in the sixty-sixth verse: "Unless it be given him by my Father."

But when he speaks most directly of vocation, being about to send forth His disciples, He says: "The harvest, indeed, is great, but the laborers are few. Pray ye, therefore, the Lord of the harvest, that He send laborers into His harvest" (St. Luke x. 2). And he adds, in the sixteenth verse, the source or fountain of *vocation*, and the authority thereof, saying: "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me. And he that despiseth me despiseth Him that sent me." Add to these words what is found in St. John xx. 21: "As the Father hath sent me, I also send you;" and we are prepared for the very finishing stroke of an authoritative call, vocation, or mission, which is clearly set forth as though by letters patent in His last words on earth directed to His disciples, whom He had educated and instructed in His own seminary, saying: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (St. Matthew xxviii. 18, 19, 20).

This call or vocation is, therefore, not human, but divine. It has its source not from men, nor from among men, but solely from Him who alone is the possessor of the right to teach mankind. Now, since the work is continuous, and must proceed to the end of time by divine command, it follows, doubtlessly, that the grace of vocation to fulfil it is given now just as freely as our needs require, or as at any former time. Certainly there are times when greater demands may ask imperiously for a larger supply; but even the discovery of new regions found adequate aid, whilst the constant growth of our country has developed vocations not inferior to those of former times. Our clergy are, in the main, just as self-sacrificing as at any former period, and we know of many whose whole lives are literally given for their flocks. Examples need not be adduced. "*Si quæris monumentum, circumspice.*"

Yet there is, of course, a human side even to the picture of a divine vocation. Undoubtedly the children of Zebedee, John and James, left a strange void in the old man's heart when "they forsook all and followed Christ" (St. Matthew iv. 22). The same must frequently happen when young men leave their home and friends to obey the impulse of the Holy Ghost, urging them to enter upon a life which is not alluring to flesh and blood. In case of a true vocation nothing will prevent the following out the higher call; and, indeed, difficulties thrown in the way, whether from internal or external sources, are rather a proof of the divine nature

of the call. A true vocation will stand testing. Nor are we to expect perfection all at once even in those who have a divine call. We can hardly fail to remember the various instances of mere human nature which present themselves in the history of our Lord's disciples. It required a long novitiate for those who were under the direct guidance of Christ. Divine grace perfects human nature, but does not make it forfeit liberty. Hence long preparation is even required, nay, demanded for those who seem likely to be useful in the service of Christ. We must try the spirit of each individual to see "whether it be of God" (1 Epistle St. John iv. 1).

Rules for knowing vocations have been put into great, we might almost say, thorough system, and religious societies have for centuries been engaged in the noble work of preparing faithful men to forward the work of Christ's mission on earth. It is true that extraordinary calls are not (for they never were) very frequent. In all the pages of Holy Writ we read of but a few expressly called by God for a special purpose, and consequently endowed with every requisite grace, as Moses, Aaron, Samuel, and he who was "the greatest born of women" (St. Matthew xi. 11), the forerunner of our Lord. These were, with the heavenly inspired prophets of the ancient law, exceptions to the general rule, for we find mention made at a very early date of "the schools of the prophets" (4 Kings, ii. 3, 5, et passim). Hence we may expect to follow the beaten or ordinary path as a rule for our guidance, and this has always consisted in making a right use of common-sense as a foundation upon which a solid edifice of piety may be built. Such basis has never been wanting in those exalted men whom God has from time to time raised up for special purposes of His own. Reason and revelation, wisdom and piety go hand in hand.

The ordinary vocation to the ecclesiastical state may generally and readily be known when young people, or even those of riper years, show a real desire for their own advancement in all that is good and devout, when they add thereto an inclination for serious studies, and direct them in such manner as to be subservient to the great end of creation. When they have not only a desire for their own advancement in virtue, but also a zeal for the salvation of others; when they show an aptitude for the ceremonies of the Church, and a degree of fondness for all that pertains to the decency of divine worship: these and similar signs may be further investigated in St. Alphonsus's work, *Homo Apost.* iii. v., Append. iii. c. ii. 45; and we may fairly aid in this matter by making use of suggestions tending to keep the minds of candidates more and more steadily engaged on spiritual things. Such dispositions can be very much fostered by pious parents, and especially by mothers, who generally know more of the inner qualities of their children than fathers,

who, in our days at least, are not brought into such frequent contact with their offspring. Thus we owe many of our greatest saints to the timely advice and fervent example of good mothers, and we know that many vocations are both preserved and advanced by graces obtained through the prayers of a pious mother's pure heart. On the other hand, we hold that parents will be held strictly responsible for vocations hindered, or even lost, because they neglect to instil into the minds of their children the untold beauty of co-operating with Christ in the salvation of souls.

Now, as our Lord is "the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world" (St. John i.), and as all His lights and graces are given in perfect harmony with the plan laid down for the salvation of mankind, we may be absolutely sure that He portions out, or imparts, His supernatural grace and light at all times to an adequate number to fill the priesthood of His Church; for this is one of the most important factors in His plan, since "faith cometh by hearing" (Romans x. 17); but how can they hear to whom no duly authorized messenger is sent? The world cannot know the truth but by the Church, to which the teaching authority in all its fulness has been given: "Go teach all nations all things whatsoever I have commanded; and behold I am with you always, even to the end of the world" (St. Matthew xxviii. 18, 19, 20).

It is true that our Lord chose out His especial Apostles from among men already mature. Yet these also required to be drilled, as it were, under His own eyes, in order to become true witnesses of His stupendous miracles. At subsequent periods, and as a general rule, it was necessary to take the young and prepare them assiduously for the task. This takes the place of the extraordinary vocation of the Apostles. We deem it of the utmost importance to insist that youth is the season when such a bent may be given to the mind towards what is high and ennobling, that no future trials will be able to change it. In this wicked world we must anticipate the possibility of having the evil seed of vice sown in the garden of the heart, and it is our duty to prepare the youthful mind by precautionary measures. Parents would assuredly be faithless to their trust did they forget the strict duty of efforming the minds of their offspring both by human learning and by Christian precepts. Thus their character will be based on fixed principles of action. This is no tampering with the freedom of choice in a profession or vocation, nor is it an undue influence exercised by parents over those under their charge. Children are generally not averse to follow the avocation, or worldly trade, or profession of their parents, yet even these leave them entirely free in their choice.

The next step is usually in the schoolroom, where the further development of character is effected. Here youth are under the

care of those who make it their solemn duty to elicit that quickness of comprehension and ready grasp of subjects placed before them, which tend to enable them to grapple with the harder questions of practical life. Much will, therefore, depend on the teacher, holding almost a parent's sacred position, to give a serious bent to the well-disposed pupil's mind.

Now, since God is not expected to act outside of His ordinary method, we may be said to proceed with tolerable certainty and prudence in forming an estimate of character, when we base it on the deliberate judgment of able and conscientious teachers. This is not, indeed, the work of a few desultory meetings. The true teacher becomes very thoroughly versed in the mental and moral condition of his pupils, and the horoscope made from such experience is reliable. When, in addition to such testimony, we have the approval of grave and unselfish clergymen, there is little fear of the result. At least we shall possess an approximate likelihood of a vocation.

Nevertheless there will be numerous and serious difficulties still to be overcome. In this country we can hardly be said to compose a homogeneous body. It is certainly true that the question of nationality has no entrance here, since of all things the Church has least of this spirit. She has shown it no quarter from her very inception. She is Catholic, consequently intended for all races of men, and all time. In her divine mission for the salvation of the world she knows no distinction, and the testimony of St. Paul is conclusive on the subject: "God has made of one all the races of men" (Acts xvii. 26). Yet we see cropping out, from time to time, certain *natural* feelings in reference to vocations. Evidently some thought that the Greek origin of St. Timothy should prevent his vocation, although he had been chosen by St. Paul to do the work of an Apostle. Of course it will not be denied that those who are of the same language, habits, customs, and manners are usually most useful and acceptable. So far as we are concerned this matter need not be even mooted. It will in due course of time settle itself. As we assimilate in this vast country more and more daily, but a few years will be required to pass from the swaddling-clothes of childhood to the perfection of manhood. This can be attained by a close imitation of the excellent lives of those apostolic men who left all for Christ, and gave themselves to the missions in the midst of trials which we should often recall. Their memory must remain as an incentive to virtue. The names of the laborers should be held in perpetual benediction by every grateful heart. We would be demanding an impossibility, however, were we to ask that such transient arrangement should continue. It was a special blessing for our needy and forlorn condition, and an unspeakable

grace for those who dedicated themselves to our difficult missions in earlier days.

For the future, therefore, we must in a very great measure, if not entirely, depend upon ourselves to keep up these plantations for the "sons of the prophets." And we must meet the difficulties arising in reference to our clergy. As the ranks are yearly thinned by death, or incapacity from old age, sickness, etc., there must be provision made, and we need only look at the mortuary record of each year to assure ourselves of the increasing demand for laborers in the vineyard.

As a practical people we all know that the heavy item of cost for the education of the clergy must fall ultimately on the laity. None feel this more sensibly than our poor people, who are not only taxed to keep up the expensive system of "public schools," but also are super-taxed for the parochial or parish schools, whence the material is drawn, in most cases, to form our probable ecclesiastics. Now, from the beginning of his studies, the bright young student, whose poverty is, perhaps, his chief fault, has to be sustained by charity. In all other avocations, or conditions of life, each candidate is supposed to have gone through what is deemed, or at least called, a satisfactory course of studies in some reputable college. Afterwards he must pay for instruction in law or medicine, as indeed in almost all other permanent professions of the higher sort. In the seminary alone, during from four to six years of philosophy and theology, with the other analogous studies, the student for the ministry is a heavy (unless in a few rare instances) tax on the people, who have to secure the raw material, are burdened in transforming it, and finally levied upon to support and protect it. They do not complain, but they have a right to know on whom their money is spent, and that the really *called* have been chosen.

Just here a remark seems fitting. When those to whom God has given the grace of vocation shall have been so cared for, and shall have corresponded with lights obtained in their career, so that they have already entered the clerical ranks, a right sense of their own obligation, and a manly gratitude, will impel them to repay out of their own means the expenses of their education. This plan has been adopted in some of our dioceses, and will tend to make the seminaries self-supporting. Another excellent plan would be that each priest should educate a young cleric, and thereby diminish the constant claim made upon the small wages of the poor who work for daily bread. As to those who, sailing under false colors, have pretended a vocation in order to obtain an education free of expense (the case has occurred), we can only say that such unscrupulous persons are little likely to make restitution for ill-gotten goods, however much in conscience they are bound, both because

of their own deception and the positive hindrance of others who would have been useful in the diocese.

That was a very flimsy sort of pretext for a vocation to the priesthood put forward by the guileless young man who said: "I never was fond of work." Yet there are those who would have graced a plough and a yoke of oxen, and who actually are a disgrace to their profession by their ignorance and vices, who have managed to put themselves forward as guides of the people. "They ran, but I have not sent them, saith the Lord" (Jer. xxiii. 21). They secured some bishop who was forgetful of St. Paul's advice, nay, command, to St. Timothy, 1 Epis. v. ch. 22: "Impose not hands lightly (thoughtlessly) on any man," and was unfortunate enough "to lay hands—careless hands—on skulls that could not teach, and would not learn."

Now it is certain that the duty, in the last analysis, devolves on the bishop to look out for candidates who may be imbued with the qualities pre-eminently required in the priesthood. It is his chief work, since he has the power of transforming them into "the ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1). Having found suitable candidates he must see to their training, either personally (which is usually impossible) or by those in whose judgment he may reasonably rely. No undoubted certainty is or can be attained, and since even when the number was only twelve one of them was found utterly recreant, we should not be astonished that numbers being increased many fail to persevere. The fewer mere worldly motives enter, on the part of candidates, the greater will be the probability that the vocation is divine, and such a vocation will endure trials and contradictions. Mistakes in the choice will also be fewer just in such proportion as the precautionary measures of sound common-sense are observed, and as the bishop is faithful in asking God's wisdom to enlighten him, and His grace to guide him in the selection.

The plan proposed in a pastoral by the late Archbishop Spalding for the increasing of the number of candidates, seems to us very clear and concise. It consists of the following suggestions. Let every priest in charge of a congregation or mission, keep his eye on promising lads, even from their tender years. Frequently give explanations, both to parents and children, on the dignity and honor of the office, the necessity of keeping up the ranks of those who forsake all to follow Christ, the certainty of salvation for those who faithfully receive and treasure up the divine call or vocation to labor for Him, the promise that "those who teach many unto justice shall shine like stars forever in the kingdom of heaven" (Daniel xii. 3). These and similar suggestions should frequently be made in pastoral and catechetical instructions. Even

the wealthy are moved by such appeals, and may participate in the blessing of a divine vocation, since riches and possessions by no means exclude their owners, but only an overweening attachment to them, as we see in the case of the young man whose dispositions were excellent even to such a degree that Jesus loved him, but the same youth, when it came to the test, was too much enamoured of his possessions "to sell all he had, and give to the poor, and come to follow Christ" (St. Matthew xix. 20-22). Nor, indeed, are the highest classes excluded, as we see from brilliant examples among the clergy who rose to saintliness of life by making themselves like to Christ in humility. "Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi" (St. Matthew xx. 16) applies to every rank and condition.

If young candidates be thus chosen they should be separated at an early age from secular life, and be placed under the charge of men who have been religiously trained in community. Should any of the candidates be deficient in the necessary qualities of head and heart, or either, he is to be returned to his home without delay. In case a mistake had been made, or an injustice done by too great severity in observing this inexorable rule, the subsequent good conduct of the student would prove him worthy of a new trial.

We would wish to make our views most emphatic in reference to those under whose charge these youths are to be placed. They ought to be, when possible, either men under strict discipline, as those of a religious order, or community approved for that purpose, or, at least, living under rule. They should be men of *wisdom, prudence, and experience*, who have themselves been educated under special auspices for the guiding of young men in the clerical life. They hold a most necessary place in the work of training youth for future usefulness. They should know the needs of our country, and have some practical knowledge of the missions, their wants and difficulties. This was the manner in which our Lord, as the great prefect of studies, introduced His own disciples into the apostolic seminary, teaching them after His own example, "first to do, and afterwards to teach" (Acts i. 1). We can have no higher model. The more closely our guides for the young ecclesiastic imitate Christ, the more surely will the clergy be imbued with the spirit of their vocation, a sense of the dignity of their solemn office, and a horror of ever departing from the same, even in thought, or swerving from the discharge of duties, however onerous these may be. The spirit of such a seminary life will pervade each student, and like the leaven of the woman mentioned in the Gospel, "leavening the whole lump" (Matthew

xiii. 33), will cause mind, soul, and strength of all to be pervaded with heavenly motives of action.

The priest who lives in the world as a secular has many very different and almost contradictory duties to perform. Not only the spiritual guidance of his flock, his own advancement in study, and in all virtues, but also the material work of building up churches, schools, and the surroundings of a parish, fall upon him, a task for which his previous education in no way fits him. In such multiplied work the chief wonder is that many more do not fail. Few, comparatively speaking, who have been zealous and sincere have come to grief. The priest is also in our country isolated, in many cases far from any other clergymen. Now, unless he be endowed with the "spirit from on high," and view all things in the light of eternity, and with reference to the salvation of souls, his own and those of his flock, he is little likely to persevere. He is a man like others, and if piety and zeal, a love of study and inclination thereto, do not form a part of his very frame and power of thinking, and unless these be, at least, virtually never absent from his mind, he will surely fail, for he is not imbued with the spirit of his Lord. If mere material prosperity, the building of large edifices (well thatched with mortgages to be borne and paid for by posterity), if temporal matters take the upper hand, we may fairly conclude that the pastor is merged and destroyed by the mere business man, "*implicans sese negotiis sæcularibus*" (2 Epist. Tim. ii. 4),—which is not the vocation of the priest. For his work is exactly that for which the Son of God came into the world, and nothing could be further removed from secular employment. If the priest be "*alter Christus*" as St. John Chrysostom says, if the work be divine, if it consist in the application of the benefits of the atoning blood through the Sacraments by his hands, how can any other thought intrude upon, much less take the place of the work of salvation whereto he is called? Should the mere animal life of eating and drinking hold the chief place in his mind, he will not withstand the many occasions of fall daily and hourly presenting themselves. We know this from past experience, and can with ease and certainty point out the cause of lapse in each special case. Hence, the minds of youth must be formed in and inclined towards piety in the sense of the Apostle (1 Timothy iv. 8): "*Quæ ad omnia utilis est.*"

In the next place, it is simply a truism that unless the mind be cultivated when young, it can with great difficulty be brought in after years to severe studies. The name of priest in former times was, as it always should be, a synonym for learning, even among outsiders. Now, if this is to continue, greater care must be exercised in choosing out those who are to be admitted to the

sacred ranks of the priesthood, where learning should have honorable home. It might do little good, or possibly be productive of much evil, were we to speak of the utter superficiality of many of the younger members of the clergy. It is thoroughly true that they have an immense field of hard study before them which requires constant application, and they are no sooner ordained than they are obliged to take upon themselves, in many cases, all the onerous duties of attending, perhaps, several missions; but there can be no excuse for the prevalent neglect of study, which is at once occasion and cause of numerous evils.

We are prepared to assert that whatever there be of scholarship in Latin and Greek culture, may be found in our colleges and seminaries, but we could wish that the latter study were more rigidly insisted upon, as well as mathematics and science. This can hardly in every instance be urged and, in point of fact, has not been absolutely demanded. Cases may occur in which the candidate, although lacking a full classical training, will be a very efficient and devout clergyman; but for us, at least, the time has arrived when it should be required of each student to be able to meet the keen adversaries of our faith with their own weapons. The age demands that we should keep pace with whatever is good in progress, and this has always been the mind of the Church, of which our holy father Leo XIII. is the exponent. When his firm teaching shall have thoroughly imbued all superiors we shall by no means be the losers in comparison with those who have gone before us; nor shall we suffer, as we do now frequently, because some ignorant men, to whom no institution ever accorded a diploma, make a false pretence of learning to the detriment of the good name and fair character of the sacerdotal office.

It should, therefore, be the bounden duty of the bishop and his advisers, to choose out select youths, not many in number, but excellent in quality and disposition, and place them under guidance suitable for developing their vocation. This is the mind of the Council of Trent, that only a few, comparatively (according to the wants of each diocese), are to be taken. These should be thoroughly educated, examined, and sifted, until it be evident, humanly speaking, that the right choice has been made.

SOCIALISM AT THE PRESENT DAY.

German Socialism in America. North American Review, for April and May, 1879.

De l'Etat Actuel de la Science Sociale. Claudio Jannet ; Correspondant ; 10 et 25 Sept., 1878.

Les Naturalistes Philosophes. Professeur A. Proost. Revue des Questions Scientifiques, Janvier et Juillet, 1879.

AFTER the extravagant attempt of the St. Simonians in France had failed, and the phalansterian system of Charles Fourier had been proved impracticable in France, England, and the United States, social science, as it is called, fell back into the simple political economy of Adam Smith, but was tainted more or less with socialism, and even with communism. This must be treated of somewhat in detail.

The French economists of the last century were at this time altogether forgotten, and no one thought of bringing again into notice the theories of Turgot, Quesnay, and Mirabeau the elder who called himself *l'ami des hommes*. But new speculators soon arose, particularly in England and Germany, who turned their attention to the well-known doctrines of the English philosophers of the previous century, who had flourished about the same time as the French. Adam Smith's followers set aside all consideration of the moral law and never attempted to influence the politics of the nation. They limited their theories to the production and distribution of material wealth. Morality did not appear to them to be a factor in the social system, as they conceived it ; and, in fact, of all social questions they meddled only with those of labor and money. They never even dreamt of discussing those of the family, marriage, religion, or anything connected with politics and government. They seemed consequently to leave intact all the bases on which human society rests, and thus seemingly were not anti-Christian. Their social science was, therefore, very incomplete, yet not strictly of a disorganizing nature, neither religiously nor politically. The only great moral defect in their views, consequent upon their doctrinal indifference, consisted in setting aside all considerations of individual welfare, and never asking themselves the question, how the condition of the masses, the toilers, the producers, would be improved by their speculations ?

Those first English economists thought, therefore, much less of the comfort and happiness of human beings than of wealth itself as an abstraction. They could not embrace humanity, with its won-

derful social activity, all ordained for a great end, and this the last and supreme end of human life, and consequently connected with a hereafter. As on one side, owing to their materialistic philosophy, they did not take account of man's immortality, so, likewise, on the other, they were so full of the importance of their theories that they regarded the era which had preceded the introduction of their system as darkness itself. Thus it seemed to them idle to examine if man had, before their time, any conception of social ideas. They were, in fact, men of only one idea—wealth and how to procure and increase it. Their rules seemed to them perfectly, infallibly certain with regard to that supreme end; but they were only the iron rules of supply and demand, of capital and labor, of distribution and circulation. What did it signify if, meanwhile, a great part of mankind was made or left even more wretched than it had ever been before, provided wealth were on the whole increased?

As was just said, this supposed a complete ignoring of human history. It was idle, in their opinion, to interrogate the past, and inquire if nations had not previously reached a high degree of prosperity and happiness without regard to their rules. It did not even strike them that it would be proper to ask themselves what would become of society in case their projects succeeded, and their views were generally admitted among mankind. Undoubtedly it would become—as they thought—the golden age! What a splendid spectacle would be offered to the philosopher if the whole world were converted into a huge commercial firm, and every capitalist became enormously rich! When this took place it would be worth while to write and read history; as things were it was needless trouble.

Still, long before the era of Christianity even, some philosophers had gone deeply into the study of human nature, to deduce from it firm and unchangeable principles of social science. Aristotle in particular had spoken on the subject with all the authority of reason. But the religion of Christ, more effectually than any philosophy, had established on firmest basis the principles of social life among men, and thereby placed the European family at the head of the human race. All this was entirely ignored by the English economists.

Nevertheless, they could not long remain in this ignorance, which, at first, distinguished their theories from all others. Voices had been lately heard which could not be forever hushed. They had come, it is true, from unhallowed lips, which spoke irreverently of almost everything sacred. Still, they had, at least, proclaimed that wealth is only a means, not an end; that it must be used ra-

tionally to be of any value; and that even the lowest classes of society must have a share of it. This was, after all, in substance the principle advocated by the Fathers of the Church and the mediæval schoolmen, re-echoed by Bossuet when he said that "*La vraie fin de la politique est de rendre la vie commode et les peuples heureux.*" This was the occasion for introducing new principles into the old political economy, and for dividing this school into several very distinct branches.

The first of these branches truly worthy of being examined is composed of those who have been called the Manchester men. The ideas of Mr. Cobden, the head of the party, will suffice to explain their programme. Free trade, the spread of liberal ideas over the whole world, and the promotion of universal peace among nations were the chief planks of Mr. Cobden's platform. In his opinion previous axioms of political economy must be brought to agree with these three saving measures. But, by the necessity of the case, Adam Smith's axioms could not but be greatly modified by the new principles of the Manchester school. It would be, in fact, a complete revolution; for Cobden's three great measures were all derived from the apparent desire to improve the condition of the people, whilst Adam Smith had never troubled himself on that point. Nay, to adopt this new view every detail of the old scheme would have to be changed, for its great radical defect was that everything, according to it, must be organized in favor of capital and against labor, while under the new theory it was the interests of the laborer, or *prolétaire*, that were to be consulted. Mr. Cobden had been born poor, and of an extremely poor family, it seems. He could not but take up with warmth, on all occasions, the cause of the suffering classes, particularly of the operatives in factories. He had deeply studied previous theories of political economists in England, and whilst remaining faithful to them as far as it was possible under the circumstances, he was bound to give them a new turn. The branch of which he became the founder could not remain indifferent to the welfare of individuals, as was the case before among all the old English economists. Much less could it rest satisfied with the accumulation of wealth in general; the intention now was to make it profitable, particularly to the poor, and to open new channels for its distribution.

But the chief trait of difference between the new and the old, was that political agitation was henceforth to be the means of spreading the new ideas. Free trade, liberal views, and universal peace could not at that time be advocated in England without violent political commotion. It is well known that free trade itself met at first with a fierce opposition at the hands of Sir Robert Peel, and that the whole of England was shaken to its centre by the

simple discussion of its merits. Former political economists never imagined that social theories, as they understood them, would become the cause of any disturbance in politics; and now a great nation had been at once plunged almost into civil war by the simple demand for a free admittance of breadstuffs. An important step had thus been unwittingly made in the direction of socialism, which was to introduce into Europe the pregnant germ of most ominous strife.

The people's welfare being now brought into discussion, it soon appeared that the Manchester doctrine could never become a universal panacea. Mr. Cobden, as well as Adam Smith, could not conceive of the necessity of morality as a basis to social science. He had no greater knowledge than his predecessors of the history of social ideas in previous ages, and could not think of examining how nations had formerly become prosperous and happy. He labored like his predecessors under the delusion that human bliss could only be promoted by giving to all a share of sensual enjoyment. The moral, social, and religious nature of man was for him an unknown thing. How could he, or Mr. Bright, his great co-worker, succeed in solving such a problem as is comprised under the magic words, *human happiness*? The well-meant agitation into which he threw himself, could not by any possibility be productive of any important results. It is not surprising, therefore, that his party is now in a complete state of disorganization. His three pet measures are fairly on the way of being abandoned even in England. Free trade is again a problem subject to discussion, after having once won a complete victory. The old doctrine of protection to industry and commerce is reviving, under the influence of the surprising success of the United States in forestalling Great Britain in many markets of the world. Liberal ideas are evidently frightened at the aspect of gaunt socialism which is now everywhere bold and audacious. As to universal peace, the words even cannot now be uttered without a smile.

But if there is little hope of saving mankind, and improving the condition of the poor by the theories of the Manchester school, it must be said, nevertheless, that by calling public attention more than any other school of English sociologists had ever done to the needs of the lower classes, they have, without wishing it perhaps, placed a number of political economists in England and France on the way to a true solution of the problem. Henceforth the influence of national life and of the family as a unit, the idea of right, the principle of social benevolence, cannot be discarded from the conditions of the problem; and a number of powerful writers (though they may be called the successors of Adam Smith) are in the way of entirely reforming the science, and bringing it into

much closer conformity with **Christian** views than was ever the case before. Mr. Lowe, of England, and Mr. Dameth, of Geneva, particularly by their strong advocacy of the unchangeable laws of human society, are evidently coming to a common understanding with the French school of M. Le Play. This last gentleman, in his *Ouvriers Européens*, published as early as 1855, openly proposed to reorganize industry on the feudal model, and undertook to prove that the European nations among whom this old industrial system had not yet entirely disappeared are the most happy and prosperous in our day. History is thus restored to us as containing lessons invaluable to the student of political economy; and from history it becomes evident that economical laws are but the expression of the divine plan which presided at man's creation. Several writers of eminence have lately furnished a demonstration of it not only from mediæval times, but likewise from the history of Greece, the ancient Hindoo laws, those of Chaldea and Palestine, and from numerous inscriptions lately discovered in Assyria, Persia, the whole Orient in fact. M. de Quatrefages, finally, has demonstrated in his most important work, *l'Espèce Humaine*, that the moral, social, and religious character of man, has been the same at all times, whatever may have been said to the contrary by such scientists as Sir John Lubbock and Herbert Spencer.

These happy consequences may be more or less attributed to the Cobden movement, and it was proper in the foregoing remarks to say a word of it here. But it is not less just to mention that by introducing political agitation into sociology, the Manchester men have prepared the way for *socialism* itself without even suspecting it. Their example could not but be followed by the ardent theorists who began at that time to speculate on what they called social science; and it is in Germany under the powerful influence of Prince Bismarck that we find them first actively at work to discover the true laws of industry, economy, human society, and to engage in violent political polemics to further the prevalence of their views. Thus, in all German universities, economical speculations have been made subservient to political parties, and in the idea of the great Chancellor, they were to be a part of statesmanship. He, however, soon saw his error, and tried to retrieve it. This much, by way of introduction to our consideration of modern socialism.

Two new principles were from the very beginning adopted by these theorists, as the firm basis of social science, from which many pregnant consequences would follow. The first is that man's evolution is not confined to his physical organization, but extends likewise to his moral nature; and that social laws must partake of the necessary and rigid fatality which, according to them, governs the

world. The moral nature of man, however, though ruled by fatality, must constantly change, since evolution is ever shifting. This second principle, derived from the first, asserts that the State alone is competent (in a world constantly on the move) to organize human society, and to prescribe the minutest as well as the most important details of social life. Here you have a broad hint of a new *Babefism*, to anglicize a French word.

The first of these two supposed axioms originated in England, but was immediately adopted by the new German school. Mr. Herbert Spencer was the first to elaborate this theory, and he has done it with wonderful acumen and plausibility. As his views have made a deep impression on many, it is proper to examine them somewhat attentively. He was evidently led to adopt the views he has put forth by the theories of modern astronomers of the formation of the world. From the *Mécanique céleste* of Laplace, particularly, it is now generally believed that without embracing the whole creation, and limiting the inquiry to our solar system (composed of the sun and of all the planets and satellites which revolve around it), the whole harmonious group was primitively evolved from the rotation of the central body, by which rings of solar matter were formed by centrifugal force; and, being successively detached from the sun, they became planets, with or without satellites.

Mr. Spencer introduced into these speculations the words *integration* and *differentiation*; and he said that out of the primitive integration of the sun, the differentiation of the planets was reproduced, owing to the condensation of elements which were previously diffuse, and apparently homogeneous, but which became condensed and heterogeneous, so as to introduce variety into the world. This change from homogeneousness to the contrary is not altogether logical.

This very ingenious theory was transferred by Mr. Spencer to man himself, first in his physical nature and then in the moral and social order; and finally he applied it to nations in their social characteristics. For, as he remarked, all organisms proceed from a cell, since all organisms begin in the simple cell. Through the process of differentiation, the primitive homogeneous cell gave rise to the immense number of plants and animals which we see. Their various species were formed by natural selection, a principle of which Mr. Spencer is the true inventor, Mr. Darwin having merely adopted and elaborated it. This is not the place to show again the want of logic here. Physiologists have proved, I think, that unless the cells differ there can be no process of differentiation. It is true that where this theory is limited to the physical nature of organic beings, it requires a great deal of science to prove its un-

reliableness. But as we have just seen, this would not satisfy Mr. Spencer. From the physical he passed to the moral and social orders, and though he displayed extraordinary ingenuity in showing (or pretending to show) that man, at first *inconscious*, because homogeneous with mere matter, gradually reached consciousness by differentiation, which first produced instinct, we suppose ; then arrived at emotion and sensation ; and finally reached morality and sociability—though he brought to his help all his knowledge of the natural history of organic beings, he nevertheless only accomplished a task which logic itself repudiates, and which no sensible man can accept without stronger proofs.

It would require too much space and time to give a succinct account of the specious and plausible way by which Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles*, and in his *Principles of Sociology*, proves to his own satisfaction not only that the material world has been evolved without a designer, but that man in his physical, moral, and social nature is simply the result of rigid material laws, allowing him to remain perfectly independent from, and unaccountable to, any superior power. The only thing important here to learn is that in the new social science evolution explains everything, and is supposed to form a basis for further speculations. To include the new doctrine in a nutshell, it is sufficient to say that evolution as a law is supposed to draw more complex organisms from the simpler ones. Besides, according to them, the study of history proves that the social aggregates no more escape from this law's action than do the organic aggregates. And the proof they give of it is that "constitutions of states are not made; they grow and are gradually transformed." So it is likewise of languages, arts, sciences, religions, and theologies. All these things are the products of development, and "pass through insensible phases like the body and soul of an infant." The proof is evidently weak, and the parity scarcely allowable.

Nevertheless, the German sociologists eagerly embraced this Spencerian doctrine, as to the principle itself; but they were far from unanimous in accepting the proofs given of it by the English philosopher. In fact they soon began to offer as many explanations as there were heads among them, none being satisfied with what another had said.

Hartmann was among the first to disagree, and the cause of it is truly instructive to the impartial looker-on. Mr. Spencer is, as we all know, the great advocate of progress. In his opinion if nature presents anomalies, incongruities, nay, evident disorders apparently inexplicable, it is only for the reason that the end of evolution has not yet been reached. As soon as this blessed moment arrives the whole universe will furnish a spectacle of the most per-

fect harmony and bliss. Hartmann thinks precisely the contrary. Professor A. Proost, of Louvain, has given in the July number for this year of the *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, an abstract of his (Hartmann's) main ideas on the subject, a short paragraph of which I translate from the French :

"The German author has not discovered in nature this progressive evolution of Mr. Spencer, which explains all the sufferings of sensitive beings. In his eyes the world is the product of a blind and barbarous power, which, though itself inconscient, seems to employ all the resources of a wicked cunning in order to render its own work imperfect. From that inconscient being has come out at last an animal—man—who believes himself free, because he supposes that his impressions correspond with the reality of things. . . . Man believes that he possesses knowledge and will ; but he is in fact the sport of ignorance and fatality, owing to the obscure consciousness of his acts. This has been the cause of all the evils he suffers from ; because, owing to that presumption, he has thought that he could invent laws, religions, etc. . . . Our pretended knowledge, according to Hartmann, is only a huge illusion ; and all his philosophy ends in despair. He thinks that when the inconscient evolution of the human mind shall have put an end to its illusions by developing conscience, man will close by suicide the fatal evolution of his species."

Let it be incidentally mentioned here that Mr. Hartmann has lately published a book on the *Self-dissolution of Christianity and the Religion of the Future*. The future creed will be Monotheistic Pantheism, and man will be God. We leave to the author the task of reconciling his new ideas with previous ones.

This disagreement of evolutionists did not stop at Hartmann *versus* Spencer. Soon Ernst Hæckel, a most ardent promoter of the belief in the transformation of species, and consequently of literal evolution, appeared to have deliberately undertaken the task of universal demolishing of all the systems of his co-laborers. He seems to have nobody on his side ; and thus like Ismael "his hand is against all men, and all men's hands against him." Professor Huxley, of England, however, agrees generally with him ; but both having lately fallen into several blunders connected with their evolutionary system, the celebrated *History of Natural Creation* by the German sociologist does not seem to be on the way of benefiting overmuch the new social system adopted in Germany. Hæckel, however, is a link in the chain of these fanciful writers, and his name could not be omitted.

Karl Voght is another, and he professes to be a most consistent evolutionist, though in his *Origin of Man* he fiercely takes to task Hæckel, one of his most ardent co-workers, and proves the entire unreliability of his opinions. The arguments and counter-arguments of all these gentlemen embrace the whole doctrine of evolution so dear to them, and evidently prove how far it is from being demonstrated, as many simpletons of our day would fain believe. But the point which must be insisted on here is the pretended sup-

port that those theories give to new social theories, and the character of rank socialism with which they inoculate it.

Man's sociability is all the time considered by them as an essential item in the whole evolutionary process. The object being to frame for man a system in which God and religion shall have no part whatever, it is most important to them that social laws should be entirely derived from fatalistic and material principles. On this account the German socialists are unanimous in advocating evolution in society, to the total exclusion of free will and moral accountability, and consequently to the open denial of eternal and unchangeable social laws, imposed on man by his Creator, and intimately moulded in his nature, to secure human happiness in this world and in the next. These principles in a previous number we called *Christian socialism*; it is our intention to return to this presently.

The new school is driven by natural logical necessity to the position just stated, and to adopt a very different code of laws; and, in order to set aside accountability, free will must be denied, and man left the victim of a blind, fatal power. The doctrine of a strict evolution comes in here admirably to complete this theory. But, the result, when we come to examine it closely, is far from pleasant. Man, according to this theory, has no moral accountability, it is true; no judge to whom he must answer for his actions; but then he is a slave. Human society constructed on this basis must rest on despotism of some sort; and thus even the first view we gain of this social philosophy is by no means pleasant. When we look farther the hideous character of the monster becomes still more clearly apparent.

The second principle, on which all German sociologists now agree, when properly examined is even less attractive. This is State omnipotence, which already for several years has been universally advocated in all German universities. It is interesting to know how this strange freak of the new science became so prevalent in an age of liberalism; and this was probably the genesis of it. It is only a conjecture, but a very reasonable one in our opinion.

Though in the new theorist's idea the social laws are those of a fixed necessity or fate, absolute in their origin and development, they must be constantly changing, because evolution, essentially and in itself, is ever moving and shifting. Besides, the application of those laws must be multiform, owing to the actually divided state of society which has not yet reached the last goal of unity. Each nation, each people has its own history and aims; and when the socialists enter upon these historic considerations they are compelled to deny that there is a general social science, because they refuse to admit that the laws which govern society are the expression of the will

of God, and have been communicated to man by the voice of conscience. Everything, therefore, must still be chaotic, fragmentary, until the day of the universal republic comes to make all humanity a whole. In their opinion, consequently, there must be at the present time only a national economy particular to each people, and particular likewise to each epoch of its history. The idea which each of them conceives of the incongruity of things in general with the interests of his particular nation, is what they call their *ethical* science. For they spurn as childish the immutable formulas of the Decalogue; and ethics or morality, as everything else, must have, according to their theories, only a human origin.

If this be once admitted, it is manifest that the State alone can be the organ of the nation as to its ideas, interests, and welfare. It cannot be left with each individual, because to do that would be anarchy. It cannot go higher than the State, because there is no power superior to it. And the State has to consult only the utility of the moment, since there are no social laws immutable in their essence and founded on human nature. This presents a new view of the monster called Socialism; and this feature is more hideous even than the previous one, because the State is not an abstraction as are the imagined laws of the theory of evolution, but an actual, living, and powerful institution, which in some places is an emperor or king, in others a president or a body of oligarchs, in others still a mere party which has obtained the majority by fair means or foul, intending to derive all the advantages it can from its good luck.

This State omnipotence was openly promulgated in a Congress at Eisenach, Germany, in 1872, when the Association now called the *Verein für Social Politik* was founded. The doctrine, however, had previously been admitted by the great mass of German socialists. Their object was to frame a social organization, such as they had devised among themselves, but which was to be accepted by the State and carried out by its power. This they intend to substitute for the natural organization of society resulting from the free activity of individuals and families, and they include within it a circle of precepts and prohibitions promulgated by the law of God. The reader will readily determine whether this new system could possibly be an improvement upon the old one. Of this new organization Mr. Claudis Jannet says in the *Correspondant*, for September 10th, 1878:

"Nearly all the professors in German universities belong at this moment to this school. Mr. Engel and Wagner teach this doctrine at Berlin, Mr. Nassa at Bonn, Mr. Shinöler at Strasburg, and Mr. Scheele at Berne. Among its adherents are found men of great weight in the German Empire, such as Girst and Henry von Sybel; and likewise Mr. Schœffle, formerly Minister of Commerce at Vienna."

This was true in 1878. The theory probably has been considerably modified since that time, owing to the change of policy adopted by Prince Bismarck toward socialism. We are not informed, however, as to those modifications. Has the German Chancellor turned his back on socialism altogether, or only on the extremists who united in what has been called the International Association? We are inclined to think the latter most probable, as the system, when it was confined to Germany, admirably chimed with his own notions of statecraft. But even had the German Chancellor ordered the university professors to be henceforth silent on their socialism and State omnipotence, he cannot prevent them from thinking, and perhaps writing and publishing their ideas under a false name. We must show why they should do so in spite of Prince Bismarck.

This doctrine of State omnipotence was in fact a godsend to many economists in Germany and elsewhere, even in the United States. The writer thought proper to say a word about this in a late paper in which he quoted the commendatory expressions of a Catholic magazine of this country on this very subject of State power. This is properly the place to speak of it at greater length.

One of the greatest difficulties inherent in all systems of political economy consists in determining the *production* on a general plan, in strict conformity with the *consumer's* needs; and this the State alone seems to be able to do. Every one is aware that too often *the market is glutted*, and workingmen have to remain idle until the goods manufactured in too great quantity have been disposed of, and the stores are on the way of becoming empty. A systematic arrangement by which all such cases would be foreseen and provided against would undoubtedly be of great advantage, and allow the workers to continue their employment, and at least to earn bread for themselves, their wives, and children. It is impossible for manufacturers to calculate exactly how far they can go in production. Even could they do this, their supposed immediate interest would often induce many of them to shut their eyes to the future, and look only at the actual demand.

The State seems, therefore, a preferable *producer*, though until this time it had been regarded only as a *consumer*. It is well known that manufacturers always have ardently longed for large demands from the government, and the *lobbyist's* avidity at Washington and the State capitals is not unknown to politicians. A new scheme was set on foot to dispense with lobbyists altogether by dispensing with the manufacturers themselves, and the best way, evidently, was that the State itself should become universal manufacturer. It was contended, too, that the best goods at the lowest price would come out of the State workshops, because the government would not look to profit but only keep itself from loss. In all these sys-

tems the State, the government, is supposed to be immaculate, as also the individual is assumed, on one side, not to have been born in sin, and, on the other, to be fatally controlled by his natural aspirations.

For the reasons just assigned in favor of State universal supervision, many persons, not only in Europe, but even in this country, are not opposed to it, nay, sincerely wish that the plan would be adopted, at least in the main; and they find a further support for their opinions in the extraordinary difference of circumstances in this age from any previous one. Every enterprise, they say, is now conducted on an immense scale, which a single individual, however skilful, can scarcely grasp. There is a constant tendency to develop every branch of business to immense dimensions, and as nationalities are daily growing larger by the annexation of small states, so likewise monstrous commercial firms are swallowing up inferior concerns, which do not seem to have any longer a right to exist.

The evident ultimate result is that the State itself should replace everything of an individual nature. They even pretend to have experience on their side, and they aver confidently, and with seeming truth, that since the government succeeds so well in the carriage of letters and the transmission of money by post-office orders, it might as well sell us our shoes, and garments, and drygoods, and provisions. For these reasons, and others perhaps, the German professors continue firm in their opinion in spite of a change of views on the part of Prince Bismarck.

The answer to all these arguments is, nevertheless, plain, and must satisfy all who reflect on the essential characteristics of a nation, great or small. The government cannot be everything and the citizens nothing. If property is to remain undisturbed, every one is entitled to employ his money as he wishes, and the various natural aptitudes with which men are generally endowed require that all the channels of industry, commerce, agriculture, science, and art should remain open to them, provided they obey the laws of God and of man. Should the project of State omnipotence, entertained by many economists of this day, chiefly in Germany, be adopted, the first consequence to follow would be that property also must be included in the scheme, and this is probably what many socialists ardently desire. Then Babeuf's great principle would become at once a social axiom: *the State would be sole owner of the territory*. And not only this would take place as regards real estate; personal property would soon have to be handed over likewise to the universal purveyor of all material goods. This last measure would be inevitable, and only the blind can fail to see that this would be the rankest socialism that can be imagined. Citizens, in this case, would become mere slaves and tools, as we have shown

in a previous paper. Can any one suppose that any nation could long continue to subsist under those circumstances? Is it not counter to the essential idea of a nation? Is not the proposal an outrage, and socialism a hideous monster?

Moreover this theory of State omnipotence, in order to be logically consistent and beneficial to all, assumes that human governments are always immaculate, infallibly prudent, and absolutely just institutions, working disinterestedly for the common good, entirely incorruptible in fact, and thus must really aim at replacing God's government in the world. To indulge in these theories is, however, little less than insanity or cruel mockery when one reflects on the stupendous disclosures of crimes and impious plans and conspiracies which have lately astonished mankind, though it can readily be believed that the worst and most odious of them have never come to light. It would require more than the simplicity of a child not to see, at once, that the new state of things, with all the imaginable social science possible, would run directly into the most insupportable tyranny on the part of the State, exciting universal indignation, and ending in the most terrible insurrections on the part of trodden-down proletarians. It is not necessary to dwell further upon these points. What we have said suffices to prove the scheme impracticable.

When the attempt was made in Germany to prepare the way for the advent of this blissful project in favor of the lower classes, it is probable that Prince Bismarck paid little attention to these points. He was shrewd enough not to be caught by brilliant utopias. But he only saw before him a number of wise professors, who openly advocated State interference in political economy; and, instead of silencing them, he warmly encouraged them in the dissemination of their doctrines. The chief measures contended for by these theorists had evidently for their object to place in the hands of the rulers of the State the right of equalizing production and consumption; that is, the right of looking into all the private concerns of commercial firms, banking institutions, and manufacturing companies, previous to assuming, not only their general supervision, but at last the totality of their functions, if the State so desired. The astute Chancellor looked to the increase of his personal power rather than at the future difficulties which it would be easy enough for him, as he supposed, subsequently to master. Schemes, besides, were already being formed to render everything smooth and practicable. Mr. Shœffle proposed the establishment of *State tribunals of labor*; Mr. Shauberg, of Freyburg, was in favor of creating a body of *arbeits-æmpters* (baillifs de l'industrie), who would be high functionaries of the empire, and, of course, chosen from the professors of political economy.

But these dreams were soon on the point of vanishing into air by the sudden discovery that all this was a childish playing into the hands of the International Association. We do not know whether they have yet been altogether discarded, or some modifications of them have been thought sufficient.

A formidable name, *The Internationale*, has just been mentioned. Our intention is not to enter here into a detailed account of this mysterious society, of which everybody speaks, and which, in fact, scarcely anybody knows. So far, the secret of its occult transactions has been well kept, though its ultimate object is sufficiently evident. It has already been said that German sociologists in general do not admit a universal social science, equally extending to all the nations of the universe, but only a partial one for each nation. This school of economists has, of late, spread extensively through Germany. It is called the Historical School, because they rely, in part, on history, and they can, as they imagine, read in the annals of each nation heterogeneous aims, since each nation has peculiar features of its own, on which alone they look. They close, in fact, their eyes to the universal principles of right which are undoubtedly common to men of all races, and which constitute the true basis of social science. In their view mankind is an aggregate of many fragments, disconnected from each other in great degree, each of them having an evolution of its own. Over these fragments the State must be paramount for the reasons previously assigned.

This suited Prince Bismarck admirably until he became aware that there were spirits in the world bolder than his own State professors, men who did not recoil from the consequences of larger views, and for whom there was a universal social science of a new kind. These men admitted a strict evolution for the whole of mankind, and consequently strict social principles, embracing the whole world. Combine all the States together, they said, and you have humanity. Only these universal social principles and aims must not be looked for in the pretended prescriptions of right proclaimed by what is called conscience's voice, but in the independent aspirations of each man toward material enjoyment, irrespective of any hereafter. Humanity must, therefore, form a universal republic, and the various nations are only its component parts. The whole huge machine would work admirably well, owing to *co-operation*, and this became the pregnant word of the day. Everything, to succeed well, must be co-operative—production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. This would instantly do away with the necessity of *wages*. This odious word must disappear together with that of *capital*. There must remain nothing but co-operative labor, and instead of wages each one will receive his *share*.

The reader will perceive that this is Babeuf's doctrine again, but extended this time to the whole world. France alone was not destined to partake of these inestimable blessings. All nations were indiscriminately called to the feast. But, evidently, Germany was bent on receiving the first and largest share.

It is not the writer's intention to enter here into all the details of the scheme, so far as the public is allowed to know them. But it can easily be understood that if despotism was the last goal of the State socialism advocated by Prince Bismarck's professors, the most crushing destruction of all initiative, free action, and individual interest would be absolutely necessary for the safe and sure working of the gigantic international monster. If this plot's realization were possible,—thank God, it cannot be,—and if it became a fact, the world would not become a huge commercial house, as Adam Smith, and after him the Manchester men, intended. It would become a prison compared with which all our penitentiaries would be pleasant retreats. This would infallibly be the result of the theories broached by Karl Marx and Lassalle in Germany.

That the project is not a mere supposition and the International Society a dream is proved beyond all question by many facts and publications now well known, but particularly by the frank avowal of the German socialists themselves in their attempt at organization in the United States, in 1877, the year of the great labor strikes. The following paragraphs are a part of the "National platform and principles of the Socialistic Labor Party," as adopted at the national congress of the workingmen, held at Newark, New Jersey, at the end of December of that year. We copy it from the *North American Review*, for April, 1879:

"Labor being the source of all wealth and civilization, and useful labor being possible only by and through the associated efforts of the people, the results of labor should, therefore, in all justice belong to society. The system under which society is now organized is imperfect, and hostile to the general welfare, since through it the directors of labor, necessarily a small minority, are enabled in the competitive struggle to practically monopolize all the means of labor, all opportunities to produce for and supply the wants of the people, and the masses are therefore maintained in poverty and dependence.

"The industrial emancipation of labor, which must be achieved by the working classes themselves, independent of all political parties but their own, is consequently the great end to which every political movement should be subordinate as a means.

"Since the ruling political parties have always sought only the direct interest of the dominant or wealthy classes, have endeavored to uphold their industrial supremacy, and to perpetuate the present condition of society, it is now the duty of the working people to organize themselves into one great labor party, using political power to achieve industrial independence. The material condition of the working people in all civilized countries being identical and resulting from the same cause, the struggle for industrial emancipation is international, and must naturally be co-operative and mutual; therefore, the organization of national and international trade and labor unions upon a socialistic basis is an absolute necessity. For these reasons the So-

cialistic Labor Party has been founded. We demand that the resources of life, the means of production, public transportation and communication, land, machinery, railroads, telegraph lines, canals, etc., become, as fast as practicable, the common property of the whole people, through the government; to abolish the wage system, and substitute in its place co-operative production, with a just distribution of its rewards.

"The Socialistic Labor Party presents the following demands as measures to ameliorate the condition of the working people, through the government, under our present competitive system, and to *gradually accomplish the entire removal of the same.*"

The words italicized by us were italicized in the programme, and the *demands* which follow directly after, being only of a temporary nature (*until the present competitive system should be gradually and entirely abolished*), they do not give any information as to the ultimate objects of the movement. The pregnant paragraphs, however, which immediately precede those demands, are sufficient to indicate them, and the reader has seen their international character.

In these well-defined purposes there is a suggestion calculated to deceive the unwary. It is said that the great object of the new labor party is to abolish the wages system, and to substitute in its stead co-operative production, *with a just distribution of its rewards*, and this is to be done *through the government*. To make it more attractive it is assumed throughout the whole scheme that capital, such as it has been always understood, will cease to exist. All personal property, of every kind, will be common to all. But, since no one individual can any longer be permitted to dispose of any part of it, it must be vested in the whole organization, and to make the delusion stronger and more plausible it is pretended that this will be brought about through the government.

Could the managers of the Labor Party suppose that the government of the United States, such as it has always been from the first establishment of the Constitution, would favor the project, adopt the measures of this party, and turn socialist on such an immense scale? They would have been perfect simpletons had they so believed. But they were not simpletons. Did they not openly say that the first measure to be adopted was to form a party *of their own*? This they did emphatically say at that very congress in Newark. It was evidently intended that this new party should sweep all other parties out of existence, and finally absorb into its own hands the *government* of this country.

And what would be the inevitable result of this blessed movement, if successful? Simply to leave the destiny of this great country under the sole control of the leaders of the Labor Party. According to their intention, there soon would be no government, in the ordinary sense of the word, on the surface of the earth; neither absolute monarchies, empires, nor kingdoms; nor any other

representative body politic. All these institutions were to be replaced by a universal republic, about whose organization they scarcely condescend to utter a word. There would be a head, certainly, and this could not be a mere abstraction. It must consequently be a man, or a certain number of men, following rules of their own, entirely concealed from the multitude. Nothing is ever said by them of universal suffrage, nor of elections under any form. People have an indistinct fear that the whole system resolves itself into the *ipse dixit* of a single man, appointed in a mysterious way to rule the whole concern. But whatever may be the mode of instituting the ruling power, that power must be supreme, irresponsible, and final in its decisions. Nothing else could maintain the existence of such a government, even for a single day.

The just distribution of rewards, as the platform cunningly expresses it, will be entirely in the hands of the supreme power, through its blind agents. It remains to be seen if the *rewards* would be more equitably distributed than were the wages which workmen, under the existing system of society, have received. Is it not to be feared that from the tyranny of capital the world will have passed to the far worse tyranny of a committee of scoundrels? This surely would lead to the most frightful anarchy, because the *masses* would soon open their eyes, and, by bold and universal insurrection, at once break off the intolerable yoke.

What has just been said is not based on mere conjecture. From the passage which has been quoted, and from several others contained in the same paper of the *North American Review*, it is only too evident that the project is in motion, and that there are, at this moment, men who intend to bring it to a successful issue, even in this country, in connection with all the other, European, branches of the sect. The well-informed contributor to the periodical alluded to, seems even to fear that it will eventually be carried out in the United States, and he is not alone in his opinion. He says that "Mr. Seward once declared that of all the elements which entered into our national composition the German was the element which he feared most. The discontented and revolutionary spirit which characterizes the German mind, coupled with the little learning which every citizen of the Fatherland brings with him, and the clannishness of his race, seemed to Mr. Seward a danger menacing to the existing order of things."

Many other conservative men in this country share in this opinion. It has always seemed to us that the extreme socialists, whether of Germany or elsewhere, will find more obstacles to their plots in the United States than in any European country. Still it is the plain duty of all honest citizens to oppose the monstrous project with all their might, and every one is aware that Catholics

will never listen, except with intense indignation, to any proposal leading to such monstrous conclusions.

But if there was a sad reality in this gigantic and wicked enterprise a year ago, it was then only *conjectured* that the socialists were bent on carrying out their plans with the pistol and the dagger previous to a wholesale inception of civil war. To-day it is no longer a conjecture, it is a fact.

It is well known that many other secret societies, particularly in Italy and France, have formerly used the same odious weapons either against the rulers of the State or against those whom they regarded as apostates from their ranks. Assassination was openly advocated by secret plotters against the established order of things. This was also considered by many as a *plank* in the socialistic *platform*, to use a well-known American phrase. There were, however, no positive proofs of it.

But, "not many months ago," again says the *North American Review*, "Europe was panic-stricken by four successive attempts in one year upon the lives of three monarchs." Should we enumerate similar attempts upon the lives, not of monarchs, but of generals, magistrates, police officers, etc., a long list would undoubtedly be the result. It is, therefore, a fact that there actually are men in Europe using the revolver and the dagger against the lives of officials obnoxious to them. The question is, who are those men? Public opinion points its finger directly at the socialists, and the conjecture is forthwith so far probable, that no other supposition can explain the fact, and the ominous word *socialists* is the only answer that can be given to the question.

There is, however, further proof, and this time it is a public avowal. The passage is remarkable, and is contained in the same *Review* already quoted. A *Russian nihilist* was allowed to publish an article in it last July, in which, among many other interesting items of information, two positive facts are acknowledged, or, rather, boastfully proclaimed, which must be considered as settling the question. The first fact is that Russian nihilism is nothing else than Russian socialism, or "the reorganization of Russian society according to the doctrines of modern socialism." The writer must certainly be what he says he is, and he seems perfectly well acquainted with the whole history and the real projects of the sect, without exaggeration or overstatement.

The second fact is the open adoption by this party of the doctrine of assassination as a means of success. His words deserve to be quoted:

"When not only the public speech is stifled, but the innermost thoughts of the citizen are searched and pried into by a barbarous inquisition, then the time has come for the dagger and the pistol to speak. Violence becomes a necessity, a duty, and revenge

becomes retribution. To use Milton's words, 'it is but reason that he who trod down all law should not be vouchsafed the benefit of the law.' It would be idle to discuss here the theory of political assassination; it is to the best of my belief an element of public life which stands out of the reach of any scientific theory. It is a simple fact which under certain conditions must make its appearance with the elementary force of a law of nature. As any man has an unalienable right of shooting a robber who attacks him, so has the citizen an equally unalienable right of destroying the infamous tools of a system which shamelessly tramples on humanity and justice. The question of right and wrong in this matter reaches beyond all the ordinary standards of morality, and depends mainly on the manner in which the people itself looks upon the deeds of violence. . . . These deeds are no longer murders, but acts of national justice."

The editor of the *Review*, from which we quote, in declaring as usual that "he accepts no responsibility for the opinions of his contributors," adds with great justice:

"Since Colonel Sexby perished in prison for disseminating in England the treatise in which Colonel Titus undertook to show that killing would be no murder in the case of Protector Cromwell, no such deliberate plea for assassination, as a political weapon, has been put forth in Europe as is embodied in the programme of the Russian nihilists. Recent events have but too clearly shown that it is their intention to carry this dreadful doctrine into effect whenever and wherever it may seem to them necessary so to do. It is of the highest interest, therefore, to know on what grounds and by what reasoning it is that men not belonging to the criminal classes of society in Russia, have brought themselves to reject one of the most sacred and fundamental principles of our Christian civilization."

We will merely add that *recent events* also have proved that this is not the doctrine of Russian nihilists only, but also of German and other socialists. The measures taken against them in Russia, Germany, Austria, and even Italy, oblige them at present to keep themselves quiet. How long this will continue, and whether political repression will effectively destroy this satanic monstrosity is a consideration of great moment; and a few words on the subject will not be out of place.

That the conspiracy has taken deep root in Europe, and has even invaded this country cannot be denied; and it would be most imprudent on the part of those who are conservative to close their eyes to it, and to act as if it did not exist, merely because its ulterior aims and true character are systematically concealed. Suppose that these socialistic projects, as they have been described, existed alone of their kind, and found all other social elements in open antagonism to them, it would even then be an extremely serious matter, requiring the union of all other classes of society in support of existing governments to successfully cope with it. Still it might be hoped that strong measures of repression highly approved by the great majority of citizens, would in course of time put an end to it, or that as an epidemic, according to M. Thiers's expression, the frightful evil would die out of itself. But unfortunately the virus of these doctrines has deeply penetrated into a body politic weakened and tainted by many diseases, altogether

akin to the one which alone has attracted attention and created terror. Nearly all the other modern systems of political economy have sown the seeds of the disorder, and continue to be the fond objects of many delusive dreamers. In all of them religion is set aside, morality is considered of no account, material or rather sensual enjoyment is the only thing looked for and aimed at. The Christian principles which have given such strength to human society are openly discarded; and the only object of desire offered to the aspirations of men is an illimitable increase of whatever may please the senses and stimulate the lower appetites. Can the deleterious doctrines of socialism under these circumstances, and in this way, be successfully opposed, and in the end destroyed? We think not. It will undoubtedly continue to spread among the lowest ranks of society, among a large class of proletarians deprived of all religious and moral sense. It will continue to employ all the means adopted by secret associations with which the European mind has for a long time been familiarized. At the first favorable opportunity it will burst out afresh like a smouldering fire when it once finds vent. Its pent up fury will be all the greater because of its former confinement, and the world will shudder over the ruin and destruction it will produce. Then men will at last understand their folly in excluding God and His religion from society, and in trusting to their own wisdom for the construction of a new social edifice after having battered down the solid walls of that previously existing.

The growth of the evil until now has been attributed to two baneful principles, from which its excesses have sprung. These are: 1st, the doctrine of material evolution extended to social science, in order to develop it independently of God's will and action; and, 2d, State omnipotence, which replaces in modern theories the power of God Himself. Are not these notions at the root of all political and social axioms by which alone men now consent to be governed? Do not men now openly and scornfully deny God's government in all human affairs? Do they not pretend that evolution has been demonstrated to the full extent attributed by Herbert Spencer to that theory? Do they not imagine that it is a great boon conferred on man in this age to be freed from the fear of God? Let them understand that in spurning His yoke they put on their necks a heavier one of another master. Their dearly-bought independence leaves them more slaves than ever, and with no lightening of their thralldom by the hope of a hereafter. They pretend to be wise in preferring present enjoyment to any future and eternal prospect of happiness. They will find that the earthly paradise which their imagination pictures to itself is far worse than the sacred inclosure of God's city,—the Christian Church,—which looks to them like a prison.

That there is no exaggeration here a single reflection will prove. All must admit that the sum total of all modern philosophy is to do away with the miraculous, the supernatural, that is, with God's government among men. The mildest systems of political economy always assume it even when they do not openly set it forth. All political principles by which men now are ruled are impregnated with a like doctrine. Hence the State must be above the Church, must be paramount, in fact omnipotent. In human society the family, the tribe, the nation, must be free from all spiritual control, unless they foolishly impose it upon themselves. The human law does not acknowledge anything above itself. This being so, can it be expected that socialism in its various forms will die out? We say that it is destined to conquer, because everything conspires in its favor. The principles of socialism are now those of ordinary human society; it is impossible that all its consequences, even the worst, should not follow. Some of these have been already enumerated and we have proved them to be actual facts. Is it an earthly paradise that socialism promises to man? We leave it to the reader's imagination to answer.

Before concluding, a hasty sketch of the true social ideal consecrated by Christianity must be drawn by way of contrast to the previous picture. This we have promised more than once, and have called it Christian socialism. It is time now to develop some of the expressions and hints scattered here and there through these pages, and which of themselves are not sufficient to a full understanding of the subject. In calling it Christian socialism it must not be forgotten that most of its peculiarities were the guiding rules of men even before Christianity. Aristotle embodied its chief principles in his ethics. Some modern economists who now advocate the Christian ideal, were brought to it by the consideration of the rational views of ancient pagan philosophers. But this is not the place to make a distinction between whatever part of it is founded on mere reason, and what is based on revealed truth. By explaining the Christian side alone, whatever is at the same time founded on reason is brought forward with still more power; and this must suffice here.

In entering on this subject a preliminary remark must be made of no small importance, when we speak of the contrast between the old and the new; that is, between what was thought to be the basis of human society in Christian times, particularly in mediæval, and the view now taken of it by modern economists. With great justice the theory—the old—embraced within it whatever can be known of *man's nature* as a social being; of the *family* as the first social unit; of *morality* as the great substratum of social laws; of *religion* as their firmest support; of the *State* as the regulator of the

peace and prosperity of citizens; finally, of belief in a *hereafter* as the sanction of the whole system. But it is known that what is now called political economy makes no mention of any of these important truths, whether known through philosophy, or revealed. It treats of human society without even referring to what is essentially and inseparably connected with it. After having read all the books of recent scientists you can scarcely have any idea of what human society is. It is probably on this account that the name given by the *founders of the science* to their pet theories is political economy, not social economy. There is, it is true, nothing avowedly political in those theories, since they make not the slightest reference to politics or government. But as they entirely ignore whatever constitutes true sociology (to use a modern expression), their originators and advocates probably feel that it would be preposterous on their part to call their theories *social* economy. Hence, in their eyes it is only *political* economy.

We, Christians, are accustomed to be logical in our expressions. Consequently when we speak of *social* matters, the dullest reader at once perceives that there is really a question of human society. Let us, therefore, enter at once on the subject.

I. In all modern economical systems man's social nature is scarcely alluded to, and among the extreme and most radical of the supporters of these systems—among the strict evolutionists—their theories are avowedly grounded, not on firm, stable, and eternal principles, but on shifting eventualities. For, according to them, there is nothing else in nature. This has been sufficiently proved already. It must, however, be repeated here that, in their opinion, man is a perfectly harmonious being, without any admixture of evil in his moral composition. All evil consists, according to them, in outward circumstances, which press hard upon man, and have to be redressed by political economy.

In Christian socialism two very different principles are laid down at the very beginning with respect to human nature, both susceptible of the most tangible proof, and furnishing firm ground on which to build the whole edifice. The first is that there are exact, eternal, and unchangeable social principles, deeply impressed on the very soul of man, and which are known to all nations, even the most rude and barbarous. This the Fathers of the Church from the beginning, and the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages, have clearly demonstrated, and human reason ought certainly to be convinced of it after the repeated proofs they have brought forward. To the English reader the discussion of this question in Mr. Lecky's *History of European Morals* cannot but prove interesting. It is entirely conclusive, though the celebrated author merely repeats what had been written long before.

The second Christian principle with regard to man's nature, as easily demonstrable as the first, is that we are born sinners; that original sin is a fact; and that the social evils which afflict mankind are the result of a first transgression, communicated to the whole human race. The sufferings consequent upon it must be taken by man as an expiation, though he is permitted to mitigate them by all lawful means left in his power.

The existence of original sin is undoubtedly a fundamental fact of the Christian religion. It forms its historical foreground. Christ said that he came not to call the just but sinners. Every one who admits that our religion is divine must, at the same time, recognize the fatal power of Adam's first sin, since redemption would not have been needed had it not been for the fall. But, independently of revelation, our own experience and consciousness gives us, at least, a strong presumption of this. To pretend that there is no evil inclination in man's will, argues a total deprivation of the moral sense; and, in order to be compelled to acknowledge our original sinfulness, it is only necessary to look at the inborn depravity of our hearts. All this is elementary in moral science, but the principle once admitted is pregnant with ominous consequences for true sociology. First, *l'homme de la nature*, as imagined by J. J. Rousseau, perfect in himself, because not yet corrupted by civil society, is worse than a delusion; it is a fatal error, which more or less vitiates all economic systems. Wherever the paradox is not adopted to its full extent and with all its consequences, the sinfulness of man is always presupposed, and means are often suggested by economists for the *equalization of nature* in man, by which modifications would be produced tending to perfectibility and to raising man to a higher moral level. Mr. Accolas proposes for this, common meals for children, a public and obligatory education, etc. It is always the Spartan system, and comes back to Rousseau. When, on the contrary, you admit that man is a fallen being, and that his lapse is interior and moral, means or remedies of a very different nature are plainly required, and to these we will soon refer.

Secondly, when original sin is once admitted as an actual fact, the cure of the evils to which human society is liable cannot be limited to any exterior circumstances, such as the inequality of conditions. But since the great cause of those evils is interior in man and touches his very moral constitution, it is there that the corrective is to be applied. The consequence is that it is from morality, namely, from the observance of the Decalogue, that the true social reform must be expected. This will require, by-and-by, a special development.

II. No social system can be broached without laying great stress on the *family* as the first and most important social unit. The econ-

omists, and particularly the socialists, never treat *ex professo* of this important subject. They often, it is true, speak of the education of children—Mr. Accolas has just enlightened us on this subject—and on the rights of woman, and her adaptation to all civil and social purposes. Some sects among them speak of marriage; all of them rave on population, the intercourse of the sexes, etc. But to lay down firm principles on the three relations of father, mother, and child; to attentively consider whether reason can contradict the injunctions of divine revelation, can defy the precepts of the Divine law; to seriously reflect on the immense importance that particular families have had, in all ages, on various states and nations (as M. Le Play has done in France in his *Monographies de Familles*); all this and many other considerations are regarded by them as of no account in what they call political economy. It may be said generally that the human family is desecrated, yea, dishonored, in all these modern systems. They wish to improve on Christianity, of which, however, they never speak; and most of their theories, if successfully realized, would go to the instant weakening, first, and then to the total breaking asunder of all social ties. What would have become before this of the human family in case the ravings of the philosophers of this and the previous century had become facts, actualized in any nation whatever?

Though most of these utopias have been rejected as impracticable by the good sense yet left among men, is it not lamentable to see the wretched state, physical and moral, of a large number of human families in all our great manufacturing centres? Except when and where the Catholic Church intervenes the moral decline among operatives soon becomes unmistakable, and the road to degradation is plain before them. It has required strong parliamentary measures of repression in England to correct disgraceful evils of this kind, brought on by prevalent theories of political economy.

The Church, on the other side, has always been most attentive to keep unimpaired the dignity and sacredness of the home circle; and the principles laid down in revelation and enforced by Catholic rulers have invariably proved to be the only ones adapted to the preservation of the foundation of well-being among men. Read what the Schoolmen have said of the human family ages ago, and what Catholic theologians down to this day have repeated on the same subject, and tell us whether you can find elsewhere anything comparable to it for promoting the great object in view, viz., the foundation of virtue and happiness. It is chiefly on this account that in mediæval times, yes, in the much-abused *dark ages*, the public welfare was so well attended to by Christian rulers. This is now admitted by all well-informed men. And the great cause of

it was that the dignity of the human family, on the pattern of that of Nazareth, was sacredly preserved under the Church's wings.

Fortunately this is not unknown now to many men who at first did not believe it, but have been brought by a sense of truth to openly acknowledge it. M. Le Play is one of them. He began as a simple economist and was far from being a Christian. But his studies, carried on with fairness and in good faith, soon brought him to the threshold of the Church, and he developed in his *Monographies* (an essential part of his *Ouvriers Européens*) a splendid panorama of what have been, at all times and in all countries, the great social units, called families, in the Christian commonwealth. Pity it is we cannot enter into more details, and must pass on to our next point.

III. Morality has been called the universal substratum of social laws, and it is important to show the fatal error of economists and socialists in entirely discarding it. In the first place, it must be remarked that it is only from Turgot's time in France and Adam Smith's in England that morality has begun to be considered of no importance in sociology. The founders of political economy thought that even the natural principles of ethics would not be strict enough for laying the foundation of their *strict* system. They, of course, could not think of the morality of the Gospels, which they knew was *strict* enough; but as they were aware that many strange and almost unaccountable notions of ethics had been entertained by various nations, which could not suit them, they took the bold step of forming a *gospel of their own*, where no mention should be made of any moral obligation. They consequently turned their backs on all thinkers and writers of previous ages who had been unanimous in proclaiming the identity between the social and the moral laws. They thought that by keeping silent on these *moral laws* they could proclaim with more effect the stringency of their own *social axioms*, and to this day the socialists, their successors, have continued in the same path. For them, consequently, the Decalogue has never been written with any serious purpose. Its prescriptions are only childish enactments which can have no weight in the eyes of a philosopher.

But in the second place the Decalogue is fortunately inscribed in the human heart, and on this account the human heart never ceases to protest against the pretended ignoring of it by these new teachers. They must know that the numerous flaws of their systems are visible at least to eyes that have once looked on the majestic Mosaic tables; and no one can pretend that man has not seen those tables, since they form a part of his being, and are *written*, as St. Paul says, in his heart by the testimony of his conscience.

This folly of economists and socialists shows the inanity of their

thoughts, since they imagine they can dissociate what is strictly identical. But it is an herculean task which they will never be able to accomplish. Until the end of time mankind will declare that social laws must be moral laws, or no one will ever be bound to keep them. In vain the new teachers, therefore, do their best to invent a perfect system; it will remain in the end a dead letter in spite of all the perfection they can give it.

IV. Religion, as has been said, is the firmest support of social laws. This is a mere corollary of the previous paragraph. Morality is in the keeping of religion alone. No other institution has the right to prescribe it in all its fulness. Natural morality in ancient times was to a certain extent within the scope of the State's attributes, or of an authorized teaching body. Since Christ came the State undoubtedly should see that its legal enactments are conformable with Christian social ethics, and it can forbid whatever is contrary to them. But for an ultimate decision, in case of doubt, reference must be had to Christ's representative, namely, the Church, which alone has received the power of teaching what is truth and virtue. This must be admitted by all Catholics; and those who are not, must see at least that it is the safest way that can be conceived in all human affairs. Every one can perceive how firmly human society is established when this is the case; and how, on the contrary, everything in social institutions is problematical and precarious when this is denied. There is no need of proving in detail how pernicious is the socialistic idea that the exclusion of religion from society must be carried so far as to deny God's presence and power, either at the origin of it or throughout the course of its history. If this denial could once come to be universal there would soon be an end of man himself. God's intervention would not be necessary, man would be his own destroyer.

V. The State, which has been called the regulator of the peace and happiness of citizens, is the next subject of consideration. The reader is aware that mere economists never took any account of it. They were mainly concerned with the industrial questions of supply and demand, production and consumption, circulation and distribution of wealth. On this account their speculations scarcely deserve the name of social science. The modern socialists go much further, and discuss many topics of real sociology in a way peculiar to themselves, as has been already explained. Their doctrine of State omnipotence, as has been shown, instead of excluding the State from their system, makes the State the keystone of the whole edifice, at the expense of all individual activity.

The true social science of the old Schoolmen and of Catholic theologians in general considered the State as the head of the social body; but its attributes, according to them, were very different

from the monstrous power granted to it by modern theorists. The State, particularly when *Christendom* existed in its full vigor, favored the existence of numerous corporations, either of churchmen, or of noblemen, or of burghers, artisans, and agriculturists, whose liberties, as they were called, gave birth to a solid and complete hierarchy of rank and functions. This was chiefly visible in industrial pursuits, which, however, presented features very different from those of recent times. Owing to the division of Europe into many small states, and to a certain difficulty of communication between them,—a difficulty which has been often exaggerated,—each district furnished itself with the necessities or conveniences of life. Very few commodities had to be imported from other districts. There was consequently no difficulty in regulating the production and distribution of goods. On this account we hear of no strikes during those times. There was no forced cessation of labor; and the joyful keeping of Christian festivals gave to the artisan, merchant, and agriculturist all the time required for necessary rest and the sufficient improvement of his mind.

It would, no doubt, be difficult if not impossible to reproduce in our day so happy a state of society. There were, however, shadows in the picture, resulting chiefly from the feudal system then prevalent, which no one would wish to see revived. But could not the State in the present age enter into the spirit of those times, allow the reconstruction of many corporations similar to those of the ages referred to, and favor private industry without allowing the monstrous monopolies which are now so fatal to all ordinary commercial and manufacturing concerns? The Church would, no doubt, heartily co-operate with the State in spreading comfort among all classes, preventing the absorption of wealth by a few concerns, and cutting off the root of pauperism by favoring the simple artisan, and extending a fostering care over humble and honest homes. The only thing required for it would be a peculiar legislation modelled after the old Catholic one. It is all comprised in the pregnant phrase of Bossuet already quoted: *La fin de la politique est de rendre la vie commode et les peuples heureux.*

Let the State at the same time encourage the Church in her efforts to relieve human misery. She knows how to do it, because she has received the mission to do it from her Divine Founder. The reign of true charity is the kingdom of Christ, whose universal spread has been intrusted to the Church. During her whole history she has proved her willingness and ability so to do. Let a false shame be thrown overboard and a reconciliation take place, which would redound to the good of humanity. This would be far better for the State itself than the omnipotence proposed to it by new dreamers. The few pages just indited at the end of this

paper prove abundantly that these infatuated men know nothing of human society, and cannot speak intelligently of social laws. It has been proved at the same time that there is a Christian socialism which alone deserves the name. The only defect of the demonstration is that it could not be sufficiently developed, and with regret we now stop.

VI. A word must be added on a last consideration. There cannot be a true human society without *belief in a hereafter*; because man's life does not end in this world, which is only a preparation for a better and eternal one. Let sophists close their eyes to this truth if they choose. Mankind cannot do so, because its aspirations towards heaven are irrepressible. Those who have lost hope in it cannot truly enjoy present blessings, should they even have a large share of them. Those who are happy enough to keep that sweet hope in their inmost heart are measurably contented in this world, even in the midst of privations. The hereafter is the place where every injustice will be repaired and every evil compensated. For this reason it is that human society in this life cannot be perfect, because it is merely a probation. All our sanguine philosophers who promise to change earth into heaven, foolishly work against the designs of God, who does not wish it to be so. He reserves for us far better things than this world can ever secure. The Christian should never forget that piety alone is useful for all things: *Pietas ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitæ que nunc est et futuræ.*

THE NECESSITY FOR INFALLIBILITY.

THE subject of infallibility is one of commanding interest. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the intelligent theological mind to set it aside. The consequences resulting from it are so serious and far-reaching as to command the attention of all. If true, no one can afford to treat it with indifference, and if not true, all should know it to be so. It is the duty, therefore, of all earnestly to test it in every form in which this may be legitimately done, and not to endeavor to confuse and thus hide its true claims from the conscience. Though there has been, as we have reason to know, a good deal of earnest reflection by many Protestants upon this subject, the public treatment of the question by them has not been such as to do them full justice. Only here and there has it been allowed to make its appearance in their more elaborate publications, and even then, owing to some sort of indistinct or undefinable dread, it has always been more or less slighted or superficially run through, so as to create the impression that it is not worthy of a full, radical, and thorough examination. The question, however, is manifestly not thus to be quieted or put out of the way. It has called forth a response from the common reason of men, which commands respectful consideration, and the theological mind generally is beginning to realize that if it is to be satisfactorily refuted, it must be done by legitimate means, which will require all, and likely a good deal more than all, the most earnest resources of Protestant thought.

It is said that Nero, in order to conceal his cruelty from his own conscience, as well as from the eyes of the world, clothed many of his victims with the skins of wild animals, and then cast them into the amphitheatre to be torn to pieces by ferocious beasts. They were human beings, nevertheless. So there are many who oppose infallibility, and denounce it as an absurd pretension, not because of its own true nature, but because of the imaginary and tawdry garments with which they have clothed it. They are fighting, for the most part, the consequences of their own misconception; just as the lions in the amphitheatre thought, no doubt, if they thought at all, that they were devouring beasts, not men; and many of this class, after the true idea was allowed to take the place of the false one, have fully recognized, along with the greatest intellectual lights of the world, its profound rationality, and have come to be not only sincere believers in it, but also its most strenuous advocates.

Let us briefly allude to, and, if possible, correct some of these misconceptions.

Infallibility, for instance, is not inspiration, with which it is often carelessly confounded, namely, that peculiar supernatural gift of

prophets and apostles, by which a divine relation was given to the world. It pretends to no power or authority to give a new revelation, nor yet to add one jot or tittle to the old. Nor is it a personal gift, whereby a man is made to be unerring individually in all his mental or moral judgments. Moreover, it is not impeccability; for, however infallible in his proper function, it is freely admitted that the Supreme Pontiff may nevertheless sin, and sin so deeply as to be lost forever. His sin is always greater than that of others, because of the exalted position which he occupies. Infallibility, briefly, is a supernatural gift secured by the Divine Spirit to him who occupies the office of Viceregent of Christ on earth, so that when, in this office, and teaching the whole Church, in matters of faith and morals, and when, if he were in error, the whole Church, of which he is the head on earth, would be in error also, he is so guided and guarded, by the promised light and grace of the Holy Ghost, that he cannot but teach the truth in the most absolute accordance with revelation.

As regards the nature of this great endowment the subject of this article requires no further remark at this point.

Now, where is the absurdity of this dogma? Is it an impossible bestowment, and in this view absurd? Then, what becomes of the claims which similarly frail human beings, such as prophets and apostles, made to inspiration—a still more transcendent gift—upon the truth of which depends the validity of revelation? Those claims must, on this ground, also be absurd; for so far as they personally were concerned, it cannot be asserted that they were materially different from the generality of men; they experienced the same human frailties and were conditioned by the same finite limitations. But absurdity is not predicated in respect to their claim upon this or any other ground. Therefore, the objection in this application is, as it must be, without foundation. If God was able, or if it was consistent with His manner of working, to give inspiration to feeble men, men of like passions as ourselves, and through them, thus endowed and conditioned, to communicate an absolutely infallible revelation, can any one on the ground of reason say, that it is absurd to believe that He is also able to give, with this revelation, the inferior grace which will qualify a man, placed at the head of the Church, to preserve the truth thus revealed from all fatal error? Surely this cannot be. To speak of the impossibility, and in this view the absurdity, of frail erring men sharing with God, and by His act, in the grace of infallibility, is, therefore, in the way of fact, to undermine the whole groundwork of inspiration itself; for, if anything is clear, it is the fact that the first is presupposed by the last; that the two are, like body and soul, inwardly bound together; that the union is so vital, that the first cannot be impossible if the

second is not, and that the one cannot be absurd unless the other is so likewise.

These reflections prepare the way for a clear and in some sense full apprehension of the necessity for infallibility, in regard to which we now proceed to speak more definitely and in detail.

As already intimated, it seems clear that the nature of revelation itself requires infallibility. This, so far as it can be sustained, is a direct, divine requisition. Inspiration in giving, and infallibility in guarding revelation, are co-ordinate, at least as to their ultimate aim, and therefore must be, in their respective functions, of equal necessity. The last but secures the proper results of the first, and is, in fact, the only condition on which the first can be of any real account as respects its own purpose and mission.

Revelation is acknowledged to be supernatural, both as to its substance and form, *i. e.*, that its truth and its inspiration are wholly above and beyond the natural order. Although much of it is concerned with natural or historical facts, which might be known in an ordinary way, yet the whole, being the work of the inspired mind and connected with a spiritual and supermundane end, is a purely divine product. This is revelation in itself,—an objective fact, as really so as the sun, which gives natural light to the world,—absolutely unerring and supernatural. Here we stand upon common grounds with all believers in the fact of a revelation.

But now, whilst this objective supernatural revelation is one thing, conceded to be unerringly true by all so-called orthodox Christian minds, our fallible apprehension of it is, as must also be conceded, quite another and a different thing.

It is well, at this stage of our general discussion, to mark somewhat in detail a few of the sharp points of difference which here arise.

1. Revelation, as an objective fact, immediately from the pen of inspiration, is, as to its truth, absolutely certain. It must be so, otherwise it would not be inspired. As, however, it is understood, or subjectively apprehended by fallible minds in their ordinary state, it is just as absolutely uncertain; and this also must be so, otherwise those minds would not be fallible.

2. Revelation, as objective or in itself, teaches the same truth through all ages and to all minds. It cannot vary or change, or, as regards its doctrine, adapt itself to different conditions, being one thing for one and a different thing for another. As understood, however, by different minds, on the principle of fallibility, it teaches radically different things.

3. Revelation, as objective or in itself considered, carries the whole complicated system of divine truth in a way that is perfectly harmonious throughout. There is not, as there cannot be, the

presence of a single jar. As apprehended by the fallible individual reason, it results in contradictions of the most palpable nature from beginning to end.

4. Revelation, as objective, is the bearer to our natural, and now world of sin and moral darkness, of pure supernatural truth, which, as such, is in no sense attainable by the reason, nor by any process which the reason might institute. As apprehended by finite, darkened, fallible minds, it is truth on a level with the limited human understanding, that is, truth in the order of nature.

Now there is certainly no form of reasoning known to the human mind which can make it appear that these two things, with differences so strongly marked, are one and the same thing. This would be to destroy reason itself and convert the whole region of knowledge into a fancy or an idle dream. As it cannot be shown that light is darkness, so neither can it be proven that these two things are the same thing. Rather, like light and darkness, they are opposites, and, as such, can never be reconciled.

Take now these two strongly-marked and divergent facts, and suppose infallibility, or an infallible interpreter, does not exist, which of the two would remain, and be the practical guide and controlling power for men? Very manifestly, the latter—that is, the uncertain, contradictory, natural opinions of men respecting revelation, which constitute just no revelation at all, instead of the absolutely sure and perfect Word of God itself! Here, as all may see, is a direct substitution of the word of man for the Word of God. What, then, in these circumstances, is the perfect objective revelation of God, without the power somewhere to understand it in its own perfect character? Clearly, in spite of all the vain boasts of the Protestant world, it is, as it must be, a pure abstraction.

The absence of this power of infallibility to understand revelation would not, it is true, utterly destroy revelation as such. It would still exist, just as the sun would, were there no eyes to see its light; and it would still be, in itself, absolutely unerring. But, plainly, so far as we are concerned, it would be as though it were not. For us and for the world generally, concretely and practically, it could not be. In other words, it would be shorn, *ex necessitate*, of every element that constitutes it a supernatural revelation, and would be reduced to the character of a mere ordinary, common book, from which each one may, *ad libitum*, gather what notions best suit his tastes, though he would be, at the same time, at absolute war with every other one, who professes, in like manner, to take his opinions from the same source. To speak of this book, thus eviscerated, in which human opinion has taken the place of divine inspiration, as being the revelation of God, is simply to be foolish and impious; and it certainly is not harsh to say, that no

one in proper harmony with his own reason can seriously maintain such a proposition.

In such form, being a mere abstraction, or relegated practically to the clouds, the Revelation of God, however perfect, both as to form and contents, could of course never actualize its own purpose, namely, serve as an infallible guide, or lead men into infallible truth; and not being able to do this, we cannot rationally believe that it would ever have been given. Why should it, in such case, be inspired at all? Surely it did not require inspiration to produce such results. There is nothing in variable and contradictory opinions which, as effects, can connect them with inspiration as their cause.

What then is the general conclusion which reason, to speak of nothing higher, compels the mind to draw from these premises? Nothing less, surely, than this: If Revelation is to be a fact for our world—if it is to be for us the actual revelation of God, whose teachings are, and in their own nature must be, certain, harmonious, invariable, and supernatural, in which there can be no error, no changing opinion, no contradiction, then, by some means or other, we must be made to understand it in its own certain, harmonious, and absolute character. Otherwise, whatever it may be in itself, it is, and can be, no inspired revelation for us. Thus the inherent logic of reason, which speaks to the consciousness of every man who recollects himself as being accountable to God, will force the conviction, when prejudice is banished and nature is calm, that to know revelation in this the only way it can be known, we need a power to interpret it which shall have equal authority with revelation itself. This conclusion cannot be avoided.

It is a great mistake, which many make, to suppose that all that is necessary in order to possess the Bible, is to purchase it, and, like an honest man, pay for it. They seem to forget that infidels of the most advanced type possess it precisely in the same way, and are frequently able much more adroitly to manage, in the service of infidelity, their quotations from it. Such possession may indeed give him a legal right to the paper and ink which enter into it, as into any other mere personal chattel. But the Bible itself, in its own proper nature, namely, its truth, is not thus a matter of merchandise or legal ownership. To possess it in this its only true sense is to seize its meaning, to know its sense, and to know this infallibly, for this sense or meaning is infallible. How may this be done without infallibility?

The necessity for infallibility in this view is, therefore, clearly equal to the value of revelation itself; for without the first it is not possible to possess the last. He who has the truth of revelation, in its own infallible form (and it has no other truth), has revela-

tion, and he who has not the truth under this form has not revelation, and would not have, though printed Bibles were stacked around him to the height of the Himalayas.

Give up, then, this infallible interpreter, and you have remaining a fallible interpretation, a varying opinion, an absolute uncertainty, that is, no revelation at all, and thus nothing, to be the guide for all men in respect to their eternal destinies. What rational mind can calmly yield to such a result?

But we may view the same general truth in another light, namely, in its relation to faith, both in itself and in its unity. It is acknowledged on all hands that faith is an essential grace. Here again we start on common ground. The necessity for infallibility arising from this source is no less apparent and imperative than that which we have just seen growing from the nature of revelation. We all admit the Christian faith to be a divine gift. As such, like the eye, it must have an object. What would the eye be without an object adapted to it? So what would faith be without, in the same manner, an object which in its nature might correspond with it? What is the object for faith other than the truth of revelation? The living person of Christ, as the *λογος*, or the Revealer, is not distinct and separate from this general revelation. This truth of revelation is inspired truth, and therefore, as to its form, is certain and unerring. It is this truth, in this form, that constitutes the object for faith, as a divine gift. Divine truth, substantively, cannot be separated from its form, as given and fixed by inspiration. Divorce here means general shipwreck.

Here, then, are two divine or supernatural things, namely, the spiritual organ of vision (the gift of faith), seeing, and the object (the inspired truth of revelation) seen.

Now, if the truth of revelation is one, or single, as we have already seen it must, to be inspired, then it follows that this faith must also be one or single; that is, it must apprehend its object in the form in which it is given by inspiration, which, by the necessity of the case, must always be one and single. There is no way in which we may escape this conclusion. Therefore, unless revelation changes, or unless there are many and different revelations instead of one, and this one unchangeable, there must be one faith only, even as there is but one baptism and one God.

It follows from the foregoing, that faith is not and cannot be a mere opinion. Opinion takes many forms—is never fully settled. By its own nature it is something individual, and follows all the kaleidoscopic changes to which the individual is liable. In its best estate, and sustained by the highest degree of human intelligence, it involves uncertainty, and therefore, at least, the possibility of error; for if it were or could be certain, it would, *ipso facto*, not

be opinion. Now the uncertain or doubtful is not an object of faith, for it is the nature of faith to exclude doubt. Faith, as distinguished from opinion, is, in its own nature certain, just as much so as its object is, and hence is divine or supernatural; or, to 'change the order, it is divine or supernatural, and *hence* certain, and was given for the purpose of enabling man to rise above all mere sense, and opinion, and ratiocination—the whole sphere of mere mundane existence—into the supernatural order, and thus take into his moral being what he never could by reason, namely, the certain, infallible, and perfect sense of revelation, just as revelation gives it.

Now if revelation could teach, in regard to the same subject-matter, many and different doctrines to many and different minds, or if it could proclaim one doctrine to one age and a different one to another, it would manifestly not be the same revelation for each; and in these circumstances, instead of there being but one faith, there would be many and different faiths. Indeed, there would be, by the necessity of the case, as many revelations as there would be men, and as many faiths as there would be revelations. And, besides all this, they would all be in fatal conflict and contradiction. God would thus be at war with Himself. Could any rational mind regard this as the work of an infinitely wise Being? Such revelations would carry their refutation upon their own face so clearly that the most illiterate even would at once see and spurn them.

Faith, then, by its very nature, is a unit. It could not exist in any other form; for the moment it takes any other attitude or nature, or becomes many and contradictory, it ceases to be properly related to its certain object, and is mere opinion.

But what, now, is the condition on which this essential unity of faith depends? There can be immediately but one, and that plainly is the power to apprehend revelation—the object of faith—in its own infallible character. In this character, as we have seen, revelation does not and cannot teach in regard to the same subject-matter, many different and contradictory doctrines, but must always announce, as it does in fact, one and the same doctrine. That which the Apostles taught and was believed in the beginning, is that which is taught and believed now. It is the same in every age, in every clime, and to all minds; and the original commission under which this teaching is continued from age to age is also the same. Hence the nature, and hence also the ground of the unity of faith—"the faith once delivered to the Saints."

Here again, it is very clear to perception that the power capable of so apprehending revelation as to give to faith its own sure object, namely, unerring and absolutely certain truth, and in this way preserve its unity, which is essential to its being, can be noth-

ing short of infallibility. Whatever, therefore, may be the value of the unity of faith, nay, whatever may be the importance of faith itself, as a condition of personal participation in the grace of redemption, must form the measure of the necessity which exists for infallibility, since neither faith nor its unity can, in the way of fact, exist without it. Could any necessity well be more absolute? and could any touch our nature at a more vital point?

The same argument might be deduced from the nature of the Church. There is, as is theoretically acknowledged by all properly enlightened minds, but one Church. It is also clear that this Church is visible and invisible, or that these two sides inhere in its nature. As such it is an objective, organic, and historical fact in the world, compared by the Apostle to a human body—it being the “body of Christ.” It cannot, therefore, be divided. By its own nature it is a unit, and division would be destruction. This unity is invisible of course, but it is visible also; for where is the proof of the first if the last does not exist? and, moreover, how can an organism be a unit internally and not a unit externally? But we have not the space further to develop this point, and can only say that this unity of the Church, in fact, in faith, in government, and in work, is possible only on the ground of an infallible head, very clearly secured to it originally in the person of Peter and his successors to the end of time. To speak of invisible unity, as Protestants are in the habit of doing, in spite of the fact that each denomination is independent of all the rest, and in spite of the continued and bitter warfare between them in regard to the most vital doctrines of Christianity, is manifestly a pure delusion, and hardly worthy of earnest discussion. Where earnestness ceases, argument is wasted.

There is yet, however, one other consideration showing the same necessity, to which we would direct earnest attention. This is the nature of Church authority. Here again we start on common ground, at least so far as the more advanced Protestant thought extends.

There is authority in the family and authority in the State, and neither the family nor the State could exist, as all readily acknowledge, without it, except in ruins; certainly could not accomplish their own respective ends in the economy of society in its absence. The same is, of course, true in respect to the Church as the collective body of believers or the Ecclesia. Indeed, the principle of authority, even to a greater extent than is true in relation to the family and the State, is a vital part of its being. This authority, however, thus asserted, both as to the being and the mission of the Church, is peculiar altogether to itself. There is no class into which it may be arranged, and with which it would in all respects be

similar or alike. It stands alone, and all that can be properly said of it is, that it is like itself. As authority simply it is, of course, the same as that in the family and the State; that is to say, it is *real* authority. But as to its nature it differs widely from both, and mainly in the fact that it refers to the conscience and matters of faith. This renders it entirely unique. The conscience, dependent, as it is, upon a morally darkened intellect and perverted will, is not, as all are ready to admit, an infallible or safe guide, and therefore needs a controlling force beyond itself. Of course this force is moral, and not physical. The authority of the family is internal as well as external, *i e.*, it takes hold of the child mentally and physically, but is conditioned and limited at every point. The authority of the State, on the other hand, is wholly external, it having no right to command any but outward obedience, allowing full freedom to faith and the conscience.

Acts, however, arising in the conscientious conviction of being right, may be, and often are, palpably wrong. A sadly striking instance of this is seen in the melancholy conduct of Freeman, the Pocasset murderer of his child. Civil government has the right, and is, moreover, obligated, to suppress and punish such acts, if intelligently committed, however sincere the conscience from which they arise, because it is bound to protect society and punish crime. The mere fact that men are conscientiously sincere, will not, if the act is wrong and injurious, stay the restraining or punitive hand of civil authority. Brutus, when plunging the dagger into the heart of Cæsar, and Jacques Clement, when he assassinated Henry III., acted, no doubt, under a very great excitement of mind, which led them to view their attempts as deeds of heroism; and yet, if they had both been brought before the tribunal of justice, no one would have thought them entitled to impunity—the one on account of his love of country, and the other on account of his zeal for religion.

But now, just as civil law has an acknowledged right to suppress and punish wrong and injurious acts (not thoughts, feelings, or purposes) arising in conscience, so moral law, with even greater right, and quite as strenuously, condemns the wicked feelings which are the immediate antecedents of these acts. There must therefore be a power entering into the person, capable of regulating and controlling the conscience itself, irrespective of outward acts. If this is not so, then the most vital and responsible part of our being is left altogether without government, and this cannot be supposed. The authority, thus entering man's moral being, is not that of the State, but that of the Church. Its field of action is the interior of our being, just as that of civil government is the exterior; the first

having regard governmentally to our moral nature as the second has to our physical.

Here the question arises, what, in the nature of the case, must be the character and ground of that authority which undertakes to regulate the faith and command the conscience of men, or modify and mould their relations with God and eternity? Can it be any form that carries in it even the possibility of error? Clearly, it cannot; for where is the authority to compel men, in conscience, to trust their salvation to an uncertainty? Chances may do in the world of speculation, where, if you miss, you lose a dollar, or ten, or ten thousand. This is comparative trash. But it will not do where, if you miss, you lose your soul and a happy eternity. No man can preserve his sense of moral integrity and manhood who voluntarily surrenders his spiritual being to the dominion of a possible falsehood. But the absence of the rule of absolutely unerring authority means, in our circumstances, not only the possible presence of error, but always its actual presence. Our nature, through the Fall, is preoccupied with error; but where exists the power to compel men to believe a lie, and, in the significant language of Scripture, be damned? To submit to such authority voluntarily and intelligently is moral suicide. Here is the very taproot of slavery,—slavery of the very deepest sort,—the ruin, in fact, of everything in the form of moral manhood and personal responsibility. And, moreover, very clearly, it is treason against God. Against all such authority we are not only justified in rebelling, but we are bound to do it, even unto blood.

Manifestly, the voice of God alone, or unerring truth, can be authority for the conscience. How can this voice reach us practically, so as to be an authoritatively governing power in our moral nature? No progress can be made until this question is fairly met and satisfactorily answered. Is it directly through the Bible? This, as we have seen, on the principle of the fallible mind, is full of contradictions. Whilst in itself it is conceded to be the inspired will of God, to become a consistent practical rule it must be interpreted. This is the point where the real contest begins. The question is not the Bible, but biblical interpretation. How may the Bible be interpreted in such a way as to assure the conscience that the interpretation is, beyond the possibility of error, the inspired truth of God? for if it is not this it is not the Bible. Can individual reason, which in its own strength may affect to be the measure of this truth, give such assurance? This, as is known to all, is the very essence of shrivelling rationalism. Can the principle of self-authentication, which some few modern theologians affect to hold, do this? No principle has, to a greater degree, caused the divergences and contradictions touching sacred truths

which have arisen during the last three centuries. Is it possible for human creeds, springing into life to-day, to wilt and die to-morrow, the handiwork of restless, ambitious men, to give this guarantee? The question carries its own answer. Can synods and assemblies, which acknowledge in the very act of forging the rule of authority that they have not the grace of inerrancy, that they have often been mistaken in the past, as they may possibly be also in the present act, give this assurance? The fact is, that in the very effort they make to weld the links of a chain to bind this God-given freedom of others they themselves have, in the way of fact, we do not say designedly, repudiated the only authority that can bind the soul.

No! All these various forms of authority, by their own confession, and in their very nature, carry in them the principle of error, and doing this, they cannot be admitted into the conscience with power to bind and control. Instinctively the intelligent spirit shrinks from and resists them, and, acting conscientiously, must feel itself ever bound to do so.

The sense of this is coming to be very seriously felt in all directions. Men are restless under the human shackles which are made to bind them. They feel that their moral nature has been invaded and captured, and is now held in bondage, by an illegitimate power, and the sense of humiliation hereby occasioned gives them real pain. This is the reason of the earnest cry which is raised latterly in all directions against creed. Boldly are men moving into the kindly light, beginning to challenge the authorities that have forged their chains. "What right," they are asking, "have you who acknowledge your own fallibility, and often glory in it, to dictate articles for our faith, and formulate rules to coerce our conscience? Are we not your peers, and do we not stand upon the same platform?"

Clearly, for Protestant "churches," this authority, essential to the very idea of the Church, does not and cannot exist. It is a pure delusion. Their creeds are rapidly losing themselves amid the rubbish of other days. It is a remarkable fact, but a fact nevertheless, and we announce it with respect, that not one of these creeds, which created so much enthusiasm in the 16th century, commands to-day the real inward regard and confidence of its friends. It is coming to be seen in a light without a shadow that no Church, any more than any other form of organization, say the Odd Fellows or Freemasons, which does not possess, and is not able practically to apply the principle of inerrancy, can or dare claim authority over faith and conscience.

The idea of dogma, also in the light of this fact, has been in the various Protestant churches already practically abandoned, and

the policy now generally inaugurated to secure union and carry forward their respective enterprises is an appeal wholly to feeling and sentiment; thus hiding an inherent and fatal weakness, and placing themselves beyond the reach of argument—the end of which, notwithstanding, and in the near future must be, by the acknowledgment even of their own more astute friends, pure naturalism, and thus, at last, absolute failure.

Infallibility alone being God's own supernatural gift is able to give to faith its object, and to conscience its law. This cannot err, and therefore, for us, concretely and practically, it is the only ground of authority for our moral being. There can be none other; therefore the alternative is this or nothing.

No abandonment of moral manhood is involved in bowing to such authority. It is the simple, pure dictate of reason itself, and when done voluntarily and intelligently it is one of the highest as well as freest acts that man is capable of performing. Being the mediated voice of God himself, as it must be, if true, to obey it is to be truly free, and to rise consciously into our own proper being, as connected both with absolute truth and with God himself. *Veritas liberabit vos.* Not until this act is thus intelligently performed can any one fully realize its moral richness on the one hand, and, on the other, the utter barrenness of the whole moral world, where this great principle is not to be found.

Upon this principle, moreover, is solved the great problem which has commanded the finest philosophic thought of every age, viz.: How may liberty and authority be reconciled? Apparently they are mutually exclusive and repellent principles, and yet really the one demands the other, and cannot properly exist without it. Liberty without authority is libertinism, whilst authority without liberty is despotism. How may they be united so as to secure and conserve the proper nature and function of each? In themselves there is nothing to furnish the basis of this meeting and blending. By their own nature they look to and demand a third element, a mediating force beyond themselves, which will yet be in inward, real harmony with both, in and through which they may enter, permeate, and condition each other. Ultimately this third factor can be none other than sure or certain truth, or rather the grace of sure and certain truth.

Liberty and authority, both arising in this truth originally, must here again, and by its grace, become really reconciled. Here is solved what philosophy has vainly labored for ages to accomplish. The reason has no legitimate claims beyond this truth, and reason will so acknowledge. This force entering as a factor, both liberty and authority are governed by it, and thus each is preserved in its true character. Indeed, they become, on this ground, substantially

but the different sides of the same thing, and are only distinguished by different names. In the light of this fact it is clearly seen that to obey is to be free, and to be free is to obey; for the obedience here, seeing that its demand arises in truth infallibly ascertained, is not constrained or forced, as by an external arbitrary power, but springs spontaneously from the human soul, as something eternally right and fitting in itself.

The counterpart of this, as we find it in the State, is strikingly significant, and may serve very aptly to illustrate the point. The authority of civil government, whose ultimate basis is also divine, is no less unyielding, and in its own sphere, and for its own ends, infallible; infallible, however, only in the sense of being ultimate and conclusive; and it is this without even the suspicion of ignoring freedom or being despotic. It is a simple necessity; it must take this attitude in order to be free. The citizen, as such, has no civil rights beyond, or contrary to, the decision of the supreme appellate court. This decision announced, the controversy is ended, and the only duty which remains is that at least of outward submission. Take away this power of finality, or of finally determining civil rights, and the foundation of government itself is at once broken up, and freedom is converted into the merest figment of the imagination.

Here, then, unquestionably, is the ultimate and firm foundation on which rest these two strong pillars in all properly constituted society—freedom and authority—without which society must be, through all its manifold departments, in a perpetual state of anarchy and helpless confusion.

All the interest, therefore, which attaches to the principle of moral authority (and of true freedom as well), and with this, more remotely, to civil governmental authority, connected at the same time with the inward sense of reverence and personal responsibility (and no one can sufficiently estimate this, permeating, as it does, our individual nature, and spreading from thence through general society, constituting the basis of morality, the motive of virtue, and the incentive to pure and noble deeds, touching and inspiring our common humanity at ten thousand secret points); all this, we say, is due, primarily and fundamentally, to the supernatural grace of infallibility, giving certainty, and hence divine authority, to truth.

Looking at the question simply as furnishing the basis and animating spirit of Church government, what is there like it in the whole sweep of the world's history? The Emperor Maximin, in the beginning of the fourth century, who was an ardent friend of pagan worship, and the bitter foe of the rapidly rising and spreading Christian Church, recognized very clearly the mighty power

which the Church possessed in her governmental unity; and, with a view to check her progress, and, if possible, crush her, suggested a similar polity for paganism. A complete external imitation was accordingly adopted. Priests were subjected to the authority of superior pontiffs, and these acknowledged, in turn, the supreme jurisdiction of the high-priests of the province, who acted as the immediate vicegerents of the emperor himself. The white robe was the ensign of their official dignity. The new prelates were carefully selected from the most noble and opulent families of the empire. And yet, with all this compactness of organization and power of magistrates combined, it passed away like the morning cloud, or, rather, suddenly crashed, like the rotten framework of an otherwise massive temple. If the government of the Church were, in like manner, a mere pretence or outward imitation even of Heaven's own government, what could have prevented, long since, a like ruin in relation to it? On the contrary, as history fully attests, its strength has remained firm and steady all through the uprisings and downfallings of states and dynasties; and how can this historical wonder, this singular exception, be accounted for or explained, except on the ground that she actually possesses what she claims, namely, this *rock-foundation*, against which even the powers of hell cannot prevail?

These now, to extend the basis of the argument no further, are some of the positions showing the necessity for infallibility. If these positions are well taken, in other words, if they rest on solid ground, as we believe they do, then the inference must follow with a force which cannot be resisted, that the necessity, as to its nature, is simply absolute. To deny it is—to all intents and purposes—to deny revelation itself; for this, without an interpreter, in nature and authority corresponding with revelation, can never be more than a splendid supernatural abstraction, which, as such, would never have been given. To deny it—though there still would be opinion and vague conjecture touching supernatural truth, there can be no faith in the true sense of the word, and, of course, no unity of faith; for there can neither be an infallibly true object for faith, nor an unerring practical rule by which to relate faith with it. At best its object may be error, as well as truth, and is always more likely—taking human nature as it is—to be error; at least it can never be absolutely sure whether it be truth or a lie. To deny it, no one can conceive how the Church could continue with its several essential attributes, and especially that of unity. To deny it, moreover, there can be no regulated authority for conscience, and our whole inward moral nature is at the mercy absolutely, either of every perverted fancy of a depraved heart and darkened intellect, or of every tyrannical pretence seeking to enslave men, coming in

the name of authority from beyond themselves. In a word, let the denial be general and final, and we are absolutely at sea, with all the magnificent interests of Christianity, connected, too, with all the deep longings of the human soul; so that we can have neither confidence in the present nor hope in the future.

Clearly, this necessity for infallibility is entirely too serious and vital, and the consequences depending on it are too far-reaching and tremendous, not to carry with it at the same time the thing itself to which it points. It cannot be that a loving God would thus mock and tantalize His children, and especially in respect to interests which are so momentous.

Is it possible for any one intelligently to concede the presence of this necessity, so absolute in its nature, and yet think that infallibility itself could be absent? We cannot believe this. As well might you concede the presence of a similar necessity in the system of nature for the law of gravitation, and yet imagine the absence, in fact, of such a law. This cannot be; neither can the other. That, therefore, to which this necessity points, and which it so imperatively demands, must have an actual existence; and, like the law of gravitation, be, in the sphere of the supernatural order, in perpetual concrete operation from year to year and age to age. To eliminate the principle of infallibility from the order of grace, would be like destroying the law of gravitation in the kingdom of nature; in the first, no less than in the last, it would result in a universal collapse.

Infallibility, then, we have a full right from reason to conclude, is a fact, and one of the most vital and vitally far-reaching facts, not only for the Church, which is its centre, but also for the entire world.

Viewed, now, in the light of this rational necessity, instead of infallibility being absurd, as the claim is sometimes said to be by those who have not seriously studied its nature, there is nothing, in fact, that can be in deeper and more perfect harmony with reason. The absurdity lies altogether on the other side—in the flip-pant spirit by which it is decried and denounced. *A priori*, the mind looks for, and expects it, and it would be disappointed not to find it, fully as much as the man who, looking into a clear mirror, should fail to meet his own image. It would argue a radical defect in the laws of moral government. Indeed, if there be one call of reason louder and more earnest than all the rest combined, it would seem to be just that call which seeks to regain what belonged to the reason originally, but which was lost in the fall, and thus, through this reacquired supernatural gift, be surely led back on the bright lines of unerring truth, to Him in whom our being may again become complete.

We pause here to ask, Where is this infallibility, thus necessitated, to be found? Is it in *Episcopalianism*? Reluctantly and slowly the response comes—"It is not in me." Is it in *Presbyterianism*? Sharply and somewhat crabbedly the answer is—"Tis not in me." Is it in *Methodism*? In a smiling but slightly bewildered tone, the reply is the same—"It is not in me." And thus on and on, *et id omne genus*; and to the whole, if whole there be, I put the same question—is it in you? And the answer is, a deep and absolute—"No."

Still the necessity continues, and grows more earnest with every successive repudiation, and must exist somewhere. Where? And listening, I hear a calm, mild, and gentle voice, saying, "Here—'tis in me;" and, looking up, I find before me all the outlines of the grand old Catholic and Apostolic Church. She stands peerless and alone in her claim to this transcendent grace; and it is so consistent with this a priori necessity for infallibility that it must, in the view of reason, be admitted to be just.

Yes, here it has been from the beginning. Its tones were heard by kings and princes, and they uncovered their heads and reverently bowed before it. They were heard by the rude barbarian, and under them his savage nature warmed and softened into a high-toned civilized Christian man. They were heard among the lowly haunts of the poor and oppressed, and they inspired hope and courage. Truth here received an incomparable majesty and value, and faith an unconquerable life and power. The martyr at the stake or in the dungeon was by them miraculously nerved and enabled to endure the most excruciating torture in the spirit of the grandest heroism. They sounded forth among the rich and powerful, and these, hearing the call as from God, at once abandoned their ambitious pursuits of the world, and dedicated their influence and gold in rearing massive cathedrals, spacious monasteries, and ample asylums for the poor and afflicted. They entered the ears of genius, and at their bidding, as by magic, Christian art sprang into being, which, by its sweet harmony and perfect lines of beauty, allured and lifted the age-thought to heaven. Philosophy and science, and jurisprudence and history entered, by their influence, upon a new and higher mission. Truth, thus made certain, not only ennobled, but also enlarged and truly freed the human mind, gave to it celestial wings, and bade it soar grandly through the universe. Magnificent universities, at its call, were made to dot and cover the whole fair face of Europe. Civilization was led, as by its hand, to its own proper Christian plane, spreading rich blessings by means of ten thousand different conduits through the whole of society, starting the grand march of the races upwards and onwards to their true goal. And from this grand centre of

condensed supernatural power, all over and around the globe, was found to extend a vast and complicated system of spiritual graces, the like of which the world never saw before; here jubilant, and there depressed, now flattered and then persecuted, comprehending all nationalities, races, and tongues, the most lowly and abject of the human family and the most highly gifted and cultured of earth,—the king, the philosopher, the orator, the poet, the sage, and the saint,—“men studying everything, disputing in everything, replying to everything, knowing everything, yet always agreeing in unity of doctrine, bending their noble intellectual brows in respectful obedience to the one faith”—a system moving grandly through all time; old, yet with the dew of early morn sparkling upon it, kept all the while in absolute unity and harmony, the surprise and wonder of the world, the standing, speaking miracle of the ages! And how, under God, is all this accomplished? The simple answer is, by the still, calm, but potent voice of infallibility.

Truly, “Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord.”

“Do we not here,” in the language of a brilliant writer, “seem to behold another planetary system, where globes of fire revolve in their vast orbits in the midst of immensity, always drawn to their centre by a mysterious attraction. That central force allows no aberration, takes from them nothing of their extent, or of the grandeur of their movement; but inundates them with light, and gives to their motion a more majestic regularity.”

Now, infallibility, carrying with it, as by an inexorable logic as it seems so plainly to do, all the features peculiar and essential to Catholicity, you may see how and why, sincerely believing it, as I cannot help doing, I am now in this service. I am engaged in it, moreover, frankly to acknowledge that infallibility is stronger than I, and humbly to lay at the feet of the Church, from whose bosom it speaks, this little and poor chaplet, in grateful memory of her victory.*

* The writer of the foregoing article is a recent convert. To this the last few sentences refer.

ARCHBISHOP GIBBONS AND HIS EPISCOPALIAN CRITIC, DR. STEARNS.

The Faith of Our Fathers : Being a Plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church founded by Our Lord Jesus Christ. By Rt. Rev. James Gibbons, D.D., Bishop of Richmond and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Baltimore : John Murphy & Co. London : R. Washbourne.

The Faith of Our Forefathers : An Examination of Archbishop Gibbons's "Faith of Our Fathers." By Rev. Edward J. Stearns, D.D., Examining Chaplain of the Diocese of Easton, etc. New York : Thomas Whitaker. 1879.

THE first edition of Archbishop Gibbons's *Faith of Our Fathers*, appeared in December, 1876, since which time, that is, within the short period of only three years, the book has gone through no less than thirteen editions, equivalent to sixty-five thousand copies. Taking into consideration that it treats exclusively on religious subjects, and mainly, too, on those that are distinctively Catholic, the popularity enjoyed by the *Faith of Our Fathers* appears quite remarkable. And this popularity furnishes an evidence that there existed, and still continues to exist, a general demand for a Catholic publication of its character. Had it met with an indifferent reception on the part of the reading public, it is safe to assert that Protestants would probably have left it pass unnoticed. But as an eminently successful work, the Episcopal Church of this country has found it necessary to issue a counter publication. Reverend Dr. Edward J. Stearns, "at the earnest request of the Assistant Bishop of Maryland," has written a volume entitled *Faith of Our Forefathers*, thus clearly indicating by its very name what it is meant to be, namely, a refutation of Archbishop Gibbons's work.

A merely superficial glance at its contents is sufficient to dispel from any intelligent reader's mind the idea that Dr. Stearns's book can even pretend to any just claim to being a refutation. From beginning to end there is visible but one aim; that is, to cast odium upon the writer of the *Faith of Our Fathers*, and thereby upon the book itself. Its true character, as a grossly personal assault, is shown in unmistakable language on every page; and though, as a matter of necessity, it also directly attacks the Catholic Church, yet one cannot fail to perceive that it is specially designed to impeach the veracity and orthodoxy of the Archbishop. It is, of course, needless to remark that the attack is no less malignant than gratuitous, and falls perfectly harmless before the exalted dignity of the Primate of the Catholic hierarchy in this country. In

this respect it is *vox et præterea nihil*. I propose to take as little notice as possible of its character as a personal attack, but, wishing to assign it to its proper place as a literary production, I shall examine and criticise both works with regard to their parentage as well as issue, because a just and critical comparison of two rivals is always the best way to bring their respective merits or demerits into bold relief.

Inquiring, first of all, into the causes which combined to secure an almost phenomenal success to the *Faith of Our Fathers*, it will be seen that this inquiry will account, to some extent at least, for the vindictive acerbity displayed in the work of Dr. Stearns. A survey of the situation will disclose that its aggressive spirit is a desperate effort to regain lost positions. If we contemplate the attitude of the intellectual world towards religion, as it presents itself to-day, and compare it with what it was even in the recent past, we observe that a remarkable change has taken place. It cannot be said to be merely a change of scenery, a shifting, as it were, from one place to another in the same theatre. Religious strife moves to-day in another sphere altogether from what it did a decade or two ago. There was a time when the burning question of religion was confined more or less within the narrow limits of controversy between Protestantism (with a numerically formidable and steadily increasing array of sects) on one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other. But that time is past. The war then waged has been virtually decided in favor of Catholicity. The decomposition of all religious structures outside the Church of Rome, no matter how skilfully erected, no matter how powerfully supported, ever since the Reformation, goes on visibly before the eyes of men with startling rapidity; and institutions which are awaiting their doom are like falling houses. Ghastly warnings awaken the inmates of the house in the dark of night; the walls quiver, the timbers creak, the partitions can no longer muffle the strange rushing sounds behind them. Protestantism to-day, from whatever side we view it, presents unmistakable signs of having reached that stage which invariably precedes final and complete dissolution. Protestantism itself recognizes that the battle of to-day is in reality a battle between the Catholic religion and atheism, a war between the Church of Rome and infidelity. In this contest Protestantism plays no part. The world of thought shows entire indifference towards it. It treats it with disdain, with undisguised contempt, not even taking cognizance of its existence. It is excluded as a factor of no significance, and that verdict, rendered as it is, not by partisans, but by the intellectual society of the world of culture, is perhaps the most sweeping that has yet been rendered against pseudo-Christianity. If this seems a strong assertion, the move-

ment from which modern atheism has sprung may be pointed to as its verification.

The leaders of the schools of "advanced thought," in proposing their claims to our acceptance, appeal directly to reason for the rejection of the supernatural order. They begin by denying the personal Deity as worshipped by Christianity, and by denying the immortality of the soul in man. These propositions of the creed of the nineteenth century, proposed as they daily are to our mental assent, startle every one who is deeply imbued with religious sentiments. But this is not all, something still more startling lies in ambush, namely, inquiry reveals to us that these propositions rest on precisely the same basis as that on which Protestantism has been erected; for the principle of negation,—and to it the principle of private judgment, the most vital element of all Protestant denominations is admittedly reducible,—underlies also positivism, agnosticism, and whatever other systems of similar atheistic tendencies are now in vogue. Only, and this fact deserves special attention, positivism, agnosticism, in short, the scientific infidelity of modern times possess the unquestionable advantage of being at once more logical and consistent, more honest and courageous than the *soi-disant* religions, the notions of the different Protestant sects, which all draw their main strength from the same source. In the concrete, it may be readily admitted, that it is better for an individual to belong to a Protestant "church" than to no church at all; to profess the ever-changing creed of Luther, or Calvin, or Zwingli, etc., than no creed at all; but, in the abstract, it must be conceded that it is more rational and consistent *not* to believe in God than to believe in Him and, at the same time, to prescribe to Him what He may wish or command us to believe and what not. And it is this perception, of which numbers are becoming more and more painfully aware, which has acted of late so largely as a disintegrating element. The insufficiency of a religious system, with no better authority than the individual's own *bon-plaisir*, has become apparent to all thinking men. Reflective minds now acknowledge openly that they have sunk into what Goethe calls *Weltschmerz*; that is, a sense of vagueness, of hopelessness, for which the faint and disturbed semblance of real faith neither knows nor has a remedy. And, turning away from the dearth and barrenness of Protestantism, they find themselves in this position: they must give their adherence to the scientific atheism of our period, or they must turn to the religion which alone possesses the requisite element of real faith, namely, authoritative certainty. It will thus be seen that Protestantism has been the chief loser since the time that modern advanced thought gained ascendancy. For numbers of Protestants have given in, and are still giving in, their

allegiance to the fashionable creeds of the schools of science ; in consequence whereof some denominations have been compelled to join hands so closely with infidelity that their pretensions to Christianity appear as ridiculous as they are fictitious. And others, again, have, on reflection, decided to return to the true Church of God. The ranks of all non-Catholic "churches" have been thinning out in a twofold direction, and this at a ratio so rapidly increasing that absolute dismemberment appears inevitable at no far-distant day. Any one who is doubtful on this point should peruse *Rome's Recruits*, and he will hardly fail to coincide with the gloomy predictions which have been uttered quite recently in the pages of the *Nineteenth Century* by Mr. Gladstone in regard to the future of what he calls "the Anglican Paddock." To the self-same "Anglican Paddock," it must not be forgotten, credit must be given for being, indeed, the most conservative and the most powerfully supported of all Protestant denominations.

Society has, therefore, been benefited by the intellectual movement of our day in this respect, that its attention has been directed anew towards the Catholic religion. The religion that so long has been despised begins now to be examined ; the religion which offers love, even where hatred and indifference are the only response to love, begins to be recognized, and to be respected and revered. The prejudice against Rome dies gradually out, not because it is now less carefully nurtured, but because hate towards Rome is found after all to be the only point of agreement in a camp where all else is disagreement. It would not be just, however, to overlook the fact that other reasons also have been actively at work in bringing about a more favorable disposition towards the Catholic Church. It has not passed unobserved that, with affectionate solicitude, she follows man step by step from the cradle to the grave, and that her efforts for securing the spiritual welfare of her children stand not alone, but are, on the contrary, coupled with efforts not less unceasing nor less energetic for ameliorating their earthly condition and procuring for them such share of terrestrial happiness as may properly be attainable. And with this fervent devotion of the Church to all her children, whether obedient or unruly, it is seen that there goes hand-in-hand a cheerful and joyous submission, and an absolute freedom from doubt on the part of those who acknowledge her authority. Submission to her is recognized as the submission of love, and the faith which she imparts is recognized as the faith of certainty. "Whence this submission of love?" and "Whence that faith of certainty?" are questions which naturally suggest themselves, and these questions are being urged now in many quarters with wonderful insistence. And here we have struck the chord that has been set vibrating and is re-echoed by so many honest

minds; it is the willingness on their part to learn from the Church herself what answer she can give; what answer, in fact, she does give to these questions.

Manifestly, however, a readiness for receiving information about the Catholic faith does not mean a close study of the dogmatic teachings of the Church as propounded in heavy theological works. It means a desire to learn in a general way what her chief tenets are and whereon they rest. To oral teaching many still close their ears, but they refuse no longer to read about that strange institution whose strength increases in proportion to the number and power of her enemies; about that strange religion which alone has withstood the dissolving test of time, and which they admit, tacitly, it may be, and only in the innermost depths of their heart, but which, nevertheless, they do admit, to be the one and the sole lever by means of which man's soul can be lifted up, even to the embrace of divinity itself, and by which alone we can become "true children of God."

This is and has been the want of the intellectual world, and to meet this want the *Faith of Our Fathers* was written. If its author had not taken a clear comprehensive view of the religious issue of to-day, the book could hardly have failed to fall short in some respects at least. But this is not the case. The least that can be said of the Archbishop's work is, that he not only wrote what was needed, but exactly in the way in which it was needed.

There is no trace in it of the acrimonious spirit, so frequently encountered in works of this character. In a popular, yet dignified way the main doctrines of the Catholic religion are laid down so plainly and so clearly as to make misapprehension impossible. The proper distinction between a non-theological book and a professedly controversial treatise is carefully observed. The precision and minutiae of the latter are not required, and would be altogether out of place in a book intended for all classes of readers; yet, whenever either the nature of a doctrine or its history is concerned, forcible logic is invariably combined with fulness of argument and great clearness. The author indulges in no futile efforts to divest the mysteries of faith of their character as mysteries. Of mysteries we know and can know nothing as regards the intimate relation between subject and predicate; we can and do merely affirm their coexistence by an act of faith. Still, though all mysteries are destined to remain mysteries as long as our reason is incased in a material prison, that is, during the term of our terrestrial existence, there is a certain justness and a certain reasonableness attached to these mysteries which make them comprehensible to the human mind, and from which, when properly presented, we cannot withhold our assent. Now, to this side of the Catholic religion the

author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* calls particular attention. The entire conformity of the doctrines of the Church with the wants of human nature has been treated in a singularly felicitous manner, and it certainly is an aspect of true religion which can never be too clearly brought to view. The most rigid dogmatism blends harmoniously in the Catholic faith with a proper appreciation of the fact that the individual has, besides reason and will, a heart also, to the throbbings of which nature demands imperatively a response. Just here pseudo-Christianity shows its greatest weakness, the Church of Rome a divine parentage; and the gospel of hatred always shrinks away when brought into contrast with the gospel of love.

Nor is this all. The cordial welcome which Catholics and non-Catholics alike extended to the *Faith of Our Fathers* stands on other grounds also. The book in itself, taken simply as a literary production, has merits which no just critic can pass over in silence. It is distinguished by a happy elegance of diction. The language flows easily throughout, delights, yet never fatigues the reader; it enlists his interest, and does not weary; and, where occasions arise, passages of exquisite eloquence enliven the calmer tone of the narrative form. In a condensed form it brings before the reader the main doctrines of the Catholic religion, yet truth is not sacrificed to condensation. Of works of this kind the instances are rare where the critic can say as of this: "Correct in matter, concise in expression, pleasing in style, and elegant in language."

From the wide circulation which Archbishop Gibbons's book has obtained, results the uneasiness it has created in the ranks of Protestantism. The Protestant camp, very naturally, could regard it only as a dangerous enemy. And when edition followed edition, the uneasiness increased, and not unreasonably; for the apprehension that it would gain an influence proportionate to its circulation was well founded. An attempt, therefore, to check this influence by a counter-publication is a perfectly comprehensible act of self-defence and self-preservation, on the part of the Episcopal Church. Nor could anything have better served that purpose than a well-written refutation. Hence, it is easy to understand why the Reverend Dr. Edward J. Stearns was commissioned to write the *Faith of Our Forefathers*; why he was relieved during the time spent on its compilation from the onerous duties of the Episcopalian ministry; and why every aid and assistance that would further the object in view was freely given him. The difficulty of the task must not be underrated. To *have* to refute what, *ipso facto*, cannot be refuted may well overtax even a professional controversialist's good-humor. Moreover, it was not enough to publish simply a reply to the *Faith of Our Fathers*; it was necessary that the reply should

be so crushing as to annihilate utterly both book and author. If we consider, moreover, that Dr. Stearns devoted upwards of a year to finish a book of which fully one-half is a reprint of passages from the Archbishop's volume; if we consider the vast, though quite unnecessary, amount of reading which he undertook; if we consider, further, that Dr. Stearns is by his own admission familiar with controversy, a professional author, well versed in the Fathers and at home in ecclesiastical history; if, I say, we consider all this expenditure of time, and learning, and ability, and turn from this consideration to what the *Faith of Our Forefathers* really is as an answer to the *Faith of Our Fathers*, then with striking force Horace's famous line recurs to mind:

"Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus."

It is, after all, not incomprehensible why the pretended refutation proves to be only an unsuccessful attempt to impugn the fair character of the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers*. But unfortunately what may often serve as a satisfactory explanation of conduct, does not always serve as an exoneration or excuse.

As a professional author the learned doctor ought to have known that the age is past when a personal onslaught in vehement language meets with the approval of society. Culture and civilization have advanced beyond the stage where such productions please the reading public. The *Faith of Our Forefathers* savors strongly of the times when blind fury made the proclaimers of the gospel of hate regardless even of the decency of their own age. In our days, happily, such violent outbursts appear only sporadically as the remnants of an obsolete fanaticism. An earnest craving after truth forms a clearly discernible feature of all contemporary writing on the religious question, and distinguishes even the school of "advanced thought." It is missing entirely in Dr. Stearns's book, for he aims not so much at enlightening the world in regard to truth as at impressing it with the idea that his adversary is deficient in even those virtues which are most essential in the daily intercourse of life between man and man. Instead of being bent upon throwing what light he can on doctrines where the Episcopal denomination differs from the Catholic Church, he prefers to indulge with the utmost recklessness in malevolent misrepresentation. As has been already remarked, a most praiseworthy characteristic of modern literature consists in the unimpassioned temper which has obtained, and which is now as willingly conceded to discussions on the question of religion as to scientific controversy. Of this temper no trace can be discovered in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*. In its literary aspect alone, as regards style and language, the production is far below the standard of excellence of our times. An ill-selected

vocabulary does not surprise us in a demagogue haranguing, perhaps, a laborers' mass-meeting ; but it justly surprises us in an author before whose name we find the prefix "Reverend." That prefix, it seems to us, ought to be a sufficient assurance of the presence of culture and refinement, and of freedom from grossly abusive language and vulgar expressions. It is a well-known truism, that whatever we may have to say, much, very much, depends upon the manner in which we say it. The observance of this wise precept has been entirely forgotten by Dr. Stearns. On the contrary, he heaps the most gratuitous slanders on all that is Catholic, and particularly on the exponent of the Catholic Church with whom he is dealing. Some specimens of the utter recklessness with which he applies himself to this undertaking will be furnished before we close our remarks. The extent of his ignorance will prove no less astonishing than the fact that in every instance he dug a pit for himself from the depth of which no power can rescue him. Before proceeding, however, to take up any of Dr. Stearns's charges and assertions, it is proper to state what the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* himself claims for his book.

In the preface he says that he wishes to "present in a plain and practical form the principal tenets of the Catholic Church." . . . "The book was compiled during the uncertain hours which he could spare from the more active duties of the ministry;" and, finally, he avows that, "though he has sought to be exact in all his statements an occasional inaccuracy may have inadvertently crept in." From these statements several conclusions are quite obvious. In the first place, the work does not pretend to contain *all*, but only the principal tenets of the Catholic faith ; it does not, therefore, claim to comprise within its limited compass *every* doctrine ; and, hence, either an entire absence or but a brief allusion to some dogmas ceases on that ground to be chargeable against the author. Then, from the mode of its compilation it is evident that the author neither harbored the intention, nor had sufficient time at his disposal to furnish to the reader, in every instance, the exact page and volume where references or quotations were to be found. Nor is this at all a requisite in a book destined to reach the many, and not destined for the very few who, perhaps, might take the trouble and the labor of verifying every quotation. If, therefore, no other reference is given for a quotation than simply "Thomas a Kempis," no charge of inaccuracy can in fairness be preferred on that account. Lastly, if in a manuscript not carefully revised, a comma instead of a colon appears, it is not admissible to fasten on that, which very likely might be a printer's mistake, as proof of wilful and inexcusable inaccuracy or vagueness or falsification. As a matter of fact every writer knows that few manuscripts leave

the press in entirely satisfactory form. When, however, an author takes the precaution of declaring at the outset that his work does not pretend to be exempt from those slight mistakes which are found in almost every publication, no fair-minded critic can hold him responsible for these errors to such an extent as to impair the value of the work.

These preliminary remarks seem called for by the unwarranted manner in which Dr. Stearns endeavors to build upon flaws of this kind an unanswerable accusation against Archbishop Gibbons. In the preface and introduction to the *Faith of Our Forefathers* we find in a most obliging and, for our purpose, exceedingly convenient manner summed up, as it were, the crimes of which the Catholic prelate is guilty. It would be quite useless to deny their serious nature, *if true*; for veracity, that is love of truth, is a principle dear to every human being, an essential condition to securing the respect and esteem of our fellow-men, and is indispensable in the daily intercourse of life. And "lack of straightforwardness," as Dr. Stearns calls it, is what he first detects in his opponent. Next he finds him guilty of "gross and glaring misrepresentations," which designates probably the next higher stage on the ladder of depravity. But even there the crowning vice is not yet reached, for the culminating immorality of the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* consists in nothing less than "a significant keeping back of the accredited teachings of the Church;" on account of which "propensity" Dr. Stearns considers it necessary "to commend his prudence, though he would much rather commend his candor." Now, in a high dignitary of the Church this amounts either to downright dishonesty or to culpably deficient orthodoxy. These three impeachments are made in clear language. How utterly devoid they are of all foundation will be presently seen. As to all other charges, they are based upon a radical misconception on the part of the Episcopal divine as to what the main doctrines of the Catholic Church are. He labors, we regret to say, under an erroneous impression, for whatever constitutes in *his* opinion and in *his* estimate a main doctrine of the Catholic faith forthwith acquires, on the strength of his opinion and in virtue of his estimate, validity as such. The deplorable blindness of the Catholic Church is, however, so great that it has ventured to hold for wellnigh two thousand years, and will venture to hold in the future, an opinion independent of Dr. Stearns's view of the matter. A misconception of this sort invalidates, of course, many of his bold assertions. If conversant with integral calculus he probably would have differentiated more properly between "Catholic doctrines" and "*his* opinions of Catholic doctrines." And with this remark we dismiss the bulk of his slanderous attack.

Waiving, however, this point as to the three grave impeachments, we may ask what is the basis on which the alleged "commendable prudence" and "lack of straightforwardness" rest? What evidence supports them? Are they to be admitted as well-founded charges, or are they entirely gratuitous assertions? Dr. Stearns opens fire with a complaint. He says: "Here is *all* (italics ours) I can find in the whole four hundred and thirty-three pages on the Immaculate Conception," and gives then the following very clear and very concise, though condensed definition of the dogma at the end of the quotation: "In the doctrine of the supreme power of Peter as the visible foundation of the Church, we have the *implied* assertion of many rights and duties which belong to the centre of unity. In the revelation of the supereminent dignity and purity of the Blessed Virgin there is implied her exemption from original sin, etc." "Hence, Pascal truly says man is a greater mystery to himself without original sin than is the mystery itself." "The Church, however, declares that the Blessed Virgin Mary was exempted from the stain of original sin by the merits of our Saviour, Jesus Christ; and that, consequently, she was never for an instant subject to the dominion of Satan. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception." Commenting on this discovery, Dr. Stearns goes on: "Here is the whole 'exposition and vindication,' and, coupling it with the absolute silence of the book on any special veneration of the Virgin above that of the other saints, and, contrasting it with the well-known and universal practice of the Roman Church, we may well say, we have here the tragedy of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out." The fact, therefore, that the *Faith of Our Fathers* contains only a definition of the dogma, a definition which is full and covers the whole teaching of the Church on this point,—a fact that Dr. Stearns does not controvert at all,—this fact then goes to prove, according to Dr. Stearns's logic, that the Metropolitan of the Catholic hierarchy abstained on purpose from dwelling at any length on the subject, else he would have devoted a greater number of lines to its elucidation. This, to say the least, strikes us as rather a novel mode of reasoning. Let us take an analogous case. A learned mathematician publishes a popular work on geometry; to the Pythagorean thesis he devotes only, say, nine lines. Now the critic must find, according to Dr. Stearns, that the professor of mathematics is either deficient in the knowledge of mathematics, or that he is afraid the thesis, if expatiated upon at any length, would invalidate other parts of his book. Such complete tergiversation on common-sense, not to say logic, is, indeed, very rare in the annals of controversy. Dr. Stearns is, of course, at perfect liberty to infer from the number of lines in which certain information is imparted, a conscious suppression of

truth on the author's part; he is at perfect liberty to strain every premise beyond its capacity and draw inadmissible conclusions. For this we do not find fault with him; but what we do find fault with him for is that he offers his ridiculous assertions as incontestable evidence to the reading world, which he ought to suppose possesses at least a moderate share of sound sense. We certainly do not object if he chooses to amuse himself in this harmless way, but such arguments do not serve as a favorable introduction to intelligent readers.

But this is not all; he omitted, strange to say, to ascertain even whether this negative evidence, meagre and worthless as it is, is supported by reality, and it so happens that reality does not support it. The facts of the case briefly stated are these: Before the printer's ink was dry on the pages of the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, in not less than fifteen thousand copies of the Archbishop's book sold *before* the appearance of Dr. Stearns's volume of slander, there is to be found a chapter of thirty-eight pages, in which the veneration paid by Catholic Christendom to our Saviour's Mother is fully explained. This fact stands on no debatable ground, because as many copies as have been printed and sold with that chapter in them, so many witnesses declare Dr. Stearns's assertion to be a base calumny. Supposing that the chapter in question had not been added until the complaint of Dr. Stearns had been lodged in print; in that case, even, the insertion of thirty-eight pages on the Blessed Virgin would have virtually contradicted all that the Episcopal controversialist had the boldness to assert. But when he cannot deny that he asserted in a positive manner as true what at the time he wrote the assertion, at any rate at the time the statement appeared in print, was *not* true, he will have to admit that the "gross and glaring misrepresentations," of which he was so anxious to find another guilty, fall back upon and remain fastened on himself.

No attempt has ever been made to erect a structure of vilification on a more shadowy basis than Dr. Stearns's. At the time he had the manuscript ready for the press, he *might*, and, as a controversialist who "knows something of the windings-in-and-out of Roman controversialists," he *ought* to have been circumspect enough to ascertain whether any change had been made in the editions subsequent to the one he had before him. He would, thereby, have saved himself the unenviable position of telling to the world what every purchaser of a copy of the *Faith of Our Fathers* discovers at once to be absolutely and undeniably untrue.

Where then is the proof that "out of prudence" and out of "lack of straightforwardness" the first few editions contained no more about the Blessed Mother of Our Lord? Did not, on the

contrary, the author, the moment he saw his book acquire a circulation beyond his most sanguine expectations, at once decide to carefully revise the whole, and to add to it a chapter on a point which is properly understood by few persons outside of the Catholic Church? Did he not perceive himself that the numberless hands through which the book passed made it desirable to be more explicit on the dogma of the Immaculate Conception? So much as to this "gross and glaring misrepresentation," which, on examination, has turned out to exist not in the *Faith of Our Fathers*, but in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*. True, Dr. Stearns probably does not share the sentiments which Catholics nurse carefully in their breasts for the Mother of Him who gave us back to life, and who placed forever the Virgin Mother between us and the Serpent. Nor does he, though minister of a "church" that claims to be Christian, rise to the height which outsiders reach in our day in reference to the Catholic devotion to the Blessed Virgin. He may not appreciate the deep truth so beautifully expressed by a literal skeptic in the following words: "Whatever man most reveres in mother, wife, and sister, that he will know is holy everywhere and forever, and is exalted high over all things in one of like nature with theirs, the Mother of Grace, the parent of sweet clemency, who will protect him from the enemy, and save him in the hour of death." Still he might have spared himself the ridicule attached to the absurd belief that the incumbent of the See of Baltimore does not hold the accredited teachings of the Church on this point. Apart from all this there are other considerations which ought to have proven more than sufficient to keep Dr. Stearns from this *faux-pas*. He pretends to know the Catholic Church; he admits her to possess a wonderful organization; he states himself that she cuts off from her fold relentlessly whosoever does not believe the fulness of her teachings. Nevertheless he is ready to believe that a high dignitary has been suffered to palm off as Catholic doctrine for three years what she repudiates as incorrect.

On all grounds, therefore, the charge based upon Archbishop Gibbons's alleged reticence, or suppression of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, presents an aspect as senseless as it is ridiculous. It is a libel in its very nature, so much so that it offers to intelligent and well-balanced minds neither a point of dispute nor of difference of opinion concerning its true character. Against arguments of this kind, if it be allowable to call this mental process argument, it is impossible to contend. The fault of the critical judgment of Dr. Stearns in this matter is not its greater or less deviation from the standard of justice and truth, but its want of any relation whatever to any such standard. The reading public, at any rate the fair-minded portion of it, recognize that sympathy

and antipathy will influence more or less the verdict of every writer ; but all agree in this, that personal likings or dislikings must be kept from seriously interfering with the justice of the verdict. If the reverend doctor's judicial faculty appeared to be biassed only in this, or a few instances at most, it might be pardoned, but his *naïveté* in maintaining that the verdict which he renders is the one that ought to be rendered, because it is the one he desires to render, is kept up throughout, and becomes, consequently, a propensity absurd as well as irrational, especially in a professional controversialist.

In one place, indeed, he has not hesitated to lay before us an example of it, which will serve as a sufficient illustration that he really and truly holds his personal opinion alone infallible, and consequently thinks it must virtually supersede the universal opinion of Christendom down to his day. He instructs us in one paragraph that our Lord did not say to Peter, "Thou art a rock, and upon this rock, etc.," but simply "Thou art rock, etc." In the preceding paragraph he kindly informs us that "they (that is the Fathers, who, as he admits, make Peter the rock) are all off the track, as are also all the modern commentators that I have consulted, and they are not few." From this declaration it is manifest that the whole world, Protestant and Catholic alike, has been deeply in error so far as this passage and its proper interpretation are concerned. For he declares that the Fathers are "off the track," and all the authorities he consulted, and hence must have necessarily misinformed the Faithful. Poor error-stricken humanity! one is tempted to exclaim, for nineteen hundred years hast thou lain in darkness, until Dr. Stearns has rescued thee from obscure visions. Render thanks to him, who, not out of Christian charity, however, but out of malice against his opponent, dispelled thy illusions and gave to thee the light of truth. How deeply must not the world feel indebted to Archbishop Gibbons for having been the means of eliciting from the Episcopal minister that precious light, which, for all we know, might otherwise never have dawned upon it.

But let us turn to another amusing example of precious logic. It occurs in the chapter on the infallible authority of the Church. Quoting from the *Faith of Our Fathers*, Dr. Stearns begins: "There can be no faith in the hearer unless there is unerring authority in the teacher," and comments upon this statement as follows:

"Is this so? Either the Archbishop *knows* that there is 'unerring authority' in the Church, or he does *not* know it. If he does not know it, then, according to his own argument, only six lines above in the same paragraph, he does *not* know, when he is listening to her, whether he is 'listening to truth or to falsehood.' If he does know it, then his reception of her teachings is not 'faith,' but 'sight,' that is knowledge; there is no moral quality in that reception any more than in his reception of the truths of arithmetic and geometry above mentioned; he simply walks by sight, not by faith, contrary to the example of St. Paul, who walked 'by faith, not by sight.' It is not

true then, *necessarily*, that 'faith excludes doubt.' It may, or it may not; that depends on its strength. *Knowledge* excludes doubt; but it excludes faith (religious faith) also. Hence in that world where we shall know as we are known, faith is lost in sight, as hope also is swallowed up in fruition."

Here we have an ill-concealed sophistry before us; for, as will be shown presently, to possess the knowledge that a teacher is unerring, is not equivalent to possessing the knowledge of what he teaches us, that is, a full comprehension, to the exclusion of doubt, in regard to what the teacher proposes to our mental assent. For instance, we believe that God is One and yet Three, Trinity in Unity. We believe this, not because of our knowledge that three is one, but because it is presented to us by an authority which we do not question. Our knowledge, therefore, that the authority on the strength of which we assent to the proposition is incapable of proposing to our acceptance anything but truth, this knowledge alone makes us believe it; but this knowledge imparts to us no knowledge equal to sight, of the intrinsic nature of the proposition. We believe in the Triune God, because He, the author of truth, has revealed it to us, but not because we know that three make one, or that one is three. Hence, to believe in the infallibility of the Church does not involve, as Dr. Stearns means to imply, an absolute knowledge, a complete understanding of what the Church enounces to her children as true and bids them believe. And in this sense, and in this sense only, as the Archbishop maintains, does faith exclude doubt; that is, we feel certain, absolutely certain. We possess the knowledge of the inability on the part of God's Church to propose anything as a dogma to be believed but what is true. Faith, again, is not thereby bereft of its moral element; for, all the mysteries of Christianity cease not to be incomprehensible because of our knowledge of the infallibility of the Church as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the Divine Founder Himself. Without that knowledge, on the contrary, faith would lose its moral element; for, in emphatically declaring that three is one, we assert something which would be irrational and absurd were it not for our knowledge that God is truth, by which alone our belief acquires virtue as a morally meritorious act of faith. It must not be presumed, however, that ignorance of where the line between faith and knowledge is drawn misled Dr. Stearns. For, in the paragraph immediately following the one which we have quoted, the acquaintance of the author of the *Faith of Our Forefathers* with the correct meaning of both words is clearly evinced. He imputes to them an erroneous sense only as long as by doing so he can misrepresent Archbishop Gibbons. It ill befits a candid intellect to resort to such means in order to pervert a correct

statement. In a child such behavior would be termed silly. What shall we call it in a full-grown man when treating subjects of the gravest import?

A strain of reasoning similar to this in point of soundness winds from page to page. Occasionally a passionate personal outburst, and sometimes vehement invectives against all that is Catholic, break the monotony. The reiteration that Dr. Stearns's interpretation is the only correct and admissible interpretation, appears with disgusting frequency, and ends invariably with the refrain, "those who differ from me are wrong." The book is written with an unwarrantable assumption of authority, and it is a foolish notion to presume that society is so circumstanced that it lends a credulous ear to stories the contents of which, before they can be accepted, require reason to abdicate its proper functions. Any one who is bent with all earnestness upon finding fault with another, is liable to be carried away by overzeal. It seems to engender a certain recklessness, and that probably led to the subsequent charge on turning to the Sacrament of Penance. It is there that the author promises in the preface to adduce proofs of what he affirms to be the gravest offence of the opponent. Let us tell how the pledge is redeemed.

Dr. Stearns's charge is garbling. St. Basil furnishes the material—the *corpus delicti*. It is not, however, garbling pure and simple, but garbling under aggravated circumstances. To use, for the sake of unimpeachable accuracy, the elegant language of Dr. Stearns, we quote at length the following:

"I am sorry to say I have detected him (the Archbishop) in a garbling of St. Basil in what purports to be a continuous and consecutive quotation from the *Regula brevis*—lumping into one continuous paragraph sentences that are *only* twenty-four folio pages (of the Benedictine edition) apart from each other, and stopping short in the first part of the quotation with a period where St. Basil puts a comma, because to have given the rest, which could have been done in half a dozen lines, *would have defeated the purpose for which the citation was made!*" The proof of this will come in due time."

Happily we have here a positive assertion, an explicit statement of facts, and facts, moreover, given with enough detail to be capable of proof. And the proof, let us remark, in order to be valid and full, must cover two points. In the first place, it must be shown that the omitted part of the sentence alters materially the meaning and virtually defeats the purpose for which the quotation was made. And, in the second place, it must be established that the period, instead of the comma, has been put there with the intention to deceive the reader into the belief that the two sentences form one whole. If the first point be settled in Dr. Stearns's favor, we admit that it would furnish strong presumptive evidence that the

period had been substituted for a comma with the intention and purpose of deception.

In this case, again, there are no less than fifteen thousand witnesses, namely, so many copies of the revised edition of the *Faith of Our Fathers*, proclaiming the value which Dr. Stearns's emphatic promise possesses; for the passages from St. Basil do not appear as "one continuous whole." The obnoxious comma and period are done away with and the two passages are separated by an interpolated sentence. Irrefragable evidence, therefore, points clearly to this: that there could not have been in the mind of the author any intention of making the two citations appear to be one continuous paragraph. And this evidence becomes conclusive if we bear in mind that the two passages were separated at a time when Dr. Stearns's objections were still lurking in the dark. Obviously, then, whatever Dr. Stearns's view of the matter may be, in Archbishop Gibbons's estimate their severance did not impair the value of their testimony, else, on revising his book, he might just as well have eliminated both. There still remains another question to be answered: Do the passages, if given in full, change the sense or not? Do they, as Dr. Stearns asserts, defeat the purpose for which they were chosen, or do they not? And since the Episcopal divine refers with an almost triumphant voice to chapters xx. and xxv. of his volume for proof, it may serve a good purpose to inspect closely the nature and the weight of his testimony. Turning to chapter xx. one is surprised by the fact that it contains not so much as the slightest allusion to St. Basil and the alleged garbled passages. So, without further animadversions, we pass quietly to the chapter on the Sacrament of Penance. To understand properly this chapter in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, it is, however, necessary first to go over the corresponding chapter in the Archbishop's volume, and so I shall state briefly what points are mainly dwelt upon therein.

The Sacrament of Penance is shown to be a divine institution from Scripture texts which admit no misconception. Then, taking St. John xx. 21-23, the Archbishop draws three conclusions from the unequivocal language in which our Lord confers therein the power of forgiving sins upon the Apostles. These three conclusions are: First, that the power of forgiving sins was not restricted to the Apostles, but is transmitted to their successors in the same manner in which the power to preach, baptize, confirm, ordain, etc., is transmitted; secondly, that the forgiveness of sins was to be obtained ordinarily through the ministry of the Apostles and their successors; thirdly, that this power of forgiving sins on the part of God's ministers involves the obligation of confessing them on the part of the sinners. These three deductions are made with an

irresistible force of logic, and in language so precise as to leave no doubt on the reader's mind. Yet to augment the strength of the Scripture texts, quotations from the Fathers are added, because "their testimony as witnesses of the faith of their times" must be accepted even by those who call in question their personal authority. The object in citing the Fathers is defined to be this, that they confirm the existence of sacramental confession in the Church at all times, and that they all unanimously insist upon the necessity of sacramental confession as a divine institution. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that any passages having particular reference to public confession can in no way go to disprove private or auricular confession; for public, as well as private confession, is comprised in the term "sacramental confession." And this is all the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* desires to establish by the testimony of the Fathers, as is rendered more obvious by the fact that the word "private confession" is not used until later on.

Again, confession, whether public or private, embraces all sins, sins of thoughts, of words, of actions, and of omissions, and extends the obligation of confessing all mortal sins to all who resort to the tribunal of penance, while the confession of venial sins is strongly recommended. I have endeavored to make this point quite clear, because it is not admissible to impute a meaning to a word used by an author different from that which the author himself imparts to it, and it is still less admissible to presume that a Catholic prelate in an exalted position, writing for the instruction of the public, could be ignorant of the meaning of "sacramental confession." And now to the questions themselves. In the early editions of the *Faith of Our Fathers* we find;

"St. Basil writes: 'In the confession of sins the same method must be observed as in laying open the infirmities of the body; for as these are not rashly communicated to every one, but to those only who understand by what method they may be cured, so the confession of sins must be made to such persons as have the power to apply a remedy. Necessarily, our sins must be confessed to those to whom has been committed the dispensation of the mysteries of God. For thus also are they found to have acted who did penance of old in regard of the Saints. For it is written in the Acts, they confessed to the Apostles by whom they also were baptized.'"

In the revised editions, after the word "remedy," Archbishop Gibbons remarks: "Later on he (St. Basil) tells us who those persons are," and continues then "necessarily, etc." Dr. Stearns gives his translation of Question 229 and answer, and Question 288 and answer, as found in the Benedictine edition, as follows:

"Q. 229. Whether forbidden actions ought to be laid open, *citra verecundiam*, to all, or to whom and of what sort?

"A. The discovering of sins has the same rules as the making known of bodily ailments; as, then, men do not reveal the ailments of the body to all, but to those skilled

in, their cure, so also the discovery of sins ought to be made to those able to cure them, as it is written (Rom. xv, 1), 'Ye, then, that are strong, bear the infirmities of the weak, *i. e.*, by care remove them'

"Q. 288. Whether he who wishes to confess his sins ought to confess them to all, or to any chance persons (*quibuslibet*), or to whom?

"A. . . . Sins must be confessed to those who have been put in trust with the mysteries of God. For thus they also are found to have acted who of old did penance in the presence of the saints (*ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων*, *coram sanctis*). For it is written in the Gospel (St. Matthew iii.) that they confessed their sins to John the Baptist, and in the Acts, to the Apostles themselves by whom they were also baptized."

Dr. Stearns maintains that the first question and answer relate not to confession of sins, or, as he puts it, to the disclosing of spiritual ailments by the laity to the clergy, but "by the weak to the strong." For that reason he translates "*peccatorum confessio*," which occurs twice in the answer of St. Basil, not with "confession of sins," but with "discovery of sins." Now, if Dr. Stearns's version of the case were true, St. Basil would do nothing less than affirm the absurdity that the power to forgive sins was delegated to clergy and laity alike, which would flatly contradict his own words; whereas, if we apply the only correct and possible interpretation, we find St. Basil enjoins upon the ministers of God to cure the weak from their infirmities, that is, as Dr. Stearns himself admits, "to remove them by cure." The addition, therefore, of Rom. 15: 1 to the Archbishop's citation, far from changing the meaning of the preceding words, only strengthens and affirms them. And the passage chosen from answer to Question 288 has been selected most advantageously, because it leaves no room for doubt whom St. Basil meant by the "strong." "*Peccata iis confiteri necesse est quibus mysteriorum Dei concredita dispensatio est*," runs the Latin in the Benedictine edition, though Dr. Stearns quietly ignores in his translation the "*necesse est*" altogether.

Now, is it possible to conceive that St. Basil understands by those "to whom the dispensation of the mysteries of God has been committed" clergy and laity? This passage, taken together with the answer the Saint makes to the question, "whether forbidden actions have to be laid open to all," namely, to those only "who have the power to apply a remedy," establishes, we take it, beyond the faintest shadow of doubt, and in a most conclusive manner, that by "the strong" he meant only the Clergy.

He talks about "confession of sins" in both cases; he bids the Christians of his time to confess only to those who can heal in the one case, and only to those to whom God has intrusted the dispensation of His mysteries in the other case. Does it not obviously follow that the latter distinction confers upon them the privilege of possessing the healing powers he alludes to in the former? All, then, that is required to reduce Dr. Stearns's absurd assertion to

its proper value, is an analysis which every intelligent mind can make without any exertion. Dr. Stearns contends, however, that the whole answer to Question 288 refers only to public confession, as if public confession were not sacramental confession! And, therefore, he says with much emphasis, "the Archbishop has *prudently* omitted the reference to John the Baptist"! This caps the climax. The fact that confession was made to John the Baptist weakens the fact that confession was made to the Apostles! Unless we assume this, the omission of the words in the Gospel, "they confessed their sins to St. John the Baptist," is quite irrelevant.

For this omission an obvious reason suggests itself. The author of the *Faith of our Fathers* is engaged in demonstrating the existence of sacramental confession since the earliest days of the Church. Confession to the Apostles is, therefore, quite important to note; but, so far as his object is concerned, it is quite immaterial whether, or not, the precursor of our Lord prepared, by "confession before the dispensation," the way to sacramental confession. But, under all circumstances, confession in the time of St. John the Baptist cannot detract from, but only add to, the weight of confession in the time of the Apostles. Besides, on what ground does Dr. Stearns base his persistent assertion that the confession to St. John the Baptist was public? It is a perfectly gratuitous assumption on his part, for Scripture defines in no place whether that confession was public or private.

As long as we follow the dictates of common-sense, and reason, and logic, the evidence put forth by Dr. Stearns to invalidate the testimony of St. Basil, as given in the *Faith of our Fathers*, all turns against the Episcopal divine. And it is difficult, indeed, to stretch imagination far enough to assume that St. Basil honored Dr. Stearns with a private interview in order to enable him to disabuse the world of the opinion that St. Basil was a learned and great Saint, enjoying a well-deserved renown for his deep knowledge of philosophy and theology, and to authorize Dr. Stearns to exhibit him instead as a simpleton, who meant to prove one thing, but unfortunately proved its opposite.

It will thus be seen that the Archbishop simply conformed to the custom of the literary world in using only parts of the answers in his book; for, where he stopped, there the sentences virtually end which he proposed to introduce; and this is in accordance with universal practice. It is true that, in the first editions of the *Faith of our Fathers*, after the word "remedy," a reference on the margin of the page that it stands on page 492 of the Benedictine edition of St. Basil, *might* have been given, had Archbishop Gibbons designed his book for learned scholars; but for doing this in his present work one fails to perceive a reason, since, as has been re-

marked before, the book is a popular exposition intended for the generality of readers, where briefness must be the principal object, and where such a reference would have been pedantry.

These charges, therefore, which the writer of the *Faith of our Forefathers* regards as of the utmost importance, dwindle down on close examination to an insignificant omission of an asterisk, which grave crime, however, is confined to the first editions of Archbishop Gibbons's book. Only by a complete disregard of logic and common-sense, and by arrogating to himself the privilege of knowing better what St. Basil meant to say than common mortals can infer from the Saint's own words—only thereby has Dr. Stearns been able to establish a semblance even of truth; whereas, in reality, the whole testimony turns against him, and sustains in full the Archbishop.

Instances of a like acute mode of reasoning are not rare in the course of Dr. Stearns's work; but, since it is not within the scope of this paper to refute the *Faith of our Forefathers*, the instances given must suffice. There is a copious array of quotations from the Fathers in the book, showing great diligence and a praiseworthy familiarity with them on the part of this Protestant minister, but he presumes rather too much upon the credulity of his readers by invariably insisting that the Fathers who say one thing in the Catholic version say just the reverse in *his* version. Yet these are the only points raised which require even an examination to clear up. If we turn to the others which Dr. Stearns attempts to raise we are at a loss how to proceed, for he exhibits a supreme contempt of all rules of logic, and rejects what is commonly considered evidence as no evidence at all, while what all others deny to be competent evidence he insists must be accepted as conclusive proof.

For instance, special correspondence of a second-class newspaper, a sectarian paper, moreover, that circulates only among the adherents of certain denominations, is presented as irrefragable historical proof. It needs only a slight acquaintance with the amount of reliance that can be placed upon newspaper correspondents to see that testimony of that character may serve well in a political campaign, but is not in its proper place in a serious controversy. And in both cases in which Dr. Stearns jubilantly flourishes a newspaper article as solid incontrovertible testimony before his readers it so happens that he refers not to leading papers of well-known standing, but to very obscure publications.

More hopeless, still, does the case grow when he touches upon ecclesiastical and secular history. In the chapter on the celibacy of the clergy various tendencies, we presume, lead him to enumerate not less than "three female popes" and "not less than a hun-

dred thousand mistresses in fifty thousand parsonages." Now a standard history, though by no means indisputable evidence, carries at least a certain weight; for on the strength of recognized historians many falsehoods concerning the Catholic Church have obtained currency. But it is not to historical works of established standing that Dr. Stearns refers us. He refers us to a historical sketch of sacerdotal celibacy, which is as unknown as it is untrue. In our days historical researches are being made with such rigid impartiality, even by Protestants, that it is sheer recklessness to ignore the concurrent testimony of the latest investigations. Charles Gebler, accepted by English critics and English historians as a most thorough inquirer, threw light upon events hitherto maintained by some authorities, which it would be irrational to believe now. Dr. Stearns has overlooked Dr. P. Tams's work on the Spanish Inquisition. But passing by these specialists of recent date, is it possible that Schlosser, Becker, Welter, Puetz, Ditmar, Armegarn, and others of equal renown and equal standing in the eyes of the civilized world, are unknown to Dr. Stearns? Yet they all pronounce against Dr. Stearns, and they are historians of a period with which one "well conversant with history" ought to be well acquainted.

We hesitate not to say that the *Faith of Our Fathers* might have been and could have been made more complete, more exhaustive, nay, stronger even in some respects. But, in that case, the work would have grown into a ponderous volume, and in that case it would have necessarily failed to accomplish the end for which it was intended; so that, while not absolutely free from imperfections—and what book was ever written with which a critic could not find fault—it retains its place of usefulness nevertheless, and will continue its beneficial mission despite the assault of Dr. Stearns.

Meanwhile we may suggest to Dr. Stearns to ask himself whether he seriously expects that his own unsupported individual declaration will upset the opinion of the world. According to him, all Catholics, along with Cardinals Manning, and Newman, and Wiseman, are "drivelling idiots," who must plead "guilty to moral and intellectual suicide," a verdict wherein the world does not quite agree with our infallible Episcopalian. It may so happen that he will not "take up the corpse and carry it forth and bury it out of sight," but rather that the world will leave his book

"To lie in cold obstruction and to rot."

ENGLISH MANNERS.

SOCIETY in any country must be largely affected by its political and historical institutions. A monarchy and a republic breed different ideas. An autocracy makes sharper lines than a constitution, though a constitution creates many more classes; it creates, therefore, a variety of aristocracies. In England there are five kinds of aristocracy, each distinct, yet each woven into the other; but all, more or less, naturally developed out of the traditions and characteristics of the people. There is the aristocracy of title, of land-owning, of political power, of money, of reputation, of personal caste. ("Birth" is but the accident of all five.) Personal caste is the least definable of the number, being rather an impression or an appreciation than an arithmetical estimate of worth. It will sometimes happen that a man who is a nobody, either by birth, by position, or by property, acquires a social status which is regarded as being his right, though he does not seem to have done anything to earn it. This is the rank of individuality. In every country it is seen to exist, but in England it exists as an institution. It is an institution which has no canons, no embodiment, but which is sovereignty self-asserting, yet accepted. Its acceptance is the homage which the smallness of conventionalism offers to all personal superiority. There are many men of title in England who have less social caste than certain commoners; and there are certain commoners, too, who without being "self-made," are made by nature to take precedence of lords. England is a free country in spite of its aristocracy; nor does any country in the world more appreciate personal caste, while at the same time it bows low to "the great." The English are both vulgar and sublime. They bend the knee to the accidents of greatness, but they bend the head and the heart to its essences.

Most conventional yet most independent of people, the English are anomalous yet consistent. Let us assume for a postulate that every people in the world both possess and look up to an aristocracy. The red Indian lowers his head to his great chief, to the father of his tribe, or of his settlement. Every household in this world has its "best," in point either of authority or of gift. To ridicule aristocracy is to ridicule creation, for there is scarcely an atom of it without a higher and a lower. The only question for the philosopher is how in modern society to establish the truest canons of respect. Now in England there are certain broad, popular fallacies, as distinct as are the five aristocracies. We do not mean to say that such fallacies are purely English, but that English institutions give them play. The same fallacies exist every-

where in kind, but they are not everywhere so demonstrative or so blatant. A titled aristocracy of itself begets the fallacy that an aristocracy without title is less distinguished. The mere calling of names is assumed to exalt a person, as though his name became a part of his very nature. Yet a name cannot in any way offset a person. His possessions like his merits remain precisely what they were before he was made Duke of London. But title, it may be said, is a recognition of distinction. It is so, undoubtedly, in the first possessor; but its inheritance is an accident of birth. Accept it, however, as a recognition of merit, in the person to whom it is first given; yet it is not the title but the personal merit which should command intellectual homage. Now the English worship primarily the title, and render inferior homage to the merit. There are no people in the world who so profoundly worship title as the free and enlightened British public. You have but to mention a lord,—or even a half lord, a baronet,—and there is an immediate disposition to look up to him as essentially, not accidentally, your superior. There are some good people who put themselves to dreadful pains to get into the society of lords; who make themselves miserable, and live far beyond their means, so that they may be able to boast of great acquaintances. There are others who have the peerage at their finger's ends, and who never seem so happy as when they can correct you as to the mysteries of "De Brett," and "Walford," and "Burke." You will hear a "tuft-hunter" speak of some third-rate insignificant as being essentially a man to be known, because he is a cousin of Lord B. Character, attainment, high breeding, even heroism, are all subordinated by such persons to rank. To be titled, or near to title, is life. And this disease, the morbid worship of big names, permeates the whole range of the middle classes. Even those who are not infected by it breathe the taint. While most Englishmen thoroughly appreciate real worth, few Englishmen turn the back on empty name.

It follows that a man who is the bearer of a title must esteem himself more honorable than a commoner; and so he may be, at least, in this one consequence, that some titles imply a seat in the House of Lords. But it is due to titled Englishmen to say that, as a rule, they do not vaunt their own titular superiority. Perhaps they have no reason to do so. Their "inferiors" vaunt it quite enough for them. Yet English peers are not boastful or vulgar men; on the contrary, they are conspicuously well-bred. It is quite the exception for any really great man to give himself airs or take liberties. There is even a fashion of modesty about this class. And it is a little singular, that the vulgarity of title-worship is confined almost exclusively to the untitled. Per-

haps it may be said that the sublime complacency of rank—or what Disraeli called the “magnificent affectation”—is an elegant and graceful substitute for obtrusion. Yet this would be to judge too interiorly, and it would, too, be dishonoring and not just. No, the English aristocracy is a representative body of good breeding, high intelligence, and fair merit. It is only when we get down among the sham aristocracy,—the lower strata of pushing, struggling, would-be great,—that we are sometimes made to smile at pretensions to exaltation, without its social or its personal credentials.

Indeed, the pushing and the struggling which goes on among the middle classes, among the incalculable strata of “the respectable,” is suggestive of a “Sisyphusism,” which is always rolling itself up hill, but always hurting itself by reaction. Most comic are the subdivisions of respectability, which are accepted and even approved by the middle classes. The retired tradesman, who lives in a neat villa, presses close upon the heels of the struggling merchant; while the struggling merchant is fondly flattered by the notice which the successful, opulent stockbroker may extend to him. This is no more than human nature; yet it has one positively demoralizing weak side, and that is disrespect for inferiors. The worst bane of English manners, and this too in all classes, is the graduated scale of politeness, or of rudeness towards either the superior or the inferior. Thus a man will very seldom raise his hat in return to the salutation of an inferior; he will take the inferior's homage as his right. He will nod to him, smile on him, even speak to him, but he will not recognize his claim to politeness. Inversely the inferior will “pocket” the indignity, as no more than what is becoming from a superior. Ten thousand a year has the right to be impertinent; one hundred a year must not resent it. It is true that mere money does not make the sole distinction; yet accepted social grade marks the canons. A shopkeeper is not “hatted” by a gentleman. This is the established English canon. A thorough-bred gentleman will, of course, “hat” a shopkeeper if a shopkeeper respectfully salutes him; but the thorough-breds in nature, not in place, are as rare in Great Britain as in the States. It will be replied that on the Continent, say in France or in Italy, the reciprocal salutation is but conventional; it is rendered, it is even demanded, between all classes, but it has no further signification than established rule. Accepting such a statement—which, however, admits of argument—we should only answer that the Latin races have the best of us. But we venture to assert that there is a deep religious meaning and Catholic and most interior philosophy, in the principle of outward homage to inferiors. The principle is the confession of the dignity of poverty,

and of the unmerited good fortune of wealth. It gives to virtue, and natural gift, and acquired merit, a just claim to be recognized and respected. It may come to be but conventional in its hourly uses, but its repudiation would be esteemed to be brutish. To salute may mean but little, perhaps nothing; not to salute would mean much. And, in addition to the philosophy of mutual homage, its Christian and even natural sound sense, there is the question of convenience, which is painfully important in our hourly interchanges with one another.

In England the inconvenience of bad manners embitters a good deal of the social life. A man is always liable to be offended by the graduated impertinence of his superiors, and always liable to cause pain to others by not seeming to recognize just claims. The way servants are treated in England, and even sometimes poor clerks or any hireling, is less feeling, less thoughtful, and less sympathetic than the way in which "slaves" are commonly treated. And one result of this atrocious vulgarity is to make inferiors as vulgar as their superiors. This fallacy obtains all down the strata of society, from number two in social rank to number a hundred.

Between stiffness and familiarity, between presumption and want of dignity, few Englishmen know how to preserve the mean. Conventionalism taking the place of high breeding, the "proprieties" of generous sensibility, patronage of modest politeness, the different ranks of society can never be quite at their ease, for they must stand on the tiptoe of egotism. Now, let it be granted that the born, high-bred gentleman,—not in conventional but in interior sense,—is as rare as is magnificent virtue, it follows that such social canons as oblige all men to pay homage are the most convenient for the world's big majority. The exquisite must be always very few, the tenderly just and tenderly generous must be rare; and, therefore, the code of manners which compels exterior homage is at once the most convenient and the most Christian.

Yet it would be absurd to deny that there are in England such "gentlemen" as are not to be eclipsed in the whole world. Especially now that Englishmen travel much, and pick up hints and large ideas from other countries, there is a greater ease and much more heartiness of manner than there used to be five and twenty years ago. The principle of esteeming every stranger to be a blackguard until he has proved himself not to be one, has given way to the principle of imputing respectability where its absence is not conspicuously demonstrated. Strangers coalesce now with a freedom which would have been thought insecure in earlier days. When Englishmen first began to grow their beards, which was immediately after their last war with Russia, they began to regard the "clean shave" as not identical with decorum, and manly ease

as not fatal to self-respect. Speaking from the experience of half a century as to the gradual development of English manners, the conviction is unqualified that their change for the better has been remarkable both in kind and degree. [What manners must have been in the days of George the Third, our grandfathers have told us with a blush.] Men no longer drink deeply at dinner parties as a mark of good birth or fair position. Swearing is tabooed as intensely vulgar. Low games, such as prize-fights or cock-fights, would be offensive to (conventional) good taste. Dress has become singularly unobtrusive. Jauntiness, with all pretension, are out of date. To be tranquil in demeanor is a first requisite. To be silent about vices is of obligation. Morals may be precisely what they used to be; human nature does not change with the fashions; but for a man to vaunt his vices, even to mere friends, would class him among the low-lived and despicable. At the best clubs members affect moral decency; even to play high at cards is thought equivocal. Men veil their moral weaknesses, if they have them. And thus far, at least ostensibly or exteriorly, English manners have made great advances. It may be all superficial. There may be no growth of principle; as to religion, there may be as little of it as there ever was, yet there is a certain gain in the outward homage of decorum, if only in the sense that it lessens scandal. Some moralists will have it that "Englishmen are hypocrites." They are not outspoken as is the average Frenchman. The naughty Frenchman will tell a stranger that he is an unbeliever, or a voluptuary, but an Englishman keeps such counsel for his intimates. But is the bombast of immorality a social gain? Granted that hypocrisy is individually contemptible, it has the merit of respecting others' feelings.

That Englishmen of different classes do not mix freely with other classes, and that the rich seldom visit the very poor save in a patronizing or eleemosynary spirit, is a natural result of this pride of superiority which artificial social canons must generate. Big people do not associate with little people; this is an axiom and a fact. Grosvenor Square knows no more of humble industry than it knows of the occupation of the angels. Grosvenor Square does not recognize poverty. And the trim villa, or the garden-fronted cottage, rails off its little grandeur from the struggling. To give a check to the parish clergyman for Christmas blankets and coals is the sole interchange of greatness with suffering, and to put something into the offertory plate once a week, or once a month, is the sole interchange of the middle classes with want. Exceptions do not, in the least, change the rule. Many exceptions there are,—brilliant, bountiful exceptions,—but we speak only of established social canons. Personal communication between the

prosperous and the needy is regarded as undesirable, perhaps risky. One reason of this fallacy is that, English manners being stilted, free converse might result in disrespect.

It might also be unwelcome to inferiors. There is nothing so offensive to a poor man as to be patronized by money or by rank; and few Englishmen possess the happy faculty of being at once sweetly modest and dignified. It has been said that a true test of supreme breeding is to be able to confer a favor with such a grace that the recipient is under the impression that he is conferring a favor in the act of consenting to receive one. This may be hyperbole or idealism, but certainly it pictures both a lofty Christian standard and also an extreme beauty of refinement. Now where the converse is demonstrated, and every act of beneficence assumes the color of self-glorifying compassion, the poor man feels degraded by his benefactors, who lowers him in the proportion of serving him. There are, indeed, some graceful English people to whom such cynical comments cannot apply; but this is simply because such people are less English than they are abnormally gifted by nature. Again, be it said that the highest type of Englishman has no superior in the East or in the West. When he superadds wide knowledge to a high nature, he may sit for a portrait of a gentleman. More than this, his religious appreciations, his manly, robust notions of duty,—and of its handmaid, a chivalrous sentiment,—make him at once an ideal of the superiority of the natural and the Christian culture; yet it is just here that we have profoundly to regret that his graces do not permeate the social strata. He is alone, or in a world but of few. The million seldom hear of his existence unless they see him on a platform or on horseback. He belongs to his class; they to theirs; nor do the classes even touch by points of contact. Is there any remedy for this insociable social malady? Does not "Socialism," which is the extreme of levelling folly, gather some degree of pretext from insociability? Would the wild theories of the *sans culottes* of the Russian Nihilists, or of the German Democrats find an atmosphere in which to be developed, if the different ranks in all countries held the salutary principle, that the prime duty of superiority is to impart? "I hate you, not because you are above me, but because you avoid me for my lowness," is the attitude of thought which is bound to remain hostile, because vanity is more sensitive than is interest. The mere fact that in England a constitutional government theoretically opens high places to all, cannot reconcile the masses to their daily experience of the iron subdivisions of class. Self-respect taking the form of social pride, respect for others being mainly measured by their status, polite manners being the recognition of class, or inward homage being expressed only to outward place, the ideas

of moral worth become subverted, and so do true ideas of civilization. The twin gods, respectability and comfort, being enthroned by all the ranks who can cherish them, such small divinities as graceful modesty and deep charity are rather esteemed as moral exotics than as principles.

Yet it is one thing to speak of the unreality of public manners, and another of the unreality of character. The extremest urbanity of the outward form of a gentleman may but cover a sepulchre of heartlessness. Take an example of a typically polite class,—the highest class of the titled laity of Rome. Now here we have the dogmata of etiquette carried to their most transcendental pitch. Yet it must be allowed (at least a long residence in Rome may perhaps justify the individual opinion) that there is no more impression of reality of character conveyed by Roman than by Bagdad etiquette. No one would say that the reality does not exist; it does exist, and, in some persons, profoundly; but only that the impression of the urbanity is far stronger than the impression of the sincerity. It is of impression alone that we are speaking; and the remark applies only to some “big” laity. Yet when we come to associate with the middle and humbler Roman classes, we find quite as much sincerity as in other countries. Hence it may be argued that exterior politeness towards each and every class of society—and the “big” laity in Rome show this politeness—is not necessarily a proof of magnanimity of character, but may be sometimes mere convenience and conventionalism. The truest code of manners would be that code which made charity, in its sense of earnest sympathy and modesty, the sole test of any man’s being a gentleman. And though we have suggested that English manners are abnormally conventional, and English canons of interchange frightfully narrow, yet there is this immense advantage in all English social strata, that the domestic element saves the whole nation. “Home” is so supremely unconventional that it rectifies the injuries from outside. The very people who are most conventional in the street, in the ball-room, at the watering-places, in Hyde Park, enjoy the frolicsome mockery of the very canons they obey the moment that the house-door is shut. They may obey, but they laugh at their own obedience. And they laugh the most loudly at other people’s. Home is the salvation of English manners. It is a paradise which knows no conventionalism. So that we should be inclined to say of the English that they are quite as real as any people, a good deal more real than are most people, in domestic and in individual character; while at the same time their manners and all external demonstrativeness are cramped by the fallacies of rank. But it is totally impossible, in any huge national society,

to avoid fallacies of one kind or another; and travellers in Austria, in Japan, in Brazil, detect easily where such fallacies lie.

We will not introduce any remarks about religion in its influence upon national manners, because we must get into this scrape, that, the higher the religion the greater the expectation which it justifies. We might hazard the theory that a pure Catholic society would present the most typical code of manners, and we might point to certain countries where, such society existing, the manners are, in fact, almost perfect. But the crowding of business masses, of worldly or striving throngs, in all cities, whatever their religion, tends to the obscuring of the graceful influences of religion and to the triumph of selfishness over modesty. In England, where the religions are various, it is not possible to trace their social influence. Controversy does not breed gentle homage any more than it unites social strata. Yet the days are passed when sectarianism in England threw up barriers of "religious" demarcation. At one time they did so; they do not now. A Catholic and a Dissenter are equally welcome in a drawing-room if they bring their contributions of good breeding. Englishmen are simply weary of "polemics." They talk religion, but only as they talk politics. There are, of course, bigoted people, but they are laughed at if they make their bigotry a pretext for any personal depreciation. This is the rule with the vast majority. It may be said that this is a good sign and a bad sign. Sincerity is usually ardent if respectful. Indifference may be polite, but it is not Christian. Here we touch on broader questions than manners, or the social canons of exterior interchange. We have spoken only of superficial manners, and of certain natural, broad fallacies in their promptings. We should conclude that the generous race that is now spread over the earth has as much earnestness of character as any other race, and that its foibles of manners are rather created by social accidents than by a dimness of perception or of sympathy. Nay, we should go beyond this, and say that such foibles, in their purely external silliness or vulgarity, are often but a set-off against an inner appreciation of whatever is admirable in character. Even very bad manners are sometimes a shy covering of certain nervous or untrained sensibilities. Why should we expect that the majority, in any country, should be any better bred than it is disciplined? A "gentleman," in any country, is that very rare being who unites every grace that makes a man. There must be this delicacy of the nature, with this breadth of the intelligence, and the culture which gives charm to both. Yet, sometimes, even in the humblest classes—in England and everywhere else—we meet with a natural winningness of manners which is inborn, ineradicable, without merit, being the gift of mother nature, not of "society." This kind of "gentleman-

liness" has no country. It can neither be created nor extracted by art, and, like genius, it acknowledges no laws. Perhaps it may be said that an average modesty of position is most favorable to a modest grace of manners. And, on this principle, we can explain why, in England, the best manners are generally seen in the educated humbler classes.

IS FROUDE A HISTORIAN ?

Romanism and the Irish Race in the United States. Part I. James Anthony Froude, *North American Review*, December, 1879.

THE December number of the *North American Review* affords matter for wonder and surprise, and we ask ourselves whether this ancient quarterly, in which so many of the best efforts of American literary ability have appeared, has lost all dignity and all decency by removing to New York. Leaving the narrower circle of New England thought for the more cosmopolitan atmosphere of New York seemed to promise freedom from many prejudices and grooves of thought that were apparently inevitable in its former home. But the leading article, which in its first word applies to seven millions of Americans a term of insult, a degrading opprobrious epithet, drawn from the rogue's lexicon or the vile invective of polemic pulpits, makes one think it some remnant of olden time, some fierce philippic of a New England clergyman, written in the days when men were hounded on by "pulpit, drum ecclesiastic," to burn the convent at Charlestown. But there it is, in black and white, in the forefront of the *North American*.

The epithet *Romanism* shows the writer to be an unscrupulous enemy, one whose moral sense is so warped that it is useless to expect any fair or moderate treatment at his hands. All we can look for is skill. The article bears the name of one who has written on subjects connected with the history of the British Isle. For that work his studies may have fitted him so far as his powers of appreciating motives and events permit him to write history. But it is a surprise to find him treating an American subject. A passing visit to this country, without any special study of our complex and strange history, certainly did not fit him to write on such a theme with any credit to himself or usefulness to his reader.

We can hardly conceive the article to have been spontaneous; or, if really such, that the editor would accept it on its merits. It is impossible that any American scholar would accept such an article as at all adequate to the subject or fit for the position assigned it. Are we, then, to infer that it was written to order; that an American quarterly employs the hireling pen of an ignorant foreigner to treat one of the perplexing questions in this country: the actual position of the Catholic Church here and the influence it is likely to produce on the Protestant element, or receive from it, and consequently the result on the local and national affairs during the next fifty years.

We blush as Americans to see an English writer thus retained to vilify any part of the American people. Time has brought its changes. Sixty years ago all America hailed with pride a work of a Catholic writer, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain respecting the United States of America, and Strictures upon the Calumnies of the British Writers*.¹ Now a great American review becomes the accessory of a calumnious British writer in assailing Americans.

Mr. Froude ranks among historical writers. His attractive style, his vivid imagination, his warm partisanship are admitted; his historical accuracy has been questioned. Meline, in defending Mary, Queen of Scots, against Froude,² obtained from the State Paper Office documents cited by this English writer, and proved, as English judges mildly expressed it, that Mr. Froude did not seem to know the value of quotation-marks; in fact, that he garbled documents by suppressing passages and making paragraphs read on consecutively, which in the original had no relation to each other.

But such investigations have little attraction for readers generally, who shrink from the study of old documents with obsolete language and quaint forms. They leave this critical work to dry-as-dust antiquarians, and are content to enjoy a writer's volume who tells his story plausibly and attractively, even though from the highest standard of morality and historic truth it cannot be said that he tells it well.

Now, however, that Mr. Froude takes up a subject of American history reaching far back into the past, and with a future that merits the most serious thought of the American statesman who has the true interests of his country at heart, the position of affairs changes. Here the matter is, to a certain extent, familiar to us all. Our history dates back less than three centuries, and though the

¹ By Robert Walsh, Jr.

² Mary, Queen of Scots, and Her Latest English Historian.

number of those who are professed students of our forefathers' days is much smaller than we wish, our numerous historical societies are a nucleus around which thousands gather, becoming daily more and more interested in the topic.

Let us see, then, how Mr. Froude treats his American topic, and we appeal to our historical societies for a decision whether such a man shows either the research of the student, the knowledge of the subject, the careful weighing of clashing testimony, or the impartial, sober, critical judgment that constitute an historian.

He does not cite an authority for a single statement from the first line to the last. We shall endeavor to extract from his rambling and declamatory text various propositions, and meet them by the fruit of thirty years' study and a collection of nearly two thousand books, pamphlets, and volumes of papers and periodicals bearing on the Catholic Church in the United States.

He assumes that the Catholic Church has just begun to attack the various Protestant denominations, and that the latter have just awakened to their danger, especially as Catholic Lower Canada is on the north and Catholic Spanish America on the south. "That religion," he says (p. 523), "unfortunately is, by its own choice, at war with every other." "And they (the Anglo-Americans) are *now* confronted with the unpleasant fact that the Catholicism, which they have already so much cause to fear, is in all these countries overwhelmingly predominant." (P. 525.)

Now, as matter of history, has the Catholic body here from the early days been on the offensive or on the defensive? The question is easily answered. They have been altogether on the defensive; not attacking but attacked, often meeting from the majority around them persecution, oppression, unjust legislation and judicial action, as well as lawless violence from the mob, and unfair discrimination in various departments. They have had to contend with a feeling of strong prejudice and antipathy, excited against them by the governing body in England to effect the change by which that country, the majority of whose people were still Catholic in the reign of Elizabeth, became Protestantized. This prejudice, long cultivated and kept alive by misrepresentation of Catholic doctrines, Catholic practices, and the facts of Catholic history, has become a second nature to most non-Catholics. While all other matters require study, everything Catholic comes to these people by a kind of intuition. They will tell you an immense deal about the Mass without ever having seen a Mass offered or once read seriously through the liturgy of the Mass, and so with a hundred points. Even among those who have ceased to believe in the dogmatic teaching of any Protestant denomination or avail them-

selves of its ordinances, the feeling remains strong that Catholicity is wrong and that Catholics must be put down.

Catholics are perfectly aware of this feeling, and are living it down, confident that the time will come when this strong prejudice must yield to the force of common-sense; that sooner or later those who wish to know what Catholics really believe and what they really do, will take the same steps to acquire information that they do in regard to other matters, and not depend on old wives' tales, whether put forward by some old crone or by an English historian.

The first document bearing on the position of Catholic and Protestant in this country is the charter of Maryland. It grew out of an event which raises no blush to the cheek of the Catholic. Turning from the inhospitable Avalon, which he had planted on the shores of Newfoundland, and attracted by the glowing description his wife gave of Virginia, which she had visited, Lord Baltimore resolved to contribute all his influence and colonization to the increase of that province. "When, in October, 1629, he visited Virginia in person, the zeal of the assembly immediately ordered the oaths of allegiance and supremacy to be tendered him. It was in vain that he proposed a form which he was willing to subscribe; the government firmly insisted upon that which had been chosen by the English statutes, and which was purposely framed in such language as no Catholic could adopt." (Bancroft, i. p. 240.) Certainly Catholics were not the sinners here against the broad principles of toleration and religious freedom. Lord Baltimore asked only what he had established at Avalon, in Newfoundland, and failing to obtain it from Virginia, he sought from the king a charter for a colony adjoining that which repulsed him for his faith. Of Maryland, which under his charter his son founded, Bancroft wrote: "Every other country in the world had persecuting laws; through the benign administration of the government of that province, no person professing to believe in Jesus Christ was permitted to be molested on account of religion" (p. 248).

As a contrast we find Massachusetts, in 1647, forbidding Jesuits to enter Massachusetts, banishing them if they did, and visiting them with death in case they returned. (General Laws, p. 67.) As early as 1631, one Sir Christopher Gardner, suspected of being a Catholic, was summarily sent out of the colony, and this same year Massachusetts initiated the policy by which none could be admitted as freemen who were not members of some church in the colony, and as none but Congregational churches were permitted, this effectually barred all others from any voice in public affairs. (Palfrey's *New England*, i. pp. 329, 330, 345.)

Maryland, in which the majority had by this time become Cath-

olic, passed, April 2d, 1649, an act for general toleration, but Mr. Froude would not probably admire it, as it punished whoever dared to stigmatize his fellow-man by any name or term in a reproachful manner relating to religion. Where such a law prevailed he would have had perforce to use the language of a gentleman. The example did not find imitators, for no sooner had the Puritans gained the ascendancy than, in 1654, Catholics were prohibited from voting for or sitting as delegates in the very colony which they had done so much to establish. Nor was this spirit confined to the English colonies. In New Netherlands under Dutch rule no worship but the Calvinist was tolerated, and in 1658 a Catholic on Long Island, who remonstrated against being compelled to pay for the support of the Protestant minister, was fined for his insolence.

The New York Bill of Rights of 1683, under the influence of James, Duke of York, granted general toleration to all Christians; and if the original Rhode Island charter of 1663-4 did the same, it was soon altered so as to exclude Catholics. (Walsh's *Appeal*, p. 428.)

The advent of William III. was followed by penal laws in several colonies. A New York act of 1691 excepted Catholics from toleration (Brodhead, ii. 645); as did a similar act in South Carolina in 1696 (Ramsay's *South Carolina*, i. p. 51). In 1692 Maryland established the Church of England by law, and in 1702 gave the minister of that church forty pounds of tobacco from every person in his parish, a tax that bore heavily on the Catholic settlers. New York and Massachusetts, in 1700, passed acts to punish any Catholic priest entering the colony; the next year the former colony disfranchised Catholics; in 1704 Maryland had her law to prevent the growth of Popery, and eleven years after the first of a series of laws to prevent the importation of Irish Papists. (*Maryland Colony Laws*, pp. 16, 158.)

Virginia had her series of penal laws, culminating in one which made a Catholic inadmissible as a witness in any court, while Maryland levied a double tax on these unfortunate people.

The state of feeling may be seen in the slaughter of Father Rale by the people of New England, at Norridgewalk, in 1724, and of the Franciscan fathers in Florida, by an expedition from Carolina, in 1702, and in the execution of Ury, a supposed priest, at New York, in 1741, on suspicion of being concerned in a negro plot, after a trial under the act of 1700.

The charter of Georgia excluded Catholics from toleration, and the historian of the State tells us (I. p. 417) that "it was one of the express conditions on which Georgia was settled, that no Papists should be permitted in it." Hence, when they began their prose-

cution of John Wesley, one of the weightiest points was that he was suspected of being a Roman Catholic. (Ibid. p. 336.)

The story of the Acadians, who were torn from their homes and scattered along the seaboard from Massachusetts to Georgia in 1755, is well known; but it is not generally known that the precise cause of their treatment was that they were Popish recusants who had refused the oath. (*Nova Scotia Archives*, p. 256.)

Now we here see that this war is an old one, and was made against Catholics, not by them. So far as their influence went it was in favor of toleration, never against it. In Maryland the number and severity of the penal laws led to a project for a general emigration from the colony which they had founded.

The feeling which dictated all this hostility was too deep to be easily eradicated. Mr. Froude and the anonymous author whom he cites propose similar legislation in the nineteenth century. Better far to imitate Pennsylvania, which from the earliest period gave Catholics a shelter and a home, and which, under severe pressure from England, held nobly to her glorious principle of toleration, and never persecuted any of her settlers for their religious opinions. She stands peerless among the colonies, with no blot on her escutcheon.

Leaving the colonial period we come to the period of the Revolution. As to that Mr. Froude is wisely silent. The feeling against Catholics was kept alive in the north by the proximity of the French in Canada; in the south by that of the Spaniards in Florida; in Virginia by the fact that Maryland, her neighbor, contained a large body of Catholics groaning under intolerant laws, and who were to be repressed with that instinct of cowardice which dictated the maxim, "Humanum est odisse quem læseris."

To accomplish the overthrow of Catholicity in Canada, New England and New York had, from 1691, stimulated by England, lavished blood and treasure. One New England expedition went forth, the chaplain shouldering an axe, to hew down the images in the Catholic churches. When after a desperate fight Canada fell, the Northern colonies naturally expected the home government to gratify the bigotry it had fanned, and to sweep Catholics and Catholicity from that province as it had from Acadia. When, however, England allowed the Canadians to enjoy their old laws and to practice their religion undisturbed, the exasperation in the old colonies was intense. The Quebec act was one of the wrongs that prompted the Revolution, which was in its origin so anti-Catholic that the first flag raised in New York bore the legend, "No Popery;" and the party of Scotch Catholics settled in the North, alarmed at the demonstrations against them, fled with their priest to Canada. Toned down as the Declaration of Independence was,

it requires no searching eye to detect this feeling there. The earliest constitutions formed by the Colonies after asserting their independence are deeply imbued with hostility to Catholics. In that which New York formed in 1777, every effort was made by John Jay, afterwards Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to exclude Catholics from all civil rights. He wished them excepted from the general toleration to be given to all religions. When defeated by men of more Christian mind and grasp, he succeeded in introducing a clause under which he hoped to effect covertly what he could not do openly. In the clause bearing on naturalization he was completely successful, and down to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and the enactment of a naturalization law by Congress, no Catholic could become a citizen of the State of New York. And even when he did, the tortuous policy of John Jay barred him from office, as an oath was prescribed which he could not conscientiously take. (*Journal N. Y. Convention*, pp. 842-845.)

There is not a whisper of accusation anywhere that the Catholics, as individuals or as a body, had not contributed to develop the wealth and resources of the country; that they were turbulent, idle, factious, or troublesome; no charge that they did not sympathize with their fellow-colonists in opposing the demands of England. Yet here, at the very outset of a long struggle, the strong anti-Catholic feeling made men spurn toleration as an "evil egg," as cordially as New England did a century before.

How did the Catholics act? Did they throw themselves into the hands of England, to do battle against their old neighbors, who showed such illiberality? No, they knew their neighbors better; knew that it was not their better selves that dictated this miserable policy. The Catholics of the Colonies to a man rallied around the standard of independence. You may con Sabine's *Loyalists* from cover to cover, but you will not find a Catholic Tory. Carroll the statesman, and Carroll the priest, went with Franklin and Chase to Canada to win the Canadians to the American cause; and the project which Catholics did their best to carry out was defeated by the bigotry of John Jay. (*Journal of Charles Carroll*.)

From the outset of the struggle Catholics did their part on sea and land; in the ranks and in command; in the council and Congress. Every Catholic hand, every Catholic heart, in the limit claimed by the United States, gave its aid to the cause. The idea of the new government was one that Catholics took to at once, and no wonder; we Catholics have a Bible that praises a republican form of government, while Protestants have not. The Government of the United States, as established in 1776, had the com-

plete, instant, continuous support of all Catholics within its bounds. The Catholics in the thirteen Colonies were all Whigs; the Catholic Indians of Maine at once sent to Boston to join the cause; the Catholics on the Illinois and Wabash co-operated with Clark, and, as Judge Law declares, secured the Great West to the Republic. (*Colonial History of Vincennes*, p. 65.)

And not only was this government accepted by Catholics at home; but in Europe every Catholic state gave it its sympathy, and Catholic states gave direct aid and helped indirectly by stopping the levying of troops in Germany. What preposterous folly to arraign Catholics as enemies of a government which they cordially helped to found. There was no exception in their case. Other denominations divided, some siding with the mother country, some with the Colonies; but with the Catholics there was no division. They were a unit for the Republic. Mr. Froude can conceive what a queer look a Catholic descendant of the Catholics of those days must put on when some descendant of a Tory or a Hessian tells him that a Catholic cannot be loyal to the United States!—that there is something in Catholicity incompatible with republican institutions.

The war ended, with the army and fleet of Catholic France battling beside the American. Peace came.

"In 1785," says Mr. Froude, "there was one Roman Catholic bishop in the United States, with fifty priests and twelve churches. The Roman Catholic population was French or Spanish." Now really, are Mr. Froude's so-called histories made up in this way? Are we to take this as a specimen of historic accuracy? Had he been writing for an English public, who might be supposed to know little and care less about American topics, well and good; but surely when he addresses Americans *de rebus Americanis*, he ought not to make himself ridiculous. In 1785 there was a recognized country called the United States, but in 1785 there was not a Roman Catholic bishop in the United States aforesaid. The oldest See in the United States is that of Baltimore, established in 1789 by Pope Pius VI. (*Bullarium Romanum*.)

The first Catholic bishop was the patriot, Rev. John Carroll, who was not consecrated till August 15th, 1790. (Brent's *Life of Carroll*, p. 113.)

The next statement of this wonderful historian is that there were in 1785 fifty priests and twelve Catholic churches in the United States. These figures are far beyond the reality. Bishop Carroll, in his statement of the position of Catholics in the United States, later than this says nine priests in Maryland and five in Pennsylvania. (Brent, p. 71.)

But his next assertion is comical in its utter absurdity. Hear

this grave English historian. "The Roman Catholic population was French or Spanish." Spanish! Where in the thirteen Colonies was this body of Spanish Catholics? The historians of Maine know nothing about it; Minot, and Belknap, and Trumbull tell us nothing; New York writers have never found them; they do not appear in the Pennsylvania archives; McMahon, Bozman, Burk, and Campbell fail to note their existence in Maryland or Virginia; and when we ask the Carolinas and Georgia to give us some information about this body of Spanish Catholics of 1785, they stare at us. There were a few Spaniards scattered among the people, doubtless, but there was no Spanish settlement anywhere in the country. There was no territory taken from Spain or ceded by it, and no body of Spaniards had come to settle here before the Revolution or afterwards.

If by French he means natives of France, there was no body of them here; no settlement of French Catholics. The Catholic body in the United States was mainly in Maryland and Pennsylvania. In Maryland they were the descendants of the original Catholic settlers, the emigration of Catholics having been so far prevented by penal laws that comparatively few Catholics came over from the days of Cromwell. Hence, the Catholics in Maryland were mainly American born, and it would require very ingenious sophistry to make them out either French or Spanish. In Pennsylvania the Catholic settlers had been Irish and Germans. The immigration began soon after the settlement of the colony and continued almost to the commencement of the Revolution. Many of the Pennsylvania Catholics of 1785 were of the second or third generation born in America, and as fully American as any around them. Probably not one-third were natives of Ireland or Germany. Now we have official statements of the number of Catholics in Pennsylvania in 1757, when a report made to Lord Loudoun gives 901 as German, or of German origin; 364 English and Irish, or of English or Irish origin; in all 1365 over the age of twelve. (Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 3.) Bishop Carroll after the war estimated the Pennsylvania Catholics at seven thousand.

The Catholics on the prairies from Vincennes to the Mississippi, and at Detroit, were nearly all natives and all of families for generations in America. They were, when the war began, British subjects, like those on the coast. They were neither by birth nor by political relation, French. The same is true of the handful of Acadians who lingered in Baltimore. It is an abuse to call these French. They were taken to Maryland as British subjects.

It is very clear that the Catholic population of the United States in 1785 was neither French nor Spanish. It was mainly native born; of English origin in Maryland; of Irish and German origin

in Pennsylvania; of French-Canadian and Acadian stock in Baltimore and the West; of Indian origin in Maine, Northern New York, and the Upper Lakes.

Mr. Froude asserts that the Catholic body in 1785 was declining in numbers; but as he cites no statistics the assertion must be taken with due allowances when coming from a writer who so pretentiously displays his ignorance. We leave to our friends of the New England Historic Genealogical Society to give us the names of the Irish Presbyterians who Mr. Froude tells fought the battle of Lexington against the English troops.

We have seen how little Mr. Froude really knows of the position of Catholics in the United States in the days of the Articles of Confederation. Let us now come to the Constitution.

On the word of an anonymous writer Mr. Froude proceeds to tell us what the Constitution of the United States contains. Would it not have been well for a grave historian to read that not inaccessible document for himself and learn something of its formation? He represents the Catholic Church as having condemned the Constitution of the United States and forbidden obedience to it. "The Constitution requires all the people and all the churches (!) to obey the laws of the United States. The Pope anathematizes the provision, because, etc." (p. 531). Now as an historic fact is it true or is it absolutely false that any Pope from Pius VI., who occupied the See of Peter when the Constitution was framed, to Leo XIII., who occupies it now, has ever condemned the Constitution of the United States or any of the amendments, either as a whole or any provision in any part? There is nothing in the Bullarium, in the *Acta Pontificia*, or any known collection of Papal acts. Of the thirty-eight members of the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States; two were Catholics, Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, and Daniel Carroll, of Maryland. They were earnest supporters of it, and not a voice was raised by Catholics against the Constitution when it was submitted to the States. The States which declined to accept it were not Pennsylvania and Maryland, where the Catholics chiefly were, but Rhode Island and North Carolina, where Catholicity was scarcely known. Catholics helped to frame the Constitution, Catholics helped to pass it, at a time when it passed with great difficulty. Catholics have never, from their pulpits, much less in the councils of their bishops or the acts of their Sovereign Pontiffs, pronounced it "a covenant with hell." This theological opinion has not been taught in Catholic seminaries, and if Mr. Froude will drop a line to the London *Notes and Queries* he may ascertain from what theological school this opinion emanated, and by what clergy it was sustained. Is it not mere rubbish then in the face of events to say as he does (p. 524): "It

is only as long as they are a small minority, that they can be loyal subjects under such a constitution as the American."

The statement that the Constitution requires "all the people and all the churches to obey the laws of the United States," is rather a free rendering. The word "church" does not occur in the Constitution at all. What is said in the enacting clause is this: "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." One law of the United States has in our time been openly defied. It stands as a solitary case. May we ask Mr. Froude whether those who openly resisted the Fugitive Slave Law, thwarted its execution and appealed to a higher law, based their action on any decree of the Pope? Were they Catholics at all?

Almost every statement made by Froude in regard to the Constitution is unfounded. "The Constitution of the United States repudiates the idea of an established religion," he says; but it does nothing of the kind. The first amendment says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The power was explicitly denied to Congress, but it existed in the States. Massachusetts had an established church at that time and maintained it far down into the present century; New York, until after the commencement of the century, excluded Catholics from office, as New Hampshire does to this day; North Carolina excluded from office by her constitution those who denied the truths of the Protestant religion; and New Jersey secured civil and political rights to Protestants only.

The whole Protestant opinion leaned strongly to the idea of an established church, as is seen in the petition of a number of clergymen asking Congress to publish a Bible; and at a later date asking that body to place Bible publishing under a legal censorship. (O'Callaghan, *American Bibles*, xxi., xxxix.) They had not outgrown the idea of looking to the state for direction in things spiritual.

But had Mr. Froude known anything of the history of Catholics in the United States he would never have made such a blunder as to call attention to the first article of the amendments to the Constitution. It says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." We admit that Congress has passed no law; but, by authority of the General Government, the Protestant religion is established in the army and navy and in Indian reservations, and Catholics are prohibited from the free exercise of their religion, and a whole

series of cases can be cited where soldiers and sailors have been punished for refusing to attend the services of a church established in defiance of the law. He could learn something of this matter by consulting Lieutenant O'Brien's *Treatise on American Military Law and the Practice of Courts-martial* (Philadelphia, 1846), the author having been himself tried by court-martial for refusing to attend a Protestant church. At this very time (1879) one-fourth of the soldiers in the United States army are Catholics, yet all the chaplains maintained by government, with a single exception, are Protestant; and in the navy, although numbers of sailors and marines are Catholics, there is not a single Catholic chaplain; but, perhaps, Mr. Froude explains all this where he says (p. 530): "If the progress of Romanism creates difficulty, with which the Constitution cannot deal, they will not sacrifice reality to scruples of form." By *they* he means Americans; but, though this theory may be that of a few fanatics, we may assure Mr. Froude that it is not the will of the American people that the Constitution should be trampled on to carry out the prejudices or hates of any set of men.

Thus, though Congress has made no law, and can make no law establishing a religion, the bureaucracy, the departments created without the Constitution, have established a religion.

The Secretaries of War and of the Navy have done so in the army and navy to an extent not known even in England.

The Secretary of the Interior has gone still further. He is not President or Congress, he is not named in the Constitution, but his word is law. The army and navy of the United States are fortunately of very trifling extent in numerical force; but the Secretary of the Interior controls the very soil of free America, and by his authority there are thousands of square miles of American land where there are established religions—established in a form that would shock the moral sense of the world. There is district after district where, under the authority of a foreigner, now occupying the position of Secretary of the Interior, a native-born Catholic priest attempting to preach the Gospel to Catholics who desire his services, and to officiate as a clergyman for them, can be arrested and removed by force. The Catholic Indians on reservations have been allotted to Protestant denominations, and the creed of that denomination has been made the established religion in that district. No other is tolerated, and every remonstrance of the Indians themselves and of the Catholic clergy has been treated with derision. These men have the power; they can call the army to their aid, and they act in defiance of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. What they do in a Territory they may soon attempt in a State, for the principle is the same.

All this subversion of the Constitution sprang from jealousy of the Catholics. In the Commissioner's Report for 1861 the Catholics are represented as having one-fourth of all the missionaries among the Indians. This excited jealousy, and, as soon as the army left the agencies, the old system was broken up, and in 1873-74 a new and specious scheme was devised, by which the different tribes were allotted to different denominations. No regard was paid to the ratio of the denomination to the general population. No regard was paid to what missionaries had actually done. The great mass of the agencies were assigned to Protestant denominations, and the Catholics found only four allotted to them, while they were almost immediately excluded peremptorily from the others and cut off from all intercourse with the Catholic Indians. The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, who had been under Catholic guidance before the settlement of Virginia and Massachusetts, were allotted to a little body called Christians, who had no Indian missions at all ! And when that body declined the task the Presbyterians were put in possession of the district. In the few agencies allowed to the Catholics no attempt has ever been made to exclude any Protestant denomination that has missions or members ; but from the Yakama Mission, the Mission Indians of California, the Pimo, and other old Catholic ground, Catholics are persistently excluded, often with violence, as in the case of Father Osuna and Rev. Mr. Tomazin, to mention no others. In each agency the Episcopal, the Presbyterian, the Baptist religion, or the doctrines of Fox, is established, not by law, but in open defiance of law, and the free exercise of religion is prohibited, not by Congress, not under or by virtue of any law, but by the sole authority of the President and the Secretaries.

It is one of the cases that show the rapid decline of personal liberty in America and the rapid growth of usurped power. No man of thought can fail to grieve over this decline and the steadily increasing disregard of individual rights. The late war gave rise to many usurpations, justified on the shallow pretext of military necessity ; but once begun, the invasion of individual rights has increased in every department, and is the real danger menacing our institutions.

But to leave this question and return to the Established Church in this country, we appeal to Mr. Froude, as he has undertaken to treat of American subjects, to lay aside his narrowness, prejudice, and unfairness, and be for once what he well claims to be, an Englishman, loving fair play and even-handed justice, and to take up the Indian system established under General Grant, compare it with the Constitution of the United States, and tell the world whether religion is not really established here, and the free exercise

of religion is not prohibited, in defiance of that Constitution, and whether Catholics are the wrong-doers or the victims.

That the Constitution guarantees liberty of speech and of the press is a misstatement. Congress cannot abridge it, but it cannot control the action of a State in that regard. The Constitution, we are told, repudiates royal powers. There is not an allusion to them. "The Constitution allows," he tells us, "the free circulation of the Bible, and the right of private judgment in interpreting it." In our school-days we used to learn the Constitution by heart, and have never altogether forgotten our early training, but we are perplexed. Froude, the great Froude, the learned Froude, the accurate, honest Froude, says that the Constitution allows the free circulation of the Bible and private judgment. We do not like to admit that our memory is failing, so we take up the familiar pages and look. Bible! Bible! Bible! Private judgment! Oh, good Mr. Froude, you have been fearfully hoaxed! Had you only in this case used your private judgment and read for self, instead of taking as Bible truths all the outpourings of anti-Catholic rant, you would have known that there is not a syllable in the Constitution about the Bible or the interpretation thereof.

But citing his anonymous authority, Mr. Froude asserts that the Pope censured two propositions which he finds in the Constitution, and which we confess we cannot: 1. A guarantee of liberty of speech and of the press. 2. A clause requiring all the people *and all the churches* to obey the laws of the United States; and in the third place that the Pope declared to be heresy the part of the Constitution of the United States wherein "the Constitution subordinates all churches to the civil power, except in matters of faith and discipline."

Which of the Popes he does not tell us, but Pius VI., VII., VIII., IX., Gregory XVI., Leo XII, and XIII., all the Popes who have occupied the See of Peter since the Constitution, signed by two Catholics, went forth to the world, do not cover so long a period in the annals of the Church but what we may find out which Pope sat in judgment on the Constitution of the United States.

Again we take up this Constitution. We fail to find any such clauses in the whole document as some Pope is said to have condemned. The words *church, faith, discipline* elude our scrutiny. We examine to see what proposition is there laid down that might excite scruples in a Catholic mind, or lead to question between a layman and his clergyman, a priest and his bishop. We find none. The Constitution is a singularly practical, cautious, state paper. It enters into no effusive statements of political doctrines or theories; it lays down no axioms, denounces no form of government. The organization of a new federal government, the powers to be con-

ceded to it by the States, the powers renounced by the States, these alone are treated of by the Constitution of the United States. It was drawn up in a very critical time, when anything except what was absolutely essential would endanger its passage. Much as we venerate it now, we must not forget that it passed by a close vote; that New York accepted it most reluctantly; and that Hamilton's able articles in its favor were met by arguments that showed no inferior ability. No one who knows the history of the formation of the Constitution and has studied under its ablest expositors ever elicited from it any proposition which has caused any difficulty in Catholic minds. And, in fact, there is no trace in the history of any Catholic diocese or bishop, in the annals of any church or order, in Catholic periodical, book, or newspaper, of any question in regard to the Constitution of the United States, which was ever carried to Rome, and became the subject of a Papal decision.

But on page 524 he refers us to the Syllabus. To cite his words: "The Syllabus says that men are not free; that they are not capable of taking care of themselves; that the laity, in the most important matters, must be guided and governed by the clergy; that the press ought to be under a censorship; that the Catholic religion being true all others are false, and therefore ought not to be tolerated."

Now this does not sound a whit like the Syllabus, and Mr. Froude, as usual, gives us no reference. We must, then, take up the Syllabus to see whether it was in this that Pius IX. so strangely condemned things in the Constitution of the United States that really are not there. Popes make bulls, but not bulls of this kind.

The Syllabus is a collection, as it were, of the marginal notes in a book of law reports—brief notes of decisions made by Pope Pius IX. on the various questions brought before him during his long pontificate. Now in this Syllabus there is not the slightest reference to the Constitution of the United States. There is no statement that men are not free; there is no statement that men are not capable of taking care of themselves; there is no such statement as Mr. Froude affirms about laity and clergy; there is no statement in regard to censorship of the press, and if there were, it would not be disputed here, where men are actually in prison for printing and circulating what they deemed right and proper. There is no such proposition as the last, and no general condemnation of religious toleration.

Protestants hold that Catholics are wrong in doctrine and must so hold to justify their leaving it at the Reformation. Catholics hold that the Reformers were guilty of heresy and schism, and that their followers are in the wrong. Three centuries have not sufficed

for either side to convince the other, and no one ever dreamed of seeing a Pope, after the long series of condemnations of Protestant doctrines, recognize them as true. Indeed a Pope would need only to read Mr. Froude to see that it was unnecessary. "Protestantism has failed," says Mr. Froude. "And no Protestant community has ever succeeded in laying down a chart of human life with any definite sailing directions," he proceeds to tell us. This is not exactly what we expect of an institution founded by God, and which He is to direct by his abiding presence.

The Syllabus condemns doctrines put forward by Catholics which were at variance with the recognized teaching of the Church. There is not one that touches even remotely the Constitution of the United States. So far as that is concerned the inference that Mr. Froude leads his readers to draw is unfounded. Neither Pius IX. in the Syllabus, nor any other Pope before or since, ever condemned the Constitution of the United States or a single clause in it.

As directly bearing on this point, I quote the words of Archbishop Spaulding :

"To stretch the words of the Pontiff, evidently intended for the standpoint of European radicals and infidels, so as to make them include the state of things established in this country, by our noble Constitution, in regard to the liberty of conscience, or worship, and of the press, were manifestly unfair and unjust. Divided, as we were in religious sentiment, from the very origin of our government, our fathers acted most prudently and wisely in adopting as an amendment to the Constitution, the organic law that 'Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' (Amend. i.) In fact, under the circumstances, they could have adopted no other course consistently with the principles, and even with the existence of our newly-established government.

"In adopting this amendment they certainly did not intend, like the European radicals, disciples of Tom Paine and the French Revolution, to pronounce all religions, whether true or false, equal before God, but only to declare them equal before the law ; or rather simply to lay down the sound and equitable principle that the civil government, adhering strictly to its own appropriate sphere of political duty, pledged itself not to interfere with religious matters, which it rightly viewed as entirely without the bounds of its competency. The founders of our government were, thank God, neither latitudinarians nor infidels. They were earnest, honest men, and however much some of them may have been personally lukewarm in the matter of religion, or may have differed in religious opinions, they still professed to believe in Christ and His revelation, and exhibited a commendable respect for religious observances. Therefore their action could not have been condemned, or even contemplated by the Pontiff in his recent solemn censure, pronounced on an altogether different set of men, with a totally different set of principles—on men and on principles so very clearly and emphatically portrayed in the document itself, which every sound canon of interpretation requires to be strictly construed." (Pastoral Letter, February 8th, 1865, pp. 10, 11.)

Certainly no Catholic writer in America was abler, or more thoroughly informed of what had been decided by the Church on important questions, than Dr. Brownson ; and, near the close of his life,

he wrote thus in *The American Republic, its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny*.

"The system is no invention of man, is no creation of the Convention, but is given us by Providence in the living Constitution of the American people. The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that they did not destroy or deface the work of Providence, but accepted it, and organized the government in harmony with the real order, the real elements given them. They suffered themselves, in all their positive substantial work, to be governed by vality, not by theories and speculations. In this they proved themselves statesmen." (P. 271.)

"In all human governments there will be defects and abuses, and he is no wise man who expects perfection from imperfection. But the American Constitution, taken as a whole and in all its parts, is the least imperfect that has ever existed, and under it individual rights, personal freedom and independence, as well as public authority or society, are better protected than under any other; and as the few barbaric elements retained from the feudal ages are eliminated, the standard of education elevated, and the whole population Americanized, moulded by and to the American system, it will be found to effect all the good, with as little of the evil, as can reasonably be expected from any possible civil government or political constitution of society." (P. 276.)

These two great American Catholics, a great archbishop, a prominent figure in the Vatican Council, and a great philosopher and reviewer, knew of no condemnation of the Constitution of the United States, and of nothing in it that was at variance with the doctrines of the Church, or that could excite scruple in the mind of a Catholic. Each, from his own standpoint, gives it his hearty praise.

And the voice of American Catholics has been uniformly the same. Mr. Froude and his anonyme give no authorities, but as they cite no article of the Constitution condemned, no Pope who condemned, and as our search fails to lead us to one or the other, we will leave the field of constitutional law and its theological recognition to return to Mr. Froude in his favorite field, history.

The condition of Catholics and Catholicity from 1785, when, as he supposes, they were all French and Spanish, down to 1847, the time of the potato famine in Ireland, is to Mr. Froude a terra incognita. Who constituted the Catholic body he does not seem to know; his mythical French and Spaniards seem to have vanished. Who took their places according to his theory it would be hard to say, for he tells us suavely and serenely: "The Irish who were in America before the potato famine were chiefly Presbyterians from the North, part of the Protestant colony which had been planted by Cromwell." It is a puzzle to determine whom this gentleman's judgment constituted the Catholic body in the United States prior to the Irish famine. If the Irish were all Presbyterians, and all other nationalities are ignored, of what will he make the Catholic population in 1844, estimated loosely, indeed, at a million, but in all probably twice that number. There was a great attack on the Catholic Irish of Philadelphia in 1844; mobs burned Cath-

olic churches, and asylums, and a library, and houses of Catholics. There was a general movement of hostility to Irish Catholics. A party called Native Americans was violent and active, and carried elections in various parts. It was the period of the second great anti-Catholic outbreak; the first dating about 1835, the period of coarse indecent fictions like *Maria Monk* and *Six Months in a Convent* as well as of works by abler hands against Catholicity, like Beecher's *Plea for the West*, and the *Brutus, or a Foreign Conspiracy against the Liberties of the United States*, by S. F. B. Morse, who saw, in the gift of a few paintings from the Queen of the French to the Cathedral in St. Louis, the utter overthrow of American liberty and institutions. But Mr. Morse had not reached his great fame then, and was not painted with royal decorations on his breast, and even one from his Holiness, the Pope, so that if Mr. Froude pursuing his studies reads *Brutus*, he ought by all means insert a portrait of the author with his foreign decorations.

Of any element but the Irish constituting the Catholic body Mr. Froude knows nothing. Of the large, intelligent, well-united, and organized German element, with its numbers of priests, religious of both sexes, schools, newspapers, and readers, he knows nothing; although it has given the Church several bishops not only of the first but of the second generation. Of the American element gained by conversions during two centuries he knows nothing, and his idea of the mental process, by which a man aided by God can come to see that when Christ instituted a church with power to teach there arose the duty of accepting that teaching, is very extraordinary. He says: "That an educated American Protestant should, at this time of day, run his head into the sand, and call himself a Catholic, is very absurd," and we agree with him; but though we have known numbers of educated American Protestants who have become Catholics, we never before heard of this curious way of entering the Church. The ritual for receiving a convert into the Church does not prescribe any such comical act as is here indicated. Many we have known who forfeited position, friends, wealth, business by the act of becoming Catholics, who knew that they must take their share of misrepresentation, obloquy, petty persecution, and insult, and who gallantly faced it all, but of these Mr. Froude knows nothing. Of the French Canadian element, numbering at least half a million, he knows nothing; of the Flemish, both Holland and Belgian; of the Polish, of the Portuguese and Italian, he knows nothing. And yet in his supreme ignorance of American history and our Constitution, of the Catholic body, its constituent parts and its history, he gives us nearly twenty pages of what can really deserve no name but twaddle and threatens to inflict another article. Is it anything but twaddle to tell us (p. 524): "The Catholic says

it (the spiritual part of man) resides in the Church?" We presume he means to state that Catholics maintain that the power to teach and define revealed truth resides in the Church. "The question is, where the spiritual part of man resides. The Protestant answers that it is in the individual conscience and reason." From this he infers that the Catholics can be loyal to such a constitution as the American only as long as they are a small minority. Is this logical? The Protestant recognizes no authority out of or beyond himself, therefore he is always and under all circumstances a loyal subject. He may be a loyal subject, but it is just for the contrary reason that he does recognize an authority beyond himself to which God requires his obedience.

Is it anything but twaddle, and anachronistic twaddle, to give a long list of things that a Catholic majority will do, and among the rest tell us "it will put the press under surveillance." Then he proceeds: "That it will try to do all this . . . is as certain as mathematics. It tried before in the Dark Ages." He certainly ought to give us a chapter on the "Press in the Dark Ages." It will be like the chapter often cited "On the Snakes in Ireland." The chapter was very brief, but to the point: "There are no snakes in Ireland."

Of course Mr. Froude must touch on the school question. "If there is one thing which *they* are prouder of than another, it is their national schools. The Roman Catholics do not like these schools. They insist on educating their own children." *They* evidently mean the Americans, not merely New Yorkers; but there is no system of national schools, nor can there be under the present Constitution of the United States, although the utterly useless Bureau of Education at Washington would lead a stranger to suppose that Congress had some power to establish schools. The States have, within a generation, adopted systems of public schools. They are not uniform, and at best are only experimental. But a portion of the people favor the exclusion of all religious teaching from the schools, while others believe that the best interests of the community are advanced by imbuing the young with religious principles during the whole course of their education. Here are two distinct theories of education. Each party has the right to establish schools at its own expense, and carry out its views in them. Have the advocates of either theory the right to assume that they are the people, and to establish schools at the public expense to carry out their views? Certainly not. Yet it is done. Those who claim that education should be simply secular, insist that schools for which all are taxed shall be managed according to their theory. They assume that they are the whole people and ignore completely the advocates of the opposite theory, driving

them by bigotry and intolerance from schools which they are taxed to support.

The theory of a completely secular education is, however, never really carried out. A fanatical, but active portion, by the indifference of the masses, make the schools really Protestant. The school bodies are almost exclusively made up of Protestants; laws will be cunningly altered to effect this; the whole tone of the school-books is Protestant, and they abound with assertions and statements and insinuations which no Catholic will admit to be true, and which no teacher should have power to compel a Catholic child to learn and repeat. The Protestant canon of the Bible, a Protestant translation, Protestant hymns and prayers are used in schools; so that though the schools are nominally secular they are really Protestant, and it must be so as long as the control is entirely in the hands of the active advocates of one faith, for such men cannot entirely lay aside their religious convictions and bear constantly in mind that they are not individuals regulating their own private or church concerns, but State officers managing a department in which all creeds are interested.

It has frequently been boasted that these schools are the great engine against Roman Catholic progress. That in the free school the Catholic was sure to learn to throw off the authority of priest and church. And a belief in this power is one of the reasons of the great interest violent anti-Catholics entertain for the schools. Mr. Froude recognizes this: "It (the Church) kept its hold on the children, and furnished them with antidotes to correct the poison of the secular schools. The lapses from the faith, once relatively large, have now wholly ceased" (p. 522). Then the question comes: Should a State which recognizes all creeds as equal maintain a system of schools which one set of people can employ to proselytize from another set? Is there not something intrinsically wrong in a system which can be put to such a use?

But the system of secular schools, leaving religion to the Sunday-school and excluding it from the school, has never been tested. Most of our criminals have received this slight religious training, and the result shows that it is not enough to counteract vice. Are we to go on bringing up unreligious and depraved generations, trusting that if they see that men in our day blundered, they will try to remedy the evil by returning to religious training?

The same false reasoning is seen in other things. Throughout this article Froude contrasts Americans with Catholics, thus making American synonymous with Protestant, and denying us Catholics our American nationality. Our separated brethren cannot easily divest themselves of the idea that they are the people, and that they allow us to live here, and if we behave ourselves, they

may do something for us one of these days. Hence in many States this intolerant majority, intolerant, because they do not recognize us as being as much as themselves part of the people, cut off Catholics in all eleemosynary and penal institutions from all means of practicing their religion or enjoying the ordinances of their faith. New Jersey rejected a law which aimed at giving the members of each church a right to the ministration of its own clergy. Ohio passed such a law, but under a storm of public odium hastily repealed it. Yet Mr. Froude tells us: "The theory of the republic is that all men are free, that each citizen is capable of taking care of his own interests, temporal and eternal; that so long as he does no practical wrong to others, he has a right to go his own way, *to worship under his own forms*," etc. This theory is certainly not carried out in Massachusetts or New Jersey or in Ohio, not to name other States.

"But the figures in the census startle them;" that is, Protestant Americans. The last census is ten years old now, and it is rather late in the day to begin to be startled by its figures. But it is a comical fact that this strong anti-Catholic feeling which is so active and which has contrived to get hold of so many departments of the public service, has manipulated the census for its own ends, and that statistical work is made to show the Catholic body as small as possible, and on the other hand the property possessed by it as great as possible.

The same farce will be enacted by the census bureau in 1880, and Mr. Froude will be taken to task for drawing attention to it. The plan is this: No effort is made to ascertain the faith of the inhabitants in taking the census, but the seating capacity of the churches is given; and ignoring the fact that in Catholic churches, especially in towns and cities, several masses are said every Sunday, each attended by a different set of worshippers, the Catholics are estimated for each church as being only as many as it will seat, when that is often not one-fourth of those who attend it, and a Protestant church, where an unpopular clergyman preaches to empty benches, is credited with as many as the church will hold. The figures of actual church attendance, obtained by count for a Philadelphia paper last year, show how completely fallacious the census figures are.

The matter of property is similarly exaggerated. Every asylum, school, institution, under the control of Catholics, is put down as property belonging to the Catholic Church in that ward, village, or district, although there is no legal or real connection between them. In this way the amount of property is swelled to a figure to alarm old women. But, in classifying similar Protestant institutions, they are not put down to any particular church unless directly connected

with them ; nor where denominational are they added to the sum-total of that denomination's property ; nor where Protestant at large, like the Bible Society and Tract Society, or Foreign Missionary Society, is such property added to the sum-total of Protestant church property.

The whole matter of Catholic population is in a very unsatisfactory state. Men like Mr. Froude, who know nothing of the subject, are very ready to settle it in a moment ; but, among Catholics, we have only the guesses made from year to year in the Catholic almanac. Where the estimates there given are based on the yearly baptisms considered as live births, and on the yearly marriages, a fairly accurate estimate can be reached by adopting the rates of live births to population in that State ; but, where the estimate is made without any definite data, it is, of course, not of similar authority, and such estimates vary greatly when made by different well-informed persons in the same diocese. The present estimates are, perhaps, somewhat over the mark, while ten, fifteen, and twenty years ago they were certainly far below the real number.

So far as the growth of the Catholic body in the United States, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution to our time, its rapid organization of congregations, building of churches, and at once working out its own life, in its religious, educational, and charitable institutions, as naturally as a plant throwing out its branches, blossoms, and fruit, he shows no knowledge whatever. He attempts no outline of its history, no account of its struggles, of its members as valuable citizens in peace and war, of the services of its clergy and religious in the cause of morality, or in times of peril from epidemics. Yet there is matter here for philosophical study and examination. So far as the history of the Church here in the last century is concerned, Mr. Froude tells us nothing, and shows us unmistakably that he cannot possibly tell us anything.

The actual position of the Catholic body in the United States is a peculiar one. The great effort is to prevent it from exerting any influence, from obtaining any adequate representation in the executive department of government, the legislative or the judicial, and above all in the educational system controlled by the state. Both political parties agree in this though they do not avow it. One, whether called Republican now, or Whig a few years ago, has been uniformly hostile to Catholics, and occasionally falls into the background to let a directly anti-Catholic party, Native American or Know-Nothing, take its place. The other party professes some liberality, goes so far as to accept Catholic votes, will give an occasional minor office to a Catholic where the votes of citizens of that faith are numerous enough to require it ; but if a Catholic is put up for any prominent office he is certain to be

scratched, and to run far behind the rest of the ticket, often sufficiently so to insure defeat. If a Catholic is proposed in a nominating convention this experience will be adduced, and it will be argued that it is useless to put up a Catholic only to insure defeat, and perhaps imperil the whole ticket. Cases can be cited in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, not to name other States, proving this state of things.

The school law of New York was altered so as to take the election of Commissioners of Education in the city of New York from the people, and confer the appointment on the Mayor. The danger was that as the Catholic population is large, several Catholics might be elected. The Mayor made his appointments; out of some fifteen, one Catholic was selected and at least seven Presbyterians, yet no one will pretend that this is at all in ratio to the numbers of the two denominations in the city. It was simply a piece of special legislation to deprive the Catholics of any influence in a city where they form half the population.

What Catholics should do under the circumstances is a question for wise and prudent statesmen to decide. Some, where a Catholic is scratched for any office, always scratch that office in subsequent elections unless a Jew is nominated. They adopt the lesson in courtesy inculcated by their fellow-citizens. Of course as numbers scratch in this way, the result must be seen. Carried to its full extent Catholics will finally not vote at all, or will nominate a ticket of their own, not necessarily of Catholics, but of fair equitable men. For not only do Catholics find that those who expect them to vote for the regular candidate turn against them on the score of religion, but no sooner does a distinctively anti-Catholic party come up than they see among its leaders men who have for various offices depended on their votes, and who, when the new party has lived its short life, will be as prominent as before, obsequiously asking Catholic votes, and expecting that their late conduct shall be overlooked in the interests of party.

That seven millions of the population should be content to remain in their present helpless political state is not to be expected. They are accused of no crime except that of wishing to educate their own children. Everything else is a forced conclusion from prejudiced premises. The Germans and some of the other foreign elements are well-organized bodies, acting together under recognized leaders, and with a press of influence; among the Irish Catholics there is little organization or concert; among American Catholics none. The continuance of an active anti-Catholic party in the country for ten years would unite all these elements into one organized whole, alive to its wants and its interests; and under this point of view it is, perhaps, the best thing that could possibly

occur for the Catholic cause, as any long hold of power will, by its fanaticism and excesses, make such a party forever after impossible.

The evanescent character of these anti-Catholic parties is one of our difficulties. When they start they profit by the latent prejudice against Catholics, the result of old training and of current literature; but as soon as these fanatics show their inherent obscenity, coarseness, violence, disregard of civil rights, and taste for arson and murder, the sensible and respectable men who were led away for a moment, withdraw from the party in disgust and shame, and the party dissolves. If it could be made to live ten years by the existence of a directly Catholic party, every question would be so thoroughly canvassed that the sound sense of the American people would banish Catholic and anti-Catholic parties forever after from American politics.

Of our present position Mr. Froude speaks vaguely. But as a prophet he is sublime. Historian he may not be; philosophical observer of the present he may not be; but as a prophet he surpasses all we have hitherto read. He foresees the future with unerring eye. What we American Catholics will do under any possible contingency, at any period of time, is as clear to him as noonday. Starting with the absurd theory that we Catholics are opposed to the Constitution, and with the false assertion that our Church had condemned it, he cries, like some tragic ranter on a provincial stage: "Give them the power and the Constitution will be gone. A Catholic majority, under spiritual direction, will forbid liberty of worship, and will try to forbid liberty of conscience. It will control education; it will put the press under surveillance; it will punish opposition with excommunication, and excommunication will be attended with civil disabilities. That it (*i. e.*, a Catholic majority in the possible future) will try to do all this as long as it accepts (? in the living present) the Ultramontane theory which at present passes current (what is it, please?) is as certain as mathematics. It (*i. e.*, this possible American Catholic majority of the future) tried before in the Dark Ages; it will try again in the age of enlightenment."

We cannot comment on such nonsense, especially when backed up by what M. Louis Veuillot said in the Chamber of Deputies, where it happens that M. Veuillot never spoke,—we cannot comment on it better than by citing Mr. Froude's own words: "Language of this kind is permitted in the New World because of its absurdity. Fools are allowed to talk as they please."

Signs betoken a new movement against us Catholics in America, like those of 1835, and 1844, and 1855; but we must beg those who differ from us, or view our progress with jealousy, to meet us

fairly, and to bring to the discussion of the few real questions in debate men possessed of some knowledge of American history and law; men who have read, or are willing before they speak to read, the recognized doctrines of the Catholic Church, and not build up a colossus of prejudice and misinformation. For, from the specimen afforded, we must decline to consider Mr. Froude as an historian, at least where American topics are concerned, and we submit the question, with all deference, to the various historical societies from Maine to California, convinced that they will decide as we have.

INSANITY AS A PLEA FOR CRIMINAL ACTS; INSANITY AS EMOTIONAL OR AFFECTIVE; AND WHETHER INSANITY CAN BE OF THE WILL ALONE.¹

MENTAL insanity is an obscure and difficult subject, and yet the discussion of it, especially as related to crimes against the civil law, has passed from the schools of science and philosophy to popular literature, to the magazine—even to the daily newspaper. This has been brought about mainly by the fact that members of the medical profession and the “scientists,” in their writings addressed to the general public, and also “experts,” in their testimony before the criminal courts, now propose novel and strange theories for explaining diseased mental action, maintaining that “emotional insanity is an ordinary physical cause of moral depravity and crime of unusual atrocity.” Some of these scientists go so far as to hold that their hypotheses for explaining disease of the mind and the physical causes of crime should be authoritatively recognized in the criminal code; and with such success have they done this that some courts in New Hampshire have actually ruled that insanity is a question of fact, not of law, and

¹ The following authors, among others, were consulted in the preparation of this article: Dr. Ray, on Medical Jurisprudence; J. H. Balfour Browne, Esq., on Medical Jurisprudence; Maudsley's works, *Body and Mind*, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, his writings being of standard authority with the medical profession on the subject herein treated, were consulted for the theories generally defended by his school of thought. While Dr. Ray's treatise on Medical Jurisprudence is very elaborate, that of Browne is far more correct in its philosophical principles, and under this respect it is a safer guide, both for the student and the general reader, who are desirous of forming sound notions on the subjects treated by them.

that its definition, and the tests of its presence or absence, are matter for the jury with the experts to decide, without any instruction from the court on responsibility of acts, on the definition, and the legal tests of insane deeds. It is for the legal profession to determine at what value they will estimate the verdict of a petit jury made up without instruction from the court, and entirely on the answers of experts, some of whom maintain that all moral depravity is insanity; that one may be insane at the instant of committing a criminal act, and perfectly sane at the instant next before the act, and next after it, and at all the other instants of his life; that one may be perfectly sane as to his intellect, and yet plan and execute a criminal act by compulsion of an insane will. It remains to be seen whether this strange precedent in New Hampshire will be followed elsewhere, and thus take from the office of judge what was heretofore looked on as one of its most important functions. Is not murder that is charged also a question of fact, and yet must the judge not instruct the jury as to what constitutes the crime of murder?

The questions raised in respect to insanity are living and practical, therefore, and their discussion cannot rightly be left exclusively to those "scientists" who claim to speak for the medical profession, and reduce crime to a purely physiological basis. The problems of insane mental action pertain to civil law, to the medical science, and to psychology or the philosophy of mind. The matter of those questions concerning insane mental action has its ethical and civil aspects which relate it to public authority; and since insane mental action supposes organic lesion in the brain, under this aspect the subject legitimately pertains to the science of medicine; and, finally, it is related to psychology, or the philosophy of mind, whose office it is to discriminate between intellectual or spiritual action and organic action. Before expressing any opinions or drawing any conclusions as to the share which mental disease may have in causing criminal acts, it will be very advantageous to consider, 1st. What rules and axioms are laid down by jurists for the guidance of civil courts; 2d. What the medical science has succeeded in proving; and lastly, what principles the philosophy of mind must claim as demonstrated which bear upon the subject. As regards the sciences of law and medicine the writer cannot pretend to give more than a general statement of results; but such statement will, at the same time, suffice for that view of the subject which is here to be taken. There are questions concerning diseased mental action which are interesting to the Christian, and which he must be prepared to answer with as much clearness and certainty as are attainable. Nothing more is attempted in this

article than to state those questions, and offer a few suggestions pertaining to their solution.

Insanity is an abnormal state of the soul's superior faculties, produced by disease of the brain, which state of the soul's faculties is manifested by disorderly and unsound or abnormal action, thus showing such person to be *non compos mentis*. But, it may be asked, what more precisely and specifically is that abnormal action of the mental powers which conclusively proves one to be of insane mind? Are there certain symptoms or tests which, when known with certainty, infallibly determine that some persons are victims of this disease? Is there some sign or characteristic of insane mental action which surely and in all cases distinguishes it from sane action of the mind? Is the insane person who, in consequence of his disease, violates the law ever justly punishable for the transgression?

The works written for the legal profession, and the instructions given by the courts, at different times, treat these questions more ably and dispassionately than do most works composed by members of the medical profession, since the latter class of authors either theorize concerning all mental action from a purely materialistic standpoint, or else they consider only the pathology of the disease as manifested by its various types in lesions of the brain.

Whenever a murder of startling atrocity is perpetrated, and its author is brought to trial, public sympathy is enlisted in the case, either for the culprit or in favor of the victim; and as the populace are swayed rather by feelings than by any juridical view of the deed, one while the culprit is summarily lynched, another while his crime is condoned under the assumed plea of "emotional insanity." As the courts do not presume insanity *a priori*, merely because the crime is enormous and was committed without reasonable motive, a plea of insanity must be sustained by sufficient proof; and hence great effort and ability have been directed towards establishing some legal tests of mental insanity by which to rule all cases of the kind. "Experts" from the medical profession are summoned to assist the jury, who are duly instructed on these tests, in applying these criteria to the particular case before them, and thus determining as to the fact of mental insanity. As these "experts" have come to impugn all the formerly received legal tests of insanity, and to advance conflicting opinions concerning the distinctive symptoms and the true nature of insanity, less and less authority is accredited to them; and their cross-examination is, in many instances, made an ordeal through which few of them would freely pass a second time. There is usually no great difficulty when the offender is under the control of frenzy, is a raging maniac, or is a confirmed idiot; but the perplexing case is that of the accused who

has "method in his madness;" who deliberately planned, selected the means, and executed a criminal work. Can such a person be really insane, and, if so, by what tests, symptoms, or criteria can it be certainly determined that he is of insane mind, and, therefore, not punishable?

The scope of the question will be more clearly and fully apprehended by here stating some of the rules actually laid down by the courts, at different times, for testing and distinguishing insane action. The tests as first given were quite vague and unprecise, and though more satisfactory results were reached at a later period, there is not even yet any uniform or invariable rule that governs the courts. The law provides justly enough that an act is not punishable when the person, at the time of doing it, was not of free will, owing to mental disease. Lord Coke merely classified persons mentally diseased: "1°. An *ideota*, which from his nativitie by a perpetual infirmity is *non compos mentis*; 2°. He that by sickness, grief, or other accident, wholly loseth his memory and understanding; 3°. A lunatic that hath sometimes his understanding and sometimes not, *aliquando gaudet lucidis intervallis*, and therefore he is called *non compos mentis* so long as he hath not understanding; 4°. He that by his own vicious act for a time depriveth himself of his memory and understanding, as he that is drunken." There is here given no definition of insanity. Lord Hale and others subsequently ruled that there is a partial insanity and a total insanity; that a man may be *non compos mentis quoad hoc*, without being *non compos mentis* altogether; and that "this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter capital;" this rule is still strictly adhered to in England. In 1723, when Arnold was tried for shooting at Lord Onslow, the instruction of the court was that for one to be exempt from punishment in such case, "it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." Mr. Erskine affirmed, at a later period, that "no such madness (*i. e.*, entire privation both of understanding and memory), ever existed in the world." None of these rulings of courts or provisions either furnish any definition of insanity or lay down any determinate test or specific symptom by which an insane reason can be distinguished from reason that is sane or in a normal state. The first attempt made with any degree of genuine success to do this, in explaining the nature of insanity as a plea for criminal violation of law, was made by Erskine in the year 1800, when Hudfield was tried for shooting at the king, a case rendered famous chiefly by Erskine's remarkable speech pronounced at its trial. Erskine affirmed that "delusion" is the test or the distinctive symptom of

that insanity which is the only type of mental disease the courts have to deal with, and that ordinarily admits of any doubt or uncertainty. In the words of Erskine, "Delusion, therefore, where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity;" and we shall see further on that he here assigns a true test of such insanity, understanding insanity in the sense of insane mental action. In the next preceding sentence of his speech he thus expresses more fully the same principle: "These are the cases that frequently mock the wisdom of the wisest in judicial trials; because such persons often reason with a subtlety that puts in the shade the ordinary conceptions of mankind; their conclusions are just, and frequently profound; but the premises from which they reason, when within the range of their malady, are uniformly false; not false from any defect of knowledge or judgment, but because a delusive image, the inseparable companion of real insanity, is thrust upon the subjugated understanding, incapable of resistance because unconscious of attack."

"Delusion," which this sagacious jurist declares to be an unerring test or characteristic of insanity, is variously defined by lawyers and in works on medical jurisprudence. Lord Brougham explained it to be "the belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient." Shelford defines it with less precision to be "the fancying things to exist which can have no existence, and are impossible according to the nature of things, as that trees will walk or statues nod, and which fancy no proof or reasoning will convince." It is plain this last definition does not accurately state the objects of delusion, since they are oftentimes plainly possible things, and even things partly real.

This rule for discerning insane mental action, which was proposed by Erskine, was for many years cited and followed by the courts; and that there is delusion in all insane mental *action* is a truth beyond dispute; there is now no question of mental disease in which reason has *no action* at all. The questions, "What is the general test of mental *disease*?" and "What is the test of insane mental *action*?" regard different matter. The general test of mental disease is the organic lesion in the brain; the test of insane mental action is delusion. But as it is generally conceded to be a fact, proved by experience, that there may be insane delusion which is limited to some particular objects, or class of objects, while the mind has perfectly sane knowledge of all other things, or the mind may be insane on one subject and sane on all others; it was, therefore, argued that one who is under the control of an insane delusion may still be punishable for a criminal violation of law when the matter of his offence does not fall within the range of his delusion. Hereupon a controversy arose among jurists; some main-

taining that "delusion" is not an unerring and adequate test of mental insanity; others asserting that delusion is no test at all of insanity, and this class of minds have now reasoned out their theory to a denial that there is any test of insanity at all, its presence or absence in a given case being merely a question of fact to be decided only by the jury and the experts, which is surely a *reductio ad absurdum*, since no fact can be known, even to experts, except by means of its own specific criteria. That there is no insanity of the species referred to by Erskine without delusion is a certain fact; as to whether a morbid delusion is all that is required for exempting a criminal act from legal punishment is a very different question, about which there are two plausible opinions that are defended.

One school of authorities contend that there is no such thing as monomania, or a delusion that is entirely confined to one object or one class of objects; but the reasons advanced by some of them in defence of this opinion are not genuine, namely, when they affirm as proof that the mind does not consist of compartments or distinct divisions, but it is simple, and therefore when insane at all, the entire mind is insane. Of course the soul is simple; but one who would argue the question raised should first know the elementary truth that insanity is a disease of the brain, and that it is not seated in the soul, which is a spiritual substance; disease is only in a material organ, since matter alone is composed of parts joined to parts, physical agents and reagents acting chemically. It is easy to conceive that the mental action of a person who is under the control of a dominant delusion about one class of things is affected, and more or less impaired in respect to all things, since an ailment in one part of the brain may by sympathy interfere with healthy and normal action throughout that organ; but it is, perhaps, not possible to prove that, as a fact, this invariably happens in monomania.

Those who admit, with Erskine, that delusion is the inseparable companion of mental insanity, but deny that it is an adequate legal test, on the ground that one may have a particular delusion, and yet become guilty of crime that is punishable, labor to discover some one test that will apply to all cases coming before the courts; and some dispose of the difficulty by alleging that the test is "inability to distinguish right and wrong." But this is only shifting the difficulty to another point of view. Ability or inability to distinguish right and wrong is the test of rational knowledge; an infant cannot discern right and wrong, and neither can an insane mind do it. The question must again come back then, What is the test of that insanity which deprives the mind of its power to distinguish right and wrong? We should here keep different mat-

ters in their right relation to each other; *responsibility* comes from power to distinguish right and wrong, and freely choose between them; power thus to distinguish right and wrong, and choose between them, presupposes the mind to be in its healthy normal state, and that the right and wrong are duly presented to it. The question always returns, What is the test of that mental insanity which deprives the mind of its normal state and its normal action? In respect to the type of mental insanity now under consideration, Erskine assigned its specific and uniform symptom; it is delusion, which comes from inability in the mind, caused by disease of the brain, to distinguish mere fancies or images in the morbid imagination from reality.

In order that the courts might, if possible, settle down on some uniform rules and doctrine in respect to this disputed matter, the British Parliament, in 1843, proposed four questions to the judges, with the request that they would agree upon, and report answers. Those questions and their answers were as follows:

"Question I. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusions in respect to one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, when, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?"

Answer of the judges:

"Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the accused did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing the crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand your lordships to mean the law of the land."

They limit this condition to "the law of the land," partly in order to cut off atheistical subterfuges, which, if holding the accused bound by the moral or natural law, might be resorted to by the accused.

"Question II. What are the questions to be submitted to the jury where a person alleged to be affected with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?"

"Question III. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?"

Answer to questions II and III:

"As these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we submit our opinion to be, that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man

is to be presumed sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, till the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

"Question IV. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he therefore excused?"

Answer:

"On the assumption that he labors under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation, as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."

According to the doctrine laid down in these answers of the judges, which is still generally adhered to by the courts, both in England and in the United States, in order to judge the moral character of a person's act which is done when such person is under the control of insane delusion on one subject, we must assume that the facts are just what he imagines them to be, and then judge his act by those facts, as if they really existed. If one burns down his neighbor's house, because, as he insanely fancies, God commands him to do so, his act is not criminal; but if he burns the house out of revenge, because his delusion is that his neighbor robbed him of an imaginary fortune, in such case he is guilty, supposing that his mind was sane in all else and he then knew revenge to be unlawful. It is also contended by some authorities that this same rule should be applied in the same manner to the acts of the somnambulist, or of one dreaming and acting under the delusions of his dream; his illusions being regarded as real facts, his acts must be judged accordingly. But this opinion, concerning responsibility for acts done in sleep, does not accord with the facts, as will be seen further on in this article. There is no real consciousness in one dreaming, while there is, as supposed, perfect consciousness in partial insanity, as regards all objects of thought not within the range of the morbid delusion.

What is thus far said concerning the legal and judicial doctrine of insanity and insane action, though not herein developed or analyzed fully, for that would extend this article beyond due limits, will suffice for the object proposed. It is certain that the grave authorities who hold to those principles of medical jurisprudence in adjudging criminal charges against persons pleading insanity as exempting them from punishment, sincerely intend truth and jus-

tice. Many leading members of the medical profession at the present day emphatically condemn the law as applied to partial insanity or monomania, asserting with Maudsley, "when a person is lunatic he is, as Dr. Bucknill has remarked, lunatic to his finger ends." Others of them only deny that delusion is a specific and certain test of such type of mental disease. But in order to determine the value of their theories and criteria of mental insanity, their account of its psychological nature and its relation to sound ethics, we must here consider the results which they profess to have reached and demonstrated. Pinel is credited with first saying that "there are many maniacs who betray no lesion whatever of the understanding, but are under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties alone had sustained injury." Prichard is said to be the first who maintained the theory of moral mania, or that the will, as the "moral sense," may be insane, even when the intellect is perfectly sane, alleging that persons "while laboring under this disorder—of moral insanity—are capable of reasoning or supporting an argument on any subject within their sphere of knowledge that may be presented to them; and they often display great ingenuity in giving reasons for their eccentric conduct, and in accounting for and justifying the state of moral feeling under which they appear to exist." His followers maintain his theory still more explicitly, that moral insanity is a disease of the "moral sense;" that in many instances of it every other faculty of the patient may be in a perfectly healthy condition, and that oftentimes the only symptom which manifests this type of mental disease is depravity of unusual or exceptional species. Hence Maudsley's¹ reflection on the law laid down by the judges in 1843: "How grossly unjust, then, the judicial criterion of responsibility which dooms an insane person of this class to death if he knew what he was doing when he committed a murder!" In such case, this school of teachers hold, the reason is perfectly right, and is completely conscious; it is only the moral sense, the affective faculty, or the will, that is struck with insanity.

But in order to do justice to the doctrine of insanity, as taught in most schools of medicine at this day, it is but fair to let them state for themselves the first principles on which they found their teachings; and then the correctness of their reasoning becomes only a question of valid logic, which is easily disposed of. In-

¹ Body and Mind, lecture ii. In his work on Responsibility in Mental Diseases Maudsley tries to show the falsity of all the tests of insane mental action followed by the civil courts, including that of "delusion." His theory is that the *will* may be insane, even when there is no delusion in the reason, or when the reason is perfectly sane. His doctrine is not likely to be generally followed in practice by the courts, as they must fail to see how a man is not responsible for his acts done deliberately and with perfectly sane judgment as to their moral character.

deed, their first principles are more at fault than their reasoning upon them.

With the results reached by physiologists in accounting for the organic causes of insanity, their description of the lesions in the brain which distinguish the different types of mental disease, there is no question here to be argued; for this being exclusively and specially an object of their science, it may well be conceded, on general principles, that they have made the discoveries which they claim to have made, and that they correctly state the pathology of mental diseases, so far as they affect the brain and the nervous system. It also falls within the province of medical science to describe and explain the phenomena of disordered mental action as a distinctive symptom of this peculiar bodily disease; and it may also be granted that their best authorities do enumerate and describe these facts and manifestations of insanity with much thoroughness, as well as that the medical profession of this day greatly excel all their predecessors by their skill and success in treating disease of the mind. But many leading authorities in this profession go much further and attempt to explain the spiritual world, the nature of man's soul, and the moral order; and to account for them from the standpoint of mere living organism, or of mere organic and nerve function. It is with this part of the doctrine now taught that issue is here to be joined.

The majority of the medical profession holding peculiar views concerning body and mind as only different manifestations of one and the same living physical and homogeneous nature would, perhaps, be perfectly willing to allow Maudsley to speak for them, as he represents the "advanced doctrine," and is probably among the very ablest exponents of the new theories of mind, who have treated the subject *ex professo*; however there are others who push the principles defended by him to further consequences than he does, at least as regards some special questions.

After treating of the intellect or rational principle's healthy and normal action, which he explains to be nothing else than action of "nerve-centres," Maudsley thus introduces his views on the subject of diseased mental action:¹ "I pointed out that the higher mental operations were functions of the supreme nerve-centres; but that, though of a higher and more complex nature than the functions of the lower nerve-centres, they obeyed the same physiological laws of evolution, and could best be approached through a knowledge of them. I now propose to show that the phenomena of the derangement of the mind bear out fully this view of its nature; that we have not to deal with disease of a metaphysical entity, which the method of inductive injury cannot reach, nor the re-

¹ Body and Mind, lecture ii.

sources of the medical art touch, but with disease of the nervous system, disclosing itself by physical and mental symptoms. . . . Clearing then the question as completely as possible from all the haze which metaphysics has cast around it, let us ask,—how comes idiocy or insanity? What is the scientific meaning of them? They are mysterious visitations only because we understand not the laws of their production; appear casualties only because we are ignorant of their causality.” A cause that will not produce insanity in one person will do so in another, showing that in the latter case, “there has been a certain hereditary neurosis, an unknown and variable quantity in the equation.” “Idiocy is indeed a manufactured article; and, although we are not always able to tell how it is manufactured, still its important causes are known and are within control.” He then proceeds to describe, and correctly, various causes which lead to idiocy, as drunkenness in parents, marriage of blood relations, etc. So long as he confines himself to the mere organic lesion, the external symptoms which manifest mental derangement, and the best means of treating the disease with a view to its cure, his language is generally faultless. It is only when Maudsley philosophizes concerning the intrinsic nature of mental action that he is at fault in his conclusions; he is then astray in his reasoning because he starts from wrong first principles.

He thus accounts for the origin of conscience, or, as he more generally styles it, “the moral sense.” “But if all mental operations are not in this world equally functions of organization, I know not what warrant we have for declaring any to be so. The solution of the much vexed question concerning the origin of the moral sense seems to lie in the considerations just adduced. Are not, indeed, our moral intuitions results of the operation of the fundamental law of nervous organization by which that which is consciously acquired becomes an unconscious endowment, and is then transmitted as more or less of an instinct to the next generation? . . . There is no greater difficulty in believing that the moral sense may have been so formed, than in believing, what has long been known and is admitted on all hands, that the young fox or young dog inherits as an instinct the special cunning which the foxes and dogs that have gone before it have had to win by hard experience.” “A perversion or destruction of the moral sense is often one of the earliest symptoms of mental derangement; as the latest and most exquisite product of mental organization, the highest bloom of culture, it is the first to testify to disorder of the mind-centres.” When the “moral sense” alone is insane¹ there is often irresistible

¹ Maudsley regards “punning” and also wit that startles us with the use of an idea in a double sense, as indicating “the insane temperament.” Dugald Stuart considers fondness for polemics or religious controversy as a symptom of insanity.

impulse to homicide and other crimes, when the "reason is no further affected than in having lost power to control, or having become the slave of the morbid and convulsive impulse;" and he denounces the injustice of punishing the acts of such a person. He maintains "the essential unity of body and mind;" and regards "the mind as the crowning achievement of organization, and the consummation and outcome of all its energies."

In defending this theory of body and mind philosophically he resorts to Locke's well-known argument: "To those who cannot conceive that any organization of matter, however complex, should be capable of such exalted functions as those which are called mental, is it really more conceivable that any organization of matter can be the mechanical instrument of the complex manifestations of an immaterial mind? Is it not as easy for an omnipotent power to endow matter with mental functions as it is to create an immaterial entity capable of accomplishing them through matter? Is the Creator's arm shortened so that He cannot endow matter with sensation and ideation?" The question may be fairly stated thus: Is it as easy for omnipotent power to make one being with contradictory attributes, or attributes that mutually exclude each other, and are therefore, as expressed by the old authors, not at all compossible, as it is for omnipotent power to make two distinct natures, the attributes of the one excluding the attributes of the other? Is it as easy for omnipotent power to make one figure which is a square circle as it is for omnipotent power to make two figures, one of which is a square and the other a circle? It is possible for body and intellectual spirit to be united into one living compound, as it is possible to inscribe a square in a circle; and, as a fact, man is just such a compound of soul and body; but it is not possible for a material organ to elicit intellectual action, nor is it possible for intellect to elicit the act of an organ, for the two species of action exclude each other, or they have no common property, and are not compatible in one and the same principle; they are of necessity two distinct agents.

As there can be no true theory for explaining the mind's healthy and normal action, unless it recognize the spiritual character of the intellect, so there can be no true or satisfactory explanation of insanity or insane action of the human mind which denies or even ignores the essential and fundamental truth of all genuine mental philosophy, that man's intellect is a faculty of his soul alone, not an organ, not a compound faculty, made up of two factors or components, body and spirit.

Some who agree with the above theory which makes all intellectual or rational operation merely a "function of supreme nerve-centres," oppose the legal principle that one acting under the influ-

ence of insane delusion may, notwithstanding, deserve punishment if he knew his act was criminal at the time he committed it; and they base their argument against this judicial decision, on the principle that "such person has only abstract or speculative knowledge¹ of right and wrong in the case supposed; but one who is thus insane upon real things is not capable of rationally or freely applying this abstract or speculative knowledge to particular realities in a true and normal manner at all as required for the very idea of responsibility." There is surely plausibility in this reasoning. But the premises contain a truth which proves too much as regards the theory that intellect is only a "function of supreme nerve-centres;" for, "abstract and speculative knowledge" can only be in a faculty that knows the universal or immaterial; that is itself *abstracted* from the material. How could there be "abstract or speculative knowledge of right and wrong" in the intellect, which is ideally true, or true as in the ideal order, while, as Erskine correctly words it, "the morbid imagination which constitutes the disease" obtrudes false or distorted images before the intellect, unless we conceive the intellect to be a spiritual faculty that is not capable of sickness, while the imagination is an organic power that is diseased? And, as correctly argued by those who bring this objection against the justice of punishing any one acting under the influence of insane delusion, it is not the "speculative knowledge" that is wrong; it is the application of that knowledge to particular realities which are falsely represented by the imagination, which is erroneous and against reason.

It will now be comparatively easy to conceive what the materialistic medical authorities mean by "moral insanity" whose symptoms are "depraved impulses," "perverted emotions," "motiveless

¹ See Maudsley, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, chapter iv., where he cites Ray on *Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity*, as using the same argument.

St. Thomas, p. 12, qu. 77, a. 2, in answer to the question, "Whether reason can be overcome by passion against reason's knowledge," after distinguishing different manners in which passion may either wholly or partially take from reason its ability to apply abstract universal knowledge to particular things, says, in conclusion, "Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc, quod aliquando cum passiones multum intenduntur homo amittit totaliter usum rationis; multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et iræ sunt in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad iudicium in particulari, contra scientiam, quam habet in universali."

"And that such a thing may happen in the passions is plain from this, that sometimes, when the passions are much intensified, a man entirely loses the use of reason; for many, through excess of love and anger, turn to lunacy. And in this manner passion draws reason to a judgment in a particular matter, which is contrary to the knowledge which it has as universal."

It does not follow, however, from this truth that, as implied by Maudsley's and Ray's argument, a man who is insane or under delusion only on one subject, may not be able to judge truly of other subjects which he knows correctly, and apply a general principle to them rightly.

character of the deeds done," "defective volition," "annihilation of the will-power;" for, in this form of mental disease or mental insanity, their theory is that the principal lesion is in "the volitional nerve-centres," or in those supreme nerve-centres of which all volition is a function. Hence, their instruction to the courts is, in every judicial charge to the jury, the question of fact to be determined is as to whether or not the criminal pleading insanity, while knowing the difference between right and wrong, was able or unable to control his action.

Emotional insanity, pathetic insanity, affective insanity, are expressions used by these authors as synonymous, and they signify with them insanity of the will; for this school of "scientists," like the Stoics of old, confound feelings, or the excitement of mere animal passion, with action of the spiritual part of man, his soul; or rather, the materialist recognizes no spiritual nature at all in man, and, therefore, he regards all his actions as purely that of a living material organism. In accordance with such conception of man's nature, this school of thinking now generally hold that a person's will, which in their theory is only a nerve-centre, may be insane at the same time that the reason of such patient is completely sane, so that one who has this form of insanity may deliberately plan, select the means, and execute a murder, impelled to do so by force of an insane will, though the reason is at the same time perfectly sane, knows the action to be wrong, and reprobates the deed. But, in order to quiet all scruples in religious minds, they gravely assert the superfluous thesis, that "moral insanity is never moral depravity;" yet they do not say anything about the converse of that proposition, they do not assert that "moral depravity is never moral insanity," much as such view of the subject merits their serious attention.

The question is, then, can man's intellect be perfectly sane while his will is, at the same time, truly insane? In other words, can the will alone be insane, or does mental insanity necessarily suppose disorderly, deranged, and abnormal action of the reason, coming from disease of the brain or "nerve-centres?" It is perfectly certain that no one can give any consistent or satisfactory explanation either of the sane action or the insane action of man's superior faculties, the intellect and the will, who confounds intellectual and voluntary action or spiritual action with organic or material operation in man. One who regards the act of the intellect by which it knows the universal truth, the morally good, and the act of the will by which it desires such object, as purely the action of "nerve-centres" in the brain, is not at all provided with the essential first principles for philosophizing on this subject; and

his theorizing could justly apply only to the "brute mind," which includes no spiritual faculty, but only "nerve-centres."

It may be justly affirmed, then, that it is not physically possible for the will to be truly insane while the same person's intellect is really sane or in its perfectly normal state.

To know the nature of an end, correctly judge its moral character, rightly to judge and select means, and then accomplish that end as the work or object intended, precisely constitute that operation over which man's reason has empire or free voluntary control. The choice which the will may exercise between delusory objects presented to it by the insane reason is not that rational free choice which is required for responsible action; for, when the reason is insane, the will's ability to choose is not that of genuine rational liberty; the will inclines to, or averts itself from, the objects, just as those objects are apprehended and presented by the intellect. The will is sane or insane according as the intellect is sane or insane. The will is really a faculty of the reason itself, for it is one and the same reason that judges and chooses an end and the means to that end; and it is not correct to conceive the will either as a mere organic function, or as being a something really separated or distinct from the reason. Hence, the will is very appropriately styled by the schoolmen the "rational appetite," it being the reason's faculty of appetition, or power of desiring and choosing. It follows, therefore, that insanity of the will would be insanity of the reason itself; and that abnormal action of the will necessarily presupposes abnormal action of the reason, which must present to the will its objects in order for the will to act at all; in other words, the act of reason is included in an act of the will, and is inseparable from it.

Emotional insanity, affective insanity, pathetic insanity, cannot be more nor less than abnormal action of the animal passions or sensible appetites in man, which are so sudden and violent in their disordered movement as to dethrone the reason and take away its mastery or control over the person's action. This sudden, violent, and overpowering movement of passion or bodily feelings is also styled impulsive insanity, for the obvious reason that it strongly and suddenly impels to action, its violence or force coming from the passion or affection that is abnormally excited. Such emotion or impulse in the human organism anticipates all deliberation or rational choice, or it precedes all comparison and judgment in the reason; for the superior faculties of the soul then have not their usual healthy action, as we must suppose, owing to a diseased state of the "nerve-centres" in the brain, which interrupts the right presentation of objects to the intellect.

While we must grant the possibility of reason and its appetite, the will, being either suddenly and momentarily overcome by in-

tense feelings, and even more or less permanently deprived of their normal sway, by unhealthy violence of emotion or passion in the bodily organism, the reason and the will, which are not faculties of the body or of nerve-centres in the brain, but faculties of the soul alone, are intrinsically united in the soul, and they are not, in themselves, capable of sickness. The soul itself, being a spiritual substance, is not diseased, though the natural and normal action of its faculties, the reason and the will, is disturbed, disordered, and it may be either partially or completely deranged in their action, through disease in the brain organs or "supreme nerve-centres" which minister to the intellect the objects of its thought. No well-attested fact either of the mind's sane action or of its insane action furnishes any proof whatever that the intellect and the will are "purely functions of supreme nerve-centres in the brain;" man's superior or spiritual faculties, the intellect and will, manifest their specific spiritual character, whether the organs that extrinsically serve the intellect with its objects be in a healthy and normal state, or in an unhealthy and abnormal state; just as in the analogous case of the eye, whose action of seeing objects reflected from the smooth mirror does not lose its specific character as the eye's action when it sees objects as misshapen and distorted by a mirror whose surface is ruffled with undulations and angles. It is not at all necessary, in order to explain the facts adduced to prove the existence of what is styled "impulsive insanity," or what is by some miscalled "moral insanity," either to assume that man has "a moral sense," or that the will is susceptible of insanity which is not shared by the intellect.¹ How can there be "a moral sense?" How is it possible that there should be a sense whose object is that which is not sensible, or transcends all sense power? The sense can know a sensible object; but no such faculty can apprehend that object's relation to an abstract universal law, and this is required for knowing the moral character of objects. Conscience is not "a moral sense," or any sense-power, for, if it were, then there is no reason why a brute should not have conscience. The sensible feelings of remorse, self-reproach, or self-approval are effects produced in the bodily organism by conscience; but conscience itself is an act of the reason by which it applies the moral law here and now to a deliberate choice of the will; an organ of the body is wholly incapable of such act, since it cannot apprehend the moral law, which is expressed in an abstract universal

¹ Doubtless Maudsley and his school state correctly the symptomatic facts manifesting the character of different mental diseases; but the materialistic theory which they follow in accounting for them philosophically envelops their speculations in much confusion and inconsistency.

idea and is in itself considered something purely of the intelligible order.

To suppose that a man of perfectly sane reason can plan an evil work, and deliberately execute it by chosen means, and though knowing it at the same time to be evil, is compelled to do it by an insane will, is surely to make a supposition that destroys itself.

Not a few medical authorities urge upon the courts to recognize as an established principle that "repeated crimes, being symptoms of morbid perversion of moral sentiments, should in all cases be treated as disease." In truth, repeated crimes in one who gives no other sign of mental disease is proof only of moral depravity. A man of sane reason is always responsible for the government of his passions and evil inclinations, and they cannot deprive his will of its liberty, except by deposing reason from its normal rule; for the will cannot be forced to elicit its acts by any degree of passion while reason is in its normal state. Properly speaking, the will cannot be *forced* to act by any object or power.

One who has the "St. Vitus's dance" may have so little control over the movements of his body as against his will, and in spite of his reason, to run over the precipice or into the ditch. In such case there is nervous and muscular action of which he has no voluntary government, though his reason is perfectly sane; but it is sickly and disorderly action of his body, and is done only mechanically.. It is also easy to conceive certain bodily passions or emotions, acting with sickly and abnormal violence, to override the reason and cause acts of "impulsive insanity;" but the reason and will could have no share in the deed, since it would not be a deliberate action, as we suppose. Admitting the facts as usually related in this connection concerning kleptomania and other forms of monomania coming from insane passion, they can be explained only by assuming that the reason is bereft of its normal sway when the acts are done; for if the reason have sane action and there be deliberate choice by the will, such acts would be fully responsible. The deeds of one under the control of insane passion or impulse are not imputable, in the supposition that the action of his members and faculties is, by consequence of the disease, taken from under the empire of his reason and will.

It is not exclusively the office of the physician or of the physiologist, as already affirmed, to account for insane mental action; it strictly belongs only in part to him, in so far, namely, as the insanity is an organic ailment, a nervous disorder, a lesion of the body, and has certain manifestations in the mind as symptoms of the disease. It is for that profession to give the pathology of insanity and define rules for its diagnosis; the essential distinction between spiritual or intellectual action and organic bodily action

belongs to the domain of psychology or the philosophy of mind. It follows, then, that the physician who attempts to philosophize concerning the intrinsic nature of spiritual or intellectual action, without having duly informed himself as to what principles are demonstratively proved in the philosophy of mind, cannot possibly furnish any but a crude and more or less inconsistent explanation of the facts observable either in healthy or unhealthy mental operations. One who is unable to discriminate between intellectual or volitional action and organic or nerve action, is also unable to refer correctly and rightfully the actions of an insane mind to their true and proper causes. He could be persuaded that man has "a moral sense," which is capable of insanity, and that, when thus afflicted, his will may become wholly insane, even when his reason or intellect remains perfectly sane; and that, although a person of sane reason who contrives and executes a criminal work is responsible if ever man is responsible for his deliberate acts, since thus doing a work includes all the conditions for responsible action, yet, even in that case, the person may be truly irresponsible because of only obeying the irresistible impulse of an insane will. This kind of theorizing misrepresents both the medical science and the teachings of genuine philosophy; and it appears to have for its chief final aim to bring about the identification of moral depravity with mental insanity, or to defend the hypothesis that great moral depravity is mental insanity, and is one of its distinctive symptoms.

It is possible for one whose mind is really insane to contrive a work, select the means, and execute his plan, his reason being under the control of a fixed dominant idea or image of the fancy that deludes him, producing in his mind abnormal action, deception, false judgments concerning the moral character of the deed on which he is intent. When reason, which must present to the will objects of choice, is insane, the will, as wholly dependent on it, must be insane also, and in a corresponding degree, for the will must follow the reason; its freedom is not then rational freedom. This form of mental disease is technically styled monomania, and it is the species of madness which presents the subject of insanity under an aspect the most interesting, the most difficult, and at the same time the most important, whether as regards medical jurisprudence or the philosophy of mind. We shall here consider the condition of the intellect when under such thralldom, and the nature of its action in such case, from the standpoint of psychology or the philosophy of mind. Excluding from the consideration, then, all questions as to idiocy and frenzy or raging mania, in which the specific action of intellect and will is scarcely discernible at all, and confining the argument entirely to "delusional insanity," *i. e.*, insane mental action, it seems to me that the symptom, the distinc-

tive characteristic, the specific sign or mark of that form of mental disease is correctly said by Erskine to be delusion, understanding delusion as Lord Brougham defines it: "The belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient." Just as one who is fully under the influence of a dream does not doubt, and even cannot doubt, the truth and reality of the images then obtruded by the imagination before his intellect, no matter how absurdly it may combine impossible elements, so neither can one who is fully under the control of insane delusion doubt the truth and reality of the sickly phantasms before his intellect. His only medium of knowing realities as they are, and therefore as truly presented to his intellect, is the imagination; and, at the same time, the imagination being diseased, cannot fulfil its normal function, cannot be the witness against itself, but forms images of them that are false, and even impossible, and objects them before the intellect as being things actual, the intellect being entirely unable to know any objects except as thus presented to it.

The delusory image, then, is invincibly mistaken for reality; it is not truly judged, it cannot be truly or rightly judged. Whether that delusion be in the mind of one dreaming or in a mind insane from brain disease, its illusory character remains the same. It will be interesting here to give St. Thomas's explanation of the manner in which the false and delusory images in the fancy of one dreaming cut off the intellect's communication with realities. He maintains that what is done under the influence of a dream is, in itself, never imputable to the person, a doctrine which is followed by theologians and casuists in general to this day.

In his *Summa*, p. 1, qu. 84, a. 8, he lays down the principle, "It is impossible that there should be a perfect judgment of the intellect in us while the sense is bound through which we know sensible things." He gives as reason, "the object proportioned to our intellect in our present state of existence is the nature of sensible things. But there can be no perfect judgment of anything unless all is known that belongs to it, and especially if one should be ignorant of that which is the term and end of the judgment. All things now understood by us are known only by a comparison of them to sensible things. Although intellect is superior to sense, yet it in some manner receives from sense, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. Therefore, it follows necessarily that the intellect's judgment is impeded by a bondage of the sense."¹

¹ Impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum cum ligamento sensus per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. Proprium objectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non

He goes on to observe: "A man sometimes judges while dreaming that what he then sees is a dream, in some manner distinguishing between real things and unreal likenesses of things. But, nevertheless, the *sensus communis* (sensorium, sensory) is, to some extent, bound; and although it may discriminate certain mere appearances from the real things, nevertheless it is always deceived in some things. Hence, those who argue (syllogizant) in sleep, always find when they awake that they were deceived in something." On this account he decides p. 22, qu. 154, a. 5, that one is not responsible for what he does in sleep. "There is no one who, when dreaming, is not actuated by certain likenesses of phantasmata, just as if they were the things themselves; and therefore what a dreaming man does who has not a free judgment of reason is not imputed to him in blame, just as what one does who is mad or out of his mind is not imputed to him as culpable." He affirms that a man's character, personal habits, virtues, or vices, when awake, may sometimes be indicated by the turn which his dreams take, as St. Augustine has observed (12, 15, *Super. Gen. ad Lit.*), "on account of the soul's good disposition some of its merit may shine out even in sleep." Again, "the use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, but, nevertheless, it is always impeded as to something, so that it cannot have free judgment; and therefore, what one then does is not imputed to him as culpable." In reply to an objection, he adds: "The reason's apprehension is not hindered in sleep to the same extent as its judgment; the judgment is perfected by conversion to sensible things which are first principles of human thought."

The theory for explaining sleep once generally taught was that, in such state, the "*sensus communis*" or the sensorium in the brain of one sleeping suspends its action, causing the external senses also to suspend their action. But the imagination and the organic memory do not cease all action unless in deep sleep. As the "*sensus communis*" or sensory of the brain, which is the organ in which and by which all the sensations or impressions received by the external senses are reduced to the unity of consciousness, may be only partly in action; and when this happens one may actually know that he is dreaming, just as in partial insanity one may know that his delusory image is unreal. This "*sensus communis*" is,

potest nisi ea omnia qua ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et præcipue si ignoraretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Omnia autem quæ in præsentī statu intelligimus cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles. Ad. 2: quam vis intellectus sit superior sensu accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu et ejus objecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.

¹ Propter bonam animæ affectionem quedam ejus merita etiam in somnis clarent.

1st, the principle of the external senses ; 2d, it is the terminus of external sensations where they are reduced to unity, as sensations of one and the same living animal nature. This sensory informs the waking sane fancy with images coming from real things, which are then seen as real things and known as real things ; but in the dream the fancy or imagination can form images not then furnished to it by the sensory, and not coming, therefore, from real things, but only originated by the imagination out of its own resources. The fact is well known that the fancy can preserve and reproduce its images once received, a faculty not possessed by the retina of the eye in respect to its images ; and also the fancy can variously combine images once formed in it, so as to compose the likenesses of other objects. When one is awake the imagination may be made to form these combinations under the direction of reason ; in dreaming the imagination is not subject to the direction of reason. As the intellect of one dreaming, or of one under the control of insane delusion, cannot compare these fallacious images to real things, since it is cut off from communication through the imagination and the external senses with real things, it is unable to find out or even suspect the unreality of such images. In such case it is the imagination that presents false images, and at the same time it is the imagination which must furnish the true images of real things, by means of which the intellect is to discover its deception, if it does so at all ; two offices which the imagination cannot perform at one and the same time ; for it cannot act both as sane and as insane in presenting the same images.

Speaking of the insane, he says :¹ "The mad or those out of their minds are wanting in the use of reason, *per accidens* ; namely, on account of some impediment in the bodily organ, but not from a defect of the rational soul, as it is with brute animals, and hence, in regard to them, it is a different question." Again : "Insanity" is taken for this, that the human mind falls away from the due condition which man's nature requires ; and this happens either by his losing the use of reason, and it may be also in respect to the power of appetite, as when one loses human affection."

In regard to affective or emotional insanity, he thus speaks, explaining its cause : "From the very fact that appetite is vehemently affected toward a certain thing, it can happen that the man from

¹ "Furiosi vel amentes carent usu rationis per accidens, scilicet propter aliquod impedimentum organi corporalis ; non autem propter defectum animæ rationalis ; unde de his non est similis ratio." P. 3, qu. 68, a. 12, ad 2.

² "Insania animæ accipitur per hoc quod anima humana recedit a debita dispositione humanæ speciei. Quod quidem contingit et secundum rationem, puta cum aliquis amittit usum rationis ; et quantum ad vim appetitivam, puta cum aliquis amittit affectum humanum." P. 22. qu. 157, a. 3, ad 3.

violence of the affection is taken away from all other things.¹ There is in man a double appetite, namely, the intellective, which is called will, and the sensitive, which is styled sensuality. Therefore a man may get beside himself (either above or below his normal state), through appetite, in two manners. In one manner when the intellective appetite (or will), leaving aside all those things towards which sensitive appetite inclines, wholly tends towards divine things. In a second manner is the appetite rapt away when, superior appetite being put aside, a man is borne entirely towards things that pertain to inferior appetite. This has not the nature of rapture (involuntary and total alienation of the superior faculties and of self-control), unless perchance the passion be so vehement that it wholly takes away the use of reason, as happens in those who become insane through violence of anger or love. Each one of these excesses coming through the appetite can cause excess in the knowing faculty, either because the mind being taken away from the senses is rapt to certain intelligible things (things of the intelligible or spiritual order), or because the mind is rapt to some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition." It is plain that if this image in the fancy, which thus subjugates the reason, is fixed, such a one is of insane mind, and the violent and ruling affection will not be merely transitory.

Some conclusions furnished by psychology or the philosophy of mind, which must guide our investigations of insane mental action as indispensably as mathematics must direct us in solving the problems of mechanics, despite Maudsley's unreasonable and repeated sneer at "metaphysics," may now be stated and applied to the present subject-matter:

1st. The specific note or mark of insane *mental action* is delusion, as affirmed by Erskine. There may be delusion that regards only some particular class or classes of objects, and this is partial insanity, the reason then knowing correctly other objects presented to it by the external and internal senses, and those objects are also

¹ "Ex hoc enim ipso quòd appetitus ad aliquid vehementer afficitur, potest contingere quòd ex violentia affectus homo ab omnibus aliis alienetur." P. 22, qu. 175, a. 2 ad 2: "In homine est duplex appetitus, scilicet intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas et sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas. Dupliciter ergo homo secundum appetitum potest fieri extra seipsum. Uno modo quando intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, prætermis his in quæ inclinat appetitus sensitivus. Alio modo quando prætermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quæ pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem. . . . Deficit a ratione raptus, nisi fortè tam vehemens passio sit, quòd usum rationis totaliter tollat; sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam iræ vel amoris insaniunt. Uterque excessus secundum appetitum existens, potest causare excessum cognoscitivæ virtutis, vel quia mens ad quædam intelligibilia rapiatur alienatur a sensibus, vel quia rapiatur ad aliquam imaginariam visionem seu phantasticam apparitionem."

presented as they are really and truly. But if the imagination offers none except delusory images, the condition of the reason is then like to its state in dreaming, when by suspended action of the "sensus communis," or common sensory in the brain, it is entirely cut off from all communication with the order of real things, the impressions made on the external senses not reaching it in a normal manner at all. In madness of this type the patient cannot know rightly any real object that is brought before him, since, in his state, the diseased imagination cannot present an actual and truthful image of any objects to his intellect. It may be inferred, perhaps, that in such form of mental disease, in which the imagination has none but delusory images, the disease is not wholly confined to the imagination; but there may also sometimes be lesion of the "sensus communis" or sensory, whose office is to reduce the external sensations to the unity of internal consciousness, understanding "consciousness" in a wide sense, so as to include even that power by which a brute may be said to know that it sees, to know that it hears, know that it feels, etc., and a brute has sensible knowledge of these impressions received.

2d. Affective insanity, emotional insanity, pathetic insanity, impulsive insanity, which, as before observed, are different names employed to present one and the same thing under different respects, all arise from abnormal action of the animal passions, feelings, and appetites caused by organic lesion or disease. When the impulse of such passion or feelings is so violent or abnormal as to take away the use of right reason, then the consequent action of such patient will be insane and, by consequence, irresponsible. Should the impulse of such feelings and passions or appetites not be so violent as to overpower and take away the use of right reason, then the deliberate yielding to such impulse and doing criminal or unlawful actions would not be insanity, but it would be in its degree moral depravity. This impulsive or emotional insanity,¹ which takes away the use of right reason, may perhaps be only occasional and transitory, as seems to happen in kleptomania; or it may produce more or less permanent dethronement of the reason, accompanied by delusions which, of one kind or another, are as inseparable from all insane mental action as they are from all real dreaming.

3d. It will be more easily understood how all mental insanity is proximately caused by diseased or abnormal action of the imagination, if we rightly conceive the true function of that brain-power

¹ "An interesting circumstance in connection with this morbid impulse is that its convulsive activity is sometimes preceded by a feeling very like the *aura epileptica*—a strange morbid sensation, beginning in some part of the body, and rising gradually to the brain."—Body and Mind, lecture ii., Maudsley.

when its action is healthy and normal. The office of the imagination is to present the images of objects primarily derived by it from impressions on the external senses before the intellect; and the intellect itself forms all its ideas, no matter how abstract they may be, only by directing its action towards these images, or as turned towards them. In no other manner can the intellect even think its own thoughts, think of them, or reproduce any of its own ideas, than by converting itself towards their objects as somehow mirrored before it in the imagination. One who reflects attentively on what takes place in his own mind when thinking, will observe this fact for himself; and he will notice that the intellect, as it were, looks outward from itself, to what is extrinsic to itself, and that the representations before it and extrinsic to it are always clothed in some or other sensible properties, among which are certain relations of place and extension. Whenever we think, then, we look towards the images in the imagination as at something which is extrinsic to our intellects, and we cannot even think of our own intellectual ideas as objects, or, in other words, make them the objects of our thoughts, except by embodying them or imagining them under some form in the imagination. If the intellect was not thus entirely dependent, in thinking, on this extrinsic ministry of the imagination, disease or lesion of this organ in the brain would not then deprive it of its ability to know and think of real things by means of true ideas of those things. But the intellect's actual condition is like that the eye would be in, if it were so situated that it could see no object whatever, whether above, below, to one side or to the other, unless that object were presented to it as reflected from a mirror placed before it. If this mirror were perfect it would truly image the objects; but if it were furrowed, indented, irregular, or filled with various flaws, it could give only distorted, fragmentary, and false images of the objects reflected by it, and, hence, the eye's vision would be false in a corresponding manner. Such dependence of the eye on the mirror would be very analogous to that which the intellect has, in all its acts, on the imagination; and disorder or defect in this mirror before the intellect also disturbs or falsifies its perceptions and ideas, in a degree corresponding to the injury which is in the organ.

It may be easily perceived, by reflecting on our own thoughts, that these images in the imagination are of a material nature, or are made out of what is part of matter, since they so plainly possess the qualities of matter, as size, or some property of extension, some respect of color, or other qualities of material things that are derived by the imagination from impressions on the external senses. Indeed, who can say that some Kepler may not yet make the physical discovery of the material phantasmata at a nerve-centre in

the brain, as the philosopher by that name actually physically discovered and verified the fact that, in ocular vision, perfect images of objects when seen are projected on the retina of the eye? It had long before been demonstrated by the philosophy of mind that the eye must acquire images of the objects seen by it. Kepler actually discovered the now well-known physical fact that the eye forms these images.

4th. There is no such faculty in man as "a moral sense," nor could there exist such faculty in the nature of things. There is a popular use of such expressions as "good sense" for correctness in apprehending and judging practical things, and less commonly "moral sense" applied to a conscience that is exact and steadfast in dictating what is right and condemning what is wrong; and these forms of language may be justified. But what is herein denied is that the will of man can be only an organ in the brain or a mere nerve-centre. *Sense* is an organ of the living body, and therefore it is body, bodily; but, being itself matter, it cannot transcend the sphere of material action. Matter can never have action which is wholly immaterial, for this is a contradiction in terms. Now, the moral character of an action or an object arises from the relation of that action or object to the norma of right reason; but this norma of right reason totally and absolutely transcends all matter and all the physical predicates of matter; it follows, then, that it cannot be apprehended by a bodily organ, whose object must always be physically extended and material. Hence, to say that "the moral sense may become perverted or insane," is unmeaning language, since there is no such sense in man at all. Perversion of the will's affections in one who has lost the use of reason gives no proof whatever that the will is a sense or an organ in the brain; such perversion is from disorder in the reason's action, caused by a diseased imagination, through which the reason has lost its control over the feelings and passions, since it has lost its ability to judge rightly.

5th. A man's will cannot be insane while at the same time his reason is really and truly sane. Man as a rational being has but one superior mental power, strictly and radically, and that power is reason, which possesses, as its virtues or faculties, intellect, will, and memory. Reason and will are not really separated from each other, but they intrinsically constitute one principle, which is capable of both knowing or judging and choosing. Will, as distinguished by us from reason, is blind, and is incapable of any action till reason proposes its objects. Error or falsity is only in a faculty which is capable of knowledge, and therefore there can be no disorderly, insane, or deluded action of the will which does not come from insane or deluded action of the reason in presenting to the will its

objects. The will, then, is of itself incapable of being deceived or deluded, because it is incapable of knowledge; it is a mere appetite of the reason, or the reason's power of inclining towards objects which that reason apprehends as good. There can be no insane mental or bodily action in man, therefore, which does not spring from that lost use of right reason which is caused by a diseased state of the imagination.

6th. In accordance with the foregoing doctrine, concerning the nature and connection of man's superior faculties, it is a generally received principle in ethics that no violence of passion or force of impulse can carry away the will, or compel its act of choosing, except by previously obscuring and overturning sane reason.¹ It is an undeniable fact that violent passions or emotions may take away the use of right reason by injuring the brain. The will intrinsically elicits or puts forth its own acts, and it is the complete principle that determines its own choice in all those things that fall under the empire of reason, whereas force is extrinsic violence, which cannot reach the will's own immanent act, or share in the act as intrinsically elicited by the will. Man's animal appetites, and all the appetites and inclinations of the brute animal, promptly obey the "predominant motive;" but man's rational appetite, the will, can choose either the stronger or the weaker motive, or it can freely refuse to choose at all either the one or the other.

7th. No one is really and truly *non compos mentis*, or of insane mind, unless he has lost the free use of right reason through a diseased state of the imagination, either in regard to some objects only, or in regard to many objects. It may happen, it doubtless does happen, that, owing to special nervous lesions, a man may suffer sudden and violent impulses of feeling, emotion, or passion, which cause in him a transitory and sometimes a permanent privation of right reason, and for this he may be in nowise responsible. But to say that a man whose reason is perfectly sane and right may, by impulse of insane emotion or passion, determine on perpetrating an unlawful and criminal deed, select the means for its

¹ "Unde si sit talis passio, quæ totaliter involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, alioquin non totaliter. . . . Si verò causa non fuerit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cùm aliquis ex ægritudine vel aliqua hujusmodi causa incidit in talem passionem, quæ totaliter aufert usum rationis, actus omnino redditur involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter excusatur a peccato."—St. Thomas, Summa, p. 12, qu. 77, a. 7.

"Hence if the passion be such as to render the act following from it wholly involuntary it wholly excuses from sin; otherwise it does not wholly excuse. . . . If, indeed, the cause was not voluntary, but natural, as when one from disease or any cause of the kind falls into such a passion as entirely takes away from him the use of reason, the act is rendered altogether involuntary, and by consequence it is wholly excused from sin."

accomplishment, and actually carry out the work, while at the same time his right reason reprobates the action, which, however, he is compelled by an insane will to do, is to state a case whose conditions destroy themselves. It is surely nonsense to say that when a man of sane reason deliberately resolves to do a future action, selects the means, and then deliberately fulfils his purpose, he is not therein a free agent, since such action would include all the conditions, and that without any exception, for an act that is completely and perfectly free. There may be involuntary impulses, feelings, and diseased nervous action of various kinds in a person who, though diseased, is of right reason, but the action of such a one is merely physical and mechanical; there is then no object resolved on, no means deliberately selected, for his action is not designed, it is not at all voluntary. It follows, therefore, that there can be no such thing as "annihilation of the will power," except as consequent upon a previous "annihilation" of the reason itself.

The imagination, as heretofore said, may be so injured by its lesions as to object before the intellect few genuine and true images of real things, as happens with idiots and with some maniacs; or it may offer some defective and delusory images, but yet present true, real, and healthy representations to the intellect, of all other things. Were the imagination to offer no images at all but delusory ones, the condition of the intellect would then be perfectly analogous to its state in a dream; were the imagination to offer before the intellect no images of any kind, true or false, the condition of the intellect would be as it is when a person is in a deep sleep, or, rather, as it is when the person is in a comatose state.¹

We may conclude, then, that the subject or the seat of the disease called mental insanity, which takes away the free use of right reason, is the imagination, not the reason itself, though it impedes or wholly mars the reason's action. A living bodily organ is susceptible of disease, because it can be decomposed, can have part violently torn from part, and be dissolved into its constituents; but the reason, being a perfectly simple faculty, and not composed of tissues, or material parts joined to parts, cannot be acted on by chemical forces, cannot be decomposed or dissolved, and, therefore, it cannot be diseased. From the fact that, as we are now constituted or as we are existing in this life, the intellect is wholly dependent on the imagination in all its thought, it can never think

¹ The scientific weekly, *Nature*, of August 7th, 1879, says: Delusion, really, in its widest sense, may be said to constitute the essence of insanity.

It is certainly true that there can be no insane mental *action* without delusion. When the reason can have no action at all, it is because the imagination is incapable of presenting any images, whether true or false; and the mind's condition then is that of complete inanition.

of anything or form any idea at all unless the imagination represent before it the extrinsic object of its thought or idea under the form of some or other image or likeness. The seat of the disease is, therefore, the imagination, which is an organ in the brain; and this is confirmed by the positive discoveries of science, as Dr. Hammond with others bears witness: "Even in the most striking instances of what is called transitory mania, or morbid impulse, the evidences of pre-existent and subsequent disease of the brain will be found, if they are looked for with skill and diligence and intelligence."¹ Were this lesion in the brain distinctly and specifically known, it would constitute a general physiological criterion of mental disease. But, as yet, the "nerve-centre" whose function is imagination, is not ascertained. While delusion is the criterion of insane mental action, the general criterion of mental disease cannot be deranged mental action, since the mind has no discernible action in some types of mental disease; it must, therefore, be some different symptom from disordered action of the reason.

8th. In order to conceive insane mental action correctly and truly it is necessary first to understand rightly the manner in which the healthy human mind naturally forms its ideas of objects, and to know clearly the dependence of the intellect on the imagination for presentation of all the objects of its thoughts and ideas. It is not less necessary also to conceive the imagination to be a sense or an organ in the brain, and that the intellect is of a simple and spiritual nature, and not a sense or a "nerve-centre" in the brain, as Maudsley falsely affirms. One who is in possession of these preliminary truths will be greatly helped towards understanding the manner in which the reason is controlled by those insane delusions in all types of diseased mental action, by reflecting attentively on the action of his own reason in dreams which he distinctly remembers to have had. He will thus prepare himself to study the action of the human reason when it is under the control of a morbid imagination, which is the proximate cause or reason of mental insanity.

Finally, there are learned members of the medical profession who merit great praise for the invaluable service to the philosophy of mind which they are rendering by their discoveries in the physiology of the nervous system, and for the advancement made by them in the successful treatment of mental insanity, and also, what is pertinent to the subject of this article, for the proof which they furnish that there is actually some lesion of the brain in all forms

¹ Insanity in Relation to Crime. New York, 1873, p. 75. Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, ch. i.

of mental disease. But when some of them, with Maudsley, proceed farther and try to interweave their science with a materialistic philosophy of mind, they surely go beyond their own premises ; they lay down principles and assert conclusions which are not only false in physiology because false in philosophy, but which are false in philosophy because false in physiology. They certainly cannot claim to have demonstrated by means of forceps and microscope that the act of knowing universal and abstract truth, and the act of freely choosing moral good are functions of "supreme nerve-centres." No one can give any consistent explanation either of the human reason's sane action or of its insane action, on the hypothesis that man's reason is a material organ, a mere nerve-centre. Man's reason retains and manifests its spiritual character, both in its sane operation and in its action when under the control of insane delusion in the morbid imagination. The sane action of human reason cannot be explained satisfactorily without admitting reason to be an immaterial and spiritual faculty, which forms its ideas of objects with the extrinsic aid of the imagination mirroring before it the representations of those objects under some or other images or species of likeness. Nor can the insane action of man's reason be accounted for scientifically except by admitting it to be an immaterial and spiritual power, yet totally dependent for its objects, in forming ideas and thinking, on the ministration of the imagination, which must somehow mirror those objects under sensible forms before it, but which being deranged by disease of the brain, is incapable of imaging or representing those objects in a normal manner, and as they are really and truly ; on which account the insane reason's ideas and judgments are rendered in a corresponding degree abnormal and false. The "scientists" are evidently correct in denying that "delusion" is the test of all mental disease, since there can be no delusion when the disease of the brain is such that the mind has no action ; but delusion is the true test of insane mental action, the only type of insanity in regard to which "either a case of conscience" can arise for the casuist or the civil courts require any special definition, test, or rule, on which to instruct the jury. But the theory maintained by these "scientists" that the human will may be really insane and thereby entirely lose its freedom, even when the same person's reason is perfectly sane and is not under the influence of any morbid delusion, is surely false, and it must prove mischievous in practical life if generally admitted by society as true.

To sum up the main theses concerning mental insanity proposed in this article : 1st. The general physiological test or criterion of mental disease is lesion of the brain ; but the exact seat of that lesion in the brain is not yet certainly determined by physiologists.

2d. The test or criterion of insane mental action is morbid delusion. 3d. There is affective or emotional insanity, which may be either transitory or permanent, and it is caused by disordered passions, feelings, nervous excitement, so violent as to take away the use of right reason. 4th. Affective, emotional, or impulsive insanity can be styled "moral insanity," in the sense that this affective insanity may be accompanied with perverse action of the will, caused by abnormal force of passion or feeling that has deprived the person of sane reason. But it would be wholly incorrect, however, to use the expression "moral insanity" to signify insanity that is limited to the will alone, as if the will could be truly insane when the reason is really and entirely sane.

THE STACK-O'HARA CASE.

Report of R. P. Allen, Esq., Master in Chancery. Submitted January 8th, 1875.

Opinion of the Court and Decree. James Gamble, President Judge, November 13th, 1877.

Opinion of the Supreme Court. Delivered by Justice Mercur, October 8th, 1879.

THERE was a time in our history when the mere fact of a citizen's being intrusted with judicial functions was of itself *prima facie* evidence of his possessing a high sense of honor and rectitude, and a guarantee of his incorruptibility and unswerving devotion to all that truth and justice demanded of him in that elevated position. In the settled conviction that he knew his duty and would conscientiously discharge it, there was a feeling of tranquil security for all, whether voluntary suitors in court, or drawn thither against their inclination. And he who was worsted in the encounter either gracefully yielded, or had only the doubtful satisfaction of setting up his own opinion against that of the judge, without daring to impugn his motives.

The rising generation came into being since that day, but there are those yet living who saw it, and who deeply regret that they will never see it again. It was when judges were not chosen by the people because they happened to be members of this or that party, but appointed by the constituted authorities because they were known to be skilled in the law, honest and impartial men. The good old practice yet prevails in one of the oldest and noblest

of our commonwealths, and the consequence is that she can point to the record of her judges as one of the brightest pages in her domestic annals. The sovereign people, as the Demos is flatteringly called, may be competent to decide on the qualifications of a legislator or member of Assembly. It is not, and cannot be, competent to pronounce on the merits of him who is to preside in a court of justice. The claims of party and all the other interests (sordid and degrading at times) that are connected with politics contribute to his election, and it is greatly to be feared may sway his course upon the bench, as it does that of others in the halls of legislation. Even where there is no room for suspecting any gross outrage upon law and justice for party ends, yet too often the public opinion that prevails in the party that elected him, with its subtle influence, will creep in imperceptibly, warp his judgment, and deaden that delicate sense of right and wrong which he may naturally feel, and which he would most probably follow were he wholly untrammelled in his decisions. The evil, or its danger, is inseparable from the system; and where one rises superior to all temptation, a dozen others succumb to this fatal influence. It is not pleasant for an honest man to know that snares and pitfalls may await him, even within the sacred precincts of the Temple of Justice. What will his consciousness of right avail him, or, in the language of the old dramatist,

“What has innocence to hope for,
When those who sit her judges are corrupted?”

or are liable to be so? Not corrupted by bribes, or intimidation, or reckless partisanship,—the writer thinks it neither necessary nor becoming to suppose this,—but by the taint of what is called public opinion. For this may be, and often is, unjust and wicked; and its baneful influence, however refined and impalpable, deserves the name of corruption, since it poisons and corrupts the administration of justice in its very sources.

All this will be looked on, and possibly denounced, as old foggyism—as the language of a man who is behind the age. At all events it is no treason; and the writer sees no harm in expressing an opinion which, apart from common-sense, long experience and observation have forced on the mind of one who, with more honest intent than far-travelled Ulysses,

“*Mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes.*”

He has no wish to bring back the old state of things, for no one desires the impossible. The absurd notion that the people is the proper judge at the polls to decide who is best fitted to sit as a judge upon the bench, is now as deeply rooted in the popular mind as the other no less extravagant belief, that the knowledge

of what are vulgarly called "the three R's" is of itself sufficient to develop any school-boy into a good member of society and law-abiding citizen. The American people, or most of them, have become so wedded to these idols (not of domestic but of foreign make) that their removal is not to be thought of. Yet one may be allowed to hold, and even modestly to state, a different opinion, untterrified by the great crowd that thinks otherwise. For in matters of this kind, as the old saying has it, great numbers rather tell unfavorably. *Argumentum pessimi turba est.*

Such were the thoughts that passed rapidly through the writer's mind on first reading the late decision in the Stack-O'Hara case. Here is, on the one hand, he said to himself, a case that would be decided in the Bishop's favor in five minutes by any five impartial men who had no qualification beyond common-sense; on the other hand, we have six or seven judges, who after shrouding and obscuring the matter with legal verbiage, decide adversely to the Catholic side.¹ What could have prompted such decision but that insidious breath of anti-Catholic prejudice which permeates the party that rules the State and that gave them judicial office, and which perhaps imperceptibly and in spite of their better knowledge has wrought upon their judgments. They decided, it is true, in favor of a Catholic priest; but was it because he was under censure of the Church, and stood upon anti-Catholic ground? One cannot ward off the suspicion that, had the relative position of plaintiff and defendant by any possibility been reversed, had the priest been the representative of Catholic law and discipline against his Prelate, they would *not* have decided in the priest's favor. The writer, being a stranger to the State, knows nothing of these judges individually, nothing of their special creeds, not even their names, unless that of the Justice who is set down in the newspapers as delivering the opinion of the court. And of him, as of all the rest, he knows absolutely nothing, good or evil. They may be very learned in the law; they may be most exemplary and above reproach in private life; they may be most righteous in their ordinary decisions. But they must be very unlike the judges elected by the people in other States, if they are not liable, in spite of all this, to be overborne by the pressure of anti-Catholic prejudice with which the atmosphere in which they live and whence they derive their official being is laden. To assign any other motive would be folly and would do them little honor. It would be an attempt to compliment their impartiality at the expense of their understanding.

But though prejudice may explain, it can never excuse a decision which reflects so little credit on Pennsylvania justice and its highest

¹ The writer has been misinformed. To the credit of the Bench it must be said that some of the Judges dissented from the Opinion of their colleagues.—NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

exponents. Still it need excite no surprise. It is only an additional instance, out of the many that have occurred and are daily occurring everywhere, and which go to prove that the profession of Christendom's earliest faith, and still more the holding of ecclesiastical office or dignity in the Church, are circumstances that weigh heavily to a Catholic's injury in the scales of what is technically called "Justice" throughout the land.

The decision in question, viewing it only theoretically and apart from its consequences, is manifestly wrong. It is not law, but a straining of the law. The reasoning on which it rests, and which accompanied the delivery of sentence by the court, is hollow and flimsy, based upon alleged facts that are not facts, and suppositions that are not real but pretended. It would have been better and more becoming to leave so arbitrary a judgment without any attempt to back it up by reasoning. But usage required some show of argument, and since nothing solid could be adduced, a few pitiful paltry reasons were strung together to supply its place.

As to the injustice done by this decision, it might be borne patiently if it were an isolated case, the effects of which would pass away with the execution of the sentence. But the injury is permanent; for this decision will serve, and no doubt was intended to serve, as a precedent for future cases of like kind. What action our bishops and clergy will take in this matter does not appear so far. Perhaps knowing that "patience hath a perfect work," they will bear the wrong patiently and meekly with the many other wrongs and insults they have daily to endure. But it seems to be the unmistakable duty of the Catholic laity to enter their cordial and outspoken protest, if they can do no more, against this flagrant judicial outrage upon the laws and discipline of their Church. Though the blow is nominally aimed at our bishops, it seems only right to let the world know that we consider ourselves attacked, and unjustly dealt with in every wrong that is done to our bishops and clergy in their discharge of official duty.

It needs not much knowledge of the law, but only a little plain common-sense and common honesty to discover the iniquity of such decision. But before saying a few words on this subject it may be well to state, as briefly as possible, the facts of the case, and the successive stages of its legal history. Luckily, but, perhaps, not very wisely, the principal facts and documents have found a place in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Rev. M. P. Stack received from Bishop Wood originally, and after the erection of Scranton into an Episcopal See, continued to hold from Bishop O'Hara, the pastoral charge of a church in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Something went wrong. The temporals of the Church were not properly administered. The sacred edifice at last fell into

the hands of the sheriff, so that it was liable to be sold at any moment. The Bishop, who had to come hurriedly to the rescue of the bankrupt church, and pay off its debt of \$600 or more, was naturally displeased with the mismanagement of the pastor which had brought about such a state of things. From the documents on record it does not appear whether he regarded him as guilty of gross negligence or of utter incompetency in financial matters. But on the same day, November 5th, 1871, that he paid the money to prevent the church from being sold, he removed Rev. Mr. Stack, as he had a perfect right to do and as prudence dictated, from his pastoral office at Williamsport. And fearing, it would seem, that possibly Rev. Mr. Stack might be disposed to loiter in the neighborhood of his former charge, he forbade him "to exercise any priestly functions in Williamsport," adding that this prohibition was binding *sub gravi*. Which text one cannot but laugh to see thus glossed or paraphrased rather by the judicial Solons of the Pennsylvania bench: "his administration was of so *grave* a character that any disobedience to the order of prohibition would be a *grievous* sin." It is hard to imagine how they kept their own *gravity* whilst writing this deliberate nonsense. On the 9th of November, 1871, Rev. Mr. Stack wrote to a friend, Rev. Mr. Kœper, a letter (produced in the evidence) stating that he had seen the Bishop, by whom he had been kindly received, and promised another place where he should have no financial troubles. Before this, in compliance with the Bishop's order, he had surrendered the property, books, etc., of his church to Rev. Mr. Kœper, pastor of the German congregation of Williamsburg. But soon after he changed his mind, whether of his own accord or prompted by others outside of the Church who proffered their aid, it does not appear. On the 26th of the same month, with a set of keys he had contrived to retain, he entered the church, and having summoned the congregation, announced to them that he would apply to the civil courts to test the legality of the Bishop's action. Accordingly, on December 1st of the same year, he filed a bill in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, praying the court to decree that his removal from the church in Williamsport, and the prohibition to exercise priestly functions in that town, were unlawful and void; further, that the Bishop be restrained by injunction from removing him, and from forbidding him the exercise of priestly functions in Williamsport; and, finally, that the aforesaid M. P. Stack be restored to his rights and emoluments as pastor of the church in Williamsport.

The unfortunate priest, who, by thus appealing to the civil courts in a matter of strictly ecclesiastical jurisdiction, had forfeited all communion with the Catholic Church, according to the very Canon

Law he and his patrons were invoking, was received and welcomed with open arms by all the enemies of the Church. Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, especially their ministers, vied with each other in showing favor to the new-comer who, though he did not join any of the sects in particular, had won the confidence and goodwill of them all by trampling on his priestly conscience and despising the authority of the Church to which he owed his priesthood. At a session in Chancery the recreant priest obtained all he asked for from Judge Gamble, a thorough bigot, as is clear from his judicial harangues, and far better suited to preside in one of John Knox's conventicles than on a bench of justice where any Catholic interest was at stake. As far as his decree could do it he annulled the Bishop's acts by declaring them unlawful and void; as far as his order could effect it he gave back to the rebellious priest his former position, rights, emoluments, etc., in the pastorate of Williamsport. But a little common-sense and sober reflection might have taught him that his furious anti-Catholic zeal had betrayed him into promising more than he could perform. It takes something more than the bare word of an angry judge to give to Father Stack a right to the use and actual possession of real estate, the sole title to which is invested in Bishop O'Hara by the law of the land, where no bargain, contract, or agreement between them relative to the property has intervened. And even, what is impossible to suppose, had he succeeded in terrifying the Bishop by threats and penalties into surrendering the Williamsport church edifice into the hands of Mr. Stack, he could never succeed in compelling him to grant spiritual jurisdiction, without which material occupation would be worthless, and over which no court in the country has or pretends to have control. Besides, if by any means this misguided priest got possession of the church building, he would have to deal with more dangerous opponents, viz., with the congregation, who, after all, are the true owners of the church property, the Bishop only holding it in trust for their benefit. There is very little doubt that, instead of respecting the new pastor commissioned by Judge Gamble, they would summarily eject the excommunicated priest from their premises without troubling their heads with writs or any other routine process of ousting. The Judge, if he had any knowledge of law and precedent, must have known that it was out of his power to grant an injunction which, from its nature, must be worthless to the party in whose favor it is granted. "An injunction will not be granted if it will not carry with it a substantial benefit" (*Jones v. City of Newark*, 3 New Jersey Eq. Rep. 357). But anything good or worthless, idle swagger or sound law, was equally expedient, if it could only impress the people, even for a few days, with

the notion that Pennsylvania lay courts have a right to intermeddle with Episcopal jurisdiction.

From this absurd and illegal sentence the Bishop appealed to the Supreme Court of the State. This body being at the time, as charity would suggest, more equitably disposed than of late, sent the case back to be tried once more in Lycoming County Court. A Master in Chancery was appointed by the judge to examine more fully the facts, evidence, etc., and report upon the same. The Report, filed in January, 1875, was clear, logical, and comprehensive. It showed that Mr. Stack had no case, and that the Bishop had in no way made himself amenable to the civil law by his conduct, having only exercised a spiritual jurisdiction which the priest had voluntarily bound himself at the time of his ordination to obey. But this did not suit the purpose of those who were bent on harassing the Bishop in the exercise of his spiritual authority, and promoting rebellion and disaffection amongst worldly-minded priests. The Report, instead of being received, was, after nearly three years' delay, set aside by Judge Gamble, who further took it upon himself to qualify this able paper as "hasty and superficial." The Judge reaffirmed his former decision, viz., that the removal of Mr. Stack, and the prohibition of his exercise of priestly functions in Williamsport were unlawful, that it was inexpedient to reinstate Mr. Stack, and, finally, that the Bishop be condemned to pay "the costs accruing from the cause, including the examiner's and master's charges, with expense of printing." Against this sentence, so manifestly unjust to both parties, both appealed. Whether the appeal on the part of the refractory priest was withdrawn or not is unknown to the writer. The name of the Bishop, as sole appellant, appears in the heading of the final decision of the Supreme Court, which was rendered October 14th, 1879. The appeal was dismissed, and the Bishop, besides former costs and charges, was condemned to pay the additional expenses of the appeal.

It has been said that the sentence of November 13th, 1877, now indorsed by the Supreme Court, was unjust to both sides; and it may be well to examine how far this is true with respect to the plaintiff, who has been for the last eight or nine years not only a mere suitor for justice at the hands of the County Court, but manifestly its theological guide. Judge Gamble and the judges of the highest State court all agree that the priest has been wronged. Then why do they not redress the wrong? If his "rights of property" (this is their favorite expression) have been wrested from him by fraud or violence, why are they not restored? For what other end than this were courts of justice instituted? Their very name implies as much. Justice, even for Pagan sages and lawyers, meant that every man should have his own, *suum*

cuique tribuere, as it has been defined by Ulpian. A "court of justice" means a tribunal organized by and representing civilized society, and which by the strong arm of the law upholds the citizen in the possession of what is his own, or restores it to him after due investigation, when he has been unjustly deprived of the same. But Pennsylvania justice, as expounded by its Supreme Bench, means neither of these things. Her judges cry out against wrong, but refuse to right the citizen who has been wronged. They sympathize with him and shed tears, figuratively speaking, over his misfortune. But it was not for this empty purpose that courts and judges were created by society. Any citizen can give his share of pity to the victim of misfortune or wrong, and it will be accepted at its just value. But when I see my neighbor wronged and refuse to right him, though it is my duty and I have the power to do it, should I, instead of help, tender him my sympathy, he will spurn it as hollow and unmeaning, or resent it as an insult. Well, at least they investigate wrong, discover and denounce it. Even if they do, what is that worth if they lack the will or the power to redress it? The editor of a newspaper can do as much, and often more effectually. A court that has no remedy for injustice has no right to investigate; for since the cure of the evil does not lie in its hands, neither does the investigation lie within its province.

They cannot plead ignorance of the proper remedy. The plaintiff, whose words they seem to look upon as oracles, has often and plainly enough told them not only wherein lies his grievance, but wherein consists the proper mode of redress. He has been unjustly deprived of the revenue of the Williamsport church, and he demands to be reinstated as pastor. Why is the injustice of the deprivation admitted and decreed, and the remedy, the reinstatement, refused? Oh, no! exclaims Judge Gamble. I have not refused exactly; I tried to reinstate the plaintiff seven years ago, and would have done it had I been allowed, but the Supreme Court dissolved the injunction. In 1877 I again boldly reaffirmed that foul injustice had been committed, but on reflection decided that to remedy such injustice would be "inexpedient," "unwise, and injudicious." (Opinion and Decree, p. 49.) Oh, yes! cries out the Supreme Bench, in chorus; he ought to have prevented or remedied this violation of the rights of property, which is "contrary to the supreme law of the land," but he "thought it unwise" to do so. (Opinion of Supreme Court, delivered by Judge Mercur.) Expediency, then, and wisdom, worldly wisdom, are sufficient reasons for a judge to sanction the peaceful, unmolested triumph of fraud, robbery, and injustice over the rights of property and injured innocence, though a word of his might prevent it! It is expediency, not the eternal law of justice, that determines what is

right and what is wrong! There may be among the occupants of that bench those who, for aught the writer knows, are in the habit of taunting the Catholic Church with this very doctrine. Whether Catholics so believe or not, this is no place to examine. There must be something in the doctrine to recommend it, since Pennsylvania judges hold it and follow it in practice. But the character and grounds of this expediency deserve a little closer scrutiny. Let us hear the explanation from the judges themselves.

"A decree of restoration as asked for . . . is deemed inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the Church of the Annunciation (Williamsport), its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff six years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. The wise and prudent course of their present pastor has secured to him their confidence and regard, which it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb." (Opinion, p. 49.)

All this reads very prettily, but, casting aside its verbiage, what is its substance? The plaintiff was unjustly deprived of his rights of property. Not content with this, the Bishop, who deprived him, sent another to enjoy these usurped rights and property. The plaintiff goes into court to recover his lost possession. The judge warmly espouses his cause and decrees his restoration; but an appeal causes loss of time, and when the judge is again ready to give sentence he once more denounces the injustice, but will do nothing to remedy the wrong which he officially recognizes. And why? The usurper who now holds the place by unlawful seizure, is well liked by the congregation, and gets on very well with them; so well, indeed, that it would be a pity to disturb him in the possession of his stolen goods! This is the plain English of the paragraph when stripped of its rhetoric. To illustrate still more Judge Gamble's theory of law and justice being made subservient to expediency, let me propose a case, which is quite in point, as he must admit. A landlord, by lease or other mode of legal tenure, grants, for twenty or thirty years (say a lifetime), a large tract of land to A. The latter makes the best use of his newly acquired possession, with its "rights and emoluments," improving the land, dividing it into small farms, and subletting to a numerous tenantry. In a year or two the capricious landlord gets tired of his bargain with A. In defiance of justice, and in spite of the lease, which holds good in law, he summarily evicts A and gives his place to B. A applies to the court for protection of his rights of property; the judge promises he shall have it, and, as a preliminary step, grants an injunction. This is followed by an appeal and counter litigation of some years. When the judge is at last free to pronounce sentence, he begins by denouncing the unlawful outrage that had been committed on A's rights of property, and assures him that his heart bleeds for the cruel injustice he has suffered and is yet suf-

fering, for his wrong is "serious, irreparable, and continuing" (Opinion of Judge Gamble, p. 47). He then goes on to say: "It would give me great pleasure to restore the plaintiff to the possession of his legitimate rights, and I would do so did I not deem it inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the tenantry, its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. Mr. B is such a nice man, and has acted so wisely and prudently, that the neighbors and tenants have become quite fond of him. It would be a pity, it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb the kindly relations existing between them." What would Judge Gamble and his brother judges of the higher court think of this decision? Let them not condemn it, for it is their own. It is the very way in which they have dealt with Mr. Stack. If he has not a good case to-day he never had one. If expediency now can warrant the leaving him without redress, it is plain that he never was the victim of injustice. Winning ways with tenantry or with a congregation can never legitimate usurpation of rights of property; and it was on the rights of property that Mr. Stack based his claim for redress, not on the good will and attachment of his parishioners.

It is hard to believe that men whose position compels them daily to scrutinize narrowly what is adduced as evidence, to pursue and detect error lurking under cover of specious argument, could have been so misled by their own sophistry as to really take for granted that there was a time at any stage of the case when it was *wise* or *expedient*, or at all possible, for them to restore Mr. Stack to his pastoral office. Not all the law courts of the State, nor Congress, with its legitimate, or even its lately assumed, powers could do it, without first rooting out of existence the American Constitution, and the principles on which it rests. It is a pity they did not try to do as well as talk, and make the attempt to quash the Bishop's spiritual jurisdiction and force a pastor bearing their commission on a reluctant congregation! They did not attempt it because they knew it was impossible, and because failure, which they knew to be inevitable, would cover them with shame and ridicule. This, perhaps, furnishes the true key to explain the words, *inexpedient* and *unwise*. They may be only mild expressions to avoid the use of that unpleasant word *impossible*, and to smooth the descent from their own lofty promises and the great expectations they had encouraged in the plaintiff. So that all the fine talk about restoration to rights of property, reinstatement in the pastorate due to plaintiff, but unfortunately hindered by the agreeable relations now existing between the congregation and the present occupant, had no meaning, was in fact mere Buncombe! The old-fashioned, unprogressive

judges of a former generation, to their credit, knew as little of this language as of its name.

In their Opinion the Pennsylvania judges are never tired of repeating that the plaintiff had rights of property in the Williamsport church. This church has no revenues, but depends on the voluntary contributions of the members, which are of their nature fluctuating and uncertain. Granting, however, that it was fixed, certain revenue or property, and that plaintiff had a right to it, of what nature was that right? Was it absolute, indefeasible right, derived from inheritance, free gift, lawful purchase, or any other way known to the law by which ownership comes? Evidently not. The right to the property or its use, for he could have no more, was purely conditional. As long as he was the pastor he was entitled to its use; as soon as he ceased to be pastor, *ipso facto* his right and title were forfeited. How does a priest cease to be pastor? According to the discipline hitherto prevalent in these United States, by death, resignation, or removal. The bishop, who has the removing power, removes sometimes for cause assigned; at others without giving any reason. But in either case the removal holds equally good. The system occasionally works harm and suffering. But for this the civil court has no remedy; and the priest has bound himself at his ordination to abide by it "for better, for worse."

It is scarcely worth while to notice the ludicrous way in which the judges set about proving that the Williamsport church revenues, though derived from voluntary sources, are constant and certain. Instead of consulting the Church treasurer's book they have consulted the Catechism, and found there that Catholics are bound by precept of the Church to support their pastors. Therefore Rev. Mr. Stack, as pastor, had a certain support. In the first place it is too kind of them to take for granted that Catholics never fail in this as in other duties. But admitting that a congregation never fails to support its "pastor," would Mr. Stack be such if, after having been removed by his bishop, he were imposed on the congregation by a court of lay judges? And if not considering him their lawful pastor they should use their own discretion in interpreting the Catechism and refuse to support him, would their refusal have to be remedied by pains and penalties at the hands of the same lay court? It is to be feared that these wise judges were nodding, not to see the mass of absurdities to which their arguments open the door.

But, they add, "a priest's profession is his property." As long as he has spiritual jurisdiction from proper authority, no doubt. But a lay court can neither give nor take away that jurisdiction. Let them look at their own profession. The name of an attorney, who has by the study of a lifetime qualified himself for the law and for nothing else, may be stricken from the rolls at any moment by

competent authority. In which case where is he to find his property in his profession?

If the writer of these lines belonged to a State whose judges could deliberately give to the world such a wretched, absurd opinion as that delivered by Judge Mercur, he would feel ashamed of them for her sake. Nothing short of intense bigotry, either innate or reflected from public opinion, could have so perverted their powers of reasoning, blinded them into contempt of the fundamental law of the land, and what is worse, of the first principles of common-sense. Omitting what they said but did not mean, and supplying what they meant but did not say, the whole opinion might be condensed into the following words:

We have undertaken to protect a priest who holds himself independent of his bishop's authority. He appears to be an enlightened priest; for he denounces hierarchical pretensions, and though he promised obedience at his ordination he has reconsidered that promise, and will henceforth keep only as much of it as his private judgment may deem compatible with his rights as a man and citizen. Had we only amongst us some of those wise provisions, which the illustrious Bismarck has lately introduced into German legislation, we would gladly reinstate him as sole legal pastor in Williamsport church. But, unfortunately, this is not a Christian government, and will not allow us to compel the Williamsport congregation to acknowledge or receive him, or submit to his jurisdiction. Meanwhile, until better days bring more stringent legislation, we can only sympathize with this noble victim of episcopal tyranny. If we cannot protect the priest, however, we can punish the bishop, and mulct him heavily in costs for the suit which the priest brought and failed to gain. If we can do no more, we will pinch his pocket,

Which, if not victory, is yet revenge.

Though the writer does not know the religious creed of any of these judges, there may, perchance, be a Presbyterian amongst the number; in which case I respectfully recommend to his perusal the following extract from the most influential Presbyterian journal of the country, that he may learn from it what is thought of his decision by those who reflect and guide public opinion in his own denomination. The other judges, too, may read it with profit. It is from an article on the case in question, written soon after the opinion was delivered:

"The opinion thus rendered is NOT consistent with religious liberty, nor in harmony with the fundamental idea of American relations between the Church and the State. . . . When the civil power steps in and says that, because a priest draws a salary, therefore the civil power has the right to determine whether or not he has been properly inducted or extruded, it is an invasion of the religious freedom of the Church, which ought to be intelligently, but firmly, resisted."—*New York Observer*, October 23d, 1879.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE FAITH OF OUR FOREFATHERS: AN EXAMINATION OF ARCHBISHOP GIBBONS'S "FAITH OF OUR FATHERS." By Rev. *Edward J. Stearns*, D.D., Examining Chaplain of the Diocese of Easton, author of "The Afterpiece to the Comedy of Convocation," "Birth and New Birth," etc. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1879. 12mo.; pp. 380.

THE admirable little controversial manual, or familiar exposition rather, of Catholic doctrine, to which the present volume professes to be a reply, has been now nearly three years before the public. During that time it has not only received the hearty applause of the Catholic press, but has also won kind words and respectful homage from reviewers outside of the Church. It has made its way into many a household, where no Catholic book had ever before penetrated. It has been instrumental, under heaven, in diffusing the light of Truth and dissipating wicked or ignorant prejudice to an extent that its author could scarcely have anticipated. Edition after edition has been exhausted with a rapidity unprecedented in our Catholic publishers' experience, whether of books written at home or reprinted from abroad.

All this must have been very consoling to the author, and to all who share his wish that "the marvellous light" of God's Kingdom should shine upon as many as possible of those who sit in darkness, waiting for the kindly hand that is to guide their steps in the way of Divine Truth. But it was gall and bitterness to many whose prejudices and interests are opposed to the dissemination of truth. They are the professional teachers of error, of what the Church calls "doctrines of men," as opposed to the truths revealed by God and intrusted to her keeping. If you listen to the professions of these men you would imagine that they are fond of encouraging investigation, ardent advocates of free discussion, who insist on a hearing of both sides of the question, and who welcome with pleasure everything that may help the candid inquirer in his search after truth. But their deeds belie their professions. They are unwilling that any of their disciples should look into a Catholic book, or even know of its existence. They forbid the reading of it where their authority extends so far, and if any one presumes to read it without their knowledge or in disregard of their injunctions, their indignation knows no bounds. Though this intolerable tyranny has its ludicrous side, one cannot well afford to laugh at it, in view of the deplorable results of such clerical domineering on one side, and too often on the other the blindest obedience in those who have been taught to boast of their Gospel liberty. But what vexes and alarms those self-constituted teachers most of all, when their authority fails to secure obedience, is this: they have been in the habit for years of misrepresenting and caricaturing in the most shameful way the doctrines and discipline of the Catholic Church. If now one of their disciples by any chance get hold of a Catholic book, they know full well that he must learn how grossly and wickedly he has been deceived hitherto. And to have his eyes thus opened, they know, will prove, in his case at least, a death-blow to their teaching authority. They have deceived him with regard to the doctrines of the Catholic Church with which they were well acquainted, having read them in her standards. How can he ever again trust them for guides in those doctrines which they pretend to have found in the Bible, and about which, nevertheless, they are perpetually wrangling with their fellow-teachers of the other sects?

Hence, whenever they had the power, as they had for more than two hundred years in Great Britain, they caused all Catholic books to be confiscated and burnt—even the Douay Bible, as Bishop Newcome confesses. The sword of persecution having been wrested from their grasp, they fall back on moral coercion wherever it is possible. And when it is possible no longer, with reluctance, with a hearty sigh for the good old days of gibbet and rack that have departed forever, they sit down to the less congenial task of writing, or pretending to write, refutations of those Catholic books that expose and correct their misrepresentations. "Fire and sword," they seem to say, "are, unfortunately, no longer at our command in settling religious controversy. The milk-and-water spirit of a degenerate age has banished these speedy and unfailing arbiters of theological strife. But there still remain for our use other ugly weapons, which the spirit of the age has not yet succeeded in consigning to oblivion. If they cannot slay, they can pierce and wound, and though they find little warrant in God's Law or the Gospel, they are welcome, and we will make the most of them, in default of those stronger ones that, alas! we are now forbidden to wield."

From a careful perusal of his volume, such we judge to have been the spirit of the writer who has undertaken to confute, or to "examine" Archbishop Gibbons's book, as the title-page professes. An "examination" from such a source could scarcely be adequate, or fair and honest, either in execution or design. And any candid reader, no matter what his religion, after an impartial reading, however cursory, of the book, must be fully convinced that it was not the author's intention from the beginning to deal with his opponent according to the established laws of controversy amongst gentlemen, leaving the clerical profession and Christianity out of the question altogether.

Who or what the Rev. Dr. Stearns is we can only partly tell and partly guess from what appears of him in his book, or what may be inferred from its pages. He is the "Examining Chaplain of the Bishop of Easton," and not satisfied with the drudgery of examining candidates for Orders, aspires to catechize an Archbishop. *Altius egit iter* may be said of him, as of Icarus; but *magnis excidit ausis* will yet have to be added to complete his epitaph.

"Chaplain of the Bishop of Easton!" This must be a novelty in Episcopalian language. Their style, heretofore, has been to designate their bishops not by towns or cities, but by the Diocese of such and such a State. A departure from this custom looks like aping "Romanism." It is only a few days since that all the Evangelical sects of New York were thrown into a flutter by an inscription on a vase publicly presented to Bishop Potter, in which he was called "Bishop of New York." The more outspoken said it was a deliberate insult to the Protestant community of that city. What do the non-Episcopalian Protestants of Easton think? Pride goeth before a fall, and the sect that of all others is doomed to speediest destruction is the one that is daily enlarging its pretensions and putting on most airs. They now want "territorial titles," like their own bishops in Great Britain, and like those of Rome who are around them on every side. There are others among them who would like to have *archbishops*, in imitation of the American Catholic Church, which is for them an object of as much genuine envy as it is of dislike; but though some of the bishops and clergy are dying for the possession of this title, Low Church and laity are strong enough to put a veto on this silly ambition. Shams must not aspire to be treated as realities, and there is enough of hard sense in our people to distinguish one from the other. "Roman" bishops derive from a power that is

acknowledged and respected even by its enemies. British bishops are the creation of a powerful government, which, if it cannot impart the fulness of true priesthood, can at least back up its titles of dignity with secular pomp, solid influence, and munificent revenues. But our non-descripts, who have to be called Episcopalian bishops that they may be supposed to have something of the bishop in them—who “sent” or authorized *them*? They derive neither from Church nor State. There are those yet living who will see the downfall of the Episcopal Church. The day, and it is near at hand, when she shall be disestablished in Great Britain as she has lately been in Ireland, will witness her disintegration as a body, and the same effect is sure to follow on this side of the Atlantic, some being added to the Church of Ages, the rest falling away amongst the various sects.

Rev. Dr. Stearns is also the author of two books which are named, and of others—who knows how many?—that lie hid under the enigmatic “*etc.*” of his title-page. What their names may be we cannot inform the reader. They are as unknown to us as were the two others until we read them for the first time as a pendant to his name on the title-page of his volume. They seem to have met with a very unappreciative reading public, for they have not succeeded in conferring any reputation on their author. But he, who rates them at their proper value and knows that they are too high for vulgar appreciation, is determined that they shall not perish through popular neglect. Accordingly he snatches them from oblivion and consigns them to immortality by freely using them as authorities (pp. 162, 184, 213, 282) in a book which he fondly imagines is to go down to posterity bearing with it the glory of having crushed an archbishop, and with him the foolish attempt to make “Romanism” appear rational in Protestant eyes.

In religion, Dr. Stearns is what is commonly known as an Episcopalian, though this vague term does not by any means define his position or his belief. For in that comprehensive Church there is room for everything from Puseyism to refined Deism. He is neither a Low nor a High churchman, or rather both in one. He believes that the Holy Ghost and the Apostolical succession were faithfully transmitted through Barlow and Parker to the present Anglican Church (p. 34). He would have us think that he and his Church are “Catholic;” and so great is his reverence for the name that he never allows Archbishop Gibbons to designate by it the Roman Church, without adding his parenthetical protest “Roman, not Catholic.” Yet when the Jansenist Dupin gives her that name repeatedly, he allows the quotations to pass without protest or correction, which can only be explained by that subtle sympathy which makes error of every kind recognize and love its like, Dupin having been a nominal Catholic and real heretic. He admits that Protestantism has no unity, but thinks its dissensions and splits are a sign of life (p. 114)! He talks as gravely of the bishops and “priests” of his sect, as if he were a curate of St. Albans. But his bishops and priests amount to very little. They have for him no teaching authority, for “private judgment is the right and duty of every man—a duty that he owes to the manhood God has given him” (p. 71). They have no ministerial power, for they have no sacramental grace to impart. What the Catholic Church calls sacraments are for him only symbolic rites, that may have meaning but have no efficacy. Rightly understood, he admits that there is “a Real Presence of Christ’s Body and Blood in the Sacrament” (p. 286); but the right understanding, as we are soon informed, is that the Presence is only nominal, not real, for it must be understood figuratively (p. 291). The Eucharist, therefore, spite of his high-

sounding words, is for him nothing more than what it was once for Zwingli and Calvin, nothing more than what it is now for his Protestant fellow-ministers, Dr. Talmage and Henry Ward Beecher. As for Baptism (p. 481) he follows heartily the decision of the lay judges in the Gorham case, who decided that Baptismal Regeneration is no doctrine of the Anglican Church. Nor is Baptism necessary for salvation (p. 280). Of the Fathers and the Primitive Church he talks now and again with reverence; but when it suits him, he can toss the Fathers aside as contemptuously as any Socinian (p. 141).

To leave now his own confessions, and come to what may be inferred or guessed from his book, one is strongly tempted to class Dr. Stearns amongst the members of the Masonic fraternity. He speaks of it more than once (pp. 9, 32, 113, 143), and always favorably. He is fond of comparing it with the "Church of Christ," and contrasting it with the Church of Rome. "The Masonic fraternity is as visible and as Catholic a body as the Christian Church" (p. 113). Again, "the Church of the (Apostles') Creed and of the Bible is Catholic, as the Masonic fraternity is Catholic; that is to say, it is not for one nation, but for all nations. A Mason anywhere is a Mason everywhere, and is received as such. A Catholic anywhere is a Catholic everywhere. Time was when he was received as such" (no doubt of it, but it was when all Christendom was Catholic); "if he is not so now it is the fault of the Bishop of Rome" (p. 32). *Fault* indeed! he should rather thank God that there is an authority left in the world to distinguish genuine Catholics from spurious. Hear him once more:

"The Church is one, as the Masonic fraternity is one. Now the unity of this latter is a visible unity 'known and read of all men;' and yet it has no ecumenical head, but only a national head to each national organization. Plainly then a visible earthly head is not necessary to the visible unity of the Visible Church. Perhaps it is on this account that the Roman Church is so *especially* hostile to Freemasonry. She can have no liking for a society whose very existence is a standing proof of the possibility of visible ecumenical unity without a visible ecumenical head" (p. 9).

Pity he did not throw in the two other marks of "holiness" and "apostolicity," and thus prove out and out that Freemasonry is the true Church of Christ!

Dr. Stearns is very anxious that it should be known to all men, that "in his veins flows the blood of Governor Dudley," of Massachusetts. So anxious is he to put this on record, that he drags it in more than once where nothing called for its mention (pp. 241, 302). Be it so, though the poet says:

Genus et proavos et quæ non fecimus ipsi,
Vix ea nostra voco.

It happens that amongst our friends and acquaintances North and South, there are not a few, men and women, Catholic and Protestant, in whose veins runs the same blood of which Dr. S. boasts. Those we know are gentle folks, not only in their manners, but in all the daily walks of life. Dr. Stearns may be such, we shall not deny it. But no reader would ever discover this, or even suspect it, from his book. The true gentleman is such always and everywhere. He never considers himself free to despise the laws of good breeding. He feels himself bound by them in preaching a sermon or in writing a book, no less than in social intercourse. And this is the test which Republican common-sense

applies to all amongst us who claim gentle blood. What admits of no doubt is the ferocious spirit of religious intolerance which Dr. Stearns has inherited from his Puritan progenitor.

Dr. Stearns is a Know-Nothing of the ultra type. He seems to think that this is a Protestant Episcopal country, and, therefore, would have the Archbishop of Baltimore and the Cardinal of New York know that they are "ecclesiastical intruders" and "have no mission to preach" here (p. 30). He makes an exception in favor of the Russian clergy. They are "welcome guests" (ib.). In spite of their Mariolatry, their idolatrous bowing down to stocks and stones and worshipping the bones of dead men, they have an Episcopal Church, and, therefore, "they are welcome." We leave him in the hands of his Presbyterian and Methodist brethren, who will be likely to resent this extravagant development of Know-Nothing madness. Another feature of his Know-Nothingism is his ill-will to everything "Irish." He seems to think that by calling anything "Irish" he has proved it to be silly and discreditable (pp. 60, 322, 323). This leads him at times into ridiculous blunders; as when he brands with the name of "*Irish*" St. Augustine's grand apostrophe to divine truth, "O Beauty, ever ancient and ever new!" etc., because he thinks Archbishop Gibbons the author, who only adopted it from the Saint for his purpose!

And now having learned something of Dr. Stearns individually, let us see what he is as a controvertist. In his style and manner of polemical discussion he is rather below than on a level with the average No-Popery pamphleteer or writer of Know-Nothing harangues. His language is too often low, vulgar, and interspersed with slang. He seems to think that colloquial English is the highest form of good English, and, therefore, treats us on nearly every page to such words as *couldn't*, *wouldn't*, *didn't*, *doesn't*, *haven't*, etc. But this is a matter of taste, and if there were nothing else we should not feel called on to blame him. But there is more, and far worse. The man of the world, who has ordinary prudence, is careful in writing for the public not to betray his temper in such way as to let the world see that from excess of passion he is not able to control his pen. Respect either for his adversary or for his readers, or at least self-respect, will make him cautious. But none of these considerations have any weight with our headlong divine. His soul is so possessed with the spirit of ill-will, spite, and bitter hate that there is no checking it. It bursts all barriers of politeness and even common decency, and pours itself out in a stream of angry, harsh words, of railing, invective, and insinuations of the most shameful kind. His mouth becomes really what St. Paul (Rom. iii. 14), quoting from the Psalmist, calls "*os maledictione et amaritudine plenum*." He accuses the Archbishop, almost on every page and in the plainest terms, of dishonesty in concealing or falsely representing Catholic doctrine; he charges him with "ignorance of logic, claptrap, rigmarole, slandering the Fathers and the Anglican Church, impudence, effrontery, and again with either shameless effrontery or discreditable ignorance" (see pages 47, 30, 67, 236, 354, 225, 76). Passages conceived in the spirit of the following are of constant occurrence: "The Archbishop's argument . . . is ineffably silly. Of course *he* sees through it, but he thinks his readers won't; else he wouldn't use it" (p. 31).

But enough of this. Let us turn to his favorite authorities. One would suppose that in discussing Catholic doctrine the Councils and Fathers would be quoted, and none but grave and impartial writers appealed to. But our "Examining Chaplain" is little acquainted with these sources. His choicest witnesses, besides his own productions, are

Janus, Dupin, Bishop Hopkins, the apostate Bower, Irenæus Prime, Tristram Shandy, the *Genius of Popery*, *Pope or President*, *Father Tom and the Pope*, the *New York Church Journal*, and the *Southern Churchman*! His ideas of standard authorities are somewhat peculiar. He says that "Gieseler is recognized by scholars as a standard authority." He had better have told us by *what scholars*. Quoting another book printed by "John Murray, of London," he adds, "the name of the publisher is a guarantee of the standing of the writer" (p. 274). Why then does he not quote from *Maria Monk*, whose standing was guaranteed by the highly respectable house of Harper & Co., New York? She would have furnished an abundance of edifying extracts as new and as true as many in his book. He tries further to illustrate his topics by anecdotes and allusions, which are not always happy nor drawn from very elevated sources. We may instance Barnum's Happy Family (in illustration of Catholic Unity), Bridget and the Protestant Bishop (a story as old as the hills, but here fastened on Bishop Wilberforce), some of *Father Tom's* gibberish, some low wit from one of Dr. S.'s own books on Peter's Patrimony and Matrimony, and other stuff lower and viler still, which we dismiss with the contempt it deserves.

It is an old saying that still water runs deep, while the shallow stream is noisy and pretentious in proportion to its shallowness. And so with writers and bookmakers. Noise, pompous pretence, and bluster on the surface are generally proportionate to the emptiness or ignorance that lies below. Never is this more signally verified than in those boastful writers who wield what Scripture calls the *linguam magniloquam*, "the tongue that speaketh great things" against the Catholic Church. There is some fatality impelling such men to lay bare their own shame. And Dr. Stearns is no exception. He makes a quotation from Virgil, on p. 309, and had he done no more he might have passed for one conversant with the great Latin poet. But having made the quotation, instead of wisely dropping it, he lingers at it and toys with it till he betrays himself. The passage is the description of Fame in the Fourth Book of the *Æneid*, to which Dr. S. calls his reader's attention, and then partly translates. But the last lines seemed to convey a peculiar sting, and he determines to give them entire, or nearly so. But in doing this, he has the presumption to alter the words, and even to put Gothic or Choctaw Latin into the mouth of the "divine poet." Virgil had said:

Multiplici populos sermons neplebat
Gaudens, et pariter facta atque infecta canebat.

This, Dr. Stearns quotes as follows:

Centum multiloquacibus ORIS (!)
Gaudentem et pariter facta atque infecta canentem:

We have no fault to find with the slight change in the second line; but in what grammar did he learn that *os*, *oris* (a mouth) makes *oris* in the ablative plural? Time was, and not quite so far back as the days of Orbilius, when the boy, who after three weeks' study of Latin could be guilty of such a shameful blunder, would have received a thorough trouncing. But we live in an age of progress when independence of Rome must be shown, not only by spurning her creed, but by shaking off the fetters of her venerable language. We should have passed over this blunder in silence had not Dr. Stearns so boldly accused the Archbishop of "discreditable ignorance of what he is writing about, discreditable in an Archbishop and Metropolitan, particularly discreditable

in a volunteer controvertist" (p. 137); and adding that "he may take his choice between the two horns of the dilemma (shameless effrontery or discreditable ignorance), as either of them will gore him badly" (ibid.). How would he like to have his dilemma retorted on himself? His own discourteous language would be enough to provoke it. Whenever in future he shall be tempted to hurl these charges of "discreditable ignorance" at his betters, let him remember *gaudentem* ORIS and wisely restrain himself.

Sometimes he allows himself to be blindly led by blind guides, and thus falls into silly mistakes which could have been avoided with very little trouble. Thus trusting to Sweete (*England v. Rome*), he denounces a certain prayer as forming a portion of the Litany of Loretto. The prayer which begins "O Glorious Virgin Mary, I commend to thee," etc., is rather a long one, and if each of the "petitions" (so-called) were equally long, the Litany would exhaust the patience of pious Christians who recite or sing it, and tax the ability of those who set it to music. It is a very good prayer, but forms no part of the Litany. The latter is a public prayer, and must not be confounded with the outpourings of private devotion.

On p. 216 he makes a mistake of a similar kind by following the same author, who disingenuously quotes from the Roman Ritual the little prayer *Maria Mater Gratia*. The Ritual, from its very nature, contains no prayers but the public prayers of the Church, or those which the priest says in his official capacity and acting in her name. And no priest acting as her minister, and on her behalf, would ever presume to intermingle private prayers with her sacred functions. How then does the prayer occur in the Ritual, for it is to be found somewhere in that Book? Yes, somewhere, but not amongst *her* Ritual prayers. It occurs in a Rubric or instruction, where the priest, in the discharge of his extra-official duty, is directed how he may comfort the sick and dying, and keep their minds fixed on the mercy of God, the Passion and Cross of our Lord, on Heaven and other thoughts that may best soothe their last hours. He is told to help them by suggesting, according to their needs and his own prudence, some ejaculations or short prayers which may cheer and elevate without fatiguing their minds. Of these prayers a list is added from which he may choose at his discretion. They are ten in number, all beautiful and most appropriate. Among them is the *Maria Mater Gratia*, an old quatrain in rhymed Iambics, that had been for centuries familiar to the lips of all Christians old and young, and is a good deal older than the Ritual itself in its present form. But it is an invocation of the Virgin at the solemn hour of death, and as such recommended, at least, by the Ritual! Certainly; though the soul that has for years daily in the Angelical salutation called on Mary for the help of her prayers "now or at the hour of death," will scarcely need the promptings of a priest to invoke the same aid when that hour has come. But, exclaims Dr. S., "how different the prayer of the dying Stephen, 'Lord Jesus receive my soul.'" Now if he had only looked into the Ritual he would have found this very prayer set down immediately before the *Maria Mater Gratia*. It is no excuse for him that he has been led into these blunders by Sweete. The Litany of Loretto and the Roman Ritual are easily accessible to all, and to Dr. Stearns in particular, for they have been printed by thousands in Maryland since he was born. It was his duty, therefore, even though the matter be not of much consequence, to consult the originals and verify the quotations, instead of treading blindly in the footsteps of Sweete, whose authority

is not a whit beyond that of his other guides, Tristram Shandy, Irenæus Prime, and the *Southern Churchman*.

On p. 306 Dr. Stearns gives a list of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the first six centuries, his object being to prove that the latter are few compared with the former. He can find only sixteen Latin by the side of twenty-six Greek Fathers, and warns the reader that he has "omitted none of any repute whose works have come down to us." Notwithstanding this flourish of trumpets, the reverend gentleman's erudition is not his own, but taken at second-hand from some Sweete or Brogden or other disingenuous Anglican scribe. He has not omitted the Augustines, Jeromes, and Cyprians, because decency forbade it; but he has omitted many others of high repute, and some of them most important as dogmatical witnesses of Catholic truth. He very wisely omits the great St. Optatus, of Milevis, whose works alone (had none of the other Fathers survived) would be sufficient to prove that Anglicanism, even if it held all our doctrine, can never be Catholic, but must be forever a paltry schism. He has omitted St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Zeno of Verona, St. Maximus of Turin, St. Fulgentius, Sts. Phæbadius, of Agen, and Philastrius. He has omitted our great poets, St. Damasus, Prudentius, St. Paulinus, of Nola, Sedulius, Venantius, Fortunatus, and others who are none the less "witnesses," because they have pressed Helicon and the Muses into the service of Christian truth. He has omitted our historians, Orosius, the friend of St. Augustine, Victor Vitensis, the elegant, almost classical Sulpicius Severus, who were as worthy of mention as Socrates (a Novatian heretic), Sozomen and Evagrius on the Greek side. But above all he has omitted those Popes who have issued doctrinal letters and decretals from St. Siricius down to St. Gregory the Great. They are twenty-four in number, excluding Sts. Leo and Gelasius, who are in Dr. Stearns's list. This makes over fifty, to whom others might be added,—Cassiodorus, Salvian, Cassian, Sidonius, and many others.

If the reader would see specimens of the reasoning by which this "examiner" thinks he has demolished the arguments brought forward in the "Faith of our Fathers," let him turn to p. 31. The Archbishop had alleged that the true ownership of the name "*Catholic*" is so well known to both friend and foe, that a Catholic entering a strange town and asking any one he met where is the Catholic Church, would be instinctively conducted to the right place, no matter what the creed of his guide, supposing him even to be a heretic, who considered his own Church to be the true Church of Christ. This is the very argument used with crushing effect against the Donatists of fifteen hundred years ago by St. Augustine. Hear how Dr. Stearns answers the Holy Doctor, for it is from him that Archbishop Gibbons has borrowed his argument :

"Well, and if the same stranger, going into a New England village, were to ask the first person he met to direct him to the Orthodox Church, he would infallibly if not instinctively point out to him the Trinitarian Congregational Church. Is that Church, therefore, Orthodox, and the only Orthodox Church?" (p. 31.)

By thus pointing to a New England or Puritan village, instead of one of his own sect, Dr. Stearns slyly contrives to make out that there is no difference between Catholic and Orthodox. But there is a great difference which completely nullifies his pretended counter-illustration. St. Augustine is speaking of true Catholics on the one hand, and those on the other who in writing attempt to usurp the name, but are ashamed of it in practice, and dare not use it when from theory it comes to a matter of fact. He is speaking of those who might be called the An-

glicans and Episcopalians of his day, who pretended to the name of Catholic—not of the sects who, like New England Puritans, reject both name and meaning. Hence he and the other Holy Fathers advise members of the Church, when they go into a strange place, never to ask for the true or Orthodox Church, for then they will be conducted to heretical synagogues or meeting-houses, but to ask at once for the Catholic Church; in which case no heretic will dare point out his own conventicle, but will show the way to the Catholic Church. *Catholic* is a real surname which cannot be misunderstood; *true* or *orthodox* is only an appellation of praise, which cannot be interpreted without reference to the opinions of him who bestows it. The difference may be seen in the following practical illustration, which is more to the point than that of Dr. Stearns: A countryman comes into town to purchase goods. He asks one whom he meets on the street where is the store of Smith, Jones & Co. He will be, without fail, directed to the very place he seeks. But if he is so simple and unsophisticated as to ask for the *best* store in town, he will be shown, no doubt, to the store of his guide or to that of some of his friends.

It is lack of space rather than of material that prevents us from exposing more of the errors and illogical reasoning of this worthless book. Dr. Stearns has done more to praise and recommend the Archbishop's *Faith of Our Fathers* than he imagines. His book, in spite of his intentions, is a very high compliment to the book which it pretends to answer; and so it will be regarded by many inside and outside of the Catholic Church. Here is what they will say. The Episcopalian bishops have become alarmed by the wonderful success of the Archbishop's little work. They have discovered that it is a very dangerous book. It is gently but steadily making its way amongst their flocks, rooting out those old prejudices which the clergy have sown amongst them, and which the clergy are chiefly instrumental in fostering and keeping alive. They summon one who ranks high among their theologians, and bid him take pen in hand to withstand the aggressions and confute the pretensions of Rome. He undertakes the task, and after nearly three years of anxious waiting, we have the old story of the mountain and the mouse. The formidable confutation of Roman errors, so long expected, differs in nothing but size from the ordinary No-Popery tracts, and exceeds them, if possible, in rant, bigotry, harsh words, reviling, and insult. It is, in a word, what might have been expected from some Rev. Hezekiah Howler, or other dissenting minister of low degree, and not from a dignified minister or priest, as he calls himself, of the Anglo-American Episcopal Catholic Church!

LECTURES ON THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHALLOWNESS OF UNBELIEF. Delivered by the *Most Rev. Roger Bede Vaughan*, Archbishop of Sidney. Baltimore: John B. Piet. 1879.

The design of these lectures is to show that the religion of denial is not only a shallow one, having no real foundation for its assumptions, and self-contradictory in its conclusions, but also that it is utterly unfitted to satisfy the wants of humanity, while the religion of affirmation, in other words, of Christianity, is adapted in a marvellous manner to meet those wants, is supported by such an array of arguments, and is so consonant to reason, that to reject it would be to act not only against the enlightened dictates of conscience, but also in opposition to those universally accepted maxims of prudence which are the guide of all reasonable men in every important secular affair of life.

The learned prelate develops his argument from a fourfold basis: First, from a consideration of the intellectual and moral constitution of MAN, he shows that he was made for "something beyond living as a mere animal on earth; secondly, that from what we know of GOD, from the evidences which lie spread out before the intellectual eye of every thinking, rational creature, His existence is as undeniable a fact as the existence of man himself, and that before the creature can deny the existence of the Creator he must first of all deny the truthfulness of those intellectual and moral faculties which for the very initial steps of reasoning he cannot choose but to trust;" thirdly, that "the religion of denial or unbelief is not merely shallow as a philosophy and empty as a religion, but, moreover, that it is the fruitful parent of intellectual imbecility, moral depravity, and spiritual death;" and fourthly, that Christianity, as no other system has done or can do, "solves difficulties, unravels doubts, gives a meaning to life and an illumination to death," and that though, like all things else, it is charged with mysteries, that is to say, with things which during this life cannot be explained, still its bases are so wide and deep, its proofs are so multitudinous, and, when taken together, so overwhelming, that enlightened reason in the order of thought and common prudence in the practical order compel men, in spite of all its difficulties, which are in themselves rather than in Christianity, to submit to its authority.

Apart from the pre-eminent ability with which the argument is developed and enforced, the lectures are especially valuable from the fact that the lecturer shapes his remarks throughout the whole five discourses with constant and direct reference to present forms of disbelief.

A GRAMMAR OF THE IRISH LANGUAGE FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS. By P. W. Joyce, LL.D., T.C.D., M.R.I.A. New York: Printed by Lynch, Cole & Meehan, at the office of the *Irish American*, No. 12 Warren Street. 1879.

Within the last few years the study of the Irish language has received an impetus which may, with the proper effort, be made to develop into a genuine revival. Its introduction into the national schools of Ireland, less than two years ago, can be made a most important factor in the accomplishment of this praiseworthy end, and the system which was at first intended to destroy not only the language but also the religion of the Irish people, has been made to serve a most laudable object; for the distinctiveness of a people's nationality depends very much on the preservation of the mother tongue. But this is not the only reason why the Irish language should be preserved. It is not only the oldest now spoken by any people, but with few of the faults it has all the beauties of the languages of antiquity, and its literature is yet rich in treasures of rare value, though the greater part of it was lost in the tumult and destruction which accompanied barbarian invasion and internecine strife. Enough of it remains, however, to make the language worth studying by a more numerous class than the few who devote their time to philological and antiquarian research. Besides, the old tongue may again become as much the language of the people as French is that of so large a portion of our neighbors across the northern frontier.

For the study of the Irish language many textbooks have been compiled of late years. The most valuable we consider to be those of Canon Bourke, written while this distinguished scholar was yet a student of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. But both his *Easy Lessons* and his *Irish Grammar* are beyond the reach of the vast majority of the people. A want which was long felt has, however, at last been supplied by the elementary work whose title we have placed at the head of this notice.

Coming from the distinguished author of *Irish Names and Places*, it is unnecessary either to criticise its merits or point them out in detail. It fulfils every promise made in the preface, and more; its rules are clear, concise, and correct. It comprises everything necessary—so far as grammar is concerned—for a student of modern Irish. We have no hesitation in recommending it to the Irish classes that have already been or may yet be formed in this country. Private students will also find it of great advantage. It is retailed at the moderate price of twenty-five cents.

THE GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, WITH AN ESSAY ON DANIEL WEBSTER AS A MASTER OF ENGLISH STYLE. By *Edwin P. Whipple*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1879.

The object of this volume is not to supersede the standard edition of Daniel Webster's works in six volumes, edited by Edward Everett, and issued by Messrs. Little, Brown & Co.; but rather to revive public interest in them by republishing some of his most prominent orations and speeches.

In the preface it is well remarked, that "among the eminent men who have influenced legislative assemblies in Great Britain and the United States during the past one hundred and twenty years, it is curious that only two, Edmund Burke and Daniel Webster, have established themselves as men of the first class in English and American literature; and that it is only by a study of what they authorized to be published under their names that we can adequately comprehend either their position among the political forces of their time, or their rank among the great masters of English eloquence and style."

The volume before us contains most of the speeches of the great statesman on questions relating to the Constitution of the United States and his historical orations; including also the famous Dartmouth College Case, the Girard Will Case, the Discourse on the First Settlement of New England, the Landing at Plymouth, at the Laying of the Corner Stone and on the Completion of the Bunker Hill Monument, on Adams and Jefferson, on the Character of Washington, the memorable "Reply to Hayne," Exclusion of Slavery from the Territories, and a number of others of Mr. Webster's most renowned speeches and orations.

The appendix contains his papers on the Impressment of Seamen, the Right of Search, Letters to General Cass on the Treaty of Washington, and the memorable Hulseman Letter.

The introductory essay on Daniel Webster as a Master of English Style, by Mr. Whipple, is itself an admirable specimen of good English. It contains a number of very interesting anecdotes and reminiscences of Mr. Webster, and is valuable as a study both of his character and his style.

MAJOLICA AND FAYENCE. ITALIAN, SICILIAN, MAJORCAN, HISPANO-MOESQUE, AND PERSIAN. By *Arthur Beckwith*. With Photo-Engraved Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

By persons interested in the history and progress of the ceramic art, and, indeed, by all lovers of art, this work will be regarded as a valuable addition to their means of knowledge. Though specially devoted to discussions of the productions technically styled Majolica and Fayence, it incidentally, but frequently, touches upon kindred topics, and is full of interesting information to the student of æsthetics.

The author gives the following account of the mode of producing

these wares: "The body of Italian fayence and majolica is a plastic clay, mixed with a limy, sandy clay. It is once baked and coated with an enamel containing lead, tin, quartz sand, salt, and soda. This opaque enamel is then painted upon with hard fire colors, as was the practice in the sixteenth century—a difficult process, but one giving great brilliancy of tone—or it is colored over the fired enamel with softer colors and fired again."

It would require too much space to follow the author in his history of the rise and progress of the ceramic art as it specially entered into the manufacture and ornamentation of these beautiful wares in the different regions of Italy, Persia, and Spain. Suffice it to say that the book is replete with valuable and interesting information, and is enriched with engravings illustrating the different styles of the wares and the ornamentation of its finest specimens.

Towards the close of the work there is a valuable chapter upon art, following which are hints for painting upon pottery and an account of the specimens of modern fayence at the Centennial Exposition, with the names of the exhibitors or manufacturers in France, England, Germany, Brazil, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, and the United States. Those who examined the collection of Signor Alessandro Castellani at the Centennial Exposition will be pleased to know that the work contains representations of the pieces of pottery in his beautiful collection.

FIVE MINUTE SERMONS FOR LOW MASSES ON ALL SUNDAYS OF THE YEAR. By *Priests of the Congregation of St. Paul*. Vol. I. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1879.

This is the first volume of a series of sermons that were commenced in St. Paul's Church, New York, towards the close of the year 1876. The motive for preaching these short sermons was that the great number of persons who generally attend on a Low Mass on Sundays might have the advantage of hearing the word of God preached without protracting the services. For this reason the sermons were limited to five minutes, and the effort was made to condense, with that brief period, a sufficient amount of instructive and hortatory matter to answer the purpose of plain practical discourses, so that they would be both solid and pungent, and furnish real nutriment to the minds and hearts of the audience.

To accomplish this it was necessary that each sermon should be carefully planned and written out, omitting all rhetorical superfluities, and condensing the matter into pithy, pointed utterances. The merit of devising and first carrying out this plan belongs to the late Algernon A. Brown, C.S.P., and many of the sermons in this volume are from his pen.

The discourses are not fragments of sermons. Each is a whole in itself. They are direct, logical, practical, pungent, and contain in small space a large amount of instructive and edifying matter. They are published now in book form in order to give to the very many persons who would not read longer discourses the advantage they may derive from these, and also with the hope that they may be useful to many priests who may read them or use them in preparing similar short sermons of their own.

THE GRACCHI, MARIUS AND SULLA. By *A. H. Beesly*. With Maps. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

The half century of the history comprised in this volume may be said

to constitute the climax of the movement which swept the Roman people into an abyss of corruption and degradation, of which, even with the facts before us, we can scarcely form an idea. The forces which carried this movement forward had long been at work. They were inherent in the social and political constitution of the Roman people; every conquest, every addition of territory, but aggravated the evils which culminated in the convulsions that led to the establishment of complete political absolutism under Augustus Cæsar.

A careful study of this period will well repay thoughtful minds in the valuable lessons it contains. On the one side were a few nobles and state officials immensely wealthy, corrupted by luxury, selfish, tyrannical, cruel; on the other a populace debased, degraded, caring for nothing but existence and amusement, the clients or hangers-on of the wealthy; and underneath all this an immense multitude of slaves in a condition of horrible wretchedness. The events that occurred were the natural outcome of this, and culminated, as we have said, after a series of convulsions which only hastened on the final catastrophe, in the people of Rome voluntarily accepting a condition of things which allowed to them nothing of liberty but the name.

The volume before us forms a valuable introduction to the study of the subsequent era,—that of Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Cicero, and Cæsar Augustus. It has evidently been carefully prepared, and explains, as clearly as can well be made out from the confusion and obscurity which characterize that period of Roman history, the real intentions and purposes of Caius and Tiberius Gracchus, and the subsequent horrors which Marius and Sulla inflicted on the Roman people.

SURIUS, HISTORIÆ seu VITÆ SANCTORUM juxta optimam Coloniensem editionem, nunc vero ex recentioribus et probatissimis monumentis numero auctæ, mendis expurgatæ et notis exornatæ: quibus accedit Martyrologium Romanum breviter illustratum, Taurinensi Presbytero e Congregat. Cleric. Regg. S. Pauli curante. Vol. X. October. Augustæ Taurinorum: ex typographia Petri Marietti. 1879, 8vo., pp. 914.

The work of the pious Carthusian, Lawrence Surius, was, before the days of the Bollandists and even since, for many, the great repertory and reading book of hagiology. The writer was not only remarkable for holiness, but also for great learning. He was the friend and pupil of the great Canisius, the modern Catholic Apostle of Germany. Indeed, it was by counsel of this great Saint that Surius entered the Carthusian order to escape the dangers of the world and the contagion of Lutheranism, which was then spreading all over his native land. Though our author did not live in a critical age, and much of what he wrote would have to be corrected by reference to the more enlightened judgment of a Pagi, Papebroke, or Tillemont, yet Surius has not lost favor, and his style, which is devotional and good Latin, still recommends him to many readers. It is objected to him, however, that he took too great liberties with the text of the old chroniclers, not altering the sense but changing their style, which may be agreeable to ordinary readers, but is disliked by students. The present editor, who modestly conceals his name, is a Barnabite of Turin. The volume before us contains the lives of the Saints for the month of October.

HISTORY OF MARYLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY.
By *J. Thomas Scharf*, Esq. Baltimore: John B. Piet. 1880. Two volumes, 8vo.

These two volumes bring the history of the State from its first settlement down to the War of 1812; the third, which is soon to appear, will

continue it down to our own day. Maryland has great and noble materials for history, and it is to be wondered that she has not ere this found a historian. The works of Bozman, McMahon, and McSherry either deal only with portions of her history, or are intended for nothing more than popular reading. Mr. Scharf has given us a history worthy of the grand old commonwealth to which he belongs. He has gone over the whole ground of Maryland toleration, and thoroughly disproves the newfangled notions of Brantz Mayer, Rev. Messrs. Neill and Brown, and others, by whom the historian Bancroft was led into error; though this signifies very little, for no one who has read Mr. Bancroft's silly letters addressed from Berlin to the Washington Government can feel much respect for his opinions on any subject. We regret that the space at our disposal does not allow a more extended notice of Mr. Scharf's splendid work, but we shall return to it in our next number.

The typographical execution of the work is excellent and reflects the highest credit on the publisher, Mr. John B. Piet.

DE RECIDIVIS ET OCCASIONARIIS ET DE PRAXI CONFESSARIORUM. Auctore *Æmilio Berardi*, Parocho Faventinæ dioecesis. Editio secunda auctior et ad novam formam redacta. Faventie: ex typographia Novelli. 1877. Two volumes, 8vo.

There is nothing more important, and at the same time more arduous, in the administration of the Sacrament of Penance than to determine exactly when Christian prudence allows the boon of absolution to be unhesitatingly granted, or when it requires it to be withheld for a time for the penitent's own good and the honor of the Sacrament itself. Here, as in everything else, there are two extremes,—excessive caution and boundless indulgence. And between these two the wise minister of God's pardoning must steer a middle course. The principles that must guide him are laid down, of course, in all treatises of Moral Theology. But they cannot be given there with such fulness of development and illustration as they have been in this estimable book by the Parish Priest of Faenza. He holds, on the whole, a just mean between rigor and indulgence; and if he ever inclines in one direction it is, perhaps, on the stricter side. The work will be very useful to those priests who are perplexed at times to know how to keep the golden mean with the class of sinners mentioned in the author's title-page.

MEDITATIONS AND CONTEMPLATIONS ON THE SACRED PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, AND ON THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. With Instructions on Prayer. Translated from the Spanish of the Venerable Luis of Grenada, O.P., by a member of the Order of Mercy. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1879.

The Venerable Luis of Grenada has long been regarded as one of the ablest masters of the spiritual life. His published works have always borne the highest reputation. They were warmly commended in a brief by Pope Gregory XIII. St. Charles Borromeo preferred them to all other spiritual writings, and made them the subject of daily meditation. St. Francis de Sales advised every priest to procure them and make them his second breviary.

We welcome, therefore, this translation of one of the venerable author as a very valuable addition to English Catholic devotional literature. It is published with the *imprimatur* of His Eminence, Cardinal McCloskey, and a warmly expressed approbation of the Most Rev. N. J. Perche, Archbishop of New Orleans.

GREETINGS TO THE CHRIST CHILD: a Collection of Christmas Poems for the Young. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1880.

This is a delightful volume for children, and even for those of more advanced years. The illustrations are good, and the poems well chosen. The latter are not strained and elaborate, like so much of the ambitious poetry of the day, which often needs hard study to find out wherein consists its title to the name. They are all selected from Father Faber, Longfellow, F. Abraham Ryan, etc., and will make their way at once to the hearts of all, old and young.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION. A paper read before the University Convocation of the State of New York at Albany, July 11th, 1877. By *Brother Azarias* of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. New York: E. Steiger.

A brief pamphlet of not many pages; but terse, elegant, full of vigor and keen analysis, like everything that comes from the pen of the gifted President of Rock Hill College.

THE STORY OF JESUS. Simply told for the Young. By *Rosa Mulholland*, with a preface by *Rev. Richard Brennan, LL.D.* Benziger Brothers, 1880.

It is not always an easy matter to maintain the dignity of a religious subject when it has to be lowered to the capacity of children. Yet the fair authoress has done this most admirably, giving Our Lord's whole life in beautiful yet simple language, adapted to the intelligence of any child. Both this and the preceding are very appropriate gift-books for the season, as they are very nicely gotten up and well illustrated.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS NOVISSIMI ECCLESIAE DOCTORIS S. ALPHONSI IN COMPENDIUM REDACTA ET USUI VENERABILIS CLERI AMERICANI ACCOMMODATA. Auctore *A. Konings, C.SS.R.* Editio quarta auctor et emendator. Neo-Eboraci: Benziger Fratres. 1880. Two vols., royal, 8vo.

We have already noticed with commendation in a former number this excellent work of Father Konings. It is a sign of the favor with which it has been received by the clergy and theological students that it has already reached a fourth edition.

PRELUDES. By *Maurice F. Egan*. Philadelphia: P. F. Cunningham. 1880.

We have read this little volume, which contains much more of value than its modest title would suggest. Mr. Egan is no trifling songster, but a genuine poet. If he but continues as he has begun, he will yet carve out for himself a name and reputation amongst the few poets of whom the country can boast.

THE HOLY MASS. A History of the Mass and its Ceremonies in the Eastern and Western Church. By *Rev. John O'Brien, A.M.* Fourth edition. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1880.

This admirable book has been already praised, as it deserved, in the pages of the REVIEW. The author, we understand, had before his death prepared a good deal of additional matter, which it is to be hoped will enrich some future edition.

THE ILLUSTRATED CATHOLIC FAMILY ANNUAL FOR 1880. New York: Catholic Publication Society.

For neatness, elegance, and most interesting and useful information this is one of the best works in the country. And if the Catholic Publication Society were to publish nothing else, it ought to exist for the sake of this Annual alone.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. V.—APRIL, 1880.—No. 18.

PUBLIC EDUCATION IN FRANCE—THE FERRY BILL.

Les Erreurs de M. Spuller sur le projet de loi de M. Ferry. Paris, Lecoffre fils, 1879.

Les Débats de la Commission de 1849. Par H. de Lacombe. Paris, 1879.

Rapport de M. Guichard sur le budget des Cultes. Paris, Victor Palmé, 1878.

Enseignement Secondaire congréganiste. Paris, Jacques Lecoffre, 1879.

FRANCE is now passing through a political and religious crisis, formidable in many respects, very hopeful in many others. The religious side of the question, which is the only one of which we intend to treat, hinges altogether on the alternative of freedom of education or the reverse. The subject, consequently, cannot but be of extreme interest to the Catholics of the United States, since it happens that they also have to guard their right of securing the religious education of their children. A clear statement of the actual position of French Catholics will, therefore, be instructive to all of us in this country, and on this account it is undertaken in the present paper.

If the spectacle presented by the attitude both of the enemies and the friends of Christianity in the French republic is attentively studied and accurately appreciated, it strikes the mind at once as one of the most remarkable and interesting in the whole course of French history. For the stern determination, the free-spoken defiance, the certainty of success, displayed on both sides, leaves no room for doubt or hesitation about the matter which is in dispute; and this is certainly of the highest order in point of

national interest. Is Christianity, that is, Catholicity, to continue in France or not? This is the question; and although the party of M. Gambetta hypocritically pretends not to aim at religion, he himself, the party's leader, openly declared it when he said: *Le cléricalisme, c'est l'ennemi*. Every one understands that *cléricalisme* means Catholicity.

But the Church is not dead, and does not want to die. No one would have suspected forty years ago that there could be so soon so great a revival of religion in the upper classes of that country. For it is not the clergy alone who show vigor, energy, and strength. Laymen without number, of every station in life among the educated part of the population, speak and write with the same frankness and uncompromising firmness as do the most energetic, talented, and eloquent bishops. This is a feature peculiar to this epoch, which the writer thinks has never before been witnessed in France, in the same degree. And in the ardent conflict, thank God! the intellect, the science, the real literary and oratorical talent are undoubtedly on the Church's side. She must win in the end!

Let us enter directly into the subject. The attacking party follows a very simple and plain policy. Let the education of the rising generation, in all its degrees, be left entirely to the control of the state; and as the state is now, and will, they hope, continue to be godless, in twenty years there will be no religion left in the country. This, they imagine, is the best means to establish in France the republican form of government. They seem firmly convinced that Catholicity is monarchical, and thus they identify politics with religion, and they must in the end adopt open persecution as a political measure if their adversary should let them go as far as that. Let us first look at the question in past ages.

Until the revolution of 1793 no one dreamt in France that education could be an exclusive attribute of the state. The idea that teaching was altogether under its control, so that no one could open a school except with its permission and under its strict supervision over all educational details, took its rise during that period which has been justly called the Reign of Terror.

In mediæval times, until the fourteenth century, the teaching body received all its powers and privileges from the Church. Not only was every one left free by her to open a school, but the zeal of the learned to impart their knowledge to others by teaching was always encouraged. The freedom was so complete that often teachers of error arose who had to be brought to reason and sense, as was the case with Abelard and many others.

From the fourteenth century down to the eighteenth the state shared with the Church the power of supervision, but it continued to be understood that the ecclesiastical authority was paramount,

and the governmental action was limited to the enforcement of orthodoxy, on which the social welfare of the people rested. Consequently all the teachers in public schools, particularly in universities and colleges, were either secular or regular clergymen. The idea that laymen alone can teach—*l'éducation LAÏQUE*, as it is now called—is a ridiculous pretension, which does not go farther up in time than the last twenty years. A decree of the Convention, it is true, forbade to former religious and clergymen to teach in schools; but as at that time there were absolutely no schools of any kind in France, that decree fell flat and was never revived since. Meanwhile the upholders of the freedom of education in the ominous struggle which is at this moment going on in the new French republic, can point with pride to the fact that the teaching imparted to the nation by clergymen during nearly a thousand years, has been productive of the most magnificent results, and during a long time placed France intellectually at the head of Europe.

There was, however, a decline, of which it is important to speak briefly. The so-called *revival of learning* previous to and coeval with the Reformation, was not an absolute blessing, as is sometimes pretended. In France, particularly, it introduced into literature a mawkish imitation of the old pagan authors, and Greek mythology became an almost universal element in poetry, and to a certain degree in eloquence. In philosophy it evidently disposed the minds to an antagonism towards theology, and produced an incalculable injury to the cause of truth. But with all these disadvantages education, being always in the hands of the clergy, remained on the highest level. It penetrated Christianity to the core, and the great French writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries carried the literary art almost to perfection. It is then that the French language became the usual channel of social intercourse among educated Europeans of all nations.

With the spread of infidelity, however, the eighteenth century witnessed a thorough revolution in literature, though the education of young people remained the same. Religion was first insidiously, then openly attacked by a set of sophists who took the name of philosophers. It is known that to their pernicious doctrines must be mainly attributed the civil and social commotions which after a hundred years are still as violent as ever. What was then the state of education in the country? and must the evils referred to be attributed to it? A respectable clergyman, *l'abbé* Gaume, has written many volumes to prove that the chief cause of the Revolution and of its consequences was the classical learning imparted in the French schools, in which the pagan authors of Greece and Rome were exclusively studied. This is not the place to enter deeply into this question. The single fact to which we must limit

our remarks is that public education was still at that time entirely in the hands of the clergy, and they could not be even suspected of intending to bring back France to paganism. If the reading of Latin and Greek authors by boys in colleges brought them naturally and necessarily to despise religion and become infidels, how is it that in the previous century—the seventeenth—the same baneful effect did not follow in France? Why is it that in other European countries, in England, for instance, where the same classical authors were studied perhaps more thoroughly than on the other side of the Channel, no effect of this kind was produced? There must have been some other cause than the one assigned by M. Gaume, and none can be perceived other than the revolution in literature mentioned a moment ago.

Although education was in good hands and perfectly free, the deleterious doctrines of the *philosophers* had altogether shaken the influence of the Church. Rousseau particularly had undermined all the bases of the former Christian educational system by his *Emile*, and the country was prepared for a thorough revolution in education as well as in literature.

The Constituent Assembly of 1789 and the following years, in preparing to give a new Constitution to France, began its work by the destruction of all previous institutions. Thus, together with the monarchy, the whole social, civil, and religious system, was swept away. The parliaments, the nobility, the provincial privileges, the Church organization, having been either altogether destroyed or essentially modified, the old system of education could not continue to exist; and university after university, college after college, primary schools in cities, and village schools in the country, were the successive objects of as many decrees which demolished them root and branch. The Legislative which followed the Constituent Assembly finished at last the unholy work, and when the last blow was struck France remained without public teaching of any sort.

The Convention in 1793 had thus a fair field for its theories. Its first attempt at reorganization was to revive the Spartan system. The children were declared to belong to the state, not to their parents, and this is the Satanic origin of all the educational nonsense that has followed, and it is also the origin of the present attempt of M. Ferry and his friends to revive the now exploded idea that the state alone is the instructor of youth. I call it "exploded," because freedom of education having been granted in 1850 and 1875, France had then acknowledged that the children belong to their parents.

To understand it better still, however, this interesting history must be continued. The Spartan system, as it has been called, consisted in bringing out the children, boys and girls, for the cele-

bration of *fêtes républicaines*, teaching them the new creed contained in the farrago called *les droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, swearing hatred to monarchy, singing patriotic hymns such as *La Marseillaise*, and in general living in the open air in the midst of the violent commotions peculiar to that period of anarchy. Seldom indeed did these forlorn children employ any of their time in study. The Convention itself, having abolished all the previous teaching as monarchical and superstitious, could not find leisure for prescribing a new plan of studies. The celebrated Abbé Grégoire, constitutional bishop of *Loir et Cher* (this was his new title), who was publicly appointed to report on a suitable educational system, often, it is true, read long rigmaroles, which were supposed to devise the best plans of encyclopædic instruction. But whatever may have been the cause, an attempt was never made to open schools, and give those *plans* the benefit of a trial. And this continued the whole time that the *Convention* and the *Directoire* lasted. Until Napoleon came, consequently, nothing was done, except to establish the fatal principle that the children belonged to the state, which was the only recognized *instructor*.

The emperor eagerly adopted this principle in laying the foundation of his *Université de France*. To the Church, which he condescended to reinstate at the same time, he left the direction of philosophical and theological studies for the candidates to the priesthood; nothing more. His profound sense told him he could not be the head in spiritual matters; but he insisted that not a single child destined to be a citizen, not a priest, should receive instruction from any one but from his state professors. The new bishops were too prudent to thwart him in that object, and besides they had not at that time the means of opening colleges of their own independent of the state body called the *Université*, had they been free to do so.

The Bourbons who succeeded to Napoleon fell in naturally with the same idea, because they thought it gave them a great opportunity of gaining over the new generation to the adoption of monarchical principles. It was a huge mistake, as the sequel showed, but it was natural for them to fall into it. Charles X. in 1828 went even further, though reluctantly. The Jesuits having, at the instigation of some bishops, opened eight colleges under the name of *Petits Séminaires*, a royal ordinance, prompted by the universal outcry of pretended liberals, closed them by authority; and members of religious congregations were declared incompetent to teach, unless they were authorized by the government. From that moment the distinction came into use of religious corporations *authorized*, that is to say, recognized by the state, and those which were not so authorized.

At the downfall of Charles X., in 1830, a new charter having been framed on the accession of Louis Philippe, an article was inserted into it promising freedom of education. It was the first time since 1793 that this word was pronounced, and became the object of a solemn promise. But it took the whole reign of the new king of the French,—fully eighteen years,—to frame a project of a law, which could scarcely claim even the appearance of freedom. The fatal principle of '93 had so profoundly entered into the heads of all French politicians, that it seemed impossible to recover so precious a liberty after it had been denied during thirty years. The chief cause of this delay, from 1830 to 1848, was the political antagonism existing between M. Guizot and M. Thiers. These two gentlemen were for a long time directing alternately the cabinet of the king. It was not, as in England, a contest between Whigs and Tories, but between Guizot's theory of resistance and Thiers's phantasmagoria of liberalism. When one was in the other intrigued to put him out. M. Guizot, in order to *resist* democracy, wished to grant to the Church some share in public instruction. But M. Thiers was always in the way, and used all his power to secure to the state *Université* the continuation of its teaching monopoly.

At last the revolution of 1848 broke out and threatened to plunge France into anarchy. M. Thiers, himself, perceived his imprudence. The excess of the evil became the cause of an unexpected freedom. As the laws that were then enacted to bring in that immense boon, and the astonishing results that followed, were the chief cause of the wrath engendered in the hearts of miscreants such as are undoubtedly the leaders of the actual crusade against religion, it is proper to speak of those laws and of their results at some length.

All the governments that succeeded each other since the first republic had labored under the same delusion, namely, that state training for the young generation was the best, because it would, in the end, render the nation homogeneous, and no more split up in parties, and that the attachment of all to the ruling form of government would be secured by the united efforts of able and devoted professors, and through the friendly bias that would be given to the studies, particularly of French history, and of the modern institutions adapted to the peculiar constitution of the times. Thus Napoleon I. began with the cry of *Vive la Gloire!* The Bourbons followed with the old motto *Vive le Roi!* Louis Philippe thought he had invented the precise device needed in the combination of *Ordre et Liberté!* All of these rulers would have been afraid of interference on the part of other teachers than their own; either laymen with republican ideas, or religious corporations laboring

more for the Church than for the state. They all had found the ground free for their experiments, owing to the despotic principles of the Convention, and thus they arranged, skilfully in their opinion, their plans of national education, with the intention of moulding the French into willing slaves.

Still they all had failed. Napoleon saw the French, satiated with glory, prefer his rule to that of the Bourbons. This new dynasty could not revive the former enthusiasm for the cry of *Vive le Roi!* in spite of its able and devoted professors. Louis Philippe, finally, had not united the nation by his pretended union of *Ordre et Liberté*. The popular insurrections which had upset three thrones, one after the other, were invariably led by the pupils of the state schools. It was a feature equally remarkable in the revolutions of 1830 and of 1848. The students of the *Ecole Polytechnique*, particularly, had organized the mob in the streets of Paris, and enabled them in great part to defeat the plans of the government with its troops of soldiers, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Thus, all the monarchical training the young men had received in the state institutions had served only to make of them radical republicans, or, rather, anarchists. M. Thiers saw it in 1848, and being truly a statesman he directly perceived that religion must go hand in hand with instruction in the education of youth. France had never been so much in danger of being plunged into the horrors of anarchy as she found herself in 1848. M. de Montalembert had for a long time already started his war-cry of *freedom of education to all*, and the strange spectacle was offered of the Voltairian Thiers, with his friend, the rationalist, Cousin, joining hands with Montalembert, Dupanloup, and De Falloux. This requires some explanation.

This last gentleman, De Falloux, was appointed Minister of Public Instruction, in December, 1848, by General Cavaignac, then President of the Republic. The following January he formed two committees,—*extra-parlementaires*,—that is, their members were not all taken from the legislature. The first one, to the number of ten, was intrusted with the task of revising and adapting to the present circumstances the laws on primary instruction previously enacted in France. The other, comprising twelve members, had the same object in view with regard to the laws on secondary or collegiate instruction. Soon they were merged into one, and it was decided that the minister himself, M. De Falloux, should preside over them. In his unavoidable absences M. Thiers occupied the chair. The chief intention was to give to primary education a stronger Christian character, and to prepare a law which should be presented to the legislature, in order that secondary

or collegiate instruction should be henceforth free to a great degree, and not left entirely under the control of the state university.

To begin this work M. Thiers wrote a letter, published in all the papers, in which he openly declared the change of his views. He had a far greater influence over the French mind than any statesman in the United States could ever possess, for there is in this country a far greater degree of independence in individual citizens than there can ever be in France. A few passages of that letter deserve to be quoted: "When the state university followed the views of a wise and conservative *bourgeoisie*, when it taught our children according to Rollin's ideas, and gave more of its attention to the old classical studies than to the physical and mechanical theories confined to the narrow circle of so-called professional training, I was in favor of denying to all else the faculty of teaching. But this is not the case to-day. The state university has fallen into the hands of phalansterians, and evidently wants to teach our children, together with some mathematics and natural sciences, a great deal of *demagoguism*; I do not see any way of saving the country except by granting freedom of teaching. I repeat what I have already said: The education given by the clergy, which I did not like for several reasons, seems to me far better than what our state professors prepare for us. . . . My antagonism is now turned against the social enemy, which is the mania of the demagogue. I do not intend to surrender to it. I wish to save from destruction the last hope of social order, which is evidently attached to Catholic institutions."

Then followed, between the twenty-two gentlemen appointed by the minister, a most interesting discussion, which lasted in numerous sittings a great part of the year 1849, and has been published by M. H. de Lacombe. The most frequent interlocutors were, on one side, Messrs. Thiers, Dubois, Cousin, De Corcelle; on the other, Messrs. Dupanloup, De Montalembert, Laurentie, Cochin, De Riancey. The chief measures agreed upon were, first and foremost, liberty granted to all corporations acknowledged by the Church, not excepting the Jesuits. M. Thiers first thought them unpopular, and wished them to be excluded. But M. Dupanloup spoke eloquently in their favor, and asserted that the Church would never consent to their exclusion, because they were innocent of all the accusations brought against them, and the Church always stood up for justice.

In general, throughout all those discussions, the future Bishop of Orleans showed such a firmness joined with moderation, such a clear insight into all the questions connected with public instruction, that he finally convinced M. Thiers of the justice of his views, so that the great adversary of the Church's right in his previous

life completely surrendered, and brought M. Cousin to the same acknowledgment.

Besides the liberty granted to religious corporations, and to the secular clergy, with regard to secondary instruction, it was agreed that in the lower grade of teaching, namely, in the primary, the Church should enjoy a high control over the state instructors, who would be placed under the supervision of the *curés*, though not dependent on them. This was an immense advance upon the previous arrangement, when the schoolmaster was altogether independent of the priest, and often took pride in opposing him. Meanwhile, the religious bodies whose object is the direction of village schools, or of primary schools in cities, could be invited by the *communes* to all establishments of this nature, and their members needed not to be subjected to examinations, as the appointment of their superiors sufficed. It was from this time that the numerous schools of the Christian Brothers, particularly, obtained the pre-eminence they have now obtained throughout France for the education of the people.

To regulate the freedom granted for secondary instruction, it was agreed that all citizens, lay or clerical, and all members of religious corporations, even of those not legalized by the state,—this meant chiefly the Jesuits,—could open free colleges, with the government sanction; and that their pupils could be admitted to literary degrees after an examination before a mixed board, composed, half and half, of professors of the state university and of members of the religious body to which the college belonged. The state university was to continue to enjoy some privileges of supervision over those establishments, but these were very simple and not liable to abuse. From that moment the schools established by the various orders of the Church obtained an exalted position in the public education of the country. It is proper to consider here, for a moment, the astonishing success which has crowned their efforts, particularly because this success is the true cause of the attempt made by the present radical government to do away with them. The party to which the destiny of France has unfortunately lately been intrusted, perceived that the educated classes in France were on the way of being converted to religion, and that soon France would be again a Catholic country, in case her Catholic schools continued to flourish. *Inde iræ*. The Ferry bill was the result.

Before 1850 the Church's teaching was strictly confined within the precincts of the episcopal institutions, to prepare candidates for the priesthood,—*Petits et Grands Séminaires*. Not a single school could be opened by bishops and religious orders out of the narrow limits of priestly education. What do we find was the case in 1876, just before the present administration of the country un-

dertook to close at once all the free establishments under the care of the regular clergy? In 1878 M. Bardoux published officially, for the government, the general statistics of education, and it is from his report that the following details are taken concerning the free colleges opened by the secular and regular clergy. With regard to the episcopal *Petits Séminaires*, M. Bardoux remarked that he did not intend to speak of them, but *their pupils were about 30,000 in number*. We will go still farther than he did, in abstaining from speaking of many schools; and as religious congregations alone are threatened by the Ferry bill, nothing will be said here, either, of 91 episcopal institutions outside of the *Petits Séminaires*, or of 129 houses which are in the hands of the secular clergy. Still this wealth of educational means in the Church's hand took its rise only from the freedom granted in 1850. But we will confine ourselves only to the free establishments of religious corporations. These, according to M. Bardoux's report, were 89 in number in 1876. Not a single one of them existed prior to 1850. Of these 27 belonged to the Jesuits. Since the chief object of the Ferry law is to strike at them, it is proper to single them out. M. Ferry said, in one of his late speeches, that "the soul of France was, through those establishments, in the hands of the Jesuits."

The number of pupils in the 89 houses belonging to religious corporations was 19,960; say 20,000. Of these, 9131 (nearly one-half) were under the care of the Jesuits. Several free colleges belonging to the regular clergy prepared, also, young men for admission into the Polytechnique School, into that of St. Cyr for army officers, and into the Naval, the Central, and other schools. M. Bardoux, in his official report, spoke only of the admissions to the Polytechnique School and to that of St. Cyr, and confined himself to the single year 1876. He evidently wished not to call the public attention to the wide influence of the religious corporations in teaching, consequently he merely mentioned 39 admissions to the Polytechnique School, and 127 to St. Cyr. Another report from authentic documents, published by M. de St. Genest, says that the Jesuits alone, between 1850 and 1876, have successfully prepared 458 young men for the Polytechnique; 1248 for St. Cyr; 189 for the Naval School; and 288 for the Central School. This is the sore spot in the eyes of M. Ferry and his friends. It is evident that the religious congregations in France, owing to the freedom granted them, have been taking a deep hold on the intellectual classes in the country. A few years more of the same educational training, and the army, the navy, the engineering corps, the various branches of the civil administration, will be full of gentlemen educated by members of religious orders, to whom they remain ever after strongly attached. Have we not heard, a few weeks ago,

General Farre, the new Minister of War, an ardent supporter of godless education, exclaim that he will have trouble in reducing to his own way of thinking a large number of army officers who have openly fallen into the meshes of *clericalism*, that is, who bravely, and in the eyes of all, practice their religion?

But besides this remarkable change in military and civil circles there is also the greatly larger one of 20,000 young men who now follow their collegiate course under the care of religious, and have done so for many years past. In the next twenty years how many will have received a like religious training? What prodigious changes will it not have effected among the educated classes of the country? The effect which has already been produced could not have been expected twenty years ago. It has been described in a few spirited paragraphs by M. de St. Genest in his *Persécution Religieuse*, of which it is proper to transcribe here a few words. He contrasts the actual state of the country with respect to genuine religious feeling with what it was in appearance under Napoleon III., when he went with Eugénie to Notre Dame d'Auray, just before this remarkable transformation began to be perceptible in the intellectual and wealthy classes of society.

"I have known other times. I have seen the result of purely state religion. I have witnessed the pompous festival of *St. Anne a' Auray*, when I followed with my regiment the Emperor and his court, accomplishing an official pilgrimage. The priests on that day appeared to be invested with a great power; religion seemed to triumph indeed. Nevertheless I must say, that if we all assisted at that Mass, in a splendid order of battle, I saw few men around me showing unmistakably the faith of a Christian.

"What is the cause of the great change that has since happened? How is it that to-day the churches are too small, the Christian schools and the convents too narrow for their inmates? What has been the source of this new piety, so strange in regiments of soldiers, among burghers, and in the popular ranks? Has there been a thaumaturgus, another Peter the Hermit preaching a new crusade? No! These multitudes have been converted neither by a Lacordaire, nor by a Dupanloup. It is you atheists, it is you radicals, it is you demagogues that are the cause of it. Your voice is the one which calls these legions and sends them to the four quarters of the globe. As soon as they hear it, many of them run to the Sanctuary of St. Martin at Tours, others to Lourdes, not a few to Rome, some even to Jerusalem.

"When you attack the Brothers, the Brothers do not know where they are to find room for the children that come to them. When you threaten the priests, the priests are embarrassed by the great number of the faithful that surround them. You are the

new preachers sent by God; you are indeed the Fathers of the Church!

"If the pupils of the schools of every degree, if those young men formerly scoffers and skeptics, give the astonishing spectacle of which the whole of Europe speaks; if at St. Cyr all those brave young soldiers walk up to the altar headed by their officers; if large crowds of people are now seen walking in procession through France with their banners and holy images, it is to you that we owe it; yes, to you, the slaves of the Beast, the enemies of God. Go on, therefore, and continue to persecute! It is the breath of air which starts again the blazing flame when it was nearly extinguished!

"You have forced us to openly recognize all the grandeur of our Church. You have made us spew out the poison that was tainting the blood in our veins. . . . Go on! Let the horror that your very sight excites in us prove stronger than even Christian eloquence. You see it; at the first view of this impious war, we all rush on to the rescue; old men and young men; military people and civilians; noblemen and burghers; city and country people together. Directly the processions begin, and we turn pilgrims of God! It is a universal, unheard of conversion. What an admirable work you have been the innocent cause of! Let me tell you, however, in conclusion, that you are great fools!"

This is but a specimen of many outbursts of eloquence and pathos. Paul Féval is not the only one to speak and write in this apocalyptic language. He is not the best of them. The attempt of M. Ferry has elicited many other professions of faith from the pen or the lips of ardent laymen led on by the great Albert de Mun, all now engaged on the side of religion and truth. The cause of it, as assigned by M. de St. Genest in the previous passage, is true in great part. But it would not have taken place had not the eighty-nine educational establishments, founded by religious corporations since 1850, formed within their holy precincts the characters of very many of the young men, who now fill important offices in all the branches of the civil and military administration. From 1875 a much greater impetus was to be given to the holy cause by the law for *superior* education passed at Versailles in that year, by which the bishops were empowered to found Catholic universities for the highest branches of learning. Five of them were just being opened when the Ferry bill came to threaten their existence. A word must suffice on this subject.

It was Napoleon III. who, satisfied with the result of the freedom granted to the Church for primary and secondary education, thought of crowning the whole work by adding at once the privilege of the full university course. A committee was appointed to

frame the project of a law for that purpose. M. Guizot consented to preside over it, and two of its most eminent members were M. Prevost Paradol and the Père Captier, who was later on put to death by the Commune. The downfall of the Empire prevented the completion of the undertaking. But directly after the Franco-German war, Count Joubert introduced on his own responsibility in the National Assembly at Versailles, in 1871, a bill on the freedom of superior education. It was only four years later, after many incidents, delays, and obstacles, that the bill at last passed, opposed to the last by Messieurs Challemel-Lacour and Paul Bert, but, strange to say, supported by M. Jules Ferry, who was then a member of the Assembly. It seems he had not yet received his cue from the Masonic lodges, and in giving his opinion, after the passage of the bill, he used the following expressions :

“You have just concluded a grand affair, gentlemen ; you have ratified a great project, in which I have concurred with you. You have just proclaimed the freedom of superior education ; the free diffusion of doctrines not only by individual citizens, but likewise by religious corporations. It is a noble experiment, a great novelty in this country. Pause awhile, and do not incumber the project with doubtful adjuncts,” etc.

The bishops did not delay making use of that precious liberty. In two or three years five of those immense establishments were founded, namely, at Paris, Lille, Lyons, Angers, and Toulouse. The French people of every class contributed generously. From two to five millions of francs were realized for the foundation of each of them ; for of necessity they were to rival the state universities, and that of Paris in particular. The best talent was engaged for the schools of arts, medicine, law, philosophy, and theology. Large libraries and rich collections of everything necessary for scientific studies were purchased. Students flocked to them from every part of France, and, to the astonishment of all, in five of its great cities the highest courses of learning were opened to Catholic young men, on a par with the most celebrated in the country. Parents did not fear in them the teaching of atheistic and materialistic doctrines, as was too often the case in state establishments. At the end of every year, too, the number of young men admitted to degrees was comparatively greater than in the state institutions, though half of the examiners were members of the rival establishments. This was a climax that nobody expected, and which gave the clearest proof that France was Catholic to the core.

But this of course alarmed the enemies of religion, who before imagined that France had lost her faith. For a long time it had lain dormant, and the noise made, as usual, by the infidel party had

generally convinced people that the Church would never again obtain the control of the educated classes. All were profoundly surprised at such a revival as this. The anti-clericals, as they were called, were dismayed at this spectacle, and keenly felt they had no time to lose in opposing so formidable an antagonist as the Church unexpectedly proved to be. They had lately acquired in politics an immense power, owing to circumstances which cannot even be hinted at here, and they made up their mind to use that power instantly. In Freemasons' lodges particularly, to which many men belonged in the administration, in the legislature, and in the press, a plan of attack was quickly devised, which seemed to them sure of success. It was nothing else than the intention of returning to the former state monopoly in education, by following the lead of Prince Bismarck in his *Kultur-kampf*. It is true, two recent laws, which had proved a great success, would have to be abrogated; but could there be a better example to follow than that of the great Chancellor of Germany? After all, if it was a hazardous project, something must be done, and it would be folly to wait for a better opportunity.

The first intimation of it was given in 1877 by M. Guichard, in his report on the Budget of that year, when the national expenses for public worship came to be examined. He boldly asked that among the ordinary appropriations granted for the *Grands Séminaires*, seventeen of those Episcopal establishments should be deprived of their usual allowance, alleging that pure dogmatic doctrine and pure morality were not taught in those houses; that pure doctrine was not, because first, the four articles of the Gallican declaration, in 1682, were openly attacked by the professors of divinity; and, secondly, in moral theology, probabilism and many other lax opinions were advocated.

This proposal on the part of M. Guichard supposed that the state was intrusted not only with the general instruction of the people, but as well with the teaching of theology, which had been recognized even by Napoleon I. to be the province of the bishops alone. But since the *Kultur-kampf* of M. de Bismarck was to be taken as the model for France to imitate, it was thought to be better to adopt at once the whole of his plan, which they foolishly believed had already succeeded in Germany, and had there placed the Church in bondage. This, however, was too foolhardy on the part of mere political leaders of the stamp of Ferry and his compeers. It was asking more than they needed and more than they could obtain. It was proclaiming at once that they aimed at religion itself by attacking the bishops, whilst their best plan was to profess great respect for religion, for bishops and secular priests in particular, and declare war against religious orders only, which many inclined

to consider a useless appendage to the Church. Consequently the plan of campaign adopted inconsiderately by M. Guichard was promptly abandoned, and M. Jules Ferry, the new Minister of Public Instruction, gave a different turn to the attack by the celebrated bill which he brought to the Chamber of Deputies in March, 1879, and which is the proper subject of the present paper.

Two great objects were aimed at by this bill. First, it was an insidious attack against the Catholic universities lately organized; and, secondly, the religious orders not recognized by the state were to be deprived of the freedom of teaching granted them by the law of 1850. The designers of this project did not wish to appear opposed to freedom, except as against *foreigners* and open *enemies* of the Republic. They were great liberals, the leaders in fact of all *liberal* measures. The bishops, consequently, the secular clergy, the Orders even recognized by the state, would continue to have the liberty of education they enjoyed; only it would be better guarded by *some few* measures of their own device, which would give to the state a *little more* authority over them. These were certainly benevolent intentions. It remains to see how far they were sincere.

And first with regard to the Catholic universities, they would be, of course, respected; and the bishops would find that M. Ferry and his friends were not their enemies. Very little would be changed with regard to them in the provisions of the new bill. Only two small items would be insisted upon: the fees, which, according to the law of 1875, were paid by the Catholic students, would no more be exacted; and the examinations, which, according to the same law, were passed before a mixed board, would henceforth be left altogether to the State University professors, to whom alone fees would be paid. The fees previously paid for tuition and for examination were the only pecuniary resources of the Catholic universities, and M. Ferry and his friends thought that this single measure would oblige the bishops to close their establishments. Remonstrances were made on this point, but they were of no avail; and it seems strange that in all the excitement on the Catholic side which followed, far less energy was displayed against this part of the bill than against the article 7th, which excluded from teaching the religious not authorized by the state. The fact is that the Catholics were determined to keep their universities in spite of all obstacles; and if it came to the worst, and their resources were totally taken away from them, the Catholics, who had already found in their purse the many millions required for the foundation of those establishments, would also provide for their yearly maintenance. This was evidently the reason why so little noise was made against this outrageous feature of M. Ferry's project. The reader may be

assured that whatever may be the ultimate fate of this bill before the Senate, the universities will go on with more *éclat* than ever. The professors will be satisfied with their bare subsistence, all the expenses which are not absolutely necessary will be curtailed, and the French Catholics will find in their almost empty purses whatever will be strictly required. They are on their mettle, and nothing is impossible to them.

But the great battle has been fought and is yet raging on the article 7th. It is proper to give it in French: "*Nul ne sera plus admis à participer à l'enseignement public ou libre, ni à diriger un établissement de quelque ordre que ce soit, s'il appartient à une congrégation non autorisée.*" It is short and plain. If it becomes a law no man belonging to the congregations of the Jesuits, Dominicans, Oratorians, Benedictines, etc., will be able to teach in any school, lay or clerical. Consequently not only those orders will be forbidden to open any institution of their own, of whatever degree, but no bishop will be allowed to appoint any of their members to a chair of theology or philosophy in his *Grand Séminaire*, to a professorship of belles-lettres, or grammar, or even of simple elements in his *Petit Séminaire*, which is understood in this article as *public teaching*. The French, to their honor, felt the ignominy of such barefaced tyranny; and not only the Catholics themselves, but many rationalists, freethinkers, and Protestants joined, in the firm determination of uncompromising resistance. All those in fact who had adopted truly liberal ideas, and wished freedom for all, according to the motto of Montalembert, spoke in public, wrote in papers, and published powerful pamphlets where the cause of the Jesuits was openly advocated.

But it is time to look at the attack; the resistance will be better appreciated. The Committee in the Lower House appointed to report on the Ferry bill was, of course, ardently in favor of it. Every one knew that it would be carried in that Assembly without the slightest amendment. The composition of this body of legislators is truly inexplicable. Never since the first republic has any combination of public men showed such a disregard of justice and right. It is, however, the direct result of universal suffrage; but it is known how incompetent are the French to use this privilege with prudence and a right understanding of the common welfare.

M. Spuller, the chairman of the committee, presented his report at the beginning of June, 1879. It is important to attentively examine some of its points. It had a threefold object: to lay down the true source of power in point of public teaching; to discuss the objections that had already been made against it by bishops and other petitioners; to justify every article of the new bill. With regard to the first of these points the task of M. Spuller appeared

to him plain and easy, but was not so satisfactory to many of his readers. "The state is eminently the public instructor of the nation;" this was the principle on which all his argument was based. But this axiom needed first to be proved, and it was not. At all times and in all nations the parents have been considered the first instructors of their children. When they cannot do it themselves it is their right to look for other teachers in their place. As long as the children are under age the family is a unit, and the state cannot interfere except in the case of an open danger for the public welfare or of the violation of others' rights. Here the government pretended to see a danger, but no one else perceived it except the members of a party which called itself liberal and was in fact despotic. France had certainly never before admitted that the state alone can teach in so sweeping a manner as the Spuller report pretends it should. The proof of it was that in all the recent constitutions, except in the first followed by Napoleon, the freedom of education was promised as a corrective of the state influence.

Beside this first remark the reporter of the new bill did not clearly define what he understood by the state. This word has many meanings, as it is generally used. It may signify the totality of public institutions, or the administration in its complexity, or the executive alone, or finally a mere party which has obtained the governing power. M. Spuller did not seem to accept any of these interpretations, but he invented a new definition of his own which no doubt will startle the great majority of American readers. "The state," he said, "is a civil, lay, and political power, able to keep in check the pretensions of the spiritual authority!" This, in his opinion, was the great institution which was to be also "the public instructor of the nation." By its very essence it must be in a constant state of warfare against the Church.

M. Spuller, however, pretended to give proofs of his fundamental principle. He mentioned two in particular: the first was that freedom of education had never been granted by the state in France; just the contrary of the truth, except under the Convention. At all times, undoubtedly, unless during the first part of the Middle Ages, the state in France had extended its supervision over public teaching; but it is beyond contradiction that until 1789 the state left it entirely to the clergy, and never restricted its freedom. It only kept public order among the various institutions intrusted with it. For the religious orders taught concurrently with the universities, and it was proper that the state should interfere whenever a disagreement among them arose. This was then the only state interference in public instruction. This error of M. Spuller was immediately exposed and refuted in many pamphlets and speeches.

But his second proof was in some sense a still greater failure.

"Public instruction," he said, "is for the state an object of high interest;" and he concluded from this that the state must have the monopoly of it. At these words energetic and eloquent remonstrances came from all sides. For since the state must and does take interest in everything which concerns the citizens' welfare, it strictly follows that it must interfere in all those concerns, or rather take to itself the total management of them. This is well known to be the great principle of the rankest socialism of our day; and it was easy to convict the reporter of belonging to the sect of socialists, or at least of favoring and fostering it.

Meanwhile, in the midst of this fierce contest, the great danger to the Church appeared more ominous than ever. It has been stated that in presenting this bill to the legislature the government did not intend to alarm too much the religious interests. If the Catholic universities were "insidiously attacked," as was said, they nevertheless appeared to be safe from destruction. If some religious corporations (not authorized by the state) were excluded from teaching the whole body of the secular clergy were left as free as before, and even several orders of the Church (being authorized) could continue to teach. The real danger did not appear such as to excite the sudden outcry of execration that was raised on the part of the Church's friends.

But suddenly M. Spuller comes with his report, and he boldly asserts that in point of teaching the state is the only master, so that everything is despotically under its sway. At his bidding a certain number only of the colleges of the country under the Church's control are suppressed; but next year, if the same principles prevail, everything else bearing the religious character can be swept away like so many cobwebs. And that this was the real intention of these men seemed proved by the motto of their great leader, M. Gambetta, namely, that *l'ennemi c'est le cléricalisme*; and the object of the new bill with regard to the Catholic universities was unmistakably to end in their suppression.

This was sufficient to bind firmly together all those who took an interest in religion. There was no longer any fear that the secular clergy would see without dismay, and perhaps with a sort of satisfaction, the disappearance of a few of the regulars. The enemies of the Church had too openly showed the direct object of their attack, and the whole clergy of France, from the highest archbishop or cardinal to the humblest parish priest or curate, was as solidly bound together as if they had formed only a single bar of steel.

That the intention was to use this law as an entering-wedge into the most essential of the Church's prerogatives, was shown not by a few passages only of this political tirade, but by the whole

performance. The reason on which M. Spuller most insisted was the threatening aspect of ultramontaniam, which would ultimately triumph in France if the free colleges continued to exist. The Syllabus particularly was the bugbear evoked by the reporter. According to his wise arguments, if the Church wished to obtain the freedom of teaching, it was with the evident intention of concentrating it into her hands, and in the end excluding all lay teachers from this function. Texts were quoted by him from Catholic authors, whose words were tortured into a meaning which the writers never had. Nothing was better calculated to unite as a band of brothers all those who had the good of religion at heart; for the Syllabus and ultramontaniam, rightly understood, are now the Church's doctrine.

But the effect of this report went still further, and opened the eyes of many true liberals in France to the projects intended for the future. If this bill became a law, the despotic power which was supposed by M. Spuller to be the aim of the Church in asking for freedom, would be in truth vested by it in the state. This was tantamount to the establishment of a state morality and a state religion, which is perhaps the thing most abhorrent to the modern Frenchman. As the state, moreover, takes every day more and more the appearance of a party, if the dominant faction became at last that of socialism the way would have been paved by this bill for the crushing despotism which every one knows socialism keeps in store in case of its success. This was a sudden revelation for many men who cared little for the Church, and perhaps even dreaded her, but would never consent to take on their necks a far heavier yoke. Thus a considerable number of pure liberals, including among them even some avowed atheists or positivists, openly declared themselves against the passage of this bill, particularly against the seventh clause. They wrote letters in the public journals, made speeches, published pamphlets, increased the popular agitation in every possible way. This alarmed the party which had raised that storm, namely, the administration itself.

They wished to strengthen public opinion in their favor, and asked the Councils General of all the Prefectures of France to discuss the question among themselves, and express their views of it in their annual reports. From the reign of Napoleon III, and perhaps during the Republic which preceded it, these public bodies, which are composed of the most prominent men of each department, and are the official advisers of the Prefects, have become extremely influential, and on all great occasions they are consulted by the cabinet at Paris. A large number of new members had been lately elected, favorable, as was thought, to the projects of the government, and M. Ferry had no doubt that a thundering answer

would come from them to reduce to impotence the opposers of his bill. But he was sadly mistaken, and the result must have been far from pleasing to him. Of their total number, namely, eighty-seven, forty declared openly or indirectly against the bill; only sixteen voted unreservedly in its favor; thirty-one finally abstained from giving their opinion, which, consequently, could not be favorable. The papers which supported the measures of the government tried in vain to give a different turn to this result, and pretended to prove that the opinion of the Councils General was in the main satisfactory to the ruling faction. M. Spuller also in his report gave a garbled account of the general result, in which he himself evidently had no faith, considering his very embarrassed expressions. But these pretensions were so lame, and the real state of the case was so clear, that M. Ferry himself could not be blind enough to be inwardly pleased with the new aspect this incident gave to his expectations.

Directly after this first blow given to them, another, which he might have expected, came from the bishops. They all, without exception, protested against the bill. They sent to the legislature their remonstrances, and strong, indeed, they were, even in the short abstract of them which M. Spuller gave in his report. I translate from the French this short passage of it: "The complaints of the Episcopate can be reduced to three points, which we shall successively examine.

"First, the bill annuls, without compensation, just and legitimate rights previously acquired. It introduces into the legislation a fatal principle of instability, calculated to destroy the respect due to authority and law. It kindles again the flames of a war which had lasted fifty years, and which everybody thought had been ended by a happy and honorable compromise between the state and the Church.

"Second. The bill does not attack the freedom of superior education only, but it openly subverts the liberty of conscience by its seventh article, which denies the liberty of teaching in public and private schools to religious congregations unauthorized by the state.

"Third and lastly. The bill shows on its face the deliberate intention to impose on the nation, by legal means, an irregular teaching, in order to destroy Catholicism in France."

Pity it is that long extracts of this noble protestation of the French bishops cannot be given here. M. Spuller did his best to answer these eloquent objections. "The acquired rights," he said (meaning those of the Catholic universities), "date only from 1875." As this was uttered in 1879, I leave it to the reader to imagine how this answer would be received in any American legislature; and the more so that the reporter did not appear to

remember that the "acquired rights" of the free colleges dated from 1850, nearly thirty years. As to the instability of legislation to which the bishops had alluded with so much force, the same gentleman had nothing to answer except that every day a bill passed by one legislature is annulled by the next. Is this a pleasant feature of modern legislative enactments?

But as we cannot enter into the discussion of the whole report, something must at least be said of the last remonstrance of the bishops; namely, that the deliberate intention of the bill was to impose on the nation an irregular, that is, secular and state teaching, in order to destroy Catholicism in France. M. Spuller, alluding to this last objection of the bishops, said that this reproach was in effect that "the government wished to introduce a sort of French *kultur-kampf*. It went to a foreign country to find a political doctrine which is not, and cannot be that of France." But M. Spuller was immediately reminded that the very principles which were invoked in Germany for enacting the Falk laws were those he had himself advocated in his report. M. Falk, at Berlin, had no other object in view than to "protect the national spirit against the encroachments of Romanism," which is called *clericalism* by M. Spuller, at Paris. M. Von Lutz, the reporter of the Falk laws bill in Germany, assigned as the best reason of their enactment "the necessity for the state to create strong safeguards against the trespasses of the enemy." It is evident that the same objection can be raised in France against the pretensions of M. Spuller in France, which the eloquent bishop of Mayence, Von Ketteler, raised against the *kultur-kampf* in Germany, namely: "The Prussian legislation is intended to place the absolute omnipotence of the state in the hands of a man who does not allow any independence but his own, even in religious matters. The father cannot claim over his children the rights of paternity; he is only their guardian as far as the state will allow." Many other reflections of the same nature were made by the Catholics, showing the absolute identity between the tendency of the Ferry bill and of the modern German laws, which have culminated in a most crushing persecution. These few words abundantly prove that the reporter in France, in 1879, was not on a bed of roses.

His equanimity was still further disturbed by the immense mass of petitions against this bill, which about the same time were brought with solemnity to the Senate. The petitioners had not thought proper to send their signatures to the Lower House, where no justice, no fairness could be expected. They had only three months to draw and sign them before they were sent to Paris. The precaution was almost universally taken of having the signatures of less known citizens certified by some men of note in each district.

Still, at this moment (February, 1880), a great outcry is raised among the supporters of the Ferry bill, complaining of fraud, and asking that a strict inquisition may be brought to bear on those petitions. The object of this complaint is manifest from their insisting that M. Jules Simon should be excluded from participating in the inquiry, and offering his criticism upon it, though he is the reporter of the bill before the Senate. His perfect independence is well known, and it was also well known he would not be pliant enough to see fraud where there is none. A few days will decide if there is fairness among the majority of the Senators or not. But the following was the result of a three months' labor among the Catholics: one million four hundred and sixty-eight thousand signatures were obtained, and sent to the Senate Committee of which M. Simon is the reporter. There was evidently alacrity and goodwill in the performance of this great act on the part of so many French citizens. But it is most remarkable that the Catholics were not the only ones to do it. Many men who had opposed the Church all their lives, like M. Jules Simon himself; a goodly number of Protestants and Jews; even some avowed atheists and positivists like M. Littré, if I mistake not, wrote their names along with those of fervent children of the Church. And as the Catholic leaders are not only conscientious but are likewise sharp and wide awake, it will be difficult to convict them of fraud.

But what of the other party? Did they think of opposing petition to petition, and sending signatures in favor of the bill? They could not help it; they had to do it. To abstain from it would have afforded too clear a proof of their small number all over the country. Some of them even thinking that the majority of those who read and write in France were no longer believers in Christianity, imagined that a large majority would be on their side. To be, however, more sure of success, an awkward measure was adopted which proved in the end a ridiculous failure. In 1870, before the Franco-German war, a petition was started in France by the radical party, forming what they called *la ligue d'enseignement*. Three different forms of headings were used. One was in favor of *compulsory* instruction for all children; another asked that instruction should be *compulsory* and *gratuitous*; the last added the word *laïque*, meaning that laymen alone should teach. When the war began there had been just 266,480 signatures obtained on those three petitions. Their circulation was resumed in 1873, and three years afterwards (not three months), the total amount of the signatures affixed to the lists was 939,875. The first of those lists was not necessarily in favor of the Ferry bill, which could not be even mentioned in any of them, since in 1870, and even in 1873, there could be no question of the Ferry laws. In point of fact the free-

dom of superior education was granted in 1875 in spite of those petitions which had then ceased circulating. It was, therefore, "an awkward measure," as it has been called, or rather a pitiful trick, to bring them on in 1879 and oppose them to the Catholic petitions. The supporters of the Ferry bill, however, contended that the petitions for compulsory, gratuitous, and lay instruction, were a good enough answer to the opposing side, and here we must rest for the present.

A point of great importance in this animated discussion was the number of non-authorized religious congregations which were to be deprived of the faculty of teaching, the exact number also of their houses, and the total number of their pupils as well in the year 1879, as from the beginning of their operations. M. Spuller had endeavored in his report to place before the public all these statistical items, but whatever the cause might be, he had given a most false, nay, a ridiculous and absurd view of them. Then gentlemen engaged on the Catholic side quickly obtained reliable statements on all those questions and not only sent them to the legislature, but published them in all the papers.

On this subject a preliminary observation not altogether void of interest, is that the only "authorized congregations," on the part of the men, were the Sulpitians and the Christian Brothers; and among the numerous female corporations the "Daughters of Charity" were, I think, the only ones "authorized." It was found that there were 120 distinct congregations of women, and 16 of men, not "authorized." The female corporations possessed 555 educational establishments, and there were 89 directed by religious men. The number of teachers, on the side of the women, was 4857, and on that of the men, 1556. The pupils in the female establishments numbered 40,784. Those contained in male schools and colleges were 20,235. From the foundation of these establishments 486,527 female pupils, and 178,438 male scholars had passed through them. Being nearly all charitable as well as educational houses, in the last year 4008 *bourses* or *demi-bourses* were granted in the female establishments, and 3426 in the others. The total amount of money which was thus remitted to poor students, was 418,581 francs for the girls, and 765,095 for the boys.

This expresses the amount of mischief which the Ferry law was destined to do in France, in point of instruction and charity. The state was bound in duty to repair it directly by opening new houses of education, and granting like favors to poor students. This was a question of importance, which deserves to be considered by itself.

When in 1762 a decree of Parliament closed 124 Jesuit colleges, a great difficulty was immediately felt by the government. It was

thought at first that by confiscating the Jesuit property, and replacing by new teachers the religious who had been expelled, there would be no harm done. This appeared very simple, economical, and requiring little time. The college buildings had been kept by their former owners in good repair and order; they could be occupied immediately by the state, and in fact of the *lycées* and colleges now in the possession of the state in France, there are still sixty-six which have formerly been Jesuit establishments, so in 1762 there was no difficulty on that score. But it was not so easy to find teachers. As M. Villeman once said, "The Society of Jesus had left by its suppression a blank which it was not easy to fill."

At the present time the good luck of the government of Louis XV., which found so many handsome and roomy houses ready for occupation, cannot be expected by the rulers of France. The 558 establishments in the possession of female congregations, and the 89 occupied by regulars, cannot be confiscated at a single swoop. All those splendid buildings have owners who have complied with all the French laws regulating and securing property; and if a single attempt at confiscation took place, the courts would certainly decide against the government. M. Jules Ferry knows it, and he does not dream of attempting this step. He falls back on two measures which, in his opinion, are sufficient for his purpose. There will be room, he thinks, for many boys in the present *lycées* of the state. For the others he shall build; the girls can be accommodated anywhere.

But these two projects,—the free room in *lycées* and building,—have been proved to be entirely insufficient. The *lycées*, such as they are, are now full, and most of them, being old structures, can scarcely be warranted much longer by any board of health. Whilst on the contrary, most of the religious establishments, male and female, are splendid, airy, roomy, bran new, and delightful structures, to which for a long time the children of Catholics have been accustomed in France. As to building new houses, the sum of money required for this would be so enormous that no legislature could now consent to it. Details here would carry us too far, but let the reader imagine what it would cost to prepare at once buildings able to receive every day more than forty thousand girls, and more than twenty thousand boys or young men.

The question of the teaching-body necessary for the occasion, would be still more difficult to solve. It would amount to an absolute impossibility. Five thousand female teachers and fifteen hundred professors in colleges, offer thus a difficulty which no one could surmount in France. It is very probable that in case all this had been foreseen, after due examination, the project would have been essentially modified if not altogether abandoned. But in their

blind rage, anxious to stop the movement which was bringing back France to Catholicity, the originators of this scheme launched into an undertaking of the gravity of which they had only a dim perception. Now that they have pledged themselves to carry it through, they must go on in spite of all considerations; the more so as they are hounded on by Freemason fury, of which it is proper to say a word before concluding.

That Freemason lodges, organized in France from the beginning of last century, and at this time more rampant than ever, have been the main cause of all the revolutions which have disturbed the social state, not only in France itself, but in all the countries of Europe, is a fact which cannot be gainsaid, and of which the Freemasons themselves have often boasted. In spite of their pretended rule which forbids politics from being discussed in their assemblies, and welcomes to their ranks men of all political parties, they cannot now deny that they have been uppermost in nearly all the social and civil commotions that have agitated the Old Continent for one hundred and fifty years. At this moment they are most influential in all elections in France. They have a programme now well known, which all the members are sworn to execute. Each one of them has his part to accomplish, and none of them would dare to swerve from his allegiance to *the Grand Orient* in all the measures that have been adopted and are prescribed. M. E. d'Avesne has demonstrated all these points in a small volume published last year at Marseilles, entitled, *La Franc-Maçonnerie et les Projets Ferry*.

But the only matter of interest here is the influence of Freemasonry in the scheme and furtherance of these projects. M. d'Avesne proves that the bill itself comes from the lodges, and that a large number of members of this secret order are actively engaged in working for its success. Their great object is to destroy Catholicity, or rather Christianity, in France; and the bishops in their remonstrance did not fear to allude to this intention, though they did not point out the lodges as the great source of the evil. Many Freemasons in this country may, no doubt, demur from entirely believing this. For it is well known that for a long time Freemasons showed great respect for the name of God, and called him emphatically the great Architect of the Universe. In many places, no doubt, they allowed their members to profess the Christian religion, and Catholics even were admitted to their ranks without requiring from them an open apostasy. This is now entirely gone; and on the Old Continent at least the rankest atheism and materialism is openly professed in their assemblies, and the most violent hatred not only of the Christian doctrine, but even of the belief in God, is manifested on all occasions. But Catholicism is chiefly the

butt of their denunciations, the main object of their fury. The quotations given by M. d'Avesne, mentioning the names of their authors, are in the highest degree revolting; and we have not heard that any of those men openly accused of using such language, have denied it or called M. d'Avesne before a court of law. There is in particular a short passage attributed to M. J. Ferry himself, which has been lately copied and re-copied in many Catholic pamphlets, and which the Minister of Public Instruction in France has never thought proper to contradict or deny. These are the words which M. Ferry is said to have used in the lodge of "Clémentine Amitié," of which he is avowedly a member. As they cannot possibly be translated in English, we give them in the original language: "*L'Infâme qu'en vain avec le xviii-e Siècle on se flattait d'avoir écrasée, et qui renait plus vigoureuse, c'est la morale n'avançant qu'appuyée sur des béquilles théologiques; et pour tout dire en un mot, c'est l'embrigadement général de la Sottise humaine.*"

This picture of the state of parties in France is truly appalling. The Freemasons, animated with the spirit which has just been described, occupy many of the most eminent positions in the social and political world. Last year four of the ministers of M. Grévy were members of the order, namely: Le Royer, Lepere, Tirard, and Ferry. In the Senate M. d'Avesne gives us twenty names. In the Lower House it was still much worse. The President, Gambetta, was of course one of them. There were two Vice-Presidents out of four. All the chairmen of committees, except three, were on the same list. The same was true of the leaders of all the divisions of the *Left*; that is, of the great majority in the Chamber. Of the ordinary members I have counted just sixty.

Beside the executive and the legislature, the majority of the Municipal Council of Paris is composed of Freemasons. Hence a few months ago the schools, directed by Brothers and Sisters under the control of the Municipal Government, were taken from them and given to lay teachers.

It would be useless to go further in this investigation and show the power of Freemasonry in many other influential bodies in Paris; and in particular it would be impossible to recount in detail the number of journalists and publicists who belong to the order.

It was under these circumstances that this secret order attempted to take charge of education in the whole country; and to begin with it, the Ferry bill was elaborated as a first essay which should naturally lead to further projects. What will be its fate in the Senate cannot be altogether foreseen at this moment (February, 1880). It is, however, considered certain that its seventh article will be either expunged or essentially modified. Even if it should pass, it would only be the beginning of a prolonged agitation which

must ultimately end in freedom. The short sketch that has been drawn of the number, influence, earnestness, and talent on the Catholic side, cannot leave any doubt as to their ultimate success. Only a crushing persecution such as that which disgraced the first Convention, could temporarily prevent it. But in 1793 religion unfortunately could not sustain itself, because the lay element was altogether wanting. Even in the ecclesiastical body, even among the Regulars, there were scandals which, thank God! are not possible to-day. By the civil constitution of the clergy, schismatic bishops, and priests were directly placed at the head of all the dioceses and churches of France. To-day, if the ruling party went so far in its rage as to inaugurate an open persecution, the amount of devastation required would be so enormous that it would be impossible to carry it fully into effect.

The truth is that France is now divided into two camps; and the army of God is possessed of as much energy, talent, and wealth, as the rabble on the other side can boast of. The colorless description that has just been sketched in this paper, fails to give any idea of the sublime determination which animates the upholders of right. France is evidently destined to be altogether Catholic, and the leader of Catholicism all over the world. Look at her work in the missions of Asia, Africa, and Polynesia. Examine attentively what the children of the Church are doing over her continental possessions and in Algeria. See the immense multitude of religious, educational, and charitable institutions that have been lately founded. Ponder over the proud position taken by her sons in the intellectual world. Her Catholic universities will continue to flourish in spite of all opposition; and from the lips of her theologians, philosophers, and true scientists must come the solution of all the difficulties raised in this age by materialists and atheists. The time of delusion has passed for her. Infidelity had wellnigh destroyed her by reducing the opinions of her pretended men of science to disorganized fragments. Henceforth there will be unanimity in her thought, because she relies only on the solid anchor of truth, on the Catholic faith proclaimed by the lips of the infallible Pastor.

Since this paper was written the Ferry bill has been defeated in the French Senate. This was expected, but the majority against it was much larger than could well be hoped. In the absence of details recent telegrams attach great importance to this event. It seems that the party called Left Centre has openly separated from the remainder of the Left, and has refused to come to any compromise with the Ministry. In this case the Ministry will have to resign, having the majority against it. It is even said that there is no union in the Cabinet. It looks indeed like a complete disorgani-

zation of the radical party; and the government that has succeeded that of General MacMahon seems altogether unable to stand in the midst of warring elements. To increase further the hopes of the friends of religion, the mob has not appeared on the scene, though the Chambers are now sitting at Paris. The whole rage is now concentrated in the hearts of radical deputies and senators; and the fury of journalists and scribblers cannot succeed in rousing the rabble against bishops or Jesuits. This is the most hopeful feature of this revolution, for in all the bearings of the case it is a complete revolution. The struggle, however, is far from being over; the city of God cannot so soon obtain peace in France. Still, a great victory has been won; and all Catholics must pray that nothing comes to mar it, and prevent its fruits from being gathered in abundance after this blow inflicted on the godless party.

THE SIXTH NICENE CANON AND THE PAPACY.

Τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθνη κρατεῖτω τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Λιβύῃ καὶ Πενταπόλει, ὥστε τὸν Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπίσκοπον πάντων τούτων ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐπισκόπῳ τοῦτο σύνηθές ἐστιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ Ἀντιόχειαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπαρχίαις τὰ πρεσβεῖα σώζεσθαι ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις.¹

“**T**HOSE holy and venerable Fathers of Nicæa,” said St. Leo the Great,² “who, after having condemned to eternal infamy Arius and his blasphemies, enacted a series of church canons destined to have force to the end of times are not dead; for, both here at Rome and throughout the whole world they are judged to be still living in their immortal decrees.” We feel this undying influence of the three hundred and eighteen bishops just as vividly to-day, though nearly sixteen centuries have passed since they met in Bithynia, as St. Leo did fourteen hundred years ago. Of the twenty canons which they promulgated, not one has grown entirely obsolete; for the majority of them relate to things of catholic and fundamental interest, and the few which were enacted for the protection of assailed individual rights or the extirpation of local abuses have in them a germ of immortality.

Canon VI. is an instance of this latter class. The main object of the decree is to confirm the time-honored privileges of the See

¹ The rest of the canon deals with matters which do not here concern us.

² Ep. 106, ad Anatolium.

of Alexandria. From time immemorial the bishops of that city had claimed and exercised supreme jurisdiction over the churches of Egypt and the neighboring provinces. They received the appeals of the bishops from the sentence of their metropolitans; they convened and presided over provincial synods; they ordained and, if necessary, deposed bishops; in a word they were, in the phraseology of a later age, *patriarchs*. Whatever may have been the source of this authority, there is no record of its having been contested by any of the Egyptian bishops before Meletius of Lycopolis raised the standard of rebellion.

This Meletius, as we learn from Socrates,¹ having been degraded by St. Peter of Alexandria in consequence of many heavy charges, the most grievous of which was that during the persecution he had denied the faith and sacrificed, would not submit to the sentence of his superior; and not content with renouncing all allegiance to the Alexandrian See, he arrogated an equal right with the patriarch to ordain bishops and convene synods throughout Egypt. By attaching to his cause all the disaffected elements through the country, he sowed religious dissension in every parish, and soon was leader of a numerous and devoted faction, which obtained quite a formidable accession of strength by coalition with the partisans of Arius. Indeed the desire of putting an end to the Meletian schism was one of the chief motives which impelled Constantine, "with the advice of the clergy," to convoke the Nicene Council.

The great synod decreed "that the ancient order of things in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis must be maintained, to wit, that the Bishop of Alexandria should have authority over all these provinces." And lest similar disorders might arise in Antioch or elsewhere, the Council enacted furthermore "that all the churches should keep their ancient standing."

The decree thus far is perfectly clear and reasonable; but it is not, to use St. Leo's term, *δαιωνύζων*. Its importance has not survived the ravages of time. Many an age has rolled by since those brilliant luminaries of ancient Christendom—Alexandria, Antioch, Heraclea, Cæsarea, Ephesus—were extinguished. They were undoubtedly grand and princely in the day of their strength, but their greatness was of men and shared the inevitable fate of human things. Of what importance, save to the antiquary, are now those old Patriarchates with their accessories of high prerogatives, august state, and far-stretching boundaries? If it was permitted to those ancient princes of the Church to revisit these mortal scenes, their self-esteem would probably be less mortified by finding that every vestige of their patriarchdoms has been swept away, than by perceiving how

¹ Lib. i., c. 6.

wonderfully well the Church of Christ gets along without them. And upon turning their eyes Romeward and beholding the "Bishop of Old Rome" seated upon the Rock of Peter as firmly and serenely as ever, it is possible they might recall St. Leo's prophetic words: "A Church that is built upon any other foundation than that Rock which the Lord hath laid shall sooner or later come to grief."¹

This canon, therefore, owes its perennial interest to its incidentally alluding to the Roman Pontiff; for any scrap of ancient parchment upon which *his* name has been written cannot fail to interest Christians so long as the Vicar of Christ shall have friends or enemies. The importance of the document before us is greatly enhanced by the fact that it was the very first utterance by the Universal Church on the subject of the prerogatives of the Bishop of Rome. The Nicene Synod was the first of the Ecumenical councils, and was, consequently, the first occasion which offered itself to the Catholic Church of speaking in a corporate and official manner. Hence the historian and the controversialist turn eagerly to learn what the first of councils had to say about the chief of bishops.

Now if we sincerely desire to know what the Council really said, we must first of all discard translations and comments, and allow the canon to speak for itself. The endless controversies to which our canon has given rise would, in great part at least, have been avoided if this course had been pursued. Indeed, one of the main objects of this paper is to convince theological students, by an apt illustration, how necessary it is to study ecclesiastical documents in their authentic source and original dress of language. There is an impression abroad that in this day of elaborate translations there no longer exists a necessity for submitting to the drudgery of acquiring dead languages and poring over barbarous glossaries, and very many prefer the more facile method of transcribing the assertions of their predecessors to the laborious task of hewing their own inferences out of the original text. Now a translation is necessarily a poor substitute for the original; for if it were faithful and perfect in other respects, it must, like a false diamond, be lacking in weight and lustre.² Besides, whoever quotes from a translation quotes at second-hand, for a translation is nothing but the translator's expressed *opinion* of the sense of his text; and,

¹ Nec præter illam petram quam Dominus in fundamento posuit, stabilis erit ulla constructio. Ep. 104.

² What a world of wisdom is condensed into that little phrase of St. Jerome's, *Hebraica Veritas* (the Hebrew Text). And if it be permitted to look at the phrase from a different point of view, how much better it would be if we, spiritual children of Abraham, were as tenacious of the original *Veritas* as were the carnal seed of the Patriarch.

in consequence, is essentially an inference. And then, no matter how adequately the translator may have, himself, seized the meaning of his text, there will still remain room for doubt whether the words he has selected adequately embody that meaning. But what assurance have we that the version we are to rely upon is faithful? Will the fact of its being generally received as such vouch for it? Certainly not. An error, be it ever so common, is an error still; and an erroneous translation is all the more dangerous for having obtained universal currency, because one is the less inclined to suspect it.

Now applying these remarks to the subject we have taken in hand, let us put the question to prominent writers: What said the Council of Nicæa regarding the Roman Pontiff,? 1st. The Protestant historians and controversialists, with a few honorable exceptions, will reply that whereas the Bishop of Rome, from being a simple bishop, like any other, had succeeded, before the date of the Council, in imposing his authority upon the bishops in his vicinity, the Council thought it proper to permit him to retain his usurped dominion; a course which they are free to deplore, since it encouraged the "ambitious Pontiff" to persevere in his fixed design of enthralling the Christian world. Hear Calvin on the subject:

"In regard to the antiquity of the primacy of the Roman See, there is nothing in favor of its establishment more ancient than the decree of the Council of Nice, by which the first place among the Patriarchs is assigned to the Bishop of Rome, and he is enjoined to take care of the suburban churches. While the Council, in dividing between him and the other Patriarchs, assigns the proper limits of each, it certainly does not appoint him head of all, but only one of the chief."¹

2d. Now turn to those Catholic writers of the Darras and Rohrbacher stamp, who seem to think that the office of the historian is

¹ Inst., b. iv., c. 7, Edinburgh version. Dr. Alzog (vol. i., p. 664, Cincinnati edition) must have been temporarily laboring under Calvinistic influence, when he informed his astonished readers that the "precedence of rank and authority possessed by Rome was CONFIRMED by the Council of Nice (Canon VI.)!" Not only is this assertion historically false, but it was resented centuries ago by the Roman Pontiffs. "The Nicene Synod," said Bonifacius I., "did not DARE make any enactment regarding the Bishop of Rome; well aware that no act of man could add glory to him who had received the fulness of power from the mouth of the Lord." "Adeo ut non aliquid super eum AUSA sit constituere, cum videret nihil supra meritum suum posse conferri; omnia denique huic noverat Domini sermone concessa." Ep. ad Episcopos Thessaliæ. Compare Nicolaus I. ad Michaelem. "Si instituta Nicænæ Synodi diligenter inspiciantur, inveniatur profecto quia Romanæ Ecclesiæ nullum eadem Synodus contulit incrementum: sed potius ex ejus forma quod Alexandriæ Ecclesiæ tribueret particulariter, sumpsit exemplum."

to copy bodily the assertions of his predecessors. According to these slashing authors, the Synod declared, *totidem verbis*, that "the primacy has always resided in the Church of Rome (Canon of the Council of Nice). Let the ancient custom, then, be vigorously maintained . . . for so the Roman Bishop orders."¹

To tell the truth, I have less sympathy with the second class of unscrupulous writers than with the first. Protestant writers, when they undertake to combat the Papacy, are struggling "with the sun in their eyes." Their position is obviously disadvantageous and paradoxical, and it is not to be marvelled at if they should grow desperate. But a Catholic writer, who is full certain that Truth and Catholicism are synonyms, ought to make every endeavor to find out the truth, and when he has found it to present it to his readers unvarnished; for every victory gained by our adversaries over the indolent stragglers from our ranks is accounted as a triumph over our sacred cause.

II. Now let us approach this famous document, and translate it as we should a passage from Thucydides:

"Let the ancient usage throughout Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis be strictly adhered to, so that the Bishop of Alexandria shall have jurisdiction over all these; since this is also the custom of the Bishop of Rome. In like manner, as regards Antioch and the other provinces, let each church retain its special privileges."

Confining our attention to the clause ἐπειδὴ . . . τοῦτο σὺνηθές ἐστιν, let us at the outset assure ourselves that our translation faithfully represents the original. The term *συνήθης*, according to Hedricus, denotes *consuetus*, *familiaris*, and is translated by Liddell and Scott, *habitual*, *customary*. The phrase *συνήθης τινι ἐστιν* is equivalent to the well-known Latin expression *familiale* or *consuetum est mihi*: *it is my custom*. It cannot be rendered, *It is the custom of others regarding me*. Hence Hefelé's rendering, "There is a similar custom for the Roman Bishop," is evidently incorrect. Da auch für den römischen Bischof ein gleiches Verhältniss besteht, Conciliengeschichte, vol. i., p. 389, new edition.

In fact, Hefelé was influenced by the old version of Dionysius the Less, who has rendered the clause thus: *Quia et Urbis Romæ Episcopo parilis mos est*. This is unsatisfactory; for there is no equivalent for *parilis* in the Greek text, and there is no equivalent in the Dionysian version for the Greek *τοῦτο*. The earliest Latin version—that which was read in the Council of Chalcedon—is more to the point: *Quoniam et Romano Episcopo hæc est consuetudo*; which coincides with our own. Protestant writers have also rendered the text as we have done, though naturally they strive

¹ Darras, vol. i., p. 387. Compare Rohrbacher (livre xxxi.).

afterwards to blunt the edge of it. Thus Sheppherd¹ translates it: *Since this is also the Roman Bishop's custom.* Neander:² *Since this is the custom also with the Roman Bishop.* Schaff:³ *Since this also is customary with the Bishop of Rome.* We are justified, then, in assuming that our translation is a faithful reproduction of the text;⁴ and may safely make it the basis of our further remarks.

III. After having determined with the greatest possible precision what the Council *said* about the Roman Pontiff, our next step is to investigate the *meaning*, the scope and bearing, of the words of the canon. "Let the ancient usage throughout Egypt, etc., be adhered to, so that the Alexandrian Bishop shall rule these provinces; *because this is also the Roman Bishop's custom.*" Now it is plain that Bonifacius and Nicolaus, as quoted above, were quite correct in affirming that the Synod made no enactment of any kind in regard to the Roman Pontiff. This canon neither grants new privileges to the Apostolic See, nor confirms any existing ones. For some reason or other, the Council did not think it necessary to legislate upon the Bishop of Rome. It strengthened the hands of the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, and of the Exarchs of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace. In Canon VII. it conceded a *Patriarchate of Honor* to the Bishop of the Holy City; but it did not DARE exercise, in any way, a legislative authority over the city of St. Peter.

Hence, Calvin's rhetoric evaporates like dew before the sun. The Council does not "divide between the Roman Pontiff and the other Patriarchs," but adduces the authority of the former as a *reason* for admitting the claims of the latter. But whence did Calvin derive his information about those "suburban churches" which the Pope was "enjoined to take care of?" There is no trace of this in the canon. The wily heresiarch knew well enough that he was not quoting "the decree of the Council of Nice," but Rufinus's corruption of that decree.

Rufinus wrote a History of the Church in continuation of the immortal work of Eusebius, and inserted in it a Latin translation of the Nicene Canons. But his character of rhetorician did not

¹ History of the Church of Rome, p. 63. It is about the only grain of truth I have discovered in his violent diatribe.

² Church History, vol. ii., p. 162.

³ History of the Christian Church, vol. ii., p. 275.

⁴ There is an untranslatable grace and force in the article prefixed to ΠΑΡΑΝ. It breathes the deepest reverence. Observe that the article is not placed before Alexandria or Antioch, nor, as may be seen in the III. Canon of the Second Council, before Constantinople, whilst it invariably occurs before *Rome*. "Trifles light as air" oftentimes carry with them a great weight. Compare the little shibboleths *Our Saviour*, the *Blessed Virgin*, etc., which in the dialect of the modern Ephraimites become *the Saviour*, the *Virgin Mary*, etc.

permit him to give the decrees to his readers in the plain, unambitious style of the good Fathers of the Council. He was fain to embellish them and give them a high-sounding, antithetical form. The result of his lucubration upon our canon is the following sententious effusion: "Et ut apud Alexandriam, et in Urbe Roma vetusta consuetudo servetur, ut vel ille Egypti, vel hic Suburbicarum Ecclesiarum sollicitudinem gerat."¹

Now this "translation" ought to be brushed aside as undeserving of notice, and it is pitiable to see how much time and pains have been wasted by eminent scholars upon the barren task of determining what Rufinus meant by his "suburban churches." What did he mean by his whole translation? Did he understand it himself? As every one knows, Rufinus was the prince of bunglers. He was notoriously ignorant, and just as rash and stubborn as he was unskilful. His knowledge of the Greek was scanty, having been picked up without system or teacher. As for his Latin, the above specimen convinces us that he richly deserved St. Jerome's contemptuous criticisms.² It must be remembered, moreover, that shortly before writing his history he had been excommunicated for heresy by Pope Anastasius. Hence, we cannot expect to be assisted by Rufinus in our investigation of this subject. Let us return to the text.

The kernel of the difficulty is the demonstrative *τοῦτο*, *this*. "*This* is the custom of the Roman Bishop." What does *this* refer to? "Let the Bishop of Alexandria retain his ancient sway over these three provinces, for *this* is also the Roman Bishop's custom." According to Bellarmine and others, *τοῦτο* refers to the Patriarchate of Alexandria, and is to be expounded thus: "Let the Bishop of Alexandria continue to govern these provinces, because this is also the Roman Pontiff's custom; that is, because the Roman Pontiff, prior to any synodical enactment, has repeatedly recognized the Alexandrian Bishop's authority over this tract of country."³

¹ Hist. Eccl., lib. i., c. 6. For the benefit of those readers who may find it an arduous task to follow our sublime author through the upper air, I shall attempt a translation, though in the process much of the Rufinian froth must go to waste. The Synod decrees also (the rhetorician expects his readers to supply this) "that as well at Alexandria as in the city of Rome the ancient custom be preserved, that either the former (probably he means the Bishop of Alexandria) shall bear the solicitude of Egypt, or the latter (most likely the Pope) of the suburban churches."

² The saint has exhausted his copious vocabulary of vituperation upon his unfortunate adversary. He compliments his style as *slovenly, barbarous, unintelligible, solecistic*. "Such is thy skill in the Greek and the Latin, that when thou speakest in Greek the Greeks take thee for a Latin, and when thou speakest Latin, the Latins take thee for a Greek." Apologia adv. Rufinum.

³ Vera expositio est, Alexandrinum debere gubernare illas provincias, quia Romanus Episcopus ita consuevit; idest, quia Romanus Episcopus ante omnem Conciliorum

This exposition is unpalatable to the adversaries of Roman supremacy; hence they offer us a different interpretation. They make *τοῦτο* refer to patriarchates in general and expound the sentence as follows: "Let Alexandria have jurisdiction over these provinces, because the Roman Bishop has also a Patriarchate." "It illustrates the sort of power by referring to a similar power exercised by the Roman prelate in his province."¹

IV. Although this second exposition might strike the reader at first sight as being *possibly* correct, yet I trust I shall be able to prove that it is inadmissible; and that Bellarmine's is the only unexceptionable interpretation.

Let me, at the risk of being tedious, state, first of all, my understanding of the passage. The supremacy of the Bishop of Alexandria had been contested by the Meletian bishops. They had asked him, if not in words at least in facts, upon what warrant he based his claim to rule over and depose his fellow-bishops. If he had a title let him produce it. Now the Alexandrian prelate had no written document of any kind to produce. The Council of Nicæa, therefore, came to his assistance, by decreeing that the Patriarch's² authority must be respected, and that for two reasons: 1st, because it was *ἀρχαία*, *inmemorial, aboriginal*; and 2d, because it was sanctioned by constant recognition on the part of the Roman Pontiff. Two very good reasons.

1st. The first argument in favor of this interpretation is drawn from the grammatical structure of the text. (*a*) Take the pronoun *τοῦτο* and see what it obviously refers to. Surely to this subject in hand, to wit, the ancient privileges and boundaries of the Alexandrian Patriarchate. It seems impossible, without quibbling, to refer the *τοῦτο* to anything else. The only objection which can be urged against this is the *καί*, *also*. What is the use of the *καί* in this interpretation? This objection is readily answered. The *καί* introduces a new and stronger reason why the Patriarch's authority should be respected. "Let the custom prevail, not only because

definitionem consuevit permittere Episcopo Alexandrino regimen Egypti, Libyæ et Pentapolis; sive consuevit per Alexandrinum Episcopum illas provincias gubernare. Bellarmine De Rom. Pont., lib. ii., c. xiii. He says there is no other plausible interpretation.

¹ Shepherd ubi supra. "Since this also is customary with the Bishop of Rome (that is, not in Egypt, but with reference to his own diocese)." This is Schaff's clumsy paraphrase of the clause.

Many Catholic writers of eminence have interpreted the canon in this sense, but for the most part, they were interpreting, not the text, but the Dionysian version; and Dionysius was, no doubt, biased by the *Prisca*, which had adopted the gloss of Rufinus. The *Prisca* may be found in the Ballerini edition of St. Leo's works, vol. iii., p. 498.

² The word *Patriarch* is of later origin, but must serve in default of an equivalent.

it is ancient, but *especially* because it has Roman usage in its favor;" or, "Since even the Roman Bishop constantly recognizes it." (b) The word *συνήθης*, *customary*, is intelligible in our interpretation, but in the alternative it becomes absurd. "It is customary with the Bishop of Rome to recognize the Bishop of Alexandria as Patriarch," is clear and sensible; but, "It is customary with the Bishop of Rome to be a Patriarch," is devoid of sense.

2d. A second argument in support of our interpretation is elicited by considering the logical sequence of the passage. "This is the Roman Bishop's custom," is the Council's *reason* for supporting the Alexandrian claims. If it is a reason, we must reverentially presume that it is a valid one. The ancient fabric of the Patriarchate was tottering; the Nicene Fathers prop it up with this clause, which, therefore, contains a reason strong enough to sustain a Patriarchate. Now imagine Meletius demanding wherefore Lycopolis should be subject to Alexandria? If the Council be made to answer: "Because Tusculum is subject to Rome," would it not appear a "lame and impotent conclusion?" Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis must obey the Bishop of Alexandria; because this (not Egypt, etc., but Campania and the islands) is the Roman Pontiff's custom!¹ Besides, granting that Rome's possessing a Patriarchate were a valid reason why Alexandria also should have one, would it be a sufficient reason why the Alexandrian Patriarchate should extend just so far and no further? If so, then the following rationation must be considered sound: "Let the Alexandrian Bishop have jurisdiction over *three* provinces, because the Bishop of Rome is also a patriarch." Should any one rejoin that the reason why Alexandria happened to rule *three* provinces instead of two or four, was that this was the ancient custom, I answer that *his* reason is different from that of the Council, which tells us that "Alexandria shall rule these *three* because this is the Roman Bishop's custom."

Now take Bellarmine's view of the canon. "Why shall Meletius and all the other bishops of Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis acknowledge the supremacy of the Patriarch?" Because the Bishop of Rome has time and again recognized the authority of the Alexandrian Bishop over these provinces. "Where are the documents to prove this?" asks Meletius. "Documents are not necessary," says the canon, "custom has force of law. Has not the Bishop of Rome, ever since he sent Mark to found churches in Egypt, held the Bishop of Alexandria responsible for purity of faith and strict observance of discipline in that part of the world?"² What

¹ "Since this also is customary with the Bishop of Rome [that is, not in Egypt, but with reference to his own diocese.]"—SCHAFF, quoted above.

² When Pentapolis was devastated by the Sabellian heresy, Dionysius, Bishop of

could Meletius reply to this? If he and the Council admitted the Catholic doctrine of Papal supremacy, his mouth was closed. *Here* was a reason strong enough to sustain, not Alexandria merely, but, "in like manner, Antioch and the other great eparchies;" their authority was sanctioned by the Vicar of Christ. But if we assume that the Bishop of Rome was, in the opinion of the ancients, a simple bishop, like any other, what weight would his recognition of Alexandrian claims then carry with it? None at all. The Meletian would answer, "What care I for the favor or displeasure of a bishop a thousand miles away? What right has the Roman to recognize any one's jurisdiction in Egypt? Antioch is nearer to me than Rome, and so are Carthage and Ephesus; but the bishops of Antioch, and of Carthage, and of Ephesus know very well they have no right to meddle with things in Egypt. After having thrown off the tyrannical yoke of an Egyptian, is it probable that I shall be swayed by the opinion of a Latin?"

3d. We are now led to the threshold of a third argument, which I shall forthwith proceed to develop. The Council was evidently desirous of establishing the Patriarchates on the firmest possible foundation. Hitherto the Bishop of Alexandria or of Antioch,

As one secure
Sat on his throne, upheld by old repute,
Consent, or custom.

But "old repute" can uphold a throne so long as things go smoothly; but if there be no "strength concealed" within, the throne will fall to the ground at the first touch of a skeptical hand. Now, knowing as we do, that, so far as divine right was concerned, the Bishop of Lycopolis was the peer of the Bishop of Alexandria, upon what principle of ecclesiastical law could the latter base his claim to judge and depose the former? In other words, what was the original source of that patriarchal authority which the Alexandrian wielded? Every Catholic must answer that, whereas, *per se*, the bishops are mutually independent within their proper jurisdiction, they, of divine right, have no other superior than the successor of St. Peter, and, in consequence, a bishop who shall claim any legitimate sort of precedence or authority over a fellow-bishop, must of necessity found his pretension upon the expressed or tacit consent of the Roman Pontiff. In the Catholic system, then, "Alex-

Alexandria, exercised his patriarchal authority in extinguishing the evil. He was in consequence accused at Rome by his enemies as having denied the divinity of Christ. He purged himself of the charge, and was commended by the Roman Pontiff for his zeal. This incident, preserved by Athanasius, goes to show that there was a constant flow of intercourse between the two Sees, and explains the *custom* alluded to in the canon.

andria, Antioch, and the other eparchies," were exercising prerogatives which belonged, natively, to the chair of Peter, and we are forced to the conclusion that they and the Council were as sensible of this as we are ourselves. Therefore, the clause in question can bear no other interpretation than this: "Alexandria and the other great Sees must retain their ancient sway because the Roman Pontiff wishes it." Understood in this sense the *ἐπειδή* places the archiepiscopal thrones on the firmest—and indeed the only firm—foundation. Why should we deem the Fathers of Nicaea either less "Roman" than ourselves, or less capable of comprehending their strongest argument in favor of Alexandria? Suppose a parallel case to happen in our own day and country. Suppose that, ages ago, the Roman Pontiff had dispatched to these provinces a missionary with episcopal ordination and unlimited, unwritten jurisdiction. If in course of time the throne on which "as one secure he sat upheld by old repute" should be shaken by an unruly suffragan, what might we suppose would be the ruling of a plenary Council? The Fathers would probably enact: That the authority of the Bishop of Baltimore must be respected; that it was unnecessary to apply to Rome for a formal recognition of his primacy, since the custom of the Roman Pontiff, invariably to address himself to the churches in these provinces through his medium, was an ample justification of his claim.

It may be objected that this argument would have no weight with Protestants. What of that? Are we to abandon our old standard of interpretation, our "Catholic analogy," because, forsooth, we cannot induce "those who are without" to view things from our standpoint? Let our adversaries prove that our interpretation is false; for the burden of proof is upon them.

4th. But we have a fourth argument, of which every historian must feel the force. I refer to the establishment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In my last argument, I took for granted that the only foundation upon which a Patriarchate could legitimately rest was the consent of the Roman Pontiff. This assertion we are able historically to make good, by observing a Patriarchate in process of crystallization.

Shortly after the date of the Nicene Council, the little town of Byzantium was by the genius of Constantine metamorphosed into Constantinople, the New Rome and Mistress of the East. With the magnitude of the city grew the importance and pretensions of its bishop, who now became the emperor's ecclesiastical adviser, the arbiter of bishops, the chief organizer of missionary expeditions, and the president of politico-ecclesiastical assemblies. A dignitary of such importance seemed to the emperor, the senate,

the metropolitan clergy, and the Eastern bishops,¹ to be deserving of the highest honor. Hence the second General Council (A.D. 381), in its third Canon, decreed that "the Bishop of Constantinople should rank in the Church next after the Bishop of Rome," giving as its reason that Constantinople was a new Rome.²

But this canon never obtained the *βεβαιώσεις και συγκαταθέσεις*—the confirmation and consent—of the Roman Bishop, without which even the Byzantine was conscious that his authority was founded on the sand. Hence, in the fourth Council, taking advantage, as St. Leo has remarked, of the prostrate position of the churches of Alexandria and Antioch,³ the Bishop of New Rome, Anatolius, made a desperate attempt to gain a more solid footing for his Patriarchate. Pope Leo, in anticipation of this, had strictly enjoined his legates "not to suffer the Nicene Decree to be violated." The Fathers of the Council, however,—some no doubt for political motives, others because they were given to understand that Leo was not so much opposed to the innovation as his legates would have them believe,—granted the Byzantine the desire of his heart. But now the more serious task remained of inducing the Pope to ratify the decision of the Council. The Council wrote to Leo, so did the Emperor, so did the Patriarch; all begging the same favor, and all acknowledging that the validity of the act depended on his confirmation. "We make known to you furthermore," wrote the Fathers of Chalcedon to the successor of St. Peter, "that we have made still another enactment which we have deemed necessary for the maintenance of good order and discipline, and we are persuaded that your Holiness will approve and *confirm* our decree. . . . We are confident you will shed upon the Church of Constantinople a ray of that Apostolic splendor which you possess, for you have ever cherished this church, and you are not at all niggardly in imparting your riches to your children. . . Vouchsafe then, most Holy and most Blessed Father, to accept what we have done in your name, and in a friendly spirit (*ὡς οἰκεῖα τε καὶ φιλα*). For your legates have made a violent stand against it, desiring, no doubt, that this good deed should proceed, in the first instance, from your provident hand. But we, wishing to gratify the pious Christian emperors, and the illustrious Senate, and the capital of the empire, have judged that

¹ "As to the new honors conferred upon my see by the late Council, let me assure your Holiness that I am not to blame in this matter. A man am I fond of retirement and quiet; from my earliest days content with a lowly station. But my reverend clergy are very eager for the advancement of their Church, and the prelates of the vicinity encourage and abet them." Anatolius to Pope Leo. Opp. S. Leonis, Ep. 13^o.

² Τὸν μὲντοι Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐπίσκοπον ἔχειν τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς μετὰ τοῦ τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπίσκοπον, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν νέαν Ῥώμην.

³ Dioscorus of Alexandria had been deposed, and Maximus of Antioch was a creature of Anatolius.

an Ecumenical Council was the fittest occasion for effecting this measure. Hence we have made bold to confirm the privileges of the afore-mentioned city (θαυρήσαντες ἐκυρώσαμεν) as if your Holiness had taken the initiative, for we know how tenderly you love your children, and we feel that in honoring the child we have honored its parent. . . . We have informed you of everything with a view of proving our sincerity, and of obtaining for our labors your *confirmation and consent*.¹

Anatolius writes to the same purpose: "The holy Synod and I have submitted this canon to your Holiness in order to obtain your assent and confirmation, which I beseech your Holiness not to withhold."²

And in a later epistle he assures the Pope that "the whole efficacy and ratification of the decree had been reserved to the authority of his Holiness."³

We have also two letters of the Emperor Marcian to Pope Leo, in which he acknowledges that the Pope's sanction is absolutely necessary to the validity of the canon.

"Since it has pleased the Synod to grant the Bishop of Constantinople the post of honor next after the Apostolic See, I pray your Holiness to give assent to this arrangement."⁴ And a few months later he writes endeavoring, with evident anxiety, to hurry on the cautious Pontiff.

"I am puzzled beyond measure to know wherefore your Holiness, although fully informed by the bishops assembled at Chalcedon of the proceedings of the Council, has not yet dispatched us *that epistle which must be read in every church, so as to reach the notice of all*. This delay has afforded an opportunity to the evil-disposed to suggest a doubt whether your Holiness would confirm the acts of the Synod. Deign, therefore, to send a letter which shall certify the churches and the faithful that the decrees of the Council have been confirmed by your Holiness. Very laudably, indeed, and with a constancy worthy of the Bishop of the Apostolic See, your Holiness has resisted the attempt which was made to disturb the ancient order of things as established by the canons. But you have, no doubt, been apprised of the active machinations of the enemies of the faith, against whom I have been unwilling to proceed because the Council's exposition of orthodox faith has not yet received your confirmation. I pray your Holiness, therefore, to send us a decretal with all possible dispatch, so that it may become manifest to all that you confirm the Synod of Chalcedon."

St. Leo readily assented to the emperor's request and ratified all the dogmatic decrees of the Council. But he and his successors

¹ Opp. S. Leonis, Ep. 98.

² Ep. 101.

³ Ep. 132.

⁴ Ep. 100.

resolutely condemned this surreptitious canon in favor of New Rome.¹ In consequence the *political* Patriarchate of Constantinople lacked ecclesiastical confirmation; and this 28th canon of Chalcedon was not admitted into the Greek synodical code until the Eastern Church had become thoroughly saturated with Byzantinism.²

Bring this analogy of a Patriarchate *in fieri* to bear upon the subject under discussion, and my former argument returns in a new shape. The Nicene Council desired to *confirm* the Patriarchate of Alexandria. Now the only way of accomplishing this was to show that the Bishop of Rome had "shed a ray of apostolic splendor upon his favored child." Therefore the clause, "Since this is the Roman Bishop's custom," must mean, "Since this is the Roman Bishop's will as expressed by custom."

5th. Another powerful argument in support of our interpretation of this sixth Nicene canon, is that the ancients saw in it a plain and formal acknowledgment by the Fathers of Nicaea of the primacy of the Apostolic See. Indeed, Pope St. Gelasius proclaims it an *invictum et singulare iudicium*. "By what process of reasoning can you persuade yourselves," he writes to the Eastern bishops, "that the rights of the other Sees will be respected, if due reverence be not paid to the supreme See of Blessed Peter,—that See which has ever been the support and bulwark of all sacerdotal dignity, and to which the *unique and irrefragable testimony* of the three hundred and eighteen Fathers acknowledges immemorial veneration."³ Hence, if we believe Gelasius, the Roman Pontiff's name was made use of by the Nicene Fathers to serve as a *support and bulwark* for the privileges enjoyed by "Alexandria, Antioch, and the other eparchies." The Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian also give expression to this widespread sentiment in their celebrated edict on the subject of the primacy of the Apostolic See. The civil power, they argue, must recognize the Bishop of Rome as Head of the Church, 1st, because he is the successor of St. Peter, the Chief of Bishops; 2d, because of the dignity of his city; and 3d, because his supremacy has been confirmed by the sacred council.⁴ Now the "sacred council," so far as we know,

¹ Consensiones episcoporum. . . . in irritum mittimus, et per auctoritatem beati Petri apostoli generali prorsus definitione cassamus.—St. Leo to Pulcheria, Ep. 105.

² There is grave reason to suspect that the Acts of Chalcedon have been tampered with by the schismatical Greeks. But since this cannot be fully demonstrated, there is no use of making the charge. Even as the documents stand, they furnish abundant evidence of the unquestioned supremacy of the Bishops of Rome.

³ "Qua ratione vel consequentia aliis sedibus deferendum est, si primæ Beati Petri sedi antiqua et vetusta reverentia non defertur, per quam omnium sacerdotum dignitas semper est roborata atque firmata, trecentorumque decem et octo Patrum invicto et singulari iudicio vetustissimus iudicatus est honor." Apud Natal. Alexand.

⁴ "Cum igitur sedis apostolicæ primatum sancti Petri meritum, qui princeps est

had no other occasion of introducing the subject of Roman supremacy than this Alexandrian question, and to this sixth canon, therefore, as all admit, the Emperors were alluding. True, it may be objected that the Emperors' argument is based not upon the original text, but on the old Latin version, which contained the famous *additamentum*: "Quod Ecclesia Romana semper habuit Primatum." (The Bishop of Rome has ever been Head of the Church.)¹ It seems quite probable that such was the case, for the edict emanated immediately from the Western Emperor, and at the suggestion of St. Leo. But we cannot suppose, for a moment, that it was the Pope, or any of his clergy, who drew up the document, because the Roman Church would have vehemently denied that any synod did or could *confirm* its primacy. A score of years before, Bonifacius, in the epistle already quoted from, had expressed the views of the Apostolic See upon the attitude of the Nicene Council regarding the prerogatives of the Roman Pontiff. "Non aliquid super eum *ausa* est constituere." It follows, that the Latin version had passed the critical examination of the imperial lawyers, who would have been quick to detect an interpolation in the document, had there been one. But they took the *additamentum* for what it really was,—a title; and their understanding of the clause, *Episcopo Romano hæc est consuetudo*, was the same as the original translator's, the same as Pope Gelasius's, the same as Bellarmine's. It has, of course, been insinuated by hostile

episcopalis coronæ, et Romanæ dignitas civitatis, sacræ etiam synodi firmiter auctoritas," etc. Opp. S. Leonis, Ballerini, ep. xi.

¹ This variation is found in all the ante-Dionysian versions, as may be seen by consulting the Ballerini-Quesnel edition of St. Leo's works, vol. 3. Were this the proper place, it would be an instructive and amusing occupation to trace the process of corruption which our canon underwent as it passed through the hands of the successive editors. The *additamentum* was, doubtless, in the first instance, the title selected by the earliest Roman translator. Next, in the *Antiquissima*, the *Quod* was dropped. Then the following editors, thinking it necessary that each canon should have an appropriate title, and believing that the sixth had none, added the words: "De Primatu Ecclesiæ Romanæ." The editor of the *Prisca*, to make confusion worse confused, introduced the Rufinian jargon into the text, making the canon read thus: "De Primatu Ecclesiæ Romanæ vel aliarum civitatum Episcopis. Antiqui moris est ut urbis Romæ episcopus habeat principatum, ut suburbicaria loca, et omnem provinciam suam, sollicitudine gubernet. Quæ vero apud Aegyptum sunt, Alexandria episcopus omnium habeat sollicitudinem," etc. It is important to remember that the only version received by, or emanating from, the Roman Church, was that read by the Pope's legate at Chalcedon. The others were executed without Roman co-operation, by irresponsible parties in various parts of the West. These interpolations, therefore, can with no more semblance of justice be fathered upon the Roman Pontiffs,—as several Protestant writers have done,—than they can be upon the Nicene Council, as some Catholic authors have sought to do. To the Catholic who expresses indignation at Calvin's attempt to substitute Rufinus for the Council, and to the Protestant who is equally indignant at what I have termed the Darras-Rohrbacher substitution of a Latin version for the original canon, I can heartily exclaim, *Plus ego!*

writers, though somewhat timorously, that the Latin variation was a deliberate interpolation by the Romans with a view of extolling their chief; nay, some have even laid the blame of it upon the "ambitious Popes" themselves. I do not propose to enter largely into the uninvestigable question of determining the *intentions* of people who lived and died ages ago. The Bishops of Rome have ever been distinguished for scrupulous attention to the genuineness of their documents. From the earliest ages, the fact of a text proceeding *ex scriniis Ecclesiæ Romanæ*, was the best witness to its accuracy. The version of our canon which was read by Parchasinus at Chalcedon, is a faithful reproduction of the original. The words *Quod, Romana*, etc., cannot be called an interpolation, because they were not *inter*; they were *ante*; which is equivalent to saying, they were the title prefixed to the canon in the Roman Codex.¹

Now, therefore, the inference drawn from the text by the Latin translator was, that it acknowledged the primacy of the Apostolic See. This is all that we can expect to find in this title, and it is all that we seek to find in it. I have no doubt but the author of the translation considered himself justified in giving the canons what he judged to be the most appropriate headings, for the original had none. And what more felicitous heading than this could a Latin have selected? It was pithy and contained the very soul of the decree. "Let Alexandria, Antioch, and the other great Sees retain their privileges, because this is the Roman Bishop's custom." To a Latin, the particular privileges of the Eastern churches were a matter of slight moment. The only interesting feature of the canon to him, was that the Bishop of Rome's authority had been made the common basis and foundation of the various prerogatives of the individual churches. Is it not a strong confirmation of our own interpretation to know that it coincides with that of the contemporaries of the Council?

Dr. Schaff contends that this "interpolation" was rejected by the Greeks at Chalcedon. The only foundation for this assertion is that in the acts of the IVth Council, it is stated that upon the legate's reading the Nicene Canon as it stood in his codex, Constantine, the Greek secretary, read the same canon without the interpolation from the codex preserved in Constantinople. This

¹ "Trecentorum decem et octo Patrum Canon sextus; Quod Ecclesia Romana semper habuit Primatum; Teneat autem et Aegyptus, ut Episcopus Alexandriæ omnium habeat potestatem, quoniam et Romano Episcopo hæc est consuetudo. Similiter autem," etc., ap. Nat. Alex., Sæc. iv., Prop. ii., Dissert. xx. The canon proper begins manifestly with *Teneat*. *Aegyptus* probably represented to a Latin mind that large extent of territory which the Orientals divided into Egypt proper, Libya and Cyrenaica.

is a feeble basis to build such an argument upon. For, first, Baluzius, Ballerini, and Hefelé contend that this repetition is not to be found in the manuscripts prior to Photius. But, secondly, if Constantine had read the canon again, for the grave purpose of denouncing a Roman forgery, or of resisting Roman encroachments, he would not have contented himself with a quiet re-reading of the canon. If, therefore, he read it at all, it must have been for the sake of preserving the verbal accuracy of the decree, which cannot but have suffered by the process of a double translation, from Greek into Latin, and from the Latin again into the Greek. Indeed this incident of the Council of Chalcedon does but strengthen our argument; for we now may add that the Greeks themselves admitted that the canon of Nicaea acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. The question then before the Fathers was whether Constantinople should have a Patriarchate. The Pope's legate maintained that the Nicene Canon forbade any change to be made in the relative standing of the churches. The clergy of Constantinople adduced the III^d Canon of the Second Council, which conceded to their master the post of honor next after the Bishop of Rome. "After the debate," Dr. Schaff tells us, "the imperial commissioners thus summed up the result: From the whole discussion, and from what has been brought forward on either side, we acknowledge that the primacy over all (*πρὸ πάντων τὰ πρωτεία*), and the most eminent rank (*καὶ τὴν ἐξάιρητον τιμὴν*) are to continue with the Archbishop of old Rome; but that also the Archbishop of New Rome should enjoy the same precedence of honor (*τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς*)."

I should be happy to see Dr. Schaff make good his point against Hefelé, as it would add new strength to my statement that the ancients understood this sixth Nicene canon to be a clear acknowledgment of the primacy of the Apostolic See.

V. These five arguments—drawn respectively from the grammatical structure of the sentence, from the logical sequence of ideas, from Catholic analogy, from comparison with the process of formation of the Byzantine Patriarchate, and from the authority of the ancients—seem to me an overwhelmingly abundant confirmation of our understanding of the canon before us. True, a very formidable array of mighty names can be marshalled against us; but the number of these will be decimated by considering how few of the eminent authors who have interpreted the canon in a different sense from ours had consulted the original text. We are not inquiring in this paper whether our interpretation be the most obvious one on the basis of the Dionysian version. We started out with asserting the right of investigating the document for ourselves, which, surely, is the most direct method of ascertaining the truth. With Dionysius we are not concerned. His version may

have represented to himself the idea which we have extracted from the Greek ; in fact, Bellarmine and Baronius have interpreted his translation as we have interpreted the original. But, as was stated at the outset, not every translator who has seized the true sense of his text embodies that sense clearly in the words he selects. This has probably been the misfortune of Dionysius in the present instance.

As an appendix to our discussion, I beg leave to suggest to those who still cling to the idea that in the clause, "Since this is also the Roman Bishop's custom," the Council meant, "Since it is also the Roman Bishop's custom to be a Patriarch," that there is a grave difficulty inherent in this interpretation. To be frank, I do not believe that, in the age of the Nicene Council, the Pope was a Patriarch. When was his patriarchate founded? What were its boundaries? What special prerogatives did the Pope claim or exercise in virtue of this adventitious dignity? The chief office of the ancient patriarchs was to ordain, judge, and depose bishops and metropolitans, and to convoke and preside over synods. The Bishop of Alexandria had been, from time immemorial, every inch a patriarch throughout his vast domain. The Bishop of Antioch enjoyed a similar authority throughout the great diocese of Oriens. Their jurisdiction was *immediate* and *ordinary*, and there is no difficulty in defining its nature and the limits within which it was exercised. If, therefore, the Council had "illustrated the sort of power," which it accorded to the Bishop of Alexandria, "by referring to a similar power exercised by the" Bishop of Antioch, then the term of comparison would be clearly intelligible ; because both were patriarchs, with pretty much the same sort of power and the same extent of territory. But who has ever defined satisfactorily the limits and nature of Rome's patriarchal sway? Protestant writers have circumscribed this "Roman Patriarchate," some within the radius of a hundred miles, others within the confines of the urban vicariate.¹ Catholic writers are more generous, and make the "Patriarch of Rome" a donation of the entire Western World. But, on both sides, there is difficulty ; for the Protestants have to explain how it is we find the Pope exercising great authority beyond the boundaries in which they have hemmed him ; whilst the Catholics have to explain how it is that the Roman Pontiffs are not found to have ordained Bishops in Milan, or presided over synods in Carthage. In both cases the patriarchal robes they have made for the Pope do not fit him ; the first is entirely too small, the second too large. And as neither party will abandon its unproved assumption, that the Pope was, in the technical sense of the

¹ Southern and Central Italy and the adjacent islands.

word, a patriarch, the Protestants have to fall back upon the easy doctrine of Papal aggression, and the Catholic controversialists are obliged to contend that "the Pope had authority over the whole West, but did not exercise it equally in all places." Surely the Pope had authority over East and West, as Head of the Church; but when we ask what particular part of the Church he exercised that authority, in immediately performing in person the routine work, it will not do to make distinctions between the having, and the exercising, of authority. The Egyptian Bishops at Chalcedon protested that "nothing could be done by a Bishop of their country without the consent of the Patriarch of Alexandria." Can anything similar to this be said of the early Western Church? Not by any means. The various provinces of Europe and Africa were governed by their bishops and metropolitans, and whenever the Pope stepped in it was as the successor of St. Peter, "to whom the care of the whole vineyard had been intrusted." The notion, then, that the Bishops of Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, like Jupiter and his two brothers, had divided the world among them, was not conceived at that early day, but was the offspring of schismatical brains in Constantinople. The Patriarchates did not enter into the original constitution of the Church, which existed before them, and has survived them. That interpretation of our canon, therefore, which is adopted generally by Protestants and admitted by several Catholic writers, is founded in error. The Council cannot have illustrated the powers confirmed to the Patriarch of Alexandria by referring to a similar exercise of power by the "Roman Patriarch," because this latter personage had no existence. Whatever powers the Bishop of Rome exercised beyond the narrow boundaries of his little province—which certainly did not constitute a patriarchate—he exercised in virtue of his "primacy over all." It ought not to be overlooked, moreover, that the Popes intervened more frequently in the East than they did in the West, because in that turbulent quarter of the globe it more frequently happened that knots were to be cut worthy of the Vicar of Christ. But whenever the emergency called for Papal intervention, the Roman Pontiffs did not pause to consider in what patriarchate their authority was needed. A fuller elucidation of this point is foreign to our present purpose.

I hope that my readers will not consider that my investigation of this subject has been excessively minute. Should they be inclined to think so, let them take up any of the heterodox historians who have treated of Papal supremacy, and see how prominently this Nicene Canon figures in their pet theory of the gradual aggrandizement of the Bishop of Rome. To that theory it is essential to assume that at the epoch of the Council of Nicaea the au-

thority of the Roman Pontiff was circumscribed by very narrow limits. Unless Protestants make good this assertion, no force of rhetoric can avail to establish their system.

Never mind, then, their voluminous rhetoric; shake this one column and their oratorical edifice will tumble upon their heads. When the Bishop of Rome first met the assembled Universal Church, was he considered a "Bishop like any other?" Was he a metropolitan "enjoined to take care of suburban churches?" or a patriarch with "proper limits assigned" him by an unsuspecting council? If I have been even moderately successful in my efforts, I have demonstrated that the Vicar of Christ at his first emerging from the gloomy atmosphere of the Catacombs into the free open sunlight, had already attained the full measure of his greatness.

THE LAWS OF THE CHURCH WITH REGARD TO SECRET SOCIETIES.

WHAT laws has the Church enacted against secret societies? Why does she inflict so severe penalties on their members? What societies incur her condemnation? These are the questions which it is proposed briefly to answer in this article, guided by the best authorities on the subject.

I.

First, then, *what laws has the Church enacted against secret societies?* As far back as 1738 Pope Clement XII. excommunicated the Freemasons: this excommunication was renewed in 1751 by Benedict XIV., in 1821 by Pius VII., and in 1826 by Leo XII. But the weightiest authority on the subject is the Papal Constitution "*Apostolicæ Sedis*," promulgated by His Holiness Pius IX. on October 12th, A.D. 1869. By this most important document the Supreme Pontiff, just when the Vatican Council began its labors, proclaimed to the Catholic world the censures, "*latæ sententiæ*," which were to remain in vigor, and the exact limits assigned to each, while he abolished by the same Constitution all former censures not therein renewed. Of the excommunications which are there stated as remaining in force, there are four classes. Of the first the absolution is in a *special manner* reserved to the Supreme Pontiff; of the second class, absolution is *usually* reserved to the same; of the third class, it is reserved to the bishops; and of the fourth, absolution is not reserved, but allowed to every ordinary

confessor. Now among those of the second class, *i. e.*, among those usually reserved to the Pope, and therefore considered very weighty, the fourth case regards the present subject. It states that all those are *ipso facto* excommunicated "who become members of the Masonic Lodges or of the Carbonari, or of other societies of the same kind, which openly or secretly plot against the Church or against legitimate powers; and likewise all who in any way show favor to such societies; and all those who do not denounce their secret chiefs or leaders until they shall have denounced them."

The evils, then, which the members of the condemned societies incur, as seen from this last document in particular, may be reduced to three heads.

1. *They render themselves guilty of a grievous mortal sin*, thereby forfeiting their right to heaven, as Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; and this although they should see no evil in said societies, provided they know the prohibition of the Church. For the sin is incurred by disobeying the laws of the Church in a grievous matter. It is the Pope's right and duty to feed the lambs and the sheep of Christ, to lead them into wholesome pastures, and to keep them away from poisonous fields. Whenever the Church through her Supreme Pastor threatens a grievous censure against those who pursue any certain course, she thereby most solemnly forbids that course: to disobey her is to disobey Christ, who has said to her: "He who hears you, hears Me; and he who despiseth you, despiseth Me." And this Pope Leo XII. declared when he said: "Be convinced that no one can be a member of those societies without making himself guilty of a most grievous crime." *Quin gravissimi flagitii reus sit.* When a power constituted by Almighty God decides a point it is not for inferiors to judge whether the decision be right or wrong. What is the use of having a teaching body on earth if every one is to be his own judge after all? This spirit of private judgment is the very principle of Protestantism.

2. *They incur excommunication, i. e.*, over and above the grievous sin of disobedience, the members of the condemned societies incur as a penalty the heaviest censure that the Church can inflict on any one by the power granted her by Christ: "What you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven." She separates such rebellious children from her communion, and thereby from all participation in the spiritual blessings of which she is the dispenser through the sacred blood of Christ, and through his commission to his Church: "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you." "And behold, I am with you even to the consummation of the world." The excommunicated Catholic is entirely deprived of all the Sacraments as long as his excommunication lasts; he has no share whatever

in the public prayers and sacrifices which the Church in union with Christ is ever offering up for all her children; he is disowned by her and he is no longer her child; she has no blessings for him in life, and if he die in that state she has no Christian burial for him after death; she offers no prayers for the repose of his poor soul. He has knowingly and willingly separated himself from her communion, and he must bear the consequences. Should he have become a member without knowing these consequences, the only way he can avoid these great evils is to withdraw at once from the condemned societies as soon as he becomes aware of these penalties.

3. *This excommunication is usually reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, i. e.,* one who has incurred this excommunication, even when he repents, when he severs all connection with the condemned societies, and humbly applies for absolution, cannot be absolved by an ordinary confessor, but only by the Pope or by one who has been delegated by the Pope for that purpose. We must add, however, that in this missionary country our bishops and priests possess more powers in such matters than in Catholic lands; and that when a sinner is in danger of death any priest in any country can absolve him from all his sins, notwithstanding the excommunication. For the Church is a merciful mother, and does not wish any one to die without hope. Such absolution, however, "by any priest," supposes that no recourse can be had to the Pope or to one delegated by him in this matter; and that the excommunicated person, if he should recover, shall afterwards be duly absolved from his excommunication by one authorized to absolve him from it.

We feel convinced that on none of the points so far stated is there any difference of opinion among the teachers of the Church. A question was raised whether those could be absolved from sin who had become Freemasons, if they repented of having taken the forbidden oath, but still retained an outward semblance of membership. This question was set at rest by an answer from the Holy Office at Rome, which decided that such persons could not be absolved while maintaining this semblance of membership.

II.

We will next consider *the reasons why Holy Church pronounces so severe a sentence* against such societies. Many Catholics care not to ask this question. It is enough for them to learn that the Church has pronounced on any subject; they know that the reasons must be supremely good, since rulers humanly so prudent, and enlightened by a higher wisdom, have so determined. Still there are not wanting motives for examining this point, *v. g.*, that we may be

able to give a clear answer to outsiders, who may ask us why we cannot unite with them in societies which appear to them harmless enough. But there is one motive for examining this matter, to which we desire to call special attention. It is this: by understanding the various reasons why the Church prohibits certain societies, we shall be warned against the various dangers connected with them; and we shall understand that if there are some associations which are not directly condemned, these may, however, be full of dangers, as involving or leading to some of the evils which belong to the worst kinds of societies. In examining these reasons we must bear in mind that the Church, in matters of such importance, is guided by considerations of the general and highest good. Her first duty is to look to the good of souls, the next to the temporal peace and happiness of civil society at large. The question is not with her, whether in some places some individuals may make a few dollars by joining a certain society, or thereby leave a small fund for wife and children. Lower advantages must be sacrificed for higher, private for public good. How, then, can she tolerate for a moment societies which are ever trying to thwart her twofold mission of glory to God and peace to men, of the salvation of souls and the highest good of civil society? How can she tolerate those who strive to gain such control over her children as to alienate them from herself, and arm them against the mother that bore them? *Her first reason* then is, that she has learned for certain, by long and bitter experience, *the evil purposes of the societies* which she condemns. Many may be ignorant of these purposes, but she is not. She has carefully and thoroughly examined the matter; she has acted with that slowness for which Rome is proverbial. We of course believe her on her word, and besides the proofs of such wicked motives are conspicuous enough to any one that has studied the history of modern European revolutions, even if the Church had not so pronounced. Freemasonry is a powerful association, which boasts to be one and undivided. It is a tree whose branches extend into all Christian lands, and which combines everywhere all the powers that are arraigned against the Catholic Church. There was a time when its aims were more hidden, and there are lands now where all evil purposes are disavowed by most of its members, many of whom are no doubt upright men. But the Church well knows, and every careful reader of history readily sees, that the great war of opposition to Catholicity, and even to Christian civilization, which has been growing more and more fierce and general during the last generation, has constantly been promoted, if not originated, by the action of the Masonic lodges, the Carbonari, and other secret societies of like purposes and similar organization. Every one knows what the Carbonari and Freemasons have done

in Italy within our own lifetime. They have stripped the Holy Father of all his temporal dominions, they have imprisoned him in his palace, they have forced the clergy to enter the army, they have striven to make vocations to the priesthood impossible by preventing young men from entering the seminaries and as novitiates of religious bodies, they have closed many religious houses and expelled the inmates, they have desecrated churches and stolen the ecclesiastical revenues.

In Germany the war has been bitter unto imprisonment and death in chains, but its worst feature has been the expulsion of religious teachers from the land, and the handing over of the children to irreligious and infidel educators. What had the poor Sisters of Charity done to deserve this treatment? Evidently the blow was not aimed at them, but at the Catholic Church, of which they embody the spirit. Even a law against religious as such would have been too unpopular with the masses, therefore the leaders of the secret plot called it a law against the Jesuits and kindred bodies, and as the Jesuits are the universal scapegoats the ruse was successful.

In France the war just now is as fierce as possible; all the evils that have been brought on Germany and Italy are there aimed at, and the Freemasons come boldly and openly to the front in the army of irreligion, hatred of the Church and of God. They have long acted more fearlessly in France than in other lands. During the terrible reign of the Commune in Paris the Freemasons as such openly planted their banners on the walls of Paris for the avowed protection, not of France against Prussia, but of Communism against the party of order. On May 2d, 1871, between three thousand and four thousand Freemasons met in the Place de la Concorde, and resolved that "the banners of the brotherhood should remain on the ramparts, and that the Masons should march with the National Guards to their respective quarters for the protection of the Commune." This was the work, it must be noticed, of the Central Lodge of France, not of some obscure branch of the Masonic body. On May 3d the dispatches announced from Dieppe: "The Freemasons here, in conjunction with those of Rouen, have voted their full adhesion to the address of the Central Lodge in Paris." The Freemasons are in power now; they have recalled the Communists from exile, those same men who had promoted the abominations of the Commune, the burning of Paris, and the shooting of its noble bishop, with those of his clergy, and irreproachable laymen, who had the happiness of sharing his martyrdom. And should the Church allow her children to fight under the standard of Freemasonry, and glory in the name, and wear the insignia of the troops marshalled in so many lands against her? And can she

stand by listlessly, when she hears the leaders of those sects lay down a new gospel for their followers in direct opposition to the Gospel of Jesus Christ? Listen to some of its teachings: here is a resolution of the Masonic Council of Naples some ten years ago: "Considering that the idea of *God* is the source and support of all despotism and of all iniquity, the freethinkers of Paris pledge themselves to the prompt and radical abolition of Catholicity, and by every means to procure its utter destruction." The Freemasons of other lands were represented in that general council. F. Lafargue, at the Council of Liege, in Belgium, uttered this war-cry: "War against God, this is progress!" F. Jules Ferry, the present Minister of Public Instruction in France, describes Catholicity as "the grand army of human folly."

In England and the United States most Masons would of course disown such sentiments; we do not question their honesty, but the Church has seen enough of the fruits of Masonry to judge the whole tree and to guard her children against it. Placed here by her Divine Founder to direct the consciences of His followers, she points out the forbidden tree, and says, "On the day you will eat of it you shall die the death" of the soul, losing the life of grace. If the tree here had never borne evil fruit, the presumption would still be against it; for the very name and the identity of organization would suggest further identity. But have not the lodges here inserted in their reports the achievements of their brother Masons in other lands, even those of a very unchristian character, as triumphs of their sect? We know they have; and we could prove it, if it were at all seriously questioned, whether the Masonic lodges here, as a rule, sympathize with the Masonic lodges throughout the world, and even explicitly fraternize with them. Besides, must we believe them on their word when they speak of their harmless intentions? Are they not bound to secrecy? If they had evil intentions would they tell us of them? Still we will grant that there are among them here and in England men so honest that if they knew their own lodges aimed to destroy Christianity they would at once withdraw from them. Whether they would be so determined if only Catholicity were plotted against we do not know. But this is not the question. The lodges here are found in company with those who aim at great evil; they are like men caught in the company of conspirators; the presumption is unfavorable, and they must clear themselves. As long as they do not, they cannot claim that the Church should make an exception in their favor. But is not the spirit of Masonry one throughout the world? But a few weeks ago a prominent Mason and Orientalist wrote: "Western Masonry borrowed from the Arabic its spirit and form, changing only what was necessary to localize the

institution in Christian countries. Some parts of the system have been entirely Christianized, to the very great damage of Masonry. The two systems are not parallel nor harmonious. They rest on very different bases in the hearts and minds of men, and as the Christian system is introduced true Masonry is excluded. The Masonic institution is altogether different from that sacerdotal society of the Nile, whose supreme ideal was a theological God, in that the supreme ideal of Masonry is *humanity*."—*Brooklyn Cath. Rev.*, Feb. 7th, 1880.

The second reason why the Church condemns all such societies is in the *oath of secrecy* which their members swear. This oath may assume various forms, but it will generally be liable to one or all of the following objections: (*a.*) It is wrong to promise, whether under oath or not, to do things which are not yet known, as when one is made to swear that he will execute orders of which he does not yet know the nature; and it is of course worse still to promise it under oath. This requires no proof; and, therefore, though an important objection to the oaths of some secret societies, it will not be further developed by us. It is no answer to say that religious promise obedience, for they know the nature of what shall be required of them; whereas the secret societies professedly withhold their secrets till after the oath.

(*b.*) It is never allowed to promise entire secrecy, *i. e.*, to pledge oneself to keep anything secret from those who have authority to require the revelation. Now the oath of most secret societies binds the members to such absolute secrecy. Hence Lord Plunket says: "I consider an association bound by a secret oath to be extremely dangerous on the principles of common law; inasmuch as they subtract from the state, and interpose between him and his allegiance to the king." For *king* substitute *sovereign power*, and the same reason holds for all countries, be they republican or otherwise. The Catholic has besides conscientious obligations of subjection to his Church, whether in the confessional or before his priest or bishop; and he cannot promise to hide what it may become his duty to make known. The following is the oath of Masonry, as copied from the manual of the English lodges, and it is certainly liable to this objection and to several others. The candidate kneels, and placing his right hand on the Old Testament, and with his left supporting one point of the compasses to his naked breast, he says in presence of the Worshipful Master:

"I, N. or M., in the presence of the Great Architect of the Universe, . . . do hereby and hereon most solemnly and sincerely swear that I will always hale (*sic*), conceal, and never reveal any part or parts, point or points, of the secrets and mysteries of or belonging to Masons; what have been, shall now, or may here-

after be communicated to me, . . . on no less a penalty, on the violation of any of them, than to have my throat cut across, my tongue torn out by the root. . . . So help me God!"

No man can take that oath without refusing the Church and the civil government what either may have a right to learn, *v. g.*, when he is summoned as a witness before a lawful tribunal, sacred or profane. Besides, pray, gentlemen of the fraternity, who is to cut the throat across? Where does reason or revelation teach that God will do it? Does not the appointing of a special penalty imply an intention to inflict it? There are many rumors afloat and some stubborn facts, *v. g.*, the murder of Mr. Morgan, in the State of New York, which assign terrible vindictiveness to the lodges against all violators of the terrible oath. The words quoted seem to bear such a meaning. If not, what *do* they mean? But of course you cannot tell us, it is part of the sworn secret, and you do not want to have your throats cut across. Perhaps you say the whole oath is a mockery. We have no doubt that with very many persons it is a mere mockery; but that too is wrong.

(c.) This is a *third objection* to such oaths: no one can lawfully take an oath in jest, nor for a trifle. "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Is the dreadful oath we have just quoted but a mockery, a play? If it is, it looks like the play of a lower world. And is the Prince of Wales, *v. g.*, the future head of the English Church, the present Grand Master of the Masons in England, to lead in such sacrilegious profanation? It is often said, and it appears to us the most plausible explanation, that such men as the Prince of Wales are but figure-heads to give outward respectability to the "brotherhood," that they are not acquainted with any bad designs, but know of only philanthropy and display; that many other good men are received to get money and influence through them, while they see nothing in Masonry but self-interest or amusement, or even a sort of respectable worship.

(d.) There is a strong presumption that a secret oath will hide some mischief or other. Truth and honesty love the light; falsehood and crime seek darkness. If all the aims and all the means are noble and pure, especially in a free country as ours is, what need is there of secrecy? Is it to create a monopoly, and to give occupation only to members of cliques and parties? If so, these societies are the bane of free and fair competition, and the sworn enemies of the man who depends on his honest labor. Is a man in a free country to be excluded from a position because his conscience does not allow him to join certain associations?

The third reason, which makes the Catholic Church condemn all such societies, is one which applies in a special manner to these

United States, though it extends through the world, as it is the *life and soul* of Masonry in particular. It is namely, the spirit of *indifferentism*, and as such *opposition to all dogmatic Christianity*. Humanitarianism is extolled, and any definite religious teaching is thrust into the background. Christ has said: "Go and baptize all nations, *teaching them* to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." "He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who believeth not shall be condemned." And St. Paul said: "If an angel from heaven should preach another gospel, let him be anathema." Masonry not only labors persistently here as elsewhere to pull down all difference of belief among Christian sects; but it puts Mohammedanism and Buddhism and all *isms* exactly on the same level with Christianity. It extols humanitarianism, for it must hold up some *idol*, but it does not rest the love of man on the love of God; the earthly good of man is the *summum bonum*, and regard for God is a means to that end, where it is respected at all. Thus the "Official Proceedings of the M. W. Grand Lodge of Missouri, for 1877," says, on p. 89, that Masonry requires belief in God "and it does so on the ground that to one who has no belief in God conscience is an idle term, having no fixed standard, and no boundary but such as the individual himself may fix." This is *the* reason why it favors belief in God, at least in the United States, and condemns the action of the Masonic body in France, which wishes to strike out belief in God from its Constitution. But besides this belief in God and consequently in the immortality of the soul, as means to obtain the *summum bonum*, the exaltation of human nature here below, Freemasonry favors and inculcates the broadest indifferentism. There are various ways of inculcating indifferentism. The Missouri report, lately referred to, quotes, on page 88, the following words of the first English Masonic constitution, which words, it says, are still regarded as the first principles of the craft.

"Though in ancient times Masons were charged in every country to be of the religion of that country or nation, *whatever it was*, yet it is now thought more expedient only to obtain that religion in which all men agree, leaving their particular opinions to themselves."

This is the indifferentism which is the *first principle of the craft*, and which the Church must condemn, and every one that believes in dogmatic Christianity must do the same. This principle the Masons carry into universal practice. Hence they everywhere favor, and in many lands have evidently brought about, the total severance of religion and education, in Italy, Germany, Belgium, etc., and now they are trying to do the same in France, not accidentally, but in virtue of their spirit, which everywhere is in direct

antagonism to the Catholic Church. Therefore the Church considers them as working essentially, by their very nature, against herself, and wherever the state has sided with the Church, against the state. Hence the late contests in Italy, etc., so professedly Masonic.

It will be noticed that we have applied most of our objections to the Freemasons, as being outwardly the most respectable and the most widely spread, and as being the first who provoked the condemnation of the Church; but the evils complained of exist in most other secret societies in a large measure, in particular this worship of humanity, this latent pantheism, which makes earthly happiness the *summum bonum*, and humanity its God. Of course the Church loves mankind, and labors for its true happiness, viz., eternal union with Christ, who died for man; but indifferentism or humanitarianism severs man from Christ and from all supernatural aspirations. The Church and indifferentism are the two armies of Christ and Antichrist. The Protestant sects are but pasteboard ramparts scattered here and there along the battlefield. Masonry laughs at them, it never fights against them. But the Vatican is the stronghold it unceasingly attacks, as the great opponent of indifferentism, the only citadel of dogmatic Christianity. Indifferentism calls itself modern progress, and its enemy Jesuitism, clericalism, ultramontaniam, all synonyms with true Christianity. Many *civil* reasons might be mentioned why secret societies should be discountenanced, as productive of great temporal evils. Those who wish to study this view of the subject more fully will do well to read *Adams's Letters on Masonry*. But there are two points to which we wish to call attention on this occasion. First. In the United States we have had enough of secret *rings*; we want no more of them; we see already clearly enough that such associations can do much for evil when it becomes their interest to do it. What produced the gigantic fraud of the Credit Mobilier but a secret ring or society?—call it what you will. What was the Whiskey Ring but a secret society on a small scale? Secondly. Have not secret societies often much to do with screening the guilty from justice, and thus multiplying crime at a most fearful rate? Some Freemasons say: We first try a brother in our lodge, and if we find him guilty we abandon him to his fate; if innocent, we shield him. But who has constituted them the judges of the land? This *imperium in imperio* is radically wrong, and directly against the idea of government.

III.

We must lastly consider what societies are condemned by the Church. And here we must distinguish those which are condemned so as to

incur all the penalties spoken of in our first part, and those which do not exactly come under the ban, but still are reprobated by her as evil or dangerous and to be avoided. The *first class* can best be made known by examining the very words of the bull "Apostolicæ Sedis," which we quoted above. Those are therein excommunicated "*who become members of the Masonic lodges (Sectæ Masonicæ), or of the Carbonari, or of other societies of the same kind, which openly or secretly plot against the Church or against legitimate powers; likewise all who in any way show favor to those same societies (favorem qualemcumque præstantes), and all those who do not denounce their secret chiefs or leaders, till they have denounced them.*"

Therefore, 1st. *All Freemasons* are excommunicated, no matter in what land they live, or to what lodge they belong; even though they may not be aware of any evil in the body which they have joined. The standard of Masonry is planted over the camp of opposition to the Church. No man can fight under two opposing standards, as "no man can serve two masters," God and Belial. It is supposed, however, that the members know the law of the Church, and the penalty or censure attached to its violation.

2d. The *Carbonari* are also explicitly condemned; they are but a particular form of Masonry.

3d. *All members of other societies of the same kind (ejusdem generis).* The Church does not give us their names explicitly, but they are to be known by their being of the same kind as the societies named. Now societies are specified by their object, *i. e.*, by the work they are instituted to perform. Thus, a society is a religious, a benevolent, a temperance society, as its object or work is to practice religion, benevolence, temperance. And what *kind* is to be so understood in this case the bull clearly enough indicates by the words following: "*Which openly or secretly plots against the Church or against legitimate powers.*" In fact, this plotting constitutes the *essence* of the societies excommunicated in this definitive sentence. The oath of secrecy is not essential; *openly or secretly*, says the document. This reasoning of ours is put beyond all question by an order issued by Pius IX., in 1865, to the Cardinal prefect of the Propaganda, instructing him to call the attention of some of the bishops in the United States to a decree of the Roman tribunal of the Inquisition, issued in 1846, which says: "*The secret societies, of which there is question in the Pontifical Constitutions, are understood to be all those which aim at anything against the Church, or against the government, whether they require from their members an oath to keep a secret or not.*"

But it is not necessary that the societies openly acknowledge their illicit aim; it is enough that the aim exists to incur the excommunication, even though the members protest that such aim

is quite foreign to their intention. Thus, the Acts of the last Plenary Council of Baltimore, held in 1866, contain this statement, viz., that when, in 1850, the Archbishop of Philadelphia, Most Rev. F. P. Kenrick, consulted the Holy See about Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, and other societies of the kind, proposing the doubt in these words: "Whether those societies are to be held as forbidden which profess that they do not plot against religion or the civil state, though they enter into a secret league confirmed by oath, or otherwise bind themselves to secrecy?" The Sacred Congregation answered that "*these were comprehended under the Pontifical bull.*"—Conc. Plen., Balt., Acta et Dec., p. 261

To apply these laws of the Church to individual societies would be as long a task as it would be thankless, nor is it our business. We have simply endeavored to lay down connectedly the laws enacted upon the subject by those to whom the government of the Church has been intrusted by Christ our Lord. In fact, this matter is so delicate that Rome has reserved the decision of doubtful cases to itself, for it has decreed that if any case of considerable doubt should arise, *that case should be referred to the Roman tribunals*, as is done in all matters of very great importance. In compliance with this the case of the Fenians was, in 1870, referred to the supreme tribunal of Rome, which, after very careful examination of the whole subject, definitely pronounced that the society of the Fenians came under the excommunication of the Church. (Ballerini, v. ii., p. 998, in nota.) Of course we would all like to see dear old Catholic Ireland get her full rights of civil and religious freedom, and all the blessings which her devoted sons so richly deserve, but "*we must do no evil that good may come of it;*" the end, with Catholics, does not justify the means, whatever Protestants may think of Catholic laxity of doctrine. The crown of Ireland is bright with the jewels of martyrdom; with Christ, she is like the lamb before its shearer; with him, thorns and stripes are her portion on earth; but with him, too, she will be glorified in heaven; even on earth a glorious resurrection may be destined for her; but impatience and imprudence will not hasten its dawn, nor blunt one thorn of her bloody crown, as experience has shown.

4th. *All such are excommunicated as favor in any way the excommunicated societies.*

5th. *All those who do not denounce their secret chiefs or leaders till they have denounced them.* Only secret leaders are spoken of, and none need denounce when it would probably be of no use, do no good at all, as theologians teach.

Lastly, it remains for us to speak of those societies which are evil or dangerous, and of course condemned by the Church, though not threatened with the same penalties. These may, in general,

be known by the fact that they contain one or more of the evils or dangers stated in our second part as reasons why the Church condemned the worst kind of societies. For these reasons are not of our own invention. Almost all, if not all, are laid down in the Apostolic Constitution of Benedict XIV., "*Providas*." The most evident evil is the fostering of indifference, and the most ordinary sign of evil is the obligation to secrecy, especially when confirmed by an oath. But on this delicate subject we prefer to say little ourselves, and to let our bishops speak, who share, with the Supreme Pontiff, the government of the Church by Divine commission. After saying that certain societies do not fall under the prohibition of the Church, our bishops of the United States, assembled at Baltimore, in 1866, add this caution: "Care should be taken lest under this pretext (they speak of mutual protection of workingmen) anything be allowed which favors the condemned societies; and lest the laboring men who join such societies be induced by the wiles of evil and deceitful men unjustly to withhold the labor which is due, or in any other way to violate the rights of those who are over them. Still we do not wish all this to be so understood as if those societies should be considered as tolerated in which, no matter what be their nature, the members on first entering them bind themselves by oath to obey commands which may happen to be issued by the chiefs of the association, or enter into a bond of secrecy which they cannot safely violate, even when interrogated by lawful authority. Those associations are likewise altogether unlawful whose members are so closely united for mutual defence that danger may thence arise of mobs or bloodshed."

We add this serious warning of Most Reverend Archbishop Hughes, of New York, who so fully knew his people, and was so deeply loved and venerated by them, and even by those not of the Church. In a pastoral address to his diocese, issued in 1842, he writes thus: "Now we warn and admonish all the faithful committed to our charge, if any are involved in such associations, to withdraw from them with as little delay as possible; and also, as a rule of safety and precaution, we entreat all others not to yoke themselves in the membership of such associations, *without having first asked leave of their respective pastors or clergymen* whether they can do so without cutting themselves off from the communion of the Church."

We conclude with these earnest words from the same pastoral letter: "If they (Catholics) wish to perform charities, the rules of religion direct the manner, and their fellow-members and neighbors furnish perpetual occasion for its exercise. But wherever some partial good is set forth as the end and aim of any separate society, unless all its duties be public and left free, the faithful

ought to be on their guard, lest there be connected with it something which is not made public, but by virtue of which they who enter become implicated in snares that may prove fatal to their salvation."

AMERICAN RATIONALISM.

The Holy Ghost, Lord and Giver of Life. A Sermon. By O. B. Frothingham. Published by D. G. Francis, New York.

Proceedings at a Reception in Honor of the Rev. O. B. Frothingham, given by the Independent Liberal Church in New York. Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 182 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Farewell Sermon of the same. Delivered April 27th, 1879. Published by the same.

Mistakes of Moses. By Robert Ingersoll. Published in Chicago by Rhodes & McClure.

Ingersoll's Lectures on Skulls, Ghosts, Hell, and Robert Burns.

Dr. Felix Adler's Sermons, as published in the New York papers.

Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion. By F. Max Müller, M. A. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons.

THIS last work is not properly an American work; but as it is one of the chief fountains from which our American rationalists draw their supplies, the Catholic critic should read it in order to understand fully the drift of the teaching of Ingersoll, Adler, and Frothingham. There are unquestionably more rationalists in America than these, but few living are of greater prominence. Mr. Ingersoll is decidedly the most pugnacious and aggressive of the three. He has a wonderful power of sarcasm, and is skilful in handling the sharpest weapon of the ancient scoffers,—ridicule. Voltaire is his master, Luther his model in style. One of the most bitter, contemptuous, and overwhelmingly destructive onslaughts ever made on the gloomy system of Calvinism occurs in his lecture on Robert Burns. Imagine an audience of grim-visaged Scotch Presbyterians listening to it. We saw such a one once, fairly wilting under his withering irony and eloquent denunciations. It is to be regretted that Mr. Ingersoll does not confine his contempt to the horrible doctrine of fore-ordained damnation, so revolting to human reason and to the nature of the beneficent Deity, but that he extends it to the whole of Christianity.

Mr. Adler is a young preacher, of Hebrew origin, who gives

ethical lectures in a hall in New York, and hates a dogma as a bull does a red rag. He discards the literalism of the orthodox Hebrews, and believes only in natural morality. He does, however, most undoubtedly believe in himself, in his talents, and his future. A short conversation with him will convince any one of that.

Rev. Mr. Frothingham is the Melancthon of American rationalism. He is sweet-tempered, not sarcastical. He is poetical and moderate. He is laudatory, not vituperative like Mr. Ingersoll, and although he may not be more gifted than Dr. Adler, still his words will always carry greater weight, owing to his mildness and modesty. Indeed, Dr. Frothingham has quite a respectable following in New York, and some Catholic gentlemen who know him, and who from motives of curiosity have attended some of his lectures, express themselves as much pleased with his tone and manner, especially in treating Catholic subjects. In what we are about to write we shall, therefore, dwell principally upon American Rationalism as represented in the teachings of Mr. Frothingham, because they contain all that may be found in Ingersoll's lectures and Adler's sermons. The rostrum or the pulpit is the proper place for an answer to these, where their own weapons would find a legitimate sphere. But in the columns of a calm *Review*, cool reason is the proper weapon with which to fight the self-possessed Corypheus of American rationalism.

That Mr. Frothingham has a numerous and respectable following is proved by the names of those who were present when he gave his farewell sermon last April in the Union League theatre in this city. We find that upon that occasion rationalistic addresses were made by the Hon. Frank Fuller, George Hanar Putnam, George William Curtis, Dr. Felix Adler, the Rev. John W. Chadwick, Colonel Thomas W. Higginson, Edmund C. Stedman, the Rev. Samuel Longfellow, the Rev. Joseph May; while congratulatory letters were sent by Ralph Waldo Emerson, William Lloyd Garrison, George Ripley, Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Rev. Charles G. Ames, the Rev. Samuel Johnson, Joseph H. Choate, and the Rev. William J. Potter. Certainly here are numerous and respectable names enough of men distinguished in all the walks of life and letters. And who were in the audience? Can any orthodox preacher in the country point to so distinguished a class of parishioners as those whose names are printed on pages 8 and 9 of the "Proceedings at a Reception in honor of the Rev. O. B. Frothingham?"

Now what is the charm in the doctrines of this rationalistic leader which brings to him the sympathy and co-operation of so distinguished a following? This is the question which naturally presents itself. It will be best answered by a manifestation of

what his teaching is. In order to find this out we proposed a certain number of queries to a Catholic gentleman who had many opportunities of knowing and hearing Mr. Frothingham, and the following were his answers :

1st. "I do not think that he admits of a supernatural order in the sense of théologians. He believes in God, and that is about as much as I ever heard him say about God. He impresses me as not believing in prayer or grace, or other than natural means in aid of human progress and man's happiness."

2d. "He does believe in the freedom of the human will most emphatically. His great argument has been to teach men self-reliance and independence, and the efficacy of their own powers. In other words, he is a Pelagian and not a Calvinist."

3d. "His rule of ethics is not the ten commandments alone, but all that is good, and true, and noble, from whatever source it may come. The leading feature of his teaching has been to insist on the dignity and power of the *individual* man, denying all church authority and all priestly power.

"I don't think Mr. Frothingham can be properly said to have a system. He never assumes the rôle of a master. He prefers that of an eloquent literary gentleman."

If he has any system, it is "the rejection of all creeds and all church authority, so that he stands on human and individual intelligence. In a word, it is the supremacy of the individual instead of the supremacy of the church. He says beautiful things of the church, admires its beautiful symbolism, but considers it all poetry."

This analysis of the doctrine of Mr. Frothingham chimes exactly with his published sayings. Thus we read that on one occasion he said : "It is a great mistake to suppose that the Church of Rome alone represents the idea of ecclesiastical authority. There has been no despot of a spirit more despotic than Luther and Calvin. Had Martin Luther ever dreamed that in the course of time men would come to appeal to him as being the personification of intellectual liberty, he would have burned his books and gone back into the arms of the old Church which he had left."

The by-laws of the Third Congregational Unitarian Church, which were prepared by a committee of which Mr. Frothingham was the most influential member some four years ago, contain the following passage in section 4 : "It is expressly understood that no subscription or assent to any covenant or formula of faith shall be required of any member of this society." The society accepts "neither church nor Scripture as arbitrators of belief," but freely, "judging both by enlightened reason, carry their appeal to knowledge, experience, and the primary laws of the human mind, as

revealed by science and philosophy wisely interpreted." "The two Protestant sacraments, communion and baptism, have from the beginning been omitted, for the reason that they were so closely, habitually, and universally associated with the older faith as to be valueless for practical benefit, and it has never been possible to devise substitutes for them. The ceremony of christening, or the dedication of childhood, as a social rite of poetic significance, is performed by the pastor when requested."

An epitome of this pure rationalism would be, that as every man's house is his own castle, so every man's hat should be his own church steeple. This Ingersoll asserts, this Dr. Adler preaches, and this is the burden of all the speakers' remarks at the reception given to Dr. Frothingham prior to his departure on a European tour. But let us see what he has to say for himself in his own account of "twenty years of an independent ministry," which is printed as an appendix to the "Proceedings," etc.

In this interesting report he tells us that he "had been and was a believer in the spiritual philosophy—was what was in New England called a Transcendentalist," of the school of Theodore Parker. This was twenty years ago. But he had always "found fault with the theology of Unitarianism as being fluctuating, uncertain, and vague." Thus "he found fault with the Unitarian doctrine in respect to the unity of God." Here Mr. Frothingham is not clear, and seems to be a Pantheist. He writes that Unitarianism "had asserted until it was out of breath that God was numerically one and not numerically three; but that God was one, that there was but one spirit ruling, pervading, and regenerating the world,—a spirit of art, of beauty, of intelligence, of heroic will, of aspiration, of progress, had never been apprehended,—but one spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, ever present." Is this a denial of the personality of God? Is it a revival of the old pantheistic error that God is the *spiritus mundi*?

Mr. Frothingham denies the existence of a devil.¹ He denies the Unitarian doctrine that Christ is a deified man, and makes him a mere ordinary sinner.² He maintains man's immunity from original sin.³ Thus cutting loose from even orthodox Unitarianism, if it be not a contradiction in terms to apply that epithet to the system, "for the last ten years and more this ministry has been a purely *independent* ministry, connected with no sect, associated with no denomination, but simply conditioned on fidelity to the principles of free speech and free thought in all questions that concern religion."⁴ He seems to hold that even the unity of the

¹ Proceedings, etc., p. 74.

² Idem, pp. 76, 77.

³ Idem, pp. 75, 76.

⁴ Proceedings, etc., p. 77.

Supreme Being cannot be proved by reason; for he says:¹ "The Unitarianism of a generation ago never voiced itself clearly on this great article of the unity of God. We do not comprehend it now. Science is throwing light upon it; philosophy is helping us to interpret it; the advance of the human mind is unfolding it, and we see its separate bearings. But it is only through imagination; it is only through faith and hope that we can really rest in a doctrine the deepest, the highest, the noblest, the sweetest," etc.²

Those who desire to see a specimen of Mr. Frothingham's best style should read his sermon on "The Holy Ghost, Lord and Giver of Life." In this discourse he takes for text the article of the creed, "I believe in the Holy Ghost," and asserts that He is not a person at all, but merely a poetical personification of air, light, and love. The grace of his poetic style is only equalled by the self-complacent assumption of that which he does not even undertake to prove. The Holy Ghost, according to him, is air, light, and love, and it would be absurd to hold a contrary opinion! Indeed, a distinguishing trait in all these leading rationalists is the absolute disdain with which they treat all the dogmas of orthodoxy. They are treated as if they were beneath the dignity of an investigation, although the fact that men of brains do believe those dogmas should entitle them to some respect. In this regard they are entirely different from the old rationalists, who tried to prove their theories by arguments from reason and authority.

But we are growing prolix in making this exposé of American rationalism. Let us now proceed to show some of its defects.

We certainly agree with the rationalists in their rejection of the horrible Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity. We can readily understand the reaction that set in, in New England, from the days of Channing, Edwards, and Parker, against the old Calvinistic creed and its detestable estimate of human and the divine nature. We can sympathize with Ingersoll's denunciation of it, and pity him and others whom it has made infidels by the very force of mental reaction. No doctrine has done more to make men unbelievers in this country than Calvin's theory of predestination, and if to-day the country is full of spiritual "tramps," who have left the Christian sects and are roaming about with no fixed religious principles, and if the taint of rationalistic unbelief is on the best minds and on the press of the country, Calvinism is chiefly to blame for it. The Catholic Church teaches that the human will is free; that man's nature is not depraved even by the fall, and that no man will be damned save by his own free act. In the assertion of these fundamental doctrines we are one with all true rationalists. The

¹ Proceedings, etc., p. 75.

² Id. p. 75.

Catholic Church teaches that there are natural virtues, and that human reason is capable of knowing by its own force the fundamental truths of God's existence, providence, and the immortality of the human soul. To hold the contrary opinion is to be a heretic.

We further agree with the rationalists,¹ "that Protestantism is at best a bundle of complicated sects." "It is simply a conglomeration of various interpretations of Scripture. It is nothing more than a misrepresented Bible. Protestantism is only three hundred years old. It is a schism, a departure from the old Church, and it owes the savor of its piety, its nobleness, its grandeur, its sincerity, to the ages that lay behind it in the old Church, from which it came. Protestantism has two fatal weaknesses,—all Protestantism, every form of Protestantism,—from that of Calvin to that of Channing and Buckminster. It builds on the Bible. Its foundations are a book. It constructs all its ideas upon a more or less shadowy theory of an inspired letter—a book that for the last hundred years has been open to the assaults of learning, knowledge, criticism, and scholarship, which have riddled it through and through so completely, that we are not sure of the genuineness of a single chapter of it."

"Another fatal weakness of Protestantism is that it is neither of the old nor of the new. The past and future struggle in its bosom, as they have struggled from the beginning. It gave out that it had faith in reason, in free thought, but it stopped. It never practiced reason; it never believed in free thought. It has set up an iron-bound creed, and it has denounced science, and philosophy, and learning, just as vigorously and absolutely as if it had stated all these things and knew what they meant. Tradition and truth, authority and liberty, law and progress, the reign of the idea and the reign of the creed, have lain side by side unreconciled in its mind. These two powers are tearing Protestantism to pieces. They are always struggling together visibly every Sunday."²

This is better said than we could have said it. Mr. Frothingham should have added that he himself and other rationalists are the only true Protestants. Once admit the principle of private judgment in religious matters, and pure INDIVIDUALISM must be the logical consequence. The very charge of uncertainty, wavering, and doubt, which he brings against Protestantism, is found in the answers written to Ingersoll's *Mistakes of Moses* by such eminent Protestants as Professor Swing, Dr. Ryder, Dr. Herford, and Dr. Gibson. They are apologetic, timid, and vacillating. The only writer who answers the arch-rationalist with firmness and logic is the Jewish Rabbi Wise. No Protestant can answer a

¹ Proceedings, etc., p. 83.

² Id. pp. 84, 85.

rationalist unless by falling back on the Catholic Church or the Jewish synagogue.

INDIVIDUALISM is, therefore, the logical outcome of Protestantism, and individualism is pure rationalism. But is Mr. Frothingham content with his own system? He is not. After "twenty years of an independent ministry" what have he and his colleagues done for the amelioration of the human race, for lifting it up and making it more intelligent and moral than Catholic Christianity makes it? "The Society for Ethical Culture in New York establishes and conducts a kindergarten for poor children, institutes a workingman's lyceum, and offers lectures weekly during the winter by able men, who speak to the working people directly, as man speaks to man."¹ We do not like to laugh at an honest and benevolent gentleman. But really is there not something ridiculous in this statement, that after twenty years of an apostleship, instead of founding churches, schools, and orphan asylums, and preaching the Gospel daily to the poor "as man speaks to man," as the Christians have done, and are doing daily, all that the new Messiah and his followers have accomplished is the establishment of a "kindergarten!" Is Mr. Frothingham content with his INDIVIDUALISM? No! After "twenty years" of laboring in its propaganda he writes: "To-day, as it seems to me, the last word of dogmatic individualism is spoken from this place." "We must have intelligent *organization*."² Then why not take the Catholic *organization*, since you have shown that the Protestant one is defective? Why are you discontented with "Individualism?" Because, "when individualism becomes rough, and rude, and contumacious; when vagaries, and whims, and notions calling themselves inspired, and a coarse kind of self-assertion takes possession of the holy place and utter their diatribes in the name of prophecy, then individualism becomes questionable. Then a destructive process begins. Then institutions are assailed in an intemperate spirit. Then the great creeds of the world are assailed by vulgar hands, are pulled down in promiscuous ruins, never to be built up again."³ But what logic is this? What a religion is this? A logic for gentlemen, but not to be applied by *sans-culottes*. Who will prevent your refined individualism from becoming *sans-culottism*? How can that be religious truth which is not of universal application? How can that be an ethical system which will hold good only in the case of fine ladies and gentlemen, but must never be applied by peasants and washerwomen? What is there in the Society for Ethical Culture; what principle of authority to prevent its *individualism* from becoming "rude" and "vulgar?" As I write there lie before me on

¹ Proceedings, p. 65.

² Id. p. 87.

³ Id. 79.

the table three copies of a Parisian weekly print, which practically refute the whole system of this refined *individualism*. They are editions of *La Lantern de Boquillon*, par A. Humbert. Low, vile, immoral, and communistic publications, yet circulated and read by thousands in civilized France. Yet they are the logical outcome of refined individualism, as it is the logical outcome of Protestantism. Communism, free love, and Mormonism, are the natural children of individualism, and it will not do for these refined gentlemen rationalists to deny the paternity of their own offspring.

The *reductio ad absurdum* is a most powerful argument against the theory of individualism. Let the theory be applied to the poor, to the ignorant, to the dull, and stupid, and wicked, who form the majority of the human race, and how will it work? A system which would make only a few enlightened gentlemen the predestined inheritors of truth and morality, is as bad as Calvinism, which damns the greatest portion of mankind without their fault, and makes the elect a select few without any merits. A creed to be true, to be of God, must be as universal as his paternity, and as he is the loving father of all, in all times and stages of civilization, it must make no exception in its application between learned and unlearned, between genius and natural stupidity. The blockhead and the boor have as much right to the means of salvation as the man of culture, or he who, clothed in purple and fine linen, discusses metaphysics in the hall of the Society of Ethical Culture. Ride at five o'clock in the evening, in these lovely spring days, along the avenues that lead from this region to the Central Park, and you will meet two processions, one a long line of carriages, with well-conditioned horses, carrying the wealth and luxury of the city out for the fresh country air; the other a line of ill-clad laborers, tired after the day's toil, carrying the implements of their work, their spades, shovels, and pickaxes home to their hovels. Stop them on the road and let Mr. Frothingham, Mr. Ingersoll, Dr. Adler, or any other member of the Society of Ethical Culture preach to them. The line of carriages may move home, their inmates finding comfort in the doctrines which at leisure they may discuss over the sparkling champagne and the dessert. But how will the others act if they be converted to the views of the refined orators? Let these laborers but once believe that there is nothing true in Christianity, that each man must be his own church, that the self-sacrificing life of Christ is a myth and He an impostor, that there is no place of future punishment for evil deeds, and what will become of these poor hardworking men? You will turn them into wild beasts. Their pickaxes and spades will become daggers to stab the rich, and the community will become a prey to human savages with unchained passions and unbridled lusts. This is the

logical consequence of individualism. But can a system be good or true which logically leads to disorder and excess?

But let us show the fallacy of rationalism from higher ground. That reason is self-sufficient is an untenable proposition, for whose complete refutation I send the Society of Ethical Culture back to an abler man than Parker, Channing, or Emerson, although he lived in the thirteenth century. I mean the greatest genius of Christianity, Thomas Aquinas. These gentlemen who dabble in metaphysics know not how much they lose by neglecting to read, I shall not say his immortal *Summa Theologica*, but his equally excellent though shorter work the *Summa Contra Gentiles*.¹ They would learn from its perusal not the graces of style which they do not need, but how to reason logically and soundly, which they certainly do need.

How different in method is the inquiry into the perception of the infinite by natural reason in the modern work of Max Müller, and the more ancient composition of the Angelic Doctor. Müller mopes through Sanscrit roots, fetishes, or *gru-grus*, through the Vedas and Upanishads in quest of the infinite. He reminds one of a man following a marsh-light through a fog in which pitfalls abound. He is not certain. His science of language is not yet perfect. He has a number of facts, from which he deduces probable conclusions, but not certainties. "I thought it right to warn you again and again," he writes towards the conclusion of his work, "against supposing that the foundations which we discovered beneath the oldest Indian temples must be the same for all temples erected by human hands. In concluding I must do so once more.

"No doubt the solid rock, the human heart, must be the same everywhere; some of the pillars even, and the ancient vaults may be the same everywhere, wherever there is religion, faith, or worship.

"But beyond this we must not go, at least not for the present." "I hope that the science of religion, which at present is *but a desire and a seed*, will in time become a fulfilment and a plenteous harvest."²

Thus the result of all his erudition, of all his research, is that he is certain of nothing in regard to the origin of religion or the perception of the infinite. Thus the erudite meets the speculative rationalist on the same shaky ground. Max Müller can find no *à pou* star any more than Mr. Frothingham or Archimedes. Reason let loose from the control of the supernatural, like the bird of good omen which flew from the ark, finds no rest for the sole of her foot till she returns to the bosom of the infallible Church.

¹ What Catholic scholar will give us a good English translation of this work?

² The Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 363.

But let us hear St. Thomas: "A wise man," says he, "is one who directs all things to his last end;" but this end is the goad of the intellect, and that is *Truth*. Wisdom, therefore, consists in considering truth and meditating on it!¹ But truth concerning God is twofold. Some things reason knows by its own force, and some things it is unable to know unless it be assisted. We know that God is and that He is one; but we do not know his inner nature. Yet it is quite proper that even things which we know by the natural light of reason should be made articles of our faith for the following reasons:² Because few men take the trouble to investigate truth. Some are prevented by natural stupidity, so that without aid they could not understand even simple things; others are impeded by their business avocations from spending the necessary time in the investigation of truth; while others are prevented by indolence. Much labor is required, and few are willing to give it. We find children unwilling to study a simple catechism, therefore it would not be paternal on the part of God to leave each individual to himself to find out the truth, especially that which concerns his immortal destiny. Therefore unless the knowledge of even simple truths had been made easy for mankind by the teaching of authorized masters, most men would remain in profound ignorance, since the knowledge of God, which makes men especially perfect and good, would be obtained only to a few cultivated rationalists, and by these only after a long period of time and hard study.

Moreover error is continually mixed up in human investigations, on account of the weakness of the human intellect and the intermingling of *phantasms* with our judgments.³ And, therefore, many would remain in doubt concerning those things even which had been truly demonstrated, because they would be ignorant of the force of the demonstration, especially since they would see contrary things taught by so-called philosophers. Besides, sometimes that which is false and not probable is mixed up with many things that are true and that have been properly demonstrated, the error depending upon some probable or sophistical reason which passes frequently for a demonstration.

Divine clemency has therefore wisely provided that, in order to give us absolute certainty and make the paths of truth easy for us, many truths of reason should at the same time become articles of faith. St. Paul taught this truth before St. Thomas, when he wrote: "This, then, I say and testify in the Lord, that henceforth

¹ Summa Contra Gentiles, caput i. passim.

² Id. caput i., ii., iii., and iv.

³ Id. caput iv.

ye walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having the understanding obscured with darkness."¹

As we are not giving a mere school refutation of rationalism or individualism, the reader will not expect us to give him a long paraphrase of the Angelic Doctor's masterly arguments on the subject. If it is necessary for the great majority of mankind that even simple truths should be revealed to them by teaching, and that after such revelation many of them still remain hopelessly ignorant, it must follow *a fortiori* that revelation is necessary in the case of the more sublime and abstruse truths, some of which, as we know by experience, are above the natural grasp of even such minds as that of Plato and Socrates in the past, and transcend the genius of discordant American transcendentalists in the present. A rationalist who must admit that he never saw a substance, and that he does not understand its nature; that he cannot comprehend the relation between cause and effect; between the laying of the egg and the hatching of the bird; the planting of the seed and the uprising of the stalk, or the action of his own will upon the nerves and muscles of his body, should learn to be humble in the investigation of higher truths and higher forms of being and of life, such as the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, and the sacramental system of the Christian Church. *Scrutator majestatis apprimetur gloria.*

Rem acu tetigisti. The lesson of humility, and there is such a thing as even natural humility, is what rationalists need to learn. The refutation of their system from the moral standpoint is most striking. If they were but honest they would admit that there is nothing in their system of the all-sufficiency of human reason, that will make the individual curb his evil passions; and that in their own case the system of natural ethics is an ethical failure. That they may not be public rogues or malefactors we are willing to admit. Few men are, even among the fetish worshippers of Africa. But are there no vices but these atrocious ones? Let us take up the "Examination of Conscience" as we find it in any Catholic prayer-book, and ask the respectable gentlemen who form the *clientèle* of Dr. Frothingham to study the list of sins in it. We pass by, through courtesy, the grosser offences and sins of act. But how is it with regard to all those internal imperfections of the mind, sins of envy, jealousy, vanity, rash judgment; interior sins against charity and purity? Will reason alone suffice to conquer them? What remedy will the "Society for Ethical Culture," with its "kindergarten," apply to them? It tells us to be respectable and refined; to be gentlemen of culture, to admire works of art and the beauties of nature; to be good, honest, honorable and truthful; but

¹ Ephes., iv. 17.

what means does it give us to enable us to be all that it desires? None but nature and reason. But experience, the honest experience of every man, shows that they are not sufficient, and experience is more powerful than all the syllogisms of the school in this case. Do these gentlemen rationalists expect us to make an act of faith in their sanctity while the hermits, anchorites, confessors, and martyrs of the Catholic Church, who had besides the advantages of nature all the auxiliaries of grace, who did violence to their appetites, and who practiced every species of mortification, attest that they found it wellnigh impossible to conquer their passions? The Society of Ethical Culture may preach morality, but experience, the best teacher, shows that in the end its morality will be Spartan, its only crime discovery. The most intellectual rationalism by the Darwinian theory of evolution will not terminate in a holy asceticism, but degenerate into individual *sans culottism*.

ANGLICAN DEVELOPMENT.

THERE is a plentiful supply of Protestant sects in the United States, but there is little of what in England is called Ritualism. The explanation is easy to be given. There is not in America,—what there is in England,—the development of an ecclesiastical system, which, while possessing many of the watchwords of Catholicity, has but little of its spirit or its life. English Churchism, which has been on trial for three centuries, must be said to have reached its final stage; and, having reached it, is now necessarily on the wane, and must gradually become extinct or broken up. Ritualism was the last forlorn hope—the attempt to build up a national “catholic” church out of the wreck of three centuries of Protestantism. “Puseyism” had suggested the necessity of Catholicity, in the sense of a real priesthood and real dogma; but it did not dare, from its sheer novelty, to introduce the outward robe of magnificent ritual or expression. Ritualism, being developed out of Puseyism, has gained courage or a wild desperation; and, putting on the robe, has appeared before Englishmen in the full dress, Catholic toilet of the Church. After ten years of trial it has proved itself a sham, and is now regarded simply as a sect. Unable to catch the intellect of reasoning men, it has caught only the enthusiasm of the “æsthetic;” but sound thinkers reject it as sheer Protestantism *plus* pretension—a mock church, without authority,

without law. Had it been content with pretty services, pretty vestments, it might have ranked among the phases of Anglicanism; but professing to discard Protestantism, while not possessing Catholic powers, it has come to the ground "between two stools." Earnestness it still has, much industry, frequent services; but since no bishop professes it, and no synod supports it, the whole country regards it as a failure.

At the first it was the policy, the natural instinct of the Ritualists to unite themselves in profession with real Catholics, to affirm that they desired Catholic unity, and were prepared to make sacrifices to obtain it. Real Catholics were spoken of with fraternal affection; the Ritualist newspapers praised "Rome;" even the Pope was profoundly venerated as the head of the Western Church, or perhaps as the First Bishop in Christendom. All this has been changed. When it was found that "coquetting" with the Catholic Church produced no sympathetic concessions, but rather led the Holy See to state frankly and unreservedly the impossibility of yielding one point, the Ritualists, so to speak, lost their temper; they veered round to a policy of independence; and they commenced to disesteem, even to revile that authority, of which hitherto they had spoken with deep love. They would henceforth have a church of their own. "Rome" became an enemy, and was "heretical." Rome was both corrupt and tyrannical. The old-fashioned Protestantism broke out in the new Ritualism, and the Ritualists were henceforth rank Protestants. Nay, it would not be too much to say that in no Anglican sect is there such deliberate Protestantism as among the Ritualists. The solution of the anomaly is quite obvious. The Ritualists have "thought out the whole thing;" they have experimented on fictitious theories of Catholicity; they have played at priesthood, and dogma, and even authority; and having lived in two atmospheres, so far as theories are concerned, they have conceived a Protestantism which is not a sentiment but a will. This is a very bad phase. To read some of the Ritualist journals (within the last four or five years) is to read both the impeachment of Catholicity and the profession of wilful disobedience. In the place of the first humility there is disdain; instead of searching for truth there is complacency; for the love of unity there is contentment with isolation; for fear of judgment there is judicial contempt. This is the last development of Ritualism. And Englishmen perceiving it, say that Ritualism began well, but has ended in the darkest sectarianism.

Nor can such an attitude admit of amendment. The Anglican bishops, especially the primate, treat the Ritualists as if they were proud children, and the Ritualists retort by writing savagely or contemptuously of the nominees of a Gladstone or a Disraeli. A

Ritualist would no more obey his own bishop, if he could help it, than he would obey the Baptist preacher of the Surrey Tabernacle. He would resist him in the law courts and in his pulpit. He would not sacrifice one jot of his own opinions—not so much as one equivocal practice—at the bidding of his lawful diocesan. If the bishop could be transformed into a “Catholic”—as the Ritualist so fantastically calls himself—then it might become possible to obey him; but to obey a bishop who does not submit himself to *him*, but has the presumption to order him to “put out his candles,” would be a timorous and culpable unfaithfulness, enough to brand him (in his own eyes) as a heretic. So that between disobedience to bishops, isolation from his own Church, contempt for his brother Protestants, and irritation towards the Holy See, the Ritualist stands alone in superb misery, “Ritualisticus contra mundum,” *i. e.*, unique. He owns no communion with anybody. His own Church looks upon him as a wild dreamer; even his favorite Greek Church rejects his Orders; the Colonial, “British Branches,” do not approve of him; and “Rome” simply orders him to obey. Poor Ritualist! To be an old-fashioned Protestant was to be consistent, because it meant, “I interpret the Bible for myself;” but to be a new-fashioned Ritualist is to profess obedience to authority, that authority being throned in Number One.

There cannot be, as we have suggested, any further development of a Protestantism which has reached this last stage. What is there to be developed? Even the imagination cannot supply any further excesses in the direction of theoretical inconsistency. We had witnessed, in bygone days, the rabid hatred of all authority, as demonstrated by ultra-Protestant clergymen; we had witnessed the tempered praise of *some* authority, as demonstrated by moderate High Churchmen; and we have now seen the assumption of Catholic powers negatived by personal schism and revolt. What additional strange Protestantism can there be? Unless the Ritualists were to invent a private pope of their own, and endow him with Ritualistic infallibility, it is scarcely possible that a new phase of wild anomaly should dawn on the used-up English changes. But the assembling of an ecumenical council, which should consist of five-and-twenty Ritualistic clergymen, assisted by the *Church Times* and the *Church Review* as theological advisers or assessors, and which should infallibly decree that the Archbishop of Canterbury must be made infallible in faith and in morals, though it is possible that his Grace would object to this, and which should confer on him that mysterious *grace d'état* which would sublimate him into the exact opposite of what he is, it is not easy to picture any future development of Anglican or Ritualistic phenomena. There must therefore be necessarily a going back. That

movement has, in truth, long begun. Ritualism now covers as much misgiving or skepticism as any other of the Anglican sects. Its outer robe, its *mise en scène*, is still decorous, and it charms with pretty music, pretty gestures; but to suppose that it holds the intellect or the conscience, that it does more than fill a gap in public cravings, is to suppose that the English mind has lost its ballast. Still, one thing the new idealism has certainly effected, it has pulled up the standard of church services. "Æstheticism" has become the fashion throughout England. Even where Ritualist doctrines are repudiated Ritualist decorum is imitated. For an example, take St. Paul's Cathedral, in London,—which used to be as unseemly in regard to its services as any other Protestant church in the land,—there is now a *mise en scène*, which, though it is not Ritualistic, shows a sense of obligation to be stately. But, let it be asked, what is the reach of this innovation? what is the real compass of its gain? The answer we must assume to be this, it means "we should like to be somebody, but we know that we are only nobody, dressed up." Propriety, not priesthood, is demonstrated. The singing, and the robing, and the posturing, and the processioning are all expository of fitness and seemliness; but the congregation has no more *to do* with the services than they have to do with the pealing of the bells. The sermon, too, is all platitudes or proprieties. The preacher has to steer between rocks. He reads a sermon which, but for traditional gravity, may be read or extemporized in a conventicle. There is no touch of divine authority in his teaching. How should there be? since the bishop, or the dean, or the canons, or the choir might correct the preacher's "views" on every doctrine. The whole display is like homage *to* the national conscience, more than like the homage *of* divine faith. It is suggestive of the earnest desire to be religious, but not of the full knowledge of religion. It is an effort, an inspiration—not a possession. Whereas, in a Catholic church, we feel that "God is;" the question suggested by Anglican churches is "Where?"

Now it would be interesting to go back into the long story of Church of Englandism, and search for the original elements of Ritualism. It is perfectly true that Ritualism is not Church of Englandism, but it is a natural, an inevitable outcome of it. Let us be pardoned, for the sake of the interest of the subject, if we devote a few minutes to a search back. The point we would consider is, how has Ritualism been developed out of a system which was its contrary in everything?

And we would say, first, that *every* development of Anglicanism has been the most natural thing in the world. Let us briefly run through its whole story. Of Anglicanism, in the reign of Henry VIII., it would be absurd to say more than that it was a royal

tyranny. Of Anglicanism, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it would be absurd to say more than that it was a royal interest. In both reigns there was coarse, brutal tyranny, and this alone forced the Protestantism on the people. The Stuarts had to deal with a Church ready to hand, which Church two of the Tudors had created for them. The Stuarts made the most of the doctrine of divine right, which right was now centred in the king. Charles I. made too much of the divine right, and lost his head through being pontiff and despot. Amiable in his own character, he was out of joint with his times, in which the people were quite as Puritan as they were loyal. Oliver Cromwell made use of Puritanism as his trump card, and put Catholics out of the pale of Christianity and Anglicans out of the pale of civilization. The Restoration did something to restore both to their religious rights, but between the Cavaliers and the Roundheads there existed an animosity which sorely puzzled the amiable worldliness of Charles II. Whether his playful Majesty died a Catholic it is difficult to decide; but his successor, James II., had Mass said in his palace, and even invited all his courtiers to be present. Not satisfied with the private practice of his religion he sought to compel his subjects to respect it; and Mass was said at Westminster with every accompaniment of regal pomp, for the first time after an interval of a hundred years. We know what that restoration cost James. His religion and his revival of regal absolutism, both together, drove him out of the country. His cruelty towards Dissenters and towards Puritans of every school, assisted to hasten his downfall; indeed not even under Laud had Nonconformists been so harshly treated or with more unjust or more impolitic contempt. James II. might have done something for English Catholics, but all he did was to postpone their popular favor for nearly another two hundred years.

In treating of Ritualism from an historical point of view,—that is, in trying to trace its antecedents,—we shall find that both before and after the time of James II. it had continual though long-developing causes. Ritualism is as much a social as a religious movement; it is as much a matter of caste as of principle; it is not only a result of grave political mistakes, but of the social confusions which sprang from them. It is impossible to dissociate the modern rise of "sacerdotalism" from the antecedent degradation of "ministry;" and it is impossible to dissociate the present struggle for clerical caste from the antecedent social fall of the clergy. Action and reaction have been the story of Anglicanism, not only in doctrine but in social place. Let us very briefly illustrate our meaning by a few glances at historical causes.

Henry VIII., who turned the monks out of doors that he might make presents of their property to his courtiers, did not consider,

in the wildness of his passions, that he was insulting the very profession of religion. Edward VI., poor little boy, who, through his unscrupulous agents, made havoc of what was left of Christianity, did not consider, in his childhood, that a little-boy-pope was the very thing to shock the dignity of the clergy. Queen Elizabeth, who threatened to "unfrock her clergy," having made herself the judge of their true Orders, did not consider how absurd was the idea of a female pontiff, nor how the reaction from such a mockery must produce High Churchism. James I. and Charles I., in treating Puritans with contempt, many of whom were good and thoughtful men, while at the same time treating the clergy as state officers, did not consider that in "playing the Superior" over both religion and its teachers they were really making the "divine right" to seem profane, and were thus paving the way to a reaction of pretension proportionate to the degree of the affront. Yet the affront, both to religion and to its teachers, did not reach its full insolence under the Stuarts. James II. may have meant well as a Catholic, but he cast indignity on the "National" clergy, and so by alienating the clergy as well as the Nonconformists, he made both to hate the state as their oppressor. But it was not until after what is called the Revolution, when the Stuarts were finally dethroned, that the Anglican clergy were reduced to their lowest depths, and therefore began to struggle for position. Under William III. and Mary an Anglican clergyman was so degraded that he was scarcely so respectable as a footman. He was not deemed a fit companion for a butler. A gentleman's chaplain was expected to act as gardener as well as to read the church services. He might "say grace" before and after dinner, but he "went down with the tablecloth into the kitchen." Socially he was nobody, ecclesiastically he was but a servant *in spiritualibus*, morally he was not expected to be typical, and intellectually he was only required to be able to read. This degradation of the clergy could not possibly endure; it was as insulting to the Christian conscience as to Christianity, and so under the Georges the clerical caste gradually rose, until about a hundred years ago it became "gentlemanly." But religion having been so long disesteemed, its teachers could not be expected to be exemplary. Socially they might be now well regarded; but ministerially they had utterly lost place. We therefore find that during the reigns of the last two Georges the higher sorts of country clergymen were fox-hunters, and the higher sorts of town clergymen were "diners-out." Both were simply gentlemen, wearing a white necktie on Sunday, and drinking their bottle or two of port every weekday. A bishop was but a grand social don. A rector was a most respectable gentleman. A rector's daughters might be married to peers; even a curate might marry a knight's daughter.

Every clergyman of every grade was well educated. Scholarship became the fashion among the clergy, and was very often the credential for a benefice. At the beginning of the reign of William IV. the social position of an "English clergyman" was established and was unchallenged for its stern respectability.

We come now to a period when another great reaction—yet perfectly natural, nay, inevitable—shook the very foundations of the "Establishment." What is known as "Evangelicalism" was that new burst of earnestness which woke up sleepy parsons and state bishops. Emotion took the place of dry scholarship, and fervid preaching of "Essays on the Evidences." The dry bones of the Establishment were quickened into life by the real earnestness and piety of the Evangelicals. It is perfectly true that there had always been a High and a Low Church party; that the High Church party had been always divided into two sections, the High as to ecclesiastical polity, and the High as to Christian doctrine; and that the Low Church party had been always divided into two sections, the Latitudinarians and the Puritans; but the Evangelicals were in one sense a new school, that they were at once fervent Christians and "good churchmen." In other words, they were attached to the Church of England, while they sat loosely to every doctrine save the Atonement. This new consistency may perhaps be thus explained. It must be remembered that the early controversies and divisions of the Church of England had been always aggravated, if not created, by political passions, "Church and State" being the watchword both of respectability and patriotism, though interpretable by each man's proclivity. So long as there were fierce contests about ecclesiastical supremacy, or persecutions of the Irish Catholics, or the Scotch Covenanters, or High Commissions which insulted both the Universities, or the total suspension of Convocation by the state, there were plenty of causes for political religiousness, or for making politics and religion the same thing. But when the time came that fierce political passions were no longer associated with religious sentiment, it became possible for an Anglican to be attached to his church on the simple ground that it cherished Christian sentiment. Thus the new Evangelicals were, in reality, earnest Christians, who sought, without reference to temporalities, to galvanize the dry bones of Anglicanism. They did an incalculable amount of good. All England is indebted to their enthusiasm. But for them it may be questioned whether the Oxford Revival would have had a precedent basis of earnestness on which to work. Yet, strange to say, the Evangelicals, who were so earnest about piety, cared little about dogmas or even tenets, while they simply abhorred the exaltation of ritual, or even so much as its recognition or mention. Their churches were like

barns, their surplices were seldom washed, their pulpits always obscured the communion table, and their fonts were always put out of sight. From this neglect of every function save preaching, and from this contempt of all outward symbols of the faith, sprang that natural reaction which was first known as Puseyism, and which afterwards developed into Ritualism. Puseyism was both doctrinal and decorous, but it stopped short at an earnest search for "primitive truth." Ritualism proudly declared that it had found primitive truth, and that no one else but the Ritualist had done so. He that was not a Ritualist might certainly be a Catholic,—the Greek and Roman communions were esteemed Catholic,—but the Church of England was *the* primitive church; that is, the small section of Anglicans who were Ritualists. No longer was there search after primitive truth—such search as the first Puseyites had instituted; no longer was there the preaching of the duty of obedience—which had proved the really Catholic spirit of the first Puseyites. There was only dogmatic egotism, which made number one the whole Church, and excommunicated disobedient bishops.

We have suggested that clerical caste, both official and personal, had much to do with the development of Ritualism. About fifty years ago "theological colleges" were first started, and men were admitted to Orders without degrees. This important innovation led soon to the introduction of a socially inferior class into the clerical ranks. The new candidates might be, in all respects, superior men. They might even, socially, be gentlemen, but the old-fashioned prejudice in favor of graduate clergymen was somewhat shocked by a "Curate from St. Bee's." Clerical social caste being slightly depreciated clerical power must be proportionately uplifted; nor is there anything censorious in the suggestion that personal "caste" had some charm of strong argument for the clerical mind. It is certain that, socially, Anglican clergymen have lost caste, and that, sacerdotally, they have sought to regain it. Whereas forty years ago even the average country curate was thought socially a fair match for the squire's daughter, the average country curate now plumes himself on his "priesthood" as being a far higher credential than social caste.

Historically Ritualism is the development of a reaction from "Church and State" principles or Erastianism. Doctrinally Ritualism is the development of a reaction from evangelical indefiniteness and sentimentalism. Socially Ritualism is the development of clerical pique at loss of clerical caste or position. Religiously Ritualism is the development of the aspiration after fixedness in doctrine and practice. Still, Ritualism is, in some respects, a going back. Ritualism has all the weak points of Puseyism, weak points which were never cherished by the Puseyites, with but very little of

the simple, hearty search after the true way to become a good Catholic. We are speaking only, of course, of a religious system; we are not presuming to pass judgment on individuals. It would be impertinent as well as wicked even to suggest of a single Ritualist that he is not in good faith and in earnest. Nor should we think of judging the Ritualists by their newspapers, which are often ultra Protestant in spirit. Nor do we suppose that even refractory Ritualist "priests," who disobey their Bishops in almost everything, are at all aware that they are "a Church unto themselves," that, in fact, that they are Dissenters. We must look at the whole system as a mere theory, as a perfectly natural development of worn-out Anglicanism. It is the last despairing struggle of the moribund. "Let us not die without one final effort to convert rank English Protestantism into Catholicity." It was a natural if not a laudable effort. It has failed. To make the Church of England Catholic is about as hopelessly impossible as to convert the Catholic Roman Church into a sect. A communion which has passed through every vicissitude of doctrine, as well as through every contrary of practice, yet which has existed for more than three centuries as the stoutest champion in the whole world of vigorous Protestantism, is not likely in its old age to be recreated out of itself into what it never was, is not, and never can be. Ritualism has been the death-blow of Church of Englandism. It has proved, by its "reason of being," that all that went before it was wrong; and it has proved by its present isolation that it is itself quite as wrong as its forerunners. It is insular even in insular England. Never was there anything less Catholic. All the world, save the Ritualists, can see this. Catholicity was not born at St. Albans, at Hatcham, nor even at Oxford. It is not national, nor separate, nor individual. It is indeed the opposite of Ritualism. Catholicity says, come and be one with us. Ritualism says, would to God we could be one, even with our own sect.

THE REHABILITATION OF CATHOLIC TERMS IN DICTIONARIES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

AMONG the wrongs that Catholics should seek to have redressed is the present shameful treatment of Catholic terms in all extant dictionaries of our language. Exclusion of all that savored of our religious language and practices were after the Reformation a rule steadily persisted in, till dictionaries gave no one a clear definition of a term in use among Catholics. As the suppression of Catholic books after the change of religion in England was relentlessly enforced, and the introduction of books treating of our faith, worship, or practices prohibited under the severest penalties, the knowledge of all the religious nomenclature of our language in use at the beginning of the sixteenth century died out among those who did not belong to the faith; and at the same time the open use of peculiarly Catholic terms by man or woman was enough to betray the speaker to pursuivants and priest-hunters, and they were thus removed in a manner from the public by a sort of Discipline of the Secret.

An English judge once declared that in the eyes of the law Catholics were not supposed to exist in the British Isles, and on the same principle the religious terms and expressions in use among them were adjudged to be lost, obsolete, dead, and forgotten.

When at last some words began to creep into dictionaries as if under protest from others, the meaning given was in many cases an insult to us or an insult to common-sense. For definitions the lexicographers went to Protestant sources, and while in no class of terms even at this day is the nomenclature complete, the definition is frequently utterly absurd.

While Catholic terms were excluded, every odious nickname and term of opprobrium that the filthiest hearts could engender found their placé in English dictionaries, and were paraded as though the indecencies were something of which our language felt a high and noble pride. Had Walker become a Catholic before he issued his dictionary there would have been accuracy in his definitions, but his work was in the hands of the public when he embraced the faith, and no other lexicographer has known our devotional language.

To the credit of some of our dictionaries in this country, notably Webster's, attempts have been made to remedy the evil, but the disease is beyond the mere passing treatment; it requires radical, systematic, and thorough cure.

But it will be objected that a dictionary of the English language cannot be expected to give in full the terminology in use in all

religious denominations, some of which employ words for a time and then allow them to fall into disuse. But many such terms originating within the last century are given, and no denomination has a vocabulary so intimately interwoven in the language as the Catholic, whose terminology grew up with the English tongue, when the Church, engaged in its civilizing work, transformed Saxon and Norman into one people by the unity of faith.

The Catholic terms cannot be treated as novelties. The words that were familiar in every English home five centuries ago and more, which have been uninterruptedly used in the castle homes of the most ancient of the noble families of the three kingdoms, in the manor houses of Catholic gentry who can boast a more unsullied record than post-Reformation nobles, in the homes of sturdy yeomen and peasantry, too brave and incorruptible to barter their faith for monarch's frown or parliamentary bribe, the words constituting their devotional language cannot be treated as novelties or justly excluded from a volume that professes to give the English of those who speak and write the language in our day.

The present is especially the moment when this subject should be brought up, because the most pretentious dictionary ever yet prepared is soon to go to press. A proposal was issued in 1859 for the publication of a new English dictionary by the Philological Society of Great Britain. The meanings of words are to be attested by examples showing the use of each word by writers in successive centuries. To attain this involved, of course, immense labor, and many gentlemen in the British Isles and in America have been reading the literature of each period in order to give the necessary examples. These collaborators have all been working on a common plan, according to certain definite and prescribed rules. It does not appear, however, that the works of Catholic writers have been assigned for perusal with a view to give the meanings of the religious terms used, showing their antiquity and constant use. If this immense work is to come forth as its predecessors have done, using Protestant controversialists and lexicographers as the highest available standard for the definition of Catholic terms, as though a man who did not hear terms used, did not use them himself, or move among those who used them, who never read the books current among those who used them, is best fitted to explain them, then will it not merely add one more to the list of absurdities?

Every Catholic knows that the English works of the last three centuries teem with blunders arising from the utter ignorance of the writers as to everything relating to Catholic doctrine, worship, devotional life, and thought. Even where writers seem to have meant well, with only dictionaries to aid them, which were blind

guides leading the blind, they jumble and confuse things in a manner that elicits a hearty laugh from the Catholic reader.

One would suppose that any person studying the history of the Middle Ages, and especially any one attempting to write on that period, would make himself familiar with the worship and religious usages and terms of that period, when the Church occupied so important a place in European affairs; but the very contrary is the fact, and each one thinks himself at liberty to flounder and blunder, when he would be the laughing-stock of all critics if he should commit a tithe of the absurdities in treating a topic of ancient Rome or Greece. One of our brilliant authors justly remarks:¹ "Even such as Walter Scott and Washington Irving commit blunders which are incomprehensible to men whose education is far inferior to that of those masters. In their works we find Catholics going to Mass at all hours of the afternoon and evening, confessing to and receiving absolution from laymen, and men, women, and children in general using breviaries and missals. A well-educated author, a Protestant, is required to know the meaning of the Ramadan, the Mishna, the Norwegian Sagas, Joe Smith, the Mormon, the Yezidees, the Fetish, but is allowed to blunder like an idiot about Mass, Vespers, and Rosary, the highest and most frequent acts of worship of two hundred millions of Christian men, half of whom are of the leading races of civilization in France, Spain, North America, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain."

This ignorance must be gross indeed when an Everett tells us in print that he saw Ursuline nuns at New Orleans saying Mass!

And yet, *absit omen*, the English Philological Society threatens us with a dictionary in which the Catholic terms are to be defined as understood and used by this precious collection of ignoramuses. Yet they profess to possess common-sense, and will go to some work on steam-engines for the names of the different parts and the terms employed by those who manage such engines, but will act, we fear, on the principle that the man who knows nothing of the Catholic religion and abuses it heartily is the best authority available for giving the public the meaning of the terms used by adherents of that faith.

The war on the devotional language of England is thus a curious one from a merely philological point of view. By a statute of 3 and 4 Edward VI. all antiphoners, missals, grailes, processionals, manuals, legends, pies, portuasses, primers in English and Latin, couchers, journals, ordinals, or other books or writings whatsoever, heretofore used for service of the Church, written or printed in the English or Latin tongue, other than such as shall be

¹ McLeod, Devotion to the Blessed Virgin in North America, p. 19.

set forth by the king's majesty, were "utterly abolished, extinguished, and forbidden forever to be used or kept in this realm or elsewhere within any of the king's dominions." They were to be delivered up to the bailiff, constable, or churchwardens, and then within three months to be destroyed by the archbishop, bishop, chancellor, or commissary of the diocese. The penalty for neglecting to surrender them was for the first offence ten shillings, for the second four pounds, for the third imprisonment during the king's pleasure; and if the archbishop or other executioner neglected to burn the books delivered to him he forfeited forty pounds. These books comprised not only those used by the clergy in the divine service, but the manuals and primers, then the prayer-books of the faithful, and the legends, that is, lives of the saints.

Omar's destruction of all books was not more summary. That anything escaped this monstrous edict is a matter of wonder. People would be sure to give up every doubtful book, and England under the force of this heathenish act of folly destroyed by the hundred the manuscript devotional manuals and pious literature of preceding centuries, and the first and now priceless issues of the printing press in England, wherever they bore on religion. The Caxtons, Wynken de Wordes, and other incunabula, were given to the flames; early translations of the Bible, commentaries, devotional treatises, swelled the flames of this hecatomb of religious hate.

Caxton's biographer, Blades, phrases it more mildly, merely qualifying the Church of England as sectarian. Speaking of the scanty array that now can be gathered of the works that issued from the press of England's first printer, the truly pious Catholic Caxton, some of which are but fragments or single leaves, he says: "A glance at the titles of the uniques will show that the books most liable to destruction, probably owing in part to their being much used, and in part to the destructiveness of religious sectarianism, are those directly or indirectly of an ecclesiastical character, such as 'Horæ' (prayer-books), 'Psalters,' 'Meditations,' etc."

The list of Caxtons now is made up from the books and fragments that escaped the flames; what books perished it is utterly impossible to tell, as there is no authoritative record of what he printed.

To effect the change of religion in England the first step was to destroy utterly all books that embodied the devotional language which had obtained from the definite formation of the English tongue. It was prohibited within the walls of the churches which had been erected for the Catholic worship, and had so long echoed to its rites and devotions. In hundreds of places ignorant fellows, donning a clerical garb, were vociferating abuse against the old

faith, and spelling out the newfangled service to unaccustomed ears, and propounding new devotional ideas in terms adopted for the nonce from local dialect, or coined with that facility for the invention of slang which is characteristic.

It required time for a new devotional language to take form and shape, and as the people had good sense enough to hold back from adopting a religion forced on them by rulers who had no honor or decency and no pretence to piety or godliness, the progress of these forms of speech was slow. It required time to pass from the jargon state to that of language. It was at last embodied after Elizabeth's long reign in the King James's Bible, very often called "authorized," probably because no one ever authorized it.

On the other hand, one great value of the Rheim-Douay Bible (1582-1609) is that it is a monumental work of the highest linguistic value from the fact that it embodies the religious language of England during so many preceding centuries. While it is homogeneous, and distinctively English and the English of all England, the King James's Bible is, by the admission of the very Philological Society which is preparing the new dictionary, a hotch-potch, representing the language of no part of the island and of no period of its history.

Our devotional language bears the imprint of nobility and high descent; the new is the shoddy upstart. And so little has our language of prayer changed in three centuries that devotions from what few Caxtons escaped the Edwardine flames might be printed in modern spelling in our Catholic prayer-books to-day and the faithful at large would scarcely suspect their antiquity.

Although the Roman missal and breviary have superseded those of Sarum, Aberdeen, and others that were in use in the British Isles at the apostasy, although clergy and religious were for two centuries trained in various parts of the Continent, although new devotions have arisen, yet the number of obsolete and obsolescent words and of neologisms in our devotional language is comparatively small.

A dictionary to be of any practicable value in our times should distinguish all these, and not mislead people by giving some obsolete term as still in use, or what is worse, giving some doubtful or local term, or term whose use was of most limited range, as being still a word in actual use. New terms, that is, those introduced since the change of religion in England, should be given as the current words where they have superseded the earlier expressions.

It is needless to say that there should be some system. The names of the Seven Sacraments should be all given; the different orders up to the priesthood, the gradations in the hierarchy, the vestments or dress peculiar to each, the church plate and furniture,

books, devotions, etc., with such definitions that an intelligent reader referring to the dictionary would obtain a distinct idea of the meaning of the word. Yet all this is given in our dictionaries in a most fragmentary and incorrect way. Some terms are given, and others of the class omitted which the reader will naturally look for; and at times words are used in definitions which do not appear in the dictionary with an explanation.

The old French-English dictionaries used to sin the other way. The Catholic terms were in the dictionary of the French Academy, and as a rule had to be retained, but instead of giving the corresponding English word the compilers, generally Huguenots, took occasion to give a fling at Catholics by inserting a definition to suit their own ideas, leaving the person using the dictionary to find out the proper term as best he might, or stick in the French word for want of a better. Thus: "Chasuble, s. f., a sort of priest's ornament used at Mass;" "Neuvaine, s. f. (with Papists), nine days during which prayers are made in some popish church in honor of some saint in order to implore his assistance."

Now let us take up a few of the words familiar to the twenty millions of English-speaking Catholics now scattered far and wide over the surface of the earth; terms used on the arid plains of inland Australia, through the well-watered republic of America, in England's fairest lands, and the green fields of Ireland. Our religious language is one. Many indeed are the tongues of those who follow men-made creeds, there is but one among us of the deathless faith.

Let us take the book our clergy have ever in hand, which we meet them poring over when we call for ghostly counsel; which we see them reading with fixed gaze and moving lip in our railroad car, or on the steamer's deck, indifferent to all around them.

Now let us see what idea our dictionaries convey to a person who meets the word and is seeking information in regard to this book and its parts.

The "breviary," Webster tells us, is "a book containing the daily services of the Roman Catholic or Greek Church. It is composed of matins, lauds, first, third, sixth, and ninth vespers, and the compline or post communio."

Worcester more briefly says: "The book containing the daily service of the Church of Rome. (Bishop Usher.)"

Boag, *A Popular and Complete English Dictionary*, London, 1848, takes the opportunity to insult us: "Breviary, a book containing the daily service of the *Romish* Church."

Clarke, *A New and Comprehensive Dictionary*, London, 1855, gives very blindly: "The daily service-book of the Roman Catholics."

It is hard to conceive anything more absurd than making vespers from first to ninth, or confounding compline, one of the canonical hours, with the post communio, a prayer in the Mass. Led by such guides was doubtless that American educator who in a book intended to teach teachers, gravely tells them that the breviary is a textbook in Catholic colleges; or the learned editor of Chaucer, who gives one of the canonical hours as the definition for another of the hours. Worcester and the English dictionaries are so vague that the expressions they employ will define missal or prayer-book as much as they do breviary.

Now the breviary contains the devotions for the canonical hours of prayer, required by the laws of the Church to be said or chanted by priests and members of religious orders. It is not styled a service but an office, and the word office is actually among Catholics so well recognized that one told that the priest, for whom he asks, is saying his office, understands that he is reciting the appropriate part of his breviary. "And such as have obligation to the canonical hours must at least read the whole office privately, if they be not present where it is sang." (Douay Bible, 1609, Pref. to Psalms.) It is clear then that the definition should contain elements omitted in these dictionaries. The breviary is a book, generally in four volumes, adapted to the four seasons, containing the office or devotions obligatory on Catholic priests and religious at the canonical hours, viz.: Matins, Lauds, Prime, Tierce, Sext, None, Vespers or Even-song, and Compline.

Worcester, it will be noticed, cites Bishop Usher, a Protestant, for its definition, resorting to ignorant and prejudiced sources for information.

So much for the breviary. Now let us look for its companion on every priest's table, the diurnal. This word appears in both the American and English dictionaries, but not one has any definition referring to this Catholic book, although Webster, in the matter of derivation, refers to the same word in French and Spanish as meaning a prayer-book.

If we take up the parts of the breviary we will find no little confusion. Webster's definition of Matins is intelligible, but Worcester's "the earliest hours of prayer in Catholic worship," Boag's "morning service or worship," and Clarke's "morning prayers," give no definite idea except as to time. Lauds, we are informed by Webster, are "prayers formerly used between Matins and Prime," and Worcester coupling it with insult has "(Romish Church) prayers formerly read at daybreak after Matins, (Brande.)"

Under *Hours*, Webster's definition would give an idea, but Worcester's citing Brande, a Protestant, is as blind as possible. Boag, as usual, insults us, while Clark says, "a Catholic prayer-book,"

which is incorrect, as the old form, now disused, was "Book of Hours."

Here we come upon a sort of clue to the whole matter. With an insolence that may well be termed audacious, the existence of Catholics and Catholicity, since a new religion was established by law in England, is utterly ignored. Twenty millions of English-speaking Catholics are treated as non-existent, or dumb driven cattle, that use no language of devotion. On the word of a man named Brande, these dictionaries assure all who go to them for information that Lauds are no longer recited in the Catholic Church. Now we might ask, on what they base this, where they find any authority for it? Are Lauds suppressed in the breviary now printed for the use of the Catholic clergy, or in the Holy Week Books in the hands of the laity? Every Catholic knows that they are not, and that Lauds are said as they always have been.

Prime fares better; but if the dictionaries contrive to show a little common-sense here, the editor of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, published by Routledge, evinces folly enough to atone for their offence. Where in the *Persone's Tale* it is stated that venial sin is forgiven "by general confession of Confiteor at Masse and at Prime, and at Compline," this sage and learned individual gives a footnote explaining Prime to be "early Matins, and Compline to be Even-song!" No Milesian was ever accused of defining six o'clock to be nine o'clock, but it seems that a learned English editor may do things of that kind.

Ignoring all Catholic usage of the present and preceding centuries, all English dictionaries omit the next canonical hours, Tierce and Sext, as they ignore the *Diurnal* that contains them. The notes to the 118th Psalm in the Douay Bible of 1609, after speaking of the Nocturns add, "Whereto also the Laudes are added. The Prime in the morning. Afterwards the Third houre, Sixt, Ninth, and in the evening Even-song and Compline." Tierce, here called the Third Houre, was, in earlier times, called Undern. ("Abouten Underne," Chaucer's *Clerke's Tale* and *Nonne's Preeste's Tale*. "Before Undrone sall thou thynke of the passione," *The Mirror of St. Edmund*, in *Religious Pieces*, p. 41.) The explanations of this Saxon term are not clear, and we have looked in vain in the *Restitution of Decayed Intelligence*, by that good old Catholic antiquarian, Richard Verstegan, for anything regarding it.

In all the little offices given in our old Catholic manuals since the time of the Douay, Tierce or Terce prevails. Sixt was also called Midday. ("Before Mid-daye sall thou thynke of the anunciacyone and of Jhesu passione," *St. Edmund*.) But in all our manuals these two hundred years and more, Sext and Tierce have

supplanted the Saxon words. Sext is not given in our dictionaries and Tierce has not its ecclesiastical definition.

As to Nones Clarke has merely "prayers," and Boag, "prayers formerly so called." Webster gives "a season of prayer formerly observed at noon in the Roman Catholic Church (Todd)," and Worcester, "prayers formerly celebrated in the Catholic Church at noon (Todd)." If Todd is a Pope who dispensed the Catholic clergy and religious from saying Nones, it is strange that they never discovered the fact, but keep on saying that part of the Divine office. If he is not a Catholic dignitary of any kind, but a Protestant who knows nothing really of the Catholic terms he professed to explain, we must insist that it is about as sensible to go to him or Brande for definitions of Catholic terms as it would be to go to a blacksmith for an accurate explanation of nice distinctions in law terms. The word None appears very early, and had apparently no Saxon correspondent. It is the origin of our word noon according to the general opinion.

"Vespers or Even-song," is still the expression in all our older Catholic prayer-books in the hands of the faithful. "Before even-sange," says St. Edmund; and "Even-song" is given in the Douay Bible already cited, and "Vespers or Even-song" is given in an English Dictionary by Coles, 1717, but our modern dictionaries confound everything. Webster gives "Vespers, the evening song or evening service in the Roman Catholic Church;" "Even-song, a song for the evening; a form of worship for the evening." And Worcester: "Vespers, the evening song or service of the Roman Catholic Church (Seward)." "Even-song, a song or hymn for the evening." Neither of these dictionaries, like the older English one, gives Even-song as the equivalent for Vespers, or Vespers for Even-song. Neither states that it is one of the canonical hours of the Church, or connects it in any way with the Breviary. The English dictionaries are nearly the same. Boag of course insults us: "Vespers, the evening song or evening service in the Romish Church." Clarke does the same: "Vespers, Romish evening service."

In defining Compline Webster and Boag refer to the Breviary, but Worcester and Clarke are very vague.

A Catholic who will look at the words Office, Nocturn, Antiphon, will see how queerly, following such guides as Eden, Todd, and Hook, they confuse the simplest things. Tenebræ does not appear in their columns at all.

We have thus considered only the word Breviary and those necessarily connected with it. As our readers see the subject is not treated as a whole, nor the different terms with any reference to

one another, but to each is given a haphazard definition from some source utterly destitute of authority.

The same incongruity meets us in other parts. Many people, as we have found, have a very confused idea of masses as musical compositions and the Mass as an ecclesiastical rite. The writer once tried for a long time, but in vain, to get a Protestant gentleman to understand that Pergolesi, Cherubini, Mozart, and other composers did not invent the prayers and ceremonies of the Mass, but merely composed music to be played or sung during its celebration. Worcester makes the distinction between the word in the ecclesiastical and musical sense, but Webster does not, and both define Mass in a Protestant way that offends Catholic ears, and the latter makes the oblation follow the consecration. Altar is very vague in Webster, and more clearly defined in Worcester, who gives altar-cloth, which the former omits. Boag gives it also.

If we take up the vestments, *Chasuble*, omitted by Boag, is by the others defined without any reference to color; alb is described without anything to give the reader to understand that it is a vestment worn at Mass; amice is defined by Boag and Worcester intelligibly, but no one unacquainted with the matter could glean any definite idea from Webster. Maniple and stole are confused in both, especially in the English works, and they say nothing of their being part of a priest's vestments at Mass, or of the fact that they correspond in color and material with the chasuble. Coles's old English dictionary defines amice and stole more intelligibly than our modern lexicographers, and he gives "Antependium, the cloth before the altar," which does not appear in our later dictionaries. Yet the glossary in Oakeley on *Catholic Worship* would have given all needed accurately.

Minor orders are unknown to our lexicographers, who make the subdeacon a deacon's servant, and an acolyte an inferior church servant. We need not be astonished, then, to find the deacon's dalmatic defined by Webster as a long white gown with sleeves, when it is short, and depends for color on the day, and the sleeves are but an apology. The subdeacon's tunic fares worse at their hands. It is defined "a long under-garment," when it is really short and an outer vestment, not an under-garment at all. They cite Wright as an authority when "Wrong" would have been more to the point.

The seven sacraments are generally enumerated under the word sacrament, but penance and extreme unction are rarely defined as sacraments.

If we turn to devotions, rosary is pretty fairly defined; but under beads the term "bidding of beads" is paraded in several of these works, although it seems to rest solely on anti-Catholic tracts in the

Reformation times, while the fact that beads, or a "pair of beads," designates the third part of the rosary, the five decades, as generally used among Catholics, is omitted. The good old woman who asks for a pair of beads does not know that she employs a term that may be termed classical in English. Chaucer used it centuries ago in his *Prologue*: "About hire arm she bare a pair of bedes." Sir Thomas More used it at a later day in his *Dialogue of Cumfort* (Antwerp, 1573; p. 80): "His Confessor shooke his great paier of beads upon him." The contemporaneous life of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, gives it, speaking of the pious Countess: "She used to wear about her neck either a cross of gold . . . or else a plain pair of beads sent unto her by Father Claudius Aquaviva, General of the Society of Jesus."

Rosary and scapular seems allied, so let us turn on any of our dictionaries to the latter word. What do we find? A very comical definition, credited to Brande or Brevint, of the scapular as part of the religious habit, but of the Scapular of Mount Carmel, worn by millions of the laity, not a syllable in the English or American dictionaries. Our Catholic besides a scapular probably wears a medal. The dictionaries defining the word can scarcely be said to include the religious medals so common among us. If lexicographers do not regard them as having any existence we are afraid that the custom-house officers do and would seize them if we attempted to pass them without paying duty. Some one may ask me whether my beads and medals are indulgenced. If I turn to the dictionaries I find the word *indulgential* with a definition credited to Brevint; a most unusual term it must be, but the common expression, indulgenced is not mentioned.

Should devotion prompt us we might begin a novena in honor of some mystery of our Lord's life, or in honor of the Blessed Virgin or some saint. But novena is in no English dictionary that we can find. Deletanville in his old French-English dictionary defines the French word without giving the English term, and our lexicographers all seem to have feared that some calamity might befall them in case they inserted it in their columns, so cautiously all avoid it. The word is no neologism. A little volume entitled *A Novena to St. Francis Xavier* was printed as far back as 1741 (18mo., pp. 88), and the term is used throughout the book without explanation, showing clearly that it was a word perfectly understood among Catholics in the early part of the last century.

Religion in the sense of the religious state is not given in our dictionaries, although we find its use in the fourteenth century. See *Religious Pieces*, published by the Early Text Society (p. 9), or the *Life of Lady Warner of Parham in Suffolk: In Religion called Sister Clare of Jesus*, London, 1692. In the last century it is used

in the same sense by Blackstone in his *Commentaries*. Religious indeed appears with the meaning "a person bound by monastic vows, as a monk, a friar, a nun," but Webster assures us that the word is obsolete.

Printers distinguish between monks and friars, and the dictionaries, though they note this distinction, confound the two constantly, and though some define the word friar correctly as meaning a member of one of the mendicant orders, Franciscan, Dominican, Augustinian, and Carmelite, yet commit the gross solecism of using in a book intended as a public guide such expressions as "Franciscan monk" or "Dominican monk." Even the Rev. Orby Shipley, in his *Glossary*, has "Dominican monks, preaching black friars," making them both monks and friars, and not giving their distinctive name at all. They put O. P. after their names and call themselves "of the Order of Preachers," or "of the Order of Friars Preachers," they never call themselves either Dominican monks or preaching black friars. We have never found as bad a case in the dictionaries, however, as in a Western contribution to history, where Father Hennepin is said to have been a "Franciscan monk of the Jesuit order," which would be like a "brigadier-general in the navy of the United States judiciary." A Franciscan cannot be a monk, nor a monk a Franciscan; a Jesuit is neither monk nor friar.

The well-meant endeavor in the later editions of Webster to give the names of the religious orders in this country is most commendable, and with a few modifications will be all that is needed.

Under the head *profess*, Clarke gives "to take vows," which needs only the word solemn to be correct; other dictionaries, and even Shipley's *Glossary*, omit the ecclesiastical sense altogether, although Webster and Worcester give "Profession, the act of entering or becoming a member of a religious order;" and Shipley to the same purport, which is not correct, as the profession comes some years after entering. It is given as a term of ecclesiastical law and Bouvier cited as authority. Yet curiously enough there was a law case in England in the last century which turned entirely on the point of a monk having made his profession.

A baronet of the Anderton family became a Benedictine and his younger brother assumed the title and the property. When Charles Edward advanced into England the titular baronet joined him, and after the fatal disaster at Culloden fled to the Continent, leaving his two daughters in England. His estate was declared to be confiscated, but the daughters prevailed on their uncle, the monk, to come forward and claim that the property was really his and had never belonged to his brother at all, no legal title having ever vested in him. The Crown, however, fell back on the old Catholic

law, and maintained that the elder brother had confessed himself to be a monk, that he was therefore dead in law, and that the title and estates had consequently descended to the younger brother, and that the lands were forfeited by his treason. The lawyer for the family, however, insisted that the old law must be taken in its full extent, and that in Catholic times a monk was not dead in law unless he was a monk professed, and they cited authorities establishing this point. The court held that they were right; the Crown was unable to prove the fact of the Benedictine's having taken his last vows or made his profession, and the family saved the property. The curious case is reported, and justifies the use of "profess" and "profession," as good English terms.

Probably, in consequence of the various English editions of Pascal's famous work, the word *provincial* is given in our dictionaries, although some assert that there are provincials of religious orders only in Catholic countries. As there are several provincials in this country, the consequence is clear that if these lexicographers are right this is a Catholic country; but if they are not willing to admit that, they must confess that the dictionaries are wrong. As our regular clergy give frequently retreats to the clergy and religious communities of women and missions in many parishes, we turn to our dictionaries for mission and retreat. *Mission*, in the sense of a series of sermons, instructions, and meditations, is not to be found in any of the dictionaries, though Webster gives a very clear definition of *retreat*.

But we need not pursue further the matter of omissions. As the dictionaries ignore our existence for the last three hundred years, and take their Catholic words from the violent anti-Catholic polemics of the time of the Reformation, there are many words obsolete, distorted, or merely coined at the time which have found their way to dictionaries and been retained from generation to generation. Such words, if preserved at all, ought to be characterized properly so as not to mislead any one.

Then that whole class of opprobrious and insulting words, dragged from the dunghills with the muck-rake, Papist, Popish, Romish, Romanist, Papistical, Popery, these should be distinctly characterized as terms of insult, opprobrium, and degradation, never accepted by Catholics or used by them, but always resented. If dictionaries would note the fact that they are terms of reproach applied to Catholics, many who use them now apparently unconscious of the wound they inflict would shrink from giving pain to others by applying to them words that ought never to fall from the lips of any one having any moral principle or rectitude. Even government publications, like the *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, have been allowed to fall into the hands of persons who

make them a vehicle for carrying out their sectarian hate. A glance at the indexes of the report for the last few years will show how terms of insult to us are employed there when they are not in the report itself, showing conclusively that they are inserted out of pure wantonness.

Now what is the true remedy for all this wretched treatment of Catholic terms? Catholic writers are not cited as authority for the use of words, yet from the earliest English writers down there is a catena of authorities for their use. Many of our catechetical works, old and new, give clear and distinct definitions of Catholic words which might have been adopted to advantage by dictionaries. Rock's *Hierurgia*, Barry's *Sacramentals*, treatises on the Mass, the Ceremonial, Rituals, Oakeley on *Catholic Worship*, with its glossary, would supply other definitions, but lexicographers will not go to this labor, and if it is to be done we must do it ourselves. In the movement towards the Church in England so much attention has been drawn to the ancient Catholic language and usages that dictionaries have been prepared. Works like Shipley's *Glossary of Ecclesiastical Terms*, though containing much that is fair, have too many blemishes to be accepted as a whole; yet unless Catholics take steps to produce something better, these works will be referred to as guides by our lexicographers and new difficulties will arise.

One difficulty arising from the action of these ritualists is the wholesale revival of obsolete and in many cases merely local terms, which they endeavor to bring into use, but which will probably all die out again in a few years as the movement, which attaches more importance to matters of custom and ceremony than to the essential points of religion, cannot possibly obtain permanent results.

Pugin, in his enthusiastic admiration of Gothic architecture, revived all the names connected with the Church and its fittings in the fifteenth century, and under the impulse of Early Text Societies everything is gleaned to give perfection to the revival of mediæval church furniture. The interior of some of their churches assume so Catholic a look that even priests entering them by mistake do not immediately discover their error. In fact we have heard of a case where a religious, belonging to an ancient and venerable order, having been invited to preach in a parish church, by mistake entered a ritualistic church. It was before the hour and there was nothing to disabuse him. Altar and tabernacle, candles and flowers, sanctuary lamp—all were there. He went up to the altar and passed into the sacristy. There was a stole, but he found it wonderfully long; the alb was there, but he saw no chasuble. He began to grow perplexed, and looked around for the missal. On

opening the books that were there he discovered that he was playing the interloper and retired unnoticed.

As a consequence of this revived mediævalism to which architects and designers contribute, words like *dossal* for hangings behind the altar, *orphrey* and similar terms are used very patly by those who attend ritualistic churches, and they suppose them all to be current among Catholics.

The subject is therefore to non-Catholics one of difficulty, and we can readily see how the efforts of the publishers of the later editions of Webster, who have shown every disposition to make their dictionary as clear in its definitions of Catholic terms as it is in defining those belonging to science, natural history, or commerce, have withal produced no better results. They have, too, attempted to fix the pronunciation of the proper names in our Catholic Bibles. The first essay due to one of our distinguished scholars may not in all cases be accepted, as there can scarcely be said to be established custom to fix the pronunciation of many words, and principles adopted in other cases may be questioned. Still it is a great step. Yet Webster's dictionary with all its admirable progress is, as we have seen, far from the standard. But we are inclined to think that if we on our side do something towards the preparation of a correct dictionary of Catholic terms our American lexicographers will gratefully adopt our definitions, and from the progress made we really hope far more at their hands than at those of lexicographers in England.

In view of the immense project undertaken on the other side, this ought not to be, but we fear that the greatest dictionary of the language ever projected will not, so far as we are concerned, be a very creditable performance, and we shall be most agreeably disappointed if our pessimist forecast proves fallacious.

The new English dictionary proposed by the Philological Society will, so far as we can judge, do nothing to remedy the various evils of which we complain. They propose to make it a complete inventory of our English tongue; but from the very scheme adopted the Catholic part will be done as wretchedly as ever. They began by dividing the time into three periods: 1. From the use of the language to the appearance of the first English version of the New Testament, 1526. 2. From 1526 to 1674. 3. From 1674 to the present time. For each of these periods a list of authors was made out, and members of the society and voluntary assistants were to examine them and extract passages giving the use of particular words. Of course the first period is Catholic, and many obsolete words will be found and given. How many Catholic works will be consulted in the second and third periods we have at the moment no means of telling; but beyond all doubt anti-Catholic literature

will be sifted, and terms of reproach, perverse interpretation of words, and the like, be gleaned to grace the pages.

In 1864 the secretary reported 176 works read in the first period, 622 in the second, 351 in the third, making 1149, with 360 more on hand.

That there are any Catholic collaborators we do not know ; but unless the Catholic part is made a special study the result will in that respect be a failure. The only plan seems to be for Catholics themselves to organize a similar work confined to the terms specially in use among us, and to interest as many as possible in this country, England, and Ireland to read through the Catholic authors from the earliest times, and give extracts showing the use of terms. We could thus gather obsolete words, show their meaning, their modern representatives, and examples attesting the latest period when they were in use ; words that have been in use from the earliest period and words that have been introduced to take the place of obsolete words. Terms revived by the ritualists which Catholics do not use need not be regarded ; but all nicknames applied to us should be collected, and characterized as being what they really are.

The preparation of such a dictionary of Catholic terms must be a labor of love ; but in view of the necessities of the case, there ought to be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary aid from those who have the honor of the Church at heart. If the Philological Society can secure hundreds to assist in carrying out its project, the far less comprehensive one proposed by us should be more cordially received as it directly concerns our holy mother the Church. If interest is awakened by drawing attention generally to the want there will be little difficulty in printing and publishing the result of the common labor.

In justice to others we are bound to take some steps to guide them aright, before we censure them too harshly for deviating from the correct path.

NOTES ON SPAIN.

NUMEROUS are the travellers from the United States that one meets with everywhere in Italy, and many agreeable reminiscences do I entertain of such acquaintances made there in the year of the Vatican Council. Few and far between, however, are the Americans to be found in Spain. This is a matter to be much regretted, for besides the advantage to the Spaniards of a much increased influx of visitors, transatlantic tourists would find in the more western peninsula a world of interest both in the land and also in its people, their ways, their looks, their monuments. One cannot at first but wonder that representatives of the nation of Prescott and Washington Irving are not more frequently to be found in the courts of the Alhambra, at the tomb of Ferdinand and Isabella, or amidst scenes of the lives of Columbus and Pizarro. Catholic citizens of the United States might, one would think, be greatly attracted towards a land so long, so emphatically Catholic, and still so profoundly permeated by Catholic sentiment. The bad repute, however, of Spanish living, Spanish inns, and Spanish travelling, a repute which keeps away so many English tourists, no doubt sufficiently accounts for the rarity there of our transatlantic cousins. It is, therefore, with much pleasure that I hasten to declare to the American public that a visit to Spain, just accomplished, convinces me that that land is most unjustly maligned, and to assure all interested in the question that lodging, feeding, and travelling can be effected with very reasonable comfort, and that all the points of special interest can be visited without hardship or fatigue.

Tastes proverbially differ; but for my part I must avow that comparing the towns and cities on the Spanish railways with analogous towns and cities on the German railways, I give the preference as regards cooking and sleeping accommodations very decidedly to Spain.

In five weeks spent there journeying from St. Sebastian to Barcelona, via Madrid, Cordova, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, Grenada, and Valencia, I never met with a bed that was not both comfortable and scrupulously clean, and free from unwelcome tenants. Everywhere there is most excellent bread, and either good coffee, or good chocolate. Very rarely did the flavor of garlic (a flavor, by the way, without which there is no good cookery) obtrude itself, and the fault to be found was not with the cooking, but with the too prevalent habit of dressing meat too fresh—one of the many instances in which Spaniards carry their summer habits into the winter. If, however, there is this drawback as to their meat,

their sweets and confectionery are excellent. All the hotels are very reasonable in their charges, it being, however, advisable always on arrival to make a distinct agreement for so much a day, everything included.

Travelling by rail is slow work certainly, but the carriages are comfortable; and a non-smoking carriage is always to be had for the asking, and is strictly reserved for non-smokers. This is a far preferable arrangement to that of France, where smoking is nominally forbidden in every carriage and practically allowed in all, the onus of prohibition being thrown upon the travellers themselves, whose objection to smoking may be great, but whose moral courage for objecting may be small—to their serious inconvenience.

The ill repute as to travelling comfort from which Spain suffers was doubtless formerly well deserved, and that even not long ago. To be sure of this it is sufficient to read Lady Herbert, of Lea's, narrative of her journeys to Cordova and Grenada, and to compare them with my own experience. Spain is, in fact, a country but freshly opened up to travellers who are somewhat enterprising, who like to take a route not followed by the whole mob of tourists, but who yet care for creature comforts and do not care to "rough it." To such travellers I do not hesitate to say, go at once and judge for yourselves.

With these hints for the general public—which I trust may serve to encourage not a few hesitating tourists to venture on the southern side of the Pyrenees—I turn at once to matters concerning the Church and religion in Spain. That country is full of interest historically, politically, commercially, and scientifically. Its botany may be said to be yet unknown, while its flora is a far richer one than that of Italy. Even in zoology a great deal remains to be accomplished. To the Catholic, however, the word "Spain," calls up at once a host of ecclesiastical memories and aspirations, and upon the Catholic American that old country has very special claims.

A quick run from Paris to Bayonne, a night's rest at each, with a peep at Biarritz having been experienced, we (myself and a friend) crossed the Bidassoa and arrived at St. Sebastian in good time to ascend Monte Argullo, and enjoy the magnificent view from the ramparts of the fortress on its summit.

But just over the border we hardly hoped to find what we did find, so sudden a change in the aspect of things around us. Groups of ladies with mantillas, Spanish peasant dresses, and ox-drawn carts, the wheels of which were solid like those of classical Italy two thousand years ago.

The churches of St. Sebastian would be insignificant in another Spanish city. But in this, the first town visited, they were most

interesting, so strikingly different are they from those of France. With small windows to keep out heat and glare in a land of such penetrating sunshine, the wall-space left has encouraged the development of internal sculpture; and hence those enormous carved altar-pieces or "retablos," reaching to the ceiling, which are at once so general and so characteristic. The ornate and busy character of a Spanish church interior is what, together with the semi-obscurity, at first strikes the northern visitor. Profuse carving and gilding, the lavish character of which is generally more remarkable than the beauty, are apparent on every hand. But how and where to pray may trouble some newcomers. In St. Sebastian (so near France), as in one or two churches in Madrid, chairs like those in French churches are to be found. Generally, however, there is nothing but the pavement on which to kneel or sit—no bench or chair is to be seen. Another peculiarity is the position of the choir. Instead of being in close proximity to the altar—in front of it (as generally north of the Alps) or behind it, as so often in Italy—the choir with its stalls and organ is removed far from the sanctuary and is placed near the west end of the church. A narrow pathway (railed in on each side) connects, in most cathedrals, the inclosure of the choir with the distant sanctuary and allows the clergy to pass from one to the other without being inconvenienced by the congregation, which may crowd the interspace between these inclosures, standing or kneeling with their backs to the clergy and their faces to the altar.

In many parish and monastic churches the choir is raised up upon a great west gallery, the entire area of the church being thus left to the congregation. This we found to be the case with the large church at St. Sebastian, a very handsome flight of steps leading up on one side from the floor of the church to the choir. Close to this church, on the way up to the fortress, is a large Carmelite nunnery; and the next day (October 15th) was the feast of their patron, the great Spanish saint, St. Theresa. In the fortress itself we found a well-kept little chapel, with its lamp burning and the holy water stoop outside well filled. We felt we were in a Spanish rather than in a French fort.

Descending by the graves of the English officers who fell here in the Peninsular War, and passing the modern ruins of the adjacent stations and the cross set up by Ferdinand VII., in gratitude for his return, we went to the hotel for dinner and rest, in preparation for an early start next day for Burgos. Let the traveller then follow the same route, do as we did, and traverse it by day to enjoy its fine scenery, especially the magnificent defile of Pancorbo, with its limestone precipices—still better seen by railway than by the old coach-road.

The ancient and decayed city of Burgos and its environs contains three special objects of attraction,—its far-famed Cathedral, the Convent of Las Huelgas, and the Catuja, an old Carthusian monastery of Miraflores. Interesting as is this city to the artist and archæologist, it was the worst for comfort we anywhere experienced on our route. At our hotel there, the *Rafaela*,—which, like so many Spanish inns, begins on the first floor, not on the ground floor,—we met with the only really unsavory dish, one made of odds and ends of ox, and with a taste resembling the odor of the cat. However, if the material gratifications of Burgos are scant and poor, a plentiful intellectual repast is offered there to the Catholic, the artist and the historian.

I entered the famed Cathedral at six in the morning, and found small scattered congregations at the different Masses which were going on in continual succession. The Spanish chasuble is like the Roman in that there is no cross behind, but it is longer and gradually widens from the shoulders downwards. The servers at these early masses were not clad in cassocks and surplices, but were poor boys in their own more or less ragged attire. Here, as elsewhere in Spain save Andalusia, I was struck with the gravity and solemnity with which Mass was said. The bell is always rung before the *pater noster*, as in France, and the congregation make then the sign of the cross in the complex way in which it is made in Spain,—the forehead, mouth, and chest being first crossed, then a large sign of the cross following, to which other small crossings may again succeed; the thumb being always kissed at the last.

Some forty clergy are attached to the Cathedral, of whom twenty-eight, I believe, are canons. The canons do not generally in Spain dress as in France or Italy, but each wears a long silk cloak (like a cope) with a colored hood over it, worn on the shoulders with a point extending down the back.

There are three High Masses in the Cathedral every day, and the office is, of course, daily sung—but not well sung. Hardly any congregation attends any part of it, even vespers. At that office, two priests in copes bearing silver maces (carried sloping over the shoulders) go from the sacristy through the sanctuary to the choir, and conduct thence three other priests in copes to the sanctuary, when, the altar having been incensed, they return to the choir. It is no part of the object of this paper to describe buildings already copiously described in guide-books, accordingly I will say nothing of the Cathedral, except to remark that for travellers from countries, such as England and France, the monuments of which have suffered so much from violence of iconoclasts, the uninjured and undefaced condition of its sculptured richness has a special charm.

At the old and magnificent Carthusian Monastery of Miraflores

there are now only three priests, survivors of its former monastic population. Forbidden to wear the habit, and unable to practice their rule, yet living in the building once a noted monastery of their order, their life must be a sad one save for interior consolations. They hope, however, that the change for the better, which has of late taken place in Spanish affairs, may soon permit them once more to receive novices and resume the monastic life now interrupted for what will soon be half a century. This hope is strengthened by the knowledge that every here and there over Spain the various monastic brotherhoods are beginning to reappear. At Burgos itself the dissolved Carmelite friars, the old "White Friars" of London, are once more in possession of their old church near the railway station, and are already a numerous community. Very pleasant was it to sit there and listen to their voices reciting vespers in the large western gallery, which is the choir of their church.

The Cistercian Convent of Las Huelgas is a case of ecclesiastical survival, for the abbess still holds sway over a subject village near the church, and though despoiled of her old wealth and no longer ranking as a princess palatine, second only to the queen, and no longer possessing legal jurisdiction (which formerly extended to the power of inflicting capital punishment), she is still styled Abbess "by the grace of God."

The nuns are easily to be seen when at their "office," since their "choir" occupies the whole nave of the church, with a grating at its eastern end through which they can see the altar. Visitors admitted at the transept can look back through the same grating at the nuns, and very stately dames are they, and majestically do they courtesy (not genuflect) to the altar as they pass out at the end of their service.

I paid a pleasant visit to the elderly Archbishop of Burgos, who still inhabits the ancient archiepiscopal palace adjoining the Cathedral. A conversation with him and with his secretary convinced me that no very hopeful view was taken by them of the politico-religious future of Spain. With much esteem for the well-intentioned young sovereign, King Alfonso, came the exclamations, "What can he do?" "A Constitutional King!" "He is helpless!" exclamations which seemed to me to point to possible Carlist proclivities.

After one night and day at Burgos the next city visited was Valladolid, interesting to every English and English-speaking Catholic from its Scotch and English colleges. The rector of the latter college (Dr. Allen) received us with great kindness, and courteously gave us for escort about the city a pleasant cicerone in the person of a student (Mr. Kennedy), who had already been seven years away from his friends, and who had three more summers to

grill in, in a city in which the sun of the 17th of October was quite as hot as could be endured with equanimity by an Englishman. This college was founded three hundred years ago, yet the building is not more than half that antiquity, and its church is a sort of rotunda with altars all round, their retablos profusely gilt in the Spanish style.

The Cathedral of Valladolid, though but a portion of the building which was planned, is very impressive in its massive solidity and majestic simplicity. Were it finished it might serve by comparison with Burgos as a test of the suitability for church purposes of the classical and Gothic styles. I take it that many a "Goth" going to Spain to admire pointed architecture, might end by giving the preference to its rival. Certainly before deciding, the cathedrals of Valladolid, Cadiz, and Grenada ought to be studied and "worked in." I mean really used by the observer again and again for private devotion as well as for assisting at public functions. Signs of religious life are not wanting in Valladolid. Thus the fine old Church of San Pablo has quite recently been restored, and Mass is said in it by the Jesuits, who have found their way here not as a regular community but as a few isolated individuals. It is also in contemplation to restore the much finer old Benedictine Church of San Gregorio.

After passing two days in this modern-looking city (modern on account of war's destructiveness), the capital of Spain when Philip II. was King, the old city of Avila demanded a careful visit. Avila is one of the holy cities of Spain, as being so much identified with that great and emphatically Spanish saint, St. Teresa. If Valladolid has been forced to put on a modern aspect it is far otherwise with Avila. Still begirt with its old mediæval battlemented walls with their very numerous towers, of which the east end of the Cathedral (actually built into the city walls) forms one, Avila is indeed a city of the past. It is a fossil, or rather an instance of survival, which no traveller, and certainly no American traveller (who generally so keenly appreciates the relics of the historic past), should on any account omit to visit; and his visit will not be an uncomfortable one. The small hotel (the Fonda del Ingles), conveniently situated just opposite the west door of the Cathedral, affords a clean and comfortable lodging and good and well-cooked food, all at exceedingly moderate charges.

The Cathedral, though small, is one of the most impressive in Spain. Early and severe in style, and built of a peculiar dark-colored stone, its rather small windows contain so much stained glass that even the bright sun of Spain sends but a dim religious light into its interior. A peculiar charm is imparted to the eastern portico of the church by the series of very slender columns which

intervene between the main columns supporting the clerestory and the lateral chapels.

In harmony with the charm of the church was the courtesy of its clergy, judged by the first one (a canon) who happened to be addressed, and who in reply to a request to hear a confession readily offered to a stranger and a foreigner either the present time or any subsequent hour of the afternoon or evening for that purpose.

The next morning was the Sunday within the octave of the feast of St. Teresa,—patron of Avila,—and a grand “funcion” at the expense of the ayuntamiento (or municipality) was to be held in the Carmelite Church. In and around Avila are various churches and convents connected with the life of the great saint.

At early Mass at the Cathedral, holy communion was given at the small altar in the middle of the wall of the apse. There was no rail or communion cloth, but the scanty communicants ascended a few narrow steps at one end of the chapel and knelt close to the altar, a small, square, stiff linen cloth being passed from hand to hand, and there was absolutely nothing but the stones of the pavement on which either preparation or thanksgiving could be made. The shape of the Spanish chasuble has already been mentioned. The maniple differs much not only from that of France but also from the Roman maniple, being less expanded at its free end than in the latter, and therefore more like the Gothic or mediæval maniple.

The tunics and dalmatics are as in France, with no sleeves, but merely flaps hanging over the arms, but very often, as at Avila, there is a prominent standing collar. These vestments are often worn by the serving lads at grand festivals.

The surplices are curiously and not nicely modified. The sleeves are narrow and long, but the arms do not traverse them, but, passing through armholes, the sleeves hang loose, save that they are carried by the wearer (server, preacher, or other) twisted around the arm. The surplices are also very much cut down the back at the neck, and at the same time are deeply notched below, so that the two sides are united over the back only by a narrow isthmus of linen.

The boys who serve Mass commonly aid the priest in putting up the chalice, etc., after Mass, holding open the bursa to receive the Corporal. They do the same at Bayonne. The hour for the function having arrived, we repaired to the Church of Nuestra Serafica Madre Santa Teresa de Jesus, which was adorned with hangings and lit up with many candles. There were some seats in the nave, near the altar, for the municipality, and one bench, extending almost the whole length, on each side of the nave, where, luckily

for un-Spanish knees, we got seats. The High Mass, at a side altar (said by tonsured Carmelite Fathers), was just concluding.

Soon, however (the church meanwhile rapidly filling), the strains of a military band were heard approaching, the great west doors were thrown open, and in marched the ayuntamiento in evening dress, preceded by alguazils and another most mediæval-looking official. The band remained outside and ceased playing. The priest, deacon, and sub-deacon (Carmelite Fathers) then advanced to the altar, and High Mass began before the Blessed Sacrament exposed.

Meanwhile the whole centre of the nave had become covered by kneeling women, the men standing or kneeling in the side aisles and at the west end. It is very curious to see the women of all classes so much alike. All in black, with black veils over their heads, it requires a female eye to distinguish, in many cases, rich from poor. This is one of the various pleasing and edifying instances of a *good* equality which exists in Spain, and all fine dressing for church and vain rivalry as to fashion in God's house is here utterly unknown. The women have a curious way of resting themselves, after long kneeling, by sitting back on their own heels, when they seem as comfortable as if on chairs, although the legs must continue sharply flexed the whole time, and would be painfully cramped but for long practice from childhood. It was odd to see them on this occasion, when there was a long service and sermon, alternately kneeling up and sitting back on themselves, but never rising from the ground at all, and fanning themselves more or less the whole time. The municipality and all the men behaved very well, standing during the greater part of the time, but kneeling at the more solemn parts of the service. The sermon was long, extempore,—at least spoken with animation, not read,—and eloquent, the words being also pronounced very distinctly. St. Teresa, the pride of Spain, the special glory of Avila, was, of course, its subject. A life-sized image of the saint, dressed in a real habit and surrounded with gilt rays like a sun, stood on the Gospel side of the altar, and, at intervals, the preacher turned towards it and, extending his arms, exclaimed in an impassioned manner, "Oh, Madre Nuestra! Oh, santa mia! Oh, Santa de Avila!"

The High Mass being concluded, the three Carmelite priests, with their attendants, and preceded by the municipality, came forth, bearing the relics of the saint—her rosary, a shoe, her walking-staff, and one of her fingers in a crystal reliquary. The crowd fell back on each side in the plaza, and stood uncovered while the clergy passed out for about a hundred yards and then returned.

Avila is a very Catholic city, and edifying in many ways, but,

nevertheless, all the shops were open on Sunday, and this we found to be the case in Spain generally.

A visit was then paid to the great Dominican Monastery of Santo Tomas, wherein, including novices, there are now about one hundred friars. It is thus devoted to its original destination, having been founded for Dominicans by Ferdinand and Isabella. The friars were expelled with the rest in 1831, but some years afterwards the ex-Queen Isabella II. bought it and restored it to them. The reader may wonder how a large monastery such as this should have escaped destruction during the recent revolution. The reason is not any goodwill on the part of the "Liberals" (save the mark!), but because friars are found to be actually necessary animals for the government of the Philippine Islands, and so the said Liberals are reluctantly compelled to tolerate various flourishing monasteries destined to furnish the much-needed religious, who, from their destination, are known as "Filipinos," whatever the Order to which they may belong.

The prior spoke English well, having resided at Hong Kong. His monastery is magnificent, with its stately cloisters and the beautiful carved work of the stalls of the choir. This choir is placed high up in a western gallery, and, by a very singular exception, the high altar is also placed high up on another similar gallery situated at the eastern end of the church.

On the floor of the church, in front of the high altar, is placed the beautiful white marble tomb of Prince Juan, the only son of Ferdinand and Isabella, who died a promising youth of nineteen. High up on one side of the church is a small gallery, into which his parents would occasionally come, and from which the tomb and high altar can be equally well seen.

Sunset, from the Alameda of Avila, is a lovely sight, and great is the change in temperature to be perceived immediately after it has taken place. Thin and biting is the air; but is it wonderful that it should be so when it is remembered that Avila, though in the midst of a wide, undulating plain, is as high as the top of Snowdon?

The start from Avila for the Escorial required a rise at four A.M., by which we were enabled to reach the palace about eight. That palace, its rooms for royal residence in life; its resting-places for royalty in death; its church, sacristy, library, garden, monastic buildings, etc., need no description here, for they are all fully described in guide-books. But a few words may be said as to the impressions made upon travellers arriving freshly from mediæval Avila and passing, with minds saturated with the charms of its old Cathedral, into the great temple in the Escorial. In spite of the impressive solemnity, the mysterious sanctity, and chaste beauty of

the former, it was impossible not to be struck with the majesty, lofty sublimity, and noble simplicity of the latter. Lovers of Gothic as we were, we felt that here in this classical church, we were in a temple as worthy to enshrine the worship of the being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and of inconceivable majesty, as was the pure and simple Gothic church of Avila or the stately and richly-ornate Cathedral of Burgos. Curious, also, was it to recollect how rapid was the change which came upon the architecture of the land—curious that a church so thoroughly and completely classical as that of the Escorial should have been designed while in other places Gothic architecture was still in continued use.

But however impressive and elevating may be the effect of the Escorial's church, no one can deny but that, whether as palace or as monastery, the residential building is vastly inferior to earlier—and, indeed, to later—structures, though, on account of its mass, its effect, as a whole, has a certain undeniable grandeur.

The journey to Madrid, of twenty-one miles, was accomplished in less than two hours and a half! and travellers are landed at a station sufficiently remote from the city to necessitate a long drive over a road so bad that the jolting endured must be felt before it can be imagined. Landed, at a hotel in the Puerta del Sol,—a gay, open space from which the best streets radiate,—much-needed repose was at last gained. There is little to detain or interest the lover of architecture in Madrid, but the ordinary traveller may be (as we were) agreeably surprised to find Madrid so Spanish after all that one has heard of the influx of French customs. The picture-gallery, with its most interesting portraits by Velasquez, to say nothing of Murillo, and the wonderfully rich collection of arms and armor in the Armeria, should both be visited with care and by no means in haste. The opera-house and theatres deserve a visit, and the curious in Spanish manners may go to a small, cheap play-house, No. 7 in the Calle Barquillo, for music and dancing, which made the writer, when he first witnessed it, exclaim: "Am I in Madrid or in Morocco?"

The churches in Madrid are comparatively uninteresting, and especially so is the celebrated sanctuary, the Church of the Atocha, the only handsome object in which is the magnificent tomb of the unhappy revolutionist, Prim, on which his effigy lies recumbent as in mediæval monuments, but not in the attitude of prayer. The old Jesuit church, San Isidro el Real, is handsome in its way, as are various other Madrid churches, which deserve no special mention. The fashionable church is in the Calle de Alcalá, the first church on the left after leaving the Puerta del Sol. Here there are plenty of chairs and a crowded congregation, but here, as in every other church in Spain, the ladies still wear their black veils, French bon-

nets being reserved for worldly use, and especially for the afternoon promenade. Never have I seen Mass said with more earnestness and devotion than by the worthy parish priest of this fashionable church.

In need of temporal and spiritual aids, visits had to be paid before leaving Madrid to a Spanish banker and to Cardinal Moreno. Spanish bankers have the curious habit of giving you no indication of their whereabouts. Not only is no name to be found at the gate of the house, but they do not even put their names outside their own door, which opens on the staircase, so that you have actually to ferret them out as you might rabbits, as if the one thing they wished to avoid was to "do business." The proper door having at last been found, entrance was, at half past ten, obtained into a room in which a group of clerks were discussing newspapers and cigarettes with much ease and leisure. Business we were told began at eleven.

Having ascertained that the Archbishop of Toledo had come to Madrid for the winter the writer drove to his palace, in the Calle del Sacramento, and adjoining the Church of San Justo. Ascending a large staircase a door on the first floor admitted the visitor into a dark room or outer hall, where he was met by a priest who courteously inquired his purpose in coming. The visitor saying he was provided with a special letter of introduction from the Cardinal Manning he was ushered through a room on the left, in which were persons of both sexes awaiting an audience, with two or three priests walking up and down in their midst, arranging the order of admission and other details. This room led to a third, much larger, furnished with red velvet chairs and sofa, and with a crimson and gold throne and canopy at one end, two oil paintings of the Pope and King being placed side by side beneath the canopy and behind and above the throne. After waiting some twenty minutes His Eminence appeared at a further door and beckoned with his finger. The visitor advanced, paid his reverence, and was led by the Cardinal through another rather handsomely furnished drawing-room into a small cabinet, with two tables covered with books and writings, and a sofa on which he was invited to sit down beside the Cardinal Moreno, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain. He could not speak French, but chatted pleasantly in Spanish, not by any means hurrying his visitor. His view of Spanish affairs and of the prospects of religion was cheerful, and after a pleasant interview he courteously accompanied his visitor half way through the first drawing-room, at the door of which parting bows were exchanged.

Having seen the Archbishop of Toledo the next thing was to see his city and church, so interesting not only on account of its

beauty and renown, but as the only spot in Spain in which the Mozarabic rite is still in daily use in one of its many chapels. Accordingly leaving Madrid about seven we reached Toledo (by the new direct line) about ten, and went to the Fonda de Lino, a hotel where it is well to make a distinct bargain, and where it is not easy to make a cheap one.

Toledo is a wonderful city. Though conquered from the Moors as early as 1085 it is a Moorish city still. It is a chaos of houses divided by a multitude of narrow tortuous lanes, in utter irregularity and devoid of any general direction, as if they were the gaps left by builders who must have some way of retreat from houses which they had constructed each for itself, and without regard to its neighbors or any general plan. The city moreover is perched on a lofty hill, a natural fortress with a natural moat, for the river Tagus flows round the greater part of its circumference. Then the streets are not only narrow and tortuous, but also steep, and curious indeed is the effect on the traveller who arrives in the dark in an omnibus drawn by a crowd of mules, which were fully needed to drag the heavy vehicle up the steep incline and through lanes in which it seemed hardly able to avoid the house-walls, and finally into the door of a house and a yard, from which a staircase leads to the entrance to the inn, which begins as usual only on the first floor.

Toledo is undoubtedly one of the most interesting cities in Spain for the artist, the historian, and the Catholic. Here are to be found evidences of every great transition which the country has undergone. Without its walls are remains of a Roman amphitheatre and circus maximus. Of the Visigothic civilization and the high perfection to which its arts attained we have evidence in the beautiful gold votive crowns found in the vicinity, and now preserved in the Armeria, at Madrid, and the Hotel de Cluny, at Paris. The Saracenic period has here left deeper traces than anywhere else in Spain, except at Cordova, Grenada, and Seville. The early and late mediæval periods are well exemplified, while Renaissance work everywhere shows itself, and modern revolutionary destruction and decay have, alas, left but too sad and unmistakable traces of their operation. In another manner also the changes of ideas and manners are well exemplified. The religious sentiment of the time of the Visigoths (as shown by its worship) is preserved in the venerable Mozarabic rite, which is still daily performed in the Cathedral, and annually in various Toledan churches. The many traces of Moorish skill in construction and decoration, exemplified in the two fine mediæval synagogues, not only testify to the coexistence of Mohammedan and Jewish believers, but to the wise and equitable toleration of the Spanish Christians in the earlier part of the Middle Ages. It was this spirit of equity which led King Alonzo VI.

to refuse his sanction to the conversion of the great mosque into a church till the Moors themselves had consented to the act. The spirit of intolerance which subsequently became so sadly characteristic of the nation has left its mark in the Christian emblems in the synagogues, which emblems mark their confiscation, and commemorate the period of the expulsion of the Moors and Jews. These intolerant acts not only violated equity and greatly impaired material prosperity, but religion itself suffered, for a religious decay soon began to show itself as a sequence if not a consequence of the régime of excessive repression. To that régime succeeded revolution and irreligion, of which only too abundant traces are to be found, and amongst them the present desecrated state of the two sometime churches and ancient synagogues of Toledo. Finally the last phase of national life, the reviving spirit of religion, is showing itself in the work now going on to restore Christian worship in the old Jewish building, where, if no untoward event occurs, Mass will be once more said, and this time without the accompaniment of persecution or injustice to any one.

Singularly desolate and forlorn is the old Jewish quarter of Toledo, and decay is also the prevailing aspect of the city as seen from the exterior, with its crumbling walls and ruined buildings, the result in great part of the suppression of the monasteries.

The two synagogues to which reference has just been made, are called *El Transito* and *Santa Maria la Blanca*, respectively. Both are very interesting works erected by Moorish workmen for the Jews. The latter building was founded in the twelfth century and the former in 1366, so that for more than three hundred years the Jews enjoyed generous toleration.

Not far off is the magnificent Franciscan Convent and Church of San Juan de los Reges, founded by Ferdinand and Isabella. The cloister is perhaps the most elaborate and ornate example of Gothic architecture which exists, and it is open to question whether its luxuriant magnificence altogether harmonizes with the severe and austere monastic reform professed by the friars who were its first inhabitants.

Its church is also open to criticism. Questionable was the taste which ornamented its exterior with the chains said to have been worn by the Christian captives at Grenada.

Within the church the profuse decorative sculpture exemplifies that decay of piety and increase of worldliness characteristic of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In it, as generally in the churches of that period, and notably in the interior of the magnificent chapel of King's College, Cambridge, we see the images of the saints and holy emblems dwarfed and diminished, while heraldic figures, crests,

and supporters became enormous, and huge coats of arms, crowns, and coronets obtrude themselves on all sides.

But the temple of Toledo is, of course, its famed Cathedral, interesting as the primatial church of Spain, as the one example of pure Northern Gothic in the old Spanish capital, and from its intrinsic beauty and vast size. Its length is not great,—less by more than a hundred feet than the length of Westminster Abbey,—but its width is much more than twice that of its London rival. Its beauty is mainly due to the charm of the originally constructed pure pointed church, but in part to the multiplicity and richness of later additions, which, though less profuse and ornate than those of Burgos, are equally well preserved and free from mutilation.

It happened that the first introduction of the writer to the Cathedral's interior was by the door of the north transept, from which an uninterrupted view is at once obtained of the whole breadth of the transepts and of the circling aisle with its clustered columns extending round behind the high altar. Turning to the left the comparatively modern chapel de la Virgen del Segario at once arrested the attention. This chapel has a very striking effect, for there is first a sort of antechapel, then the shrine of the much-venerated Virgin of Toledo, with the richly decorated sacred image above the altar. Beyond this is a large chapel containing relics, the golden reliquaries of which are visible in the distance behind and above the Virgin's altar, which thus stands between a dark and sombre antechapel and the large, brilliant sanctuary of relics, which seems a mysterious Holy of Holies but partially visible. Around the sanctuary of the high altar are beautiful sculptures, which have been partially removed to the Gospel side to make way for the Renaissance tomb of a bishop. Behind the altar is the lofty and elaborately carved, painted and gilt retablo, and the great pillars on the east side of the entrance to the sanctuary, which are elaborately decorated with niches and statuary. The choir is not so near the west end of the church as in many Spanish cathedrals, and this, together with double aisles all round, gives great spaciousness to the nave. Beneath the southern towers at the west end is the Mozarabic Chapel. The great charm of this magnificent Cathedral is its splendid old stained glass, with which almost every window is entirely filled.

The 25th of October being the feast of the dedication of the church there was a grand High Mass, solemn procession, and sermon. There are between forty and fifty clergy attached to the Cathedral. In the old days there were nearly a hundred canons and prebendaries, amongst which were reckoned the Pope and the King, each of whom was fined two thousand maravedis for non-attendance in choir at Christmas-tide. In the procession there

were thirty-six priests in white copes and three in dalmatics, carrying relics. The processional cross here, as in some other parts of Spain (*e. g.*, at Cadiz), has at the upper part of its staff a wooden cylinder covered with an embroidered veil so arranged as to form a conical roof above it, the whole being placed just below the cross.

At High Mass a few men knelt or sat within the screen of the sanctuary, and the Epistle and Gospel were sung near but not from two gilt metal pulpits placed one on each side of the metal screen.

The sermon was long, and the preacher complained bitterly of the coldness and indifference which must exist when on such a day only a few dozen persons (and there were really no more) could be found present at the festal service. The music was moderately good, but it seemed to us that in Spain both church organs and military bands had become affected by the prevailing twang of the guitar.

The matter of most interest to the present writer however was the old Mozarabic rite, the performance of which he carefully attended, having been provided by the civil sacristan with the office book and missal of the rite. For it is not only the Mass which is peculiar but the office also; and in the Mozarabic Chapel there is a choir with regular stalls, wherein the Mozarabic office is duly chanted daily. It is chanted very quickly and also indistinctly, so that it was a matter of some difficulty to follow the words.

The office began with Prime, of which the first words said audibly are: "In nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi lumen cum pace." After four Psalms and a number of versicles and responses, there followed a lesson from the Old Testament and one from the Epistles and a hymn; and then, strange to say, the *Gloria in excelsis*, followed by the Nicene Creed. In the creed there are certain differences from the creed in the Roman rite. Thus instead of "genitum non factum consubstantialem patri," there is "natum non factum, Homousion Patri; hoc est ejusdem cum Patre substantiæ." Also instead of "et crucifixus est," there is only "passus sub Pontio Pilato."

Next comes the Lord's Prayer, which is said in the following peculiar and very impressive mode:

Priest. Pater noster qui es in cœlis.

Choir. Amen.

P. Sanctificetur nomen tuum.

C. Amen.

P. Adveniat regnum tuum.

C. Amen.

P. Fiat voluntas tua sicut in cœlo et in terra.

C. Amen.

P. Panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie.

C. Quia Deus es.

P. Et dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris.

C. Amen.

P. Et ne nos inducas in tentationem.

C. Sed libera nos a malo.

Finally comes an elaborate benediction in four parts, given by the priest standing, the choir all kneeling and replying Amen to each part.

Tierce then begins with the *Venite exultemus Domino*, followed by Psalms, two little chapters (one from the Old and the other from the New Testament), a hymn, the Lord's Prayer (as before), and an elaborate benediction. *Sext* and *None* are constructed similarly to *Tierce*.

The Mass is believed to be almost purely the ancient Mass of the Gothic times before the advent of the Moors, but a few additions and alterations are known to have been made in the time of Cardinal Ximenes; and doubtless the influence of the Toledote rite, introduced in the eleventh century, must have made itself felt. Neither in the altar nor in the vestments is there anything at present peculiar.

As in the Dominican rite, so here, the priest puts the wine and water in the chalice, and spreads the corporal before the Introit. There is no Kyrie, but the Gloria is said, and then a lesson from the Old Testament, followed by the Epistle and Gospel, as in the Ambrosian rite at Milan. After the offertory and incensing, the priest turns round to receive the offerings of the people saying: "Centuplum accipias, et vitam æternam possideas in Regno Dei. Amen. A special blessing is then given to the bread, with which ceremony the blessing of the bread at the French High Mass has probably some connection. With this ceremony the Mass of the Catechumen ends. At the beginning of the *Missa fidelium* the priest (after a short prayer) raises his hands and says: "Oremus," to which the choir respond, "Agyos, Agyos, Agyos, Domine Deus Rex Æterne, tibi laudes et gratias."

The priest then prays for the Catholic Church, and commemorates the blessed Virgin, the Apostles and Evangelists, and many saints, and afterwards begins the preface by placing his hands on the chalice and saying:

Priest. Aures ad Dominum.

Choir. Habemus ad Dominum.

P. Sursum Corda.

C. Levemus ad Dominum.

P. Deo ac Domino nostro Jesu Christo Filio Dei, qui est in cœlis, dignas laudes dignasque gratias referamus.

C. Dignum et justum est.

Then follows a preface different from the Roman ones, and after it a Sanctus is sung, at the end of which occur the words: "Agyos, Agyos, Agyos, Kyrie O Theos." The rest of the Mass before the consecration is exceedingly short, and the words of consecration of the Gothic Mass are different from those of the Roman. The last words (of those which immediately follow the actual words of consecration) are said aloud; the choir responding, Amen.

The consecrating words of the old rite are: "*Hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis tradetur;*" and "*Hic est Calix novi testamenti in meo sanguini, qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.*"

The chalice is elevated, not naked but covered with its veil.

Then after two short prayers there is another and very peculiar elevation, due doubtless to the former prevalence of the Arian heresy in Spain.

The priest holding the Host over the uncovered chalice says: "Fidem quam corde credimus, ore autem dicamus." He then elevates the Holy Sacrament that it may be seen by the people, and the creed is recited in the same words as at Prime, the separate clauses being said alternately.

The Host is then broken into nine pieces, disposed on the paten in a peculiar order, and the priest commemorates first the living and then the dead, and the choir sing as introductory to the communion the words: "Gustate et videte quam suavis est Dominus. Alleluia."

Having received both kinds and said two short prayers, the priest or the deacon says on the more solemn feasts: "Solemnia completa sunt in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi; votum nostrum sit acceptum cum pace." On less solemn days he says: "Missa acta est in nomine Domine nostri Jesu Christi perficimus cum pace."

This form is very interesting as giving the key to the enigmatical words of the Roman Mass, "Ite missa est."

Lastly, the priest gives the blessing, turning to the people (the only time he does it except at the offertory) and making the sign of the cross over them saying: "Pater et Filius." The unaccustomed hearer might well wonder (as the Frenchman, King Philip V., did wonder) how it is that the name of the Holy Spirit seems to be omitted. It is not, however, really so, for it occurs at the very beginning of the benediction before the priest turns round, so that it is not apt to be noticed. The full words of the blessing are: "In unitate Sancti Spiritus benedicat vos Pater et Filius."

There is yet another notable peculiarity in the Mozarabic rite. The Gloria Patri does not form two verses as with us, but the whole is said in one verse, as follows :

“Gloria et honor Patri et
Filio et Spiritui Sancto in
Sæcula sæculorum. Amen.”

It has been thought that these observations may not be without interest to the Catholic American reader. The writer has not yet had time to jot down more, but hereafter hopes to add his notes, taken in the same spirit, respecting his visit to Cordova, Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, Malaga, Valencia, and Barcelona.

A QUESTION ON LAUGHTER.

THERE is something very attractive in a good hearty laugh. It is like a furtive sunbeam, peeping through the clouds of a sullen September equinoctial, or a bright, cosy fire in the sitting-room on washing-day, suggestive of the idea that not everything, after all, is wet, and dreary, and dismal, and comfortless in this lower world of ours. It brightens up a man's face, and smooths out the wrinkles of passion, and opens up unsuspected depths of good-humor and kindly feeling, until you wonder that the good points of your friend's character could have lain so long concealed from you. Yet, if we reflect upon it, it is not often that we hear a genuine, hearty, whole-souled laugh. Man's nature seems rather to be made for sorrow than for joy. Gladness is but a transient guest, and passes quickly; sorrow makes her abiding-place with us. Go into the streets of this busy city, for example, and scan the faces of the passers-by. How many care-worn, haggard countenances; how many faces bearing the stamp of anxiety, trouble, or even settled melancholy, will you find for one which shows the placid mien and clear bright eye of habitual cheerfulness. Laughter is all too rare in this world, and if there were more of it men would be better, both physically and morally—naturally and (though to some it may seem a bold assertion) supernaturally also.

This being the case, it is certainly somewhat discouraging to be told, as we are by certain pious and excellent books, that our divine Lord never once laughed during the course of His mortal

life. Now if these grave and reverend authors were to confine their assertion to the horse-laugh or guffaw, that rude and boisterous mirth which is the very stamp and seal of vulgarity, they would find in us an ardent supporter. To our taste nothing is more offensive than

“The loud laugh that speaks the vacant mind,”

and consequently nothing more foreign to the angel modesty of our Saviour. But the upholders of the tradition are not content with this. True, they will admit that our Lord's face habitually wore a smile; that grace and beauty clothed him as a garment; that the gentle serenity and ineffable peace depicted on His features formed a great element in that attraction which kept thousands spellbound at His side in the desert, forgetful even of food and drink; but that He laughed outright, they stoutly deny. Their opinion seems to be based upon the too rigid interpretation of some passages from the Fathers. St. Basil, for example, writes as follows:

“To break out into boisterous guffaws is not the mark of one whose soul is composed, upright, and master of itself. . . . And our Lord Himself shows that this is true, because, while taking upon Himself other affections which necessarily accompany the body, and all those things which bear some relation to virtue, such as weariness and sympathy for the unfortunate, He never, so far as can be gathered from the history of the Gospels, indulged in laughter.”—*Lib. Reg. fus. disp. Interrogatio*, 17.

St. John Chrysostom, writing on sorrow for sin, speaks as follows:

“If you also weep in this manner, you are become an imitator of your Lord. For He wept both over Lazarus and over the city; and he was troubled for Judas's sake. Indeed we often find him weeping; nowhere do we find Him laughing—no, nor even smiling. Certainly nothing of this sort is narrated by any of the Evangelists.”—*Hom. in Matt.* vi.

St. Augustine speaks to the same effect:

“And, indeed, we read that the Lord Jesus grieved, wept, was wearied with journeying; that He bore insults and injuries, and took upon Himself spittle, scourges, and the cross; but we do not read that He ever laughed or was prosperous on earth.”—*Sermon LXXXIII.*

It would seem, at first sight, that these passages confirm the idea that our Lord never laughed, but we think it will appear on closer examination that they give it nothing more than a purely negative support. The holy Fathers point out to us that the Gospel does not bring our Lord before us as laughing, and this is undoubtedly true. It was more necessary that our attention should be called to

His tears. They do not intend to infer from this that, in fact, He never laughed, nor could they in justice do so. "The Scriptures do not say that our Lord laughed; therefore He never did," is the argument put into the mouths of these Fathers by our opponents. They were too good logicians to overlook the fact that there is no evident reason why the converse of this argument should not have equal probability: "The Scriptures do not tell us that our Lord never laughed; therefore, it is probable that sometimes he did." In fact, the second argument would appear the more valid of the two, because that a man should never once laugh outright, during the whole course of his life, is certainly an extraordinary fact, and one which would well deserve mention had it occurred. Thus, we find it especially recorded as a remarkable trait of the stern old Roman, M. Crassus, that he laughed only once in his life, and gained thereby the surname of *ἀγέλαστος*.¹

There is only one case in which the former syllogism could be regarded as having weight; in the supposition, namely, that laughter in itself is something wrong or unbecoming a virtuous man. In such a supposition, we may readily conceive that had our Lord really laughed, the sacred writers would not have failed to notice the fact, and explain it. In any other case, it would be unnecessary to do so. Now, that laughter is in any degree wrong in itself, the sternest Calvinist would hardly venture to maintain. It only remains, therefore, to be seen whether there is in it anything essentially trivial, low, childish, or imperfect; anything, in short, which could render it in any way unbecoming the ineffable dignity of the God-man. Before answering this question, let us endeavor to obtain a clear idea of the nature and intrinsic characteristics of laughter.

To invent a rigorous definition in this matter is by no means an easy task. Cicero, in his *De Oratore*, thus confesses his unwillingness to undertake it:

"Quid sit risus, quo pacto concitetur, ubi sit, quomodo existat, atque ita repente erumpat ut eum cupientes retinere nequeamus, et quomodo simul latera, os, venas, vultum, oculos occupet, viderit Democritus."

It is not like Melancholy. She is a subjective, reflective, self-inspective being; she craves to be examined and brooded over; and the more closely we gaze upon her, the more defined does her shadowy form become, the more distinct her gloomy features, and the more oppressive that sad and solemn spell which she shakes from her dusky robes. It is not so with Mirth. He is a shy and

¹ Lucilius, cited by Cicero, de Finibus, cap. xxx.

capricious elf. He is with us, bright and airy, scattering roses on our path, wreathing our forehead with flowers, shedding the hues of morning from his roseate wings; but no sooner do we wish to scrutinize his laughing features, and subject the merry elf to a grave analysis, than, lo, he has vanished, and, like another Ariel, mingling with the elements, leaves us to paint his unsubstantial lineaments from memory alone. Relying, however, on certain grave authorities, we may perhaps say, with some approach to accuracy, that laughter is a peculiar movement of the muscles of the face, particularly of the lips, indicating merriment or satisfaction, and usually accompanied by some convulsion of the diaphragm, and a sonorous and interrupted expulsion of air from the lungs. It must also be observed that these effects are usually due to the felicitous association of objects or ideas which are not in themselves connected, or which, being in some way opposed to our ordinary observation and expectation, carry with them a pleasant surprise. That some sort of surprise or shock to our accustomed train of ideas is necessary to excite laughter, appears from the fact that even the most ludicrous events, when grown old by frequent repetition, have no longer their mirth-provoking power, and that even when they are presented to us for the first time, they are comparatively tame if we come upon them gradually. Thus every one knows that the faculty of "telling a good story" depends, in great measure, on the ability to keep the *dénouement* hidden until the proper moment, when all the circumstances, severally explained and understood, are suddenly brought into some incongruous and ridiculous juxtaposition, which by its very suddenness carries us completely by storm, and forms the *point*, or laughable part of the tale.

Laughter, therefore, implies two things—is formed of two elements: reason, which perceives the ridiculous in things, and certain organs which give expression to the pleasure arising therefrom. Hence it follows immediately that laughter is peculiar to man; that it is what the scholastics call a *proprium*. The brute cannot laugh. The ape may grin and chatter, and the parrot scream a clamorous ha! ha! ha! but the power of laughing is denied them; for though they are, in all probability, furnished with the necessary organs, the rational faculty is wanting, by which to compare ideas and perceive their mutual relations. The angel cannot laugh; for, although the intelligence with which he is endowed is far superior to our own, he lacks the material organs. It may even be questioned whether an angel could really laugh were he, by some miracle, to become possessed of an organized body; for being gifted with an intellect so vast and far-reaching, and seeing besides with one glance, in every principle of his knowledge, all

the conclusions to which it leads,¹ he could, in all probability, never come upon any relation of objects or ideas having, in his regard, that element of novelty and surprise which, as we have shown, seems to be essential to the ludicrous.²

We are now in a position to answer the question, Is there in laughter anything essentially low, trivial, or degrading, which would render it in itself unworthy our divine Lord's character, and thus make the mere fact that no mention is made in the Gospels of his having laughed a sufficient guarantee that he did not? Evidently, from what we have shown, there is nothing. Far from being derogatory to the dignity of man, laughter is an exercise of his noblest faculty, the godlike reason. It is one of his prerogatives.

"Smiles from reason flow, to brutes denied,"

sings the poet. It is this fact which makes us so impatient with those shallow characters who, through a motive of vanity or the mere love of buffoonery, continually assail us with threadbare puns and strained allusions, and by every trivial means lay siege to our risibilities. If it be repugnant to reason to exert any of our merely animal powers, to eat, sleep, walk, or run, without a sufficient object and motive for the action, how much more so when the act implies the use of our noblest faculty, the reason. The resentment, then, with which we regard these impertinent triflers, is an indication of the really high place which laughter holds in our estimation. Besides, we would remind those who think mirth unseemly and derogatory to the dignity of our Lord, that dignity does not consist precisely in *what* one does, but rather in *how* he does it. The most dignified person in the world must perform all the commonest actions of life, which appear so awkward in others; but he does them with a grace which ennoble them. So it was with the laugh of our Lord; it must have been soft and sweet as the evening breeze when it lingers and whispers and murmurs in the waving rushes, or sinks to sleep, dew-laden and heavy with perfume, on some odor-breathing violet-bed; it must have been musical and clear as a silver bell, and tinged withal with a certain gentle gravity and simple majesty, which made it not less godlike than his terrible anger or mysterious weeping. That our mirth is undignified is no sign that His was so.

Our divine Saviour, says St. Paul, was made like to us in all things except sin. The object of His life was twofold: first, to redeem us; secondly, to teach us by His example; or, rather, the

¹ St. Thomas, Sum. Th. P. I, Qu. 54, Art. 4 *et seq.*

² St. Bonaventure holds a similar opinion, though for another reason. See his In. Lib. Sent., l. 2, d. 8, p. 1, arg. 3, q. 2, ad arg.

object of His death was to redeem, while His life was intended as a model, that we might in all things be made conformable to Him. For this end it was not necessary that all His actions should be recorded. The Beloved Disciple himself says that were all, even of the most wonderful actions of our Lord, to be written, the whole world would scarcely contain the books. It sufficed that He should show His apostles and disciples, who were constantly observing and scrutinizing His life, how every thought, word, and action should be ordered, every impulse moderated, every passion controlled and directed, that they might afterwards know how to form themselves and others. We see, then, the propriety of His taking upon Himself all our thoughts and feelings, of His tasting joys and griefs like ours, of His sharing our weakness and our strength; in short, all that is ours except sin, and consequently our laughter as well as our tears.

Indeed, the very fact that our Lord wept is a probable proof that He laughed also. There is but a step from laughter to weeping. Both seem to affect the same muscles, though in different manners. This can easily be remarked in the little parlor ornaments which were quite popular a few years ago, one of which represents the head of a laughing child, while the companion-piece shows the same child crying.

Both actions are accompanied by a sort of convulsive action of the lungs, although the sobbing of grief, as befits a stronger passion, is more violent than that of mirth. Both, properly speaking, are peculiar to man; "crocodile tears," no less than a "horse-laugh," have only a metaphorical existence. Finally, both are possessed of that contagious influence which impels us to laugh with the laughing, and weep with those who weep.

"Ut ridentibus arident, ita flentibus adflent humani vultus."

All this shows that laughter and crying have their seat in the same organs. Take children, in whom the emotions of nature find their unrestricted course; how often does their laughter end in a sob, and who has not seen a rainbow smile break through the falling mist of their tears? It is this mysterious sympathy between the two extremes which gives so much truth to Scott's description of his Lady of the Lake, gazing from the strand after her departing knight,

"With a smile on her lip, and a tear in her eye."

There is a very sound scholastic maxim which has a bearing on this point: *Contraria sunt ejusdem potentiae*. Objects which are directly contrary to one another pertain to the same faculty; as, for instance, black and white to the sense of vision, hard and soft

to that of touch, pleasure and pain to the sensitive appetite, etc. From this, as well as from the facts we have mentioned, it follows that laughter and weeping are only different acts of the same faculty, and that whatever reason may have existed for our Lord's weeping (outside of the immediate occasion, which in His case, of course, could have been no real cause) would probably have been equally strong in favor of His laughing, especially since, as we have shown, there is nothing in the latter essentially evil or unbecoming. Against this conclusion only one objection, we think, can be urged which merits serious attention; and this, it must be confessed, is by no means devoid of plausibility. We have said above that it was at least doubtful whether an angel could really laugh, even though he were to inhabit a material body; and this inability we ascribed to the vast range and intuitive character of his knowledge. *A fortiori*, then, our Saviour, who as God knew and had actually present before His mind at all times everything knowable, not only actual, but also possible, could never have experienced the sensation of novelty which, in some degree at least, necessarily accompanies the ludicrous. The difficulty, we have said, is not without weight, but it may, we think, be satisfactorily solved by the method which St. Thomas applies to one precisely similar. He considers (*Sum. The.*, P. 3, quest. 15, art. 8) whether the feeling of wonder was in our Lord, and deciding from the words of the Evangelist, "*Jesus miratus est*," "Jesus wondered," that it was, he puts to himself this objection: Wonder comes from this, that we see an effect, the cause of which is unknown to us; so that wonder implies ignorance. Now Christ was ignorant of nothing, and therefore could not wonder at anything.

It will be observed that the case is a perfectly parallel one to our own. Nothing could be novel or strange to Him who knew all things, actual and possible; therefore He could not be provoked either to laughter or to wonder.

The Angelic Doctor answers his own objection by noting that although nothing could be novel to our Lord, so far as concerns the knowledge which he had as God, nor even if we speak of that science which, though human, was infused, yet if we consider His *experimental* knowledge, He could come upon novelties every day, and this knowledge, gained naturally by Him as man, could have its natural effect in producing genuine wonder in His human mind. Father Faber expresses this distinction between infused and experimental science very well: "He gains no new knowledge. He does not grow in science; he only becomes master by acquisition of the same science of which he was master before in higher ways. He knows certain things, such things as life's experience can teach, in two ways, instead of knowing them in one way. He has now a

double knowledge of them, an acquired knowledge in addition to the infused knowledge He had before." (Bethlehem, *Soul and Body*, p. 267.)

Now just as the *experimental* novelty of acquired knowledge could, and according to the testimony of St. Matthew, really did produce genuine wonder in our Lord, so could it produce genuine laughter. There is still another argument in our favor which we have reserved for the last, because, to our mind at least, it is a very powerful one. What brings a deeper thrill of happiness to a mother's heart than the joyous laugh of her child? Now can we suppose for a moment that our dear Lady, for whom so many sorrows were in store, was denied this poor consolation, which all other mothers enjoy? For our part we love to believe that the silver laugh of the Divine Child, ringing in sudden music through the quiet home at Nazareth, more than once brought sunshine to His mother's human heart. Even Virgil's poetic instinct would not suffer him to think otherwise; for in that almost inspired eclogue, where, by some mysterious dispensation of Providence, he rises from the level of a Pagan poet to the sublime elevation of the Christian seer, in the last most exquisite lines, he calls upon the infant Messias to greet his mother with a laugh:

"Incipe, parve puer, *risu* cognoscere matrem."

THE LATE ENCYCLICAL ON CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE.

ON the following pages of the REVIEW will be found, in its Latin original, and in a translation somewhat more correct than the one generally current amongst our newspapers, the late Encyclical Letter of our Holy Father on Christian Marriage; for this should be its proper heading, not on Divorce, as it has been generally entitled by the press. The mistake would appear to have originated with the cable telegraph and its agents, who seem either unable or unwilling to transmit correctly any important item of Catholic, and especially of Roman, news. Their constant blundering would be simply ludicrous were it not that the malice by which it is too clearly and too often seasoned is very apt to provoke other feelings than mere laughter. And what is strangest of all, their palpable mistake, though involving little harm, has been repeated, and is yet kept up by those from whom more accuracy might have been expected.

In his Encyclical the Holy Father treats of marriage as it was originally established by the Lord and Creator of all, and as it was

re-established, so to speak, by the Divine Lawgiver in person when He walked on earth for our redemption. In other words, he treats of marriage as it is in itself, and as it should be regarded by all who aspire to the Christian name. He pointedly asserts its essential attributes of unity, holiness, and indissolubility. Going back to its first institution in the Garden of Eden, he shows that, as then designed and framed, such must it endure down to the end of time. It was the bond of one man with one woman, and in this consisted its unity. It was to be as lasting as the existence of the contracting parties; and as it is not bodies or souls merely that are given and taken in marriage, but persons, hence arises its essential character of perpetuity, inasmuch as nothing but the extinction of personality can extinguish the marriage bond. And further, how great was the holiness imparted to matrimony from the beginning by its Divine Founder is evident from this, that even then in the foresight of eternal wisdom it prefigured that most intimate union which would one day exist between redeemed humanity and its Redeemer, the bridal of the earthly Church and her heavenly Spouse. Yet even this was, in the divine counsels, nothing more than a faint shadow of another union, not only closer, but far higher and holier, the blending of the weakest with the strongest, of the finite with the Infinite, which it pleased the Deity to accomplish when He assumed our poor, fallen nature through the mystery of the Incarnation.

The Church of the New Testament received this divine institution of marriage from the Old Church, but in a more perfect form, like everything else that had come down to her from the former dispensation. The relation between those two peoples of God, as He himself designed to call them, was the same that the bud bears to the flower in full bloom, or childhood to the ripeness of age. Their respective treasures of revealed truth stood to each other as types and shadows to reality, as dim twilight to the brightness of noonday. And this enables us better to understand the vicissitudes which this portion of divine revelation had to encounter in early times. This sacrament, for such is the name *latiori sensu* given it by many Fathers even in the Old Law, had been intrusted to the keeping of frail vessels; and in the lapse of ages its sacredness had been somewhat impaired. The Jews, though bearing about with them the mark of the covenant in their flesh, were but too often "uncircumcised in heart," as the Prophet bitterly complains (Jer. ix: 26). For which reason Moses, not of his own accord, but driven to it by "the hardness of their hearts," as Christ Our Lord testifies in the Gospel, had experienced the necessity of tolerating some deviations from the holy rigor which characterized the primeval institution. But the Divine Founder of the New

Law abolished those irregularities, and recalled marriage to its original type of unity and indissolubility. He enriched and ennobled it with the grace and dignity of a sacrament, and willed further that it should become thenceforth a token to mankind of the mysterious blending of the two elements, divine and human, in His new covenant with the children of men. And it was thus exalted and sanctified that Christian marriage came to the Church from the hands of Christ and of His Apostles. It would have been well for the world and for human society at this day had they adhered steadfastly to her authorized teaching of this and of other divine truths.

When Christianity, by a miracle which the most elaborate efforts of human philosophy have so far failed to explain, overran and brought into subjection the Roman world, she rooted out with unsparing hand all its falsities and abominations, that she might renew the face of the earth. At that day men had been taught from the cradle, and confirmed by their schools of learning so called, in false principles and corrupt practices. In these they prided themselves, and they dignified them with the name of civilization, as does this boastful nineteenth century of ours, which has become so blinded by pride and unbelief that it can find no better ideal of perfection than the rotten Paganism of eighteen centuries ago. But the march of the Church was irresistible, for behind her was One stronger than herself; and at His bidding and by His power she overcame the world, not after the fashion of earthly conquerors, by the sharpness and terror of the sword, but, as St. Augustine says, by the healing Wood of the Cross. *Domuit orbem non ferro sed ligno.* To temporal authority she gave a new sanction, mitigating its iron rigor with the law of clemency that sat upon her lips. From subjection she took away the sting of shame by abolishing the element of servile fear; she chastened it with the spirit and enriched it with the merit of Christian obedience. For the hateful motives of self-love and self-interest, that had been hitherto the mainsprings that governed the relations between man and his fellows, she substituted, what was before unknown, the golden bond of Christian charity, grounded on the brotherhood derived from a common Father in Heaven, and consolidated by the additional sacred tie of a common redemption.

Nor was her beneficent work visible only in the political or social order. She well knew that her labor in either sphere would be fruitless, unless the domestic circle were first purified. For the family is not only the origin and primal type of society and of the state, but exercises over both an unceasing and unbounded influence. The Church, therefore, began with domestic life, and sanctified it in its very origin and foundation by recalling the true

meaning and nature of marriage, as instituted by God in the case of our first parents, and holding it up to veneration, invested as it now was, not only with the grace and beauty of a religious rite, but with the dignity and holiness of a sacrament. The change that she wrought was marvellous. Through her teachings the purity of conjugal, as well as of single, life was brought back into a world that had forgotten or remembered only, as if in a dream, this relic of primitive tradition. And this in its turn, like other Christian virtues, was a potent means of subduing the heart of Paganism, and winning it over to that Gospel doctrine which alone could meet all its necessities, and satisfy all its yearnings; for the human soul is by natural instinct thoroughly, or in great part, Christian, as Tertullian, the great Doctor of the African Church, well expresses it.¹ They then learned for the first time, what is after all most conformable to natural reason, that in marriage both parties are alike bound to conjugal chastity, and that, though woman be the weaker vessel, her faithlessness to duty is not more inexcusable than that of him, whom the Apostle styles her "head!" They learned, too, that the prevarication of the husband, who violates his plighted faith by sinful indulgence, is not to be measured by the higher or lower condition of those who subserve his passions, as the Pagan world of old and of our own day imagines,² but solely by the wickedness of his guilty will. The heinousness of adultery was to be estimated in future by the laws of Christ, and not of Cæsar; and all moral cases relative to the marriage state were to be decided by a reference to Paul and not to Papinian, to the inspired and divinely commissioned teacher of the converted

¹ "O testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ!" as he exclaims in his rough African idiom. He had, perhaps, these very words of his Apology in his mind years after when, to give them a more correct philosophical or theological sense, he wrote those other words in his treatise *De Testimonio Animæ*, "Fieri enim (O anima), non nasci soles Christiana." The date of the latter work is not known with chronological exactness; but there is no doubt that it was written after the Apology. See amongst others Dom Remy Ceillier in his *Histoire des Auteurs Eccles.* under Tertullien, Prestre et Docteur de l'Eglise, ch. xxviii., art. 9.

² *Quasi culpam dignitas faciat non voluntas*, indignantly exclaims St. Jerome. These words, quoted by the Encyclical, simple as they are, seem to have puzzled unaccountably more than one translator. They are from St. Jerome's Epistle to Oceanus, numbered as Ep. xxx. in the old editions, lxxxiv. in the Benedictine edition of Martianay, but Ep. lxxvii. in Vallarsi's edition, which is the best of all. It is not the dignity of the offender, but the grade or condition of his victim, that the Saint alludes to; as is clear enough from the context, which will allow of no other meaning. So, too, with the words quoted further on in the text, "eadem servitus pari conditione censetur," which have bothered the translators who examined them apart from their context. The Saint's meaning is evidently: husband and wife are alike servants and bondsmen of Christ, though bearing to each other a special relation as yoke-fellows (implied in their name *conjuges*); hence, they are bound alike by their quality of servants, and the one has no more right to burst his bonds and rebel than the other.

Gentile world instead of the renowned Pagan interpreters of Roman jurisprudence. The language of the great Doctor of the Church, St. Jerome, on this point is so eloquent and beautiful that we cannot withhold it from our readers, especially as some portions of it have been quoted in the Encyclical of our Holy Father.

"*Aliæ sunt leges Cæsarum, aliæ Christi: aliud Papinianus, aliud Paulus noster præcipit. Apud illos viris impudicitia fræna laxantur; et solo stupro atque adulterio condemnato passim per lupanaria et ancillulas libido permittitur, quasi culpam faciat dignitas non voluntas. Apud nos, quod non licet fœminis æque non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur.*"¹

So thoroughly did the converted world acquiesce in the new teaching and legislation of the Church on matrimony, that during the early centuries, and indeed during the greater part of what is known as the Christian era, very few dared to oppose their private judgment on this point to her authority. Not a few from the very earliest days of Christianity "thought and spoke wickedness, and set their mouth against Heaven," as the Psalmist forcibly expresses it.² There was no truth revealed in Scripture or handed down by tradition bearing upon the august mysteries of the Trinity or Incarnation of which their private opinion, or, as they perhaps called it, their rational philosophy, did not make a sport and plaything. But with the sacredness of the marriage contract, as re-established on earth by Our Lord, they did not presume to meddle. The whims and crazy notions of a few Gnostics and Manichees, the latter reappearing at intervals as Paulicians or Albigenses, are the solitary exception that confirms the general rule.

The Christian theory of marriage was not formally called in question, nor any well-organized attempt made to set it aside until those unhappy days when Europe, after having been convulsed for some time by the throes of the new Paganism that was struggling into existence, saw it emerge into light under more than one disguise, but notably that of Reformed Religion. Its sponsors, and those who assisted at its birth, little understood the nature of the young monster whom they had helped to usher into the world. When in after years they looked round them and saw the wickedness, corruption, bloodshed, and manifold woe that had come of their toil and trouble, they sought every pretext to elude the bitter confession of the truth. They pleaded amongst other falsities their youth, their inexperience, lack of sufficient knowledge and

¹ Ep. ad Ocean. Inter Opera Hieronymi. Venetiis, 1766, tom. i., p. 459.

² "Cogitaverunt et locuti sunt nequitiam, iniquitatem in excelso locuti sunt: posuerunt in cælum os suum."—*Psalm lxxii.*, 8, 9.

of becoming diligence at the outset of their reforming career.¹ But the fact is that they were the tools, many of them unwillingly or unconsciously, of a stronger power, the spirit of the age in which they lived. They had fostered its growth; and in its turn it overmastered them and forced them to do its will and bidding. The Pagan element that was asserting itself in society clamored for liberty, or license rather, and those obsequious ministers of its caprice granted freely whatever was asked, gilding it beforehand with the specious name of Gospel liberty, and pure religion. The world was growing tired of Christ's yoke and of the restraints of His Revelation. It demanded the right to think for itself independently of God's authority, and to act as it pleased independently of His law. The intellect was to be freed from the shackles imposed by divine teaching, and the flesh was to be emancipated from that bondage in which it was kept by God and His Church. And this emancipation of the flesh Heyne, without the faintest intention of irony, but with the genuine glow of enthusiasm, entitles the crowning glory of the Reformation.

The Reformers, it would almost seem, considered it their mission to degrade matrimony, and thus pave the way for its elimination from the number of Christian ordinances, and for the reintroduction of the natural, or rather purely Pagan, character of marriage. In pursuance of this unhallowed task they began by stripping it of those glorious prerogatives with which it had been invested by the Creator in the Garden of Eden and by Christ Our Lord in the Church of the New Law. They robbed it first of its holiness by casting it down from its high place of honor as a Christian sacrament and relegating it to the civil sphere. Thus in the first official statement of the doctrines of the new religion set

¹ See for example the Confessions of Bucer, of which the following is a specimen:

"Haud mirum si ille (Lutherus) alicubi, nos in multis lapsi sumus. Juvenes enim imperitque prope omnes ad hanc tantam causam pertracti sumus." (It is no wonder that he (Luther) went astray in some points and we in many. For we were, nearly all of us, drawn into this great cause while young and inexperienced.)

And again: "Ego ingenue coram Christo et ecclesia ejus fateor me, cum ad hoc ministerium pertraheretur, communionis sanctorum et disciplinæ Christi nec justam scientiam nec dignam curam habuisse. . . . Jam, ubi ego impegi, ibi et complures symmystas meos impegisse non nego." (I freely avow before Christ and His church that when I was dragged into this ministry I was wanting in adequate knowledge and sufficient care of the communion of Saints and Christian discipline. . . . And where I myself stumbled I do not deny that very many of my fellow-ministers have likewise stumbled.)—Ap. DOLLINGER, *Die Reformation*; Regensburg, 1848, vol. ii., p. 33.

This is the Bucer whom Milton, for reasons of his own, extols as a man "of gravity and worth," "a faithful evangelist," "the pastor of nations," "who, if any since the days of Luther, merits to be counted as the Apostle of our Church."—*Milton's Works* (Pickering), vol. iv., p. 302, 303. Besides being an outspoken advocate of divorce and of polygamy, Bucer was notorious for his trickery, habitual falsehood, and double dealing. Luther, who knew him well, denounced him as "a lying varlet."

before the world by its princes and theologians for their own justification, as they alleged, in the articles that treat of "The Sacraments and their Use," there is no mention of Matrimony, not even a word of warning against the doctrine of the Church which attributes to it a sacramental character. It occurs for the first time in the article which is headed "Of Civil Matters" (*De rebus civilibus*), and there it is thrown in promiscuously with the making of bargains, fighting in just wars, holding of property, taking of oaths by order of the magistrate, etc.¹ Calvin, in his *Institutes*, sneeringly adds that if marriage is to be counted a sacrament because it came from the hands of God to mankind, the same claim may be advanced in favor of agriculture, architecture, and the like! Scores of honest Pagan writers have come down to us whose ideas of marriage were more noble and more rational, and loudly cry shame on this pretended Christian reformer.

The next step was to break down its perpetuity by granting to the state, to theologians, and even to individuals (for Luther passed through all these varied phases of opinion), the privilege of annulling any marriage, however valid in the original contract. Not only desertion, but even conjugal disobedience, was to be held as excuse sufficient for this high-handed outrage against the divine commandment. Nothing now remained but to do away with the unity of marriage, though virtually this had been done already by maintaining its dissolubility in so many cases. But even this venerable characteristic of marriage, which constitutes one of the leading features that distinguish civilized nations from utter barbarians and savages, was openly attacked and deliberately set aside by Luther, Bucer, Ochinus, and many others. They preached it in the pulpit and defended it in set works of controversy. When occasion called for it they reduced their theory to practice, as they did in the case of their patron, the Landgrave of Hesse, to whom they gave under their hand and seal a written license or dispensation, as they called it, to have two wives at the same time! Amongst our English-speaking admirers of the great revolt of the sixteenth century and its heroes special pains are taken to palliate and cover up this infamous transaction. It has been adroitly represented as nothing more than a case of divorce, a substitution of Catharine Von Sala for the repudiated Landgravine. No one in Germany would attempt to explain the matter in this way, and it is not creditable to English or American scholarship that such a ridiculous line of defence can find writers to urge and readers to acquiesce in it. Nothing could be more false and unfounded. To

¹ See the Confession of Augsburg, art. xvi., in the 26th volume of the works of Melancthon, better known as *Corpus Reformatorum*, edited by Bretschneider & Bindsell, Halle, 1858.

understand this readily nothing more would be necessary than to read the Lutheran Von Rommel's *Life of Philip of Hesse*, and, above all, the original documents collected in its third volume. This "dispensation" has covered the heads of the Reformation with everlasting disgrace, from which no explanation or excuse can ever rescue them. And it is somewhat to the credit of poor Melancthon, who was dragged into this wretched affair against his will, that grief and shame on account of this hideous prevarication overpowered him to such an extent as to throw him into a mortal illness, in which he remained hanging for weeks between life and death. After this the very name of the Landgrave became hateful to him, and the least mention of this scandalous business awakened in him an agony of remorse, which lasted for years, until the whole matter seemed to have passed into oblivion. Then he dismissed it from his memory. It is to be hoped that his paroxysms of grief sprang from some higher motive than the dread of seeing his share in the sin and scandal dragged into the light of day.

All these novelties had to be justified by Scripture, for the fashion of the day made it an imperative necessity. Hence this sacred arsenal was ransacked for weapons and texts, and, as might be expected, human ingenuity or sophistry found there an abundance of them to use in the combat against divine truth. It was the old story, what has often happened before and since then, and what was prefigured in the Gospel¹ for our warning,—the Evil One, or those whom he had inspired, making bold to turn God's Word against its Divine Author. But this presumptuous practice has produced its legitimate fruit at last, and the children of those who anxiously searched the Bible for arguments on behalf of divorce and polygamy have come to discover by study of the same source that Christianity is either a myth and fable, or at best an imperfect evolution of progressive mundane truth, and its prophets and apostles amiable dupes, to take the most favorable view of them, or benevolent impostors, who tried to deceive the human race for its good. It is not our purpose here, nor is it necessary, to go over the tortuous ways through which those interpreters wilfully strayed in the wicked attempt to delude themselves and their hearers or readers. Enough that they deliberately set aside the clear teaching of Our Saviour in His Gospel: "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder;" and coolly proposed, if not as a virtue to be admired, at least as a privilege to be enjoyed by all followers of the new Gospel, that very hard-heartedness of the Jews which the Son of Man by explicit declaration had rebuked and condemned as subversive of the original divinely ordained

¹ Matt. iv. 6.

type of matrimony. *Ab initio non fuit sic* is the gloss with which the Divine legislator cancelled the deviations that had crept into His original code. "From the very beginning," He says, "there was no such thing as divorce, for God made marriage one and enduring until death; and though Moses had to tolerate such practices because of the hardness of your hearts, I who have come to restore all things will give back to marriage, too, its pristine form of unity and perpetuity. What, therefore, God originally joined together let no man presume to put asunder."

This is most distinctly and unquestionably the teaching of Our Lord, as may be seen by reading the Evangelists and His inspired Apostle, St. Paul (Cf. Matthew xix. 3-6; Mark x. 5-12; Luke xvi. 18; Romans vii. 2, 3; 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). And this should suffice for all who aspire to be in name and deed Christians, or "taught of God," as they alone deserve to be styled who receive with implicit faith everything uttered by God's Incarnate Wisdom, when it pleased Him to be seen on earth and converse with the children of men (John vi. 45; Baruch iii. 38). But how are these words of Our Lord received by the proud men who presumed to correct the teaching of His Church, and to alter the belief of all Christendom through all ages? Do they not say as plainly as if they spoke the words: "As long as the New Testament recommends and urges that saving faith by which the sinner is made whole and justified without works of the law (Luke vii. 50; Romans iii. 28), we will listen to its preaching. But when it comes to Gospel precepts that are hard to flesh and blood, we will give up the Lawgiver of the New for him of the Old Testament. Here we prefer Moses to Christ as a teacher. And for our models of perfection in the marriage state we will look henceforth, not to the disciples and friends of the Redeemer, but to His revilers and enemies, to the stiff-necked, hard-hearted race that persecuted the prophets, resisted the Holy Ghost, denied the Holy and Just One, and put the Author of Life, the Son of God, to a cruel and ignominious death."

We will pass over as unworthy of consideration the parenthetic clause of Matthew (v. 32, xix. 9) on which some inside and outside of the Church seem to lay too much stress and exaggerate its difficulty. It refers evidently only to a temporary separation for just cause. Nor could a few doubtful words by any possibility make void the absolute declaration and command of Christ, given in the same breath and repeated by St. Mark, St. Luke, and St. Paul, without any limitation. Besides, it is a dictate of common-sense that all laws are to be interpreted, not by individual caprice of the subjects of the law, but by a legitimate tribunal. And the Church, the tribunal which He established on earth and which He com-

manded us all to "hear," that is to abide by, under penalty of everlasting damnation, has always understood and explained these words as allowing a partial temporary separation, but not the liberty of divorce, properly so called. Besides, it is not so much on this clause as on the law of Moses that heresy has built up its theory of divorce. The clause admits of only one ground of separation or dissolution of the bond, supposing it for a moment to be such. They extend the number indefinitely. Had the advocates of divorce, who bear the Christian name, sought honestly in Holy Writ for a confirmation of their opinion, they would have found it. But where? In the querulous words of those carnal-minded men who were dissatisfied with the rigor of Christ's teaching, and came out boldly to His very face with their *Si ita est, non expedit nubere*. "If the case of the man be so (as Thou sayest) with his wife, it is not good to marry." In other words: "If marriage be robbed of the prospect of divorce when needed, men had better avoid it as a galling yoke and unbearable bondage." Indeed, to generalize somewhat this reflection, it is to be feared that very few professed Bible-readers ever consult the sacred volume with the serious aim of seeking from it what they should believe. They are intent rather on finding in it confirmation of what they have already made up their mind to believe. Hence their perusal of it is necessarily not only one-sided, but superficial. If they would but study or even read it with a little more of attention and of impartiality, they would be astonished, and it is to be hoped disedified to their great advantage, by discovering how much of the new religion that was obtruded on Europe in the sixteenth century to supersede the teaching of the Church, is to be clearly found in Scripture, not, however, proceeding from Christ or His Apostles, but recorded by the inspired penman as coming from the mouths of Scribes, Pharisees, Capharnaïtes, cavilling inquirers, etc.; in a word open enemies or vacillating disciples of Our Lord and His Gospel. And their anti-Catholic argument is for the most part put in the shape of a question, a form of objecting that seems congenital with heresy from its first birth in the Garden of Eden. Thus we hear it asked: "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition? Who can forgive sins but God alone? How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" with other interrogatories of a like kind. Whence it becomes plainly manifest what and whose spirit it is that accuses the Church (in the person of her Divine Spouse) of Sabbath-breaking, or habitually taunts her with the absurdity of her belief in the Real Presence, Confession, Absolution, etc. But we have no time to go any further in this ample field of investigation.

It was the misfortune of the early Reformers that they were

fighting the battles of Heathenism and were nevertheless compelled by public opinion to argue their case with weapons borrowed in appearance from Scripture. It is no wonder that so many of them, as their private correspondence testifies, became at last tired of life and looked forward to death and the grave as a welcome relief from this painful warfare. Meanwhile the new doctrines, especially those that defined the relation of man and woman, were everywhere producing the results that might have been expected, and that had been confidently foretold by those who remained true to the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church: The paradoxes of Luther, as wild and atrocious as they were shameful and indecent, touching the physical impossibility of continence, re-echoed by every pulpit and diffused broadcast through the land in pamphlets, tracts, manuals of controversy, and even books of devotion, the facilities opened to divorce by theologians, consistories, secular courts, and in too many cases even the tribunal of individual private judgment, all contributed to bring in a deluge of crime and moral devastation upon Germany, which struck the divines and God-fearing laity with horror and dismay, and filled statesmen with alarm for the future of their country.

The wisdom of Christ Our Lord in recalling marriage to its pristine purity and perfection was vindicated by the very men who presumed to undo or improve upon His divine legislation. The reiterated warnings, too, of Catholic theologians and moralists were fully verified. Divorce proved neither a remedy for human weakness nor a check to licentiousness, as its advocates had boastfully promised. All manner of unchastity, and above all adultery, began to abound everywhere. It soon ceased to create horror or even surprise. It was no longer a sin and a shame. It had become the daily bread of the people. It was no longer anything serious, but a matter of jest and laughter. These are literally the complaints, a thousand times repeated, of Luther, Melancthon, Brentz, Mathesius, Bucer, Sarcerius, of all the leading Reformers. The evil was not here nor there, but everywhere. Nuremberg, Ulm, Strasbourg, Wurtemberg, Leipsic, Marburg, Bremen, Brunswick, the proud imperial cities, the market towns, the humblest country villages, were all groaning alike under this plague of uncleanness. Wittemberg, the home of Luther and the Rome of the new religion, asserted its shameful pre-eminence, not only by the orthodoxy of its creed, but perhaps even more by the dissoluteness of its men and women, and above all of its students, till it became the byword of all Germany. Luther, more than once, towards the end of his life, thought of quitting it in horror and disgust. All acknowledged with sighs and lamentations the prevailing moral rotteness; but few, if any, were able or honest enough to trace it to

its true source. Some cast the blame on the Devil; others regarded it, some with fear and trembling, some with joy and hope, as a token of the approaching end of a wicked world. But what is stranger still, is the unaccountable folly of men who kept on from day to day longing for death to come and deliver them from the fierce storm of iniquity they themselves had raised. The pathetic outbursts of Melancthon alone on this score would fill a good-sized volume. Surely these men must have never read or forgotten the terrible intimation of St. Paul (Heb. ix. 27), that as surely as man must die, so surely shall his death be followed by judgment.

In England an attempted divorce was the first step towards that complex of tyranny, rapine, spoliation, murder, and manifold crime, which has passed into history under the name of "The English Reformation under Henry VIII." The wicked lusts of a blood-thirsty tyrant compelled him to break with the Holy See, in order that he might be free from all hindrance in putting away her who before God and the world was his lawful wife. He found in the Cromwells, Cranmers, and other unprincipled prelates of his court willing tools to consummate an iniquity in which the Pope was restrained by conscience and by the laws of the Church from having any part. To bolster up the nefarious scheme in its successive stages and after completion, they found it necessary to make first a few, and then gradually more innovations in religion. Hence they altered whatever suited their purpose or their inclinations, both in doctrine and in discipline, with no other limits to their attempts than the iron will of the imperious tyrant to whom they had sold themselves as willing slaves, no less in soul than body. And thus it was to a licentious king and a few renegades, the shame and dishonor of the sanctuary, that England was indebted for that insular system of religion which very properly proclaims its utter absence of connection with the true Church of Christendom by assuming the name of Anglicanism. It is a new religion fastened on the people of the country by the high-handed tyranny of its rulers, but which has never yet commanded the homage or respect of one-half of its inhabitants. And the withdrawal of the strong hand of government protection, in other words its disestablishment, which is daily approaching, will inevitably soon number it amongst those human institutions that have had their day, and when factitious support is taken away must forthwith wither and die.

But to the credit of England it must be said that divorce never flourished there, never became popular, nor even gained a partial hold upon the people, though it had been introduced into the country by a popular monarch and taught in its chief school of theology by a reformer of such note as Martin Bucer. Even

Henry VIII. did not venture to shock the Catholic sentiment by proposing openly such a divorce as the sectarian gloss of Scripture, in spite of Christ's express words, has declared lawful and Christian. He disguised his contemplated crime under another name; and, to give it a specious coloring of legality he pretended that his marriage with Catharine had been by canon law null and void from the beginning, and that all he desired was to have its nullity judicially declared. Could he but establish this fiction legally he would have gained possession of Anne Boleyn, the end for which Catharine's repudiation was only a means, without horrifying his Christian subjects. It seems to admit of no doubt that some hereditary feeling of reverence for most of what is holy and true in Christian and Catholic tradition appears to have lingered longer in England than in other countries that threw off the yoke of Catholic obedience in the sixteenth century. Englishmen are often loud, extravagant, almost frantic, in their outcries against Popery and its "superstitions," but for all that Catholic sentiment yet tinges the national mind. The Anglican Church, while recognizing, as Catholics do, the lawfulness of partial divorce (as it is improperly called), that is, a separation *a mensa et thoro*, has never yet, in spite of her erring theologians, officially allowed that parties thus divorced or separated have a right to marry another. And when John Milton for interested motives of his own, no less trifling than unworthy, appealed to the Puritan Parliament to give back to England the freedom of divorce, or, as he calls it, "the most important freedom that God and nature hath given us in the family," his words were received with cold surprise in most quarters, and in some with jeering and derision, of which he bitterly complained. Soon after he was reconciled to his wife, upon which all his theories vanished into thin air. And this notwithstanding the fact that only a little before in the exuberance of his fanaticism—not to call it by a meaner, more odious name—he had pretended almost in express words to have received a call from Heaven to complete the work of England's Reformation, to do away with "unfit marriage, the Protestants' idol," as they had done away with "the Papists' sacrament," by introducing freedom of divorce. And such freedom! Not only large, but limitless. For, in Milton's theory, divorce was to be as thoroughly Protestant as any other article of his creed, or even more so. There was to be no intermeddling on the part of Church or state. Private judgment was to be the only tribunal, the repudiating husband the only judge! This was evidently the cunning device of one whose own case would bear no sifting. In the example of this great poet, but little man, we have another sad commentary on the sincerity of those who set up for reformers of society, play the pompous rôle of benefactors to mankind, boast of their lofty mis-

sion, fortify it by arguments from Scripture and reason, labor to overthrow established order, and set the whole world in a blaze;—and all this merely, if the truth were but known, to gratify some passing whim of their own, some petty ignoble passion! The reforming Puritan had forgotten, it is clear, what in his younger days he had written or sung about one “who steals the souls of men away, under false semblance of religion.”

“Prædatorque hominum falsa sub imagine tectus.”

But, though the spirit of innovation had established itself in Europe, it was only within the last hundred years that the monstrous doctrine and practice of divorce have crept into Catholic countries. For this they have to thank the infamous philosophy of the last century, which assumed the task of rooting out Christianity from Europe and the civilized world. Heathen in its origin, it had been nurtured and strengthened in its growth by the Protestant development in Germany and England. It was from the last country that it made its way into France. Its votaries knew full well that the same attempt had been made by Nero, Decius, Diocletian, Galerius, and Julian, and made in vain, but they were undeterred by the failure of their Pagan predecessors. Many of them from their unhappy training, or from having voluntarily shut their eyes to the evidence that surrounded them on every side, did not believe that the Church was the work of God's hands, and consequently knew not that it was a house or fortress which no human effort could overturn against the will of its Heavenly Builder. But this was not true of all of them. Not a few, led on by the prevailing influence or fashion of the hour, or yet meaner motives, wrote and spoke against their deepest convictions, trusting to the wretched hope—common to all bad Christians, who have retained their faith—that they would some day, at their last hour at the farthest, utter a cry of repentance, and thus obtain mercy and forgiveness. But there were yet others, and who can tell how many, who with open eyes and willing hearts deliberately chose impiety as their portion, spurning all hope and desire of repentance or pardon. Most Christians, who are upright and simple of heart, measuring others by themselves, cannot conceive such a frame of mind to exist in any one, above all in a Christian, who, as the Apostle says, has “once tasted the Heavenly gift” of faith, and would fain hold it for impossible. They are right to some extent, for such a state of the soul is not natural, not human, but purely devilish. And this very word solves the difficulty.

Christ, it is true, by His coming, destroyed the empire of the devil over mankind, but the fulness of this blessing belongs only to those to whom the angel's message announced peace on the

night of His birth, *hominibus bonæ voluntatis*, that is, "to men of good-will." But to those of stubborn and perverse will, who not only refuse obedience to His Law but scout His authority and fling away with contempt His yoke as Teacher of Truth, in a word reject all faith as well as good works, He allows the baneful privilege of going their own way and choosing their own Master. And this explains why it is that the empire of the devil seems growing once more in a world whence Christ Our Lord had done what in Him lay to expel it. For which reason St. Paul exultingly speaks of the Evil One's sway as a thing of the past: "*Diabolum . . . qui habebat imperium.*" Since the decay of faith, for which Neo-Paganism and its offshoot, Protestantism, are both responsible, the devil seems to have returned to busy himself in human affairs with more energy and more success. He of all others it appears evidently is the prime mover and inspirer of the great work of secret societies directed against the work of the Son of God, His revelation, and His Church. And without the aid of these societies irreligion would have made little progress, instead of subjugating Europe as it has nearly succeeded in doing. It is in the awful gloom of these nightly assemblies that man is drawn near to the devil; there that with unthinking rashness he swears homage to his worst enemy and binds himself by oath to do his bidding. And sad experience has shown in too many cases that by this frequent holding of communion with Satan man begins at length to imbibe his spirit and comes at last to be like him in hating God and all His work. He is then ready to stand up deliberately against the Eternal and confront His invincible omnipotence, content if he but succeed in marring, however slightly, His fair work of Redemption, or detracting in the least degree from His glory. His highest pride, and the only miserable satisfaction left him, is that of the foul fiend to whom he has become a willing slave. Since he cannot hope to conquer or overthrow the Divine Ruler, he will be content like his new master,

"To disturb His heaven,
And with perpetual inroads to alarm,
Though inaccessible, His fatal throne."

The "philosophers"—such was the insolent name they gave themselves, just as in our own time they call it "science" to decry Moses and his cosmogony, the Apostles and the Gospel they preached—did not look forward to the possession in their day of political power to be used against Christianity. They longed for the armed hand of a Nero and a Julian, but they did not dream of its speedy coming. Meanwhile, until the hour of coercion by the sword should arrive, they made what use they could of the pen in addition to their other means of seduction. Taking example, if

not actual counsel, from Satan, they concluded to flatter those whom they could not terrify. It was thus their prince and leader had succeeded with our first parents. The same pride which cast Lucifer out of Heaven and Adam out of Eden is the true weak point of human nature; and here they began the assault. They took up the Protestant principle of private judgment, and brought it to such philosophical perfection as even error may be made to reach. To their credit it must be said they for the first time explained the true and full meaning of that principle, and flung away the illogical fetters with which it had been clogged by the arbitrary caprice or caution of the Reformers. Man's private judgment, they correctly said, is as free to reject ten, twenty, or all mysteries as to reject two or three. Creation from nothing, a soul that no sense can reach, the resurrection of a body that our eyes have seen die and perish, are just as irrational and absurd as the Eucharist or the Trinity. The Scripture that teaches such things can only be a mass of falsehood, and to pin one's faith to such authority is to degrade or renounce the dignity of human reason. Thus they not only rightly explained this great principle of Protestantism, but they carried it to the full extent of its logical development. With impious parody of St. Paul (Rom. ii. 29) they said: "Man is a law unto himself. He is sole lord of his whole being, not only of his intellect but also of his will. If he is to own no master of his thoughts, why should he be called on to recognize any power that claims to control his actions?" From this came as a necessary conclusion that individual reason was to be the measure not only of intellectual speculation but also of sensual indulgence. This was, with changed phraseology, the very same liberty or emancipation of the flesh that Luther had introduced with his new Gospel, though tenderness for Christian ears had compelled him to disguise his tenets under the garb of religious language and call the indulgence of brutish passion by the lofty names of "Opus divinum, opus necessarium, Dei mandatum, etc."¹

¹ This he has repeated so often in Latin and German that it is unnecessary to give any reference. Here is a specimen of his detestable principles uttered in the vernacular, some of it from the pulpit, for the benefit of women and children: "Also wenig als in meiner Macht steht dass ich kein Mannsbild sey, also wenig steht es auch bei mir dass ich ohne Weib sei. Wiederum auch also wenig in deiner Macht steht dass du kein Weibsbild seiest, also wenig steht es auch bei dir, dass du ohne Mann seiest. Denn es ist nicht ein freie Willkuhr oder Rath, sondern ein nöthig natürlich Ding, dass Alles was ein Mann ist muss ein Weib haben, und was ein Weib ist muss einen Mann haben." And further: "Wachset und mehret euch, ist nicht ein Gebot, sondern mehr denn ein Gebot, nämlich ein göttlich Werk, das nicht bei uns steht zu verhindern oder nachzulassen, sondern ist eben also Noth, als dass ich ein Mannsbild sei, und nöthiger denn essen und trinken, segnen und auswerfen, schlafen und wachen." Again, read this shameful utterance: "Die brünstige natürliche Neigung zum Weibe

That such men should angrily and contemptuously spurn the laws of the Church and state in Europe regarding divorce was quite natural. But they were after all nothing more than writers, statesmen on paper or in the closet, with no material backing, no way of enforcing their ideas. They had found allies in other men, misguided enthusiasts, more innocent of purpose, but led away by the specious name of liberty, who lost themselves in admiration of the rights of man, utterly unconscious, or criminally forgetful, that God and civilized society may have rights as well as the individual, and that the latter may have, besides his rights, duties also to his Maker and his fellow-man. But, for a long time, these disturbers of society, whether evil-minded revolutionists or idle dreamers, could do nothing more than complain, theorize, and keep on agitating the public mind, and spreading their poison through every available channel, from learned tomes of philosophy and jurisprudence down to tales and romances for youth and the uneducated classes. A day came at last when unexpected circumstances, not suddenly, but gradually, placed in their hands the power of the state. The philosophers reigned, but only to falsify Plato's saying; and France was the unhappy country that the justice of an angry God handed over to their rule. They proceeded by stealthy steps; and it is worthy of notice that, in their new-fangled legislation of 1789, the only *cahier* recommending divorce was the one presented by the wretched coward, Egalité (the father of Louis Philippe), who perished soon after, a victim of the anarchy he had done so much to bring about. Nor is it to be forgotten that in his last hour this idol and slave of the infidel revolutionists had no friend on earth but a priest of the Church that he had so grievously sinned against by his irreligion and other crimes. When these wicked men had succeeded in binding France hand and foot in their chains, they accomplished their purpose; and in 1792 divorce was solemnly legalized in a Christian country, where since the first introduction of the Gospel it had never been known nor tolerated, not even among the Jewish or Protestant subjects of the monarchy. Divorce was subsequently enlarged and its facilities increased, until at last, somewhat modified, it found a permanent place in the Code Napoleon. After the restoration of the old Bourbon dynasty, notwithstanding the worthless character of the king and his infidel counsellors, an organized movement, springing from the Christian sentiment of the country, was set on foot for the abolition of this new and iniquitous law of divorce. The

kann weder mit Gelübden noch mit Gesetzen verhindert werden, denn es ist Gottes Wort und Werk." Cf. Luther's Werke (Walch's ed.), iii. 64, 412; v. 2011; vi. 2750, viii. 1099; xviii. 2148; xix. 904; xxii. 1470, 1695, 1700, 1713, 1726, 1763, 1806, 2070.

movement was successful, and in 1816 this foul blot was erased from the pages of French legislation. After the Revolution of 1831, in the reign of Louis Philippe, fresh attempts were made to re-enact this anti-Christian law. But, though they found favor in the Chamber of Deputies, they were always rejected by the Upper House or Chamber of Peers, which represented the Catholic conservative element of the nation.

Since then more than one storm of revolution has burst upon the head of that unhappy country. The events of February, 1848, made her a republic. Then came the now-forgotten Louis Napoleon, first as Prince President, and afterwards as Emperor. "My uncle's nephew" could not fail to introduce the Code Napoleon, and with it divorce, into his new empire. He had even the sacrilegious temerity to insist in his infamous letter to Colonel Ney (written, it has been said by way of excuse, amid the fumes and excitement of one of his orgies), that the Vicar of Christ should adopt this irreligious code for the government of his states; or, failing to do this, he must expect no longer the support of France against his enemies. Never yet, since the days of St. Peter, had the Head of the Christian Church been thus insulted. Never had he heard such outrageous language from Protestant Prince or Russian Czar, not even from a Mohammedan ruler. What wonder is it that God has launched against himself and his house such signal retribution for this and other crimes against the majesty of His Vicar on earth! His empire was overthrown in the field by the iron host of Prussia, that he had affected to despise; in the streets of his capital by a handful of puny miscreants. He died alone, unpitied, and, it is to be feared, unrepentant, in a strange land; and divine vengeance, that visits the sins of fathers on their children, has not spared even his unoffending son. One might well repeat *Et nunc Reges intelligite!* but in vain. The warning will ever remain unheeded, as it has been since first uttered by King David (Ps. ii. 10).

The revolution that overthrew the dynasty of Louis Napoleon, it may be justly supposed did not do away with the unchristian liberty of divorce. Even had the new government repealed all the laws of the banished emperor, their character is such as to warrant the belief that they would cheerfully grant any and every right, such as human law can make it, to trample on the Law of God and His Gospel.

From France this impious legislation, by the arts of infidel statesmen and the secret societies, has passed into other Catholic countries. Italy, which is governed not by its people, as some innocent newspaper-readers imagine, but by a handful of Free Masons and unbelievers, is, or is soon to be, in the same condition.

It is true that the first article of their Constitution declares that the Catholic religion is, and shall be inviolably, the religion of the country. But this is only a sham and dead letter, and placed there, at the beginning of their legislative career, merely as a blind to delude the simple. Their whole course shows, even had we not known their intentions beforehand, that their aim is to abolish Catholicity in Italy as a preliminary step to abolish Christianity throughout the civilized world. And one of their favorite ideas is to elevate the sensual man, to encourage in every way and promote his growth and full development, knowing well that this is the surest way to annihilate in him all that is spiritual and Christian. Hence their freedom of divorce and other legalized abominations, with the details of which we shall not offend the reader.

In the Protestant portions of Europe divorce is alarmingly on the increase. In the Prussian Empire it is bad enough; but in Switzerland it is still worse, the rate per cent. of divorce there exceeding that of any other region of Europe. And the enormity of the evil appears more fully when we reflect that in Switzerland two-fifths and in Germany three-eighths of the population must be deducted before taking into account the number of those among whom divorce exists. These are Catholics, and therefore to be excluded when it is a question of divorce statistics. *Kultur*, as they call it, is loud in boasting that it has taken in hand the subjugation of the world and is gradually completing its task. The old Roman civilization made the same boast, perhaps with more truth. However, in both cases a conquered world has been avenged by the scourge of sensuality that has come in the conqueror's train.

"Sæviôr armis

Luxuria incubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem."

Even in England the wicked spirit of the age has begun to triumph over the stubborn conservatism for which that country was distinguished, and by the law of 1857 (Act of 20 and 21 Vict. c. 85) divorce has been cheapened for the masses, instead of being, what it was heretofore, a luxury for the noble and wealthy. What shall we say of our own country? Its divorce record has become of late years absolutely disgraceful, especially in some of the Western and in the New England States. In some of them the number of marriages remain stationary, while the number of divorces goes on increasing from year to year at a frightful rate. In little Rhode Island, it is said, there is one divorce to every ten marriages! The secular press throws out fitfully, now and then, an indignant protest against this disordered legislation. The so-called religious (non-Catholic) papers are dumb. They see nothing to alarm them

in this growing corruption of morals. They are too intent on watching, and warning their readers against, imaginary dangers from the Pope and the Jesuits. And yet, by the side of this increasing deluge of legalized immorality, of what account is growing material prosperity, the expansion of commerce, the reclaiming and building up of the Western wilderness? "Shall the shield of the law continue to protect and foster the growth of moral and social corruption?" is a question of far more importance to the welfare of the country than "What party is to triumph at the next election?" or, "Who shall be our next President?" Yet those who have undertaken, or at least profess to be the teachers of the people, instead of seriously devoting themselves to this vital question, will not give it a moment's attention.

Was it not full time for our Holy Father to issue his voice of warning to the world, and thus rouse, if possible, the well-intentioned from their lethargy? He is the common Father of all, and though all do not recognize his authority, none are shut out from his paternal solicitude. Oh! that they would give ear to his words, so full of Christian truth and gentle persuasion. They would be almost exclusively the gainers by it. For, as a rule, Catholic peoples and communities have nothing to amend, nothing to reproach themselves with in this matter of divorce, since they have never abandoned the Gospel rule. He appeals to them, if they will not hear the Church in everything, to hear her at least in this, and to heal their wounds, confessed by themselves, by restoring Christian marriage to that high dignity with which it was invested by him whom they acknowledge for a Divine Legislator.

EPISTOLA ENCYCLICA LEONIS PAPÆ XIII.

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI

LEONIS

DIVINA PROVIDENTIA

PAPÆ XIII.

EPISTOLA ENCYCLICA.

*Ad Patriarchas, Primates, Archiepiscopos et Episcopos Universos Catholici Orbis
Gratiam et Communionem cum Apostolica Sede habentes.*

*Venerabilibus Fratribus Patriarchis, Primatibus, Archiepiscopis et Episcopis Universis
Catholici Orbis Gratiam et Communionem cum Apostolica Sede habentibus,*

LEO PP. XIII.

Venerabiles Fratres, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

ARCANUM divinae sapientiae consilium, quod Salvator, hominum Iesus Christus in terris erat perfecturus, eo spectavit, ut mundum, quasi vetustate senescentem, Ipse per se et in se divinitus instauraret. Quod splendida et grandi sententia complexus est Paullus Apostolus, cum ad Ephesios ita scriberet: *Sacramentum voluntatis suae . . . instaurare omnia in Christo quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt.*¹ Revera cum Christus Dominus mandatum facere instituit quod dederat illi Pater, continuo novam quamdam formam ac speciem rebus omnibus impertiit, vetustate depulsa. Quae enim vulnera piaculum primi parentis humanae naturae imposuerat, Ipse sanavit: homines universos, natura filios irae, in gratiam cum Deo restituit; diuturnis fatigatos erroribus ad veritatis lumen traduxit; omni impuritate confectos ad omnem virtutem innovavit; redonatisque hereditati beatitudinis sempiternae spem certam fecit, ipsum eorum corpus, mortale et caducum, immortalitatis et gloriae caelestis particeps aliquando futurum. Quo vero tam singularia beneficia, quamdiu essent homines, tandiu in terris permanerent, Ecclesiam constituit vicariam muneris sui, eamque iussit, in futurum prospiciens, si quid esset in hominum societate perturbatum, ordinare; si quid collapsum, restituere.

Quamquam vero divina haec instauratio, quam diximus, praecipue et directo homines attigit in ordine gratiae supernaturali constitutos, tamen pretiosi ac salutare eiusdem fructus in ordinem quoque naturalem largiter permanarunt; quamobrem non mediocrem perfectionem in omnes partes acceperunt cum singuli homines, tum humani generis societas universa. Etenim, Christiano rerum ordine semel condito, hominibus singulis feliciter contigit, ut ediscerent atque adsuescerent in paterna Dei providentia conquirere, et spem alere, quae non confundit, caelestium auxiliorum; quibus ex rebus fortitudo, moderatio, constantia, aequabil-

¹ Ad Eph. i., 9, 10.

itas pacati animi, plures denique praeclarae virtutes et egregia facta consequuntur. Societati vero domesticae et civili mirum est quantum dignitatis, quantum firmitudinis et honestatis accesserit. Aequior et sanctior effecta principum auctoritas; propensior et facilior populorum obtemperatio; arctior civium coniunctio; tutiora iura dominii. Omnino rebus omnibus, quae in civitate habentur utiles, religio christiana consuluit et providit; ita quidem, ut, auctore S. Augustino, plus ipsa afferre momenti ad bene beateque vivendum non potuisse videatur, si esset parandis vel augendis mortalis vitae commodis et utilitatibus unice nata.

Verum de hoc genere toto non est Nobis propositum modo singula enumerare; volumus autem de convictu domestico eloqui, cuius est in *matrimonio* principium et fundamentum.

Constat inter omnes, Venerabiles Fratres, quae vera sit matrimonii origo. Quamvis enim fidei christianae vituperatores perpetuam hac de re doctrinam Ecclesiae fugiant agnoscere, et memoriam omnium gentium, omnium saeculorum delere iamdiu contendant, vim tamen lucemque veritatis nec extinguere nec debilitare potuerunt. Nota omnibus et nemini dubia commemoramus: posteaquam sexto creationis die formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, sociam illi voluit adiungere, quam de latere viri ipsius dormientis mirabiliter eduxit. Qua in re hoc voluit providentissimus Deus, ut illud par coniugum esset cunctorum hominum naturale principium, ex quo scilicet propagari humanum genus, et, numquam intermissis procreationibus, conservari in omne tempus oporteret. Atque illa viri et mulieris coniunctio, quo sapientissimis Dei consiliis responderet aptius, vel ex eo tempore duas potissimum, easque in primis nobiles, quasi alte impressas et insculptas prae se tulit proprietates, nimirum unitatem et perpetuitatem. Idque declaratum aperteque confirmatum ex Evangelio perspicimus divina Iesu Christi auctoritate; qui Iudaeis et Apostolis testatus est, matrimonium, ex ipsa institutione sui dumtaxat inter duos esse debere, scilicet virum inter et mulierem; ex duobus unam veluti carnem fieri; et nuptiale vinculum sic esse Dei voluntate intime vehementerque nexum, ut a quopiam inter homines dissolvi, aut distrahi nequeat. *Adhaerebit (homo) uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una. Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet.*¹

Verum haec coniugii forma, tam excellens atque praestans, sensim corrumpi et interire apud ethnicos populos coepit; et penes ipsum Hebraeorum genus quasi obnubilari atque obscurari visa. Nam apud hos de uxoris susceperat consuetudo communis, ut singulis viris habere plus una liceret; post autem, cum *ad duritiam cordis*² eorum indulgenter permisisset Moyses repudiorum potestatem, ad divortium factus est aditus. In societate vero ethnicorum vix credibile videatur, quantam corruptelam et demutationem nuptiae contraxerint, quippe quae obiectae fluctibus essent errorum uniuscuiusque populi et cupiditatum turpissimarum. Cunctae plus minus gentes dediscere notionem germanamque originem matrimonii visae sunt; eamque ob causam de coniugiis passim fere-

¹ Matt. xix. 5, 6.

² Matt. xix. 8.

bantur leges, quae esse e republica viderentur, non quas natura postularet. Sollemnes ritus, arbitrio legumlatorum inventi, efficiebant ut honestum uxoris, aut turpe concubinae nomen mulieres nanciscerentur; quin eo ventum erat, ut auctoritate principum reipublicae caveretur, quibus esset permissum inire nuptias, et quibus non esset, multum legibus contra aequitatem contendentibus, multum pro iniuria. Praeterea polygamia, polyandria, divortium causae fuerunt, quamobrem nuptiale vinculum magnopere relaxaretur. Summa quoque in mutuis coniugum iuribus et officiis perturbatio extitit, cum vir dominium uxoris acquireret, eamque suas sibi res habere, nulla saepe justa causa, iuberet; sibi vero ad effrenatam et indomitam libidinem praecipiti impune liceret *excurrere per lupanaria et ancillas, quasi culpam dignitas faciat, non voluntas*.¹ Exsuperante viri licentia, nihil erat uxore miserius, in tantam humilitatem deiecta, ut instrumentum pene haberetur ad explendam libidinem, vel gignendam sobolem comparatum. Nec pudor fuit, collocandas in matrimonium emi, vendi, in rerum corporearum similitudinem,² data interdum parenti maritoque facultate extremum supplicium de uxore sumendi. Talibus familiam ortam connubiis necesse erat aut in bonis reipublicae esse, aut in mancipio patrifamilias,³ cui leges hoc quoque posse dederant, non modo liberorum conficere et dirimere arbitrato suo nuptias, verum etiam in eosdem exercere vitae necisque immanem potestatem.

Sed tot vitiis, tantisque ignominiis, quibus erant inquinata coniugia, sublevatio tandem et medicina divinitus quaesita est; quandoquidem restitutor dignitatis humanae legumque mosaicarum perfector Iesus Christus non exiguam, neque postremam de matrimonio curam adhibuit. Etenim nuptias in coena in Cana Galilaeae Ipse praesentia sua nobilitavit, primoque ex prodigiis a se editis fecit memorabiles;⁴ quibus causis vel ex eo die in hominum coniugia novae cuiusdam sanctitudinis initia videntur esse profecta. Deinde matrimonium revocavit ad primaevae originis nobilitatem, cum Hebraeorum mores improbando, quod et multitudine uxorum et repudii facultate abuterentur; tum maxime praeicipiendo, ne quis dissolvere auderet quod perpetuo coniunctionis vinculo Deus ipse constrinxisset. Quapropter cum difficultates diluisset ab institutis mosaicis in medium allatas, supremi legislatoris suscepta persona, haec de coniugibus sanxit: *Dico autem vobis, quia quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, nisi ob fornicationem et aliam duxerit, moechatur; et qui dimissam duxerit, moechatur*.⁵

Verum quae auctoritate Dei de coniugiis decreta et constituta sunt, ea nuntii divinarum legum Apostoli plenius et enucleatius memoriae litterisque prodiderunt. Iamvero Apostolis magistris accepta referenda sunt, quae *sancti Patres nostri, Concilia et universalis Ecclesiae traditio semper docuerunt*,⁶ nimirum Christum Dominum ad Sacramenti dignitatem evexisse matrimonium; simulque effecisse ut coniuges, caelesti gratia quam merita eius pepererunt septi ac muniti, sanctitatem in ipso coniugio adipiscerentur; atque in eo ad exemplar mystici connubii sui cum

¹ Hieronym. Oper., tom. i., col. 455.

² Dionys. Halicar., lib. ii., c. 26, 27.

³ Matt. xix. 9.

⁴ Arnob. *adv. Gent.* 4.

⁵ Ioan. ii.

⁶ Trid. sess. xxiv. in pr.

Ecclesia mire conformato, et amorem, qui est naturae consentaneus perfecisse,¹ et viri ac mulieris individuum suapte natura societatem divinae caritatis vinculo validius coninunxisse. *Viri*, Paullus inquit ad Ephesios, *diligite uxores vestras, sicut et Christus dilexit Ecclesiam et seipsum tradidit pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret. . . . Viri debent diligere uxores suas ut corpora sua nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit; sed nutrit et fovet eam, sicut et Christus Ecclesiam; quia membra sumus corporis eius, de carne eius et de ossibus eius. Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem suam et adhaerebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una. Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia.*² Similiter Apostolis auctoribus didicimus unitatem, perpetuamque firmitatem, quae ab ipsa requirebatur nuptiarum origine, sanctam esse et nullo tempore violabilem Christum iussisse. *Iis qui matrimonio iuncti sunt, idem Paullus ait, praecipio non ego, sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere; quod si discesserit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari.*³ Et rursus: *Mulier allegata est legi, quanto tempore vir eius vivit: quod si dormierit vir eius, liberata est.*⁴ Hisce igitur causis matrimonium extitit sacramentum magnum,⁵ honorabile in omnibus,⁶ pium castum, rerum altissimarum imagine et significatione verendum.

Neque iis dumtaxat quae commemorata sunt, christiana eius perfectio absolutioque continetur. Nam primo quidem nuptiali societati excelsius quiddam et nobilius propositum est, quam antea fuisset; ea enim spectare iussa est non modo ad propagandum genus humanum, sed ad ingenerandam Ecclesiae sobolem, *cives Sanctorum et domesticos Dei;*⁷ ut nimirum *populus ad veri Dei et Salvatoris nostri Christi cultum et religionem procrearetur atque educaretur.*⁸ Secundo loco sua utrique coniugum sunt officia definita, sua iura integre descripta. Eos scilicet ipsos necesse est sic esse animo semper affectos, ut amorem maximum, constantem fidem, sollers assiduumque praesidium alteri alterum debere intelligant. Vir est familiae princeps, et caput mulieris; quae tamen, quia caro est de carne ilius et os de ossibus eius, subiiciatur pareatque viro, in morem non ancillae, sed sociae; ut scilicet obedientiae praestitae nec honestas, nec dignitas absit.

In eo autem qui praeest, et in hac quae paret, cum imaginem uterque referant alter Christi, altera Ecclesiae, divina caritas esto perpetua moderatrix officii. Nam *vir caput est mulieris, sicut Christus caput est Ecclesiae. . . . Sed sicut Ecclesia subjecta est Christo, ita et mulieres viris suis in omnibus.*⁹ Ad liberos quod pertinet, subesse et obtemperare parentibus, hisque honorem adhibere propter conscientiam debent; et vicissim in liberis tuendis atque ad virtutem potissimum informandis omnes parentum curas cogitationesque evigilare necesse est: *Patres, . . . educate illos (filios) in disciplina et correptione Domini.*¹⁰ Ex quo intelligitur, nec pauca esse coniugum officia, neque levia; ea tamen coniugi-

¹ Trid., sess. xxiv., cap. i., de reform. matr.

² 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.

³ Ad Eph. v. 32.

⁴ Ad Eph. iii. 19.

⁵ Ad Eph. v. 23, 24.

⁶ Ad Ephes. v. 25 et seq.

⁷ 1 Cor. vii. 39.

⁸ Ad Hebr. xii. 4.

⁹ Catech. Rom., cap. viii.

¹⁰ Ad Eph. vi. 4.

bus bonis, ob virtutem quae Sacramento percipitur, non modo tolerabilia fiunt, verum etiam iucunda.

Christus igitur, cum ad talem ac tantam excellentiam matrimonia renovavisset, totam ipsorum disciplinam Ecclesiae credidit et commendavit. Quae potestatem in coniugia christianorum omni cum tempore, tum loco exercuit, atque ita exercuit, ut illam propriam eius esse appareret, nec hominum concessu quaesitam, sed auctoris sui voluntate divinitus adeptam. Quot vero et quam vigiles curas in retinenda sanctitate nuptiarum collocarit, ut sua his incolumitas maneret, plus est cognitum quam ut demonstrari debeat. Et sane improbatos novimus Concilii Hierosolymitani sententia amores solutos et liberos;¹ civem Corinthium incesti damnatum beati Paulli auctoritate;² propulsatos ac reiectos eodem semper tenore fortitudinis conatus plurimorum matrimonium christianum hostiliter petentium, videlicet Gnosticorum, Manichaeorum, Montanistarum sub ipsa rei christianae primordia; nostra autem memoria Mormonum, San-Simonianorum, Phalansterianorum, Communistarum. Simili modo ius matrimonii aequabile inter omnes atque unum omnibus est constitutum, vetere inter servos et ingenuos sublato discrimine;³ exaequata viri et uxoris iura; etenim, ut aiebat Hieronymus,⁴ *apud nos quod non licet feminis, aequae non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur*: atque illa eadem iura ob remunerationem benevolentiae et vicissitudinem officiorum stabiliter firmata; adserta et vindicata mulierum dignitas; vetitum viro poenam capitis de adultera sumere,⁵ iurataque fidem libidinose atque impudice violare. Atque illud etiam magnum est quod de potestate patrumfamilias Ecclesia, quantum oportuit, limitaverit, ne filiis et filiabus coniugi cupidis quidquam de iusta libertate minueretur;⁶ quod nuptias inter cognatos et affines certis gradibus nullas esse posse decreverit,⁷ ut nimirum supernaturalis coniugum amor latiore se campo diffunderet; quod errorem et vim et fraudem, quantum potuit, a nuptiis prohibenda curaverit;⁸ quod sanctam pudicitiam thalami, quod securitatem personarum,⁹ quod coniugiorum decus,¹⁰ quod religionis incolumitatem¹¹ sarta tecta esse voluerit. Denique tanta vi, tanta providentia legum divinum istud institutum communiit, ut nemo sit rerum aequus existimator, quin intelligat, hoc etiam ex capite quod ad coniugia refertur, optimam esse humani generis custodem ac vindicem Ecclesiam; cuius sapientia et fugam temporum, et iniurias hominum, et rerum publicarum vicissitudines innumerabiles victrix evasit.

Sed, adnitente humani generis hoste, non desunt qui, sicut cetera redemptionis beneficia ingrate repudiant, sic restitutionem perfectionemque

¹ Act. xv. 29.

² Cap. 1, de coniug. serv.

³ Can. Interfectores et can. Admonere, quae est. 2.

⁴ Cap. 30, quae est. 3, cap. 3, de cognat. spirit.

⁵ Cap. 8, de consang. et affn.; cap. 1, de cognat. legali.

⁶ Cap. 26, de sponsal.; capp. 13, 15, 29, de sponsal. et matrim.; et alibi.

⁷ Cap. 1, de convers. infid.; capp. 5 et 6, de eo qui duxit in matr.

⁸ Capp. 3, 5, et 8, de sponsal. et matr.; trid. sess. xxiv., cap. 3, de reform matr.

⁹ Cap. 7, de divort.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. v. 5.

¹¹ Oper., tom. i., col. 455.

matrimonii aut spernunt, aut omnino non agnoscunt. Flagitium nonnullorum veterum est, inimicos fuisse nuptiis in aliqua ipsarum parte; sed multo ætate nostra peccant perniciosius qui earum naturam, perfectam expletamque omnibus suis numeris et partibus, malunt funditus pervertere. Atque huius rei caussa in eo præcipue sita est, quod imbuti falsæ philosophiæ opinionibus corruptaque consuetudine animi plurimorum nihil tam moleste ferunt, quam subesse et parere; acerrimeque laborant, ut non modo singuli homines, sed etiam familiæ atque omnis humana societas imperium Dei superbe contemnant. Cum vero et familiæ et totius humanæ societatis in matrimonio fons et origo consistat, illud ipsum iurisdictioni Ecclesiæ subesse nullo modo patiuntur; imo deiicere ab omni sanctitate contendunt, et in illarum rerum exiguum sane gyrum compellere, quæ auctoribus hominibus institutæ sunt, et iure civili populorum reguntur atque administrantur. Unde sequi necesse erat, ut principibus reipublicæ ius in connubia omne tribuerent, nullum Ecclesiæ esse decernerent; quæ si quando potestatem eius generis exercuit, id ipsum esse aut indulgentia principum, aut iniuria factum. Sed iam tempus esse inquirunt, ut qui rempublicam gerunt, iidem sua iura fortiter vindicent, atque omnem coniugiorum rationem arbitrio suo moderari aggrediantur. Hinc illa nata, quæ *matrimonia civilia* vulgo appellantur; hinc scitæ leges de caussis, quæ coniugiis impedimento sint; hinc iudiciales sententiæ de contractibus coniugalibus, iure ne initi fuerint, an vitio. Postremo omnem facultatem in hoc genere iuris constituendi et dicandi videmus Ecclesiæ catholicæ præreptam tanto studio, ut nulla iam ratio habeatur nec divinæ potestatis eius, nec providarum legum, quibus tamdiu vixere gentes, ad quas urbanitatis lumen cum christiana sapientia pervenisset.

Attamen *Naturalistæ* iique omnes, qui reipublicæ numen se maxime colere profitentes, malis hisce doctrinis totas civitates miscere nituntur, non possunt reprehensionem falsitatis effugere. Etenim cum matrimonium habeat Deum auctorem, fueritque vel a principio quaedam Incarnationis Verbi Dei abumbratio, idcirco inest in eo sacrum et religiosum quiddam, non adventitium, sed ingenitum, non ab hominibus acceptum, sed natura insitum. Quocirca Innocentius III.¹ et Honorius III.,² decessores Nostri, non iniuria nec temere affirmare potuerunt, *apud fideles et infideles existere Sacramentum coniugii*. Testamur et monumenta antiquitatis, et mores atque instituta populorum, qui ad humanitatem magis accesserant et exquisitiore iuris et æquitatis cognitione præstiterant: quorum omnium mentibus informatum anticipatumque fuisse constat, ut cum de matrimonio cogitarent, forma occurreret rei cum religione et sanctitate coniunctæ. Hanc ob caussam nuptiæ apud illos non sine cærimoniis religionum, auctoritate pontificum, ministerio sacerdotum fieri sæpe consueverunt. Ita magnam in animis cælesti doctrina carentibus vim habuit natura rerum, memoria originum, conscientia generis humani! Igitur cum matrimonium sit sua vi, sua natura, sua sponte sacrum, consentaneum est, ut regatur ac temperetur non principum im-

¹ Cap. 8, de divorc.

² Cap. 11, de transact.

perio, sed divina auctoritate Ecclesiae, quae rerum sacrarum sola habet magisterium. Deinde consideranda sacramenti dignitas est, cuius accessione matrimonia christianorum evasere longe nobilissima. De sacramentis autem statuere et praecipere, ita, ex voluntate Christi, sola potest et debet Ecclesia, ut absonum sit plane potestatis eius vel minimam partem ad gubernatores rei civilis velle esse translatam. Postremo magnum pondus est, magna vis historiae, qua luculenter docemur, potestatem legiferam et iudicalem, de qua loquimur, libere constanterque ab Ecclesia usurpari consuevisse iis etiam temporibus, quando principes reipublicae consentientes fuisse aut conniventes in ea re, inepte et stulte fingeretur. Illud enim quam incredibile, quam absurdum, Christum Dominum damnassee polygamiae repudiique inveteratam consuetudinem delegata sibi a procuratore provinciae vel a principe Iudaeorum potestate; similiter Paullum Apostolum divortia incestasque nuptias edixisse non licere, cedentibus aut tacite mandantibus Tiberio, Caligula, Nerone! Neque illud unquam homini sanae mentis potest persuaderi, de sanctitate et firmitudine coniugii,¹ de nuptiis servos inter et ingenuas² tot esse ab Ecclesia conditas leges, impetrata facultate ab Imperatoribus romanis, inimicissimis nomini christiano, quibus nihil tam fuit propositum, quam vi et caede religionem Christi opprimere adolescentem; praesertim cum ius illud ab Ecclesia profectum a civili iure interdum adeo dissideret, ut Ignatius Martyr,³ Iustinus,⁴ Athenagoras,⁵ et Tertullianus,⁶ tamquam iniustas vel adulterinas publice traducerent nonnullorum nuptias, quibus tamen imperatoriae leges favebant. Postea vero quam ad christianos Imperatores potentatus omnis reciderat, Pontifices maximi et Episcopi in Concilia congregati, eadem semper cum libertate conscientiaeque iuris sui, de matrimoniis iubere vetare perseverarunt quod utile esse, quod expedire temporibus censuissent, utcumque discrepans ab institutis civilibus videretur. Nemo ignorat quam multa de impedimentis ligaminis, voti, disparitatis cultus, consanguinitatis, criminis, publicae honestatis in Conciliis Illiberitano,⁷ Arelatensi,⁸ Chalcedonensi,⁹ Milevitano II.¹⁰ aliisque, fuerint ab Ecclesiae praesulibus constituta, quae a decretis iure imperatorio sancitis longe saepe distarent. Quin tantum abfuit, ut viri principes sibi adsciscerent in matrimonia christiana potestatem, ut potius eam, quanta est, penes Ecclesiam esse agnoscerent et declararent. Revera Honorius, Theodosius iunior, Iustinianus¹¹ fateri non dubitarunt, in iis rebus quae nuptias attingant, non amplius quam custodibus et defensoribus sacrorum canonum sibi esse licere. Et de connubiorum impedimentis si quid per edicta sanxerunt, causam docuerunt non inviti, nimirum id sibi sumpsisse ex Ecclesiae permissu atque auctoritate;¹² cuius ipsius iudicium exquirere et reverenter accipere consueverunt in

¹ Can. Apost., 16, 17, 18.

² Epist. ad Polycarp., cap. 5.

³ Legat. pro Christian., nn. 32, 33.

⁴ De Aguirre Conc. Hispan., tom. i., can. 13, 15, 16, 17.

⁵ Harduin., Act. Concil., tom. i., can. 11.

⁶ Ibid. can. 17.

⁷ Fejer *Matrin. ex instit. Christ.*, Pest, 1835.

⁸ Philosophum Oxon., 1851.

⁹ Apolog. mai., n. 15.

¹⁰ De coron. milit., cap. 13.

¹¹ Ibid. can. 16.

¹² Novel., 137.

controversiis de honestate natalium,¹ de divortiis,² denique de rebus omnibus cum coniugali vinculo necessitudinem quoquo modo habentibus.³ Igitur iure optimo in Concilio Tridentino definitum est in Ecclesiae potestate esse *impedimenta matrimonium dirimentia constituere*,⁴ *et causas matrimoniales ad iudices ecclesiasticos spectare*.⁵

Nec quemquam moveat illa tantopere a Regalistis praedicata distinctio, vi cuius contractum nuptialem a sacramento disiungunt, eo sane consilio, ut, Ecclesiae reservatis sacramenti rationibus, contractum tradant in potestatem arbitriumque principum civitatis. Etenim non potest huiusmodi distinctio, seu verius distractio, probari; cum exploratum sit in matrimonio christiano contractum a sacramento non esse dissociabilem; atque ideo non posse contractum verum et legitimum consistere, quin sit eo ipso sacramentum. Nam Christus Dominus dignitate sacramenti auxit matrimonium; matrimonium autem est ipse contractus, si modo sit factus iure. Huc accedit, quod ob hanc causam matrimonium est sacramentum, quia est sacrum signum et efficiens gratiam, et imaginem referens mysticarum nuptiarum Christi cum Ecclesia. Istarum autem forma ac figura illo ipso exprimitur summae coniunctionis vinculo, quo vir et mulier inter se conligantur, quodque aliud nihil est nisi ipsum matrimonium. Itaque apparet, omne inter christianos iustum coniugium in se et per se esse sacramentum: nihilque magis abhorrere a veritate, quam esse sacramentum decus quoddam adjunctum, aut proprietatem allapsam extrinsecus, quae a contractu disiungi ac disparari hominum arbitratu queat.

Quapropter nec ratione efficitur, nec teste temporum historia comprobatur potestatem in matrimonia christianorum ad principes reipublicae esse iure traductam. Quod si hac in re alienum violatum ius est, nemo profecto dixerit esse ab Ecclesia violatum.

Utinam vero Naturalistarum oracula, ut sunt plena falsitatis et iniustitiae, ita non etiam essent fecunda detrimentorum et calamitatum. Sed facile est pervidere quantam profanata coniugia perniciem attulerint; quantam allatura sint universae hominum communitati. Principio quidem lex est provisa divinitus, ut quae Deo et natura auctoribus instituta sunt, ea tanto plus utilia ac salutaria experiamur, quanto magis statu nativo manent integra atque incommutabilia; quandoquidem procreator rerum omnium Deus probe novit quid singularum institutioni et conservationi expediret, cunctasque voluntate et mente sua sic ordinavit, ut suum unaquaeque exitum convenienter habitura sit. At si rerum ordinem providentissime constitutum immutare et perturbare hominum temeritas aut improbitas velit, tum vero etiam sapientissime atque utilissime instituta aut obesse incipiunt, aut prodesse desinunt, vel quod vim iuvandi mutatione amiserint, vel quod tales Deus ipse poenas malit de mortalium superbia atque audacia sumere. Iamvero qui sacrum esse matrimonium negant, atque omni despoliatum sanctitate in rerum profanarum coniiciunt genus, ii pervertunt fundamenta naturae, et divinae

¹ Cap. 3, *de ordin. cognit.*

² Cap. 13, *qui filii sint legit.*

³ Ibid. can. 12.

⁴ Cap. 3, *de divort.*

⁵ Trid. sess. xxiv., can. 4.

providentiae tum consiliis repugnant, tum instituta, quantum potest, demoliuntur. Quapropter mirum esse non debet, ex huiusmodi contactibus insanis atque impiis eam generari malorum segetem, qua nihil est salutis animorum, incolumitatisque reipublicae perniciosius.

Si consideretur quorsum matrimoniorum pertineat divina institutio, id erit evidentissimum, includere in illis voluisse Deum utilitatis et salutis publicae uberrimos fontes. Et sane, praeter quam quod propagationi generis humani prospiciunt, illuc quoque pertinent, ut meliorem vitam coniugum beatioremque efficiant; idque pluribus causis, nempe mutuo ad necessitates sublevandas adiumento, amore constanti et fidei, communione omnium bonorum, gratia caelesti, quae a sacramento proficiscitur. Eadem vero plurimum possunt ad familiarum salutem; nam matrimonia quamdiu sint congruentia naturae, Deique consiliis apte conveniant, firmare profecto valebunt animorum concordiam inter parentes, tueri bonam institutionem liberorum, temperare patriam potestatem proposito divinae potestatis exemplo, filios parentibus, famulos heris facere obedientes. Ab eiusmodi autem coniugiis expectare civitates iure possunt genus et sobolem civium qui probe animati sint, Deique reverentia atque amore assueti, sui officii esse ducant iuste et legitime imperantibus obtemperare, cunctos diligere, laedere neminem.

Hos fructus tantos ac tam praeclaros tamdiu matrimonium revera genuit, quamdiu munera sanctitatis, unitatis, perpetuitatisque retinuit, a quibus vim omnem accipit frugiferam et salutarem; neque est dubitandum similes paresque ingeneraturum fuisse, si semper et ubique in potestatem fidemque fuisset Ecclesiae, quae illorum munerum est fidissima conservatrix et vindex. Sed quia modo passim libuit humanum ius in locum naturalis et divini supponere, deleri non solum coepit matrimonii species ac notio praestantissima, quam in animis hominum impresserat et quasi consignaverat natura; sed in ipsis etiam Christianorum coniugiis, hominum vitio, multum vis illa debilitata est magnorum bonorum procreatrix. Quid est enim boni quod nuptiales afferre possint societates, unde abscedere Christiana religio iubetur, quae parens est omnium bonorum, maximasque alit virtutes, excitans et impellens ad decus omne generosi animi atque excelsi? Illa igitur semota ac reiecta, redigi nuptias oportet in servitutem vitiosae hominum naturae et pessimarum dominarum cupiditatum, honestatis naturalis parum valido defensas patrocínio. Hoc fonte multiplex derivata perniciēs, non modo in privatas familias, sed etiam in civitates influxit. Etenim salutari depulso Dei metu, sublataque curarum levatione, quae nusquam alibi est quam in religione Christiana maior, persaepe fit, quod est factu proclive, ut vix ferenda matrimonii munera et officia videantur; et liberari nimis multi vinculum velint, quod iure humano et sponte nexum putant, si dissimilitudo ingeniorum, aut discordia, aut fides ab alterutro violata, aut utriusque consensus, aliaeve causae liberari suadeant oportere. Et si forte satis fieri procacitati voluntatum lege prohibeatur, tum iniquas clamant esse leges, inhumanas, cum iure civium liberorum pugnantes;

quapropter omnino videndum ut, illis antiquatis abrogatisque, licere divortia humaniore lege decernatur.

Nostrorum autem temporum legumlatores, cum eorundem iuris principiorum tenaces se ac studiosos profiteantur, ab illa hominum improbitate, quam diximus, se tueri non possunt, etiamsi maxime velint: quare cedendum temporibus ac divortiorum concedenda facultas. Quod historia idem ipsa declarat. Ut enim alia praetereamus, exeunte saeculo superiore, in illa non tam perturbatione quam deflagratione Galliarum, cum societas omnis, amoto Deo, profanaretur, tum demum placuit ratas legibus esse coniugum discessionem. Easdem autem leges renovari hoc tempore multi cupiunt, propterea quod Deum et Ecclesiam pelli e medio ac submoventur volunt a societate coniunctionis humanae; stulte putantes extremum grassanti morum corruptelae remedium ab eiusmodi legibus esse quaerendum.

At vero quanto materiam mali in se divortia contineant, vix attinet dicere. Eorum enim caussa fiunt maritalia foedera mutabilia; extenuatur mutua benevolentia; infidelitati perniciose incitamenta suppeditantur; tuitioni atque institutioni liberorum nocetur; dissuendis societatibus domesticis praebetur occasio; discordiarum inter familias semina sparguntur; minuitur ac deprimitur dignitas mulierum, quae in periculum veniunt ne, cum libidini virorum inservierint, pro derelictis habeantur. Et quoniam ad perdendas familias, frangendasque regnorum opes nihil tam valet, quam corruptela morum, facile perspicitur, prosperitati familiarum ac civitatum maxime inimica esse divortia, quae a depravatis populorum moribus nascuntur, ac, teste rerum usu, ad vitiosiores vitae privatae et publicae consuetudines aditum ianuamque patefaciunt. Multoque esse graviora haec mala constabit, si consideretur, frenos nullos futuros tantos, qui concessam seculi divortiorum facultatem valeant intra certos, aut ante provisos, limites coercere. Magna prorsus est vis exemplorum, maior cupiditatum: hisce incitamentis fieri debet, ut divortiorum libido latius quotidie serpens plurimorum animos invadat, quasi morbus contagione vulgatus, aut agmen aquarum superatis aggeribus exundans.

Haec certe sunt omnia per se clara; sed renovanda rerum gestarum memoria fiunt clariora. Simul ac iter divortiis tutum lege praestari coepit, dissidia, simultates, secessionem plurimum crevere; et tanta est vivendi turpitudine consecuta, ut eos ipsos, qui fuerant talium discessionum defensores, facti poenituerint; qui nisi contraria lege remedium mature quaesissent, timendum erat, ne praeceptum in suam ipsa perniciem respublica dilaberetur. Romani veteres prima divortiorum exempla dicuntur inhorruisse; sed non longa mora sensus honestatis in animis obstupescere, moderator cupiditatis pudor interire, fidesque nuptialis tanta cum licentia violari coepit, ut magnam veri similitudinem habere videatur quod a nonnullis scriptum legimus, mulieres non mutatione consulum, sed maritorum enumerare annos consuevisse. Pari modo apud Protestantes principio quidem leges sanxerant, ut divortia fieri liceret certis de causis, iisque non sane multis; istas tamen propter rerum similitudinem affinitatem, compertum est in tantam multitudinem ex-

crevisse apud Germanos, Americanos, aliosque, ut qui non stulte sapuisent, magnopere deflendam putarint infinitam morum depravationem, atque intolerandam legum temeritatem. Neque aliter se res habuit in civitatibus catholici nominis: in quibus si quando datus est coniugiorum discidiis locus, incommodorum, quae consecuta sunt, multitudo opinionem legislatorum longe vicit. Nam scelus plurimorum fuit, ad omnem malitiam fraudemque versare mentem, ac per saevitiam adhibitam, per iniurias, per adulteria fingere causas ad illud impune dissolvendum, cuius pertaesum esset, coniunctionis maritalis vinculum: idque cum tanto publicae honestatis detrimento, ut operam emendandis legibus quamprimum dari omnes indicaverint oportere.

Et quisquam dubitabit, quin exitus aequae miseros et calamitosos habiturae sint leges divortiorum faurices, sicubi forte in usum aetate nostra revocentur? Non est profecto in hominum commentis vel decretis facultas tanta, ut immutare rerum naturalem indolem conformationemque possint: quapropter parum sapienter publicam felicitatem interpretantur, qui germanam matrimonii rationem impune perverti posse putant; et, qualibet sanctitate cum religionis tum Sacramenti posthabita, diffingere ac deformare coniugia turpius velle videntur, quam ipsa ethnicorum instituta consuevissent. Ideoque nisi consilia mutantur, perpetuo sibi metuere familiae et societas humana debebunt, ne miserrime coniciantur in illud rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen, quod est Socialistarum ac Communistarum flagitiosis gregibus iamdiu propositum. Unde liquet: quam absonum et absurdum sit publicam salutem a divortiis expectare, quae potius in certam societatis perniciem sunt evasura.

Igitur confitendum est, de communi omnium populorum bono meruisse optime Ecclesiam Catholicam, sanctitati et perpetuitati coniugiorum tuendae semper intentam; nec exiguam ipsi gratiam deberi, quod legibus civicis centum iam annos in hoc genere multa peccantibus palam reclamaverit;¹ quod haeresim deterrimam Protestantium de divortiis et repudiis anathemate perculerit;² quod usitatam graecis diremptionem matrimoniorum multis modis damnaverit;³ quod irritas esse nuptias decreverit ea conditione initas, ut aliquando dissolvantur;⁴ quod demum vel a prima aetate leges imperatorias repudiarit, quae divortiis et repudiis perniciose favissent.⁵ Pontifices vero maximi quoties restiterunt principibus potentissimis, divortia a se facta ut rata Ecclesiae essent minaciter petentibus, toties existimandi sunt non modo pro incolumitate religionis, sed etiam pro humanitatis gentium propugnasse. Quam

¹ Pius VI. epist. ad episc. Lucion. 28 Maii 1793. Pius VII. litter. encycl. die 17 Febr. 1809, et const. dat. die 19 Iul. 1817. Pius VIII. litt. encycl. die 29 Maii 1829. Gregorius XVI. Const. dat. die 15 Augusti 1832. Pius IX. alloc. habit. die 22 Sept. 1852.

² Trid. sess. xxiv., can. 5 et 7.

³ Concil. Floren. et Instr. Eug. IV. ad Armenos. Bened. XIV. Const. *Et si pastor-
alis*, 6 Maii 1742.

⁴ Cap. 7, *de condit appos.*

⁵ Hieron. epist. 79 ad Ocean. Ambros. lib. vi. in cap. 16 Lucae, n. 5. August, de nuptiis, cap. 10.

ad rem omnis admirabitur posteritas invicti animi documenta a Nicolao I. edita adversus Lotharium; ab Urbano II. et Paschali II. adversus Philippum I. regem Galliarum; a Caelestino III. et Innocentio III. adversus Alphonsum a Leone et Philippum II. principem Galliarum; a Clemente VII. et Paulo III. adversus Henricum VIII.; denique a Pio VII. sanctissimo fortissimoque Pontifice adversus Napoleonem I., secundis rebus et magnitudine imperii exultantem.

Quae cum ita sint, omnes gubernatores administratoresque rerum publicarum, si rationem sequi, si sapientiam, si ipsam populorum utilitatem voluissent, malle debuerant sacras de matrimonio leges intactas manere, oblatumque Ecclesiae adiumentum in tutelam morum prosperitatemque familiarum adhibere, quam ipsam vocare Ecclesiam in suspicionem inimicitiae, aut in falsam atque iniquam violati iuris civilis insimulationem.

Eoque magis, quod Ecclesia catholica, ut in re nulla potest ab religione officii et defensione iuris sui declinare, ita maxime solet esse ad benignitatem indulgentiamque proclivis in rebus omnibus, quae cum incolumitate iurium et sanctitate officiorum suorum possunt una consistere. Quam ob rem nihil unquam de matrimoniis statuit, quin respectum habuerit ad statum communitatis, ad condiciones populorum; nec semel suarum ipsa legum praescripta, quoad potuit, mitigavit, quando ut mitigaret caussae iustae et graves impulerunt. Item non ipsa ignorat neque diffitetur, sacramentum matrimonii, cum ad conservationem quoque et incrementum societatis humanae dirigatur, cognitionem et necessitudinem habere cum rebus ipsis humanis, quae matrimonium quidem consequuntur, sed in genere civili versantur: de quibus rebus iure decernunt et cognoscunt qui rei publicae praesunt.

Nemo autem dubitat, quin Ecclesiae conditor Iesus Christus potestatem sacram voluerit esse a civili distinctam, et ad suas utramque res agendas liberam atque expeditam; hoc tamen adiuncto, quod utrique expedit, et quod interest omnium hominum, ut coniunctio inter eas et concordia intercederet, in iisque rebus quae sint, diversa licet ratione, communis iuris et iudicii, altera, cui sunt humana tradita, opportune et congruenter ab altera penderet, cui sunt caelestia concredita. Huiusmodi autem compositione, ac fere harmonia, non solum utriusque potestatis optima ratio continetur, sed etiam opportunissimus atque efficacissimus modus iuvandi hominum genus in eo quod pertinet ad actionem vitae et ad spei salutis sempiternae. Etenim sicut hominum intelligentia, quemadmodum in superioribus Encyclicis Litteris ostendimus, si cum fide christiana conveniat multum nobilitatur multoque evadit ad vitandos ac repellendos errores munitior, vicissimque fides non parum praesidii ab intelligentia mutuatur; sic pariter, si cum sacra Ecclesiae potestate civilis auctoritas amice congruat, magna utrique necesse est fiat utilitatis accessio. Alterius enim amplificatur dignitas, et, religione praeunte, numquam erit non iustum imperium: alteri vero adiumenta tutelae et defensionis in publicum fidelium bonum suppeditantur.

Nos igitur, hurum rerum consideratione permoti, cum studiose alias, tum vehementer in praesenti viros principes in concordiam atque amicitiam iungendam iterum hortamur; iisdemque paterna cum benevolen-

tia veluti dexteram primi porrigimus, oblato supremæ potestatis Nostræ auxilio, quod tanto magis est hoc tempore necessarium, quanto ius imperandi plus est in opinionē hominum, quasi accepto vulnere, debilitatum. Incensis iam procaci libertate animis, et omne imperii, vel maxime legitimi, iugum nefario ausu detrectantibus, salus publica postulat, ut vires utriusque potestatis consocientur ad prohibenda damna, quæ non modo Ecclesiæ, sed ipsi etiam civili societati impendent.

Sed cum amicam voluntatum coniunctionem valde suademus, precamurque Deum, principem pacis, ut amorem concordiæ in animos cunctorum hominum iniiciat, tum temperare Nobis ipsi non possumus, quin Vestram industriam, Venerabiles Fratres, Vestrum studium ac vigilantiam, quæ in Vobis summa esse intelligimus, magis ac magis hortando incitemus. Quantum contentione assequi, quantum auctoritate potestis, date operam, ut apud gentes fidei Vestræ commendatas integra atque incorrupta doctrina retineatur, quam Christus Dominus coelestis et Apostoli tradiderunt, quamque Ecclesia catholica religiose ipsa servavit, et a Chistifidelibus servari per omnes ætates iussit.

Praecipuas curas in id insumite, ut populi abundant præceptis sapientiæ christianæ, semperque memoria teneant matrimonium non voluntate hominum, sed auctoritate nutuque Dei fuisse initio constitutum, et hac lege prorsus ut sit unius ad unam: Christum vero novi Foederis auctorem illud ipsum ex officio naturæ in Sacramenta transtulisse, et quod ad vinculum spectat, legiferam et iudicalem Ecclesiæ suæ adtribuisse potestatem. Quo in genere cavendum magnopere est, ne in errorem mentes inducantur a fallacibus conclusionibus adversariorum, qui eiusmodi potestatem adeptam Ecclesiæ vellent. Similiter omnibus exploratum esse debet, si qua coniunctio viri et mulieris inter Christifideles citra Sacramentum contrahatur, eam vi ac ratione iusti matrimonii carere; et quamvis convenientur legibus civicis facta sit, tamen pluris esse non posse, quam ritum aut morem, iure civili introductum; iure autem civili res tantummodo ordinari atque administrari posse, quas matrimonium efferunt ex sese in genere civili, et quas gigni non posse manifestum est, nisi vera et legitima illarum causa, scilicet nuptiale vinculum, existat. Haec quidem omnia probe cognita habere maxime sponsorum refert, quibus etiam probata esse debent et notata animis, ut sibi liceat hac in re morem legibus genere; ipsa non abnuente Ecclesia, quæ vult atque optat ut in omnes partes salva sint matrimoniorum effecta, et ne quid liberis detrimenti afferatur. In tanta autem confusione sententiarum, quæ serpunt quotidie longius, id quoque est cognitu necessarium, solvere vinculum coniugii inter christianos rati et consummati nullis in potestate esse; ideoque manifesti criminis reos esse, si qui forte coniuges, quæcumque demum causa esse dicatur, novo se matrimonii nexu ante implicare velint, quam abrupti primum morte contigerit. Quod si res eo devenierint, ut convictus ferri diutius non posse videatur, tum vero Ecclesia sinit alteram ab altera seorsum agere, adhibendisque curis ac remediis ad coniugum conditionem accommodatis, lenire studet secessionis incommoda; nec umquam committit, ut de reconcilianda concordia aut non laboret aut desperet. Verum hæc extrema sunt; quo facile esset

non descendere, si sponsi non cupiditate acti, sed praesumptis cogitatione tum officiis coniugum, tum caussis coniugiorum nobilissimis, ea qua aequum est mente ad matrimonium accederent; neque nuptias anteverterent continuatione quadam serieque flagitiorum, irato Deo. Et ut omnia paucis complectamur, tunc matrimonia placidam quietamque constantiam habitura sunt, si coniuges spiritum vitamque hauriant a virtute religionis, quae forti invictoque animo esse tribuit; quae efficit ut vitia, si qua sint in personis, ut distantia morum et ingeniorum, ut curarum maternas pondus, ut educationis liberorum operosa sollicitudo, ut comites vitae labores, ut casus adversi non solum moderate, sed etiam libenter perfectantur.

Illud etiam cavendum est, ne scilicet coniugia facile appetantur cum alienis a catholico nomine: animos enim de disciplina religionis dissidentes vix sperari potest futuros esse cetera concordēs. Quin imo ab eiusmodi coniugiis ex eo maxime perspicitur esse abhorrendum, quod occasionem praebent vitiae societati et communicationi rerum sacrarum, periculum religioni creant coniugis catholici, impedimento sunt bonae institutioni liberorum, et persaepe animos impellunt, ut cunctarum religionum aequam habere rationem assuescant, sublato veri falsique discrimine. Postremo loco, cum probe intelligamus, alienum esse a caritate Nostra neminem oportere, auctoritati fidei et pietati Vestrae, Venerabiles Fratres, illos commendamus, valde quidem miseros, qui aestu cupiditatum abrepti, et salutis suae plane immemores contra fas vivunt, haud legitimi matrimonii vinculo coniuncti. In his ad officium revocandis hominibus Vestra sollers industria versetur; et cum per Vos ipsi, tum interposita virorum bonorum opera, modis omnibus contendite, ut sentiant se flagitiose fecisse, agant nequitiae poenitentiam, et ad iustas nuptias ritu catholico ineundas animum inducant.

Haec de matrimonio christiano documenta ac praecepta, quae per has litteras Nostras Vobiscum, Venerabiles Fratres, communicanda censuimus, facile videtis, non minus ad conservationem civilis communitatis, quam ad salutem hominum sempiternam magnopere pertinere. Faxit igitur Deus ut quanto plus habent illa momenti et ponderis, tanto dociles promptosque magis ad parendum animes ubique nanciscantur. Huius rei gratia, supplice atque humili prece omnes pariter opem imploremus beatæ Mariae Virginis Immaculatae, quae, excitatis mentibus ad obediendum fidei, matrem se et adiutricem hominibus impertiat. Neque minore studio Petrum et Paullum obsecremus, Principes Apostolorum, domitores superstitionis, satores veritatis, ut ab eluvione renascentium errorum humanum genus firmissimo patrocinio tueantur.

Interea caelestium munerum auspicem et singularis benevolentiae Nostrae testem, Vobis omnibus, Venerabiles Fratres, et populis vigilantiae Vestrae commissis, Apostolicam Benedictionem ex animo impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die 10 Februarii an. 1880, Pontificatus Nostri Anno Secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

[TRANSLATION.]

ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF OUR MOST HOLY LORD,
LEO XIII., BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE POPE.

*To all the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops of the Catholic World
holding Grace and Communion with the Apostolic See.*

Venerable Brethren: Health and Apostolic Benediction.

THE hidden counsel of divine wisdom, which Jesus Christ, the Saviour of men, was to accomplish on earth, had for its purpose that He, through Himself and in Himself, should divinely restore the world which, so to speak, had grown old with age and decay. This much is expressed in that grand saying of St. Paul to the Ephesians, "The mystery of his will . . . to re-establish all things in Christ that are in heaven and on earth." And truly when Christ Our Lord set about fulfilling the commandment given Him by His Father, He forthwith imparted to all things a new form and beauty, banishing every trace of age and decay. For the wounds which the sin of our first parent had inflicted on human nature He himself healed; He brought back all men, by nature children of wrath, into favor with God; He led into the light of truth those who were wearied with long wanderings; He renewed to every virtue those who were worn out by every kind of impurity; and, restoring them to the inheritance of everlasting blessedness, he gave them a certain hope that their very body, mortal and frail as it was, should one day be partaker of immortality and heavenly glory. And that such wonderful blessings might endure on earth as long as men existed, He constituted the Church to carry on His work, and, looking forward to the future, commanded it to set in order whatever in human society might have become confused, and to restore whatever might have fallen to ruin.

But although this divine restoration, of which we have spoken, mainly and directly concerns men who are in the supernatural order of grace, nevertheless its precious and saving fruits have largely flowed into the natural order also; the result of which, not only to individuals, but to human society in general, has been no scanty measure of perfection in all respects. For the Christian order being once established, it became the happy lot of every man to learn and accustom himself to rest in the fatherly providence of God, and to cherish that hope of heavenly help which does not bring to confusion, from which follow fortitude, moderation, constancy, the equability of a mind at peace, and many great virtues and noble deeds. And to domestic and civil society also there has come a wonderful accession of dignity, stability, and honor. The authority of rulers has been made more just and more holy; the obedience of peoples readier and more easy; the tie between citizens closer; the rights of property more secure. The Christian religion has attended to and provided for everything of acknowledged utility in a state, so that,

according to St. Augustine, it could not have contributed more to the welfare and happiness of existence if the good and advantage of our mortal life had been the sole end for which it came into being. We do not intend to enumerate all the instances of this ; but we desire to speak of domestic life, of which the source and the foundation are in *matri-mony*.

The origin of marriage, Venerable Brethren, is well known among all. For, although the revilers of the Christian faith are loath to acknowledge the constant teaching of the Church on this subject, and have been long endeavoring to obliterate the record of all nations and all ages, they have been unable to extinguish or weaken the strength and light of truth. We are speaking of what is known to all and doubtful to none. When on the sixth day of creation God formed man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, it was His will to give him a companion, whom He brought forth wonderfully from the side of the man himself as he slept. And in this the design of God's providence was that this married pair should be the natural source of all mankind, and that from them the human race should be propagated, and, by uninterrupted course of procreation, be preserved to all time. And the union of the man and the woman, in order more perfectly to correspond to the wise counsels of God, bore upon its face two especial properties, noble above all, and, as it were, deeply impressed and engraved, namely, unity and perpetuity. And we see this announced and openly confirmed in the Gospel by the divine authority of Jesus Christ, who declared to the Jews and to the Apostles that marriage from its very institution was to be between two only, the husband and the wife, that of two there was to be as it were one flesh ; and that the nuptial bond was by the will of God so closely and strongly woven that it cannot be unloosed or broken by any among men. A man "shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together let no one man put asunder." (Matt. xix. 5, 6.)

But this form of marriage, so excellent and admirable, began by degrees to be corrupted and to die out among the heathen nations ; and it seemed to be overclouded and darkened even in the Hebrew race. For among the latter common usage had sanctioned the possession by each man of more than one wife, and afterwards, when the indulgence of Moses had conceded "to the hardness of their hearts" (Matt. xix. 8) the power of repudiation, a door was opened to divorce. As to pagan society it is scarcely credible how marriage became corrupted and disfigured, exposed as it was to the flood of each people's errors and most shameful desires. Every nation, more or less, seems to have lost the idea and forgotten the true origin of marriage, and consequently laws were in many places enacted which seemed useful to the state rather than conformable to the requirements of nature. Solemn ceremonies, invented at the will of legislators, were the cause of the honorable name of wife, or the disgraceful name of concubine, being given to women ; and the authority of the rulers of the state even took upon itself to de-

cide who were and who were not to be allowed to marry, the laws being, to a great extent, contrary to equity, and resulting often in the commission of injustice. Moreover polygamy, polyandry, and divorce were the cause of a great relaxation of the nuptial tie. There was also a great disturbance of the mutual rights and duties of married persons when the husband acquired dominion over the wife, and commanded her, often without just cause, to go her way, while he assumed to himself, in his propensity to unbridled and untamed lust, the license to "roam with impunity amongst women of servile condition or infamous life, as if the guilt of sin depended on rank and not on the will." (Hieronymi Ep. ad Oceanum. Oper., tom. i., col. 459.) With this prevailing licentiousness on the part of husbands, nothing could be more wretched than the wife, who was reduced to such an abject condition that she was considered a mere instrument provided for the purpose of satisfying the passions or producing offspring. Nor was it thought shameful to buy and sell marriageable girls like chattels (Arnob. *adv. gent.* 4); the power of inflicting capital punishment on the wife being sometimes given to the parent and the husband. The families which owed their existence to such marriages as these were necessarily either the property of the state or owned as slaves by the father of the family, to whom the laws gave the right, not only to conclude and dissolve their marriages at his will, but even to exercise over them the monstrous power of life and death.

But at length a relief and remedy were divinely provided for all the ignominious evils with which marriages had been defiled; for Jesus Christ, the restorer of human dignity, and the perfecter of the Mosaic laws, did not make the subject of matrimony His least or last care. He ennobled the nuptials of Cana of Galilee by His presence, and made them memorable by the performance of the first of His miracles; so that from that day dates the beginning of the new holiness which descended upon human marriage. Then He recalled matrimony to the nobility of its primeval origin, both by reproofing the abuses introduced by the Jews as to both the plurality of wives and the privilege of repudiation, and by teaching them above all that no one might put asunder that which God had bound together by the chain of perpetual union. Therefore, after solving the difficulties adduced from the Mosaic institutes, assuming the part of a supreme lawgiver, He pronounced this decision in reference to married persons: "And I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and he that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." (Matt. xix. 9.)

But the Apostles, heralds of God's legislation, have more fully and in greater detail delivered to memory and to writing those things which have been decreed and established by divine authority in regard to marriage. For to no other teaching than of the Apostles must be referred what "our Holy Fathers, the Councils, and the tradition of the Universal Church have always taught" (Trid. sess. xxiv., in pr.), namely, that Christ Our Lord raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament; that He at the same time ordained that married people, guarded and

protected by the celestial grace provided by His merits, should derive holiness from marriage itself; and in it, in a manner wonderfully resembling the mystical union between Him and His Church, He perfected the love which accords with nature (Trid. sess. xxiv., cap. 1, *de reform. matr.*) and cemented the natural union of the man and woman more firmly in the bonds of divine charity. "Husbands," Paul says to the Ephesians, "love your wives as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it. . . . So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies, . . . for no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it as also Christ does the Church; because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother; and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church." (Ad Ephes. v. 25 *et seq.*) And in the same manner we learn from the teaching of the Apostles that Christ commanded that the union and perpetual constancy which was required from the first commencement of marriages should be held sacred and should not at any time be violated. The same Paul says: "But to them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband." (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.) And again: "A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth, but if her husband die she is at liberty." (Ibid. v. 39.) For these causes, therefore, matrimony has been made "a great sacrament" (Ad Eph. v. 32), "honorable in all" (Ad Hebr. xiii. 4), pious, chaste, and venerable as representing and signifying the most exalted mysteries. Nor is its Christian perfection and completeness confined to those things which have been mentioned. For in the first place something more exalted and noble has been given to the conjugal union than it had before, inasmuch as it was bid to look not merely to the propagation of the human race but to the procreation of offspring to the Church, "fellow-citizens with the saints and the domestics of God" (Ad Eph. ii. 19), "that a people may be begotten and trained to religion and to the worship of the true God and of Our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Catech. Rom. cap. viii.). In the second place the duties of both parties in marriage are defined and their rights fully laid down. It is incumbent upon them to bear in mind and understand that each owes to the other the greatest love, a constant fidelity, and careful and assiduous support. The man is the chief of the family, and the head of the woman, who nevertheless, inasmuch as she is flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone, should be subject to and obey the man, not as a servant, but as a companion; and so neither honor nor dignity is lost by the rendering of obedience. But let divine charity ever regulate duty both in him who commands and in her who obeys, since both are images, the one of Christ, the other of His Church. For "the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church. . . . But as the Church is subject to Christ so also let wives be to their husbands in all things." (Ad Eph. v. 23, 24). As regards

children, they are bound to obey and be subject to their parents, and to do them honor for conscience sake; and, on the other hand, every care and forethought should be vigilantly exercised by parents to protect their children and above all to train them to virtue: "Fathers, bring them" (your children) "up in the discipline and the correction of the Lord." (Ad Eph. vi. 4). Whence it may be understood that the duties of married people are neither few nor light; yet to those who are virtuous they become, by the grace imparted through the Sacrament, not only easy to bear, but even a source of happiness.

Therefore Christ, having renewed matrimony to such and so great an excellence, intrusted and commended its entire discipline to the Church. And she has exercised authority over the marriages of Christians at every time and in every place, and has so exercised it as to show that it was her own inherent right, not obtained by the concession of men, but divinely bestowed by the will of her Author. How many and how vigilant were the pains which she took to retain the sanctity of marriages, in order that their inviolability might be preserved to them, is so well known that it need not be pointed out. And we know that loose and free love was forbidden by the sentence of the Council of Jerusalem (Act xv. 29), that the Corinthian citizen was condemned for incest by the authority of St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 5), and that the attempts of very many persons who attacked Christian marriage, to wit, Gnostics, Manichæans, Montanists, in the very beginning of Christianity, and within our memory Mormons, St. Simonians, Phalansterians, and Communists, have been opposed and rejected with the same vigor. In like manner the rights of marriage have been made equal among all persons and the same for all, the ancient distinction between slaves and the freeborn being put an end to (cap. *de conjug. serv.*), the rights of husband and wife have been equalized; for, as Jerome said (Oper., tom. i., col. 455), "among us what is not lawful for women is equally unlawful for men, and the same obligation results from equal servitude," and those same rights, tending to promote mutual good-will and reciprocal kindness, have been firmly established; the dignity of woman has been asserted and vindicated; it has been forbidden to a husband to inflict capital punishment on an adulteress (Can. *Interfectores*, et Can. *Admonere*, quæst. 2), or with a wanton unchastity to violate his own plighted faith. And it is also very important that the Church, as far as is right, has limited the power of fathers of families, so that their sons and daughters when desirous of marriage should not have their just liberty diminished (cap. 30, quæst. 3; cap. 3, *de cognat spirit.*); that she has decreed that there could be no marriages between relations and kindred within certain degrees (cap. 8, *de consang. et affin.*; cap. 1, *de cognat legati.*), so that the supernatural love of married persons might diffuse itself over a wider field; that she has taken care that marriages should, as far as possible, be guarded against error, force and fraud (cap. 26, *de sponsal.*; capp. 13, 15, 29, *de sponsal. et matrim.*; et alibi). That she has willed the holiness of the marriage-bed, the security of persons (cap. 1, *de convers. infid.*; capp. 5, 6, *de eo qui duxit in matr.*), the decorum of

marriages (capp. 3, 5, 8, *de sponsal. et matr.* Trid. sess xxiv. cap. 3, *de reform. matr.*), the inviolability of religion (cap. 7, *de divor.*), to be placed under proper safeguard. In fine, she has fortified that divine institution so strongly and with such prudent laws, that no one can be a just judge of things who does not understand that even with regard to the subject of marriages the Church is the best guardian and protector of the human race; and that her wisdom has victoriously survived both the flight of time, the injuries of men, and the innumerable vicissitudes of states.

But, by the efforts of the enemy of the human race, there are not wanting those who, as they ungratefully repudiate the other benefits of redemption, in the same way either despise or altogether ignore the restitution and perfection of marriage. It is the disgrace of certain of the ancients that they were hostile to marriage in some respects; but much more perniciously do those in our own time err who would entirely pervert its nature now that it has been made perfect and complete in all its elements and parts. Of which the cause is chiefly to be found in this, that the minds of many, being imbued with the opinions of a false philosophy and a corrupt habit of mind, bear nothing so ill as to submit and obey; and they labor with the greatest bitterness in order that not only individuals, but families, and indeed the whole human race, may proudly despise the authority of God. But since the fount and origin of the family, and all human society, consists in marriage, they will in no way allow it to be under the jurisdiction of the Church; nay, they endeavor to cast it down from all sanctity, and to drive it into the narrow circle of those things which have been instituted by human authors, and are regulated and administered by the civil law of nations. Whence it necessarily followed that they have attributed to the rulers of the state all jurisdiction over marriage, and granted none to the Church; and if she at any time exercised power of that kind they affirm that this was done by the indulgence of rulers, or unjustly. But now they say it is time that those who rule the state should bravely vindicate their rights, and should determine to direct according to their own will all matters relating to marriage. Hence have arisen what are called civil marriages; hence laws enacted concerning the causes which constitute an impediment to marriage; hence judicial sentences on conjugal contracts, as to whether they have been entered upon rightly or wrongly. Lastly we see every possible power of legislating and judging on this subject taken away from the Church with so much determination that no account is any longer taken either of her divine power or of the provident laws under which all the nations, to whom Christian wisdom brought the light of civilization, lived so many years. But the naturalists and all those who, specially professing to worship the deity of the state, are striving to disturb entire commonwealths with these doctrines, cannot avoid the reproach of falsehood. For since marriage has God for its author, and since it has been even from the beginning a shadowing forth of the incarnation of the Word of God, therefore there is in it something sacred and religious, not adven-

titious but innate, not received from men but implanted by nature. Wherefore Innocent III. (cap. 8, *de divor.*) and Honorius III. (cap. 11, *de transact.*), our predecessors, were enabled to say, not unjustly nor rashly, that the sacrament of marriage exists both among the faithful and among infidels. We call to witness also the monuments of antiquity, and the customs and institutions of those nations which were the most cultivated and excelled in a more refined knowledge of right and equity, in all of whose minds it was a settled and foregone conclusion that the idea of marriage was connected with religion and sanctity. For this reason marriages amongst them were frequently accustomed to be performed with religious ceremonies, with the authority of the pontiffs, with the ministry of priests, so great an influence even on minds ignorant of Divine Revelation had the nature of things, the memory of their origin, the conscience of the human race!

Wherefore marriage, being by its own nature and meaning sacred, it is consistent that it should be regulated and governed, not by the command of rulers, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone possesses authority in sacred things. Then we must consider the dignity of the sacrament, by the addition of which the marriages of Christians have become in the highest degree ennobled. And, by the will of Christ, the Church alone can and ought to legislate and decide concerning sacraments, so that it is out of the question to attempt to transfer any, even the smallest part, of her power to the governors of the state. Finally, there is great weight, great force in history, by which we are clearly taught that the legislative and judicial power of which we speak was wont to be freely and continually exercised by the Church, even in those times when it is vainly and foolishly pretended that the chiefs of the state were consenting and conniving thereto. For how incredible and absurd it is to suppose that Christ Our Lord condemned the deep-rooted custom of polygamy and of repudiation by a power delegated to Him by the governor of the province or by the ruler of the Jews; or, in like manner, that the Apostle Paul declared divorces and incestuous marriages to be unlawful with the consent or by the tacit authority of Tiberius, of Caligula, or of Nero! Nor can any sane man be persuaded that so many laws were enacted by the Church regarding the sanctity and stability of marriage (Can. Apost., 16, 17, 18), and regarding marriages between slaves and free women (Philosophum. Oxon., 1851), by authority derived from the Roman emperors, the deadliest enemies of the Christian name, who desired nothing more earnestly than to extirpate by violence and blood the growing religion of Christ; more especially as the law which proceeded from the Church differed so widely from the civil law that Ignatius the Martyr (Epist. ad Polycarp. cap. 5), Justin (Apolog. mai., n. 15), Athenagoras (Legat. pro Christian., nn. 32, 33), and Tertullian (De coron. milit., cap. 13) publicly denounced as immoral, and even adulterous, marriages which, nevertheless, the imperial laws allowed. But when all power came into the hands of the Christian emperors, the Supreme Pontiffs and the bishops, assembled in council, continued always, with the same liberty and the

same knowledge of their own right, to command and to forbid in matrimonial affairs as seemed to them to be useful and in conformity with the requirements of the times, no matter how inconsistent it might be with the civil institutions of the day. No one is ignorant that many rules were made on the subject of impediments arising from obligations, vows, disparity of worship, consanguinity, crime, or public decency by the prelates of the Church at the Councils of Elvira (De Aguirre, *Conc. Hispan.*, tom. i., can. 13, 15, 16, 17), Arles (Harduin., *Act. Concil.*, tom. i., can. 11), Chalcedon (Harduin., *Act. Concil.*, tom. i., can. 16), Milevis (Harduin., *Act. Concil.*, tom. i., can. 17), and other councils, which frequently are far different from the decrees sanctioned by the imperial law. And so far were princes from claiming any power for themselves in the matter of Christian marriages, that they declared and acknowledged that that power, in all its plenitude, was vested in the Church. In fact, Honorius, Theodosius the Younger, and Justinian (Novel. 137) did not hesitate to admit that in matters which concerned marriage they had no right to do anything except as the guardians and defenders of the sacred canons. And if they made any decrees regarding impediments to marriage, they of their own accord explained the reason to be that they had taken this upon themselves by the permission and authority of the Church (Fejer, *Matrim. ex instit. Christ.*; Pesth. 1835), whose decision they were accustomed to ask for and reverently to receive in disputes concerning the legitimacy of children (cap. 3, *de ordin. cognit.*), concerning divorces (cap. 3, *de divort.*), and, in fine, all matters having any kind of relation to the matrimonial bond (cap. 13, *qui filii sint legit.*). Wherefore it was most justly decreed by the Council of Trent that the Church has power "to define the impediments which make matrimony void, and that matrimonial causes belong to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical judges." (Trid., sess. xxiv., can. 4.)

Nor let any one be led astray by that distinction so sedulously urged by regalists, according to which they separate the nuptial contract from the sacrament, in order that, while judgment respecting the sacraments is reserved to the Church, they may give over the contract to the authority and decision of the civil power. For a distinction, or rather a disjunction, of this nature cannot be established; inasmuch as it is manifest that in Christian matrimony it is not possible to separate the contract from the sacrament, and, therefore, that there cannot be a true and legitimate contract without its being, on that very account, a sacrament. For Christ Our Lord raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament; and matrimony is the contract itself, provided only that it be lawfully made. In addition to which, matrimony is a sacrament for this reason, that it is a sacred sign conveying grace, and presenting an image of the mystic nuptials of Christ with the Church. But the form and figure of these is expressed by that bond of perfect unity by which man and wife are joined together, and which is nothing else but matrimony itself. Therefore it is evident that every lawful marriage between Christians is in and by itself a sacrament; and nothing can be more opposed to truth than that the sacrament is but an ornamental addition,

or a character imparted from without, which may be separated and disjoined from the contract at will. Wherefore it is neither established by reasoning nor proved by historical evidence that authority over Christian marriage is rightly given to the state. And if in this matter the right of others has been violated, no one can say that it has been violated by the Church.

And would that the teachings of the naturalists, so full of falsehood and injustice, were not equally fruitful in mischiefs and calamities. But it is easy to perceive what evil the profaning of marriages brings about, and how much it is likely to inflict upon the whole of human society. For in the beginning it was divinely ordained that we should find those things instituted by God and by nature more useful and more salutary in proportion as they remain whole and immutable in their original condition; since God the Creator of all things well knew what was expedient for the establishment and preservation of each, and so ordained all by His will and judgment that each should have its appropriate development. But if the temerity or the wickedness of men seek to change and to disturb the order of providence, then indeed even things which have been most wisely and most advantageously instituted begin to be injurious, or cease to be beneficial, either because by change they have lost the power of doing good, or because it is the will of God to punish in this manner the pride and audacity of men. They who deny the sanctity of marriage, and cast it, stripped of all sanctity, into the order of profane things, pervert the fundamental principles of nature, and, while they fight against the counsels of divine providence, at the same time to the extent of their power destroy its work. Wherefore it is not wonderful that from such insane and impious attempts there springs a crop of evils than which nothing can be more pernicious to the salvation of souls and the safety of the state.

If it be considered to what the divine institution of marriage tends, it will be very evident that it was the will of God to comprise in it the most abundant sources of public happiness and security. And plainly, marriages, besides that they are intended for the propagation of the human race, tend to make the life of married people more virtuous and more happy; and this in several ways, as, by mutual assistance to relieve necessities, by constant and faithful love, by the community of all possessions, and by the celestial grace that goes forth from the sacrament. And the same causes are most powerful in promoting the welfare of families; for marriages, as long as they are in accordance with nature and fitly correspond with the designs of God, possess a power to confirm a spirit of concord among parents, to promote the good education of children, to temper paternal power by proposing the example of the power of God, to make sons obedient to their parents, servants to their masters. From such marriages states may justly expect a progeny of citizens who will be animated with virtuous sentiments, imbued with the love and fear of God, and will deem it their duty to obey just and legitimate authority, to love all, to injure none.

These fruits, so many and so great, holy matrimony produced so

long as it retained the attributes of sanctity, of unity, and of perpetuity, from which it derived all its fertile and salutary force; nor can it be doubted that it would still have produced similar and equal results if at all times and in all places it had been in the power and care of the Church, which is at all times the most faithful guardian and vindicator of those attributes. But because, ere long, in various places the law of men was made to take the place of the divine and natural law, not only did that most exalted form and conception of marriage which nature had impressed, and, as it were, engraved, on the minds of men, begin to be obliterated, but even in Christian marriages its power, the source of such great blessings, was, through the wickedness of men, greatly weakened. For what benefit can nuptial unions confer from which the Christian religion, which is the parent of all good, and which fosters the greatest virtues, exciting and urging to everything which adorns a generous and exalted soul, is banished? When it is put aside and rejected marriage must needs be made a slave to the corrupt nature of man and the passions, which are the worst of rulers, protected only by the weak defence of natural virtue. Manifold evil, derived from this source, has resulted not only to private families, but to nations also. For when the salutary fear of God is removed, and when that alleviation of troubles which is to be found nowhere more effectual than in the Christian religion is taken away, it often and naturally happens that the duties and obligations of marriage appear almost intolerable; and many inordinately desire the loosening of the bond, which they imagine to have been tied by human law and choice, if difference of disposition, or quarrels, or infidelity on the part of one or the other, or mutual consent, or any other cause make them think it expedient. And if the law denies satisfaction to the wantonness of their desires, they exclaim that the laws are unjust, inhuman, and opposed to the rights of free citizens, and that some provision must be made for their abolition and the introduction of milder laws to facilitate divorce.

But the legislators of our times, while they profess themselves tenacious and studious of the same principles of right, cannot even, though they desire it ever so much, guard themselves from that wickedness of men of which we spoke; wherefore the times must be yielded to, and the faculty of divorce granted. History herself declares the same thing. For, to pass by other instances, towards the end of the last century, in that conflagration rather than disturbance of France, when all society was profaned and God was set aside, it was decided that the severance of married couples should be ratified by the laws. And many wish those same laws to be revived at this time, because they would have God and the Church driven from our midst, and removed from intercourse with human society, foolishly supposing that the last remedy for the great increase of corruption in morals is to be sought in laws of this description.

It is scarcely necessary to say of how much evil divorce is productive. It is the fruitful cause of mutable marriage compacts; it diminishes mutual affection; it supplies a pernicious stimulus to unfaithfulness; it

is injurious to the care and education of children ; it gives occasion to the breaking up of domestic society ; it scatters the seed of discord among families ; it lessens and degrades the dignity of women, who incur the danger of being abandoned when they shall have subverted the lust of their husbands. And since nothing tends so effectually as the corruption of morals to ruin families and undermine the strength of kingdoms, it may easily be perceived that divorce is especially hostile to the prosperity of families and states ; for divorce springs from the corrupt morals of nations, and, as experience teaches, opens the way and the door to more vicious habits of private and public life. And these evils will appear to be all the more serious if we consider that no restraint will be strong enough to confine the faculty of divorce, when once conceded, within fixed and foreseen limits. The force of example is very great, and greater still that of lust. From these exciting causes it must result that the desire of divorce, daily creeping on further, will invade the minds of a large number of persons, like a malady spread by contagion, or a flood of water that has burst its barriers.

These things surely are clear of themselves, but they become clearer by recalling past events. As soon as the way for divorce began to be rendered safe by law, dissensions, jealousies, separations enormously increased, and so shameful a manner of living was arrived at that those very persons who had been the defenders of such separations repented of what they had done, and unless they had in time sought a remedy in laws of a contrary character there would have been cause for fear lest the commonwealth itself should rush headlong to destruction. The ancient Romans are said to have looked with horror on the first example of divorce ; but ere long the sense of honesty began to be blunted in their minds, modesty with its controlling power to die out, and nuptial fidelity to be violated with so great license that what we read in some writers seems to have a striking semblance of truth, namely, that women had become accustomed to count years, not by the change of consuls, but by the change of husbands. In like manner among Protestants, at first, indeed, the laws had sanctioned divorce for certain causes, and those, to say the truth, not many in number ; but it has been found that these causes have, through the near connection of things resembling one another, increased to such an extent among the Germans, Americans, and others, that they whose understandings were not blunted considered the boundless depravation of morals and the insufferable rashness of the laws as deeply to be lamented. Nor was it otherwise in states called Catholic, in which, if at any time the severance of marriage ties was admitted, the multitude of inconveniences which ensued far exceeded the expectations of legislators. For the wickedness of very many persons led them to turn their minds to all sorts of malice and fraud, and by means of cruelty, by injuries, by adulteries, to invent causes for dissolving with impunity that bond of matrimonial union of which they were tired ; and this with so great detriment to public honesty that all judged it necessary that the laws should as soon as possible be amended. And who will doubt but that the laws favoring divorce will be followed

by wretched and calamitous results wherever they may happen to be revived in our own age? Certainly the contrivances or decrees of men have not the power to change the natural character and conformation of things; wherefore they bring a small amount of wisdom to bear on the public welfare who think that the genuine theory of marriage can be perverted with impunity, and, setting aside all sanctity of religion and of sacrament, seem to wish to disfigure and deform matrimony more shamefully than even the institutions of the heathen were wont to do. And, therefore, unless their counsels change, families and society will constantly have to fear for themselves lest they be hurled most miserably into that universal strife and conflict which has long since been proposed by the flagitious bands of socialists and communists. Hence it is clear how unsuitable and absurd it is to expect public welfare from divorce, which will issue rather in the certain dissolution of society.

It must, therefore, be confessed that the Catholic Church has consulted best for the common good of all people in guarding with constant attention the sanctity and perpetuity of marriage. Nor is little gratitude due to her for having openly remonstrated against the civil laws that for a hundred years past have been sinning in this particular (Pius VI., epist. ad episc. Lucion., 28 Maii, 1793; Pius VII., litter. encycl. die 17 Febr. 1809, et Const. dat. die 19 Jul. 1817; Pius VIII., litt. encycl. die 29 Maii, 1829; Gregorius XVI., Const. dat. die 15 Augusti, 1832; Pius IX., alloc. habit. die 22 Sept. 1852); for having smitten with anathema the pernicious heresy of Protestants concerning divorce and repudiation (Trid., sess., xxiv., can. 5, 7); for having in many ways condemned the dissolution of marriages practiced by the Greeks (Concil. Floren., et Instr. Eug. IV. ad Armenos; Bened. XIV., Const. *Etsi pastoralis*, 6 Maii, 1742); for having decreed those nuptials to be null and void which were contracted under the condition that they might at some time or other be dissolved (cap. 7, *de condit. appos.*); lastly, for having even from the earliest ages repudiated the imperial laws which perniciously favored divorce and the breaking off of the marriage contract (Hieron., epist. 79 ad Ocean; Ambros., lib. viii., in cap. 16 Lucæ, n. 5; August., de nuptiis, cap. 10). In truth, whenever the Supreme Pontiffs resisted most powerful princes demanding with threats to have divorces granted by themselves ratified by the Church, they are to be regarded as having combated not only for the integrity of religion but also for the security of the human race. On which account all posterity admires the proofs of an invincible mind afforded by Nicholas I. in conflict with Lothaire; by Urban II. and Paschal II. struggling against Philip I., King of France; by Celestine III. and Innocent III. against Alfonso of Leon and Philip II. of France; by Clement VII. and Paul III. against Henry VIII., and lastly by the holy and brave Pontiff, Pius VII., against Napoleon I., uplifted by prosperity and the greatness of his empire.

This being the case, all rulers and administrators of public affairs, if they wished to follow reason and wisdom, and to be really useful to the people, ought to have preferred to let the sacred laws of matrimony remain intact, and to apply the proffered assistance of the Church to the

guardianship of morals and the prosperity of families, rather than to cast upon the Church itself the suspicion of hostility, and charge it falsely and unjustly with the violation of civil rights.

And that all the more, because, as the Catholic Church can in no respect depart from religious duty and defence of its rights, so is it habitually inclined to kindness and indulgence in all things which can be made to consist with the integrity of its rights and the sanctity of its duties. For which reason it has never determined anything respecting matrimony without having due regard to the state of the community and to the condition of populations; nor has it on one occasion only, mitigated, as far as it could, the prescriptions of its own laws when there were just and grave causes for such a modification. The Church itself likewise does not ignore or deny that the sacrament of marriage, since it is directed towards the preservation and increase of human society, has a relationship and intimacy with human matters, which are consequences, indeed, of matrimony, but belong to the civil order; and the rulers of the state rightly take cognizance and judge of these. But no one doubts that Jesus Christ, the Founder of the Church, willed the sacred power to be distinct from the civil power, and each power to be free and unhampered in the conduct of its own affairs; yet with this addition, which is expedient for each and for the interests of all men, namely, that there should be a union and concord between them, and that in those things which are, though in different ways, matters of common right and judgment, the one to which human affairs are committed should depend suitably and fittingly on the other, to which are intrusted the things of Heaven. But in an agreement, or harmony, as it were, of this description is contained not only the best mode of operation of each of the two powers, but also the most opportune and efficacious means of helping the human race in what appertains to the conduct of human life and the hope of everlasting salvation. For, as we showed in former Encyclical Letters, the intelligence of men, if it agrees with Christian faith, is much ennobled and comes forth much better armed for the avoidance and repulsion of error, and faith in its turn borrows no small assistance from intelligence; so, in like manner, if the civil authority agrees amicably with the sacred power of the Church, a great increase of usefulness accrues of necessity to both. For the dignity of the one is amplified, and under the guidance of religion the government will never be unjust; while to the other are supplied protection and defence for the public good of the faithful. Therefore, moved by the consideration of these things, as we have at other times earnestly, so now again at the present time we urgently exhort princes and men in authority to concord and friendship; and we are the first to extend to them, as it were, our right hand with paternal benevolence, offering the assistance of our supreme power, which is the more necessary at this time in proportion as the right of sovereign rule is, in the opinion of men, weakened, as if it had received a wound. For the minds of multitudes being inflamed with riotous liberty, and casting off with nefarious boldness every restraint of government, even

the most legitimate, public safety requires that men should associate to prevent the injury of both powers, injury which impends not merely over the Church, but also over civil society itself.

But while we strongly advise a friendly union of wills and dispositions, and pray God, the Prince of Peace, that He would infuse the love of concord into the minds of all men, we cannot refrain, Venerable Brethren, from exhorting yourselves more and more to use your diligence, your zeal and vigilance, which we know to be very great. As far as you can attain it by efforts and by your authority, strive with diligence that among the people intrusted to your fidelity the entire and uncorrupted doctrine be retained which Christ the Lord and the apostolic interpreters of the heavenly will have delivered, and which the Catholic Church herself has religiously preserved and commanded the faithful in Christ to preserve through all ages.

Take especial care of this, that the people abound in precepts of Christian wisdom, and always retain in memory that marriage was instituted in the beginning, not by the will of man, but by the authority and command of God, and was sanctioned entirely under this law, that it should be of one to one; and that Christ, the author of the new covenant, translated that alliance into a sacrament, and, as far as regards the bond, ascribed to His Church the lawgiving and judicial authority. In which matter the greatest care must be taken lest the mind be led into error by the fallacious conclusions of adversaries, who would take away this power from the Church. In like manner it ought to be recognized by all, that if any union of man and woman among the faithful of Christ be contracted without the sacrament it is wanting in the force and character of a true marriage; and although it be effected in agreement with the civil laws, yet it can have no greater value than that of a rite or custom introduced by the civil law; but it must also be remembered that such things only can be ordered and administered by the civil law which are the consequences of marriage in the civil order, and which it is evident cannot be produced except a true and legitimate cause for them, namely, a nuptial bond, really exists. It is, in the highest degree, of importance that the married should fully understand and recognize the truth of these things; which ought indeed to be accepted and understood, so that they may in this matter comply with the laws; for the Church does not refuse, but on the contrary wills and hopes that the due effects of marriage should be preserved intact in all respects, and that no detriment may be entailed on the offspring. In such confusion of opinions, however, which daily advance, this also is necessary to be known, that it is not in the power of any one to dissolve the bond of a marriage solemnized and consummated among Christians; and that they are guilty of a crime who, being man and wife, whatever cause may be alleged, wish to entangle themselves in a new matrimonial bond before the first is broken by death. But if things have gone so far that living together seems to be insupportable any longer, then indeed the Church allows one to live apart from the other, and all care being taken and remedies applied to the condition of the

married couple, she studies how she may mitigate the inconveniences of separation, nor does she ever cease to labor for the re-establishment of concord, or despair of bringing it about. But these are extremities to which it would be easy not to descend if married persons were not actuated by lust, but, having duly considered both the duties and the elevated motives of matrimony, came to it with proper dispositions, and wedlock were not preceded by a continuous series of offences displeasing to God. To sum up all in a few words, marriages will be blessed with peaceful and quiet constancy if the wedded pair draw their breath and life from the power of religion, of whose gift it comes that the mind is strong and unconquerable, and by whose existence personal faults, if such exist, discrepancy of habits and dispositions, the weight of maternal cares, the toil and anxiety about the education of children, the attendant labors of existence, and adverse circumstances may be borne, not only with moderation, but even willingly and gladly.

Care ought also to be taken lest alliances be lightly sought with those who are strangers to the Catholic name and faith, for it can scarcely be hoped that minds which are at variance in respect of religious doctrine should be in accord on other matters. Indeed it is most evident that marriages of this kind should be avoided from the fact of their giving occasion to forbidden communion in sacred things; they create danger to the religion of a Catholic spouse, they are a hindrance to the good education of the children, and very frequently they dispose the mind to become accustomed to take equal account of all religions, and to lose sight of the distinction between true and false. In the last place, since we thoroughly understand that no one ought to be an alien from our charity, we commend those, Venerable Brethren, to your authority, faith, and piety, who, being indeed extremely wretched, are carried away by the tide of their lusts, and, being altogether unmindful of their own salvation, live contrary to law and right not united in a bond of lawful wedlock. Let your skill and diligence be employed in recalling such to their duty; and do you in every way strive, both by yourselves and with the interposition of good men, that they may perceive that they have acted wickedly, that they may do penance for their sin, and may turn their minds seriously towards proper nuptials celebrated with Catholic rites.

You easily perceive, Venerable Brethren, that these instructions and precepts respecting Christian marriage, which we have resolved to communicate to you, pertain strictly no less to the preservation of civil society than to the everlasting salvation of men. May God grant, therefore, that the more weight and importance these instructions have, the more they may find everywhere minds docile and prompt to obey. On this account let us all alike, with suppliant and humble prayer, implore the aid of the Blessed and Immaculate Virgin Mary, that, by exciting minds to the obedience of faith, she may show herself to men as their mother and helper. Nor let us implore with less earnestness Peter and Paul, the princes of the Apostles, the conquerors of superstition, the sowers of the seed of truth, that they may preserve the human race from the deluge of returning errors by their most powerful patronage.

Meanwhile, as pledge of heavenly gifts and witness of Our singular good-will, We from the heart impart to you all, Venerable Brethren, and to the people intrusted to your vigilance, Our apostolic benediction.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, on the tenth day of February, in the year 1880, the second year of Our Pontificate.

LEO PP. XIII.

LETTER TO HIS HOLINESS LEO XIII.

Some months ago we published in the REVIEW the magnificent En-
cyclical of Our Holy Father, in which he urged the bishops of the Cath-
olic world to take suitable measures for restoring the study of St.
Thomas and his teachings in their seminaries of theology and wher-
ever outside of them secular youth receives philosophical instruction.

To this our American bishops, not content with the simple obedience they uniformly render to all mandates, counsels, even mere wishes, of the Holy See, have given their warmest assent and adhesion of heart and soul, and have expressed in reply to the Holy Father not only their willingness, but their eagerness to second his intentions to the best of their power. We have received such urgent requests from more than one source to put on record in the REVIEW this adhesion of the American Episcopate to the teachings of Rome touching St. Thomas, that we cannot but comply. Consequently we give below the Letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of the provinces of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. All the other prelates have, no doubt, singly or conjointly notified the Holy Father of their intention to be guided by his counsel and authority in this matter. But this is the only document that has appeared in print so far. We take it, with its translation, from the Philadelphia *Catholic Standard* of March 20th, 1880.]

BEATISSIME PATER: Litteras Tuas mense Augusto superioris anni datas non sine maxima animi laetitia perlegimus. Iis enim, quod jampridem bonorum omnium vota postulabant, Episcopos hortaris ac mones ut Clericorum aliorumque doctorum virorum studium in theologicis ac philosophicis disciplinis ad D. Thomae normam tradendis excitent; atque auream sanctissimi hujus magistri doctrinam, sicubi neglecta fuerit, revocandam ac restituendam et quam latissime propagandam curent. Quod non solum maximas Ecclesiae utilitates pariet, sed etiam scientiis omnibus quotquot apud homines excoluntur haud parum profuturum esse arbitramur. Omnes enim artissimo quodam inter se vinculo colligantur, neque sine rectae philosophiae principiis atque usu aut satis intelligi aut apte doceri possunt. Quamobrem si saperent suaeque mentis essent Tibi gratias et haberent et agerent maximas etiam illi homines qui, neglecto rerum divinarum studio iis potissimum scientiis quae ex naturae pervestigatione humanoque ingenio hauriuntur, sese totos tradiderunt.

Certissimam enim viam et rationem etiam ipsis ostendisti, quâ unâ veros optabilesque progressus humana quoque scientia sit habitura.

Nos vero. Beatissime Pater, qui Principis Apostolorum Haereditatem ac summum Fidei Magistrum in Te veneramus, cum litteras Tuas pervolveremus, non solum vim ac gravitatem orationis Tuae, qualis profecto Petrum in monendis atque erudiendis fratribus decet admirati sumus, sed etiam singularem providentiam sapientissimumque consilium quod in iisdem litteris elucet. Perspexisti et dilucide docuisti ingruentibus undique erroribus occurri omnino non posse, nisi denuo ad veterem philosophandi normam Catholicorum scholae dirigantur. Sane, quod ipse, Beatissime Pater, sapientissime commemorasti, ex quo homines petulanti ingenio effraenatisque in disputando licentiae cupidi vetera Patrum instituta ducemque tutissimum Doctorem Angelicum deseruerent, dici vix potest quam multa ac teterrima errorum monstra quasi agmine facto in philosophorum scholas irruperint. Hinc oppugnari ac labefactari doctrinae praeteritorum saeculorum, non eae tantum quae captum rationis excedunt quasque nobis Deus per Filium suum sponte revelaverat, sed illae quoque quae apud omnes etiam barbaros vigent, quas ratio ipsa avide excipit comprobaturque, quae denique in omnium animis ita inhaerent ut eas vel natura quasi inditas habeamus vel pene cum lacte nutricis hausisse videamur.

Atque hujus quidem miserrimae rerum conditionis Beatissime Pater, quod non sine lacrymis fateri cogimur, exempla domestica non desunt. Cum enim apud eos qui in hac regione maximo Catholicae unitatis beneficio infelicitate carent philosophia aut fere nullâ aut omnino perversâ ratione pertractetur, plurimos videre licet qui in dies prima illa religionis ac morum principia dediscunt quae vel feri ac silvestres homines, natura duce, agnoscunt. Pauci quidem adhuc sunt, quod uni clementissimi Dei misericordiae acceptum referimus, qui impietatem hanc suam in vulgus propalare aliosque docere audeant. Sed valde urget nos timor, ne horum numerus paullatim augeatur. Dum hoc vident, dolent animoque anguntur ceteri qui à scelere impietatis in Deum morumque corruptela abhorrent. Sed nullum, eheu! habent in suâ aut religione aut philosophiâ tanti mali remedium. Immo licentiae et impietati haud obscure patrocinantur ea ipsa principia, quibus utrique adversus Ecclesiam Dei et Catholicam veritatem tueri se solent. Utinam Petrum Apostolorum Principem lapidemque Christianae veritatis angularem in Te, Beatissime Pater, loquentem et docentem audire vellent! Secus enim in arcendo errore inermes perpetuo sint oportet. Neque unquam certis argumentis potentur quibus, quasi validissimis telis, Dei humanaeque societatis hostium crescentem in dies audaciam et furorem retundant.

Quod autem ad nos attinet, Beatissime Pater, promittimus nos omni quo possumus studio, Tuis hortatibus obsecundaturos. Iam quidem plurimis in scholis apud nos praeclara D. Thomae volumina eam obtinere auctoritatem, ut ad ea quasi normam doctores omnia exigant discipulisque tradant. Curabimus vero, juvante Deo, ut nulla sit in posterum nostrarum dioeceseon schola, nullum seminarium ad juvenes in disciplinis

philosophicis et theologicis instituendos, in quo D. Thomae doctrina non ex rivulis sed ex ipso fonte derivata non plenissime imbuantur.

Gratulamur igitur Tibi, Leo Pontifex Maxime, quod antecessorum Tuorum vestigiis insistens gravissimis ac magnificentissimis Verbis Tuis Thomam Aquinatem, sanctissimum ac doctissimum virum in pristinum honorem revocasti atque adeo tam philosophiae quam theologiae Catholicae, immo etiam scientiarum omnium profectui et augmento sapienter consuluisti. Iterumque pollicemur nos monitis et hortamentis Tuis hac in re nullo unquam tempore defuturos.

Quod pium voluntatis nostrae propositum ut ratum habeas Tuaque Apostolica benedictione benigne confirmes enixe obsecramus.

Sanctitatis Tuae Filii Obsequentissimi,

JOANNES CARD McCLOSKEY,
Archiepiscopus Neo Eboracensis.

JOANNES LOUGHLIN,
Episcopus Brooklynensis.

BERNARDUS MCQUAID,
Episcopus Roffensis.

STEPHANUS V. RYAN,
Episcopus Buffalensis.

FRANCISCUS MCNIERY,
Episcopus Albanensis.

EDGAR P. WADHAMS,
Episcopus Ogdensburgensis.

MICHAEL A. CORRIGAN,
Episcopus Nevarcensis.

JOANNES J. WILLIAMS,
Archiepiscopus Bostoniensis.

LUDOVICUS DE GOESBRIAND,
Episcopus Burlingtonensis.

PATRITIUS T. O'REILLY,
Episcopus Campifontis.

THOMAS F. HENDRICKEN,
Episcopus Providentiensis.

JACOBUS A. HEALY,
Episcopus Portlandensis.

LAURENTIUS J. MCMAHON,
Episcopus Hartfordensis.

JACOBUS F. WOOD,
Archiepiscopus Philadelphiensis.

TOBIAS MULLEN,
Episcopus Eriensis.

GULIELMUS O'HARA,
Episcopus Scrantonensis.

JEREMIAS F. SHANAHAN,
Episcopus Harrisburgensis.

JOANNES J. TUIGG,
Episcopus Pittsburgensis et Administrator Alleghenensis.

[TRANSLATION.]

MOST HOLY FATHER: It was not without a deep feeling of joy that we read thy letters bearing date of August of the past year. For in the same—what all good men had long and anxiously desired—thou warnest and encouragest all bishops to excite the zealous co-operation of the clergy and other men of learning in order that philosophy and theology may be taught according to the standard of St. Thomas, to do what is in their power to bring back and restore the golden doctrines of this most holy teacher wherever it may have fallen into disuse or neglect, and to see that it be diffused everywhere if possible. And this, we feel sure, will not only be highly beneficial to the Church, but will be likewise of no little advantage to all the sciences that are cultivated by mankind. For these are all knit together by the closest ties, and can neither be well understood nor properly taught without the principles of a correct philosophy. Therefore it would be only just that even those who have no concern for the study of sacred things, but are wholly immersed in those sciences that are based on the observation of nature or intellectual investigation, should feel grateful, were they but wise and right-minded, and even express their thanks for this timely warning. For to them likewise thou hast disclosed the only path by which even purely human science may hope to attain such progress as is real and to be desired.

But we, Most Holy Father, we who in thy person reverence the heir of the Prince of the Apostles and the Supreme Teacher of faith, in perusing thy letters have found just reason to admire, not only the weight and power of thy words, but also the admirable foresight and most wise counsel that shine forth in the aforesaid letters. Thou hast clearly laid down, what thy wisdom has so well discerned, that Catholic schools can oppose the errors that are making headway on every side in no more effectual way than by a return to philosophy of the old pattern. Indeed, nor has it escaped mention in thy letters, ever since men bold, self-willed, and craving unbridled license of discussion have abandoned the teachings of our fathers, and that most safe guide, the Angelic Doctor, it would be hard to enumerate the many and monstrous errors that, like enemies in battle array, have invaded the schools of philosophy. Hence the repeated assaults meant to weaken and overthrow the teachings of past ages, not only those beyond the comprehension of reason and graciously revealed by God through his Son, but those also that are found even amongst barbarous nations, truths that when first heard reason eagerly receives and welcomes, and which are so congenial to the human soul that we seem either to possess them by instinct of nature, or to have drawn them in with our mother's milk in infancy.

Of this sad condition of things, Most Holy Father, and we say it sorrowing, examples at home are not wanting. For, whereas in this country among those who are unhappily deprived of the blessing of Catholic unity either no philosophy is studied, or that only which is of

distorted and perverse kind, we have the misfortune to behold many who, day by day, are unlearning those first principles of religion and morals which even the rude men of the forest have been taught by the guidance of nature alone. As yet there are but few, and this we ascribe only to the goodness of an all-merciful God, who have the boldness to spread before the world their impiety, and teach it to their fellow-men. But, to our grief, it is to be feared that the number of such teachers is growing by degrees. This state of things, it is true, is a source of trouble and affliction to others who yet retain their abhorrence of impiety in religion and of corruption in morals. But alas! in the shreds of religion or of philosophy that they have preserved, they can find no remedy for so great an evil. On the contrary, both religion and license find no little support in the very principles by which both parties alike try to defend themselves against the Church of God and Catholic truth. Oh! that they would but give ear to Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and who is, likewise, the corner-stone of Christian truth, speaking and teaching through thee, Most Holy Father. For otherwise they must be ever defenceless in the combat against error. Never can they get possession of those solid arguments by which, as by unfailing weapons, they will be enabled to hurl back the attacks, daily increasing in boldness and fury, of the enemies of God and of human society.

As regards ourselves, Most Holy Father, we promise most earnestly to follow thy exhortations. Already in very many of our schools the glorious writings of St. Thomas possess such authority that they have become the standard for all, teachers and scholars. And with God's help we will make further provision, so that hereafter there shall be in our dioceses no seminary, no school for philosophical or theological studies in which our youth shall not be fully imbued with the teaching of St. Thomas, and that derived, not from rivulets, but from the very fountain-head.

Justly, then, may we congratulate thee, great Pontiff, Leo! for this that, in perfect unison with the will and deed of thy predecessors, thy great and noble words have re-established in his former place of honor that most holy and learned man, Thomas of Aquin, and have thus wisely consulted for the progress and improvement of Catholic philosophy and theology, and, indeed, of all science.

Again we renew our promise never to forget thy words of admonition and encouragement. Which good purpose of our will we earnestly beseech thee to accept, and to confirm the same by thy Apostolic Benediction.

Of Thy Holiness's Most Devoted Children,

JOHN CARDINAL McCLOSKEY,
Archbishop of New York.

JOHN LOUGHLIN,
Bishop of Brooklyn.

BERNARD MCQUAID,
Bishop of Rochester.

STEPHEN V. RYAN,
Bishop of Buffalo.

FRANCIS MCNIERNY,
Bishop of Albany.

EDGAR P. WADHAMS,
Bishop of Ogdensburg.

MICHAEL A. CORRIGAN,
Bishop of Newark.

JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
Archbishop of Boston.

LOUIS DE GOESBRIAND,
Bishop of Burlington.

PATRICK T. O'REILLY,
Bishop of Springfield.

THOMAS F. HENDRICKEN,
Bishop of Providence.

JAMES A. HEALY,
Bishop of Portland.

LAURENCE S. MCMAHON,
Bishop of Hartford.

JAMES F. WOOD,
Archbishop of Philadelphia.

TOBIAS MULLEN,
Bishop of Erie.

WILLIAM O'HARA,
Bishop of Scranton.

JEREMIAH F. SHANAHAN,
Bishop of Harrisburg.

JOHN TUIGG,
Bishop of Pittsburgh and Administrator of Alleghany.



BOOK NOTICES.

THE BIBLE OF TO-DAY. A Course of Lectures. By *John W. Chadwick*, Minister of the Second Unitarian Church, in Brooklyn. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1879.

The lectures which compose this volume were written, as we learn from the preface, for Mr. Chadwick's "people." His object, as he states it, is "to condense into a single volume . . . the best historical and scientific criticism of the separate books of the Bible, and their mutual relations. I am not aware of any other volume which has made exactly this attempt, and it is high time somebody should make it." Why Mr. Chadwick should thus think it necessary for anybody to make the attempt we are entirely unable to discover, since in the very next sentence he expresses doubt of the truth of these results of "the best historical and scientific criticism." The idea which rules him is expressed in two lines on the title-page:

"Out from the heart of nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old."

It strikes us with wonder that the author and others of his school of disbelief, can have the patience to spend so much time and labor in researches about writings, which according to *their* theories are, in plain English, forgeries and impostures; and that they so strenuously claim to be Christians when, according to their professed belief, the writings which Christians regard as sacred and as a record of divinely revealed truth, are nothing else than a collection of myths and legends, growing out of the fancies, desires, or speculations of men.

It would be impossible within any reasonable limits to present the author's theory of the writings which make up the volume commonly called the Bible. The following statements will give a general idea of his notions of the Old Testament:

"Before the Babylonish captivity there were no *sacred* writings in Judea. There were some laws, and some of the writings of the prophets, and some historical compositions, and some of these, no doubt, were highly valued, but no special character was attached to them, no peculiar authority assigned to them. And this you must remember was about eight hundred years after the time of Moses. Soon after the captivity in the fifth century B. C. the law appeared, and soon after came to be considered sacred. Not long after, it would seem, that Nehemiah made a collection of histories and prophecies, together with the Psalms that had appeared up to this time, not with any idea of putting them on a level with the law, but only to preserve them from destruction. Nevertheless, in course of time they came to be regarded as almost or quite as sacred as the law. Again, as time went on, there appeared other writings, and older ones came to be more regarded for one reason or another, and so somewhat along in the first century before Christ, these were collected, and in another century or two had come to be regarded as almost, or quite as sacred as the *Law* and the *Prophets*—the two former collections. The Old Testament was now complete."

This would be simply ridiculous were it not impious. The reader will note the tone of positive assertion that runs through the statements quoted, and yet when Mr. Chadwick comes to assign definite reasons

for them, he, in effect, acknowledges that he is not able to arrive at any conclusions whatever other than merely speculative ones, and that the infidel critics he follows are all at variance with each other. Christian tradition and that of the Jews respecting the Scripture he holds in supreme contempt. With a wave of his hand, as it were, and without regarding it as necessary to give a reason for so doing, he ignores the belief of the Church, the opinions of her Doctors, the decisions of her Councils as, all alike, childish delusions, and, by the compass of his own infallible judgment, he makes his way with perfect confidence through what, without the guidance of the Church, becomes simply a maze of confused contradictions.

The books composing the Pentateuch, according to this infallible critic, were written at various periods, several hundred years *after* all the prophetic books. Here is a specimen at once of his self-assurance and of his notions:

"First, the *Prophets* also, because they are the bedrock, the hard pan, from which we start to build with any satisfaction or security. We ought to proceed from the known to the unknown, and in good part we know the prophets, who they were and when they wrote, and from their conscious and unconscious testimony we strike out in both directions; into the past behind them; into the future they did so much to form. This is the new criticism. This is the principle . . . which has proved a key to mysteries which have baffled scholarship for half a century, and which revolutionizes the popular conception of the order of the Old Testament ideas, substituting *evolution* for *revelation* as a sufficient explanation of everything we find from *Genesis* to *Malachi*."

Mr. Chadwick then proceeds to explain that by "the prophets" *he* does not mean "the prophets of the Jewish tripartite division of the Old Testament," that *he* means "all the prophets of our English Bible" (including Daniel and Lamentations, and excluding what are known as the earlier Prophets) from Isaiah to Malachi.

It would be interesting as a study of the progress which a mind cut loose from all faith and reverence, and given up to its own delusions, can make in satanic perversions of truth to follow this writer in his statements. It would serve to illustrate, too, the rapid progress of Protestantism downwards into sheer disbelief of everything sacred and divine in Christianity. For our author claims to be a mere exponent of the opinions of the great majority of modern Protestant Biblical critics. Space, however, is not allowed us to enter into details. Suffice it to say that he denies that there was any uniformity or consistency of "views" or of "hopes" among the Prophets; he affirms that they were *not* monotheists; that Jehovah was *not* "to all of them the same God, and the only God of all the universe;" that they did *not* "all accept the same moral standards;" that "they were *not* all haters of idolatry in every form;" that it was *not* "their chief function" "to predict the coming of the Messianic Kingdom, supposed to be identical with Christianity, and of the Messiah, supposed to be identical with Jesus Christ!"

All these ideas Mr. Chadwick summarily dismisses as pure delusions. He places the earlier Prophets on the same plane with "the prophets of Baal and Ashtera and other deities" of the Canaanites, and undertakes to trace resemblances between them. Jehovah, he asserts, was worshipped in the shape of a young bull. "Beginning in nature worship, and in awe and terror at the darker and fiercer aspects of nature, the religion of Israel did not shake off for centuries the spell of early associations. Their God was 'a consuming fire,' a cruel God, and, as such to be worshipped with cruel human sacrifices. The Canaanitish Moloch was his

nearest blood relation. Prophetism in the tenth century, B.C., was a regularly organized system of tyrannicide. The prophets of the eighth century, B.C., are the first prophets who are strict monotheists For them Yaweh is no longer a mere tribal God. He is the God of all the world But best of all He is a moral being In the eighth century, B.C., there was no Mosaic Law in any modern sense. There were the 'ten words' as they were then called, the ten commandments as we call them, a few precepts and traditions. But the *Pentateuch* in anything like its present form was still far in the future. *Deuteronomy* one hundred years ahead; *Leviticus* and *Numbers* nearly three hundred. Prophetism *created* *Deuteronomy*. It collected the legends. It wrote the histories. It reflected back the light which it had worn upon the past. But the spiritual monotheism of the eighth century B.C. was no tradition. It was an *evolution*. It was a new *discovery*, a greater one than any that mankind had made before." As for the writings which make up the *Pentateuch* they were not even an "evolution;" they were a "stratification," made up of successive deposits of myths indurated and consolidated in the public mind. "Genesis came after *Deuteronomy* and additions to the *Pentateuch* did not cease until about 300 B.C. The Patriarchs were not real personages, but only mythical personifications of tribal movements. David is a man of cruelty and treachery and lust; a man after Yaweh's own heart . . . and Yaweh was a god after *his* own heart."

The New Testament writings and personages are treated with like impious irreverence. Some few of the epistles were written by the persons whose names they bear, but are nothing more than expressions of their own individual ideas. The Acts of the Apostles is a legendary history composed by some one in the second century. Not one of the Gospels was written by the Evangelists. They were all gotten up for a purpose, an evolution of the views previously prevailing among Christians and an attempt made in the second century to reconcile two antagonistic parties among them. The miracles they recount are mere myths.

Christianity traced back through Judaism to its first beginning started in Fetishism; then developed into more formal idolatry; then into a higher form of nature worship; then into monotheism; and then into the worship of Jesus Christ.

We have given so much space to these impious statements, and placed them on record with great reluctance, yet with the conviction that they would serve a moral purpose in showing the horrid abyss of absurdity and wickedness into which the satanic evolution of the so-called Reformation has fallen. For Mr. Chadwick, throughout, follows avowedly the leading modern non-Catholic Biblical critics. The "good bishop" Colenso, and Dean Stanley, and Dr. George R. Noyes, of Harvard University, and Prof. Robertson Smith, of Aberdeen, and Dr. Samuel Davidson are among the authorities upon whom he relies. It will scarcely be believed, and yet it is a fact, that this mass of atheism and absurdity, setting at utter defiance all history as well as the belief of all true Christians in all ages, is put forth under the pretence of leading "to a better knowledge and appreciation of the Bible." Can barefaced hypocrisy go beyond this, or is a more patent illustration of the truth of St. Paul's words needed?

"For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men that detain the truth in injustice because that when they had known God, they have not glorified Him as God, nor gave thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves wise they became fools

and as they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense."

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW AND THE "FAITH OF OUR FOREFATHERS." The case as it stands. By the author of the book. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1880, pp. 24.

In this little pamphlet Rev. Mr. Stearns, author of the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, attempts in his own peculiar way to reply to what he evidently considers the presumption of those who have ventured to find anything but matter of praise in his book. He seems to think that none but Catholics find fault with him, and in this he wrongs many members even of his own Church, who admire his theology, but think and say that in defending its claims he need not and should not have violated other claims of social decency. He glories in "calling (as he says) a spade a spade;" but this is glory of a very doubtful character. He shares it with many, against whom we are compelled by every principle to close our ears. Nor is it to be confounded with the virtue of truthfulness. They are two different things, and by no means go together. At all events Diogenes and Thersites have never been acknowledged as models of imitation in the Christian Church, above all for those who claim to be Heaven's messengers and heralds of the Gospel.

Mr. Stearns singles out the QUARTERLY, and because it made his work the subject of an article and of a book notice he looks on it as a recognition of the importance and formidable character of his book. He is mistaken. The two *critiques* are from different hands, and had one known that the other was writing he would have laid aside his pen. When they came to the office, as it was found they took different ground, and one did not interfere with the other, both were inserted.

In the beginning of his reply to the article signed "A. de G.," which, in calm, dignified language, pointed out the true character of the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, Rev. Mr. Stearns brings forward extracts in praise of his book from newspapers and ministers of his own sect. The covers of his pamphlet are full of the same thing,—approving letters and notices from ministers and periodicals of many denominations. What do they prove? Nothing. This sort of testimony has become too common to command respect. There is no quack-medicine current, no impostor stalking through the land, that does not parade a host of testimonial letters from ministers of the various sects. To these letters he adds a quotation or two from an English clergyman, Rev. Dr. Littledale, whom, as it suits his purpose, he praises in advance as "by all odds the ablest, and fairest, and calmest of the writers in the Ritualistic school of the Church of England." Now, if Mr. Stearns had just finished reading one of those many books of Dr. Littledale, in which he defends the Real Presence, True Priesthood, Sacrifice of the Mass, and other portions of Catholic belief,—or Romanist idolatry, as it is termed in Episcopalian formularies,—and were he questioned by a friend, or "interviewed" by a reporter, to obtain his real opinion of Dr. Littledale as a controversial writer, would he give Dr. Littledale, without a syllable changed, the character, "ablest, fairest, calmest," that he so unhesitatingly accords him in the pamphlet? It is very unlikely. But would it be consistent with honesty to withhold from Dr. Littledale, writing in favor of Rome (we do not say the encomiums, but), the *character* that is allowed him when writing against Rome. A writer who is able, fair, and calm in a high degree (Mr. Stearns uses the superlative), is not apt to lose those qualities by a mere change of subject. But Dr. Littledale, while possessed of some ability, has neither fairness nor calm-

ness. Not only Catholics, but even those of his own school have found fault with him for his unbecoming, virulent assault upon English converts, and his ungentlemanly invasion of the sacred circle of private life. And what Mr. Stearns forgot to mention, the English Church Union, which patronized Dr. Littledale's book at the beginning, has been compelled by public opinion to disclaim all responsibility for his statements. Nay, Dr. Littledale himself has been driven by the same power to withdraw his book, and to promise that if there be a second edition the offensive passages shall be expunged. Amongst the passages alluded to are, no doubt, the very ones Mr. Stearns has quoted.

And what, pray, has metamorphosed Dr. Littledale from what he once was, an ardent admirer of Rome, into her bitter enemy? The reason is well known in England. Dr. Littledale, in his overhasty eagerness to bring about a reconciliation between Anglicanism and Catholicity, took into his head to open negotiations with Rome, the effect of which was to be an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Holy See by a good number of Anglican ministers, with their congregations, in return for some concessions that Rome was to make to national prejudices. He had no authority from his Church or its bishops; the latter he heartily despised as idle worldlings and Protestant to the core. He was a kind of self-constituted plenipotentiary or arbiter, rather dictating terms to both sides, Rome and Anglicanism. The end of it was what might be expected. As Rome's deposit of faith comes from Christ and His Apostles, and not from man, it is inviolable. She has nothing to surrender, nor can she treat with heretics, except on the one condition of repentance and submission. If Dr. Littledale's overtures were listened to at all, as no doubt they were, and with kindly patience and courtesy, he must have received this answer and nothing more, with perhaps the additional promise that disciplinary arrangements would be thought of, if necessary or desired, for those who should become docile children. So his self-assumed mission was a failure. *Hinc ira.* This is the source of his lately born bitterness against Rome and Catholicity. And, unless there be a miracle of God's grace, this wounded pride will keep him preaching and writing against Rome, and doing all he can to hinder conversions and malign those who, to his dictation, prefer submission to the Holy See, down to that last hour when he will open his eyes in the presence of the Great Judge. Before that dread Tribunal he will have to account for many statements, amongst others for his twofold horrible slander: (1) that "converts to the Catholic Church from Protestantism in a great majority of cases lose their truthfulness," in plain terms become liars; and (2) that "he has been assured of this by the Roman Catholic clergy themselves." Mr. Stearns repeats the first, but wisely omits all mention of the second. It was too intrinsically incredible even for him.

There is nothing in the pamphlet's reply to "A. de G." that has not been refuted beforehand in that gentleman's article. It is only a rehash of what had been said in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, with the same foul insinuations, the same tone of self-complacency, the same strange development of his peculiar self-consciousness. He thinks that whatever his adversary left unnoticed was cautiously avoided because it was unassailable, though he has raked and scraped together such an incongruous mass in a small space that it would take a volume three times the size to notice it even slightly. Yet he seems aggrieved that anything he says is passed over unnoticed. But what good has it done him that "A. de G." noticed and exposed his strange confusion of the knowledge derived from testimony and the knowledge derived from

science or intuition? "A. de G." aptly pointed out the great difference between them. Mr. Stearns does not see it yet, for he repeats the blunder once more in his pamphlet.

After this he attacks the criticism that appeared in the book notices of the REVIEW. Of course the critic is wrong throughout and Mr. Stearns is right everywhere. He is not pleased that the reviewer has failed to take up the sevenfold challenge addressed by him to Archbishop Gibbons. According to our old-fashioned notions a challenge can only be met or declined by the party challenged. He is further angry that the reviewer did not proclaim to his readers that Mr. Stearns gave in his book "eight distinct quotations from St. Ambrose, thirteen from St. Augustine, four from St. Cyprian, etc., not one of which does he venture to impugn." On the contrary, he thinks the reviewer very prudent in not attempting to refute any statement of his other choice witnesses, Irenæus Prime, Father Tom, the *Southern Churchman*, etc. We can only say that he seems to attach quite too much importance to whatever he says. He thinks, in his innocence, that his inept quotations from the Fathers, his own arguments in which slang and sophistry go together, his anecdotes, etc., culled from newspapers and viler sources, all alike strike terror into the heart of Rome. Let him enjoy his delusion, but let not his friends humor it too far.

An unfortunate allusion of the REVIEW to the "etc." on his title-page brings out a deluge of self-laudation, as to the books he wrote, the sermons he published, the articles he indited for two reviews, of one of which he was associate editor. He tells us their titles, and in some cases the number of pages, and how some of them were published by Waters and some by Lippincott, and how they "went across the water" and were "lauded and quoted" even in Great Britain! We take his word for it, and he ought to thank us for giving him this chance to spread before the world so much of his literary autobiography. But when it comes to giving us, as he does, for Gospel the eulogiums pronounced on him by the *Guardian*, *Churchman*, *Church Record*, *Christian Remembrancer*, and other Episcopal papers, we see in his citing such witnesses the proof of gratified vanity, but nothing beyond this. It is the professional business of these papers to run down everything Catholic, and to laud everything, however worthless, that is written against Rome. No doubt, if he sends them a copy of his present pamphlet, they will admire it on paper and praise it as a production of great power, Attic wit, forcible logic, convincing argument, and more perhaps of this stereotyped rigmarole. To hate and abuse Romanism, as they call it, not to argue sensibly, is their measure of the goodness of a book. The more venomous his hatred, the fouler his abuse, the more praiseworthy the writer is considered. Were Chillingworth or Jeremy Taylor to reappear on earth, we doubt if their books would receive as warm a welcome or as enthusiastic praise as that mass of ignorance and stupidity lately rolled into book form by Secretary Thompson, who rants about the Man of Sin and knows as little of him as he does of a man-of-war.

Rev. Mr. Stearns was taken to task for a shameful blunder which he committed while altering or improving, as he perhaps thought, a line of Virgil's. His answer is quite characteristic. At first he confesses his error:

"Has the reviewer, then, no case against me? None but a case of bad grammar; the use (p. 309) of *oris* as the ablative plural of *os* . . . ; a delinquency so rudimentary(!) as to be powerless for harm to the delinquent, except on the score of *incuria*, uncarefulness. How came it about? Thus: it was my first attempt at Latin poetry, as it will probably be my last (a wise resolve!) when I get through with it, and I was

naturally anxious about the metre. In getting that right, I got the grammar WRONG. I steered clear of Scylla and ran straight upon Charybdis" (p. 10).

But scarcely had this confession escaped his pen than he repented it. Hence at the end of the same page he adds that, "it is not a case of bad grammar pure and simple, seeing that it is only by the context that it is determined to be bad grammar at all!" He goes on to contend that *ora* may have made *oris* in the ablative, since *vasa* makes *vasis*. That is to say, if one noun is heteroclite, so may all be. In other words, if *man* in English has the irregular plural *men*, what is to prevent us from making *pen* and *fen* the plurals of *pan* and *fan*? If such reasoning be once admitted, there is an end of grammar and of all correct writing. He magnanimously promises, however, not to avail himself of this reasoning, and will rather change his line to a spondaic

"centum linguis
Gaudentem."

If he had carefully read the old masters he would know that spondaic lines are not constructed on this model. On the next page he becomes still more ashamed of his weakness in having confessed himself in the wrong, and boldly maintains that he was right. "Gaudentem oris (he says) is good Latin. So is

centum multiloquacibus oris
Gaudentem

also: it is good grammar, good metre, and good sense: and it is highly poetical (and quite musical he should have added) into the bargain." What can you do with a man of this stamp? He is incorrigible. He has *ora*, *oris*, but no such word as *peccavi* in his Latin dictionary.

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF THE IRISH PEOPLE AND CATHOLIC COLONIZATION. By *J. L. Spalding, D.D.*, Bishop of Peoria, New York: The Catholic Publication Company, 1880.

The general purpose of this work, as stated by the author in his preface, is to enforce three points: First, that "the Irish Catholics are the most important element in the Church of this country." Second, that "their present surroundings and occupations are, for the most part, a hindrance to the fulfilment of the mission which God has given to them." Third, and as a necessary conclusion from the first two points, that "all honest attempts to bring about a redistribution of our Catholic population are commendable." Fourth, "that this most important object can best be furthered by movements such as that which the Irish Catholic Colonization Association of the United States is now promoting."

In the illustration and enforcement of these points, Bishop Spalding commences with a chapter on the spirit of the age and the special work of the Church with relation to it. He shows that the present age has turned its back upon the truth, heretofore admitted, that religion is intimately, inseparably "related to the intellectual, moral, and social life of mankind;" that the tendency now is to "isolate religion" and "eliminate supernatural faith from the motives of action." He shows the consequences of this "in the rapid moral decay, perceptible both in Europe and America;" and that nothing remains to the Church, in the face of this new paganism, "but to permit the dead to bury their dead, and so with less hindrance to follow in the footsteps of Christ and to preach his Gospel to the poor; to begin again, as he began, at the

bottom, with the little ones—with those who have an humble and a pure heart, for of such is His kingdom.”

The next chapter is devoted to an exhibition of “The Religious Mission of the Irish People.” Here the author shows that “God’s providence can prepare no higher destiny for a people than to make them the witnesses and apostles of the truth as revealed in Christ;” and that this is the special mission of the Irish people now, as it was in past ages.

The writer enforces this by a sketch of the history of Ireland. He then shows that though Protestantism seemed to have won a complete victory over Catholicism among all English-speaking peoples, yet the cause of Catholicism, at first slowly gathering strength after its seemingly complete defeat, has acquired a power during the present century, little less than marvellous throughout the whole English-speaking world; and that this change has been achieved mainly through the Irish people.

Referring to the United States, and supporting his statement with ample evidence, he says: “No other people could have done for the Catholic faith what the Irish people have done No other people had received the same providential training for this work; of no other people had God required such proofs of love.”

The next three chapters of the work before us are devoted to the explication of the fact that “the present surroundings and occupations” of the Irish people in the United States “are, for the most part, a hindrance to the fulfilment of the mission God has given to them.” From a careful examination of the statistics of the United States Census of 1870 he shows that:

“About eight in every hundred of our Irish Catholic population are on the land, though not all as owners of the soil. The remaining ninety-two out of every hundred are chiefly in the tenement-houses of our great commercial cities, in the cottages of the factory towns, in the huts of the mining regions, in the shanties on the railroads and public works of the country, or living as domestic servants in the houses of the wealthy. *A worse condition of affairs, so far as the welfare of the Irish people and the future of the Catholic religion in this country are concerned, I can hardly imagine.*”

Taking the statistics of New York city, Bishop Spalding proves (and the same facts are true of our other great cities, though to a somewhat less extent) that in 1870 there were upwards of sixteen thousand tenement-houses in that city inhabited by a population of over half a million, by far the greater portion of which was Irish and Irish-American. He shows the utter futility of legislative enactments and sanitary and philanthropic efforts to put an end to this deplorable state of things; that “the best measures are only palliative, because wretchedness is the inevitable lot of the mode of life which modern industrialism in our cities and factory towns develops;” that “the only effective word is that which God bade Moses speak to the children of Israel: . . . ‘And I have said the word to bring you forth out of the affliction of Egypt into a land that floweth with milk and honey.’”

In the next two chapters Bishop Spalding shows what is the work of the Church in the United States, what it comprehends, and how it may be most effectually performed. He shows how, in our cities and factory towns, there is, in the words of Dr. Engel, the Director of the Royal Statistical Bureau of Berlin, “in spite of the philanthropic efforts of individuals, and the heroic endeavors of many employers,” a constant “sacrifice of human beings to Capital—a consumption of men, which,

by the wasting of the vital forces of individuals, by the weakening of whole generations, by the breaking up of families, by the ruin of morality, and the destruction of the joyousness of work, has brought civilized society into the most imminent peril."

"Nine-tenths of the Irish and their descendants," says Bishop Ireland, "are being offered up as human sacrifices in this temple of Mammon, the master idol of the age, and yet we Catholics are all the while congratulating ourselves upon the great progress we are making in this country." He refutes various objections to Catholic colonization, makes a number of valuable practical suggestions as to the proper organization of associations to aid the movement, and urges it upon the attention and favorable consideration of the Catholic public, both as a means for rescuing thousands from the fiery temptations and dangers to which they are now exposed, and of diffusing the faith and extending the Church.

We have already extended our notice beyond allowed limits, and must dismiss the writer's sketches of "Irish Scenes and English Rule in Ireland," which make up the remainder of the volume before us, with the single remark that each, in its own way, and with relation to the subject treated, is interesting and instructive.

GEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF THE FORTIETH PARALLEL. Clarence King, Geologist-in-charge. Six vols., with Topographical and Geological Atlas. Washington, Government Printing Office.

There are few public works so remunerative to a state as a complete geological survey of its territories; yet I doubt whether there is any that has been so long neglected by governments, or so indifferently performed when undertaken. The United States offer a very gratifying exception to the rule; for if we take into consideration the short time that has elapsed since she could attempt to organize great national works, as well as the amount of really unexplored land within her limits, and then compare the results already obtained by her officers with those obtained in any of the countries of Europe, the showing will be in our favor by a very large ratio. In this comparison I do not take account of what has been done in this direction by individual States, as New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, California, Wisconsin, North Carolina, etc., etc., the geological reports of whose surveys compare favorably with those of any country in the world; it will be sufficient to enumerate the several expeditions that have from time to time been fitted out by the central government at Washington for the survey of the Territories. Of these the most important are the expeditions for the survey of the Colorado of the West, and the Uinta Mountains, under Powell; the expedition for the geological survey of the United States Territories, under Hayden; that under Lieutenant Wheeler, of the corps of engineers, United States Army, for the geographical survey west of the one hundredth meridian; and, finally, that under King, for the geological survey of the fortieth parallel. For many reasons, not necessary to advance or discuss here, the work done on the fortieth parallel survey is the most thorough and satisfactory, and, in many respects, the most important geological work yet done in the United States; hence these reports have been chosen for the present notice. Later on I hope to be able to notice the work done under Lieutenant Wheeler.

Mr. King took the field in 1867. He had associated with him as assistants the brothers J. D. and Arnold Hague and S. F. Emmons, who had been previously engaged on the survey of California. The palæontology was worked up by such specialists as Meek, Hall, and Whitfield;

the botany by Watson; the ornithology by Ridgway; the microscopical examination of the volcanic rocks by Professor Zirkel of Leipsic; and the greater part of the topography was under the direction of J. T. Gardner.

The first volume that appeared was vol. iii., accompanied by its detailed atlas of plans, etc., illustrating the "Mining Industry" of the fortieth parallel district. This volume is for the most part a detailed description of the Comstock lode. At the time it was issued the lowest level did not reach below 1000 feet; the depth at present is almost 3000 feet, and the temperature of water at the bottom is about 160 degrees F. It is very gratifying, and it seems to me in the interests of science, that Mr. King has been enabled by his present position of director of the United States geological survey, to resume in the mines of this district, with which he is so well acquainted, the investigations concerning temperature, productiveness, and mode of formation, which he grappled with so thoroughly in the early part of the survey, but which could not be completed then, both for want of data and want of time.

Vol. v., on "Botany," appeared in 1871; vol. vi., on "Microscopical Petrography," and the atlas to accompany the reports, were issued in 1876; vol. iv., on "Palæontology and Ornithology," and vol. ii., on the "Descriptive Geology of the Survey," appeared in 1877; and vol. i., entitled "Systematic Geology," was issued in 1878.

Vol. ii. was written by Messrs. Hague and Emmons. In their letter to the geologist-in-charge they draw attention to the great difficulties that had to be overcome in the survey of a region where topography and geology had to go hand in hand, and so endeavor by anticipation to excuse the shortcomings of their work. The precaution was unnecessary; the work was gone through with great care and skill, and the result is a most valuable contribution to practical and theoretical geology alike.

Vol. i. was written entirely by Mr. King. In it he reviews, or "systematizes" the entire work of the survey according to the relative ages of the formations. He subjects each to a careful analytical study, and deduces therefrom, as far as can be, the essential points of its history. How far he has succeeded more detailed observation will prove; with what skill and care he has performed his work, even the most cursory reader of his pages can readily testify. He examines each exposure separately, beginning with the archæan and going through the whole series, the palæozoic, the mesozoic and the Cainozoic, and ending with the quaternary. He has most interesting chapters on the "Genesis of Granite and Crystalline Schists;" "The Correlation of Tertiary Volcanic Rocks;" "Fusion, Genesis, and Classification of Volcanic Rocks;" and finally one on "Orography." In this last chapter Mr. King endeavors to account for volcanic action by the factor of erosion. This theory, though not yet proven, has never been *successfully* called in question, and bids fair at present to solve the enigma of volcanic outflow. In a note to vol. ii., as well as in a table in chapter vi. of vol. i., may be found a method of description that will help to give, at a glance, a clear idea of the gigantic proportions of the work done. There are 50,000 feet of archæan, 32,000 feet of palæozoic, 30,000 feet of mesozoic, and 15,000 feet of Cainozoic, giving a total of some 127,000 feet of rocks. These had to be examined in place, in every exposure occurring in a belt 100 miles wide, and extending from the 104th to the 120th meridians. Specimens representing them were afterwards scrupulously analyzed in the laboratory, their determinations verified, their descriptions published; they were carefully transported to and deposited in a suitable resting-place, where they will be within easy reach of the stu-

dent of natural history. Such is the great work that has been so well performed by Mr. King and his assistants, a work of which they may well be proud, and which reflects equal credit on them and the United States government, under whose direction it was performed.

ÉTUDES SYNTHÉTIQUES DE GÉOLOGIE EXPÉRIMENTALE. Par A. DAUBRÉE, member de l'Institut, Directeur de l'École Nationale des Mines, etc., etc. Paris, Dunod, 1879.

The present volume is a reunion of the many papers and monographs published by the author, during the last thirty years, relative to experiments conducted by him, illustrating the most important geological phenomena. The great facilities for observation of these phenomena afforded by his position of Director-General of the Mines, and the unlimited resource for experiment placed under his control, give his essay an importance not attained by those of any who preceded him in the same field of inquiry. The present volume he calls "Part First; or The Application of the Experimental Method to the Study of the Various Geological Phenomena." A second volume is in preparation, which will be "Part Second; or, The Experimental Study of the Various Cosmic Phenomena." The aim of this second volume is to give some account of the constitution of meteorites, and of the essential characters of the bolides by which they are conveyed to our earth from space.

Some idea of the extent and scope of the present essay may be gathered from a simple enumeration of the principal questions treated: metalliferous deposits; crystalline, metamorphic, and eruptive rocks; volcanic phenomena; fissures, joints, and faults in the earth's crust; schistose and cleavage structure in rocks; folding of the earth's crust; formation of mountain chains, etc. Thus it will be seen that all the principal difficulties of chemical, physical, and mechanical or dynamical geology are treated; and it is very pleasing to the student of natural history that these points are treated not merely hypothetically, nor with a view to prove or defend any peculiar ideas of the author, but solely with a view to ascertain what may be learned from experiments performed under conditions, and on material, as similar to those in nature as it is possible for the laboratory to afford. Considering the disparity of proportion and resource between the most complete chemical laboratory and that of nature, it is evident that none of the experiments here described have the force of demonstration. In most cases, however, they throw such light on the points they illustrate, that they are as good as demonstrated to the student of geology.

The most interesting sections are those describing the artificial production of some of the most important minerals. By the production of crystals of the oxides of titanium and tin, the whole problem as to the mode of formation of the metallic veins, that had for so long a time previously been an enigma to the geologist, was solved. In the chapter on metamorphism it is shown that the internal heat of the globe cannot be a sufficient cause of the phenomena presented by metamorphic rocks. For if it were, then the phenomena should have been produced in accordance with the law of the propagation of heat, now so well established; but experience proves the contrary. Neither can the internal heat, aided by certain vapors or gases, such as chlorine, sulphur, and carbon, account for them. But water raised to a very high temperature, aided by the pressure of overlying rock masses, is shown to be the only agency that is capable of producing results so diverse, and, at times, so apparently incompatible. The thermal springs of the

present day are a proof of this, as not only the rocks through which the waters flow, but even the materials of the mason-work of conduits, formed within our own times, are so far metamorphosed in their structure and constitution, as to be readily confounded with true metamorphic or eruptive rocks, when examined in their sections under the microscope. A still further proof of this theory is the fact that some of the mineral species peculiar to metamorphic rocks have been produced in the laboratory by the use of high pressure and superheated steam. The experiments are very simple as to detail, and are well worthy the attention of those interested in this department of scientific research. A glass tube partially filled with water, heated to a very high temperature and subjected to a pressure of about one thousand atmospheres are the essential elements of the experiment. As a matter of precaution against the possibility of fusion of the glass tubes, these latter were incased in tubes of iron containing water. In this way crystals of quartz were produced possessing all the characters of natural crystals, as well as some perfect crystals of pyroxene. A piece of wood treated in this way became anthracite.

The sections treating of the foldings of the earth's crust are very interesting just at this moment, when almost every novice geologist sets himself to account for the mode of formation of mountain chains, valleys and volcanos, as if there were nothing easier within the whole domain of science. The experiments described are very simple and very instructive; they contain no proofs, but point, as it were, to the necessity of controlling theory by experiment. There are other very interesting chapters on the mechanism of volcanoes, and the schistose structure of rocks, that will repay careful study.

The entire work, of some five hundred pages, embracing the principal theoretical points in geology, is a grand monument to its author. It is the only textbook we possess on experimental geology. From its appearance will date the birth of a new branch of science.

GOD AND MAN. Conferences delivered at the Notre Dame in Paris, by the *Rev. Père Lacordaire*, of the Order of Friar-Preachers. Translated from the French, with the Author's permission, by a Tertiary of the same Order. New York: P. O'Shea. 1879. 8vo., pp. 244.

LACORDAIRE'S LETTERS TO YOUNG MEN. Edited by Count Montalembert. Translated by the *Rev. James Trenor*. New York: P. O'Shea. 1880. 8vo.

The Conferences of the great Dominican orator will always be attractive to a wide circle of readers. There are few, if any, who can fail to admire his graceful, captivating eloquence, even if they cannot sufficiently appreciate his deep masculine thought, the bold energy with which he seizes the great fundamental principles of divine truth, and the dextrous tact, the delicacy, the ease, with which he handles these massive subjects for the benefit of his audience. His words will furnish abundant matter to be thought over by one who reads, or by him who has to speak. Indeed, were it not for the matchless oratory that accompanied the living voice, we think that as a rule his readers must have derived from them even more profit than his hearers.

More agreeable reading, if not so profound, will be found in his *Letters to Young Men*. This volume, which we owe to the solicitude of his friend, Count Montalembert, reveals the true soul of Lacordaire. It discloses rich depths of tenderness, gentleness, and sensibility. It accounts for the unbounded influence he possessed over the souls of his friends, of all indeed who came into contact with him, especially the young, in

whom a premature cynicism, induced by vice and unbelief, had not crushed the aspirations of nature and silenced the voice of God. It explains, too, why every word of his, whether of compassion, encouragement, even rebuke (he could do this, at times plainly and sternly, but always lovingly; see p. 283), was welcomed with such delight by his friends and correspondents.

Lacordaire, though addicted to what some call "liberal" views, was penetrated by a deep feeling of Catholic faith and the necessity this involves of submission to the Holy See. This it was that saved him in 1834 from sliding into the abyss with his friend and teacher, La Menais, whose indomitable pride caused him to fall, like Satan, from almost an archangel's height, and to lose his soul in the lowest depths of irreligion. Shuddering at the spiritual and moral ruin of his teacher, and his own narrow escape, he thought of coming to the United States and engaging in missionary work. But Providence had other designs on him, and he remained in France to introduce there the Dominican Order and labor in the pulpit for the conversion of unbelievers. We should like to give a few extracts, that the reader might form some idea of the style of these *Letters* and their translation, but we must restrict ourselves to one or two. Speaking of the freedom of opinion that even in religious matters may coexist with implicit obedience to Church authority, he says:

"You will, perhaps, ask why God has left so many questions open to discussion. You might as well ask why God has not revealed everything. Now God has revealed the principles in order to serve as foundations. He has not done exactly the same with the consequences, in order to give our liberty play, like a mother who holds her child up by leading strings, but is delighted to see him try and walk like a man. . . . The liberty of her children gives her (the Church) no uneasiness, for she knows on the one hand the point at which she will check them, and on the other she is certain they will stop at her bidding. It is much the same feeling as that of God about the ocean. On the contrary, Protestant liberty recognizes no bounds and is destructive of all unity. The Protestant has not a single dogma to serve as a centre of unity or a rallying-point. He is his own unity; in other words, his unity is something essentially variable, a cloud, a dewdrop;" (p. 48).

THE MYSTERY OF THE CROWN OF THORNS: Prefigured in the Old Testament, Accomplished in the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and Revived in the Church during the last Seven Centuries. With Practical Devotions, by a Passionist Father, the author of the "Christian Trumpet," "Voice of Jesus Suffering," etc. New York. D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1879. 12mo., pp. 637.

The author of this book is Rev. F. Gaudentius Rossi, C. P.; and since one of the objects for which his Order was instituted is to cherish and spread devotion to the Passion of our Lord, nothing could be more appropriate than a book of this kind from one of his religious profession. The remembrance of Christ's Passion and Death has ever been for the Church the central point round which revolve not only her highest worship and most solemn rites, but also the liveliest affections and warmest piety of her faithful children. And as the rich germ of Catholic devotion unfolded itself, out of it there grew a natural impulse to do fitting reverence to all the mute memorials of Calvary's great mystery, to everything that had once surrounded the cross "on which hung the salvation of the world." This was the origin of that veneration, extended from the earliest days by the Christian people to the instruments

of His sufferings, a veneration approved of in many ways by the Church. And it has been chiefly in these late days, when "the charity of many has grown cold," that God has raised up pious souls to restore its life and warmth by renewing and propagating this special devotion not only to the Passion, but to all of its adjuncts that could help to bring it more vividly and effectually before the minds and hearts of the faithful.

To do his part in spreading this devotion, the reverend author has taken up the Crown of Thorns; and his title-page is sufficient clew to his division of the subject. In the first place he discusses those figures of the Old Testament which may be considered emblematic of the painful crown worn by the divine victim of God's justice. Nor are these chosen arbitrarily, though there is nothing to prevent individual piety, under the safeguard of Christian prudence, from tracing in the Old Testament varied types of the beauties and treasures contained in the New. The author insists chiefly on those that have been pointed out and so far commended by the Church in her office of the "Sacred Crown of Thorns" set apart for the first Friday of Lent. He next examines the moral and spiritual meaning of this sacred crown. Here, interspersed with sound theology and much curious historical information, the reader will find many pertinent remarks on the evils of our time and the great questions that are vexing the present world in Europe, and to some extent in our own country. In the third place he treats of the "mystical crown of thorns that our Lord has imparted to some saints," in other words, the share in His sufferings that He has allowed to some chosen souls. A list of the servants of God who have been thus privileged in every century is given from trustworthy sources. The Catholic Church neither parades these miracles nor attempts to explain them. It is enough for her to know that the Most High is wonderful in all His works, but especially in His saints. *Mirabilia opera Altissimi: Mirabilis Deus in Sanctis suis.*

GREAT LIGHTS IN SCULPTURE AND PAINTING: A Manual for Young Students. By S. D. Doremus. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1880. 8vo., pp. 218.

A book, not of much pretensions, but containing a good deal of information that may be useful to students, as it is for the most part compiled from good sources. But the author, we are sorry to see, is not content with instruction on his subject; he must go farther, and either humor the religious prejudices of the reader or try to instil them into him; and this at the expense of truth as well as propriety. Having occasion to mention St. Dominic's tomb by Niccolo Pisano, he throws in this parenthesis: "This Saint is renowned for the establishment of the Inquisition, the tortures of which were so mercilessly carried on by his followers, the Dominican monks" (p. 55). What called for this item of news? Did he speak (as he does) of Napoleon Bonaparte, would he think it necessary to add that he was born in Corsica or lived an exile in Elba, or was divorced from Josephine? No, his own notions of propriety would have prevented the intrusion of such extraneous matter. But besides not being *ad rem*, it is not true. St. Dominic never established the Inquisition, nor does any reputable historian assert it. He fought against heresy, not with the sword but with more Christian weapons, with penance, tears, prayer, and instruction, as we learn from his first biographers. Even had he been appointed an inquisitor, which is not likely, this would not justify the assertion that he established the Inquisition. Many judges, many governors of Western Territories have been appointed from time to time. But of none of them can it be properly said that they have established the judicial bench or territorial

government. And in what volume outside of romance or his own fertile imagination did he learn that Dominican monks acted as executioners? or that the general (Bourbon) whose brutal horde sacked Rome in 1527 was a cardinal! Equally curious is the statement (p. 184) that "the extreme unction administered by the Romish Church was given by friends who still clustered about him" to Salvator Rosa on his death-bed. There is nothing here that is ill-meant, but it exemplifies the folly of presuming to write off-hand on matters with which one has no acquaintance whatsoever.

SPIRITUAL PROGRESS. By *J. W. Cummings, D.D., LL.D.*, of St. Stephen's Church, New York City. New edition. New York: P. O'Shea. 12mo., pp. 330.

It was a good idea of the publisher to reprint this little work of Dr. Cummings, which made its first appearance more than twenty years ago, and was then very favorably received by the public. It consists of reflections, accompanied by practical advice and counsel, on various points of religion, morality, character, etc.

The title is not, perhaps, sufficiently expressive of the contents. The writer's aim is not to maintain the cause of religious truth against its enemies, so that no one need expect to find in it argument or controversy. It is, however, in one sense a defence of religion, for it beautifully sets forth the holy and ennobling influences of Christianity on individual life and social intercourse; and nothing can illustrate its divine character more forcibly than this simple exposition. Neither, as some might suspect from the title, is it an ascetical work, a manual of meditation for the closet or of private devotion. It is a book that may be read everywhere and at all times, in hours of study or of relaxation. It is suited to every one, the student and the man of the busy world. And it will please every one, for it is characterized by broad, manly good sense, correct and deep thought, with the additional charm of a style that is always pleasing and not unfrequently eloquent.

It was, we repeat, a happy thought of Mr. O'Shea to give us a new edition of Dr. Cummings's book, and we hope his venture will be crowned with success. He richly deserves it. He is one of the few business men whose financial reverses have not only left his honor untarnished, but have increased, if possible, the estimation in which he has been ever held by the business community.

THE CHURCH OF THE PARABLES AND TRUE SPOUSE OF THE SUFFERING SAVIOUR. By *Joseph Prachensky*, Priest of the Society of Jesus. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1880.

This little work is written for a special purpose. Its object is to present to Protestants who profess to respect and revere the sacred Scriptures the evidences contained in the parables of Our Divine Lord that "no other than the Holy Roman Catholic Church, as it was and is, can be the Church of the Bible;" and that "many things beautifully represented in Scripture as belonging to this Church are rejected by the so-called Reformers, though drawn and ordained by the master-hand of our Divine Redeemer himself." Only those parables, therefore, have been "selected for exposition that relate to Catholic dogmas controverted by the sects," passing over "those which contain only lessons of morality that are not impugned or denied by any who call themselves Christians. In accordance with this plan the Parables chosen are those of the Good Samaritan, the Good Seed and the Cockle, the Grain of Mus-

tard-seed, the Parable of the Leaven, the Pearls of the Net, the Scribe, the Pharisee, and the Publican, the Prodigal Son, and the Marriage Feast.

The truths referring to the Church, its nature, mission, unity, and catholicity, its being the divinely established dispenser of divine grace, its being the divinely constituted authoritative teacher of revealed truth, its being the veritable "tabernacle of God with men," where Christ is really present, and kindred truths contained in the parables selected, are set forth by the author in a lucid and forcible manner. The utter irrecconcilability, too, of Protestantism with these truths is also clearly shown. The second part of the volume is occupied with showing, first, that "the persecution to which the Catholic Church is subjected in all ages is an infallible proof that she is the only true Church of Christ;" and, secondly, that, "as the sufferings of Christ proved His divinity and accomplished what the prophets had foretold, so it is by suffering that the Church reaches her destiny and shall be glorified with Him."

THE CHRISTIAN MOTHER: The Education of her Children and her Prayer. From the German of *Rev. W. Cramer*. Translated by a Father of the Society of Jesus, with the permission of Superiors. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers, 1880.

The Christian mother, in whatever sphere, however humble her condition in life, has a great dignity and a high vocation of her own. She is in education the element of primary importance, and on her proper education of the children depends the welfare of the family, of society, and of the state. It would be well if all mothers were deeply conscious of the lofty trust committed to their hands and proportionately faithful in its discharge.

This little book is designed to remind them of their many duties or concurrent parts of one great duty, and to afford them help and counsel how best to perform them. The author lays down vividly, and with not unnecessary plainness, the many difficulties that beset a proper Christian education of the young, owing to the many dangers by which childhood is environed from the very cradle, the negligence, excessive indulgence, and too often the bad example of parents, and gives some wholesome admonitions on these and other points. There are in the end some excellent prayers and pious practices for Christian mothers, amongst others a useful method of assisting at the Holy Sacrifice for their own benefit and that of their children.

SHORT MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR, intended chiefly for the Use of Religious. By an anonymous Italian author. Translated by *Dòm Edmund J. Luck, O.S.B.*, Priest of the Cassinese Congregation of the Primitive Observance. Prefaced by a recommendation of His Eminence, Cardinal Manning. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet. 1879.

The wisdom of the Church in its yearly round of Sacred Seasons and the ever-varying significance of its Solemnities and Feasts is shown in countless ways. Annually "the whole Revelation of the Faith returns, mystery by mystery, dogma by dogma, precept by precept, upon our intelligence and upon our hearts. The *Lex credandi* is the *Lex orandi*, and the worship of the Church preaches to the world without, and to the faithful within the sanctuary." The best Manuals of Devotion are those that follow the Church as it moves through the Liturgical year. The Manual before us does this. It is a simple and edifying exposition of the eternal truths in which and by which we must live and persevere to a holy death. To use the words of His Eminence, Cardinal Man-

ning, who warmly recommends this Manual, "Every one, in every state in the world, in the Priesthood and in the Cloister what is enough for perfection ; for perfection consists in the love of God and our neighbor."

STUMBLING-BLOCKS MADE STEPPING-STONES ON THE ROAD TO THE CATHOLIC FAITH. By the *Rev. James J. Moriarty, A.M.*, Pastor of St. Patrick's Church, Chatham Village. New York : The Catholic Publication Society, Barclay Street. 1880.

"From his own personal experience," the author tells us in his preface, "during frequent and almost daily intercourse with persons who are not of the household of faith," he has learned that most of the objections against the Church are based on mistaken notions of her doctrines. He has selected, therefore, as subjects for explanation in this volume, the Mass, the Confessional, the Intercession of Saints, Devotion to the Blessed Virgin, Purgatory, and Infallibility, because these are more frequently assailed and more generally misunderstood.

The style is clear and sprightly, and the work is calculated to do great good, both as a source of instruction to Catholics, and a means by which non-Catholics, willing to learn the truth as regards the Catholic religion, may be enlightened.

SHADOWS OF THE ROOD ; or Types of our Suffering Redeemer, Jesus Christ, occurring in the Book of Genesis. Being the substance of a series of moral discourses, delivered in the Church of the Assumption, during the Lent of 1856. By the *Rev. John Bonus, B.D., Ph. et LL.D.* Second American Edition. Revised and corrected by the author. Baltimore : John Murphy & Co., 1878.

Devotion to the Cross is the life and soul of all devotion. Discourses, therefore, which explain, so far as they can be explained, and bring home to the mind and heart of the hearer or reader the profound yet precious mysteries comprehended in the passion and death of our Divine Redeemer, touch upon subjects of the deepest interest to every Christian. The little volume before us consists of such discourses. They are exegetical as bringing out the mystical significance of prominent personages under the Old Law, and showing that they were types which our Saviour fulfilled. At the same time these discourses are also moral, in that their chief object is to incite the readers to progress in Christian virtue.

THE LIFE OF ST. BENEDICT, PATRIARCH OF THE WESTERN MONKS. Translated from the Second Book of the Dialogues of St. Gregory the Great, Supreme Pontiff. By *P. Aurelius McMahon, O.S.B., Permissu Superiorum.* Baltimore : John Murphy & Co., 1880.

The life of a saint, written by a saint, cannot fail to be both instructive and edifying. The work before us has been so highly appreciated and commended in all generations, that it would be superfluous for us to say a word in its praise. It is brief and concise, but its every chapter and page and line is redolent of piety, unction, and the spirit of God. It is a model, too, of simplicity, and has, moreover, a special value as historical evidence of the belief and prevailing religious spirit of the Christian world thirteen hundred years ago, particularly with regard to miracles, the necessity and merit of self-mortification, humility, meditation, and prayer.

SKETCHES OF THE LIVES OF DOMINICAN SAINTS. By *M. K.* Dublin ; M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

No more interesting, instructive or edifying reading can be found

than the lives of those who, through self-mortification, prayer, meditation, and persevering, heroic striving against sin, have attained perfect sanctity. The little work before us consists of brief yet clear, and in their way, complete sketches of Dominican saints of past ages, and of the companions and disciples of St. Dominic. They bring clearly before the reader the spirit of that grand religious order, and the labors and achievements of its founder and many of his most distinguished followers.

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SCHOOL. By *Thomas Harper, S. J.* London: McMillan & Co. 1879. 8vo., pp. 592, with pp. lxxx of Introduction.

This is one of the most important books that has appeared in English Catholic literature for a long time, and it must be hailed as a most welcome help to the study of scholastic philosophy. The author's attempt to give in English the scholastic terminology is itself a great enterprise, and his success is astonishing. The matter of which he treats is so vast and important that we must reserve it for fuller criticism in our next.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE PASSION PLAY AT OBERAMMERGAU, IN THE SUMMER OF 1871. By the *Rev. Gerald Malloy, D.D.* Fourth edition. London: Burns & Oates. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

VOICES FROM THE HEART: SACRED POEMS. By *Sister May Alphonsus Downing*, of the Third Order of St. Dominic, author of *Meditations and Prayers in Honor of St. Catharine of Sienna and other Saints*. New and enlarged edition. Revised by Right Rev. Doctor Leahey, Bishop of Dromore. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

THE LAST MONARCH OF TARA: A TALE OF IRELAND IN THE SIXTH CENTURY. By *Eblona*. Revised and corrected by the Very Rev. U. J. Canon Bourke, M.R.I.A. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

THE LIFE OF REV. CHARLES NERINCKX: With a Chapter on the Early Catholic Missions of Kentucky; Copious Notes on the Progress of Catholicity in the United States of America, from 1800 to 1825; an Account of the Establishment of the Society of Jesus in Missouri; and an Historical Sketch of the Sisterhood of Loretto in Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, etc. By *Rev. Camillus Maes*, Priest of the Diocese of Detroit. Cincinnati: Robert Clark & Co. 1880. A very interesting work, received when the last pages of the REVIEW were going to press.

CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS: *Being Part IV. of the Principles of Sociology*. By *Herbert Spencer*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

BLONID. By *Robert D. Joice*, author of *Deidre*. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1879.

THE CRAYFISH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ZOOLOGY. By *T. H. Huxley, F.R.S.* With eighty-two illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

LIFE OF ERASMUS DARWIN. By *Ernst Krouse*. Translated from the German by *W. S. Dallas*. With a Preliminary Notice, by *Charles Darwin*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

LAYS AND LEGENDS OF THOMOND. With Historical and Traditional Notes. By *Michael Thomond*. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1880.

THE PATHOLOGY OF MIND. Being the third edition of the second part of *The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, recast, enlarged and rewritten. By *Henry Maudsley, M.D.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

THE REPUTATION OF DARWINISM. By *T. Warren O'Neill*, Member of the Philadelphia Bar. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1880.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THE CHARACTER OF SANCTITY IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

Mores Catholici, or Ages of Faith. By Kenelm H. Digby. London, C. Dolman, 1848.

History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne. By W. E. Hartpole Lecky, M.A. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

Atheistic Methodism. By W. H. Mallock, in *Nineteenth Century*. January, 1880.

THEOLOGICALians demonstrate that Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are four characteristic marks of the true Church, as our Lord constituted it. The second of these, sanctity, is intended to be specially considered in this paper. The most elementary authors of theology, even, set forth convincing proofs that in the divine plan the universal and perpetual society established by Jesus Christ was from the beginning destined to be holy in its doctrine and its members. The types of the Old Law which foreshadowed it, the Prophets who described it minutely ages before its birth, the Apostles who were its founders and spoke of it in detail, the Fathers who, in working out its development, never swerved from its original ideal, cannot leave any doubt as to the intention of Christ, that His bride should be forever pure and immaculate.

Passing from the abstract plan to its realization, the historians of the Church prove that the ideal was carried out, not only at the first propagation of Christianity, but during all the nineteen centuries which have intervened; and even the great majority of non-Christian writers admit that, in point of fact, with the era of the

birth of Christ commences a period of immense moral progress, and that wherever the new religion made proselytes the most remarkable purity of life distinguished them from their still pagan countrymen.

But our object is not to develop a thesis of Catholic theology. This is indeed presupposed, and the intention is not to either set it entirely aside or lessen its importance. We think it preferable to answer some objections only which non-Catholic writers of talent have rendered popular in our day. To this we shall mainly confine ourselves. Our chief work will be to examine attentively what has always been, and what is at this moment the Church's action on the moral world, in comparison with the various ethical systems which are proposed in this century for the guidance of men. For it is remarkable that in this age extraordinary efforts are being made on every side to settle the morals of mankind on new bases, altogether different from, and often totally opposed to, the old and solid foundations laid down by the Apostles of Christ and their successors. The turn given to the new theories is occasionally calculated to deceive the unwary, and the proposed object of those writers is always to place the Church in an inferior position, and to induce the reader to conclude that the superiority in morals which the Catholic attributes to his religion is not supported by the verdict of history.

And what renders the need of this more urgent is that the new moralists concede in the main that the value of life consists in "virtue," whatever meaning they give to this word. They are often extremely strict in their ethics, and sometimes raise objections which would stagger a venerable professor in our theological seminaries. The time has passed for openly preaching immorality among men, except on the part of a few novelists and dramatists. Among serious writers the French phalansterians were the last to do it, worse than Epicurus ever did. We do not intend to speak of them, nor of the immoral writers of the last century. The school of Voltaire has passed away with the gibes and sneers it lavished on the purest and holiest persons and institutions belonging to our Holy Church. Neither is it our intention to bring into comparison with Catholic sanctity the pagan, Mohammedan, or Buddhist worlds, which even at this day compose the majority of mankind. The reason of this last exclusion is simply that those dregs of Asia form, confessedly, "the kingdom of moral darkness," which it would be folly to compare with Christian holiness. There are, it is true, some eccentric writers who admire the morality practiced by the followers of Mohammed and of Gautama, and find in the Koran and the folios attributed to Sakya-muni a strict

code of ethics. This will never become the general opinion of mankind.

There remains, therefore, what is now called the Christian world, including, besides the Catholic Church, the numerous schismatical and heretical sects into which Christendom is divided, and also the rationalistic and positivist schools to which the name Christian can scarcely be applied. We must briefly pass each of these consecutively in review, and see how far they can maintain their respective claims to being perfect moral systems superior to that of the Catholic Church.

Before the upheaval of Protestantism in the sixteenth century one code of morals ruled the conduct of all Europeans. It was inaugurated by Christ himself, and was based on the Decalogue in the Old Law, and on the precepts and counsels of the Gospel in the New. The Popes and the Fathers explained it authoritatively, and the schoolmen in the Middle Ages, led on by Jonas of Orleans, in the ninth century, formed it into a complete and a concrete system. Numerous councils interpreted, defined, and approved it, and passed decrees to secure its execution. To the Bishops was mainly intrusted the care of carrying it into effect; and under the direction both of Popes and Bishops, powerful preachers, chiefly of the religious orders, explained it to the people, and did their best, by their earnest exhortations, to assure its observance in its primitive purity. Whenever a decline in morals took place, owing to the weakness of individuals or the corruption of certain classes, bishops in councils issued new and more stringent canons of morals, and troops of devoted missionaries called the people to repentance, and brought on a new period of regeneration. Their zeal was always accompanied with a powerful effusion of grace from above, and often with extraordinary portents.

This is necessarily a short and very imperfect sketch of the Church's action in general in all ages for the enforcement of the moral code promulgated by Christ and his Apostles, and impartial history vouches for its success from first to last. No rationalist even can deny that wherever the Gospel was originally preached among Jews or Gentiles a most remarkable moral change was immediately perceptible, which has invariably invested in all countries the memory of the primitive Church, as it was established in each of them, with a peculiar character for moral excellence. This is particularly true of primeval Christian history, not only in Jerusalem, but likewise in Alexandria for the Egyptians, in Rome for the Latins, in Edessa for the Syrians, in the far Orient for the Persians and Indians, among the Irish from the sixth to the eighth century, among the Anglo-Saxons in Great Britain, the Celts in Western France, the Visigoths in Spain, the Frisians and Germans

at the preaching of Boniface; in France during the thirteenth century, in Spain as soon as it was freed from the yoke of the Saracens, and in many other countries which it would require too much space to enumerate in detail. These remarkable periods of holiness illustrate successively or concurrently the history of the Church from its foundation down to our own modern times.

When the discovery of a route to India, and of the Western Continent took place at the end of the fifteenth century, the renewal of this primitive purity was immediately observable among the first Hindoo converts of St. Francis Xavier and his successors; it was soon after noticeable among the debased negroes of the Guinea and Congo coasts; among the simple inhabitants of many islands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, such as the Guanches in the Canaries under Betancourt, and later on among many tribes of the Philippine Islands in the Pacific. In America it was likewise the case with regard to the savages of Brazil converted by Anchieta and his companions; in Peru; in New Grenada; especially, too, in Paraguay at a quite recent period; and also among many tribes in Canada and the western regions of our own country.

This enumeration, incomplete as it is, will suffice to prove a fact which is universal in the history of the Catholic Church in the first efforts of its missionaries' zeal. And what renders it more surprising still is that the holiness which prevailed in those different and far-distant countries was essentially the same whether they were previously civilized or not. You can see no essential difference in Christian piety at Rome, Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria on one side, and among barbarous nations, such as were the Anglo-Saxons, the Visigoths, the Brazilians, the Algonquins and Hurons, on the other. The strict and precise code of the Gospel prevailed everywhere, and the practice of the evangelical counsels, so repugnant to our corrupt nature, flourished in all Christian communities, and covered the whole earth with innumerable establishments, charitable, religious, and educational.

It would require more time and space than are at our command to make the enumeration complete and bring it down to our days. The only thing possible here is to come directly to the actual state of the case, and sketch in a few words the Church's action as it strikes the eye at the present moment.

There is not the least exaggeration in saying that were it not for the persistence of the Catholic Church in constantly inculcating the practice of the most sublime virtues, and particularly of self-sacrifice, there would scarcely remain in our age a shred of true virtue on earth. What would have become, long ere this, of the moral world had it been left to the ravings of the maniacs who have been called the first Reformers, including Calvinists, Ana-

baptists, and all the sects of Antinomians? To what a moral abyss in our own age are not the principles of the various godless teachers of a pretended morality leading; of men who proclaim the necessity of excluding God and religion from education, of separating political rule from all the restraints imposed by right, and society from all connection with heaven? But besides these portentous characteristics of the times, the facts themselves we witness are eminently calculated to excite terror in the heart of every thoughtful observer. Look at the state of Christian Europe at the present day, if it can still be called Christian. What is the universal aim of these ardent theorists, profound scientists, or simply ardent promoters of civilization, as they pretend to be? Merely to enjoy with avidity the goods of the present life without bestowing a thought on the next. They blindly plunge into an unknown future, such as has never been unveiled to the world of past ages; and in order to realize their wild Utopias they aim at destroying every institution which the wisdom of our forefathers has established. These men are called Communists, Socialists, Nihilists. Many of them still talk of a high morality, but they subvert all its foundations. They pretend to work for the happiness of mankind, but mankind recoils with horror from the dark view they disclose to its vision. They array the poor against the rich, labor against capital, the unrestrained passions of a violent and insatiable appetite against the whole economy of divine and human laws. Is not this the state of Europe at this moment? It has never been so restless, discontented, ungovernable as it is to-day. The whole condition can be comprised in one single sentence. The law of God is openly disregarded, the tyranny of might must prevail.

On this Western Continent, formerly so happy and prosperous, because right was really respected, the change effected during the last twenty years, though at first unperceived, is now everywhere manifest. Every reflecting man sees it and openly expresses his concern, and cannot conceal his fears for the future. It is all embraced here in New York in a very comprehensive phrase: "In all transactions between man and man people are now swayed only by the letter of the civil law, no longer by the voice of conscience." It means that expediency rules and morality is dead.

In these ominous circumstances the conclusion forces itself upon the mind that the Catholic Church alone can save society, because it alone is unchangeable; and the same strictness of morals therefore, which governed the conduct of our happy ancestors is still prescribed only by our spiritual rulers.

This is strikingly true in point of fact, but it is in some sense more true than ever in point of doctrine. The Protestant world was shocked a few years ago when the Vatican Council reasserted

the Church's infallibility with like persistence as in all previous ages, and went so far as to proclaim the dogma of the Pope's infallibility in all matters pertaining to faith and morals, which had been always before admitted by the great majority of Catholics, though it had never before been defined as an article of faith. Protestants and rationalists expressed their surprise, could not understand it, and many went so far as to ridicule it; whilst others thought that *intelligent* Catholics would reject it with scorn. Still it was a forcible and striking proof that the morality of the Church would never change an iota. The Supreme Pontiffs would be henceforth more bound than ever before to preserve the moral code in its integrity in the midst of a universal decomposition of all ethical principles. In this is contained the germ of the world's salvation. Whoever wishes to stand by Christ and to be swayed by His precepts must place himself under the wings of the only Church which cannot change, and which must continue to preach Christ's unchangeable doctrine.

Nevertheless, some will, no doubt, demur to this "clerical pretension," to use a very common modern phrase. In fact, three great schools of morals, at this very moment, claim the right of inculcating the true principles which should govern man's conscience preferable to those of the Catholic Church. These are: 1st, the strict Protestants; 2d, the intuitive philosophers; 3d, the positivists. Condensation is necessarily required here, for the subject is immense.

I. The claim of the strict Protestants is urged by them with much persistence. That their claim is simply a delusion is not difficult to prove.

In the first place they themselves must admit that the very principles of Protestantism, as laid down by the first Reformers, evidently sapped the foundations of even the most elementary morality. This, for them, is a very sore point. Protestantism openly denied free will. All the founders of Protestant sects, from Luther down to John of Leyden, did it. But how can virtue exist without free will? Can a mere machine, irresistibly moved by God's action, be susceptible of any moral act? As well might we say that the planets are virtuous by faithfully revolving around the sun. There cannot be any accountability in the necessary motions of an automaton. Conscience in this case is a mere name, and the moral precepts, if there can be any, remain absolutely without sanction. Still this denial of free will was so completely adopted as an axiom among Protestants that Calvin immediately drew the conclusion, which was perfectly legitimate, that God is the sole author of moral evil; yea, of the worst sins a man can be guilty of.

This shocking doctrine was strongly confirmed by the universal

dogma (among Protestants) of justification by faith alone. Good works were naturally excluded from the scheme of salvation, because they are not possible in the total absence of free will. If some Protestants, frightened by this, asserted that good works always accompanied justification, it was understood that these good works were the result of the sole action of God; man had no agency whatever in their performance, except that he was the material subject of the phenomenon.

Their conception of the Church, as explained by the first Reformers, gave the last finishing touch to this Antinomian scheme. According to all those sects, "man in his regeneration worketh nothing; God worketh everything." It strictly followed from this that the Church was composed only of those whom God irresistibly attracted and sanctified. No sinners could exist in the Church; all were saints, and the exterior organization was absolutely nothing. Consequently, sanctity being of its nature invisible, the Church also was not visible. It is difficult to see how the existence of sanctity could be ascertained. Each individual had only the testimony of his own conscience. But this is merely fanaticism.

The Confession of Augsburg, it is true, not satisfied with defining the Church as "a community of saints," added the words, "in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments are duly administered." But as it is impossible to know exactly when these conditions are fulfilled, it came in the end to this, that the interior or invisible sanctity (the work of the Holy Ghost alone) was the only thing of any account. The terrible conclusion forced itself directly on the mind that this interior action of the Holy Spirit, being necessarily limited by the stern decrees of God, and altogether undiscernible by man, might be, for aught we know, reduced in its ever-contracting sphere to one single soul in the whole world, and thus sanctity would have almost entirely gone back to heaven. This supposition was, I believe, discussed among those sects; with what satisfaction to themselves I do not know.

There was, consequently, a deluge of moral disorders which accompanied the first outburst of the Reformation; so that all the leaders of the movement, beginning with Luther himself, bitterly complained that it had everywhere brought on corruption. A long array of Luther's own declarations and of other Reformers could be produced here in proof. They can be found in all the impartial historians who have written on that epoch.

In the second place, the actual state of the case must be attentively examined. For in our age Protestantism presents a quite different aspect, though its original Antinomianism cannot be easily blotted out. The theological theories which have just been briefly

mentioned are now universally set aside, and strict Protestants mainly try to follow the Gospel's precepts so far as they can understand them. It is strange, however, that the baneful principle of justification by faith remains for them nearly as prominent as ever, and we all have lately heard enough of it in the preaching tour of Messrs. Moody and Sankey. Still it must be confessed that Protestantism has not turned out so badly in point of morals as its origin portended. Human nature in the Protestant world has shown itself purer than the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity would naturally have made it. It is, however, preposterous for Protestants to claim, as they do, a superiority of morals over Catholicism; though in order to vindicate this pretension they state broadly, with an air of triumph, that Protestant nations are invariably more virtuous than those that are Catholic.

Far from being afraid of meeting this objection, we will consent, before showing its fallacy, to adopt the example usually brought forward by their writers. England is generally contrasted with France. Though no general conclusion can be deduced from one or two facts, we will not refuse to accept this unfair condition of the problem to be discussed. It is said by Protestants that the high moral tone of the English strikes every one in comparison with the loose morals of the French. This appears not only in the strict integrity of many individual Englishmen of note, and in the sound principles which generally govern their actions, but this is acknowledged of the bulk of the nation by foreigners in all parts of the world where the British flag appears. Civilized nations in Europe, half barbarous tribes in Asia and Africa respect the probity of the sons of Great Britain wherever they travel for pleasure, instruction, or trade. The exceptions to this are rare and do not deserve to be taken into account. So it is asserted.

This again, Protestants allege, is conspicuous in the domestic virtues of the English and in the noble literature which is their natural expression. Compare English with French novelists. Examine attentively in their respective colonies the influence they exert on inferior races. Details without number are brought forward to illustrate the argument and give it the strength of demonstration.

The answer to all this is very plain, and cannot leave any doubt in the mind of an impartial thinker. In one word, it is a pure sophism, and a few reflections will prove it. The English nation has not yet come to the process of disintegration which the French reached many years ago. It is still in the main one, and that is Protestant of the Anglican type. This particular element contains undoubtedly a large amount of Christian principle. The French, on the contrary, after a full century of revolutions, are profoundly

divided. The only part of them which strikes the eye of foreigners has been for many years, and is still, radically infidel and godless. The contrast does not oppose a Protestant nation to a Catholic people, but to a profoundly unbelieving part. This does not touch the question we are discussing. Instead of this, choose among the French the now numerous, and at this moment rapidly increasing part of the nation which has remained faithful to the religion of the crusaders, and the result of the comparison will be immediately reversed. Take among the French those noble leaders of the Catholic party, as it is called. Look at their admirable deeds in fields of charity, of education, of zeal for the welfare of their countrymen and for the spread of faith all over the world. Their virtues far outshine those of British peers and politicians, though we fully admit whatever good is done by them in the domestic circle and even in the spread of fair-handed justice. The British aristocracy is satisfied in the field of charity with the working of the poor laws; in education they secure a high degree of it for their caste, and leave the lower classes in the abyss of degradation into which it is notorious they are plunged; with regard to the welfare of the people, they are only careful to see that oppression is not carried far enough to produce open rebellion. The French Catholics do not fear a close comparison with Englishmen in all acts of benevolence.

French literature, too, is not altogether debased. The present Gallic writers on history, on philosophy, on science, on religion, nay, in light literature, will well bear comparison with the best of England; and when French authors are inspired by a truly Catholic spirit, as is now the case with a large number, their works rise far above those which come from the press on the other side of the Channel. There is at the present time a French literature which is the true expression of the sound part of the nation; and to pretend that Protestant literature in England is superior to it, is to ignore totally the new French bibliography in all its branches.

But the discussion of the present question embraces many other points, some of which must be examined in order to elicit the truth fairly, if not entirely. In the first place, Protestant England, as has been said, has preserved many Catholic principles, which give it a great moral superiority over unbelieving peoples, and particularly over a considerable number of the French people. Precisely because Anglicanism has no settled rule of faith, Calvinism has not altogether pervaded the nation, and the elastic principle of its religious system, which embraces among others the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine Articles, allows its adherents, when they choose, the practice of many pious customs which are denied to the infidel. Prayer, examen of conscience, the

reception of the sacraments, the general belief in the incarnation, in the atonement, in the future judgment, etc., form among them a strong basis of Christian morality. All this is true. But with its pretended *via media* it carries too far its compromise with dogmas and morals, allows liberty of opinion on many important points which its humanly constituted ecclesiastical authority does not feel competent to settle, and closes its eyes to the requirements of a high standard of virtue. Thus there are among them few moral disorders, it is true, and not often open impiety; but, on the other side, the heroism of faith is positively discountenanced, and holiness is altogether absent. They are in general well regulated in their lives, but this is mainly in a worldly point of view; so that the appearance of a saint among them is totally unknown. The standard of morals with them is, therefore, earthly, not heavenly, and cannot come in competition with that of Catholics. Besides, what they possess of virtue comes from their previous Catholicism; the many deficiencies of their moral code is the outcome of their Protestantism.

In the second place their want of heroism in faith and the low standard of their moral virtues become glaring when compared with the wonders of faith, charity, and zeal displayed by a large number of the French of our day. Can it be supposed, without eliciting a smile, that a Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury would willingly die for his flock as Mgr. Affre did on the barricades in June, 1848? A few of the most ardent Anglicans, under the name of Puseyites, or Ritualists, advocate celibacy, monastic rules, almsgiving to the poor, and self-sacrifice for the help of the needy. But they find no countenance among the almost entire body of their Anglican brethren. Their vain efforts in the arduous path of holiness meet only with derision, opposition, persecution. This is because Protestantism is naturally opposed to sanctity.

The French Catholics, on the contrary, manifestly cultivate whatever is highest in Christian perfection. They, at this very time, cover the soil of their country with charitable and ascetic institutions worthy of the primitive ages. The ardent zeal of Christ appears among them as pure and as disinterested as in Jerusalem and Rome in the Apostolic age. Not content with establishing all over the French soil the glorious marks of the Christian religion destroyed a short time ago by an infidel rabble, they go forth from their country like the Apostles, and know no limit to their zeal but the utmost bounds of the earth. They do not spread the New Testament without comment, printed in all languages. They, themselves, learn all tongues in order to preach it; and their lives are the best commentary on the inspired volume. The whole continent of Africa, the remotest parts of Asia, the whole extent of the

South Seas are invaded by a peaceful army, such as the world has scarcely seen before. England trades and sends her goods, for a fair remuneration, to the civilized and uncivilized tribes of the earth. France carries the pure Gospel as far and often farther; and her children, men and women, consider the palm of martyrdom their best guerdon, which, too, is not unfrequently awarded them. Where, then, is the superiority of England over France?

In the third place, in spite of all her moral deficiencies modern France, including even the infidel half, has preserved to this day the true feeling of universal manhood, which is eminently a Christian feeling, and which, I am sorry to say, scarcely appears in Great Britain. Whatever may have been the cause, it is so, undoubtedly. When the first Crystal Palace was erected in London the French commissioners who were dispatched to render a faithful account of its unprecedented splendor were instructed also to inquire into the moral state of the London poor. Two of them (Léon Faucher and Eugène Rendu) came back to Paris with two different descriptions, bearing the most extraordinary features of an apparently impossible opposition. All the brilliant recent victories of industry, art, science, and labor formed in the one a picture of dazzling beauty; but the other sketch, though faithfully drawn, exhibited all the horrors of the lowest possible human degradation. The English Government could not express its dissatisfaction at this astounding French *compte rendu*, because British commissioners appointed at about the same time, for a like purpose, by the Parliament in London, had brought out almost the same result, and sent a thrill of horror through the whole English nation. Mr. Mayhew, moreover, a thorough Englishman, but a most candid writer, published in ten octavo volumes, a long array of facts which it had taken him thirty years to collect, and to which he gave the very simple title, *London Labor and the London Poor*. He met in his rambles many most destitute Irish families, but he was struck with the difference between them and the British plebeians. He narrated manfully and honestly what he saw and heard from both; and there could not be any longer the least difficulty in believing that the lower classes in London were thoroughly degraded. They had scarcely preserved any feature of the "king of creation," and it was hard to imagine that they themselves had been created "to the image and similitude of God." The difference, likewise, between the poor in France and the poor in England was most striking and undeniable. These last were mere animals. Their French congeners might become at times wild beasts and untutored savages, but as soon as they recovered their senses they became again sensible beings, and gave many proofs of true manhood, rising occasionally to heroism. This became manifest even in their revolutionary

excesses. They acted first as if they were deprived of reason and had sunk to the level of ferocious beasts, but in their lucid moments they checked their destructive appetites, and often wept over the havoc they had made. The only exception that I know to this happened in the last rising of the Commune, in 1871, which preserved its fierce character from first to last. In their poor dwellings, also, you seldom see filth and dirt, and their wives always know how to arrange into some kind of order whatever pieces of furniture they succeed in saving from the pawnbroker or the lottery-ticket seller.

The reason of the difference between the English and the French rabble is easily explained and becomes clear to any close observer. The lower classes of England are given over, soul and body, to the cruel mercies of the poor laws. If they are seldom allowed to die of hunger, whatever is given them does not come from the hand of true charity, which is always prompted by sincere love, but is severely doled out to them by the calculating reckoning of officials, whom they come at last to consider as their bitter enemies. On the contrary, in France it is not the state alone that attends to the needs of the indigent. As soon as it is heard that there is destitution anywhere troops of Daughters of Charity, of Brethren of St. Vincent de Paul, of individual Christians, men and women, often of the highest rank, are always at hand to relieve distress. They come as friends, full of sympathy and love, and the poor know that what they bring comes from the heart, that the first visit will be followed by many others, which will continue as long as the need remains. Thus there is always hope among the French poor. It is seldom, indeed, that they are reduced to despair, and generally the lowest turn of the wheel of fortune is sure to bring an ascending scale of comfort. Together with bread, charitable advice is invariably given; the children are taken care of, the sick are attended to and nursed, and thus a community of feeling is established between the wealthy and the poor.

It would require a large volume to describe the various societies established in France during the last thirty years, for the relief of human misery and for imparting to the forlorn and friendless the consolations of religion and the benefits of instruction. It is not true, consequently, that in a comparison between England and France the advantages are all on the side of the former and against the latter. The result of a candid inquiry is precisely the reverse, as has been already said. And since a comparison of those two great nations is proposed as a test for the whole question, it must be concluded that the moral superiority of the Catholics over the Protestants is clear and indubitable under all the aspects of the subject. A passage, however, from an admirable work of Mr.

Auguste Nicholas—on *Protestantism*—falls unexpectedly into my hands, and is too appropriate to this occasion to be overlooked or omitted here. I translate only a few paragraphs :

“ If the Divine Author of Christianity appeared suddenly in the midst of the Catholic nations he would find among them a multitude of charitable souls, of merciful and compassionate co-workers with Him for the benefit of mankind, of men bent on reproducing on earth something at least of His ardent tenderness for the poor; true continuators of His mission of love, in whom He would recognize the promptings of the spirit which animated Him, and to whom He would say: ‘Come, ye blessed of my Father; for I was hungry and you gave me food; I was thirsty and you gave me drink; I was naked and you clothed me; I was a prisoner and you came to visit me.’

“ But if He happened to go through the streets of London, through the quarters of St. Giles, of Whitechapel, of Greta Green, of Spitalfields, O my God! what a terrible *væ* would issue from His lips against those members of Bible societies who constantly speak of the Gospel spread through sea and land, its dead letter, with the sole purpose of propagating heresy, whilst they trample the Gospel under foot in the persons of Christ’s poor. This heavenly King, who blessed the lowly in his Gospel, would not have to change a single word in the imprecations addressed of old to the Pharisees: ‘Woe to you, because you go round about the sea and land to make one proselyte, and he becomes the child of hell twofold more than yourselves. Woe to you, because you are like to whited sepulchres, which appear outwardly beautiful, but within are full of dead men’s bones and of all filthiness.’ ”

This may appear severe language, but Mr. Nicholas has never been accused of using such unless the occasion required it. It is meanwhile remarkable that Protestants have been more violent than open infidels, even, in their denunciations of Catholic morality, as if they themselves had nothing to atone for; and this must delay us a little while longer on the present subject. The first Reformers pretended that the Catholic Church had for a long time ceased to be the Church of Christ on account of its moral corruption. They loaded with opprobrious epithets the very memory of the Middle Ages, which had just preceded the advent of Protestantism. It is chiefly from them, as well as from the *humanists* of the revival, that all the misconceptions originated which have until now prevailed, even among Catholic writers, with regard to the supposed low morality of the ages of faith. It is this false impression that forms mainly the basis of the broad assertion of Protestants that the Church of Christ had ceased to exist, except, perhaps, among the Valdenses and Albigenes. The rationalists of our day care very little for its existence or non-existence, but they continue to bring forward an immense number of details, true or not, which give to those ages all the appearance of barbarism and moral corruption. Mr. Lecky, I am sorry to say, is profuse on this subject in his second volume.

This question cannot be treated *in extenso* here. But a few reflections are required to rebut this wholesale accusation on the part of Protestantism. In our day, at least, the Middle Ages have been better studied than ever previously, and the result of the investi-

gation has been a thorough vindication. Many important works have appeared in Germany, England, and France, restoring to that much-abused epoch its true character. It is sufficient to mention two of them,—the *Mores Catholici* of Kenelm H. Digby, and the *Monks of the West* of Montalembert. The first of these, quoted at the head of this article, is bulky, but contains an immense number of facts which present the subject under a light altogether different from that of the Protestant view, and one which certainly is more correct. It has been objected against it that it gives only one side of the picture. Even if this were the case it would still, however, furnish a sufficient answer to the revilers of those times, who cannot see any good in an age which has covered Europe with stupendous cathedrals, and with innumerable other splendid edifices devoted to the relief of all forms of human misery.

But it is not true that Mr. Digby has not spoken of the evil side of the Middle Ages, chiefly of the incessant wars which characterized that epoch, and were the main cause of all the moral and social abuses with which it is reproached. He has done this admirably, particularly in the eleventh chapter of the ninth book, in the third volume of the London edition. At the same time that he has done this he has also proved that Catholicity was not responsible for these abuses. They all originated in feudalism; and the Church not only did not establish the feudal system, but constantly labored to mitigate its evils, and succeeded at last in rooting them out one after another. The great drawback of Mr. Digby's book is his method and style. The first is somewhat confused, and the second is far from being lucid and clear. These defects detract much from the interest of his work. But whoever looks only to the thoughts and the facts, and perseveres in reading, in spite of the literary deficiencies of the book, will soon experience great pleasure in perusing his pages, and admiring the beauty of Christendom in the ages when it embraced the whole of Europe under its wings.

If the great work of Montalembert is selected for the study of the Middle Ages, the effect will be still more striking, because the heroic leader of the French Catholics in the struggle for their emancipation was an eminent writer in every respect, as well as a great orator and debater. His *Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary* and his *Monks of the West* suffice to vindicate the ages of faith from all the obloquy heaped upon them by Protestant writers, from the Centuriators of Magdeburgh down to the latest ranter of Exeter Hall.

II. After the strict Protestants, the "intuitive philosophers" think that they likewise can cast reproaches upon Catholic morality. Mr. Lecky, in his *History of European Morals*, is their chief exponent. A brief exposition of his views as to his own moral system

is required here before speaking of his objections to the Church's sanctity.

First, he is uncompromising in his opposition to the utilitarian school of ethics, as he calls those pretended moralists who deny that right and wrong depend on immutable principles, and pretend that utility is the grand basis of morals, so that an act is virtuous only when it is useful and pleasurable. This is a reproduction of the old Epicurean system, and leads logically to the worst moral abuses. This system Mr. Lecky has attempted to refute, and he has done it admirably in the first half of his first volume. At the same time he establishes on the most solid ground the innate rule of conduct by which right is absolutely distinguished from wrong, independently of present happiness or pleasure. And here he is opposed not only to the school of Bentham, so prevalent in England at the beginning of this century, but also to the rising school of positivists, of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is the chief leader.

It appears strange that laying down, as apparently he does, the same foundations of natural virtue which all Catholic theologians admit, he differs so much from them in many applications of the rule which is common to both. He was aware that the "innate rule of right and wrong," namely, the voice of human conscience, which he concedes was recognized by St. Paul in the pagans themselves, and was henceforth called *lex naturæ* (the law of nature), was likewise the basis of moral theology adopted by all the schoolmen. He even alludes to the "great writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," which he knows are sacred to all Catholic theologians. Still he wonders that "these monks, who were familiar with the language, and might easily have been familiar with the noble literature of ancient Rome, . . . added so very little of any real value for so long a period to the knowledge of mankind." He goes still further, and frequently complains of the Church's morality as laid down by the Fathers and the schoolmen; in fact, of the Church's whole practice in different ages until our own time.

The strangeness of this conduct on the part of Mr. Lecky ceases to be matter of surprise as soon as it is remarked that he totally rejects the supernatural, which for him is merely *superstition*. There is not for him any other moral law than the natural. The order of grace is totally absent from his system, and he does not seem to have even the slightest knowledge of it. Throughout his two volumes I have failed to find even the most distant reference to it. Now there is not, it is true, the smallest disagreement between the law of nature and the order of grace, because they both come from God; but the second is far above the first, and commends us to infinitely higher motives, which a pure rationalist cannot under-

stand; and thus Mr. Lecky at once assumes that the one is contradictory of the other.

On the first page of his second volume, however, the question is unexpectedly brought before his eyes, and the author of *European Morals* begins there an interesting discussion on the relative merits of the moral system of pagan philosophers, such as were Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, on the one side, and that of Christianity on the other. He immediately makes the profound remark that "the ethics of paganism were part of a philosophy; the ethics of Christianity were part of a religion." The subject was thus broadly indicated, and he had only to develop it. But he did not arrive at a proper consideration of the order of grace. He must have found the expression in many Catholic books that he certainly perused; but probably because he could not understand them he laid them aside, without even trying to find out what they meant. This alone is sufficient to show that Mr. Lecky's knowledge, so extensive and so correct on many points, is extremely deficient respecting the doctrines upheld by the Catholic Church.

He furnishes, too, a most striking proof of this; for, with reference to Catholicism, instead of examining coolly and wisely, as he so often does when treating other points, how it is that a *philosophy* must widely differ from a *religion* as to the doctrine of virtue and its motives, he launches into mere declamation against the absurd harshness he attributes to Christian morality. The following sentences, which are the only ones that time and space allow us to quote, are really inexplicable when it is considered that the writer is eminently learned and discriminating whenever his preconceived opinions on the sufficiency of natural virtue do not mislead him. He says:

"The Christian notion of the enormity of little sins; the belief that all the details of life will be scrutinized hereafter; that weaknesses of character and petty infractions of duty may be made the ground of eternal condemnation, was altogether unknown to the ancients,"—that is, to the Pagan philosophers.

These reproaches might be addressed, to a certain extent, to several absurd sects of Puritans among Protestants; but Mr. Lecky's strictures are generally directed against the Catholic Church, which he abuses as often as he praises it. He seldom objects to any vagary of Protestantism, though on one or two occasions he justly speaks of the "horrible doctrines of Calvinism." But this is so rare that, whenever he severely reflects on *Christianity*, the reader infers that he therein speaks of the Catholic Church. In the passage just quoted no other Church organization will occur to the reader's mind, as alluded to by Mr. Lecky; and it is a most false,

may, absurd accusation, which by this time must be known to be such by everybody. The difference between venial and mortal sins is elementary among us, and all children who have begun to learn their Catechism could give the proper answer to this author of a great, and on many points an excellent work.

But the main cause of the ignorance here painfully manifested is derived, as has been already said, from the rejection of the supernatural; and this must be considered for a moment, because the supernatural side of Christianity gives to it in fact immense superiority, even in point of morals, over every purely rationalistic system. This is not generally perceived; nevertheless, the true cause of the Church's sanctity is derived from its superhuman character. Take away its dogmas and Christianity becomes a simple *philosophy*, as was that of Marcus Aurelius and Seneca. We must claim a great deal more, and the simple exposition of this will reduce to nothing all the objections of rationalists against the Catholic moral system, and even prove that the claim of *holiness* cannot be advanced in behalf of any other system than the Catholic religion.

On what grounds rests, after all, the practice of virtue when man has no other guide than his individual conscience? Only on the immutable principles of right and wrong engraved on the human heart by the finger of God, which form the basis of the natural law of morality. Had not revelation been added to it this might and would have sufficed, because God would in that case have given sufficient light to our intellect and sufficient strength to our will. This comes to what Catholic theologians call in general the *status naturæ puræ*, whose possibility they all admit, and which would reduce humanity nearly to the condition which intuitive philosophers consider the present one. But revelation is a great fact, proved historically as well as rationally. The demonstration of it by Christian apologists has never been successfully attacked, and revelation supposes the fall. The fall itself is also a great fact, and is the original cause of the present obscurity of our intellect and the weakness of our will. So that, in his actual state, man is not in the condition supposed by rationalists, a condition which would give him the possibility of naturally practicing virtue and avoiding sin without other higher means.

Our own experience, therefore, demonstrates the necessity of revelation, and consequently of a supernatural religion, which is often called the "order of grace." Meanwhile, in the rationalistic system of Mr. Lecky, virtue is supposed to be clear in its precepts and easy of attainment. The mind of man is considered naturally competent to distinguish easily right from wrong, and the will is believed to enjoy a sufficient mastery over passion. That this is,

in abstracto, the case under ordinary circumstances can well be admitted, since the Church has rejected the dogma of total depravity. But that we have, *in concreto*, lost the power possessed by Adam at his creation, has always been the belief of the Church, and was made a dogma when Pelagianism arose. The common experience of all mankind would, moreover, suffice to prove this truth.

The author of the *History of European Morals* never speaks *ex professo* of the difficulties which beset man in the path of virtue, and seldom makes any mention of the arduous labor required in the performance of duty. This is probably the consequence of his system, which would entirely collapse if moral precepts were not supposed to be always clear, and the practice of virtue always easy. But his very supposition is fatal to the pretended superiority of his doctrine over that of the Catholic Church. For all know that without a great struggle not only moral perfection cannot be obtained, nor can vice itself in its most degrading aspect be conquered. If Mr. Lecky could succeed in convincing all men of the solid ground of his moral Utopia, his ubiquitous and innumerable disciples would rush headlong into what they would consider the strict path of duty, and most of them would soon perceive that they had suddenly fallen among pitfalls and snares. He is, after all, a poor professor of morals; and, if he went about preaching his system, it is very doubtful whether he would reform mankind; or rather it is not at all doubtful that he would not. And this is true of all teachers of ethics when they rely only on reason. If Mr. Lecky is here singled out, it is mainly because he is one of the very best among them.

Mr. Lecky even is candid enough to express some doubt on the perfect reliability of intuitive philosophers. At the beginning of his first volume he gives a respectable list of them, all English, and he admits that there is "an apparent discordance" among them as to the very foundation of virtue. He names Butler, Adam Smith, Cudworth, Clarke, and several others. But he tries to reconcile them by reducing their various definitions to "a complex moral sense, containing both a judgment of the reason and an emotion of the heart." (V. i., p. 77.) Still, not even here is a word said either on the obscurity which often throws a cloud over the "judgment of the reason," or of the strong bias towards evil, which oftener still carries the will in a wrong direction. All things considered, it does not look very likely that natural morality is destined to bring about the peaceful reign of virtue on earth. There are too many difficulties in the way. We must now examine attentively whether the supernatural side of the question is not more reliable.

In the first place, all there is of truth in the "intuitive" system

is admitted by Catholic moralists, and is expressed by the well-known axiom: *Gratia supponit naturam*. It is proper at this day people should know that the Church does not anathematize natural principles in morals, as she does not the exercise of reason in philosophy. The Council of the Vatican has spoken clearly on the subject, and both principles were invariably taught from the beginning by the Fathers and the Schoolmen. Heresy did its best to obscure the one as well as the other, but the Church has succeeded in defeating heresy on both these fields of battle.

In the second place, the Catholic doctrine asserts that the moral nature of man, though not totally depraved, as Calvin pretended, has been, nevertheless, weakened by original sin; and, as was just remarked, this dogma is strongly approved by reason and experience, so that to reject it is tantamount to introducing a new mystery into the nature and history of man on earth.

In the third place, with this single effect of the fall is connected the whole supernatural order of grace, through which an immense superiority of morals of necessity follows, and this requires serious attention. To understand it a very short sketch of the scheme of redemption will suffice. Man weakened in his nature by original sin requires help in the performance of duty. This help the Man-God furnishes by His example and His merits. The sacraments are the channels through which Christ's merits are applied to man; and virtuous habits resulting from this application joined with man's concurrence, the practice of virtue becomes easy, and can even take the shape of what is called *holiness*, which may be defined *the heavenly consecration of virtue*.

This must be examined somewhat in detail. From the revealed mystery of the Trinity and the infinite love of the Father and the Son, the Incarnation follows, and this opens the way for Redemption. The divine plan reveals to us the fact that the first Adam created in the image of God, and consequently holy at the beginning, having fallen from his high estate, was replaced as head of the human race by a second Adam consubstantial with God Himself. Human nature was consequently raised far above its primitive state, and now partakes by adoption of the Divine Sonship. The sacraments are the ever open channels through which abundant graces are constantly flowing. A new moral life is thus bestowed on humanity, and what was impossible to our fallen nature becomes easy to the redeemed soul. Hence a far higher morality is the consequence; and *holiness* becomes possible, whilst before it was perfectly unattainable.

This, it is true, cannot be understood by the intuitive philosophers; and the atonement of Christ is often blasphemed by them. To bring it, however, within the range of their vision, it perhaps

will suffice to examine attentively the rational grounds on which rest the claims of the Catholic Church and the divinity of its doctrine. Even in case both remain obscure for them, they can, however, easily understand that those principles being presupposed the highest possible sanctity on earth must follow. Let us see the rational grounds of this doctrine.

It is impossible here to enter into details ; but it may be sufficient to mention that the first establishment of Christianity, its propagation, and subsequent history through all ages, furnish abundant proof of its divine origin, and consequently of the absolute truth of all the mysteries mentioned above. The life of Christ alone, when it is studied and understood rightly, demonstrates that the Catholic claims are not a delusion, and that the author of our religion was truly God, since the contrary supposition carries with it the stigma of imposture, against which even mere human feeling recoils with horror when there is question of Christ. Mr. Lecky, it is true, does his best to prove that Christianity was merely the result of previous philosophers, and of the gradual progress of mankind, and this is generally the opinion of rationalists. But for their demonstration they rely only on an *ex parte* view of the Roman Empire, which can easily be proved to be false, and which even in the supposition of its truth could not render admissible a like conclusion for the whole world. The *conversion of Rome*, developed at length in the *History of European Morals* from natural data only, does not authorize any one to say the same was true of the entire earth ; but the mission of the Apostles extended to the whole of it. The well-known facts of a history so stupendous as was the universal propagation of Christ's doctrines, joined with the destruction of idolatry, the renovation of the whole world, and the introduction of new thoughts, new maxims, a new life ; all this compared with the weak instruments that were used, and the natural incompetency of the workers in the scheme, cannot possibly be explained except by the direct agency of God. Otherwise the effect would be infinitely superior to the cause, and the mystery would remain insoluble.

But the religion, which was thus established and propagated, and which brought about the highest degree of civilization, was altogether supernatural, and it contained, even in its incipient form, all the dogmatic mysteries which we have briefly referred to. New words were, it is true, gradually introduced into the Church's symbols of faith ; the ideas, however, remained the same, being only more definitely stated. Redemption through Christ, in particular, was as firmly believed in the Apostolic age as it is at the present day. All the moral doctrines which follow from it began to work in the Church, and have been constantly since then the well-spring of virtue, nay, of holiness. Man was known to have been born a sinner ; the prac-

tice of virtue was believed to be difficult, nay, impossible without the help of God. This help was furnished chiefly through baptism, the Eucharist, and penance, all derived from the merits of Christ and from the shedding of His blood on the Cross. Christ being the new Head of the human race, men were through Him adopted into the Sonship of God, as St. Peter clearly declared. The order of grace, already proclaimed by St. John, was the source of the new birth in which men were regenerated.

But man having to concur with the grace thus offered him, a manly warfare against vice was the consequence. The road to heaven had been declared by Christ himself to be arduous and rough; and the Apostles insisted in their preaching and epistles on the necessity of moral effort. The double principle on which hangs the whole conflict in the moral field was in the beginning adopted and ever since then insisted on; namely, in point of conviction, be persuaded that you can do absolutely nothing without divine help; in point of actual practice, do exactly as if everything depended on yourself. On account of the first part of this double axiom prayer was always highly recommended as the usual means for obtaining God's help; on account of the second all the natural means required for enlightening the judgment, and strengthening the will, called by Mr. Lecky the "emotion of the heart," must be employed by the man who desires to be truly virtuous. Occasions of sin are to be avoided, the company of the vicious is to be shunned, the first outbursts of passion must be repressed, the senses must be kept under control, sensual indulgence must be altogether renounced, etc. This warfare is to continue as long as life exists, and if ever, owing to the neglect of these restraints, guilt has been incurred, God must be propitiated by repentance, and His forgiveness obtained through the means which religion enjoins.

As instruments to lead Christians in this arduous path, thousands and thousands of zealous men have been constantly engaged in preaching, exhorting, supporting the weak, maintaining the ardor of the strong, forming Christ in the heart of men, since the great model always proposed to the Christian in his spiritual warfare is the stainless life of the Saviour. For virtue is not only the result of His merits, it is also strongly promoted by His example. Mr. Lecky, who never speaks of Christ's merits, because he ignores the scheme of redemption, acknowledges, however, the power of His example, and speaks of it eloquently in a remarkable and striking passage in his second volume.

All these things being combined together virtue is solidly established, and takes a shape in the Christian scheme altogether different from what it is supposed to be in any other ethical system.

The highest degree of it is called holiness or sanctity; and the Catholic Church is the only institution on earth which recognizes "saints," forms and trains them, as it were, and at the end of their lives "canonizes" them.

Holiness has been already defined as the "heavenly consecration of virtue." It is true that in natural virtue, that of the pagans, for instance, there was a glimpse of heaven. St. John tells us at the beginning of his Gospel that the eternal word—the splendor of the Father as He has been called—is the true light which illumines all men coming into the world; consequently even those who have been deprived of the supernatural light of revelation, and are reduced to that of reason; who, according to St. Paul, *ipsi sibi sunt lex*, really receive that law from the eternal Word. But as this is only in the "order of nature," and nature has been sundered from heaven by sin, it is only a *glimpse*, as it has been called, a *reflection* only from heaven, not a direct ray of light. On the contrary, supernatural virtue, derived from the scheme of revelation, contains, as it were, the substance of the eternal Word after His incarnation, who has brought down heaven to earth by a direct ray of His divine nature, so that theologians say that the infinite merits of the God-man have become the treasure of man after his redemption. The Church is the keeper of that treasure; but the first of the sacraments, baptism, by making us heirs of heaven, has given us the right to receive from and through her hands a part of that heavenly wealth, such as the world cannot comprehend. In this sublime generosity of the bestower of all good gifts virtue becomes "consecrated," and acquires the right to be called *holiness*. It is needless to say that no rationalistic system of morals, even of the highest order, can put forth a claim of this nature; and that consequently there is an infinite moral superiority in the Christian scheme over any other that can be imagined.

Hence, look at those sublime virtues in the "order of grace" which have been practiced in Jerusalem, as related by St. Luke; in Rome, as ascertained by recent inquiries; in Egypt, as known from Rosweid's *Vitæ Patrum*; in Edessa, as portrayed by the great St. Ephrem; in Celtic Ireland, in Anglo-Saxon England, in Catholic Spain and France; in all the monastic orders, as described by Montalembert, in so many religious houses of our own day. Where can be found among men of the "intuitive school of morals" anything like the sublime spirit of self-sacrifice which the teaching of Christianity introduced into this world? Mr. Lecky himself has said in his Preface: "Sometimes we find a kind of aristocracy of virtue, exhibiting the most refined excellence in their teachings and their actions, but exercising scarcely any appreciable influence upon the mass of the community." This may be said of the school

to which the writer belongs, but is not true of Christianity. On the contrary, it is not aristocracy but the commonalty of the people in Christendom that have been the most ready to adopt in their lives the highest precepts, nay, the counsels of the Saviour. And if the main reason of this is inquired into, it will be found in the fact that the scheme of our Saviour was Heavenly, that it worked in the "order of grace," that it embraced all mankind, that it acted on all classes of men, but chiefly on the most simple because less corrupt, on the less refined because more pure.

Of the moral deficiencies which have sometimes appeared in the Christian world, of the periods of looseness in morals which have occasionally afflicted the Church, much is said by those who refuse to admit the superiority of the Gospel's doctrine, as if such "deficiencies" and such looseness in morals came from the Gospel's imperfection, and was attributable to Christianity itself. It is pure sophism to reproach a religion with drawbacks, which that religion evidently condemns. It is true that its influence seems to be less holy when a number of its adherents lead a life at variance with their belief. But if at all times—as can be proved was the case—there have been in the Church men of the highest sanctity, raising aloft the standard of virtue as a signal for others to follow; if what they practiced was the outcome of the Church's teaching, and must be attributed to the religion itself, it is evident that the claim of sanctity is not vitiated by whatever may have been the moral deficiencies of others, who acted in direct contravention to the dictates of religion. It would, therefore, be needless to discuss the accusations brought forward by rationalistic writers against a Church, which in its official documents has never been known to favor any loose principle in morals, but which, on the contrary, has always prescribed the strictest rules for the guidance of mankind.

III. There is just now at this moment a third class of men, who claim for their system a moral superiority over that of the Church, and these, strange to say, are the positivists of our day. They pretend that even belief in God is not connected with a pure life, that Atheism is compatible with perfect virtue; and they go so far as to assert that the denial of all religion is promotive of the purest morality, because it is then more disinterested, and does not look to future reward. I sincerely beg pardon of my readers for discussing at all this question. On its very surface it seems perfectly absurd, and is an insult to good sense and propriety. Still it must not be left unreferred to, because a great number of men, outside of the Catholic Church, seem to incline to this opinion. Its refutation is the main object of Mr. W. H. Mallock in his book lately published, *Is Life Worth Living?* and the sensation it has produced shows that it was opportune and important.

This pretension of the positivists (of connecting pure morality with what we must call rank infidelity) is peculiar to our time, and has never been advanced before. The system of Evolution, which is the main support of modern atheism, has always been, in some form or other, a ground of disbelief in God. The existence of the world and of man without the intervention of a Supreme Designer, by the mere effect of physical laws or forces, was explained in Greece by Epicurus and developed by Lucretius in Rome through the means of the atomic theory. But the great object of the Greek philosopher and of his Latin interpreter was "to free mankind from the fear of the gods," and thus to leave human passions untrammelled by *superstition*. If some writers have pretended that Epicurus's doctrine was compatible with a blameless life, the fact seems to be proved that the Roman depravity, particularly among patricians under the first emperors, was in great part due to the adoption, almost general at that time, of Lucretius's principles. Horace has graphically expressed the common opinion on this subject by the celebrated line: "*Epicuri de grege porcum.*" The metaphysical pantheism originated by Giordano Bruno, at the close of the Middle Ages, and elaborated with great acumen later on by Spinoza, did not appear to have any fatal influence on morals, though it also was an attempt at deducing the existence of the universe from inflexible and necessary laws. But the chief reason of this seeming harmlessness was simply the narrow sphere which these doctrines penetrated. The uncouth and repulsive form under which they were offered to the public prevented them from becoming popular, and they never had more than a few adherents.

But as soon as the ancient Greek system was reproduced under more attractive forms in the eighteenth century all the previous immoral consequences of Epicurism followed. The numerous French systems on cosmology and natural history, invented by De Maillet, Buffon, Lamarck, and others, all of them tending to free man from responsibility before God, were starting-points from which ethical principles of the most deleterious nature were immediately deduced. Such philosophers as Helvetius, Diderot, D'Holbach, La Mettrie, and, in general, the Encyclopædists, taught openly that self-gratification and the mere satisfaction of the appetite was the law of human nature. The most degrading consequences were immediately deduced by a besotted public, including the proud members of the most refined society. The *salons* of Madame Geoffrin, Madame du Deffand, Madame de Marchais, Madame Necker herself, were every day defiled by the lewd conversation of the great lights of literature in Paris, and husbands of the highest rank consented to live in intimacy and social intercourse with the well-known paramours of their wives. The moral corruption that en-

sued, and which brought about all the horrors of the French Revolution, is well known. It has been thoroughly unveiled by modern writers of light *feuilletons* in newspapers and of more pretentious articles in reviews.

Even during the first quarter of this century in France, the economist systems devised by Fourier and St. Simon, who pretended likewise to explain, on merely natural grounds, the whole universe and man's nature, were tainted with the same festering moral gangrene; they all proposed sensual gratification as the great object of human life.

At this moment the most explicit assertions of positivists seem to present their case in a quite different light. We shall presently hear what they say of virtue as the great aim of life, and of its strict practice in their own ranks. Nevertheless it must be admitted that they go still further in point of religious denial than all their philosophical ancestors; and it would seem strange if they could escape the immoral consequences which have invariably followed from analogous principles. Mr. Mallock, who knows them well, and always speaks of them without rancor, if not with undue courtesy, is appalled at the aspect of their doctrines, and represents them as unparalleled in the previous history of man. Here are a few of his words (*Is Life Worth Living?* p. 197, Putnam):

"When the present age shall realize its own condition truly [owing to those new doctrines], the dejection of which it is growing conscious may perhaps give way to despair. This condition, however, is so portentous that it is difficult to persuade ourselves that it is what it seems to be, and that it is not a dream. But the more steadily we look at it, the more real will its appalling features appear to us. We are literally in an age to which history can show no parallel, and which is new to the experience of humanity; and though the moral dejection we have been dwelling on may have had many seeming counterparts in other times, this is, as it were, solid substance, whereas they were only shadows. I have pointed out already in my first chapter how unexampled is the state in which the world now finds itself; but we will dwell once again upon its more general features."

Then the gifted author draws a picture of the present age of positivism, the more frightful that it is most true in every particular, and thus concludes:

"It is not possible to conceive that this last development of humanity, this stupendous break from the past, which is being accomplished by our understanding of it, will not be the sort of break which takes place when a man awakes from a dream and finds all that he most prized vanished from him. It is not possible to conceive that this awakening, this discovery by man himself, will not be the beginning of his decadence; that it will not be the discovery on his part that he is a lesser and a lower thing than he thought he was, and that his condition will not sink till it tallies with his own opinion of it."

This must be, in fact, the natural consequence of all atheistic systems, but principally of modern positivism. To make a full statement of its assertions and doctrines is not possible here through want

of space, and it is not needed, because they must be by this time well known to the reader. The system itself cannot be discussed in these pages. Still, in the midst of the denial of all principles on which society in all ages has since rested, the new theorists proclaim that virtue remains for them as firm as for Christians and more so. This part of the question remains to be discussed.

In the words of Mr. Mallock, "Dr. Tyndall informs us that though he has now rejected the religion of his former years, yet, granting him proper health of body, there is '*no spiritual experience,*' such as he then knew; '*no resolve of duty, no work of mercy, no act of self-renouncement, no solemnity of thought, no joy in the life and aspect of nature, that would not still be his.*' Like to this is the implicit teaching of all George Eliot's novels, whilst Professor Huxley tells us that, come what may to our '*intellectual beliefs and even education,*' '*the beauty of holiness and the ugliness of sin*' will remain for those that have eyes to see them, '*no mere metaphors, but real and intense feelings.*'"

All the followers of this new doctrine speak in the same strain; and Miss Bevington, an English lady of the new school, in answering Mr. Mallock's book on the *Nineteenth Century*, bitterly complains that his object must evidently have been "to deprive her of her inducements to live righteously," nay, "to reap advantage from her unrighteousness." This point they have reached in their sophisms, that if any talented writer proves to them, as Mr. Mallock intended in his book, that "theism, with its attendant belief in man's immortality, has a practical effect upon practical life," and that "without these beliefs truth as truth, and virtue as virtue, cease to be in any way admirable," they immediately conclude that such a writer as this has the deliberate purpose to deprive them of every inducement to virtue and to render them "unrighteous, corrupt, immoral," as if such was the result of belief in God.

They consequently deny the catastrophe announced by Mr. Mallock in case their doctrines prevail; "a catastrophe," he says, "that might be not unfitly spoken of as the second fall of man." "That a vast change is imminent" they indeed readily admit; but it is a change, they say, that "does not touch virtue, nor any of the great emotions that are at present connected with it." There is, they assure us, to be no lowering of life; our highest hopes and pleasures and all our profoundest consolations are to still remain to us; and "so long as man is man," says Miss Bevington, "virtue as *virtue* will never cease to be admirable."

The author of *Is Life Worth Living?* answers them in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century*, entitled "Atheistic Methodism." His main object is to oblige them to admit that they must become strict rationalistic theists if they intend to establish a real foun-

dation for the practice of true virtue. In point of fact, all he wishes of them is that they should belong to the school of Mr. Lecky. Our purpose here is very different. Since they babble about Christianity also, and often find it below their aim, preferring their own morality, we must discuss briefly the question, What kind of *holiness* will be theirs in case they succeed in spreading their poison all over the world, and whether the claim of Christianity has anything to fear from their pretensions? And we must here say incidentally that we do not share in the excessive fears of Mr. Mallock. They will, no doubt, if they progress, do a great deal of mischief in the moral world. We do not think, however, that it will ever amount to a "second fall of man," for reasons which it is not necessary to develop here. But every sane man must acknowledge that their system is far less sure to leave virtue intact among men than that of the "intuitive philosophers." These, at least, admit the existence of God, and believe in a kind of hereafter. Simple good sense tells us that morality is much more effectually promoted by their belief than by its denial. But we have shown already the superiority of the Christian morality over that of intuitive philosophers.

The infatuation of positivists in rejecting both these beliefs, and at the same time in maintaining that in case this disbelief became universal, still, "so long as man is man, virtue as *virtue* will never cease to be admirable," is truly surprising and most illogical. For the last supposition, namely, that as long as man is man virtue must continue to be admirable, has no sense unless it is admitted that the principles of virtue are innate in our heart, that the voice of conscience is unerring, and right always distinguishable from wrong. How can this be unless there is a superior and infinite mind, whose truth and righteousness is the model of ours, and from whom is derived the life that is in us? Outside of Christianity even, all the truly great philosophers of antiquity, who from their own inward consciousness, not to refer to the voice of tradition, believed in the absolute distinction between right and wrong, were also firm believers in the existence of God, our Maker and Creator. The first part of this doctrine, in their judgment, carried with it the second. As soon as they recognized that there is an infallible moral law written in the heart of all men, they concluded that it came from God, the source of all justice and right; and in this last belief they found the great sanction of the first.

The positivists, on the contrary, recognize the inner law, but reject the only cause to which it can be ascribed. Thus they are illogical, as has been said already, and on this account they can even be justly called slaves of prejudice. As positivists, they reject revelation, alleging that because revealed facts are supernatural, they are, therefore, unknowable, and cannot become the basis of a scientific

system. These facts are believed by Christians, they say, merely through prejudice and education. A serious examination, they assert, reveals the weakness of Christian belief and destroys its foundation.

The same reasoning is strictly applicable to the innate sense of virtue. We defy them to show the reason for it, if God's existence is not first admitted. This innate sense of virtue belongs to the supersensual, if not to the supernatural order; and for positivists both are identical, since positivism does not admit anything above sense. It must, therefore, in their eyes, be only the offspring of education, of the common-sense of mankind, entirely misled and unreasonable in this case. It is, therefore, a pure prejudice; and they are the slaves of prejudice when they consent to be ruled by it. The French philosophers of last century were more consistent and more logical. They rejected with scorn the law of morality, as well as the dogmas of revelation; both were for them *de simples préjugés*. Most of them openly showed their contempt for both by living in adultery with the wives of others, often with those of their friends and fellow-philosophers.

We confess, however, that we prefer the inconsistency of modern positivists to the strict logic of the old French materialists. Still it is absurd on their part; and we contend that it cannot last, nor spread among the mass of their followers. At this moment they are trying their best to popularize their doctrine, and to inoculate with it the lowest ranks of society. In France, even, it is chiefly among these last that these pernicious notions prevail; and, thank God! the intellectual classes are with a few exceptions decidedly opposed to the new theories. And in that unfortunate country it is the immoral consequences of the new doctrine, and not its principles, that form the chief incentive that brings the uneducated into its ranks. And every one knows how far the people in many large French cities are demoralized through unbelief. In England it would be still worse if the social drags, of London for instance, had simply an inkling of what the "leaders of thought" in Great Britain are about. It is the good fortune of the nation (we may say) that the lower classes are too degraded even to imbibe this poison. Let them be prepared for it by popular lessons, such as are given in French secret societies of the lowest kind, and the catastrophe predicted by Mr. Mallock, as the "second fall of man," might soon astonish mankind, even in England.

Meanwhile the effect produced by these doctrines on the men who are able to understand the lofty speculations of Mr. Herbert Spencer in his *Data of Ethics*, of Mr. Huxley, and many others in their Lectures, is sufficient to prove their deleterious nature. This is admirably described by the author of *Is Life Worth Living?* in

his eighth chapter, entitled "The Practical Prospect." The "moral dejection" therein analyzed is shown to be shared even by the leaders of the party. At the end of the chapter he quotes "one English writer on the positive side who has clearly seen what the movement really means, whose continuance and whose consummation he declares to us to be a necessity." Here are the words of the English writer quoted by Mr. Mallock :

"Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now behold, advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, ingulfing our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation."

A fine prospect, indeed, whilst it is pretended that in positivism virtue as *virtue* is as admirable as ever! The boast of Mr. Tyndall, referred to above, does not seem to be universal among positivists. It is well known that J. S. Mill, one of the greatest among them, lived most sadly, and almost died of despair.

It would seem useless after this to discuss the pretension that the morality of the Catholic Church is inferior to that of these new professors of ethics. But the quotation just given from Mr. Mallock gives rise to some serious considerations, with which we will conclude.

The heartfelt feeling expressed by that "English writer"—when he said that a frightful calamity was "advancing like a deluge, . . . uprooting our most cherished hopes, ingulfing our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation"—referred simply to Protestantism. The writer was appalled by the mere juxtaposition of what would be the destiny of man on earth under the new dispensation prepared by positivism, and of its destructive effects upon those whose happy lot it was to possess the Anglican belief. He thought only of Protestant hopes, of the Protestant creed, and of Protestant life.

We have endeavored to show how inferior is Protestant morality compared with that of the Catholic Church, and consequently how superior to those of Protestantism are our hopes, creed, and life. Of these an imperfect description has been given in this paper. From it the true character of Catholic sanctity may be discerned, though it has not been brought fully to view. A volume would be required to do that, and the writer may say incidentally that the book is written, and may soon be published. But, from the few details here given, it may be concluded that the loss, if positivism should prevail, would be far greater for the Catholic than for the Anglican. Our holy religion, both in its supernatural character and in its exterior organization, is highly promotive of the most exalted sanctity. It has been proved that the character of holiness belongs to

it alone, and that *saints*, in the proper meaning of the term, cannot be found among Protestants. This is the necessary result of the elimination of Christian dogmas of which Protestantism is guilty; and in doing this it has reduced to a minimum quantity the supernatural element, of which its writers scarcely dare to speak. But the Catholic organization promotes the spread of holiness in a most wonderful manner. Its hierarchy, its monastic orders, its sacramental system, all unite in taking hold of man from his cradle to his grave; and nothing on earth is so powerful as they to mould the human being to the pattern of true sanctity. The history of the Church proves this beyond all doubt; and the more the truth becomes known through an enlightened criticism, the wider and deeper the influence of the Catholic Church is seen to have been in benefiting mankind, particularly as regards morality. Of all this we would be deprived should the doctrine of the new theorists become rooted in the public mind.

This becomes particularly perceptible when attention is paid to two circumstances which must necessarily be closely examined when there is question of virtue. These are the struggle and the reward:

First, therefore, the practice of virtue necessitates a struggle. The positivists recognize this, and often speak of it in terms of high consideration. It is evident that some of them, at least, have found in their experience how hard it is even occasionally to continue virtuous. They assert, however, that they can succeed; and it is astonishing how in England all join in acknowledging the moral uprightness of this school. But it is remarkable that the virtue they claim consists in self-sacrifice to others, an exterior thing, and not in the interior struggle for self-improvement, which is the primary foundation of virtue. This idea is graphically described by Mr. Mallock in his *Atheistic Methodism* in the following words:

"Bill and James are two tourists, whose keenest personal pleasure is in cutting their own names on the roofs of public buildings. They take a long and toilsome walk, that they may perform this feat on the highest pinnacle of a certain cathedral tower. Having climbed at last, however, to the lofty scene of action, they find, to their horror, that they have only two minutes to spare, that the leads of the coveted pinnacle are some distance out of reach, and that if either is to cut his name at all it can only be one of them raised on the other's shoulders. There is, for a moment, a struggle in the minds of both. Then Bill's will triumphs, and lifting James up, who cuts his name in rapture, Bill's only pleasure, the only reward of his walk, is such of James's pleasure as, received by himself vicariously, is in excess of the pain consequent on his own self-denial."

We have here the whole theory of struggle and reward in the positivist's ethics. The struggle is carried on through *self-sacrifice for another* in which the will triumphs; and the reward is a pleasurable share in the other's gratification over the pain consequent

on his own self-denial. According to their view, therefore, the only kind of virtue which is of any value, namely, that which refers to others, ends in selfishness; still it is such kind of selfishness that the majority of mankind, if imbued with the positivist's notions, would never consent to, but would much prefer to it the merely animal gratification advocated by the former French "philosophers." Any one acquainted with human nature must acknowledge that the righteousness preached by the positivist cannot kindle in the will the enthusiasm required for carrying on successfully the struggle, such as it is. It is absurd to base virtue on such a struggle as this.

But, besides this vicarious virtue, as it is called, namely, that which looks to and is derived from others, there is the real fundamental virtue which regards only man's improvement, and constitutes sanctity in man, because it purifies the soul and prepares it for acts of exterior benevolence, carried on as far as self-sacrifice. Mr. Mallock expresses it very felicitously when he says in *Atheistic Methodism* :

"Virtue includes not only the subjugation of our own pleasures as warring against others' happiness, but the subjugation of our own lower pleasures as warring against our own holiness. And *logically*, in our conception of virtue, it is this last-named part of it which is the first. My desire for holiness must first make my life precious to me before I can attach much preciousness to the lives of other people. Thus the meaning of the word virtue is at once immeasurably widened, and its present popular use is explained naturally. I will but quote one instance, and that shall be the commonest and the most significant,—the popular identification of virtue with sexual continence. What is implied here is not that chastity is a virtue because externally it is of social use to others, but because internally it prepares self for God, because it is a part of that same debt to Him, of which subserving the welfare of others is another part, and a part logically subordinate."

It is to be remarked that the positivists do not condescend to speak of this branch of virtue.

How after this can the ethical system of positivism be compared with the Catholic. Both in the struggle and in the reward the Church offers to her children all the means of acquiring virtue of every kind, and all the incentives to its practice. They are taught that the first and greatest object of their lives is to purify themselves interiorly, to sanctify themselves and become holy in the all-searching eyes of God. They are prepared for the exterior struggle by this interior one; and they can rise to the highest degree of self-sacrifice when they have first subdued their passions, and established peace inwardly by rendering their senses obedient to reason. The reward comes directly after. In this life they know that they please God and do His will, which is a sufficient guerdon for the man of faith; and they see besides the immense and eternal reward which is prepared for them in the possession of God forever.

A long history of nearly nineteen hundred years has sufficiently established the claims of the Church over those of all other systems as regards morality. A few years more will put an end to the boasts of positivism, as has indeed been predicted both by impartial observers and even by some positivists themselves. Could we have taken up and shown the system of positivism as a whole, its delusive character and pernicious effects would be still more obvious, but we were compelled to restrict our discussion to an exhibition of its natural effects only on the morals of mankind, and even this has been compressed into too narrow limits to be as satisfactory as the writer could have wished.

PHYSIOLOGY AND MODERN MATERIALISM.

The Physiology of Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

WITHIN a few years a so-called science, having appropriated the pretentious title of physiological psychology, has flaunted itself before men's eyes and courted the consideration of the scientific world on the ground that having rejected the figments and unrealities of the past, it has entered on the true pathway leading up to the knowledge of all mental phenomena, by studying what it delights to call the objective side, only, of mind. That this should be the result of the rapid growth of physiology in the course of the last half century is nothing more than what the history of philosophy prepared us to expect. The tendency of the mind, owing to its limited vision and inherent imperfection, is to overdo whatever it eagerly sets about doing, and men having brought to light magnificent truths under the stimulus which urged them to the prosecution of physical research, imagine they have discovered the highway which leads to the goal of all truth. The close interdependence of psychical and physical conditions rendered it impossible to study the latter without taking note of the former; and though the converse impossibility is not so obvious, it nevertheless exists, and those systems of psychology which are based on the substantial character of the thinking principle are sadly marred and one-sided in consequence of having disregarded it. The psychology which flourished in the seventeenth century would be puzzled to reconcile its leading positions with the facts

which modern physiology has established, and though its theorems are correct, it would find that its proofs do not cover the entire ground of discussion. The great law of compensation proves that there can be no display of energy in organized life without a corresponding loss, and that the cerebral activity which accompanies thought is as constantly attended with waste of nerve-tissue as muscular action is by detritus of muscle-fibre. We fear the psychologists of former times would have been inclined to regard the statement as bordering on materialism simply because they had not learned to observe and appreciate the close tie which binds mind to matter, and consequently in their anxiety to preserve intact the spiritual character of the former, preferred to overlook the latter as a factor in the premises. The very systems they invented in explanation of the manner in which mind acts upon matter, and *vice versa*, are proof of the reluctance with which many eminent philosophers of two centuries ago admitted that there is a close and binding union between the two. How absurd would appear to-day, in the light which physiology has shed upon the question, the utterly gratuitous theory of a *plastic mediator* acting as a go-between for soul and body. Even so discerning a man as Malebranche was betrayed into another ridiculous and no less uncalled-for explanation of the difficulty, when he broached his system of *occasional causes*, in which a constant *Deus intersit* is required to maintain equilibrium between both principles. Nor did even Leibnitz escape the superstitious dread of allowing matter to come into too close proximity with spirit, and so invented a most cumbersome and unphilosophical plan for avoiding the difficulty. He called it the system of pre-established harmony, according to which God has so arranged both substances that without any immediate interchange of action the course of the one should correspond with that of the other. The scholastics, who admitted the physical action of one substance on the other, seemed not to fear the issue; and, though they might have learned much from modern physiology, they virtually stated the question as the most advanced physiologist who adheres to fact, would be compelled to formulate it to-day.

The personality of man supposes the most intimate union between soul and body,—a *hypostatic* union,—and modern science has corroborated its existence. Every mental change implies a change in nerve-fibre, and even the quality of the mental change determines the character of the change in the nerve, just as a high note sets in vibration one portion of a cornet-a-piston, and a lower one a different portion. This fact points to the doctrine of the localization of function, towards which, indeed, the whole weight of psychological teaching tends. And this is a conclusion for which the nature of the

soul should prepare us. The soul is a simple substance devoid of extension and possessed only of an ideal or logical divisibility, and consequently is capable *per se* of many simultaneous actions specifically different. It is only matter that by reason of its inertia is capable of one act, or series of cognate acts at a time, and this condition it imposes on spiritual substance by being closely united with it, a condition which is fixed and expressed in the law of localized function. Even the general economy of nature seems to require this, since everywhere we find difference of function closely interwoven with difference of organism. The eye is adapted for seeing as the ear is for hearing, and who can deny that the specific function of the one organ as well as of the other, is the necessary outcome of the structural arrangement of each?

The recently discovered phenomena of aphasia will enable us better to understand how physiology bears out the old scholastic doctrine of direct physical influence of mind on matter. In the year 1863 M. G. Dax, in France, presented to the Academy a paper, in which he stated that aphasia coexisted with paralysis of the left cerebral hemisphere in no less than forty cases which had fallen under his observation. A most interesting case was reported in the *Gazette des Hôpitaux* about the same period, which seems to point conclusively to the left cerebral hemisphere as the seat of this special trouble. A child, having been kicked by a horse, sustained a fracture of the left frontal bone; trephining was performed at a point about an inch and a quarter above the left eye, and the operator was astonished on observing that whenever pressure was made upon the subjacent brain-substance all memory of language was lost, as also, on lighter pressure, the power to co-ordinate words into intelligible speech. The inference deducible from these experiments and observations is that the linguistic faculty depends on the complete organization of a certain portion of the brain, with the destruction of which it is extinguished; for when the cord has lost its vibrating power it will give forth no musical sound, snap it as we may.

The latest researches in this country, England, and France have confirmed those earlier ones, so that now the doctrine of localized linguistic function is almost universally accepted. Generalizing and summing up the achievements of modern physiology we may say that it has specialized, reduced, and experimentally demonstrated the old Aristotelian doctrine that matter is acted upon directly by spirit. The scholastics merely held that all the facts lend themselves to this view, and that there is nothing contradictory in the supposition, while modern science has left it beyond a peradventure. The minutest portion of cerebral matter responds with alacrity to the slightest mental change, in such a manner that

there can be little doubt that mind influences material conditions far beyond any point dreamt of by early physiology, and that mind is modified by its dependence on matter to a greater extent than the psychologists of a hundred years ago suspected. The microscope and the galvanometer have greatly aided the physiologist in his investigations, and no student of nature can call in question the revelations of either. We know now from the data of both that each separate nerve-cell undergoes a change in proportion to the character and degree of mental energy exerted, so that if the means were available for determining with reasonable continuousness the relation between structural nerve change and mental function, we might *a priori* infer the character of the latter from any given static condition of the former. We will commit ourselves even to the assertion that as a consequence of the exceeding intimacy between soul and body in the hypostatic union of both every mental change is accompanied by a physical or cerebral change determined by the quality of the mental act. Thus we hold that the doctrine of localized mental function, with all that it legitimately implies, may be admitted by the most orthodox without the least forfeiture of his convictions that the human soul is a distinct and separate substance from the body. Though we confess that much of what physiology claims as demonstrated needs additional confirmation, we see nought in what it aspires to as its possible realization which could debar the claims of the soul as a distinct entity. Yet it is the boast of not a few physiologists, not only that the old-fashioned doctrine of psychology is glad enough to pick up a few crumbs from the remnants of the sumptuous banquet of modern science, but that these are poison to it, that psychology is no longer a science, that man is to be henceforth measured in his totality by the square and compass of a science that proceeds by none other than physical and chemico-physical expedients, and that the supposition even that there is a human soul, spiritual, entitive, and capable of enjoying an existence independent of the body, is adverse to the conclusions of classified science. Comte and Mill have decided that there is no room for a soul in the hierarchy of science, Huxley and Spencer have indorsed them, and many other modern physiologists come forward armed *cap à pied* ready to shiver a lance against the doctrine of a spiritual soul.

These reflections have been suggested by the tone and tendency of modern physiological teaching, which considers that it accomplishes the purposes of its mission by fastening a fang in its elder sister psychology.

Unfortunately men whose names are identified with beautiful and interesting discoveries in physiological science, have lent the potency and magic of those names to the unscientific assumptions

of materialism. The consequence is that in England, Germany, France, and America a horde of scribblers have sprung up who give echo to the sound of their leaders, and who sadly and seriously disturb the convictions of many well-intentioned persons, who have time to read but no disposition to think.

These men cast over their crude productions a scientific glamour so apt to captivate the eye of the dabbler in science, and by an adroit misapplication of facts they mislead the unwary reader, who finds it easier to absorb than to digest.

Yet it is no difficult matter to prove that the wisest even among the masters of them are very tyros in the art of reasoning, once they venture forth from what Carlyle would call the mud-volcano where they habitually dwell, and where by dint of sputter, and flinging of scoria, and raising up clouds of ashes, they so bewilder and daze the ordinary observer that he is glad to see things as they would have him see them.

Let the proof of this statement be taken from the opening chapter of Dr. Maudsley's much-extolled treatise on the *Physiology of Mind*. Dr. Maudsley, before launching into the body of his subject, devotes a few pages to general biological considerations; but, instead of offering anything new to his readers, treats them to a *rechauffé* of the views of that brilliant but erratic genius, J. J. Rousseau.

He says (proof of his assertion he does not deign to furnish) that man was originally an untutored savage, who worshipped the powers of nature in the agony of his dread, and attributed to them the quality of personality. Thus he says when a pestilence devastated the army of the king of Assyria, the ignorant populace believed that it was an angel of the Lord who smote them, just as the Greeks believed that their army had been decimated by the angry god of the silver bow. A little reflection taught men that priests and prayers were unavailing, and the first step in the biological evolution of the race was the substitution of inquiry for blind belief. To this inquiry the hardy children of the North were compelled by the unwillingness of nature to unlock her treasures except to unremitting toil. The people of more favored climes still retained their superstitious regard for the great phenomena of the physical world, and hence, according to Dr. Maudsley, all religions had their origin in sub-tropical climates, as witness the myths of Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mahomet. It is in this fashion that Maudsley expounds his views of the progress of the human race from its cradle up to its present proud position, in which "nature is undergoing her latest and most consummate development in man."

Dr. Maudsley, repeatedly and with scorn, repels the suspicion

that he would admit as truth any statement which does not rest on a basis of positive fact. He contends that the failure of past systems of philosophy, and notably that the errors of psychology, have been the result of an overweening love of unsupported speculation, the substitution of fancy for fact, and a neglect of the iron logic of the inductive method. In view of such pretences it surely must strike even his most superficial reader with wonder that he should thus write page after page, stringing together, in sentences of strong rhetorical glow, statements entirely unsustained by proof, and which every one acquainted with the history of philosophy and civilization must condemn as not only false but absurd. The history of the human family is thickset with evidences that the first historical man possessed an intelligence from which subsequent types were a sad deterioration; and that fluctuation, and not steady progress, has been the experience of nations. But evolution on a large scale is necessary for the successful issue of Maudsley's theory of mind; and whether it comes clothed with proof or not, it seemingly makes no difference to him. The error which, in the process of evolution, operated most injuriously against the development of mental science is what he vaguely calls metaphysics,—the error of metaphysics. He constantly employs this term, and yet never once attempts to tell what he means by it. That metaphysics are a bugbear and a grand delusion, an antiquated and exploded scheme, long ago devised to enslave men's minds; to make them run amuck of truth at every step and land them on the barren shore of unmeaning wordiness, is the impression his references tend to make on the mind of the half-read medical student into whose hands his book is apt to fall.

But surely it must make the wise entertain serious fears for the future of knowledge when a recognized leader of a fashionable school of thought thus flings contumely on a science which lies at the basis of all natural knowledge, and which furnishes to every branch of physical science the only safe and unquestioned basis upon which it can rest. His language touching the value of metaphysics is sadly significant. He writes:

"Two facts come out very distinctly from a candid observation of the state of thought at the present day. One of these is the little favor in which metaphysics is held, and the very general conviction that there is no profit in it. The consequence of which firmly fixed belief is that it is cultivated as a science only by those whose particular business it is to do so; who are engaged, not in action, but in speculating in professional chairs, or in other positions where there is little occasion for hard observation and much leisure for introspective contemplation; or if by any others, by the ambitious youth who goes through an attack of metaphysics as a child goes through an attack of measles, getting haply an immunity from a similar affection for the rest of his life; or, lastly, by the active and ingenious intellects of those metaphysical philosophers who, never having been trained in the methods and work of a scientific study of nature, have not submitted their understandings to facts, but live in a more or less ideal world of thought."

Such is the arraignment Dr. Maudsley makes of a science which numbers among its lights Aristotle, Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Anselm, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and Kant. If the labors of these men have added nought to the sum of human knowledge; nay, if, on the contrary, they have succeeded in retarding its progress, then surely the opinion of the world is all awry, and men must kneel at the feet of a later Gamaliel to be instructed in the elements of truth. But Dr. Maudsley is at least consistent in his condemnation of the study of metaphysics, since his own system of scientific belief runs directly counter to its principles. It is an array of facts, interesting indeed, and presented with all the attractiveness of an animated and dignified style, but into which there enters not a scintilla of sound reasoning. Indeed, the moment he assumes the guise of a reasoner he becomes an object of pity; for, having no sure ground to stand upon, he flounders in a quagmire, and the sweat of hard, unrequited toil alone moistens his brow.

"Labor ille carens rectore fluit."—QUINTILIAN.

Though a more abiding interest might perhaps be lent to this article by a general survey of the field of modern physiology, and readers might be thus placed in possession of the peculiar views of a greater number of individual writers, still the similarity which characterizes the majority of their speculations, and their entire agreement in combating the conclusions of psychology, have led us to single out one of the number for consideration, since that one reflects all. Spencer, Draper, and even Helmholtz, though all outspoken enough in their opposition to the doctrine of a spiritual soul, are timorous and halting when compared with Maudsley. He has the full courage of his opinions, and has entered the lists against the psychologists with the ardor and enthusiasm of a *preux chevalier*. Professor Huxley is rather opposed to systematic materialism since, in his words, "it tends to paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life;" but Dr. Maudsley boldly asserts that a psychical substance is a myth, the figment of an undeveloped brain, the remnant of an age of superstition. And not only that, but he is strongly aggressive, and systematically attacks where others merely hint opposition. For these reasons we will mainly confine our remarks to him, and so estimate the worth of the materialism which claims to be nothing if not scientific.

Dr. Maudsley considers biography as one of the most helpful adjuncts to the labors of the psychical physiologist; and it is curious, as well as instructive, to note how adroitly he accredits it with such helpfulness by assuming it capable of playing a part that it

can play only on the supposition that his theory of biological evolution is correct. He says :

"Biography regards men as concrete beings; takes note, if it does its work properly, of their ancestral antecedents; acknowledges the differences between them in characters and capabilities; recognizes the helpful or baneful influences of surroundings, and patiently unfolds the texture of life as the inevitable result of the elements out of which and the conditions under which it has been worked."

All this obviously assumes what is legitimately a part of Dr. Maudsley's thesis to prove. Does he not palpably take for granted that biography is competent to accomplish what he states to be its function? and does not the accomplishment of such function set at rest all discussion concerning the freedom of the human will and the intervention of Divine Providence in the affairs of men?

Thus does neglect of the rules of logic betray men into absurdities, which, however, are not necessarily discovered at a glance; for it is a part of the new school to glaze over with confident manner and the arrogation of superior knowledge that which the humbler truth-seeker more frankly acknowledges to be an open question. But, in order that our readers may not suspect us of making unfavorable comments concerning Dr. Maudsley's candor and consistency on too slender grounds, we will exhibit a specimen or two more of his manner of dealing with controvertible matter even at the risk of tarrying too long *in limine*. He says (p. 14):

"The metaphysician has dealt with man as an abstract or ideal being, having taken no account of concrete man; has postulated him as a certain constant quantity, and thereupon confidently enunciated empty propositions."

Is not this empty rhetoric? What metaphysician, even of the most wildly speculative sort, ever yet professed or admitted that he meant to deal with man as an abstract or ideal being? It is true the science of metaphysics proceeds by way of abstraction, in which way alone we may hope to come into the possession of the truth; but making abstractions, and regarding man as an abstract being, are totally opposite things. "It surely argues," continues Dr. Maudsley, "no little conceit in any one to believe that what Plato and Descartes have not done, he, following the same method, will do."

Now, every one, howsoever little versed in the science of metaphysics, is well aware that it is the bewildering extent of the field of speculation which it offers and the unending multiplicity of the relations which hold together the terms of its problems that have stood in the way of its rapid growth; and that, were the number of minds engaged in its study multiplied *ad infinitum*, there would be always left something to discover and furnish food for additional reflection.

So much for the extent of the subject-matter over which the mind of the metaphysician ranges. Now, as regards the method he employs, nature has taken care of that ; for, since our cognitive faculties are naturally adapted to the pursuit of truth, they naturally select that method which is best suited for unearthing the separate orders of truth. To employ the argument of retort, we might say, such distinguished physiologists as Claude Bernard, Bichat, Kolliker, and the famous physiologists of England and America have, in following out their peculiar methods, produced only such results as we are acquainted with ; how, then, can Dr. Maudsley, or any other individual, hope to surpass them? The shallowness of the reasoning is patent. But the method which Plato and Descartes employed is, according to Dr. Maudsley, eminently and radically defective. That method is the interrogation of self-consciousness ; and it is its inadequacy that Dr. Maudsley impugns. Here, again, is Dr. Maudsley sadly unsatisfactory, for he fails to inform us what he understands by self-consciousness. He speaks, indeed, of direct consciousness as distinct from what he calls *transcendental* ; but he fails to define the former, and he says he does not know what the latter means. Scientific terms need to be employed with the utmost accuracy and precision, and especially such a term as consciousness, concerning which so much has been said and written, and which many modern writers are guilty of using in vague and conflicting senses. Before, therefore, discussing the views held by Dr. Maudsley concerning the value of consciousness, it may be well to set forth the meaning of the word as employed by those philosophers whom Dr. Maudsley assails for overestimating the extent of its credibility.

Self-consciousness is the ability of the normal mind to attend to what is taking place within it, so that it is thereby made sure of the reality of the occurrences to which that consciousness testifies, and likewise sure that itself is the subject and principle of them. Consciousness is not, therefore, the condition of the mind itself, but the sense of that condition, no matter to what cause this latter may be due. A delusion may, consequently, be attested by consciousness ; but consciousness does not prove the delusion. Let us take an example from any standard work on diseases of the nervous system. An overwrought brain is the fertile source of a hallucination of the senses, when it is difficult for the person affected to determine whether the mental impression is the result of a centric change in the brain or caused by the action of an external object. The doubt hinges on the cause of the impression, and not on the fact thereof ; for, whether it proceed from a centric origin or an external object, he is equally conscious, and consequently certain of its existence. Let now the person in doubt

as to the source of his impression employ the proper test for determining that source, and doubt on this point will vanish, while consciousness remains the same, + the consciousness of certainty as to the cause. Thus a person in doubt as to the source of a visual impression presses his closed eyes with gentle but prolonged force, and, on opening them, either has the impression duplicated for a moment, or finds it just the same as at first. In the latter case he concludes he has been the victim of an hallucination, the cause of which is centric, while in the former case he is convinced that it has an external origin. Had Macbeth, when he so plainly saw the dagger before him, with its handle towards his hand, tried this experiment, he would have been convinced of the unreality of the apparition, and believed, with good reason, that it was

"A dagger of the mind; a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain;"

that it was, indeed, the bloody business which informed thus to his eyes.

It is evident that consciousness has nothing to do with determining the cause of the mental condition in these cases. Should, however, a person believe that an *hallucination* is not of centric origin, but that it is an impression produced by an external object, he becomes the victim of a *delusion*, and his consciousness as to his mental state remains the same, + a consciousness of the belief that what is of centric origin has an external cause. These examples remove all doubt as to the functions and province of consciousness, and will enable us to appreciate Dr. Maudsley's attempts to belittle its reliability as a motive of certainty. The school of philosophers to which Dr. Maudsley belongs destroys the true notion of consciousness by losing sight of its subject self; or rather by confounding consciousness with self-consciousness attests self, but is not self; it is an act of the mind, by which it knows itself as affected in a certain manner; but it can by no means be called the mind, for there are conditions of the mind where consciousness does not exist. It is evident from this that Professor Huxley is wrong when he says that self is a "series of states of consciousness," for every one is conscious to himself of self as the abiding subject of changing conscious states, and not of self as "state." This point Mr. Mivart dwells upon at length in his opening chapter of *Lessons from Nature*, where he makes it clear that Huxley, Mill, and Lewes are all radically mistaken in their conception of this fundamental fact of philosophy.

Another error of which Dr. Maudsley is guilty is his neglect to distinguish *reflex* from *direct* consciousness. The majority of men pass their lives without making one reflex act of consciousness, and

yet it surely would not be correct to say that they pass their lives unconsciously. Reflex consciousness is a conscious introspective act, by which the mind adverts to its actual condition, and affirms to itself categorically that it is affected in a particular manner. Direct consciousness is that condition of the mind wherein, though not particularly adverting to the fact, it is aware of what is taking place within it. Let a person be plunged in ever so deep a revery, *totus in illis*, so that he can be said not to be at all thinking of what he is thinking about, that person is, nevertheless, entirely conscious of his thoughts; for, let him be asked of what he is thinking, and he will answer immediately and without hesitation, which could not be the case were he not conscious all along. Reflex consciousness is a philosophical act, for introspection alone does not constitute it. The person reflexly conscious must be conscious of the introspective character of his introspection; or, in other words, he must have the idea of the act of reflex consciousness before he can perform it.

These distinctions Dr. Maudsley has failed to note, and his conclusions are accordingly faulty. Thus he says:

“To direct consciousness inwardly to the observation of a particular state of mind is to isolate that activity for the time, to cut it off from its relations, and therefore to render it unnatural.”

He here supposes an extreme case of reflex consciousness, wherein the mind is occupied with itself as purely a conscious agent, and not with thoughts that have no reference to consciousness. Reflex consciousness of this sort is not necessary for the observation of internal facts; vivid direct consciousness is sufficient, viz., that consciousness with which every man in his moments of actual intellectual life is aware of what he is thinking. Isolating mental activity, cutting it from its relations, means nothing, for we either are conscious of what we are thinking of, and so the mind is capable at once of the twofold act of thinking of a problem in mathematics and knowing that it is thinking thereof, or there is no such thing as consciousness, and the ordinary speech of men is absurd. Dr. Maudsley's reasoning is the same as that of Comte, who calls psychology the last phase of theology, and condemns it for the reason just alleged. Comte says:

“In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity, yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it there is nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity.”

This is the veriest sort of quibbling. A machine cannot winnow and thresh at the same time unless constructed for the twofold

purpose, but even so clumsy a thing as a piece of mechanism made by human hands may carry on a variety of operations at once, and why not the human mind, that most delicate and complex organization, "infinite in faculties," and restless in activity? The statue of Condillac, in its first stage of sentient life, would be more perfect than the man of Maudsley and Comte, who would be incapable of observing what takes place in his mind when in a state of wide-awake thought. *A priori* reasoning is perilous in the inductive sciences, but when it is employed in the face of overwhelming facts it ought not even to be dignified with the name.

The next objection which he urges against the value of consciousness as a means of psychological research is that few can employ it satisfactorily. May not the same be said of the microscope, the ophthalmoscope, the galvanometer, or the cephalohæmometer? Indeed this objection is so unworthy of a scientific man that Dr. Maudsley himself is half ashamed of bringing it forward, and he must indeed be reduced to desperate straits when he bolsters up his position with arguments which wear but the "trap-pings and suits" of reason? The following objection carries scarcely more weight. He says:

"There is no agreement between those who have acquired the power of introspection; and men of apparently equal cultivation and capacity will, with the utmost sincerity and confidence, lay down inconsistent or directly contradictory propositions. It is not possible to convince either opponent of error, as it might be in a matter of objective science, because he appeals to a witness whose evidence can be taken by no one but himself, and whose veracity, therefore, cannot be tested."

Every word almost in this remarkable sentence betrays ignorance and confusion of thought. No two men who have "acquired the power of introspection," or are at all aware of the functions of consciousness, can lay down "inconsistent or contrary propositions" as the result of the deliverances of consciousness. That they may be conscious of different mental conditions produced under similar circumstances we will allow, but in order to determine whether those conditions are or are not the result of alleged causes consciousness cannot be invoked. Its function is limited to the testimony which it gives concerning a passing mental state, and to push it any further were to impose obligations on it which it is not competent to fulfil. Dr. Maudsley rightly observes that in consciousness "the observed and the observer are one;" but when he adds that "the observer is not likely in such case to be unbiassed by the feelings of the observed," he states what is unmistakably incorrect. If the observed and the observer are one and the same, how can there be collusion between them? And besides, how can the observed have feelings distinct from those of the observer? Are they not both one? And is not consciousness the pure testi-

mony of the mind to itself of the feelings it may have, a testimony which is the result and effect of those feelings, and which consequently could not exist did not the cause which gave rise to it also exist? The consciousness of feelings and mental states is, therefore, the best proof of their existence, since it stands in the relation of cause to effect. There can, therefore, be no difference between cultivated men or ignorant men when it is a question of the feelings or ideas attested by consciousness; it is the intervening judgment which creates the difficulty when it pronounces concerning the origin of those feelings and the truths they are competent to establish.

A false principle becomes a very Pandora's box of errors when logically pursued, and we must do Dr. Maudsley the justice of saying that having set out with an erroneous conception of the nature and function of consciousness, he does not hesitate to draw consistent conclusions. We have already remarked that a delusion is the fixed belief that a mental condition connected with morbid changes in the brain is the product of external agencies. The madman is conscious both of the impression that he is made of glass and liable to be broken by a slight concussion, and equally conscious of his firm belief that such impression represents a fact. That he is mistaken in his belief is not the fault of his consciousness, but of some organic change in the brain which has unfitted it for the purposes of the mind. And yet in view of such obvious differences Dr. Maudsley confounds consciousness with the mental state which it reveals, and does not hesitate to say that as the madman is the victim of a delusion, so also may the philosopher be. In order to confirm his view he brings forward the corrective influence of the thermometer as against what he calls "the subjective and deceptive feelings of heat and cold" experienced by the individual. He pits the observation and judgment of mankind against self-consciousness as he does the thermometer against our "subjective and deceptive feelings of heat and cold." Now we will grant that the relation is precisely similar in the two given cases, but neither implies opposition. The observation and judgment of mankind help us to the apprehension of a class of truths with which consciousness has nothing to do, and so, likewise, the thermometer is designed to measure degrees of heat, and by no means to determine our sensation. The fact that a man knows the thermometer to mark 80° will have no effect in abating the severity of a chill, neither will the combined judgment and observation of mankind alter one whit the consciousness of any individual:

Pergis pugnantia secum
Frontibus adversis componere.

Passing from the consideration of the insufficiency of self-consciousness to shed light on the data of the mind, Dr. Maudsley questions its ability to furnish any information whatever in a large class of cases wherein its testimony is invoked. Let us consider for a moment the steps by which he would lead us to this conclusion. Dr. Maudsley professes himself an ardent admirer of the inductive method, and with good reason, for though we do not consider it, any more than other methods which natural logic favors, the product of modern times, we confess that modern men of science have applied it to more purpose and with better results than their predecessors; but Dr. Maudsley mistakes the nature of induction when he endeavors to apply it in his peculiar way. His language is:

"It is the fundamental maxim of inductive philosophy that observation should begin with simple instances, ascent being made from them step by step through appropriate generalizations, and that no particulars should be neglected. How does the interrogation of self-consciousness fulfil this demand? It is a method which is applicable to mind at a high degree of development, so that it perforce begins with those most complex instances which give the last certain information; while it passes by mind in its lower stages of development, ignoring those simpler instances which give the best or securest information."

The inductive method does not necessarily impose on us the task of beginning with *simple* instances, for this cannot always be done, but it does compel us to begin with *single* instances, and to multiply them till reasonable grounds exist for a generalization. Let the single instances be as simple or complex as possible, all the inductive method requires is that we study them under all possible circumstances, and view their relations and environments as far and as often as possible before attempting to draw general conclusions or to formulate general laws. The ordinary rules of logic require us to proceed from the simple to the compound, from a consideration of the part to a consideration of the whole, when this process is possible. It is the synthetic method. But this method is rarely possible in the investigation of nature. We are confronted with complex phenomena, and these it is our business to analyze. Therefore it is that the analytical method is better adapted for physical research. When the chemist began his labors he found himself surrounded by complex organisms, and it was from these that he obtained his first knowledge of the laws of chemistry. *A pari*, the psychologist finds himself face to face with mind in its most complex, because most highly cultivated state; is he, therefore, not to explore it because it is not simple? As well inform the chemist that his science is all wrong because he did not begin with the consideration of hydrogen and oxygen. Not only that, but it is impossible for the psychologist to reach mind in its simplest state, for though the chemist can proceed from a knowledge of the most

highly organized substance to the simplest, and obtain as complete a knowledge of the latter as of the former, it is impossible for the psychologist to descend from the study of highly developed mind to the feeble mental efforts of an infant. Should he then count as nought the deliverance of his own consciousness, and is he unable to construct a science of psychology which explains and analyzes the phenomena of highly developed mind? It is true much interest would attend and valuable information result from a knowledge of what takes place in the nascent mind, but the veriest psychologist is no worse off in the way of obtaining such information than Dr. Maudsley himself. If each one could keep a record of mental conditions as experienced through consciousness, from the moment of birth up to the period of maturity, it would be his undoubted duty to begin with the simplest recorded instances, and proceed to the most complex and elaborate. But this is out of the question, and so we can understand how utterly uncalled for is Dr. Maudsley's rebuke to the psychologist as conveyed in these words of Lord Bacon: "For if he had looked down he might have seen the stars in the water; by looking aloft he could not see the water in the stars." And here we might remark *en passant*, for the thought is scarcely worth the ink, that Dr. Maudsley is guilty of a weakness common to his tribe, which is the assumption of superiority over the advocates of older opinions, and pity for their benighted state, while he complacently gives us to understand that he soars with unfettered pinion in the calm azure of truth. Most of the productions of our day having in view the exaltation of modern science are marred by this feature, as though a sneer had the weight of an argument. We do not mean to underestimate the value of physiological researches, for all truth is beautiful, the lustre of one being reflected in the other, and as sound psychology receives with welcome whatever additional knowledge it may stand indebted for to physiology, it can with patience suffer the affronts of those who are churlish in the giving. Our anxiety is to defend the methods which psychology employs, and to claim for it the credit of what it has accomplished.

A great fault in Dr. Maudsley is the mental irritability he betrays whenever the facts of psychology stand in the way of his favorite materialism. His is not a scientific treatise, but a special plea; his aim is not to increase the store of scientific knowledge, but to deal blows at truths which the unanimous voice of mankind in all ages has proclaimed. In a word, Dr. Maudsley is a passionate materialist, and impatient of the opinion of those who differ with him. One feels on rising from a perusal of his interesting but misleading monograph, that did men but agree to deny to the soul a separate and distinct entity, and view it simply as an expression of nerve

function, Dr. Maudsley would no longer interest himself in physiological investigations, his occupation would be gone. He is an ingenious, but a too evident *ex parte* worker. This is especially noticeable in his comments upon what he calls the unconscious activity of mind. He tortures the simplest facts from their natural and obvious significance to a support of his materialistic views. Thus he says :

“Consciousness, which does not even tell us that we have a brain, is certainly incompetent to give any account of the essential material conditions which underlie every mental manifestation, and determine the character of it.”

Now, it is no part of the function of consciousness to tell us that we have a brain, nor to inform us what “essential material conditions underlie its manifestations;” and the fact, that its functions do not extend so far, renders its deliverances within narrower limits more reliable. To attack the value of consciousness because it does not deal with material changes is like impugning the skill of a watchmaker because he is not acquainted with the natural history of the materials he may handle. Says Dr. Maudsley :

“The most simple phenomenon which consciousness makes known to us is really very complex ; a feeling which is elementary to it may be far from elementary ; and we cannot, by its means, go deeper into the discovery of the simpler constituent elements. Clearly, then, the science which does not enable us to go deeper in the analysis of the really complex state, which the most simple delivery of consciousness is, must lie at the foundation of a true psychology.”

In order that our strictures may be perceived to have reference directly to the thoughts and language of Dr. Maudsley, we prefer always to reproduce his own words, so that when we say he is guilty of confusion of ideas, the reader will be able to determine for himself whether we make good our statement. But the most simple phenomenon which consciousness attests, if simple as attested by consciousness, must be simple *in se*, for the feeling is nothing without consciousness ; and it is simple or complex, just as consciousness attests it. We have before seen that consciousness is the light in which the mind perceives the character of its affection, and that light is determined by the affection, so that the mind cannot see itself otherwise than as it is affected. Consequently, if the feeling is perceived as simple, it must be simple. Dr. Maudsley evidently confounds the material conditions on which a feeling depends with the feeling itself. Physiology teaches him that the most primitive feeling implies a molecular change in the nerve-structure of a very complicated sort ; and he, by a most unwarranted assumption, would have us believe that this change, complex and elaborate, is the feeling itself, which misinformed and dimly perceiving consciousness represents to us as simple. Is not

this the most flagrant sophistry? As well say that the sound of a piano is not understood, or thoroughly appreciated and perceived, because the listener is not acquainted with the complex mechanism on which the sound depends.

We would ask Dr. Maudsley whether his feelings, emotions, and perceptions differ in the least from those of other men because he is a physiologist? Evidently not; and yet all the feeling, emotion, or perception he knows only through consciousness. Dr. Maudsley speaks somewhere of a "psychology that violently separates itself from nature;" of a psychology which maintains "an unnatural divorce" from well-established facts. That such a separation should appear unnatural to Dr. Maudsley's heated mind is quite natural; but the impartial and unimpassioned observer will be more inclined to call unnatural an attempted union for which facts supply no basis. The confusion in Dr. Maudsley's language and ideas comes of his endeavor to make psychology and physiology one and the same science, whereas they are entirely distinct, following distinct methods and bringing to light completely different results. Indeed he assumes the identity of the two sciences, and it is only this assumption which gives the color of probability to his speculations.

He supposes mind to consist entirely in nerve-change, because he perceives nerve-change to accompany mental activity. This is the very essence of his position and mistake. He finds, in the adaptation of certain portions of the nerve-tissue to the production of specific functions a reason for referring the production of every class of mental phenomena to the nervous system as their cause, not suspecting that the peculiar adaptation in question may be a mere condition modifying in its manifestations the power of the substance which is the source and cause of the phenomena. He assumes the manifesting medium of thought, when in a state of action, to be nothing more or less than thought itself, and proceeds throughout on this assumption.

He is not the first reasoner who has been guilty of the fallacy of confounding condition with cause, and of assigning to the modifying influence of the former the character and operation of the latter. "On grounds," he says, "which will not be easily shaken, it is now, indeed, admitted that with every display of mental activity there is a correlative change or waste of nervous element; and on the condition of the material substratum must depend the degree and character of the manifested energy or the mental phenomenon." This we readily grant; and it is one of the triumphs of physiology that it has been able to ascertain, even though it be only to a limited extent, the conditions and changes that accompany different mental operations. But what follows? Surely

not that on this account we must admit that brain secretes thought, just as the liver does bile, for so another celebrated materialist (Vogt) has inferred.

Dr. Maudsley complains that "the received system of psychology gives no attention to those manifold variations of feeling in the same individual which are due to temporary modifications of the bodily state, and by which the ideas of the relations to self and to one another are so greatly affected." Naturally it does not, for its province is to busy itself with those variations of feelings, and not with the conditions upon which they depend. To be acquainted with bodily conditions and to understand their relation to mental states is a most excellent thing, but that is the office of the physiologist, and such a knowledge can in no manner affect the results of psychical research. The condition which modifies mental action is objective; the action itself is subjective, and revealed by consciousness. When Dr. Maudsley says that "feeling is not always objectively caused, but may be entirely due to a particular bodily condition," he shows clearly that he does not attach the proper meaning to the terms objective and subjective. A bodily condition is as thoroughly objective, as respects the mind, as any set of circumstances wholly external to it; and when the psychologist considers a feeling or state of consciousness, and endeavors to analyze it, it is as little his business to consider the bodily condition on which the character of that conscious state depends as it is to study the meteorological condition on which the "blues" depend when he is endeavoring to analyze the nature of that doleful state of mind. It would, no doubt, be interesting to trace out the connection between the weather and states of the mind, but any information acquired in that direction will never throw fresh light on a given mental condition. In like manner bodily conditions do, no doubt, influence mental condition to a greater extent than the majority of people suspect, and more marked cerebral changes accompany mental action than we may imagine; but neither of Dr. Maudsley's conclusions follows from these facts. It neither follows that these bodily conditions and cerebral changes are the cause of mental action, nor that a knowledge of them, however useful and desirable, can increase our knowledge of that action.

Just as Dr. Maudsley confounds the objective with the subjective, so does he mistake the accidental for the essential. The accidental is what pertains to the individual as such; the essential what pertains to him as representative of his species. This distinction is simple enough, and laid down in almost every handbook on mental science, yet Dr. Maudsley entirely overlooks it. His own language will best set forth his purblindness. He says:

"So far as the present psychology is concerned the *individual* might have no existence in nature; he is an inconvenience to a system which, in neglecting the individual character or temperament, ignores another large collection of valuable instances. . . . He who would realize how vague, uncertain, speculative, how far from the position of a true science psychology is, should endeavor to grasp some one of its so-called principles, and to apply it deductively, in order to predicate something of the character of a particular person; let him do that and he cannot fail to perceive how much he has been mocked with the semblance of knowledge, and must needs agree with Bacon as to the necessity of 'a scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters and the secret dispositions of particular men.'"

Now, the individual is the fountain-head of all knowledge of the species to which he belongs; first it is through a study of the individual that we obtain a direct general conception; but let it be understood such general conception embodies only what the individual possesses in common with all others of his class, and shuts from view the traits and qualities which belong to him as such. Suppose human physiology wishes to establish a general principle as the result of observation made on many individuals, would the fact that different individuals exhibit different peculiarities invalidate such a principle or stand in the way of its application to all? Yet this is precisely what Dr. Maudsley would have. It is no more an objection against a principle of psychology that it does not enable us "to predicate something of the character of a particular person," than is an objection against any principle of physiology that it does not enable us to determine the size of an individual or tell the color of his hair. Science deals only with universals because they represent essences, and we acquire our knowledge of universals through individuals, and this is what is conveyed by the words of Bacon as quoted by Dr. Maudsley, and not the absurd meaning Dr. Maudsley attaches to them. "A scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters and the secret dispositions of particular men" is the study of the individual, which leads by a reflex universal conception to a knowledge of mankind; but not, and Bacon never dreamed of such a thing, to a knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of each separate individual.

With the view of lending additional force to his argument against consciousness, he brings forward that interesting array of facts which give color to the theories of unconscious cerebration and the registration of impressions.

While not disposed to deny a single fact tending to establish what is meant by "unconscious cerebration," we decidedly object to the term as eminently misleading and adapted to cover an assumption. Men have always connected the word *conscious* with mind in the strictly psychological sense; and not only that, but they have been accustomed to measure mind by consciousness, for thereby alone do they know it. Now, the term *unconscious*, as

applied to cerebral action, is deftly employed for the purpose of insinuating, before any process of reasoning, that mind is altogether an effect of cerebation. Why should the term "unconscious cerebation" be used any more than unconscious digestion and circulation? It is evident that in the latter case the advocates of materialism would accomplish nothing by using the expression. Moreover, unconscious cerebation implies conscious cerebation; and if consciousness does not attest to us the fact that we have a brain, how can it inform us of its function? The truth is, all cerebation is unconscious, and necessarily so, for mind reveals to itself nothing but mind, and in this revelation all consciousness consists. Cerebation is the condition of mental function, and, as all conditions profoundly modify the operation of cause, is it to be wondered at that even a substantive soul should be hampered by the medium through which it acts? Dr. Maudsley is ingenious, but he is the victim of what may be called unconscious duplicity. He produces his microscope, his rule, and his retort; he examines a piece of violet glass; he subjects it to countless experiments, and announces to the world that he has discovered the reason why it is adapted to the transmission of its proper ray; he does the same for red, blue, and yellow glass; and then he constructs elaborate theories in explanation of each, not now *transmission*, but *emission*. He learnedly informs us that certain molecular changes in the violet-colored glass occur in such a manner that they necessarily emit a violet light; and so with regard to red, yellow, and blue. Does he imagine for a moment that he may be confounding condition with cause? that he may be setting down as the cause of the ray the cause merely of the color of the ray? The cause of the color of the ray is surely not the cause of the ray, but simply a condition of its manifestation. The sun is the source of light, the glass the condition of its color. In like manner all he has said and written of "unconscious cerebation," registered impression, and associated mental action, may be reduced to the following: Mental functions differ, and physiology has discovered that these different functions are connected with different portions of the nervous structure, and that the different changes occurring in the latter invariably correspond to separate and determinate functions. Therefore distinct portions of nervous substance are the sole *source*, *root*, and *origin* of the functions connected with them. The reasoning is specious and misleading, for may not structural conditions of the brain so modify the actions of the mind that with certain portions thereof volition may be connected, with others memory, and with others again intellection, while the soul is behind all, possessing its own substantive entity, just as the sun which bathes the universe in light shoots a few of its scattered rays through a cathe-

dral window, and flecks chancel, nave, and pillar with violet, purple and gold, according to the character of the transmitting medium? We have no more than turned over the first leaves of Dr. Maudsley's interesting treatise on the *Physiology of Mind*; but so suggestive of reflection have these proved that we find ourselves brought to the limits of an article sooner than we expected.

POSITIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD AS REGARDS RELIGION.

INVESTIGATIONS into the true relations subsisting between science and religion are the passion of the age in which we live. Discussions arising out of these investigations, one would think, should necessarily be confined to the respective schools—that is, to men of science on the one side and to those who have chosen their vocation in the religious order on the other. But so far from this being the case, the controversy is largely conducted by persons who have no position in either school. Philosophers, statesmen, men of letters, have taken part in it to an unprecedented extent, and thrown the light of their varied intelligence upon it, or not unfrequently increased the existing confusion of thought.

Even a slight survey of the field of contemporary literature is sufficient to assure us that at no time in the history of the world has a greater array of ability ever been engaged in the consideration of any one subject. Nor is this remarkable. The deepest questions, and the most important, that can occupy the human mind are comprised within the sphere of religion, and, hence, it is easy to understand the paramount interest which the intellectual world accords so freely in our days to the discussion of these questions. Then, again, modern science undertakes to answer them, and attempts to elucidate the problems they involve; and so wonderful has been the success which has crowned its advance in almost every other department, that many minds have been led to believe, and perhaps do still believe, that it is able to solve them. Without expressing an opinion in regard to the possibility or rather impossibility of this, the present fact that science has undertaken to instruct humanity on points heretofore considered the exclusive realm of faith, has led into the field of controversy the volunteers already alluded to, and accounts partly for the other fact, viz., that the questions at issue have been treated from every possible and im-

possible point, under all admissible and inadmissible aspects, and in every conceivable and inconceivable way. And from the flood of light thrown, or, at least, supposed to have been thrown on them, the inference might be drawn that the main points of the controversy must be settled beyond dispute. Yet, strange to say, just the reverse holds good. It seems as if a singular fatality had presided over all these efforts made for the avowed purpose of arriving at a final decision, and made, moreover, in earnest and with great sincerity. A mysterious agency appears to have led the human mind to exhaust its versatility without accomplishing the desired end. For the haze of mystery which gathers around these subjects has not been dispelled; it has been increased rather than lessened; the result thus far reached is only intellectual confusion, and the final verdict is still seemingly involved in uncertainty.

Yet, notwithstanding all this, contemporary literature furnishes a vast amount of correct information, or, at least, of materials from which correct information may be gathered, with regard to the apparent conflict of science with religion. As an ingeniously contrived apparatus enables the meteorologist to measure the direction, velocity, and force of the currents of air, so do opinions stated and refuted, modified and modifying, serve as indicators of the currents which surge to and fro in the realm of thought. To give a detailed account of all the reports that have been made by men of high competence in their own lines, would be an undertaking very difficult in itself, and wholly impossible within the scope of this paper. But it seems to me quite possible to utilize the data or results of observations contained in contemporaneous writings for indicating what answer suggests itself to the questions, Whither is modern religious thought drifting? What will be the final outcome of this strife of conflicting opinions?

Mr. Mallock, in his well-known and quite remarkable book, *Is Life Worth Living?* has shown the necessity of making some sort of reply to these questions—questions of the gravest import to individuals as well as the race. How far the reply affects the value of life for each one of us does not concern us in this paper, but only the probable solution of the difficulty, so anxiously awaited and to all appearances so terribly uncertain. The very attitudes of modern thought toward religion are highly suggestive, because full of indications as regards the proximate if not the final result, and, therefore, they well deserve careful consideration. Patient search into these, we think, will enable us to discover the central idea in the opinions that are fast permeating cultured society.

Passing over all positions which form simply links of transition from one school to another, the intellectual world may be roughly

divided into three classes according to their attitudes towards religion : One, without religion, without any wish for religion, nay, bent in all earnestness upon its abolition altogether,—the school of “advanced thought,”—which I will call for the sake of clearness and brevity the extreme left, borrowing for the occasion a parliamentary phrase with which every one is familiar ; another, the extreme right, comprising the believers in orthodox Christianity in its most authoritative form, namely, the Catholic Church ; and, third, the centre party, standing between these two extremes. The majority belong to the last-named class, for the world in our days, as is well known, is filled with people who are neither willing to accept the postulates of modern scientists in their fulness, nor altogether to ignore them ; people who professedly belong to “a Church,” but whose confidence in their professed creed has somehow of late been seriously shaken, and who have become dissatisfied without being able to assign any clear or definite reason for their dissatisfaction or doubts ; people, in short, who look with equally divided attention toward religion and toward science for a solution of their perplexing difficulties. The extreme right represents to us the cultus of religion as a science, the extreme left the cultus of science in lieu of religion, whereas the centre virtually consists of an indefinite mixture wherein both elements are contained in varying proportions. Numbers in this latter class are people who would like to possess a religion, but who unfortunately know not exactly what they want nor where to get it. Indefinite as this division may appear, it is by no means arbitrary, for the three attitudes are plainly perceptible in modern literature, and hence admit of verification without much labor.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that, the division has resulted from the influence of science upon society within the last few decades. At first the views of advanced thought were held by comparatively few. But “the disposition of mankind to impose their opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct upon others,” as Mr. Mill and Professor Max Müller both tell us, has in this instance achieved quite a success. For that is precisely what the men of science have done for society in the recent past. The cultivated classes fell into the new views without much resistance, and since the intellectual class always represents a moral force also, the acceptance of the creed of science by that class has not failed to act accordingly upon the masses. The influence of this has already begun to be felt in the lower strata of society. So long as fatalistic theories are accredited and subscribed to by only a few, they can be ignored. Yet the importance of showing a doctrine’s fallacy, and proving, once for all, its absolute untenability, stands in direct proportion to the extent to which it may be productive of

harm. And it is gratifying to observe how generally the necessity of this work begins to be recognized.

Now, what are the *nova credenda* promulgated by the extreme left? They are not, be it stated with emphasis, scientific deductions legitimately obtained, but are encroachments of science upon an order which differs from it in *kind*, and hence they are illegitimate in and by the very process of their generation. Modern science as far as it has preserved its character as real science we all have just reason to regard with pride and admiration; its achievements will ever remain genuine triumphs of the human intellect, and the practical benefits resulting from them flow in a thousand channels around us. Let us not depreciate what science has accomplished, but let us not forget, too, on the other hand, that the lines

“Reason our guide, what can she more reply
Than that the sun illuminates the sky?”

will always be applicable to the line of demarcation between science and religion. “Faith” can become a matter of science, and so it has in Christian theology; but science never can supplant faith, as will be presently seen.

However, since modern science has had the arrogance to proclaim a creed of its own, it is well to examine the positions on which it rests in trying to make good its assumptions. They may be reduced to two propositions, each of which is not an affirmation but a negation. What science denies is, in the first place, the existence of a personal Deity, a belief which is the corner-stone not only of Christianity but likewise of all monotheistic religions. And, in the second place, science denies the existence of a supernatural order; that is to say, the existence of the soul as an indestructible, immortal entity, a belief which the Christian holds in common with the pagans of old. Now the consequence of conceding these two negations is this: Faith, in the sense with which mankind has invested that word for wellnigh two thousand years, nay from the very earliest dawn of history in one nation,—this time-hallowed faith is transformed into an absurd superstition; and if the above-mentioned premises could be granted it would, of course, follow that the sooner the human race were freed from that superstition the better. This brief synopsis of the fundamental principles of the creed of “advanced thought” leads to several important reflections, which it is well to keep before us. The substitute offered for religion in these our days does not put us on a level with classical paganism. For the paganism of Greece and Rome appears far more consonant with Christianity than is the paganism of Christian countries in our own times, because Greece and Rome, and even the idolatrous forms of worship in the East, carefully preserved cer-

tain conservative elements, namely, belief in a supreme governing power, and belief in future rewards and punishments. But as the denial of the existence of a personal God does away with a Ruler on high, and as in like manner the negation of a supernatural order implies the impossibility of retributive justice after death, these two restraining forces are shaken off altogether, and man is launched into the sea of passion, on a frail craft, without compass, rudder, or sail. What modern science, therefore, endeavors to put in place of the teachings of Christianity is not a cultus of æsthetics, or of honor, or of nature, but is simply and solely a complete negation of any and all religion, in other words, a deification of man; for in virtue of this new creed man acquires all the prerogatives heretofore accorded by unanimous consent of all ages to that Supreme Power in which mankind has heretofore believed. And this conception—that the foundation-principle of the world consists in an impersonal, changeless, and yet change producing system of forces—what is it capable of producing but at best a barren feeling of despondency as to these inexorable forces, or a sort of æsthetic complacency with or stoical indifference to, its wonderful manifestations?

The pretensions of positivism have been so felicitously handled by Mr. Mallock, in the book already referred to, that I shall not dwell on any point here where the final word has been spoken by him. But in regard to the ignorance with which he charges modern advanced thought, a few remarks may not be amiss. He claims that the foremost thinkers of our age show "real knowledge in the hands of real ignorance," a statement so precise and so true that it seems all the more paradoxical. Yet ignorance, and nothing but ignorance, is the reason why all the laudable efforts of the school of "exact thought" at philosophical construction have failed; and the same fault must vitiate its further efforts. A certain amount of ignorance in regard to scientific data always does and always will prevail, even among the majority of fairly well-educated people. Nor is ignorance always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault. The word, therefore, in itself, is not necessarily one of reproach. The ignorant very often are rather objects of pity than of condemnation, and absence of correct information may be both excusable and natural even among the cultured classes as such. Ignorance grows into a deformity, however, a disgrace, when it is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, and it grows finally into a crime in one who sets himself up to teach others; and the gravity of that crime must be measured by the gravity of the subject on which the ignorant pretend to teach. And of this crime the foremost thinkers of our day are guilty to an almost incredible extent. The mischief worked by inaccurate terminology, by an

"iron force of logic," which proves when put to a crucial test more pliant than melting wax, is great enough; but the havoc wrought by a complete mistaking of first principles, and of the nature and function of scientific terms, is altogether beyond expression. An elementary fact misapprehended leads, of course, to the construction of utterly false doctrines and systems.

It is true that since the time of Pythagoras the science of man and of the universe, and even of the Author of man, as far as it is deducible from principles furnished by natural reason, has been called philosophy. Yet never until now has philosophy claimed to be heard authoritatively when touching upon the matter of theology; and in the sense in which modern science understands philosophy it is made to embrace also the sphere of theology, that is, religion. Now philosophy, let it be well understood, is the science which deduces conclusions from principles obtained by the light of natural reason alone. It can, therefore, arrive at no valid conclusions beyond the range of natural reason, and since all the great problems of man and his destiny, and of the universe itself, lie beyond that range, philosophy alone and unaided cannot be a guide in the realm of faith. These problems, if solved at all, can be solved only by the aid of a supernatural light, that is, by revelation, and are, *ipsis-sima natura*, withdrawn from that region where the human intellect alone and unaided may reign supreme. Modern philosophers, however, magnify reason beyond all reason, and imagine they obtain results from it, which, though in most cases quite indirectly, they in reality obtain from revelation. They contend that the dogmas of faith are reducible to philosophical propositions, and maintain the fatal error that the *matter* of religion and the matter of philosophy are essentially the same, and that they differ only in *form*. They fail to discern that the matter of the one is that portion of universal truth which is intrinsically evident to natural reason; whereas, the matter of faith is that portion which is intrinsically *not* evident to natural reason, and is contained in revelation, and hence is precisely that which philosophy must bow down to and worship. Philosophy is not able, nor will it ever become able, to strip from faith its mysterious robes, and present its naked truth to the natural understanding. For, let us repeat it again, philosophy is concerned solely with truths naturally cognoscible; faith, on the contrary, with truths only supernaturally cognoscible, and consequently intrinsically not evident until we are supernaturally enlightened to see them. Clear and obvious as this distinction is, modern science has completely lost sight of it. Yet, much to be regretted as is the intellectual confusion which links belief in physical laws with disbelief in the supernatural order, it is a phenomenon that can partly, at least, be easily accounted for. A man of

science concentrates his keenest attention for a long time upon the observation of one small manifestation of life. To the physicist life, and not only life, but the world and the whole universe, resolves itself into an infinite aggregate of the workings of certain sets of laws. His thoughts, instead of acquiring a wider range, instead of becoming more and more comprehensive, are thus continually narrowed and hemmed in. And the result is that whatsoever cannot be brought under the focus of either telescope or microscope ceases to have existence for the scientific observer, and its reality is denied. The measure of what our senses can compass and take in by investigation becomes his measure of life, of the world, of the universe. To mention but one instance, modern science instructs us that an atomic movement in the brain is not only the concomitant of every "thought," but that this very "thought," after all, is the effect which the atomic movement as cause produces. This virtually converts man, despite free-will, into an exquisite automaton, whose loftiest flight of imagination may in the last instance perhaps be reduced to "*chablis*" and "*pâté de foie gras*."

Again, let us not fail to note that the creed of the religion of taste does not discard morality; professedly it sails under that flag, and proclaims—and this quite seriously—that a further development of morality is one of the great results which the advancing civilization of our age has still to accomplish. As modern science overlooks the fact that religion and science have spheres belonging to different orders, so it also overlooks the fact that morality and Christianity are inseparably bound together. The morality which science inculcates is a morality bent down to earth, drawing all its nutriment and strength from the physical laws; it is a morality looking only as far as the eye can reach, and proclaiming all dreamland that lies beyond our vision in space and time. Such morality may take hold for a time of those who have grown up in tainted Christian morality, nay, it may even continue a gradually decaying sway for some generations, but if put to the test of time it is certain to collapse, as all earthborn fabrics do collapse. Never yet has natural reason alone proved adequate to furnishing safe rules for the conduct of life. Ethics, as a science, must borrow its chief fundamental principles from faith, and unless it does so it must fail as a system. For a code of morals resting entirely on the reality of the laws of matter declares itself insufficient. The problem of obligation, that is to say, our duty to seek the *summum bonum*, proclaims in that case "follow nature." And hence the gratification of our natural desires, the complete satisfaction of every passion, every craving, every appetite—this and nothing else would constitute the final aim for each individual; and the greater or less success with which this aim is attained would be the measure of

the greater or lesser morality of that individual. Nor is this all. Science preaches its system of morality notwithstanding the fact that not one ethical system based upon natural reason alone, has ever obtained for any length of time, while Christian morality, on the contrary, has outlived all systems. The much-vaunted theory of the "survival of the fittest" should have suggested an inquiry into the cause why common-sense has rejected one system after another except this one, and why natural reason still seeks for and concocts new systems, to be superseded in turn by newer still. This point has remained without investigation so far as science is concerned; perhaps this is so because the reason of it is so clear and tangible. But nature herself feels that there must be something above her, in which she must participate, else there is no supreme happiness for her. Without a supernatural order no real and lasting basis for morality, that is to say, for genuine morality, is conceivable; and this imperative necessity of morals, which happily is admitted on all sides, points to and presupposes in fact the supernatural order.

Schopenhauer, pessimist and misanthrope as he was, and one who certainly cannot be accused of hyper-religious tendencies, recognized this very clearly. He says: "We may just as well expect our system of morals and ethics in general to produce virtuous, noble-minded, and saintly individuals, as æsthetics to create poets and sculptors and musicians." And he contends that "the recognition of the supernatural as far above the natural order, metes out to the human race its greater or lesser share of happiness, and the more we cling to the material world the more do we forfeit the enjoyments which, as moral agents gifted with free-will, are within our reach in the immaterial world;" and again, "The highest, the most varied, the most lasting enjoyments are those of the intellect, no matter how greatly in youth we may deceive ourselves as to this fact."

The claims of modern science, then, for the non-existence of "soul" and of "God" are summed up thus: the soul refuses to be analyzed like that world of sense, which is all that is tangible within our reach, and hence it is not; and hence, furthermore, there is no supernatural order. And so in regard to God. The champions of exact thought declare to us—and their declaration is true to the letter—that neither the chemical laboratory nor the electromagnetic current, neither vivisection nor decomposition, have ever yielded up the infinite entity "God," and hence there is no God. Thus "God" and "soul" are placed in the category of the unknowable on precisely the same grounds.

In one instance, though only in one instance, does science admit that it is confronted by something which the foremost thinkers

not only declare baffles science now, but which they moreover believe will always do so. And this phenomenon is consciousness, the gate, as it were, by which man enters into intercourse with the infinite. This one admission inflicts a deathblow on the whole artificial structure of the creed of advanced thought. It seems to be beyond contradiction that facts which are not reducible to matter and its manifestations, and which are yet undeniable and real facts, presuppose and must belong necessarily to an order real and yet immaterial. Whether it be compatible with unimpaired reasoning faculties to admit this much and deny in the same breath the existence of a supernatural order, is a question which the reader may decide for himself. On a matter of less grave import so exquisite a piece of inconsistency would be simply ludicrous ; but occurring, as it does, on a subject which influences not only the short period of life on earth, but that life which is no longer subject to death or pain or change, it must fill one with deep regret for the individuals who stake on it the future, waiting to have their eyes opened when *trop tard, j'en l'abandonne* will be the sound reaching their ears, to resound there for evermore.

Several revolts have been made against the triune majesty of God since Christianity brought to wretched mankind the teachings of faith, accompanied by hope and by an infinite never-failing charity. And of all these revolts that of the present age bears the most atrocious character. In the records of history there are accounts of an almost constant struggle against "kingcraft." This struggle being directed against authority, and hence against the Author of authority, that is, the first person of the Trinity, is not so much a questioning of the authority of God the Father, as rather a finding fault with Him for the form in which through a divine hierarchy He has been pleased to impose the law of obedience upon us. The nations proposed then rather a transformation of the links through which the authority of God becomes manifest, ascending from father to king, from king to God's vicar upon earth, and from God's vicar upon earth to the Author and Father of all in heaven. The revolt therefore was not bereft of purely human features ; it is the rebellious child that in vain tries to break loose from paternal tutelage. And again, the revolt against God the Son, traceable in all that has been done against His Church, and familiar to us as the struggle against "priestcraft," was also not devoid of certain characteristics which bring it within the circle of transgressions essentially human ; for here also it was rather the form of Christianity than its essence which shortsighted human nature presumed itself capable of improving upon, and hence no essential attribute of Deity was directly assailed. Secondary issues were made ; the highest sphere was still left undisturbed. Not so in the present revolt. Be-

ginning with the denial of God as God, the act bears no longer the semblance of a purely human trespass ; it deprives the races of faith, of hope, of charity ; it defies *à l'outrance* the Holy Ghost, the splendor of light and grace and wisdom. There is no palliation here ; no appeal for mercy pleads in behalf of a pride which begins and ends with a declaration of self-sufficiency and recognizes no power above it. The revolt inaugurated by modern science terminates immediately in an apotheosis of human personality, and erects egotism into a basis of culture and morality. But enough of the attitude of the extreme left.

Next in order comes the centre. As has already been remarked, a variety of elements goes towards making up its vast aggregate. It includes many whose religious sentiments raise them above the depraved materialistic tendencies of the age ; many who are honest, sincere, upright in their conduct, blameless in their morals ; many who cling with a tenacity worthy of a better cause to some mere fragments of Christianity ; many who believe not only in One Father, and One Redeemer, and One Sanctifier, but who are also willing to accept dogmatic teaching, through which alone, as they correctly perceive, practical results are obtainable from faith. The onslaught of science on religion, and the fatal results accruing from it to Protestantism on the one hand, and on the other hand the imperturbable majesty of Rome, have each in its own way acted upon and influenced this by no means homogeneous mass. Having been stirred as never before, the different elements are shifting and contending, undecided and uncertain. Color-blindness hides from their sight the white robe of Catholicity, and yet they still search for truth without a proper knowledge of the whereabouts of truth. At this very time it is claimed in England, and also by some on this side of the Atlantic, that this is, after all, nothing but a returning movement towards a more mystical form of Christianity. This is what Mr. Gladstone in his remarkable paper "On the Evangelical Movement, Its Parentage and Issue," seems to maintain, for he contends that the deep craving of the human mind after an intimate intercourse with its Creator, led to Ritualism, as it led in many cases to Rome. So far as it goes this is true. The case can, however, be stated in a more correct and more comprehensive manner. Since atheism has gained a certain ascendancy, the necessity of replacing a cold and unsatisfying creed by one which leaves no vacuum in the human breast, has become more and more imperative, and made itself more and more widely felt. Protestantism and atheism are separated only by an imaginary barrier, and the need to strengthen this weak partition has become obvious. Now Anglicanism, in spite of all its solemn protests, finds itself to-day in the same uncomfortable position as all the other offspring of

the Reformation. Without a fundamental reorganization no new lease of life is possible for Protestantism under any form. During and for some time after the break with Rome in the sixteenth century, fanaticism carried the adherents of Protestantism on its wings. Isolated instances excepted it does so no longer. Its flight was short, and would have ended sooner had not the Catholic teaching which it superseded continued to still live in the hearts of many, who led astray by a sort of religious intoxication embraced then and there the one or the other Protestant "Church." Nominally Protestants, vast multitudes remained actually though unconsciously Catholic; for the Catholic Church claims all who are Catholics in their hearts, be they heathen, or Mohammedans, or Protestants in the eyes of the world. The narrow view which tries to fasten upon Rome the stigma of unjustifiable exclusiveness, reserving the realms of endless bliss for those only who professedly and openly belong to her, begins happily to be more and more discarded. Her pale, in reality, includes by inalienable rights all who partake in the fruits of Calvary either through the baptism of blood or of desire; and all, again, who have received the sacrament of baptism and believe with unshaken sincerity that the denomination of which they are professedly members is the unadulterated form of Christianity; so that there are Catholics, true children of the Church, outside of Catholic congregations, and their fate hereafter will depend upon the manner in which they have used and obeyed that "light which enlighteneth every man that comes into the world."

Others, again, have tried to explain what is going on in the Established Church of England as a reaction. Through the overzeal of the first Reformers an indispensable part of Christianity has been lost, so they tell us; and hence what we are witnessing now is merely the reacceptance of this indispensable part. But this too is a misstatement. It was not our dogmatism which led to the Reformation; and, besides, the Ritualistic movement bears on its face the marks of a decided effort to cast off bonds which bind the Ritualists to a religious system which has no claim to infallibility. The fact is that the Christian doctrines held and taught by Rome cannot be improved upon. Attempts to do so have not been wanting; they have continued through a period covering more than three hundred years, and they have been made in almost every country in which Christianity has planted its banner. The conditions, therefore, as regards time as well as space, have been most favorable for a continued series of these experiments; and, as a matter of fact, variations of Christianity have sprung up everywhere, each claiming to contain the very essence of Christianity. True, all of them contain some vague sort of Christianity, a dead

and silent Bible, and more or less of Catholicism in a mangled condition. But what is the result? Not one of these patent religions has been able to stand a test of three centuries. They change color with chameleon-like rapidity, and while the process of creed-manufacturing still flourishes with unabated vigor in the camp of Protestantism, the discovery of "*the*" religion lies still to be made. If Ritualism be placed at one end of the religious spectrum and broad Unitarianism at the other, every conceivable variety of shade and color can be arranged between the two. Hence people have had a very wide field for their choice, and yet all these religious experiments are coming more and more to be looked at by the public generally with disgust as so many religious vagaries, and the insufficiency inherent in each of them alike asserts itself. Under the auspices of these varying and contending creeds the human heart has become the prey of an undefinable melancholy. A brooding sorrow moves over man's fate, and has seized upon most highly gifted minds; a mysterious forlornness touches us in the productions of the most distinguished writers. It is a feeling of despondency which springs from the consciousness of a lost felicity, and it neither can nor will be banished by anything save such faith and hope and love as give to man heaven, since it expresses the yearning of the heart after things not of this earth,—things that God alone can give and does give if we but humbly ask for them.

For the better verification of this mental condition, and also in order to illustrate the truth of Mr. Mallock's prediction that "prejudices, even when so dogged and so virulent as that against Catholicity, will lift and disappear one day like a London fog," a few quotations from a writer in *Frazer's Magazine* are subjoined:

"The motives of right conduct which Christianity has to offer,—hope for the individual, hope for the race, a great act of self-sacrifice requiring self-sacrifice in turn, self-reverence springing from a sense of a high and divine calling, the consciousness of the divine fatherhood resulting in a claim of universal brotherhood, an unswerving faith in the complete and final victory of good over evil, love to God and love to our neighbor as the mainspring of life,—these motives are considerably superior to any mere 'honesty is the best policy.'"

Again:

"The mere blank negation of all religion, which seems to be the present mental attitude of the cultivated classes in Germany, can result in no high or noble activity, no moral heroism, nothing but the old story, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.'"

Continuing his observations on Germany, the same writer goes on to say:

"Catholicism is the only form of Christianity that has any real hold upon the people.

In the Rhineland and in Southern Germany the churches are crowded with devout worshippers, whereas in Protestant Prussia the very profession of Christianity has well-nigh died out."

And on the connection between morality and faith the following comment is made :

"The acceptance of the supernatural as a condition of adopting Christianity as a rule of life, nay, the acceptance of the supernatural in this highest sense, is an essential condition of any religious faith. Christian morality is in the highest sense supernatural."

And from a paper entitled "Agnosticism and Women," published in the *Nineteenth Century*, we quote what Mrs. Lathbury says in regard to the saddening effects upon society should the day ever arrive when the spread of the new views shall extend over her sex. After pointing out that from whatever side the practical issues of the question are broached, the motive power is always withdrawn, and no substitute offered capable of appealing to what predominates in the female character, the heart, she raises a pathetic and touching cry for mercy on behalf of her sex :

"To be in the front ranks of progress and in the tide of intellectual fashion, to rise above the prejudices that spring from our instincts rather than from our reason, and, above all, to be in sympathy with the men they admire, are often the most potent influences that sway a woman's mind towards the atheism of the present day. If it is the lot of any to be obliged through honesty of thought to cast away their ancient landmarks, let them consider whether it is all gain to others that they should be led to do likewise. What has the agnostic to offer in compensation? In the strength of his days he sets out for the goal of culture. Physical, mental, moral culture is his aim and his watchword. Enlightenment in this world takes the place of hope in the next, and the intellect alone sets its mark upon the future. Enthusiastic for all progress, he forgets that a progress that comes to an end with death is no true progress at all, and that what is untrue for the individual cannot be true for the human race. With faith of an ultimate age of ice, and their hope bounded by the grave, what is left to the women of the future but their love alone, to tell them of how much happiness and misery they are capable? If such is the only truth possible for mankind, in very mercy let us pause long before we help others to attain to it."

These quotations offer considerable matter for reflection, and help us to form a definite conception of the real drift of thought. It will be seen that both writers agree that human nature cannot be lifted by its own strength to the level of truly moral actions. Unless an element of a higher order draws us by its influx on into an upper stratum, the current of animalism will succumb to the constant pressure around, and flow downwards from its present level in the direction of the least resistance.

Such views are all the more deserving our attention, because even from so-called Christian pulpits the sound reaches the ear that the cosmogony of Genesis is, at best, an untrustworthy compilation of primeval tradition. Men whose professed calling in the world it is to preach, proclaim that belief in an infinite substance informing

all phenomena, a trust in an eternal First Cause underlying all change, is the belief which has satisfied in all ages the greatest minds, and which suffices for the advanced civilization society has reached at the present day. They indorse in full the pretence of science that the universe is an unbroken chain, without even a break between plant and animal, or animal and man ; they probably think a catena of facts established, which science itself only hopes to establish ; they subscribe to "natural selection by conflict," though they do not dwell perhaps upon it, nor advocate it in individual cases, probably because of the unpleasant backwardness of legal views on such matters ; in short, they are the oracles of scientific materialism, ridicule quite openly what they call "the old orthodox faith," which sees in life traces of direct divine intervention, and think they have discharged their functions as enlighteners of conscience in a highly conscientious manner if they finish their discourse by a remark that while reason must furnish the guide religion may still continue to give the vivifying motive. The model modern clergyman comes generally of a respectable family, is well-bred, has, besides, a good figure and voice, a "charming wife" as life companion, possesses excellent social and domestic accomplishments, keeps clear in most cases with considerable tact of all sorts of trouble, is, in short, "a gentleman," but has neither deep convictions nor much scholarship, no initiative power and no vocation. With a bland smile he informs his audience of the deep psychological meaning of the doctrine of atonement ; he perceives a matchless didactic method in the doctrine of inspiration ; in rites a moral and æsthetic cultus ; and in churches incomparable instruments of discipline and social order. And this, people are told, is preaching Christianity, that is, Christ and Him crucified. But, though these esteemed pastors of souls instil such soothing syrup into the consciences of men ; though the material wealth, which is commonly a concomitant of these "fashionable churches" serves as another incentive to swell their ranks ; though science and religion are temptingly amalgamated in them ; notwithstanding all this, these establishments do not thrive as one might expect. Disgusted with the vague and meaningless teaching of broad Protestantism, mental obtuseness must give way to more clear and more correct estimates of true religion. The principle of subjectivity introduced by the Reformation, as Professor Luthardt, the eminent Lutheran leader, himself admits, can no longer maintain its position. Men wished to be certain of salvation, each for himself, without priestly mediation. They have tried it, and the supreme judgeship of *ego* stands condemned before the forum of conscience. However much pride may revolt against anything which implies humility, there is a something within us which bids us

be humble, and this element once asserting itself is not to be silenced. And it is this element which bursts through and finds expression in our days, though restrained by the very men who ought to nurture it. It is this element which stamps hopefulness respecting the future of the centre, a hopefulness which will find its fruition in the decision the individual ultimately must make, to escape from the dreary dilemma. And thus it is that, against and in spite of all adverse influences, the conservative lines have been much closer drawn in the sphere of religious thought than was the case two decades ago.

And now how does the extreme right act? how does Rome act? Has the Catholic Church also been drawn into the vortex, or does she keep aloof from the contending masses, like an uninterested and indifferent spectator? To those who know her, her actions are also known, and to those who do not know her the uncompromising dignity and firmness she preserves are a more eloquent testimony than words could convey. Fully aware of the far-reaching and grave import of the issues involved in the questions which are agitating our times, she fulfils her mission in the same spirit which was given her on the day of Pentecost, the spirit of wisdom guiding her, the spirit of charity animating her to extend the tender mantle of divine love to all who seek for refuge and shelter.

These then are the three principal attitudes of the intellectual world towards religion as they strike us in a more or less pronounced way in contemporary literature. They are the constellations from which the horoscope of the future must be cast; they are not conjured up by imagination, but are plainly perceptible on careful observation.

The English character is distinguished by that calm, just measuring of the evidences which should decide the actions of individuals and of nations. Some extraordinary event may for a time weaken this national feature, as was actually the case in the sixteenth century; but sooner or later it will reassert itself. This process, it is true, is one which requires time for its consummation; but for that very reason after the reaction has once set in, the final result is less doubtful than in cases where the prevalence of passionate, emotional elements render every conclusion doubtful. A volatile temper has never yet been predicated of Englishmen as a race. If we cast a glance over the religious history of England for the last half century, the steps by which this reactionary movement has progressed are traceable. What, let us ask, has led the maturest intellects, the ablest scholars, the ripest minds, men of whom the nation feels justly proud—what has led and induced them to humble themselves before Rome, and ask for admittance into her fold? Manning and Newman, names too illustrious to need more than

mere mention in order to bring them before us in all their grandeur and lustre, sifted the evidences of Christianity with the thoroughness, and perseverance, and courage which ought to be inseparable from investigations into the most important subject man has to deal with; and they did not shrink from a manly acknowledgment of their error when the suspicion of being wrong had ripened into sincere conviction. Bent upon embracing truth in its fulness they accepted it where alone they could find it. If it is urged that what landed them safely in the Church of Rome was the greater ability they could apply to the task of searching for and finding the truth, the answer is that not in that, but in their great earnestness of purpose, in their unswerving justice, in their wondrous moral courage, and in their humility lies the secret of their conversion.

The Ritualistic faction of the Established Church of England likewise bears testimony that the weighing of evidences of the past has, in the opinions of a considerable portion of the clergy, made a departure from the rites of the "Established Church" an obligatory duty. Only after a long and careful search did Ritualism adopt a cultus, which is best described as a fac-simile of the cultus of the Catholic Church minus her life-giving spirit. Here again we see the same element asserting itself as in the individual cases mentioned before. While only the individual minds of a Manning, a Newman, a Faber, a Ripon, and many others went over the ground with the careful solicitude of persons desirous of discovering truth in its entirety, the Ritualistic clergy showed their unwillingness to take at once the path of humility and avow their error on all points of difference. They were submerged too long in the deep waters of self-complacent error to rise quickly to the surface; they rose high enough to see the blue sky in the firmament above; they saw rays of that light before which darkness recedes, but they did not venture to gaze upon the sun in his full brilliancy. But there is ground for hope that their union with the sole repository of unchangeable truth will at last be accomplished.

And lastly, as regards the nation itself, our judgment of its future attitude must be guided by the new currents which display themselves already in contemporary literature. A spirit of equity, of impartiality, greater freedom from prejudice, lessening aversion to Catholicism, these are features distinctly observable, and from their presence one is constrained to think that the pulse begins to beat with a hopeful vitality. The pretensions of modern science and its atheistic creed violate too grossly the deepseated religious sense of Englishmen. Publications like Mr. Mallock's works increase in popularity, and they are gauge-glasses for ascertaining the temper and the direction of the drift of thought. Mr. Mallock, a literal skeptic, as he himself avows, typifies the sterling quality of the

English character to which I have already alluded. Viewing science by the light of reason, and religion by the light of reason, he arrives at the conclusion that Catholicity is the one religion that can, and the one religion that will, survive the complete and inevitable shipwreck of all other creeds. As an outsider he sees, of course, all things that belong to the Catholic religion foreshortened; his picture of the Church of Rome is deficient in drawing, in perspective, in coloring, in the distribution of light and shade. Nor could this well be otherwise, since it is necessary to look at her from a central point of view, in order to perceive the harmony of proportions, the classic simplicity of style, the matchless beauty of color. Nevertheless, how great is the gain when a mind drifting about without aim, desirous simply of finding relief somewhere from an overpowering, unbearable anxiety, ascertains at last where relief may be found, if relief is to be found at all.

And thus three successive stages seem to be quite perceptible: Giant minds, at first, leading the way, followed in turn by individual strong minds; next, the clergy, setting fresh canvas before the breeze, and sailing for Rome, but unable to make more than Civita Vecchia; and lastly, the nation, surging to and fro, shaking off the old yoke of prejudice, casting aside the glacial doctrine of science, looking about for new and safe moorings, and no longer unwilling to listen to the soothing strains of peace, and rest, and happiness that peal forth from the organ of the true Church of God.

Yet *one* step has to be taken by one and by all before that peace and that rest and that happiness can be attained, and of that one step Mr. Mallock speaks when he asks: "But that first decision, how shall we make it?" answering: "That decision, if we have a will at all, lies with our will, with the will alone to make," which answer, however, is not full, since to secure the blessings of grace and peace and faith there is, above all, required humility, calling for help in prayer. Hence, let hesitating minds reflect well on the two words: "Pray and obey."

NOTES ON SPAIN.

PART II.

BEFORE quitting the subject of Toledo and its ancient rite, it may be interesting to my readers to compare the latter with certain other rites which here and there still survive in Europe. Unfortunately I had no opportunity of seeing the Mozarabic High Mass, which I regretted the more since I had found¹ that function, as performed at Milan and at Lyons, full of ritualistic interest. The ancient Ambrosian rite of Milan presents certain noteworthy resemblances to the Mozarabic Mass. Thus (1), after the elevation, the priest extends out his arms horizontally for a short time; (2) besides the Epistle and Gospel, a lesson from the Old Testament is also read, and (3) the priest never turns round to the people at any "Dominus vobiscum." The last circumstance is due to the fact that, according to the strict Ambrosian rite, the priest should celebrate facing the people (standing on the further side of the altar), and no doubt the former existence of a similar custom in Spain accounts for the fact that the priest does not turn round to the people at the Dominus vobiscum in the Mozarabic rite. It may be well to add here some other peculiarities observed in the Ambrosian rite, so that any reader who (more fortunate than the writer) shall witness the Mozarabic High Mass may be enabled to compare the two together.

According to the Ambrosian rite, the Gospel and Epistle are both sung successively from the same pulpit, which is on the Gospel side of the entrance to the choir. The albs worn at the High Mass witnessed were very short (not reaching so low as the knees), and with a "founce." I was, however, much interested to see that they were "apparell'd," the "apparels" being somewhat larger in size than the mediæval ones. It being advent, the deacon and subdeacon wore chasubles, but the deacon on removing his for the Gospel did not, as with us, put on a broad stole, but there was a curious rectangular ornament attached to his narrow stole, behind his left shoulder. The censer used had no cover, and, on this account, it was used in a peculiar manner to prevent its contents falling out; instead of being swung as censers ordinarily are, it was swung rapidly round in complete circles, first in one direction and then in the reverse manner. Each time before incensing the altar, the priest offered incense on his knees. At an early part of the Mass the canons all advanced in single file, and successively kissed a corner of the altar. At the offertory two old laymen (each

¹ During a journey to Rome at the time of the Vatican Council.

wearing a white cloak with a black hood) came to the rails and offered altar-bread, and two women came to the entrance of the chancel and offered wine (the offerings being received by the deacon and subdeacon in silver vases), an interesting case of the survival of a primitive practice. During the greater part of the Mass the deacon and subdeacon stood sideways, each leaning with his arms on one end of the altar. The priest washed his hands, not at the offertory, but immediately before the consecration, and it was done with great ceremony, the deacon and subdeacon holding the two ends of a long cloth, and the assistants holding the basin and ewer. The priest again washed his hands, and in the same manner, after communicating. No bell was used at any part of the Mass, and that part of the canon which comes between the "*Pater noster*" and the "*Pax Domini sit Semper Vobiscum*" was sung as loudly as any other part. The *Secreta* also were sung aloud, like the Collects and Post-communions.

The ancient rite still surviving in France, namely, that of Lyons, has fewer differences from the Roman rite than has the Ambrosian; still it is very different, and in some of its differences it approximates to the type of the Mozarabic rite. Thus immediately after the elevation the priest extends out his arms horizontally,¹ and the whole Mass shows traces of having been originally said with the celebrant facing the people. As in the Ambrosian rite, the part of the canon after the *Pater noster* is sung out loud. At Lyons the subdeacon arranges the Corporal, etc., on the altar while the deacon is singing the Gospel. The priest washes his hands before the offertory as well as after it, the acolyte carrying a large towel on his shoulder, which the priest makes use of while in that position. The subdeacon remains behind the altar (where there is a credence table and where the chalice is prepared) from the offertory nearly till the elevation, and whenever the missal or any other object is removed from one side of the altar to the other, the assistants in carrying it pass across *behind* the altar, instead of in front of it as with us. After the offertory, the priest first incenses the altar (without the missal being removed), and then the deacon incenses it all round, walking completely round it, as in a Greek Mass. The subdeacon does not wear a veil on his shoulders as in the Roman Mass, but holds the paten inclosed in a small veil, not larger than that of the chalice, if it be not the chalice veil itself. No bell is used at any part of the High Mass, though it may at the Low Mass, which I have not seen. The Lyons rite is very majestic when the archbishop pontificates; for he is then attended by no less than seven priests, seven deacons, and seven subdeacons.

¹ As he does also in the Dominican rite, and as was done in the old Saracen rite.

Probably in the pontifical ceremonies of this rite, and in those of the Papal High Mass, certain customs still survive which once were more or less generally diffused.

Returning from this rather long digression (which I hope and think will not be without interest to many American Catholics) to the record of our Spanish ramble, I would advise travellers proceeding from Toledo to Andalusia first to return to Madrid, and thence start afresh, as we did, although it must be confessed that the short return journey was a very slow and tedious one, a change of trains being necessary at Algodor, with the chance of finding insufficient accommodations in the up-train on the direct line from Portugal. In our own case a shooting party, also returning, like ourselves, from Toledo, took possession of all the first-class seats not already occupied, save those in an empty carriage ticketed, "*Reservado para las Señoras*." Into this we accordingly got and refused to leave it in spite of entreaties and threats of officials, our reply being that we would most readily leave it for an inferior vehicle should any first-class female passengers appear at any station on the road to Madrid, but that while it remained without a tenant we might as well temporarily occupy it; and this we did (no lady appearing) for the rest of our journey.

We were not sorry to be again at the Fonda de la Pax at Madrid, for though Toledo is full of antiquarian and picturesque interest, it is not a place for comfortable sojourn, with its swarms of beggars, who swoop down on you from every corner, and who may bestow on you unpleasing epithets (I was called Pontius Pilate) if their appeals be disregarded. With the uneven and not too cleanly streets your eyes have to be directed pretty constantly downwards, and yet it is needful not to neglect looking above as well as below. Thus in one peregrination I was startled by some water falling just in front of me, and, looking up, perceived that it was due to the fact that a woman above was cleaning her teeth out of the window, without much regard to the passing stranger. We got back to Madrid on Saturday night, and next morning heard Mass in the fashionable church of the Order Calatrava,¹ in the Al-

¹ The military confraternity of Calatrava is a development of the Cistercian Order. It was founded in 1158, approved by Pope Alexander III. in 1164 and Gregory VIII. in 1187. The knights at first wore the Cistercian habit, but the needs of military life caused it to be first shortened and then discarded. Ultimately a mere secular dress came to be worn for ordinary use, but a white silk mantle, ornamented with a red cross flew over the left arm, was the habit for all ceremonies. This order, like the other military orders, became rich, and degenerated, and in 1485 Ferdinand and Isabella united the grand mastership of the order to the crown, the Pope, Innocent VIII., having consented thereto.

In the year 1219 an analogous religious order for ladies was founded by Don Gonzalez Yañez. Their red cross was worn embroidered on the front of their habit.

cala, close to the hotel. It was filled again and again with an edifying congregation, particularly pleasing to a Northern visitor from the unobtrusive costume of the black-veiled ladies.

In the evening we started for Cordova, a journey of nearly sixteen hours, the train leaving Madrid at 9 o'clock in the evening and reaching Cordova at about a quarter to 1 the afternoon of the following day. The train was horribly full, and Spaniards of both sexes are somewhat fidgety travelling companions, everlastingly wanting to get out, and that on both sides of the carriage. All the males invariably smoke and have a great objection to an open window. This was the most uncomfortable journey we made in Spain; but was, after all, a miracle of comfort compared with the same journey as experienced by Lady Herbert of Lee ten years earlier.

Arriving at Aranjuez at 10.50, the rare luxuriance of trees was perceptible even through the obscurity of a moonless night. We reached Alcazar (just now made famous by an attempt at robbery by brigands) at 2.30 A.M. Soon entering the country of La Mancha, we found ourselves at dawning day in the famed Sierra Morena, at Venta de Cardenas, close to the scene of Don Quixote's penance and of the adventures of Cardenio and Dorothea, passing by the imposing defile of the *Despeñaperros*, or "throw over the dogs" (*i.e.*, the infidels). About ten minutes past 8 we punctually reached *Vadollano*, whence travellers branch off to Linares, of mining celebrity now as in ancient times.

In a little more than another hour we reached the station—affording the much-desired and very excellent breakfast,—of Menjibar, irreverently styled by English-speaking jokers, "Mangy-bar." By this time the rain began to descend in torrents. My next neighbor at the breakfast-table was an Anglican ecclesiastic of St. Paul's, Knightsbridge, who, to my dismay, informed me of his intention to walk from this point to Grenada. This, indeed, is the station whence a diligence starts for that city; but no persuasion could induce my new acquaintance to avail himself of it. Saying goodby to him with regret we started, and in another hour first saw the Guadalquivir (or great river), and another two hours and a half brought us to the much-looked-forward-to old Moorish city of Cordova. We drove to the Fonda Suiza, a large, clean, comfortable, but not cheap hotel, as the charge for board, lodging, and attendance was 12s. 10d. per diem. We reached it in a deluge. The rainy season of Andalusia had, we were told, began, and our anticipations for the future were not cheering. Our visit here, however, was enlivened by the kind attention of an English gentleman to whom we had letters, Mr. Rutledge,—known in Cordova as Señor Don Juan,—who held an important appointment in connec-

tion with railways. Cordova is, indeed, a Moorish city, and it may well be so, having continued under their sway for five hundred years. The streets are narrow, like those of Toledo; many are even narrower, and are entirely paved with flagstones; yet the place has a clean and thriving look. Most of the streets are bounded only by whitewashed walls, the sole openings of which are the doorways, and a very few and small windows with strong iron gratings, so that the aspect is quite Eastern. Moreover, many of the shops, even the largest haberdashers, have no inclosure in front, but are quite open to the street. Finally, the people are very dark in complexion, and the women generally wore one or two white chrysanthemums in their abundant, jet-black hair. Through the open doorways charming courtyards, surrounded by colonnades (patios), are visible, with large trees, great magnolias, and other Southern plants in full flower. Certain conditions of mediæval life in cities were forcibly brought home to us in our wanderings through Cordova in the rain; for there are here many gargoyles still in use, and not superseded by pipes, so that small cascades descend from them on to the pavement, sometimes at short intervals.

The only sight in Cordova is the Cathedral, or, as it is still called, "the *Mesquita*, or Mosque." Every one knows the Mosque of Cordova,¹ with fore-court and palms, its low roof, and 1100 columns connected by double horseshoe arches, so no description need here be given. But many persons wonder at the plan of its construction, consisting as it does of nineteen long, narrow, juxtaposed colonnades. To understand it one must understand what a mosque is. A mosque is no temple, but a shelter for worshippers from the sun and rain, with an indication of the direction of Mecca. Accordingly an elongated portico may well answer this purpose. Let the population increase, and then the increased need of accommodation may be met by the addition of a second row of columns with a corresponding addition to the roof. Let this process be repeated again and again, and at last we shall get such a structure as that we are considering. Very curious is the effect on entering, of the vast multitude of pillars and the relatively low roof; and it is the common practice of tourists and guidebook writers to lament the introduction of the lofty Christian sanctuary and choir which is raised in the midst of the low Mohammedan building, because it necessarily intercepts the view through the arcades, and prevents the vast extent of the interior being readily perceived. To me, however, this soaring Christian edifice, in the midst of the wide-spreading low Mohammedan structure, seemed an apt symbol of the superiority of the creed it ministered to over the relatively grovel-

¹ It was begun in the eighth century and finished at the end of the tenth.

ling religion of Islam. Far from regretting the change effected, the Christian may by it be stimulated to hope that analogous changes will ere long take place in the mosques and temples of India.

Returning to the hotel our *table d'hôte* dinner was made interesting by anecdotes from Mr. Rutledge's abundant experience, showing the changes a few years have effected. When, as a youth, he first visited Madrid, he travelled to it from Paris entirely by diligence, a journey of eight days and nights, without stopping. Early the next day the other churches were explored, and for the first time a Mass was witnessed performed with unedifying haste. We are now in Andalusia, the moral and religious condition of which is generally admitted to be decidedly inferior to the more Northern provinces. As to material comforts Cordova is a place which may well be chosen for a somewhat lengthened stay. There is very good society to be had, a first-rate club, and plenty of game for the sportsman. My friend, Mr. Howard Saunders, assures me that the great bustard is still common in the adjacent plains, with plenty of the little bustard, sand-grouse, red-legged partridges, hares, and rabbits, and, at the proper time, quails also. In the mountains are wolves, wild cats, a few lynxes, and also boars, red deer, and roebucks; the three last-named kinds of animals cannot be shot, however, till permission has been obtained.

Though Cordova is so little to the north of Seville, yet it lies near the mountains, and at a considerable elevation above the sea. The rail, therefore, continuously descends from it to Seville (which is in the midst of a wide plain), for the most part skirting the Guadalquivir; and here for the first time abundant signs of a sub-tropical climate present themselves to the traveller from the North. Hedges of prickly pear, and of what are commonly called aloes, but are really agaves (every here and there, with the decaying remains of their treelike inflorescence), form hedges on each side of the railway, and even here and there wide stretches of country have the appearance of an English common with its furze bushes; but what look like furze bushes are really patches of the dwarf palm, which here grows naturally on scraps of waste ground all about, even down to the rails. The journey to Seville was performed in a little over three hours and a half, and by 6 o'clock we were duly installed at the *Fonda de los Cuatro Naciones*, the best hotel we have yet found in Spain. The charge for everything was 8s. 9d. a day, and the bedrooms were clean, with carpets and mosquito curtains, and the living was excellent. The hotel is situated in the Plaza Nueva, close to the Cathedral. The street door leads into a large patio, which has been roofed with glass

above, and thus acts as hall, drawing and reading room, and here the *Times* and other foreign papers are regularly taken. The Spanish newspapers give evidence of a kindly and pious sentiment prevalent throughout the country. Spaniards are not content with inserting a notice of the death of their relatives and friends, but they insert a notice of the recurrence of their anniversaries also. On the morning of Wednesday, October 29th, day dawned at Seville soon after 5 o'clock, and at 6 it was daylight. The first sally was of course to visit the justly celebrated Cathedral, and a very stately church it is; its plan, an enormous parallelogram, with a central portion and two wide aisles on each side, as also a series of lateral chapels. It is somewhat like the Cathedral of Milan, but of a much purer though late Gothic, and with more bulky, clustered pillars. One great charm of the Cathedral is the brilliant stained glass, which fills every window. Even with the light of Spain the Cathedral looks gloomy at first. In London it would simply be pitch dark. The visitor should not omit to contemplate the celebrated St. Anthony of Padua, by Murillo, which made a trip to New York and back in 1874. It is placed in the chapel with the font, and in the next chapel is the tomb of Bishop Baltazar del Rio. In this latter chapel the altar is raised on a platform, to which access is gained by steps on one side, while the bishop's tomb is in the front wall of the platform. At the east end, in the Capilla Real, is the great treasure of the church, the relics of St. Ferdinand, inclosed in a silver shrine, placed in front of the life-sized image of Our Lady, which was given to the Saint himself by the canonized King of France, Louis IX. The image is seated on a silver throne, and its hair is of spun gold. But the magnificence of the Cathedral contrasts painfully with the religious indifference of the population of the city. I was informed by a pious, well-informed priest, that out of a population of 118,000, not more than 500 men and 2000 women make their Easter-communion, and not more than 5000 men go to Mass on Sundays. I heard that religion has lost enormously within the last ten years,—since the revolution of 1865. I also heard that too many of the clergy are neither zealous nor edifying, and although while residing at Seville I saw Mass said with the same devotion as in other parts of Spain, I also saw it said with irreverent haste, a canon of the Cathedral, a young man, not genuflecting even at the consecration, but only drawing his right leg a little backwards, and going away directly after Mass without making any thanksgiving. Still, in spite of the general religious indifference, if a mission is given anywhere the people flock to it in multitudes, and there is always a great harvest of souls. If only the Church had the liberty in Spain

which it enjoys in England and the United States, Spain would soon be again evangelized. Hatred of religion, however, and a spirit of persecution are engrained in the far larger part of the so-called "Liberals" (?), and men whose sons are now actually being educated in Jesuit colleges signed the decree for the expulsion of the Jesuits, and would do it again if called upon by the need of pandering to the irreligious passions of their party. The Church has been robbed most cruelly. No money is to be had for religious purposes, and yet great sums are spent by ministers on ministerial residences and such matters, while the taxes on property have risen to the extent of forty per cent.

There is a small Jesuit College in Seville, existing under a precarious toleration, and the Jesuits have another house, but no church of their own as yet. The rainy season was indeed upon us, and only the Cathedral could well be visited the first day. Thus Seville was seen to great disadvantage; but I think its charms have really been exaggerated. The Plaza Nueva, the principal square, is spoiled by the want of height in the houses which bound it, and if Madrid charmed us by being so much more Spanish than we expected, Seville disappointed by being so much less different from Madrid than we had supposed it to be. In the evening we went to the large and handsome Teatro San Fernando, where a very scanty audience witnessed a couple of very innocent farces, with enormously long intervals between their acts. The next day the weather permitted the visiting of the regulation sights, amongst them the great tobacco manufactory, where three thousand women are employed, in immensely long stone-vaulted halls, in making cigars and cigarettes. The chatter, closeness, and smell were trying phenomena, and in spite of so many hundred black eyes, by no means disposed to avoid observation, the whole thing was to us an unpleasing experience. Each hall, or ward, is under the control of a superioress, who accompanies the visitor through it and protects him from the possibly too great obtrusiveness of its other inmates. After this, the least pleasing sight of Seville, we went to one of the most pleasing, namely, to the celebrated tower of the Cathedral, called the Giralda (pronounced Heeralda). This tower, like the Campanile of San Marco at Venice, has no steps within, but only a gently inclined plane, up which a donkey could easily carry a visitor. Moreover there are many resting-places on the ascent, and there are large windows on every side at short intervals, so that there is plenty of light, and we frequently paused to enjoy the view in the four directions its four sets of windows respectively face. Hence, of course, the great plain on which Seville stands is well seen,—a plain bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena and on the

south by the very fantastically shaped mountains of Ronda, while to the east are visible the last spurs of the Sierra Nevada range. To the west the widening plain stretches out towards the distant sea.

The roof of the Cathedral has a very singular aspect when seen from above. It is like that of a northern cathedral with the wood-work and lead stripped off, for the undulating stone vaulting is here naked and unprotected by any covering.

The house of the Duke of Medina Cœli—commonly called the house of Pontius Pilate—gives the visitor an excellent idea of the sort of house most suitable to the character of the place. It consists of several open courts surrounded by arcades, from which the doors of the bedrooms, etc., open. Such arcades must form delightful drawing and reading rooms for summer use; since even, at the end of October, it was pleasant to sit there without hat or overcoat.

Happening, in an afternoon stroll, to look into the Church of St. Pablo, it was evident that some ceremony was about to take place there. It turned out to be a special confraternity service, and one which was fairly attended. The retablo behind the high altar was very elaborate, and extended quite up to the roof. It was not Gothic, but of much later date, and ornamented with many life-sized statues. Very high up in the middle line was a large gold crown surmounting a pair of curtains closed midway, with a candle on each side of the curtains. The retablos are so constructed that men can climb up, about, and behind them right up to the roof. The first thing done in preparation for the service was to light the two candles beside the curtains beneath the crown, and then other candles about the retablos and on the altar. Afterwards the rosary was said in Spanish, and then the curtains beneath the crown suddenly opened and exposed the Blessed Sacrament which they had hitherto concealed. Next followed prayers in Spanish and a sermon, after which we were compelled to leave without waiting for the end of the long service, which is called a *manifestacion*.

Circumstances so happened that I had either to miss Cadiz altogether, or to run over to it and back in one day; I chose the latter course, and therefore started on the 31st of October, at half past 7 in the morning, arriving at Cadiz at 12.50; and then returned, leaving Cadiz again at 3.45, and reaching Seville at 9 o'clock in the evening. Cadiz is so peculiar, and in many respects so pleasing a city, that it should on no account be missed. There was no time to stop at Jerez, which (apart from the highly ornate Gothic Church of San Miguel) has little interest, save what is connected with its wine trade, which had no attraction for us. As you approach the station next after Jerez—that of Puerto de Santa Maria—there is a charming view of Cadiz, which seems to rise like

an island out of the water. Seen across the bay it looks quite near, and yet it takes more than an hour to sweep round the long semi-circular strip of land at the extreme end of which Cadiz stands. I am told that for those who are in no hurry it is a good thing to sleep at Puerto Santa Maria (at the Vista Alegre Hotel, by the side of the water), and then to run across the Bay of Cadiz in the morning, when there is a magnificent view of the city of Cadiz from the steamer's deck. Proceeding, as I did, by rail, as you traverse the sandy neck of land which leads to Cadiz, you come upon what at first appears to be a military encampment. As it is more nearly approached the seeming white tents, however, turn out to be nothing but pyramids of salt. Shortly before getting to Cadiz, there is on the left (or sea) side of the train a fine large church, with a central dome and two large towers covered with blue tiles, producing a very pleasing aspect. During the last portion of the journey the sea comes close to the railway on each side of it.

The line of rail towards Cadiz is bordered not only by agaves and prickly pears, but is bright with white and yellow flowers, with the autumnal-flowering lilac crocus, which yields saffron; with the squirting cucumber, and a large yellow-fruited *Solanum*. Cadiz, in spite of its decay, is a clean, bright-looking city, with its long and narrow streets made picturesque by a multitude of projecting balconies. Its classical Cathedral is commonly abused, but to me it seemed both a noble and a devotional edifice, and preferable to many a Gothic church. All its altars are made of colored marbles, with jasper and other precious material, and there are none of the bedizened dolls, which, however they may suit the taste of the native poor, are such a trial to English-speaking Catholics. Thus at St. Pablo's at Seville I noticed (during the manifestation) that over many of the altars was a glass case containing a life-sized image, dressed up in clothes, and sometimes with a wig of real hair like a third-rate waxwork show, and forming almost the last expression of degraded taste in religious art. The Cathedral of Cadiz was completed at the private cost of a recent bishop, with the aid of the late Queen Isabella the Second. There is a charming drive around the city from the back of the Cathedral to the Alameda. On each side of the drive are very remarkable trees called "Sapote," with short stems and a scanty foliage of longish, thickish leaves. At the market were baskets of arbutus fruit, called by the Spaniards *madroño*.

At the Fonda de Paris a young Mexican was taking his breakfast, who was delighted to talk English, and was enthusiastic in his praises of Stonyhurst, where his education had been finished, and whither he was about to repair next month for recreation, the pleasure of seeing his old college and his Jesuit friends out-

weighing the disagreeableness of a long journey and an English November! This *rencontre* was a fortunate thing for me and for my English travelling companion, for the Mexican happened to remark: "In your English railway trains you have a compartment specially reserved for smokers, while here it is for non-smokers that such a reservation is made." Of such a reservation I had never heard in England, nor, until this time, in Spain; but, acting on the hint, I asked the station master, on returning to the station, for the carriage reserved for non-smokers, and obtained one with a placard duly affixed, in which the return journey to Seville was accomplished without the accompaniment of undesired tobacco fumes.

Meanwhile the king had arrived at Seville by the Guadalquivir on his return journey from visiting the sad scene of the Murcia inundations. His arrival was hours later than was expected, and when it was almost dark. No cheer greeted his arrival, nor was any enthusiasm shown at the theatre, to which he repaired before sleeping in the old Palace of the Alcazar.

On the next day, the Feast of All Saints, the Cathedral was early visited; and one of the first persons met by me in it was the little Anglican clergyman whom I had left at Menjíbar, determined to accomplish a journey to Grenada on foot, though unable to speak Spanish. He had not, I found, been able to succeed in this, in spite of great pluck and perseverance; and his adventures may serve as a caution to intending pedestrians in Spain. Yielding, to a certain extent, to my persuasion, he had taken the diligence from Menjíbar as far as Jaen, and then started to walk, about 1 o'clock in the day, in spite of the entreaties of the hotel people (who thought he must be demented) that he should wait for the diligence. He was provided with a knapsack, an umbrella, and a sword-stick. The rain began again to descend, and the road became frightfully muddy. He had not proceeded far, when he was attacked by a very large and fierce dog, which a boy in an adjoining field seemed too stupid to call off till my friend was almost exhausted with the effort to keep him away by the use of his sword-stick. This difficulty having been surmounted, he was, after a walk of a mile or two further, taken into custody by two gendarmes, who came out of a wayside cottage, demanding his passport. The passport he had unluckily neglected to have *viséd* by the Spanish authorities, so they naturally took him to be some escaped criminal,—the only sort of person in Spain who would choose to travel on foot. He was taken into the cottage and searched. Nothing suspicious being found, and cigars being proffered, he was left free to resume his march; but it was getting dark and no halting-place could be reached ere nightfall. He

therefore asked permission to stop till next day at the cottage. This was granted, and he was as well treated as the circumstances allowed. At supper the not-unwelcome stew had to be eaten without plates or forks, by the help of a spoon only, while wine was handed about from one to another in one single glass. At night a bed of straw was made for him and another man in the cooking and dining room, in which two horses, some sheep, and several cats also passed the night. The next day he continued his march in the rain, which came down in torrents. He was again arrested by gendarmes, and ultimately he had to stop and ask shelter in a village where he could find no inn. With difficulty getting what he wanted, he was compelled by fatigue and indisposition to wait for the diligence, getting into which he made the final stage of his journey to Grenada. The ill-effects of these trials having happily passed, he was now with me waiting to hear the Grand High Mass of the Feast of All Saints. The Cathedral choir was under repair, so the altar was at the west end of the choir screen, and the canons were seated on benches to the west of this, instead of in their proper "coro."

The bishop did not appear, neither did the king, for whom a throne on the Gospel side was nevertheless prepared. The music was good; but there was no assistant priest, only a priest, deacon, and subdeacon, with acolytes in dalmatics. I was interested to see that apparels were worn on the albs here, as at Milan. There was a sermon and procession, but the attendance of the people was scanty. The canons during the office and procession chatted one to another in a very free and easy way, and altogether the service was much less impressive than many a High Mass I have witnessed in England.

Before leaving Seville, a pious pilgrimage should be made by all lovers of the great Society of Jesus, to the University, for this is the old Jesuit College, and in its church are interesting tombs much older than itself, removed there from the old Carthusian monastery ruined by the revolution. Another effect of revolution has been the change of destination of what is now the Duke of Montpensier's Palace of San Telmo. This palace was an ancient nautical college founded by the son of Christopher Columbus. Ruined and plundered, it was given to the Duke in 1849, and thus (as is the case with so many other establishments in Europe), what formerly was a public good, now ministers but to private luxury. Robbery of the public for private gain is at once the cause and effect of so many of the so-called "liberal" measures, which the true English-speaking Liberals blush to see ticketed with so mendacious an appellation. Only the state rooms of the palace are shown to ordinary visitors. They are handsomely furnished with some good and

many interesting pictures, a large number of which naturally bear reference to events in France,—the accession and reign of Louis Philippe, etc. On the walls of a sort of cloister (inclosing a central court) is a complete representation of the Corpus Christi procession, as it used to take place in Seville in the old days. All the various orders of monks are represented following in due order; but heading the procession is a huge dragon, followed by half a dozen giants, made up like those which now figure in our pantomimes, or like the Gog and Magog of the Guildhall in London. The chapel of the palace could not, to our regret, be seen. Beneath it repose the remains of the deceased members of the duke's family, and it was to this chapel instead of to the Cathedral that the king went on this day to hear Mass, doubtless led by his affection for his late queen, Mercedes, whose by no means pleasing portrait is conspicuous amongst those of the other members of the family in the reception-rooms of the palace.

For one thing the inhabitants of Seville are really indebted to the duke,—the formation of a garden greatly superior to anything we had yet seen. Especially remarkable are the numerous fine palm trees, which have been planted about twenty years. Although a great number of laborers are employed to keep this very large garden in good order, yet to English eyes it seems a very untidy place, and the total absence of greensward is a great drawback to its charm. Of course greensward is an impossibility in the climate of Seville, but the attempt to produce a somewhat similar effect by the aid of a kind of houseleek is a great failure. Seen at a distance, one is led by it to imagine a pleasant stroll over soft grass, while a nearer approach shows but a rough, uneven surface, on which walking, if permissible, would certainly not be agreeable.

From the very modern palace of San Telmo we went the next day to that very ancient one, the Alcazar. Having secured an order and taken the precaution to ascertain beforehand that the order would admit us on Sunday morning, we were naturally somewhat taken aback on presenting it to be refused entrance by the surly porter—the only surly man we met with in Spain. We insisted, and finally sent in by a subordinate our passports to the superintendent, stating that admission then was our only chance of seeing the palace at all, as in a few hours we had to leave Seville for Grenada. The appeal was effectual. The dignified but courteous superintendent, who met us as we passed inwards, told us that we were admitted by special favor and exception. It would indeed have been a loss to have left Seville without seeing the Alcazar. It would, however, be better to see it after seeing the Alhambra, instead of, as we did, before visiting the latter, since the

latter's charm is somewhat destroyed by seeing the old Sevillian palace first.

Though built in the fourteenth century by that *Christian* king, Don Pedro the Cruel, the Alcazar is a perfectly Moorish building. In fact he employed Moorish workmen and intentionally imitated the Alhambra, which had been just before completed by his Mohammedan friend, the King of Grenada, Yusuf I.

The name Alcazar means "the House of Cæsar," and it occupies the site of the ancient Roman prætor's house. It bears the Gothic inscription: "El muy alto, y muy noble, y muy ponderoso, y conquistador Don Pedro, por la gracia de Dios, Rey de Castilla y de Leon, mandó facer estos Alcazares y estas façadas que fue hecho en la era mil quatro cientos y dos," *i. e.*, "The most high, noble, and powerful conqueror, Don Pedro, by God's grace King of Castile and Leon, ordered these buildings to be made in the era one thousand four hundred and two." By the "era" is meant the date from the fourth year of the Emperor Augustus, as before 1582 the Spaniards did not date from the birth of Christ.

The noble halls of the Alcazar, opening one into the other, with their beautifully decorated walls and slender columns, are full of charm of a certain kind. Graceful in the extreme, the impression conveyed by it is remarkably contrasted with that produced by the beauty of any Gothic analogous edifice. Perhaps this impression is simply due to subjective association and to the known co-existence of Moorish decoration and Mohammedan morals. But however this may be the impression conveyed is eminently soft and sensuous; nor could a residence seem less well fitted for carrying on anything like the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius. It was nevertheless hallowed by the passing away of a saint within its walls; for here is shown the spot where died St. Ferdinand, who conquered Seville from the Moors. The Alcazar, unlike the Alhambra, is no ruin; it is actually inhabited. Here the king stayed on his recent visit, and here Queen Isabella makes her home. Its walls are brilliant with color, having been restored in 1857.

The climate of Seville is trying to many constitutions, and dysentery is very frequent. The excessive moisture of the season was hurtful to my travelling companion, who looked eagerly for relief to the mountains of Grenada, our next resting-place, so that reluctantly Seville had at once to be left. There is now a train which takes the traveller pretty directly from Seville to Grenada, with only two changes of carriages: one at La Roda (where he meets the direct train going from Cordova to Malaga), and one at Boabdilla (whence starts the special line for Grenada). Though it was Sunday many laborers were to be seen from the train at work in their fields, and at Seville (as before at Madrid and Avila), the shops

seemed almost if not quite as open as on week days. A request for a carriage "resevado para los non fumadores" again had its happy effect, and after an agreeable journey of about six hours we reached the station of Boabdilla, where there is an excellent *fonda*. Both at this station and at La Roda handy young lads, with pleasant faces and pleasant manner, come to take care of your hand packages for you and place them in your next train, a help not to be despised by passengers hurrying for food. On this route Osana and Marchanda should be carefully noted by the passer-by, for their picturesqueness. Especially charming are the old Moorish walls and towers of Marchanda. The train for Grenada started from Boabdilla at a little after half past six, reaching its destination at 10.39. There being no moon, this picturesque part of the journey was for the present lost to us, but between Seville and La Roda the remarkable mountains of Ronda form a conspicuous object on the traveller's right.

With the arrival at the capital of the old Moorish kingdom the second step of our journey was happily accomplished. After the purely Christian and mediæval Burgos and Avila, after Valladolid and Madrid, cities of the Renaissance period; after the altogether peculiar Escorial, we had first met with the monumental expression of the coexistence, side by side, of Moor, Jew, and Goth, in the metropolitan city of Toledo. But in Toledo the triumphant Goth had evidently reduced the others to insignificance. There, beside a magnificent and triumphant minster, are confiscated synagogues and but insignificant though highly interesting mosques. In Seville the Moorish element asserts itself much more. It does so in the court of the Cathedral, in the Giralda, and, above all, in the fascinating Alcazar; while at Cordova the Cathedral itself is Moorish, and the Saracenic elements it contains seem to be amongst the most cherished of its sacred relics, while the whole city is redolent of Mahomet and of the East. We had thus, as we gradually approached the land of the Saracens, and receded from the purely Christian lands of the North, noted abundant external signs of these diverse influences and of the fluctuations in their relative predominance. Still the last of the Moorish kingdoms was as yet unvisited, and the charm of its romantic attraction was keenly felt. The day had been hot and dry, and the arid mountains, which succeeded the plains of Seville, had a parched and thirsty look. Dryness is the curse of so much of Spain, and we had traversed so many leagues of burnt-up land unmoistened by any visible rivulet, that the fact of its being such a curse was thoroughly impressed upon us. Arriving then in Grenada at night, as we sought our rest in the Fonda de los Siete Suelos (adjacent to the Alhambra), and slowly ascended the lofty hill to reach it, the mass of foliage, and

the lofty grove of close-set trees, through which we drove, had much charm, but yet more charming was the rushing sound of abundant gushing streamlets on either hand ; nor did the sound itself cease, for beneath the window of my bedroom a tiny fountain kept up the welcome music, and was the last sound of which I was conscious as I fell asleep for the first time of my life in what was the garden of Boabdil's palace in the city of Grenada.

THE CONFLICT OF CHRISTIANITY WITH HEATHENISM.

A VALUABLE work, with the above title, has recently been given to the world by Dr. Gerhard Uhlhorn, one of the leading Lutheran divines of Germany. The English translation has been well executed by Rev. E. C. Smyth and Rev. C. J. H. Ropes, and the book is brought out in excellent style by Charles Scribner's Sons. The work is confined almost exclusively to the contest between Christianity and Pagan Rome ; but it carries a moral and a lesson, applying to a conflict which has never ceased. This the author indicates by the secondary title of the German edition, *Pictures from the Past as Illustrations for the Present*.

We may retain his title, therefore, even while looking beyond the immediate limits of his theme. The combatants are ever the same. Christianity changes not ; and even when her adversaries have worn a Christian garb, the internal moving force has still been heathenism.

Dr. Uhlhorn's task was of such a nature that it would be unreasonable to expect in its execution an entire absence of sectarian bias. His Protestant instincts have, for instance, caused him to ignore the presence and labors of St. Peter in Rome, though the omission leaves an obscurity in regard to the introduction and spread of Christianity there, which he acknowledges but does not attempt to remove ; and, to be consistent with his prejudice, he sends St. Peter to Babylon of the East, though the bulk of historical and critical evidence is here against him. Naturally enough, he seeks to recognize in the early development of the Christian ministry a form of organization suited to his Lutheran views. Nor are we to wonder that sectarian bias should make him fail to appreciate the immense difference between the Church's attitude towards persecuting heathenism, and her course in regard to re-

ligious errors in Christian ages. But these evidences of prejudice are very few, and can well be overlooked. The author has throughout been animated by a love of Christianity, which superseded his sectarianism, and in this respect his work presents an honorable contrast to most of the products of Protestant pens.

One who wrote to criticise might object that the scope of the work is too narrow for its title. While purporting to narrate the conflict between Christianity and heathenism, it leaves almost untouched the struggles which planted the Cross among the nations of the great Orient, which Father Thébaud has described in his admirable work, *The Church and the Gentile World*. But in the mighty conflict fought out in the centre of the Roman Empire were comprised nearly all the various elements which distinguished the struggle in other lands, and its history may well be considered to stand for all.

Some, too, may find that he gives too much weight to the many facilities which smoothed the way for the introduction and spread of Christianity, thereby detracting from the argument in favor of the divinity of Christianity drawn from obstacles opposing it, obstacles which only the special intervention of the Almighty could have overcome. But while dwelling very fully on the causes which prepared the way before the fall of Our Lord, he has not ignored or diminished the difficulties which obstructed and tried to hinder His advance. And the former set of facts are not less eloquent than the latter in demonstrating the divine intervention. The preparation of the world for Christianity is not less evidently the work of God's hand than its miraculous victory over all the powers of evil. The work presents the great fact of Christianity's introduction and triumph in such light that no impartial mind can fail to see that it can be nothing short of a divine victory, the triumph of the God of truth, and love, and salvation over all the powers that have ever conspired for man's degradation and destruction. The book does not deal in arguments. It presents facts with the calmness characteristic of the German mind, and lets them speak for themselves. Only a word from the author here and there to call the reader's attention to their obvious meaning. But with this quiet simplicity it works out an admirable development and illustration of St. Augustine's argument. The Christian religion was established throughout the world either by miracles or without miracles; if by miracles, then it is divine; if without miracles, then that was the greatest of possible miracles, and, therefore, in either case it is divine.

Such a book, coming from a scholar of unquestioned repute, cannot but prove of incalculable benefit to the multitudes who are in danger of being led astray by rationalism in Germany and in

our own country. No candid and intelligent mind can go through this panoramic presentation of the events which introduce modern history without recognizing, whether he acknowledge it or not, that Christianity is no mythical outgrowth of human devices, but a divine creation, that no parallel can honestly be instituted between it and religions of human origin, and that no power can now hope to refute or overthrow a divine system which at its very birth vanquished their combined forces under more disadvantageous circumstances than can ever be expected to exist again. Most cordially do we welcome such a work, and we rejoice to welcome it from a Protestant hand. This for two reasons. The book will probably be read by many who need its lesson, and whom prejudice would prevent from ever opening it, if it were the work of a Catholic; and we are glad to see German Protestantism trying to make atonement for the harm it has done Christianity. Our readers do not need to hear from us what Protestant and infidel writers have so often declared of late, that German Protestantism is the parent of German rationalism; that Luther was the lineal progenitor of Kant and Feuerbach. Now that Protestantism has so well worked out its own refutation, in the unbelief which its principles have logically generated and spread abroad, not only in Germany, but in every other country where it has prevailed, and where thinking men have drawn its premises to their conclusions, we are glad to see it trying to stem the torrent which itself has started. Its efforts to refute rationalism can never prove Protestantism. Once it has persuaded erring minds to accept the great historical facts which are the basis of Christianity, they cannot well fail to glance down the stream of time, and recognize the only Church that can claim to be the Church of history, the sole inheritor and possessor of all Christian genealogy, of all the facts as well as all the doctrines of Christianity. May this work then be prospered in its career, and may similar works follow it in abundance. They will help both to save our generation from infidelity and to lead back wandering minds into the one sanctuary of Christian truth.

History presents no parallel to the series of events here presented before our eyes, by which the Christian Church was established throughout the Gentile world. From the very nature of the case it can have no parallel. In Christ Our Lord alone, without partner and without parallel, centre all the destinies of mankind; and the history of His Church is the history of her divine Spouse. He sent her into the world, as His Father had sent Him into the world, to carry the treasures of redemption to every creature. Around her pathway down the ages must, therefore, naturally cluster the wonders of God's mercy towards man, and the efforts

of poor man to profit by the offered blessing, or to assist and reject it.

When first the Bride of Christ, with timid tread, stepped into the midst of the darkness and corruption of the pagan world, she beheld everywhere the mingled evidences of how sadly the nations needed her healing, and how lovingly Divine Providence had prepared them to receive it. During the centuries which led up to the fulness of time, human nature had had time enough and opportunities enough to test what it could accomplish for man's welfare without the Redeemer; and it had been found terribly wanting. The state of the world was one of intellectual and moral despair. Every soul not altogether immersed in the mire of sensuality was reaching out in the dark towards a deliverance which it knew not how to attain. The noblest efforts of the human mind resulted only in the sighs of Plato, Cicero, and Seneca for a light from heaven that would lead to the truth. The sneering skepticism of Lucretius and Petronius finds its logical utterance in the sad wail of Pliny: "There is nothing certain save that nothing is certain, and there is no more wretched and yet arrogant being than man." Moral principles had shared in the universal destruction of truth, and so utterly hollow had become the profession of them that the great moralist Seneca had the same reputation for avarice, luxury, and immorality as the rotten court that praised his moralizing, and is charged with being the corrupter of Nero and the author of the letter in which the monster justified his murder of his own mother. Souls that groaned under the intellectual and moral chaos, and knew not how it could be remedied, could only exclaim with Cato and with Pliny: "The best thing which has been given to man amid the many torments of this life is that he can take his own life." Religion had become a mockery to the soul. The doctrines of polytheism were despised by the thinking classes, who yet observed its external rites in common with the unthinking herd, partly through mere custom, partly through superstition,—a weakness evident in even the noblest among them,—and mainly, as Seneca said, "as commanded by the laws."

Such a loss of all principle necessarily led to an absence of all morality. Seneca sums up the condition of his time by saying: "All things are full of iniquity and vice. So public has iniquity become, so mightily does it flame up in all hearts, that innocence is no longer rare; it has ceased to exist." The marriage tie was the sport of lust; children were mere annoyances, over which parents had the power of life and death. The great bulk of populations were slaves, who had no rights of human beings. Labor was a disgrace to a freeman; the free plebeians were content to live on the largesses of the state, and the patricians, revelling in

the wealth poured into their coffers by the labor of the slaves and the revenues of the provinces, passed their slothful existence in a refinement of sensuality, and an extravagance of luxury and magnificence, the sober recital of which sounds like romance. Man had rights and value only as a citizen, not as man. Human life was a mere toy, and the shedding of human blood the favorite popular sport. The amphitheatre and the circus rang with the applause of hundreds of thousands of spectators when writhing men and women poured out their heart's blood beneath the gladiator's dagger or the wild beast's fangs, and no young maiden was found so delicate as to turn in horror from the spectacle; nor can we find in their literature any condemnation of these horrid butcheries of human beings for the amusement of their fellows. Need we wonder that Pliny and Galen picture their generation as an effeminate, flabby, and rotten race, physically and intellectually ruined, not worthy the name of men?

Christianity came with all that was needed for the cure of a dying world. She brought the treasures of divine truth for those darkened minds, divine charity for those palled and feelingless hearts, divine life for those dead souls. She came to teach the priceless value of every human soul, be it in the body of a child or a slave, and to prove it by the ransom paid for them by the Son of God. She came to teach men the dignity of labor, and women the beauty of chastity. She came to give sacredness to the marriage tie, and, through a right appreciation of parental responsibilities, to bestow upon the world the happiness and holiness of the Christian home. She came to soften the asperities of social distinctions by the sweet charity of universal brotherhood in Christ. She came to rescue society from an enslavement which had made the emperor the ruling deity, and to rebuild it on the basis of law finding its force in the sacredness of human rights, and in the sanction of a God to whom rulers are as responsible as the ruled. She came to change and to bless all human relationships, by bringing all into accord with the will of our Father in heaven, and filling the earth with the freedom of the children of God.

The Expected of the nations had not only fitted His spouse for their healing; He had also prepared the paths which were to give her access to them, bringing low the hills and filling up the valleys, making the crooked ways straight and the rough ways smooth, that all flesh might see the salvation of God. Hitherto nations and tribes were walled in with barriers of exclusiveness and hostility against every neighbor; now all separations were broken down by common subjection to an almost universal empire, and thus ingress was offered to the heralds of the truth. Hitherto religions were as national and exclusive as languages and customs; now commu-

nity of laws had led to interchange of religions. Each nation had welcomed the gods of its neighbors, while Rome had received them all, and thus all were prepared to listen when told of the Christian God. The general tendency of cultured minds which still believed in any divinity was toward monotheism. Their belief was indeed mostly pantheistic, but it had cleared away the tangle of polytheism as an intellectual obstacle, and thus far prepared for faith in one God, the Creator of all things. The national religions having failed to supply the needs or guard the morals or fill the hearts of men, longing eyes were yearningly turned back toward the primitive home of the human family, toward the Orient, which had beheld the Saturnian reign of the golden age. Suetonius and Tacitus tell us how all then looked toward the East, and how the opinion had spread that from the race of the despised Jews was to come the ruler of the world. And now she came, His own Bride, in His name and with His power and His ever-abiding presence, to extend His kingdom unto the ends of the earth.

Wonderful truly are these two sets of providential facts,—the mortal necessities of the human race which Christianity alone could supply, and the entirely exceptional state of things which thus prepared all nations and all minds to receive and welcome her. God had well prepared for her; but from man she had little but hostility to expect. The very corruption and spiritual misery which made the need of her so great, could not but rise in bitter opposition against a religion of self-denial and holiness. Elect souls there were, indeed, in every clime, disgusted with the rottenness around them, craving for better things, and ready, when the divine fire should touch them, to be at once enkindled by it. But the bulk of mankind clung to the evil of their deeds, and therefore hated the light. Heathenism had deified sensuality, had turned self-indulgence into religiousness; no wonder that a corrupt generation turned from a religion based on chastity. Heathenism had deified self-reliance, had made pride a virtue, and the ambition of dominion a national duty; no wonder that pampered pride spurned with contempt a religion of humility, meekness; and lowliness of heart, of repentance and salvation through a Saviour's blood. Every instinct of the human heart which heathenism had fostered could not but rebel against Christianity.

But most formidable of all was the opposition that was inevitable for political reasons. Heathenism was essentially national. No foreign God could be worshipped, no foreign religion admitted save by sanction of the government, and on condition of subjection to its sway and dictation; a violation of this law was treason. Every official position was hedged around with heathenish observances; the ordinary relations of business and social life were af-

tended with, and sanctioned by, heathenish rites ; and this entire pervading of the whole social fabric with heathen religiousness had for its climax the deification of the emperor, who was not only the *Pontifex Maximus*, but the *Divus Imperator*, to whose statues divine honors had to be offered on every public occasion as a condition of social standing. Here were difficulties hedging the way of Christianity on every side, and so calculated to absolutely impede her progress, nay, so threatening her very life, that only the God who had given her mission could enable her to fulfil it.

The Christian converts were in conscience forced to withdraw from associations which at every step would have demanded a denial of their faith. Naturally enough, then, they became objects of popular suspicion. They were atheists, because they did not worship the Gods. They hated mankind, because they sought to lead lives of seclusion. They were useless drones, because they shunned public employments. They were enemies of the state and emissaries of foreign powers, because they did not offer sacrifice to the emperor. Their religious service being carried on only in secret, to avoid profane intrusion, soon popular prejudice had distorted the Eucharist into a horrid cannibalism, and their love-feasts into orgies of lust. The fate of the Bride of Christ was sealed from the beginning of her career. Persecution was to be her portion. Like her Divine Spouse, she could give life to the poor dead world only at the cost of her own crucifixion.

At first the Christians were considered too contemptible a faction to be noticed by the state. Outbursts of popular hatred and mob violence were the chief danger. Even the persecution of Nero may be considered a culmination of the blind detestation and superstitious dread with which the slanders currently believed had animated the masses against the disciples of the crucified. The monster, in order to shield himself against the popular fury which his crimes had deserved, adroitly turned it against the Christians as the enemies of mankind and the objects of the hatred of the Gods. Tacitus tells us that an immense multitude (*ingens multitudo*) of Christians were slain in this persecution, and he enumerates the fiendish devices of torture by which they were put to death. But he has no word of condemnation for the atrocities. They were innocent, he says, of the crimes laid to their charge, but they deserved their treatment because of their hatred of mankind. Strange blindness of prejudice ! They who brought to the world the new commandment of universal charity were accused of hating the whole human race !

Still onward Christianity struggled amid the malignity of the heathen multitude ; nor until about forty years after Nero's death did the state deem the despised sect worth legal notice. And well

had the Church profited by the obscurity in which she was left to spread abroad the good leaven of life and salvation. She availed herself of the countenance given to burial societies, and such was for a long time the ostensible guise she wore, just as later the burial-places were to be her refuge and her sanctuaries. The toleration given to the Jews was, for awhile, a shield to her, as the Christians were popularly regarded as a sect of the Jews, only the meanest and worst sect among them. But soon the hatred of the Jews for Christianity robbed her of this poor protection, and the destruction of the Jewish nation under Vespasian stripped the cloak from her entirely; and, finally, it was argued that while Judaism had the merit of being a national religion, Christianity, having no national character, was worse than Judaism, and by its very nature an enemy of the state. At length, under Trajan, the question of how to deal with Christianity forced itself upon the empire as a state question, and Pliny applied to the emperor for instructions. Trajan's decree, while making a show of leniency toward a superstition which was still reckoned an object rather for contempt than for dread, yet declared it a crime against the law to be a Christian, and decreed the penalty of treason against all who should be convicted. This was the law regulating action towards Christianity for about one hundred and fifty years, at times used as a sanction for leniency, and at others pouring out Christian blood in torrents, in the vain endeavor to force obedience to the laws which forbade foreign worships and commanded homage to the country's gods and sacrifice to the divine emperor.

Meantime Christianity had spread throughout the empire, had invaded the army, the forum, the senate, the palace of the emperor, had won the allegiance and love of rhetoricians and philosophers, as well as of the simple-hearted multitude. It could no longer be sneered at; violence seemed to have no effect upon it; philosophy, therefore, came to the attack with all its forces of argument and sophistry. Celsus led the way as the advocate of pure paganism. All that consummate ability could do with misrepresentation and sophistry this heathen philosopher did. As Dr. Uhlhorn clearly shows, he has anticipated every objection of modern rationalists and unbelievers. Then came Porphyry with the Neoplatonic school. They tried to combine in their system the philosophy of Plato, the dogmas of Christianity, the dreams of pantheism, and the worship of heathenism; and this they vauntingly offered as far superior to Christianity. Next, Philostratus, and others after him, tried another sort of tactics. He took the life of a wandering magician named Apollonius of Tyona, and dressed it up into a copy of the life of our Divine Lord, as if to prove that heathenism could produce and had produced miracles, virtues, and wisdom

equal to those of the Christian's God. But all was in vain. Christian apologists and philosophers were ready to refute their sophistry, and to prove that in the arena of argument, as well as in that of the amphitheatre, Christianity was invincible. Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, and others worsted the sophists, proclaimed to the emperor, the senate, and the Roman people the injustice of their persecution and the truth of Christianity, and have left to the Church a literature and a philosophy to be lastingly proud of.

The influence of Christianity was felt everywhere. It was gradually forcing heathenism to an amelioration of morals, evidenced by the laws and the literature of the close of the second and the beginning of the third century. It had grown into proportions which forced public recognition and extorted public admiration. Jesus Christ was offered a niche in the heathen pantheon, and Christian worship a place in the religion of Rome, on condition of fraternity with heathenism and subjection to the state; an offer whose refusal could but lead to deeper hate and bitterer persecution. The fact grew slowly evident that Christianity was a power which threatened to dethrone heathenism, and supplant it as the life of the state. This recognition roused the heathen heart to fury. The extermination of the sect was no longer to be left to mob violence or to the slow process of law. A consciousness spread abroad that the life of the empire was in danger. The result was a fanatical revival of devotedness to heathenism in its lowest and most superstitious forms, and a corresponding intensity of determination to crush out its adversary. A series of soldier emperors came to the throne, who led the way in fanaticism and fury, and decreed the general persecutions which knew no law but that of extermination. From Decius to Diocletian and Galerius, the Church was scarcely allowed a breathing-time. The empire was deluged in blood, and everywhere the Christians were found to be what Tertullian called them, "a people always ready to die." So fearful was the devastation that a medal was struck in Diocletian's time with the inscription: *Deleto Christianorum Nomine*—the name of the Christians wiped out. Vain boast! Even in the fiercest of the storm, "the blood of the martyrs was ever the seed of the Church," and when Diocletian, Galerius, and Constantius Chlorus met with the fate which their sacrilegious crimes deserved, at the very first word of peace uttered by Constantine the Christian Church was ready to emerge from the caverns and hiding-places and cover the face of the earth. God had given heathenism time enough in these almost three hundred years to do the best and the worst of which it was capable, and it lay prostrate and vanquished at the feet of the

Bride of Christ. The miracle of the *Labarum* and the conversion of Constantine were but the crown upon three centuries of miracles. The history of the old and the new eras in the history of mankind was summed up in the picture which Constantine suspended over the entrance of his palace in Byzantium, the emperor himself holding in his hand the standard of the cross, with his foot resting on the prostrate and dying dragon of heathenism. The little stone, cut without hands from the mountain-side, had broken the brazen colossus in pieces, and had become a great mountain, which filled the earth.

While gaining her victory over heathenism by the heroism of martyrdom and the power of the Spirit, Christianity had, during the three centuries of her existence, undergone internal trials which forced the development of her doctrine, her discipline, and her organization. Gnosticism, which was Neoplatonism trying to invade the Church, had sought to corrupt the truth concerning the unity of God and concerning the Trinity, Creation, the Incarnation, and the Redemption. But the spirit of truth was ever ready to turn these attacks of error to the Church's good by drawing out the true doctrine in greater explicitness and clearer light. Then laxity towards the *lapsed* on the one hand, and Montanistic rigorism and harshness on the other, sought to render her discipline incompatible either with the holiness of the faith or with the weakness of humanity. But again the spirit of counsel guided her action and her decrees, so that no principle of holiness should be sacrificed and yet no repentant sinner debarred from the Church's blessings. And while the Divine Master permitted these questions and difficulties to arise which demanded the exercise of the Church's teaching and ruling authority, He, by the very fact, pushed on the development and organization of the hierarchial authority which was then and at all times to meet and repel the attacks of error, to regulate discipline, and to guard the Church's unity against the danger of schism. The Church had grown amid trial and strife to the maturity of her stature and her strength, and was ready for all the vicissitudes of her checkered career. She had grown fit to be the Church, not only of the desert and catacombs, but of society, of mankind in all its conditions. She had proved that she could bear the worst that tyranny could inflict upon her; now she was to show that she could safely endure the still more dangerous trial of teaching rulers how to govern, of becoming the life of the social system, and the author of a new civilization.

But it was the will of God that one more tempest should come. Julian, the Apostate, labored for the restoration of heathenism with an earnestness, an energy, and an ability which none of his predecessors had equalled, and finally with a cruelty which few of

them had surpassed. He sought to destroy the foundations of Christianity by hindering the Christian worship, by subjecting every class to heathen jests and conditions, and finally laid the axe to the very root by prohibiting Christian education and allowing none but heathen teachers. Again blood flowed in abundance, and again the Christians showed themselves everywhere ready to die. The Church's heart quailed not. Said St. Athanasius: "*Nebecula est; transibit*,"—"It is only a little cloud; it will pass." And when the rhetorician Libanius tauntingly asked a Christian priest: "What is your Carpenter's Son doing now?" quickly came the reply: "He is making a coffin for your emperor." The coffin was soon needed. When Julian, soured and maddened by the signal failure of his efforts, fell at last beneath the blow of a Persian spear, his death-cry was the death-cry of heathenism: "Nazarene, thou hast conquered!"

One need not be a theorizer in order to read a philosophy of history in three centuries of events such as have here been sketched. The Christian sees in them the seal of his Church's divinity, the guarantee of her perpetuity. They prove it with a concrete force beyond the power of all words and arguments. He who studies well their meaning finds doubt to be a moral impossibility. Were his faith for a moment to be staggered by the sophistry of the age, he has only to turn from the puzzle of words to the mighty fabric of God-made facts, and from their every nook and corner echoes out the Saviour's rebuke: "How can ye doubt; O ye of little faith?" Dr. Brownson has well said that the strongest proof of the divinity of the Church is the Church herself as an historical fact. No amount of sophistry can melt away her majestic proportions, and whoso examines them intelligently and impartially must see that they could have no architect but God, and that no power but His could have kept them intact amid the tempest of the centuries. And should courage fail at the prospect of her future, threatened by the attacks of so many hostile forces, she points, like David, to the lion and the bear that she strangled in her youth,—the lion of heathenism and the bear of barbarism,—as guarantee enough that she has nothing to fear from any Goliath who may now threaten her life.

Heathenism still rages against her in the civil power. We seem to view the portrait of more than one state of the Europe of to-day in this description of the heathen state given by Dr. Uhlhorn: "Human life was on all sides absorbed in civil life; the state embraced and regulated all its departments. A pagan could not conceive the possibility of there being any sphere of human life which was not reached by the power of the state. It was to him wholly incomprehensible that a man could believe himself con-

strained from regard to his conscience, for the sake of God and in order to obey God, to refuse obedience to any law or ordinance of the state whatsoever." Sentiments identical with these have lately been enunciated in more than one European legislature. Decius and Julian have furnished models for the policy of more than one statesman and ruler of our day. But their might can never surpass that of the Roman Empire, which, when it threw itself against the little stone from the mountain-side, was dashed to pieces.

Heathenism still assails her in philosophy. Lucretius, and Pliny, and Celsus, and Porphyry, and Lucian, and the rest have their disciples to-day, who give forth the old sophisms in new words and with modern cleverness. There will be some to applaud now, as there were in the olden time, but they can harm the Church just as little now as then. They may be so enamoured with their own conceits as to fancy they have slain the Church. Some of them tell us now that she is dead and they are looking around for her successor, for the Church of the Future. Diocletian proclaimed as confidently as they, and with just as much truth, that the Christian name was wiped out. The Church passes on in her pathway of light and leaves these poor obscurantists to darkle in the gloom they love, muttering like Pliny that there is nothing certain except that nothing is certain. The strangest folly in the comedy of human errors is the complacent blindness of our modern Agnostics to the leading and most palpable facts in past and present history.

Heathenism attacks Christianity in modern science; or rather no, but in the gratuitous theories tacked on to science. Of science the Church has no fear, though she has often had to give it a mother's warning not to be foolish in its conceits, to be satisfied with being science, and not aspire to be theology. Science is the busy delver in the labyrinths of nature, bringing to light the hidden forces whose combinations aid the work and smooth the way of human life. And all her discoveries the Church blesses, and in all of them finds new reason for glory and thanks to the Author of nature. Conflict between the two is impossible. When scientists try to be theologians, and to correct revelation, the result must be that of the frog in the fable; and plenty of theories that have exploded within the last fifty years show this to be true. Infidel philosophy may try to transform science into a brazen colossus to withstand the Church; but the monster is sure to have feet of clay,—it has no principles to stand on,—and its fortune can only be to be overthrown.

In one form or other it is still heathenism arrayed against Christianity in perpetual conflict, and it is still also doomed to perpetual defeat. The past is guarantee enough for the future.

Mr. Leslie Stephen, an English writer of some reputation, may

be taken as a fair average exponent of the Agnostic evolutionism, which claims to be the most advanced phase of modern thought. In two articles, lately published in the *Fortnightly Review* and the *North American Review*, he presents views having a direct bearing on the subject now under consideration, and which admirably illustrate the self-contradictoriness and the blindness to facts which ordinarily characterize this type of thought. In the first-mentioned of these articles, "An Attempted Philosophy of History," he criticises Buckle's *History of Civilization*, and very conclusively shows the utter worthlessness and unreliableness of that once famous work. It is, he says, a signal failure, because its author not only paints everything in the colors of his own strong prejudices, but also has no principle of a philosophy in his mind or in his work; because he recognizes no evolution in history, but as a disciple of an effete school sees in each state of things only the result of a fortuitous set of circumstances, just as the same school sees even in the mind itself no entity beyond the result at any moment of its actual contents. Hence Buckle's great work is, says Mr. Stephen, a set of "un-systematic and haphazard generalizations," and it now lies "stranded on a shore from which the tide of speculation has ebbed." In this condemnation, as of the same school, are comprised Hume, Hartley, Bentham, and Mill. He might have added Gibbon as an historian of the same class. He would scarcely notice Dr. Draper as worthy of being classed with the school, or sharing in their sentence.

In the second-named article, "The Religion of all Sensible Men," Mr. Stephen makes his own attempt at a philosophy of history, and in direct reference to the subject of our reflections, the origin of Christianity and its future prospects. We might expect him to profit by the failure which he has signalized in Buckle; but he seems to have forgotten what himself had written, to ignore what evolution means, and to be as blind to facts and their bearings as the would-be historian of civilization. After stating that in the great struggle with heathenism "Christianity triumphed because best suited to the nature of the average men of the time," and that it has lived all these ages since because it is "a creed capable of clothing the vague emotions of many generations," he then philosophizes to the effect that Christianity grew from the circumstances of the times, as did the genius of a Shakespeare or a Dante. Besides seeing here an instance of the system of philosophizing which he so emphatically condemned in Buckle, no one can help recognizing an astounding forgetfulness of the circumstances of the case. Had he not lost sight of the facts under the pressure of his theory, he could not have forgotten that Christianity was not an outgrowth of Greek or Roman civilization, but came into its midst from outside as a foreign and an-

tagonistic force, was combated by it for three hundred years, and triumphed by supplanting it. The theory which blinded him is that religion is only the philosophy of an epoch put in the form and coloring that will bring it within the reach of ordinary understandings. He forgot that in every instance in history, and especially in the case of Christianity, religion preceded philosophy, and philosophy grew out of religion in the attempt to fathom and illustrate its truths, or to recover and rebuild them when lost. To imagine Christianity developing from Roman heathenism would indeed be to "gather grapes from thorns and figs from thistles." Evolution is growth, and its law is that "the evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit."

He goes on to say: "Christianity was doubtless the result of a spirit of social discontent. But in its origin it proposed a remedy no longer appropriate to modern wants. It has had its development, but not in the required direction." If we ask where the deficiency lies, he answers because Christianity "considers poverty sacred and inevitable, instead of an evil to be extirpated, and because it points to hope of heaven instead of gradual development." Now if modern science, which is the great central fact around which he rallies the hopes of the future, has ever devised a plan in which poverty would not be inevitable, we have never heard of it, certainly are far from seeing any of its results. And if poverty is inevitable, then surely it is a strange crime to teach men to sanctify it. And how the hope of heaven can dampen ardor in any laudable enterprise, or how men can be nerved to nobler exertions by believing that there is no immortality, is what Mr. Stephen does not attempt to show, and what we have no power to imagine. To an Agnostic, however, facts and arguments have naturally but little weight when they conflict with his subjective theory; so he takes it for granted that Christianity no longer suits the needs of the world, and immediately goes on to take it for granted that Christianity is already virtually dead, and that the Agnostic mode of thought, although not explicit in all minds, "has been thoroughly worked into the emotions and beliefs of mankind." If we mistake not, the bulk of mankind would question the correctness of Mr. Stephen's diagnosis of their intellectual and spiritual condition; and without pretending, like him, to scrutinize the inner heart of mankind, we may venture to call attention to two facts. Mr. Stephen acknowledges in the article now considered that the average mind of the present day is by no means more advanced or more independent than was the average mind of the Augustan era, and he nowhere indicates the conviction that himself and his fellow Agnostics are greater philosophers or mightier leaders of thought than were the philosophers of that classic period. Where

then he finds the necessity for a new departure in religion, or how he concludes that Christianity must now collapse before an antagonism over which it then so divinely triumphed, is far from easy to discover. Yet he and a few others who think themselves the vanguard of advancing humanity take it all for granted, and are busy trying to find a coffin and a grave for the undying Bride of Christ. And it seems they find some to believe them among those who take strong assertion for proof. The *Nineteenth Century* recently had an article from that saddest and strangest of all abnormal beings, an Agnostic woman. Replying to Mrs. Lathbury's Christian appeal to the minds and hearts of her countrywomen, Miss Clapperton argues to this effect: Men are giving up Christianity and becoming Agnostics; if women cling to Christianity, there will be an intellectual chasm between them and men which will be disastrous; therefore, it is the duty of women to become Agnostics. Stripped of its verbiage this is what the article amounts to. This poor woman, and those who are deluding her, will some day discover that the asserted failure of Christianity which now misleads them is only an echo of Diocletian's empty boast.

The radical fault in Mr. Stephen and his fellows is that they utterly fail to see the application of their own theory of evolution. The theory has much in it that is true; it is in the use of it that they blunder. Were there not an evolution in history there would be no philosophy of history, there would be no providence in history. God's plans, in the social as in the physical world, develops in a harmonious order, which the perversity of man's free will cannot thwart. The declaration of the Agnostics, that while recognizing in society "the development of an organic structure by slow secular processes," they will no longer admit the guidance of a supernatural hand, can in no way alter or annul the conclusion forced upon unbiassed minds by facts and reason. To such minds, as the existence of infinite beings is evidence of the creative act of God, so the course of history is evidence of His providence towards His intelligent creatures, and the history of religion is the history of revelation. That history runs down all the course of time, and is the grandest specimen and evidence of evolution that the annals of the human race present. A glance at it will close these reflections.

The existence of good and evil in the world is inseparably bound up with the first teaching of revelation, namely, the fall of man and the promise of a Redeemer. From that double primeval fact starts the evolution of religion. In the olden times, while the bulk of mankind, acting out the results of the fall, drift farther and farther in the erring of the mind and the corruption of the heart, one people remains unchanged, the people of the patriarchs and

the prophets, the custodian of the promise, the progenitor of the Messiah according to the flesh. The history of these thousands of years is the history of religion preparing for the Messiah. When the fulness of time has arrived, he comes, fulfilling all the promises and prophecies, the centre and summing up of all the centuries that have preceded Him. Having accomplished the redemption for which the world has so long been sighing, He establishes Christianity, not destroying the law and the prophets but fulfilling them, and the old religious dispensation passes into the new without a break in the continuity of the evolution. The instrumentalities change, but not the plan or its development. The Christian religion goes forth, embodying the providence of God for the salvation of a world which, by following nature, had wrought out intellectual, social, and moral ruin. The Christian Church is the messenger of the dispensation and the agent of its blessings; therefore, the Church is the representative on earth of God's providence and man's religion, and hence she becomes the central figure in the philosophy of history. We have seen the conflict she had to stand and the triumph she achieved. As a mountain stream, when withstood by some accumulated tangle, only mounts higher and grows wider and deeper, till at last with irresistible force it breaks through the barrier and carries its fragments in the flood, so was it with Christianity and heathenism. The centuries of opposition only deepened and perfected her life and strength. It was no emperor's favor that gave her power and victory. Her triumph over every obstacle was already complete; and when Constantine flung to the breeze the white banner of peace, she was ready to step forth the radiant spouse of the King of kings.

Then God brought the barbarian hordes over the face of Europe, not only to wipe out the iniquities of the heathen Babylon, but also to become the disciples of Christianity. While yielding to her divine power, their rude and arrogant nature could not but develop new difficulties and new combats. This time they were not to be attacks from outside, assaults upon her life, but attacks from inside, assaults upon her spirit, difficulties raised by her own children. The former could give only unmingled glory in the triumph; the latter, though sure to end in victory and to teach the world a needed lesson, could not fail to leave the Church much to mourn over, in the unworthiness of those who were to be the instruments of the trial and the occasion of the victory. This is the summing up of the Middle Ages, during which the Church had to turn barbarians into Christians, and to struggle with the dispositions of her barbarian or semi-barbarian disciples. Lust of power and plunder had brought them from their homes to invade the Roman provinces; the same too often animated them in their

dealings with the Church. Lust of power sought to use for earthly ambition the sacred power that had both Christianized and civilized them. Lust of plunder was ever ready to grasp the patrimony of the poor, and make questions of revenue and tribute tests of allegiance to truth and Christian duty. Here were Christianity and heathenism still in conflict. The temporary sway of the heathen force produced the iron age of the tenth and eleventh centuries; the triumph of the Christian spirit gave the golden age of the twelfth and thirteenth. Men with neither fairness nor philosophy in their composition, like Buckle and the rest whom Mr. Stephen so well exposes, have so misrepresented or blundered as to picture the iron age as the Church's work. The very contrary is the truth. It was the temporary sway of barbarian heathenism, which the Church finally burst through and drove before her, as she did the heathenism of Diocletian and Julian.

Then came a new age with new difficulties. The Church of Christ had brought the nations from barbarism to civilization and culture. Their pride of intellect came to ally itself with previous antagonists, and to lead them on to fresh assaults. Private judgment was proclaimed as a substitute for the teaching which Christ had commanded His spouse to impart to the world forever. It was clearly the revolt of human pride as it was in the Gnostics of the first and second centuries. Logically acting out the pagan spirit which, though not avowedly, really animated the attack, it decried chastity, it desecrated the marriage tie, it proclaimed nationalism in religion, it declared the prince supreme in spiritual as in temporal matters, it revived the heathen motto: *Cujus regio, illius religio*; as nearly as Christian times could permit it renewed the reign of the *Divus Imperator*. No wonder that the intellectual result is again heathenism,—rationalism, skepticism, agnosticism, pantheism.

The conflict has never ceased, and the combatants have ever been the same,—the fall and the redemption,—heathenism and Christ. He is blind to historical facts who does not see the unbroken continuity, the unceasing evolution, from Eden to the Vatican. The offspring of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century have no foundation in history, and they have no capability of evolution. Their principle is individualism; their evolution can be only disintegration of doctrine and of sect. The Church from which they tore themselves retains ever the divine vital force which has been the unfailing life of Christianity. She alone, as Mr. Froude has lately avowed, is a living organism; and therefore she alone, according to Mr. Stephen's definition, is capable of evolution. Protestantism is proved by science, as well as by Scripture and history, not to be the Bride of Christ, the everlasting Church.

While the process of disintegration, of crumbling and decay, goes on outside, the Catholic Church loses nothing, gives up nothing, but like an ever vigorous tree, puts forth her leaves and her fruit for the shelter, the healing, and the nourishing of the nations. Each fresh attack of error and of evil only leads to new safeguards for faith and virtue. In a word, she alone is the complete body of truth, possessing in entirety what the sects hold in scattered fragments, and she alone has the vital organic force which is to render her life and her evolution commensurate with the ages that will need the Redemption.

The Catholic Church challenges criticism and examination as the central fact of history, the great, undying, divine fact of all ages. They need to study it well who are in danger of slipping through rationalism into unbelief, because standing in the quicksand of a system which, though retaining love of Christ and some Christian truth, is not Christianity. And sadly do they need to study it who, because they have drifted out into the darkness, fancy that Christianity is dead, and grope around for what is to take its place, although they acknowledge through Mr. Stephen that they know not where they are to find it or what it is to be. We have no hope that any amount of study or of evidence will ever end the conflict between Christianity and heathenism. But it may save some souls that are perishing in the strife.

A PIONEER OF THE WEST—REV. CHARLES NERINCKX.

The Life of Rev. Charles Nerinckx. With a Chapter on the Early Catholic Mission of Kentucky: Copious Notes on the Progress of Catholicity in the United States of America, from 1800 to 1825; An account of the Establishment of the Society of Jesus in Missouri; and an Historical Sketch of the Sisterhood of Loretto in Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, etc. By Rev. Comillus P. Maes, Priest of the Diocese of Detroit. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1880. 8vo., 635 pages.

THE history of the Catholic Church in the United States is steadily receiving contributions of a valuable character in the form of local annals or biographies, which will not only give edifying and encouraging reading to the faithful and inspire a taste for such books, but will also make the preparation of a general account of the kingdom of God in this land more feasible and creditable.

The Rev. Mr. Maes, in a work of conscientious research, lays before us the life of one who at the commencement of this century did his full share of zealous mission work. Of his compeers we have now the lives of several, more or less fully given, Cardinal Cheverus, unfortunately not in detail, Prince Galitzin, Bishop Bruté, Father Anthony Kohlman, very briefly, Bishop Flaget, and, we may say, Rev. Mr. Baden, in Archbishop Spalding's *Sketches of Kentucky*.

The state of Catholicity in this country at the close of the last century was peculiar. Maryland and Pennsylvania had their little Catholic congregations, formed for years by the care of the Jesuit Fathers; Kentucky had emigrants from Maryland, who, growing up without missionaries, had lost some of the practice of faith and acquired no little of border characteristics; in other parts Catholics chiefly from abroad, more or less Protestantized by contact with those around them, often strangers for years to the sacraments, and with those who were more successful in life, anxious to conform to the prevailing spirit and show great liberality.

The suppression of the Society of Jesus had cut off the source which had for a century and a half supplied the British colonies with clergy, and the ex-Jesuits, disheartened and despondent, seem, like many of the clergy in England and Ireland, to have inclined to take more timid and less compromising views, and to have looked to a certain yielding to Protestant forms and ideas as the only way of keeping Catholicity alive.

The newly formed seminary and college could not for years

give the priests required. Europe offered clergymen, at first, indeed, in many cases not of the highest stamp, either in ecclesiastical learning and influence or in priestly bearing; but when infidelity at last bore its terrible fruit there, the priests who came to this country included many remarkable men, who have left the impress of their zeal on the Church. They were not men of the same school, or trained in the same national or even ecclesiastical ideas. They represented different phases of thought in regard to discipline and government, and yet there is something wonderful in the result, as we see priests so dissimilar in education and training, each with national and personal peculiarities, working among flocks so strange to them, and to whom in turn they must have been so uncongenial, bringing about uniformity and moulding all into one homogeneous body, receiving, assimilating, and adopting new elements as in time they came pouring rapidly in. It is a spectacle impossible out of the Catholic Church, and rare even in its history.

There is perhaps no more striking contrast than the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx in Kentucky, stern, rigid, uncompromising and severe, and Cheverus in New England, courteous, winning, encouraging the least sign of good will, seeking to call men to the fold and keep them within it by the smoothest and gentlest ways. Yet we should expect to see a Nerinckx placed in the criminal dock with thieves and drunkards and brawlers rather than the gentler Cheverus, and would look for such treatment of a priest in the backwoods of Kentucky rather than under the jurisdiction of Massachusetts; but the reverse was the case. Cheverus, whose name is still mentioned with honor by men of all classes in New England, was subjected to this gross indignity, when the sterner Nerinckx by the force of his character controlled the wilder and untutored frontiersmen.

Of the remarkable clergymen of his time Prince Galitzin perhaps bore more resemblance to Rev. Mr. Nerinckx. Both had the same strict ideas of discipline, both established rules as to the dress and amusements of their parishioners, and maintained them rigidly; but while both were severe to themselves, Galitzin was ever disposed to excuse fellow-priests when others censured them, while Rev. Mr. Nerinckx was a severe critic on all whose regulations were not up to his standard. Yet there was an impress of personal sanctity around the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx that does not associate itself in our minds with Prince Galitzin, remarkable and devoted priest though he was.

Galitzin's life has been written in German by one who knew him personally, and had access to his papers; it has been drawn up with

greater research in English by a daughter of our great Catholic reviewer.

The life of the Rev. Charles Nerinckx now placed in the hands of the faithful is a conscientious work, prepared after years spent in collecting material in the West, where he labored so long and so zealously; in Baltimore, where his frequent letters to Archbishop Carroll gave a mine of information as to his work, his trials and difficulties; in Belgium, where he had previous to his arrival in America been for years a priest honored and esteemed. The sketches of Archbishop Spalding, the annals of the sisterhood founded by the good priest complete the material for his life, leaving little that any future gleaner can add. The hasty act of a clergyman who succeeded Rev. Mr. Nerinckx as director of the sisters, deprived future historians of material that would have been invaluable, but no human power can recall from the ashes the instructions, the thoughts, the exhortations which were committed to the flames.

The author of the life now before us has not only been laborious and judicious in collecting the material for his work, but in treating his subject evinces the highest impartiality and the coolest judgment; it is no enthusiastic panegyric, like the obituary notices we see too frequently, where some clergyman is pictured as little less than a saint, when charity would have suggested silence as the wisest course in regard to one whose life had been overshadowed by serious failings.

The Rev. Mr. Maes perhaps carries his historic severity too far, and gives a volume of careful history rather than a life of a great priest, which we would like to read to strengthen our own faith, hope, and charity, to inspire us with lessons of wisdom, prudence, and fortitude.

It may be, and we trust it is, the author's intention to give in less extended form a devotional life that will be read by thousands and do its good work; while the present stands in our libraries as a most important and valuable contribution to our Church history, rich in its lessons, full of suggestion and warning, a book of serious thought, and as honest and straightforward as the man whom it depicts.

We would not be considered as implying that the life of the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx does not portray his interior, the spiritual man; but as in art, events in the life of our Blessed Lord and his Saints are treated by some painters historically, by others as mysteries, so it is in the lives of the servants of God.

There was little in the early days or surroundings of Charles Nerinckx to raise a suspicion in his own mind, or among those who knew him, that his best days were to be spent in the back-

woods of America, among a flock whose very language was as unknown to him as the geography of the vast continent.

Of a patriarchal family of the middle class, Charles Nerinckx was born on the 2d of October, 1761, at Heiffelinger, in the Province of Brabant. He was the oldest of the fourteen children with whom providence blessed Sebastian Nerinckx, a pious physician, and his wife, Petronilla Langendries.

The family were trained by these good parents to virtue, and they had among them kindred examples of self-devotion, numbering several priests and nuns among those to whom they looked with childish reverence and affection. In his own generation Charles Nerinckx was not the only one of the family to renounce the world. His brother John became a priest, and closed a life of apostolic labors in London. Three sisters became Cistercian nuns. Another entering the marriage state sent her son F. X. de Coen to America, where he died a priest of the Society of Jesus. From the sound and healthy training of a truly Christian home he went to the College of Enghien, and thence in 1774 to the town of the Irish virgin martyr, Dympna, the town of Gheel, long famous for its peculiar and successful treatment of insanity. After completing his Latin course in a college near the shrine of St. Dympna, he went through a course of philosophy in the University of Louvain in a manner at once creditable to himself and satisfactory to his professors. The grace of vocation accorded to so many of this family was given to this young student also. To it he corresponded heartily, faithfully, with no undue self-esteem or self-seeking.

The times were not such as to make the ecclesiastical state one of ease. The Low Countries had passed from Spain to Germany, and the Emperor Joseph II., deeply imbued with the infidel teachings of the last century, aimed in every way to destroy the Church in his realm and make her a mere Protestant institution, "the creature and the slave of the state." His attempt, indeed, to interfere with the course of instruction in theological seminaries of the Low Countries led to a revolt which lost Belgium forever to the House of Hapsburg. But before they could lay the broad foundation of a national existence, the Belgians saw their country swept over by the tide of French republican infidelity, full fledged, more terrible than the callow infidelity of Joseph.

Before those sad days came young Nerinckx had entered the seminary of the Archbishopric of Mechlin, his native diocese. His piety, his zeal to oppose error and diffuse truth, the stern rectitude of his character, all made him conspicuous, and won for him the affectionate interest of his professors, especially of the presi-

dent of the seminary, who subsequently as a bishop continued his friendship with the young priest.

After a long preparation he was ordained priest in 1785, the very year when, so far as we can learn, a priest entered that State, Kentucky, where he was to accomplish so much. The next year he was appointed *vicarus secundarius*, second assistant vicar, in the metropolitan parish of Mechlin, which is dedicated to an illustrious Irish bishop and martyr, Saint Rumold.

The care of the young and the ignorant was the special field of the newly ordained priest, and the influence of his instructions was seen in the devotion with which souls, long neglected, were now imbued, as their minds opened to the real meaning of their faith. Adapting himself to the condition of his hearers he cultivated a plain, simple, even homely style, which carried conviction to their minds, while his earnest eloquence touched their hearts. The austerity of his life was in itself the best of sermons; all the time not given to the exercise of the ministry was devoted to study and prayer. In the annual meetings of the clergy his learning, modesty, and piety were displayed so strikingly that all recognized his merit. When the parish of Everberg-Meerbeke fell vacant in 1794, the Rev. Charles Nerinckx received the appointment, all recognizing it as a fitting and deserving selection.

Under the fatal influence of government interference religion had begun to decline. In some parts priests were introduced by official influence who were, in the sight of God, most unworthy of the holy ministry; in others good but aged priests were left to struggle on unaided when infirmities made it impossible to discharge their duties as they desired. The latter had been the case in the parish to which the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx was appointed. Having satisfied himself as to the condition of his flock, he began his labors by regular instructions to the young, employing every art and skill to make them attractive, so as to enlist attendance, and stimulating zeal by rewards and encouragements. The parents were soon interested, and their old spirit of piety revived. Every division of his parish had its Sunday-school and teachers, and encouraged by the indulgences attached to them, nearly all sought entrance into associations established for the purpose. Dances were abolished; pious processions and confraternities were revived.

With new fervor enkindled in his flock Nerinckx soon led them to undertake the reparation and restorations which the parish church sadly needed.

The reforms effected in this parish attracted the attention of Catholics in all parts of the country; yet it was the result of only three years of the unremitting labor of this self-sacrificing priest. In 1797 the armies of republican France swept over Belgium, and

every priest was required to take an oath declaring his invincible hatred to royalty. Good priests refusing to take this oath were everywhere seized and hurried off, to be sent in penal servitude to Cayenne. The pastor of Everberg-Meerbeke saw his brother John, not yet in orders, thus torn from his home and friends. For his own part he shrunk from no danger, but desiring to render service to his flock to the last he eluded arrest, but having publicly said Mass and performed the funeral service for one of his deceased parishioners he became subject to instant arrest. Disguised in the garb of a peasant he escaped by night, and taking unfrequented paths was guided by friendly hands, and on the 6th of August reached Dendermonde, where he sought refuge in the Hospital of St. Blaise, directed by twelve nuns, of whom his aunt was Superior. They hailed with joy the arrival of a priest, as their chaplain had just been hurried off to the Isle of Ré, his advanced age preventing severer penalties. The Bishop of Ghent learning of his asylum gave him all faculties, and committed to his care the zealous community and the crowds of sick and wounded to whom their holy rule called them to minister. Accepting the work which Providence assigned him, the good priest for four years acted as chaplain to the nuns, and gave the consolation of religion to the sick and dying, always in peril, but fearless and undaunted. Places of concealment were ingeniously provided, to which, as to the priests' holes in old Catholic houses of England, the hunted priest could fly when the minions of persecution approached. Once, when his danger was greatest, he came forth with apostolic zeal to reprove a servant of the hospital who in a quarrel took the name of God in vain. He dismissed him, and though the man might have denounced him, the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx thought less of his own danger than of the offence given to God. His labors were not confined to the precincts of the hospital; he was still parish priest of Everberg-Meerbeke, and from time to time he stole back in disguise to minister to his forsaken flock, sometimes in one part of his parish and sometimes in another, administering the sacraments, offering the holy sacrifice, carrying a charmed life amid every peril, and though suspected and pursued, never falling into the hands of men who denied liberty in the name of liberty.

The seclusion in which he lived enabled him to give long hours to meditation and study. He wrote much and well, and the treatises he composed would form several volumes, but all have been destroyed except a few, which come down to us prepared for the press by another hand.

At last the Consulate gave religion a respite. Bonaparte took the great step of restoring religion to its official position in France. He wrung many concessions from the Pope, and, as these did not

go far enough, made regulations of his own that neutralized the great good. Belgium, as part of France, was cut up into new dioceses, and a new bishop appeared at Mechlin. No one thought of appointing to Everberg-Meerbeke any priest but the zealous Rev. Charles Nerinckx; but that holy priest, though full of joy at the prospect of being able to labor once more openly among his flock, studied calmly before God the conditions that would be imposed upon him by the new order of things. This involved much from which the tender conscience of the good priest shrank. He decided that he could not in conscience take the oaths required, and communicated this to the new Archbishop of Mechlin, declining the charge of the parish so dear to his heart.

He was therefore free. The papal nuncio offered him a mission at the Cape of Good Hope; his brother associated in London with the Abbé Carron seemed to call him to that field; but he, without taking any positive step, obtained from the imprisoned vicar-general of the diocese letters attesting his blameless priestly life, in September, 1801.

A letter of the Rev. Stanislaus Cerfoumont, written to his brother in Belgium from Conewago, Pennsylvania, decided him to give himself to our American missions. Penetrating to the prison where the Vicar-General Delandtsheere was confined, he obtained his hearty sanction, and the promise of a letter to Bishop Carroll, but this the vicar-general's removal to Paris under guard prevented. Mr. Nerinckx was himself in danger, but reached his father's house at Ninove, whence he wrote to Bishop Carroll in November, 1803. He could send no testimonials, his archbishop, Cardinal de Frankenberg, and the Bishop of Ruremonde were both in prison, but the Princess Galitzin wrote in terms of warm commendation.

On receiving a favorable answer from Bishop Carroll, the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx set out at once from his voluntary seclusion at the Hospital of Dendermonde, July 2d, 1804, without bidding adieu to friend or kinsman, on foot, and with no luggage, to avoid all suspicion, leaving that to be forwarded. At Amsterdam he met the Rev. Charles Guny, O.S.B., and Rev. Francis Malevé, also seeking to devote their lives to the American mission. The Princess Galitzin came also to see the devoted priests, who were so soon to be associated with her son in the United States.

The Rev. Messrs. Nerinckx and Guny embarked from Amsterdam, on the 14th of August, 1804, on an old rickety ship, which did not reach Baltimore till November 14th. Bishop Carroll received him with great kindness, and retained him at Baltimore and Georgetown for four months. During this period he applied himself to the study of English, no easy task for a man of forty-three, and he almost lost courage under the difficulties he encountered.

Bishop Carroll read him thoroughly. "Of austere virtue tempered with the sweetest charity, shining out of his rugged countenance, of an iron constitution and herculean strength, of the most profound humility, which thorough theological learning made all the more conspicuous, Rev. Mr. Nerinckx was the very man whom the Bishop of Baltimore wanted for the abandoned mission of Kentucky, where Rev. Mr. Badin was roaming about in the most forlorn condition, and which no one else wished or was indeed willing to accept."

He set out in the spring of 1805, and at Conewago, where he was cheered by a library of Flemish and Dutch books left by a Franciscan in the pastoral residence, he joined a party of Trappists then on their way to Kentucky. They travelled so slowly, however, that at Bedford he bought a horse and saddle and pushed on ahead. Catholics on the way wept for joy to see a priest, and entreated him to stay; but his destination was fixed, and on the 18th of July he presented himself to the Rev. Stephen T. Badin, then the only priest in Kentucky, "land of the long" river.

In that new commonwealth, previously the western part of Virginia, Catholicity had taken root early, but had undergone vicissitudes. As early as 1785, Bishop Carroll, when still prefect and fettered by the rules of the Propaganda, authorizing him to impart faculties only to priests approved by that congregation, wrote to a priest at Louisville who was about to take up his residence with the Lancasters, ancestors of our Bishop of Peoria. That family may preserve the name of this pioneer priest; he was apparently a regular, and not one to whom English was familiar from the cradle. The eccentric Capuchin, Charles Whelan, ex-chaplain of the French navy, first priest at St. Peter's, New York, early laborer in Maryland and on the Mohawk, and the Rev. William de Rohan, with occasional priests on their way westward, preceded Badin, who arrived in 1793 with the Rev. Mr. Barrieres. But as we have seen, the Rev. Mr. Badin was alone when Rev. Mr. Nerinckx arrived, although the Trappists and Dominicans were both preparing to raise the arms of their orders in Kentucky. Two good priests who had for a time shared his labors, the Rev. Mr. Fournier and Rev. Anthony Salmon, had been accidentally killed, and lay under the shadow of the first Kentucky church, that of the Holy Cross.

The Rev. Mr. Nerinckx entered Kentucky full of zeal, undismayed by difficulty and danger, resolved to make that the permanent field of his labors. He saw its wants, and the wants of the wide West, of the old French settlements, and the Spanish territory of Louisiana stretching limitless beyond the Mississippi. He at once began to appeal to Belgian priests to come and labor in a field where the harvest was so great and the laborers were so few. It was no

small trial that the very first who responded to his call died soon after reaching America, and before he could enter on his career.

Mr. Nerinckx saw far into the future. While he shared a log hut with Rev. Mr. Badin, he wrote to Bishop Carroll to show how necessary it was for Kentucky to have a bishop. Meanwhile he went to work, preaching the first jubilee proclaimed in those parts, and extended his apostolic journey as far as Vincennes. Then he resumed regular duties in Kentucky, a wide-scattered and laborious mission. Always forming a low estimate of his own merit, he for a time thought of joining the Trappists and seeking only his own perfection. But from this step Bishop Carroll strongly dissuaded him. He soon saw, indeed, that the fickleness of their superior was likely to sacrifice many of the Trappists, if it did not ultimately drive them from the West. When they finally removed from the State he could only deplore the result, and regret to see Kentucky deprived of monks who observed their strict rule with such holy rigor.

After a year at St. Stephen's in Marion County with the pioneer Badin, the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx removed to Holy Mary's, the mission of the late Mr. Fournier. There was a house on the farm, but that was all. "On the 15th of November, 1805," he writes, "just one year having elapsed since my arrival in America, I had the happiness of laying the corner-stone of Holy Mary's Church. Eternal thanks to our Blessed Mother for that event, which more than repays the long-forgotten difficulty that I went through during my tiresome journey. The Church will cost about \$400, which I intend to pay in kind." Here he set up a statue of the Blessed Virgin which he had brought from Belgium, and the very sight of that representation of Our Lady so impressed a good girl that she gave up the material of a new dress which she had just purchased to be made into an alb. Then a chapel was projected at Bardstown, and a residence for the expected bishop. He next visited Louisville, and in 1806 tells us that "there are just now great hopes of building a church, without delay, if they can have a priest to visit them from time to time."

That same year he built St. Charles Borromeo's Church on Hardin's Creek, dedicating it to his patron saint, whose life was his constant reading and meditation. Church-building in those days was peculiar. Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, we are told, made the members of his flock subscribe one or two hewn logs of prescribed dimensions, gauging doubtless their zeal and means. Then all assembled with him to have the house-raising, the powerful Belgian priest being more than a match for any Western man in the heavy work of fitting the prepared logs to their places. One or two days sufficed to rear such a log chapel, yet many a one did good service

for a quarter of a century, a hundred of them costing less than in our days of ostentatious display is expended on an unsightly and incongruous sepulchral mass in some of our cemeteries.

Mr. Nerinckx's log Church of St. Charles has long since passed away, but the old log house where he resided "is standing yet, a relic of the hard but glorious past."

He was constantly appealing to his friends in Belgium, and not without some result; but his missions were very poor. Only one of his churches had an altar; he succeeded in getting four chalices and a few albs, as well as catechisms and books for his flock. His labors went beyond his own district, and he aided Rev. Mr. Badin materially in erecting St. Patrick's, a brick church, at Danville, the first Catholic edifice of the kind in the State.

With three churches and outlying missions, and sick calls from all parts, he found that the field was too great even for his zeal and endurance. He appealed to Bishop Carroll, offering to take any other position to which he might be assigned. The Bishop tried his zeal and humility, indeed, by appointing him to a district extending from Washington to Union County, and embracing nearly half the State. Here his labor was incredible; his food was scanty, coarse, and irregular, as he often rode twenty-five miles before saying Mass. In fact, he was constantly in the saddle, making his way from house to house, and from settlement to settlement. His health gave way; he was a constant sufferer from disease and its results.

Mr. Nerinckx had a great love for children, and a wonderful tact in winning them. He wrote hymns for them, taught them not only the Christian doctrine, but how to pray. The practices he inculcated made a lasting impression, and he often took his little people to the adjoining graveyard to accustom them to offer up prayers for their deceased relatives. He saw and felt that to carry on the work these children must be under Catholic instructors. But where was a community to be found that could face the hardships of Kentucky life? The good priest in his flock of little ones believed that God had given him the means of accomplishing the good work with which He had inspired him. Girls trained to piety and virtue in his backwoods congregations already aspired to a more perfect life, and wished to devote themselves to God. As early as 1805 several had agreed to begin a community of Lovers of Mary in a house secured by Rev. Mr. Nerinckx at Holy Mary's, on Rolling Fork; but there was no response from the Catholics. Rev. Mr. Nerinckx did not despond, and while his associate, Rev. Mr. Badin, aroused interest in the matter, Nerinckx drew up rules. At last the convent building was begun in 1808 between St. Stephen's and Holy Mary, a pious man named Dent giving his farm

for the good work. By Whitsunday it was roofed, and was a striking object. Six or seven young ladies had already applied to be admitted, and all watched the completion with the utmost anxiety. A Catholic institution for the education of the young was ready to begin its great work, when, just as the last nail had been driven, an unaccountable fire laid the whole in ashes.

All the projects of the pious missionary were laid in the dust. He bowed his head in resignation, deeming it the result of his own unworthiness, and he resumed his mission labors with renewed zeal. There was much to be done to establish Catholic life and discipline. Promiscuous dances were a constant snare to the young, but he soon, by his strict rules, made Catholics strangers to them. He regulated the wedding festivities to prevent excess, made family devotions a rule throughout his people, and even had morning prayers in public. Strict as his direction was, the Protestants around looked to him with respect, and many came to be instructed.

Full of devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, his lively faith led him to desire to give the altar all possible beauty, and his letters to Europe brought at last what he prized, vestments, statues, sacred vessels for the altar. The pious were filled with consolation, but the lax and indifferent began to give the missionary trouble. Rev. Mr. Nerinckx was of the austere school, strict to severity, positive and rigorous in his rules and judgments, and many felt his rule a hard one. When the Dominican Fathers settled in Kentucky they adopted more lenient systems. As some of Rev. Mr. Nerinckx's missions were given to the Fathers, the malcontents seized the opportunity, and forwarded to Bishop Carroll a list of charges against their former pastor, all bearing on his strictness and severity. The good priest, stung by this ingratitude, wrote at once, justifying the course he had followed, and tendering his resignation. Bishop Carroll was not willing to lose so good a priest; he urged him to remain and bear his trials patiently, reminding him that different opinions on many points of management might be held without harm to religion or loss of souls. The good priest submitted, and continued his mission work, now made heavier still and thwarted by new opposition.

But while he went bravely on, as though almost under censure, he was thunderstruck by a letter which showed how highly the venerable Bishop Carroll appreciated his virtues and his labors. This letter, announcing the dismemberment of the vast diocese of Baltimore, the erection of sees at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Bardstown, informed the despondent Belgian priest that he had been selected to administer the diocese of Louisiana, where the episcopate had been vacant for several years, and great disorders prevailed. It must have given him new courage to find

Bishop Carroll thus appreciating his work, but if he was conscious of any such feeling he did not show it. "Reading among the elect my name, which should rather be condemned to eternal oblivion," he at once wrote to Dr. Carroll, "I could not but emit deep groans and bitter sighs of grief, convinced as I am that in the judgment of an angry and justly irritated God I should be buried away from view. . . . After much and serious reflection I am forced to the conclusion that it is simply and in every way impossible for me to accept the episcopal honor and burden; hence I refuse the proffered elevation as being totally unfit for it." But Archbishop Carroll insisted on his acceptance; and this gave him a new consolation. His old friend, Rev. Mr. Badin, and the Dominican Fathers united in representing to the Archbishop that to deprive Kentucky of his zealous and pious ministry would be an incalculable injury, while it was a matter of grave doubt whether he was fitted for the new and difficult duties which he declined to assume. But the Archbishop clung to his original decision. The Rev. Mr. Nerinckx appealed to Bishop Neale, offering to go as a missionary to Louisiana, and indeed prepared to begin his priestly labors on the Missouri. His old friend, Very Rev. Mr. Badin, opposed and maligned, called upon him for aid, and he succeeded in restoring peace and harmony.

Archbishop Carroll at last though reluctantly yielded, and made another selection for Louisiana in the person of the Rev. William du Bourg. He approved Mr. Nerinckx's plan of removing to what is now Missouri, and directed him to apply for faculties to Very Rev. Mr. Badin, who had a general jurisdiction in the West as vicar-general. All hopes of the mission beyond the Mississippi vanished. "I know Father Badin well," wrote poor Mr. Nerinckx, "and to commit this matter to him is to refuse my request peremptorily." And so it proved. The Rev. Mr. Badin was not the man to deprive Kentucky of such a priest before the arrival of the long-appointed Bishop Flaget. He insisted that Rev. Mr. Nerinckx should remain.

He had believed Kentucky weary of him; he had thought that his venerated bishop had lost confidence in him; and as he who humbleth himself shall be exalted, he found a mitre pressed on his head by Archbishop Carroll, and Kentucky refusing to part with him. But there was no elation, no self-satisfaction. He went to his work with renewed zeal; he visited remote districts, organized congregations, began erecting churches, giving freely himself, for he gave all but the merest pittance for his sustenance, to the Church, with all that his appeals to Europe brought. The district assigned to him was a hundred and twenty miles long by seventy wide. He faced every danger, and undeterred by storm or tornado,

by wild beast or lawless men, was day after day in the saddle from early dawn, when he did not spend the night itself, as he used to express it, "with Captain Dogwood," that is, in the woods.

"He seldom laughed or even smiled; but there was withal an air of contentment and cheerfulness about him which greatly qualified the natural austerity of his countenance and manner. He could, like the great apostle, make himself 'all to all to gain all to Christ.' He appeared even more at home in the cabin of the humblest citizen, or in the hut of the poor negro, than in the more pretending mansions of the wealthy."

"He was averse to giving trouble to others, especially to the poor. Often when he arrived at a house in the night, he attended to his own horse, and took a brief repose in the stable, or in some out-house; and when the inmates of the house arose next morning, they frequently perceived him already up, and saying his office or making his meditation. He made it an invariable rule never to miss an appointment whenever it was at all possible to keep it. He often arrived at a distant station early in the morning, after having ridden during all the previous night. On these occasions he heard confessions, taught catechism, gave instructions, and said Mass for the people, generally after noon, and he seldom broke his fast until three or four o'clock in the evening.

"In swimming rivers he was often exposed to great danger. Once in going to visit a sick person, he came to a stream which his companion knew to be impassable. Mr. Nerinckx took the saddle of his friend,—who refused to venture,—placed it on his own, and then remounting the horse, placed himself on his knees, on the top of the two saddles, and thus crossed the flood, which flowed over his horse's back. On another occasion he made a still more narrow escape. He was swept from his horse, which lost its footing, and was carried away by the current; and the rider barely saved himself and reached the other shore by clinging firmly to the horse's tail.

"On one of his missionary tours he narrowly escaped being devoured by the wolves, which then greatly infested those portions of Kentucky which were not densely settled. While travelling to visit a distant station, in what is now Grayson County, but what was then almost an unreclaimed wilderness, he lost his way in the night. It was the dead of winter, and the darkness was so great that he could not hope to extricate himself from his painful situation. Meantime, whilst he was seeking a sheltered place where he could take some repose, the famished wolves scented him, and came in hundreds, fiercely howling around him. With great presence of mind he immediately remounted his horse, knowing that they would scarcely attack him while on horseback. He hallooed

at the top of his voice and temporarily frightened them off, but soon they returned to the charge, and kept him at bay during the whole night. Once or twice they seemed on the point of seizing his horse, and Mr. Nerinckx made the sign of the cross and prepared himself for death; but a mysterious Providence watched over him, and he escaped after sitting his horse the whole night. With the dawn the wolves disappeared."

Such was his laborious life when Kentucky at last hailed the arrival of the first Bishop of Bardstown, the venerable Benedict Joseph Flaget. That remarkable man recognized the merit of Mr. Nerinckx, and at once put an end to his project of proceeding to Missouri. He would not consent to deprive his diocese of such a man.

The Rev. Mr. Nerinckx once more looked upon Kentucky as his field, and renewed his labors. Suddenly his old project of a religious community began to take form almost before his eyes, as though Providence wished to show him how it carried out its work in its own good time.

Mr. Dent, on a visit to Maryland, brought to Kentucky his cousin, Miss Mary Rhodes, a pious girl, trained in a convent school, who, touched by the neglected condition of her brother's children, became their teacher. Her success in her self-imposed task induced her to propose to Rev. Mr. Nerinckx to open a school. He hailed the proposal with delight, and the young lady was soon installed in an old deserted log cabin between her cousin's house and St. Charles's Church. Though the floor was of clay, and the roof gaped wide with chinks, it did not damp the zeal of teacher or pupils. Under the fostering care of Mr. Nerinckx the school succeeded. Miss Christina Stuart became the associate of the new teacher, led by a kindred spirit of piety and devotedness. Before long they resolved to make their home in another old cabin near the schoolhouse. People ridiculed their idea, but they persevered, and when another young lady wished to join them the idea of a community began to enter their minds. They begged their pastor to give them a rule of life. He wrote down on a slip of paper a few directions to be observed by way of trial. The project of a community seemed to advance, but he was not sanguine. He referred the matter to the bishop, who left it entirely to his prudent direction. This approval of their attempt gave great consolation to the aspirants, who had lived up to their temporary rule with great zeal and courage amid the poverty that surrounded them. Miss Morgan and Miss Nancy Rhodes, a sister of the foundress of the school, were the next accessions, and when Rev. Mr. Nerinckx authorized them to choose a superior of the little community, all concurred in selecting Miss Nancy Rhodes.

A little piece of ground was bought; a slave which Miss Nancy had owned was disposed of, and a little means obtained. Then the cabin underwent some repairs. The teachers repaired their roof and made an attic for a dormitory, a rude table and seats. They fenced in their garden and put up a rough meathouse and a henhouse. Rude as all these beginnings were, and to our ideas comfortless, the school was no sooner known among the Catholic congregations than parents came to apply for the admission of their daughters as boarders. They were almost forced to receive them, though their only accommodations were beds spread on the floor by night and laid up on a high shelf by day.

In his first project Mr. Nerinckx had drawn up a rule; now he proposed to the teachers to send to some community in Europe for nuns to form them to a convent life. All objected, preferring to be instructed and guided by him. To this he yielded after consulting Bishop Flaget, who insisted on his framing the new foundation according to his own thoughts of what the institute should be.

He then established "The Friends of Mary at the Foot of the Cross," the grand object of the institute being "the glory of God, the sanctification of their own souls, and the salvation of their neighbors by educating and instructing females." No religious habit was at first adopted, each, on account of their poverty, to wear the dresses she possessed. The teachers were received as postulants and became sisters. The reverend founder still resided with the bishop at St. Stephen's and continued his missionary labor, erecting St. Anthony's, on the Long Lick, in 1812, and beginning St. Bernard's, on Casey Creek; but finding that to do justice to the little community thus committed to his care he must necessarily bestow more time on them, he took up his residence in the vestry of St. Charles's Church, and lived in almost utter solitude. The schoolhouse being more convenient to most of the neighboring Catholics, he fitted up a little chapel in the convent, erecting the altar himself, and placing on it a statue of the Blessed Virgin, which he had brought from Belgium.

On the 25th of April, 1812, he gave the white veil to Mary Rhodes, Christina Stuart, and Nancy Havern, the first ceremony of the kind in the Western country. Two others were admitted as postulants, and the community began to assume a regular form. But their dresses troubled the poor Sisters. If they could only make them all black it would be something. They tried to dye them with oak-bark, and finally with that and copperas obtained a black that suited them, though it required a frequent renewal.

On the 29th of June the two postulants received the white veil, and Miss Morgan became a postulant. The reverend director,

representing the bishop, presided at the first election of a superior, at which Ann Rhodes was unanimously chosen.

The Catholics around were now conversant with the new institute and its object, and began to feel an interest in it. That same day the first log was cut for a new and more suitable convent. The trees around the little cabins were felled. Mr. Nerinckx drew the plan of two rows of buildings, and did his share in handling the heavy logs. On the right of the square court was the school-house, and next to it the convent, two detached cabins, the space between being boarded and made into a chapel. A similar structure formed the kitchen and refectory. Beyond Mr. Nerinckx's house on the left were buildings for work-rooms, infirmary, and guest-room.

Gradually the whole was fenced in, and the Sisters chipped away the stumps, and the court, nearly levelled, was seeded down with the famous blue grass of Kentucky. Such was the Loretto at its origin.

The institute in the design of the founder was not only to teach but also to offer "an asylum or shelter for old age, decrepit and useless slaves, and whatever kind of sick or distressed fellow-creatures may call for their assistance." The little community soon lost its Superior Mother, Ann Rhodes, pious, devoted to the last, guiding, encouraging all her Sisters from her loose straw bed on the floor. In the spirit of poverty that characterized these Sisters her remains were committed unconfined to the earth, and this became the rule at all their interments, till the Sovereign Pontiff, at the solicitation of a priest, ordered a coffin to be used.

After giving the black veil to the first Sisters on the Feast of the Assumption, 1813, Mr. Nerinckx saw postulants apply from near and afar. The community seemed destined to do great good, but then poverty stood in the way; the people around, though their good will was aroused by the eloquent appeals of their pastor, could contribute but little, and that mainly in kind. Rev. Mr. Nerinckx resolved to go to Europe to solicit aid. Bishop Flaget readily consented, but at Baltimore Archbishop Carroll advised the good priest to wait till the close of the war with England. He accordingly returned to his labors, to meet the usual opposition to his work and his plans.

At last peace came in Europe, and Rev. Mr. Nerinckx hastened to reach Belgium and then proceed to Rome. There he was consoled by the assurance that the Propaganda was well pleased with his new institute, "The Friends of Mary at the Foot of the Cross," and had taken it under its special protection.

He had desired to join the Trappists in America; in Rome he sought admission into the Society of Jesus, but venerating the holy

missionary highly, they deemed it for the glory of God that he should remain where and as he was. In an interview with the Pope, Pope Pius VII. told him of the joy and consolation which he felt on perusing the rules of the new sisterhood, but he deemed some of the regulations too rigid for women to be permanently adopted, and directed mitigation.

The great work of his life had received the sanction of the successor of St. Peter. Cheered and encouraged by this mark of divine favor, he returned to Belgium and appealed for priests to join him in laboring on the American mission; then he spent the winter in collecting money, vestments, paintings, and other necessary articles for the missions. He appealed to the clergy, hoping to find some zealous enough to accompany him to America and share his labors, but none joined him. This disappointment was all the greater, as, counting on the missionary zeal of his countrymen, he had even conceived the idea of establishing a missionary college in Belgium, where candidates for the American mission might be trained. He then published a moving appeal, in response to which two priests and eight young men, four of whom had completed their theological course, joined him. They embarked at the Texel, May 16th, 1817, on the brig Mars, and after a stormy voyage reached Baltimore at the close of July.

Eight of his companions, including Rev. J. O. Vanderelde, future Bishop of Chicago, P. Devos, H. Verheyen, and P. J. Timmermans, joined the Jesuits in Maryland. The Rev. H. Hendricks sailed for New Orleans with much of what they had brought for the use of the churches in Kentucky, but he died of yellow fever in that city.

Rev. Mr. Nerinckx proceeded to Kentucky, and free from all self-seeking, looking only to the glory of God, gave the richest set of vestments he had brought to Bishop Flaget, with a bell and an organ, the first seen in Kentucky. The seminary, the Dominicans, the Rev. Messrs. Badin and Chabrat all benefited by the missionary's European trip, and many a church and chapel was delighted by gifts of chalice, ciborium, or monstrance. The Daughters of Charity at Nazareth obtained a set of chasubles and a monstrance. Two of his ciboriums, it is worth noting, were purchased with the contributions of a servant girl, who would not give her name.

The sisterhood which he had founded received, of course, many articles needed to give dignity to the services in their chapel.

In these days of veneration for all that is old, when museums of art gather by purchase or loan the work of artistic gold and silver-smiths of former days, as well as the specimens of ecclesiastical embroidery and lace, it is not out of place to remember that many of the purchases of Rev. Mr. Nerinckx were obtained from old

abbeys, convents, and churches. These articles, valued for their association with the name of the great missionary, have even to the worldly a high value. The chapel of Gethsemani Convent, for instance, has a tabernacle that was once an object of admiration in the Cathedral of Mechlin, dedicated to St. Rumold.

The paintings brought by him were also of a high order.

Rev. Mr. Nerinckx reached his home at Loretto, Kentucky, in September, 1817, having been badly injured on the way by a fall. He was received with great joy by the Sisters, who had so prospered that they had the preceding year founded at Holy Mary's their first filiation, Calvary. The good priest resumed his old career, giving his various missions the effects of his renewed zeal. The next year the Sisters founded another house on Pottinger's Creek, and called Gethsemani, now occupied by the Trappists. A Belgian priest in Missouri desired a colony also, and before long the Sisters of Loretto had a convent at the Barrens.

We then find him beginning a brick church at Lebanon and making a tour of all his churches and stations with the Rev. Mr. Abel, a Kentucky priest trained by himself, to whom, however, he acted on this journey as altar boy, to use his own expression.

Leaving the charge of the churches in the new tract to his associate, Rev. Mr. Nerinckx returned to Loretto to carry out a project which Bishop Flaget desired him to undertake. That holy prelate seeing the success with which God had blessed the community of Sisters, urged the aged missionary to undertake the establishment of a society of Brothers, confiding evidently in his spiritual wisdom. Candidates were soon found, a site secured at Mount Mary's, and buildings erected, but they all fell a prey to the flames in 1819. This disaster, and the necessity of means to repair the loss, led him to propose to the venerable bishop that he should pay another visit to Belgium. As his superior approved the design, and assigned several clergymen to continue his labors, Mr. Nerinckx made a kind of testamentary arrangement, regulating affairs at his various churches, stations, and institutions. This paper concludes with this touching address to the Sisters:

"He wishes the friends of Mary the best success in holiness and all holy happiness, that the suffering Jesus and the sorrowful Mary may have armies of consoling friends, faithful on Calvary and glorious in the heavenly Sion."

In order to this he begs by all the drops of blood and by all the sweat and tears of the Loving Jesus, and through the sweetness of Mary, that the members of the Loretto Society, and particularly of the House of Loretto, should ever study their rules—never make any, the least, infraction in them. Poverty and humility of Jesus and Mary; obedience and chastity of Jesus and Mary; union,

peace and concord of Jesus and Mary; zeal for souls—your own and that of the many desolate orphans and scholars—burning zeal of Jesus and Mary! Gain souls, hunt souls, catch souls, court souls, draw souls, pull souls, carry souls, deliver souls, shelter souls, buy souls! Souls! souls! and nothing but souls, for the love of Jesus, the owner of all souls!

“O, Loretto Sisters! let Loretto be Loretto forever! Loretto houses, Loretto dresses, Loretto labors, Loretto hardships, Loretto food, Loretto furniture, Loretto sisters, Loretto scholars. Every house on the place Loretto house! Stick to the tree that Mary planted there! Stick to the cross that Mary raised there! Stick to the walls that Mary built there! Stick to the dress that Mary gave there! Make use of the graces that Mary obtained there! Love what she said! Like what she fixed! Do what she loved! O, friends of Mary! O, sweet, O glorious title! Be not unworthy of it! Do not degenerate from it!

“The writer’s wish is here set down on paper; may he hear it accomplished on earth, and may he see it rewarded in the company of the Friends of Mary in heaven! Amen! Amen!”

Accompanied by the first priest ordained in Kentucky, Rev. Guy J. Chabrat, he set out on horseback from Bardstown in March, 1820, and passing through Somerset, Ohio, Wheeling, Emmettsburg, Frederick, and Georgetown, and White Marsh, reached Baltimore just in time to take passage in a vessel to Rotterdam. They landed, however, at Dover, proceeded to London, where Mr. Nerinckx had the consolation of meeting his brother. After purchasing many Catholic works here, and committing the Rules of the Society and School of Loretto to press, he set out for Belgium. In his previous visit he had violated the laws by inducing young men to emigrate who were liable to military duty, and, doubtless afraid that in case of investigation the fact of his having been in olden time a refractory priest in the eyes of the civil authorities would weigh heavily against him, he was extremely circumspect in all his movements, using great secrecy. “Without attracting too much attention to his movements he gathered all the presents or purchases he could conveniently carry along, but he had to refuse a valuable library offered to him by an aged pastor, lest the gift might put the officials of the government on his track.” But in a most providential way a little corps of recruits gathered around him. He took a letter from Rev. Mr. Vandevelde to a young seminarian, Mr. Judocus F. Van Assche, urging him to join the American mission. This Mr. Nerinckx delivered to the family in Belgium during the young man’s absence. When he received the letter he resolved to go; and with a fellow-student named Elet sat out to find the lurking missionary. They found

him at last, and by this time Elet too had determined to go. Mr. Nerinckx gave them little encouragement. Suspected by government he had to avoid arrest. He could make no plan beyond stating his intention to sail for America in May, 1821. The seminarians returned to their studies, not in the least disheartened, and began to plan how to obtain means. A friend directed them to the pious and generous De Neff. In the spring the two, with John B. Smedts, a recruit gained to the cause, set out with aid and letters from De Neff, to get the necessary means. Meanwhile, P. J. Verhaegen, F. X. Verreydt, Mr. de Maillet, Mr. Van Horsigh, and a Rev. Mr. Veulman, with Peter J. De Smet, joined the party, all resolved to devote themselves to the missions in the United States. Of this whole party only two had seen Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, and none knew where he was or when or whence he was to sail. They, however, found that a merchant named Ketelaer was transacting the missionary's business, and he promised to notify them. About the middle of July tidings came that the vessel would sail in August. True to their purpose they all set out in several parties and reached Amsterdam, where De Smet's brother overtook him and urged him to return, but finding him firm, supplied him with means for his voyage. They then proceeded to the Texel, where the Columbus was to touch. Here they met Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, with two postulants for his intended brotherhood, but the cautious old missionary was alarmed at the indiscretion of the little corps of recruits. All finally reached the vessel without interference from officials, and on the voyage the missionary exacted regularity in their spiritual exercises, but did not converse much with them, and only on religious topics.

He arrived at Philadelphia September 23d, 1821, and the young candidates proceeded to Baltimore, most of them to enter the novitiate of the Society of Jesus, and to become in time the founders of the vice-province of Missouri. Strict and severe as the missionary had been, he impressed them all with his sanctity, and they retained through life the highest veneration for him. On his way to Kentucky he visited them at White Marsh, where they received him with a joy like that which filled his own heart to see them in the religious habit.

In Baltimore seven young ladies waited on the missionary to offer themselves as postulants for the Sisterhood at Loretto; Rev. Mr. Nerinckx examined their vocation carefully and received them all. With these and a young lady who had come with him from London he set out by stage in November, 1821. "The moment the stage started Rev. Mr. Nerinckx made the sign of the cross, and said: 'All say the beads first, then read and pray, but you are not allowed to talk on the road.'" He was strictly obeyed, and the

young girls lived under convent rules during the long and severe journey, for they did not reach Loretto until the 10th of December.

The next day the founder arrived with Bishop Flaget, and they were received with joyful procession by Sisters, pupils, and servants.

The Rev. Mr. Nerinckx resumed his projected brotherhood, but changes had taken place. The Rev. Mr. Byrne, stationed at Mount Mary's, had established a college, which was prospering, and he was not inclined to give the place up for the new Brotherhood. Such obstacles arose that the old missionary laid his project aside and devoted himself mainly to perfecting the regulations for the Sisters of Loretto.

In 1823 he replaced the old log chapel of Holy Cross by a new brick church; he also installed a priest at Vincennes, which asked for a colony of his Sisters, as did also St. Louis. Applications came indeed from many quarters. He established the houses of Bethania and Mount Carmel, and finally Bethlehem Convent, in Missouri.

An institute for negro Sisters and another one for the education of Indian girls were also projected by this active mind.

But his career of usefulness was to be suddenly arrested. He was driven out like a pariah from the stage of his long labors to die in a neighboring State, while his books and writings were seized and destroyed as though full of a moral pestilence.

We have seen that in governing the missions confided to him, the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, by nature and by training severe, had established rigid rules that it would seem no man could enforce in the backwoods. Naturally some rebelled, and the Dominican Fathers, accustomed to less stringent modes, complained at a very early period to Bishop Carroll of Rev. Mr. Nerinckx. Whether he modified his rule to some extent, the opposition gradually ceased, the young looked up to him with reverence, and young women, conscious of his strict rule and of the poverty and hardships of the Loretto Sisterhood, entered and persevered. Bishop Flaget, a man not unskilled in the ways of God, had Mr. Nerinckx and his system under his immediate supervision for years, but nowhere censured him. The rule of the Sisterhood was modified at Rome at the time of his visit and subsequently. He always yielded prompt obedience to his bishop and to the Holy See. The opposition now came from his recent fellow-traveller, Rev. Mr. Chabrat. This gentleman had been appointed confessor to Bethania Convent, and at once began to write to Bishop Flaget complaining of what he considered the uncalled for severity of Mr. Nerinckx's direction. He endeavored to alter the rule for the branch house; he censured Nerinckx's piety as visionary and overdone, and urged his removal from his position as Ecclesiastical

Superior of the Loretto Society. Bishop Flaget informed Rev. Mr. Nerinckx of the complaints made, leaving his course to his prudence. The missionary might have submitted his writings and his management of parochial affairs and communities to a judicial investigation; but the opposition to him had been so active that he felt completely isolated, and a letter reached him which declared that no priest in Kentucky would hear his confession. He bowed his head to the storm, and resolved to leave Kentucky and all that he had labored to create there. He solicited permission to join the Missouri mission, and when the bishop consented he bade farewell to the Sisters at Bethania: "I wish you all to join in prayers with me, that Almighty God may forgive all blunders, ignorances, and excesses I have committed during the thirty-eight years which I have passed very unworthily and unprofitably in the ministry, and that He may grant pardon for all the harm I have done these twelve years on the society."

On the 29th of May he addressed a farewell letter to the Dear Mother and Sisters of the Loretto House and Society, a touching retrospect of what he had done, and a sad farewell to them all. A week or two later he was on his way to his new diocese, and on the 2d of July reached Bethlehem Convent, in Perry County, Missouri. He told the Sisters that he had come to finish his days with them, and have his bones laid in their graveyard. Although he announced the time and district within which he was to die he obtained faculties from Bishop Rosati, and took active steps with the Indian agent to form a school for Indian girls at Bethlehem. On his way to that place to complete the arrangements, he said Mass for some neglected Catholics and started a movement for the erection of a church. The next day he was prostrated by fever, but reached St. Genevieve, where his illness became alarming, and on the 12th of August, at five o'clock in the afternoon, he expired, fortified by the sacraments of the Church.

"Such was the life, such the death, and such the establishments of the Rev. Charles Nerinckx, one of the very best priests who ever labored on the arduous missions of America," says Archbishop Spalding.

The veneration of the people has never died away in the West. He is revered as a saint, and supernatural gifts are ascribed to him, in some cases so well attested as to challenge belief.

Yet as the close of his life is depicted by the Rev. Mr. Maes, in his calm and well-considered pages, it leaves the mind perplexed.

The venerable Bishop Flaget was not one to be unjust to any of his clergy. On hearing the death of Mr. Nerinckx, he delivered in his Cathedral a glowing eulogy of the good missionary's life, and held him up as a model of every virtue. Yet he evidently

shared in part at least the Rev. Mr. Chabrat's opinion that Mr. Nerinckx was too severe, as he made that gentleman at once the ecclesiastical superior of the Sisters of Loretto. The great and holy Bishop of Bardstown himself came to instal the Rev. Mr. Chabrat at Loretto. Being thus in full possession of the house previously occupied by Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, he assumed complete ownership of all there, and at once proceeded to destroy all the missionary's writings, and a considerable number of ascetical works, which the founder of Loretto had brought over from Europe at his two visits.

The act is unparalleled. It was unjust to the deceased, whose writings would give the best evidence of his doctrine and discipline, and whose habitual reading would best show the source of his opinions. He carried his hostility so far as to compel the Sisters to give up Mr. Nerinckx's letter of farewell, which he flung upon the fire of books and papers that he had kindled in the yard.

The very place seemed distasteful to him, as he soon removed the community from Loretto, the Sisters setting fire before they departed to the convent and chapel, but sparing Rev. Mr. Nerinckx's log chapel, which stands to this day.

No priest ever came to the missions of the United States who left his impress so clear and distinct upon the people as did the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx. "His influence," says Rev. Mr. Maes, "is plainly traceable in the Catholics of Kentucky, and his spirit is still living in the order which he founded, the Loretines."

In the work he presents to the Catholics of the United States, the Rev. Mr. Maes has rendered a signal service. Misled by no enthusiasm he has sought information at the best sources, and gives the result without passion or prejudice, and, while admiring the holy and laborious life of the great missionary of Kentucky, ascribes the severity laid to his charge to what is undoubtedly the real cause,—the prevalence of the Jansenist and Gallican elements in the time and country where he received his ecclesiastical impressions.

The order he founded is his best monument, and his mortal remains, obtained by the Sisters with difficulty from Missouri, now rest in their midst at New Loretto.

AUBREY DE VERE'S POEMS.

The Infant Bridal, and other Poems. By Aubrey de Vere. London, Macmillan & Co., 1864.

The Sisters ; and Inisfail, a Lyrical Chronicle of Ireland. By Aubrey de Vere. London : Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer. Dublin : McGlasham & Gill, Sackville Street, 1867.

May Carols, and Hymns and Poems. By Aubrey de Vere. New York : Lawrence Kehoe, 1866.

Irish Odes and other Poems. By Aubrey de Vere. The Catholic Publication Society, 1869.

Autar and Zara : an Eastern Romance. Inisfail, and other Poems, Meditative and Lyrical. By Aubrey de Vere. London : Henry S. King & Co., 1877.

The Fall of Rora ; The Search after Proserpine, and other Poems, Meditative and Lyrical. By Aubrey de Vere. London : Henry S. King & Co., 1877.

As a critic Matthew Arnold is incomparably superior to Matthew Arnold as a poet. As a poet he is a source of considerable danger ; as a critic he is a very safe guide in purely literary matters.

His idea of truth, except in mere words, is, apparently, that of an embodied contradiction ; perhaps it should be called rather a heterogeneous mass of fractions which are vainly struggling to gravitate into an integer, and whose efforts may, in some incomprehensibly remote period, prove successful when positivism shall have succeeded in transmuting the heterogeneous into homogeneity.

Mr. Arnold is kindness itself. He is so full of what Wordsworth calls

“ The still sad music of humanity,”

that he cannot bear seriously to differ from what he respects as the sincere opinion of any large class of his fellow-men, and, various as their opinions are, he has generously contrived to agree more or less with all of them. His tolerance exceeds all bounds. If he is a positivist in philosophy, he is a universalist in poetry and politics. He wants no creed for himself ; with gentle malice he despises all Christian “ superstition.” But he will not thrust his light on others ; rather shall he entreat others to love their darkness and happy be therein. This is one of his characteristic liberalities :

“ ‘ Man is blind because of sin ;
 Revelation makes him sure ;
 Without that, who looks within,
 Looks in vain, for all's obscure.’ ”

“ ‘ Nay, look closer into man !
 Tell me, can you find indeed
 Nothing sure, no moral plan
 Clear prescribed, without your creed ?’ ”

“ ‘ No, I nothing can perceive ;
 Without that, all's dark for men.
 That or nothing I believe.’ —
 ‘ For God's sake, believe it then !’ ”

It is perplexingly illogical for one who does not believe in God to adjure others in His name to believe what he rejects as absurd error; but Mr. Arnold, who has had much to say about “sweetness and light,” and who has much sweetness if little light, is a remarkably candid man, and distinctly disclaims the imputation of being logical. “The truth is,” he says, “I have never been able to hit it off happily with the logicians.”¹ . . . So he can write in vivacious and steady prose a plea for a Catholic University in Ireland, not because he has the slightest belief in the doctrines to be taught there; so can he agree that in the English universities the doctrines of the Reformation shall be taught—the Reformation which he characterizes as “the inferior piece given under that name by Henry VIII. and a second-rate company in this island.” That he would discern benigance in a Platonic or Aurelian school is surely probable, and the presence of a Latter Day Saint as a professor in a college of pure material rationalism would scarcely irritate his sense of the ridiculous, while he would certainly consider a moral Buddhist a most fit person to teach, by precept and example, the fundamental truths of Christianity. It is this mental enterprisingness of Mr. Arnold, this courteous cordiality of his towards all systems of belief, this suave and amiable confusion of creeds and no-creeds, which, expressed in seductive and mystifying phrase and gentle jingle, renders his poetry dangerous to the young and unwary. There are certain poisons which, if taken in sufficient quantity, act as their own antidotes. Mr. Arnold's poetry comes in this classification. Read enough of it and it can do no harm. His just-quoted verses are entitled *Pis-Aller*. He is willing revelation should be believed in as a last and very bad resort, and perhaps his sneer might injuriously affect a melancholy maid or callow youth if, in another page of the same volume, she or he did

¹ Essays on Criticism, Preface, p. vi.

² Essays on Criticism, Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment, p. 192.

not find "Immortality," and on another "Saint Brandan," and on another "The Good Shepherd with the Kid," and on another "Monica's Last Prayer;" all these intermingled with poems flatly denying the essence of them. Indeed that volume is well characterized in a single line of one of the poems :

"Germany, France, Christ, Moses, Athens, Rome !"

We might have hoped that the morbid muse would disdain to hide herself in such latitudinarianism ; the company, if not actually loose, is indeed not select. But she is here. She wipes her eyes with her moist tresses. She wants to die. Like Dido, unhappy queen, she prepares to die, preferring the anticipations of dissolution to the cheerful activities of life. She arranges her sombre drapery, smooths her hair down her cheeks, folds her hands upon her breast, half opens her languid eyes, and, too morbid to decide to be altogether a rationalist or just a little a Pythagorean or a spiritualist, thus lachrymously makes her last testament :

A WISH.

I ask not that my bed of death
From hands of greedy heirs be free ;
For these besiege the latest breath
Of fortune's favored sons, not me.

I ask not each kind soul to keep
Tearless when of my death he hears ;
Let those who will, if any, weep !
There are worse plagues on earth than tears.

I ask but that my death may find
The freedom to my life denied ;
Ask but the folly of mankind
Then, then at last, to quit my side.

Spare me the whispering crowded room,
The friends who come and gape and go ;
The ceremonious air of gloom,—
All that makes death a hideous show !

Nor bring, to see me cease to live,
Some doctor, full of phrase and fame,
To shake his sapient head and give
The ill he cannot cure a name.

Nor fetch, to take the accustomed toll
Of the poor sinner bound for death,
His brother doctor of the soul,
To canvass with official breath

The future and its viewless things,
That undiscovered mystery
Which one who feels death's winnowing wings,
Must needs read clearer sure than he !

Bring none of these ! but let me be,
 While all around in silence lies,
 Moved to the window near, and see
 Once more before my dying eyes,

Bathed in the sacred dews of morn,
 The wide aerial landscape spread,—
 The world which was ere I was born,
 The world which lasts when I am dead.

Which never was the friend of *one*,
 Nor promised love it could not give,
 But lit for all its generous sun,
 And lived itself and made us live.

There let me gaze, till I become
 In soul with what I gaze on, wed
 To feel the universe my home ;
 To have before my mind—instead

Of the sick-room, the mortal strife,
 The turmoil for a little breath—
 The pure eternal course of life,
 Not human combatings with death.

Thus feeling, gazing, let me grow
 Composed, refreshed, ennobled, clear ;
 Then willing let my spirit go
 To work or wait elsewhere or here !

And the author of this apotheosis of self-loving misery is professor of poetry at Oxford !

There is nothing precise or clear about Mr. Arnold's views on philosophical and religious questions, except that he does not appear to know what his views are. If he had any exact convictions his sense of duty to his fellow-men would drive him into shyness about expressing them. "There is no surer proof," he says, "of a narrow and contracted mind than to think and uphold that what man takes to be the truth in religious matters is always to be proclaimed. Our truth on these matters, and likewise the error of others, is something so relative that the good or harm likely to be done by speaking ought always to be taken into account. . . . The man who believes that his truth on religious matters is so absolutely the truth that, say it when, and where, and to whom he will, he cannot but do good with it, is in our day almost always a man whose truth is half blunder and wholly useless." This has the high merit of being honest. There are dozens of men whose religious tendencies are as vague and shifting as Mr. Arnold's, who are so much less honest than he that each new bend in these ten-

¹ Literature and Dogma, preface, v., vi.

dencies they take to be the highroad to Heaven and insist upon all men following their lead. In religion alone will logic admit that dogma is necessary and rational; but Mr. Arnold, avowing his inability to be logical, imperiously denies the reasonableness of dogma in religion, and transfers the dogmatic prerogative to that which is his substitute for religion—culture.

Culture, to many minds, means much; to many others it means little. To Mr. Arnold it means everything that is good, that is enlightening, that is sweetening, that is progressive. In culture, as he advocates it, there are certain principles:

- α. There must be no dogmas in religion.
- β. We do not know whether we were made by God, or are the aggregate product of individual protoplasm.
- γ. We do not know whether we are immortal or not. Perhaps we are.
- δ. If we are immortal it is impossible to say in what immortality consists.

ε. But the true way to achieve a noble immortality is by doubting everything in religion and believing everything in culture.

What, then, is culture? Mr. Arnold says, "culture is indispensably necessary, and culture is reading." "Mr. Disraeli," he writes, "treating Hellenic things with the scornful negligence natural to a Hebrew, said the other day, in a well-known book, that an aristocratic class, the polite flower of the nation, were truly Hellenic in this respect, among others, that they cared nothing for letters and never read. Now there seems to be here some inaccuracy, if we take our standard of what is Hellenic from Hellas at its highest pitch of development; for the latest historian of Greece, Dr. Curtius, tells us that in the Athens of Pericles, 'reading was universally diffused;' and again, that 'what more than anything distinguishes the Greeks from the barbarians of ancient and modern times is the idea of a culture comprehending body *and soul* in an equal measure.'" Culture—culture comprehending body *and soul*—is Mr. Arnold's substitute for dogmatic religion, and culture is simply reading.

Do we now touch the secret of the organic disease in contemporaneous poetry? Have we found the haunts and home of the Morbid Muse? The Christian religion says as positively as if it were an axiomatic truth that the soul is immortal. That is a dogma; it gives joy to poetry. Abolish the dogma; eliminate it and all other religious dogmas from reason and from the imagination; substitute for them the "I do not know but perhaps it is" of culture, and instantly joy expires. Sorrow enters as joy passes out. The imagination of the true poet cannot quite darken itself. The

vanishing radiance is not wholly obscured. Some faint reflection of

. . . . "The gleam,
The lustre known to neither sea nor land"

remains. Hope makes her presence secretly felt, but sorrow claims possession. In the mental struggle which ensues, neither is victor; both retire and yield to the unknown spirit in whom something of the sentiment of both is concentrated—the new muse, the modern one, the muse of culture, the Morbid Muse.

At her presence well might a Wordsworth cry:

"Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed unborn;
To-night I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

And the muses of paganism were indeed preferable to the Morbid Muse of modern culture. We can see the regal train,—epic Calliope and Clio with her half-opened roll; the veiled Melpomene, whose solemn masque and stately tread reminds us that even with histrionic tragedy the Greeks associated delight and gayety; for was not Melpomene mother of the Sirens?—and here trippingly came Euterpe with her music, and Terpsichore, laurel-crowned, impatient for the dance; here Erato, languishing, but happy under her roses and myrtle, and comic Thalia, laughing in her face; now grave Urania, with her globe, followed by majestic Polymnia, whose nymphs "sing happy strains in rich harmonious tune."

"A cheerful life is what the Muses love,
A soaring spirit is their prime delight."

Not a morbid heart in the queenly company! Assuredly we may complain that modern culture has done less for us than did the sombre mythology of the Greek who knew not God. Better rove with the deities of pagan invention in the glens and forests of Olympus, climbing its steepes with intolerable fatigue, only to find upon its palace summit an ideal world of gods and mortals, in whose society we shall not long care to tarry, than take to our love this culture maid, whose very breath is fetid with anti-Christian despair, who incessantly wrings her hands in the agony of a woe, self-evolved from her own soul, and whose melancholy and mystic songs carry to mankind only wanton misery, irreverent and blasphemous imprecation, and whining doubt. The poetic ideal of Hellenic thought was at least tranquil; it was not subject to convulsions, nor addicted to hysteria. If it knew not Christian joy, it

was free from the melancholy of irreligious culture. Wordsworth did not live long enough to see more than the *début* of the new muse; he did not foresee in his

"Spontaneous wisdom breathed by health,
Truth breathed by cheerfulness,"

that a school of poetry would follow his own, in which health should be supplanted by disease and cheerfulness by hypochondria. His was

. "that blessed mood
In which the brother of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened; that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on
Until the breath of this corporeal frame,
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul;
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things."

"The deep power of joy" has been almost destroyed in contemporaneous verse. The poet of all living poets who has preserved it is Mr. Aubrey de Vere. With that self-contradiction which is always to be expected from him, Mr. Arnold repeats in the preface to his selection of the poems of Wordsworth¹ what he had previously said of Homer, that the profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of poetic greatness. Could prejudice lay aside her masque, Aubrey de Vere would be held a greater poet than Wordsworth, even by Wordsworthians. To characterize him as the poet of joy should not mislead. He is essentially, too, the poet of sorrow, but in the noble, manly, healthful, elevating sense; and since life is all the time joy or sorrow, assuredly he is the great poet who, with the pen of beauty and the spirit of truth, faithfully depicts both, accomplishing therein the "profound application of ideas to life," ennobling its burdens, sanctifying its pleasures, lightening its care, making tranquil its passions, refreshing its rest.² It is a long journey from Plato to Shelley, and upon no

¹ Poems of Wordsworth, chosen and edited by Matthew Arnold. London: Macmillan & Co.

² It is to be hoped that in the next edition of Allibone's *Critical Dictionary of English Literature* the painstaking compiler will not only show that he has read some of Aubrey de Vere's poems, but also that he has discovered that Sir Aubrey de Vere and Aubrey de Vere are not one and the same person,—a discovery which Dr. Allibone has not yet made. There is no mention of the father's death in the dictionary, and the father's poetical publications and the son's are catalogued together without any

subject are they farther removed from each other than poetry ; yet the poetry of De Vere, more than that of *any other living poet*, satisfies the demands of both. In the tenth book of the *Republic* Socrates would exclude the poet from the ideal state, "because he excites, and feeds, and strengthens" the "worthless part of the soul." Then he would not exclude De Vere, since this offence no line of his commits. Shelley, on the other hand, in his *Defence of Poetry* pronounces it the "record of the best and happiest moments of the best and happiest minds." "It is, as it were, the interpenetration of a diviner nature through our own ; but its footsteps are like those of a wind over the sea, which the coming calm erases, and whose traces remain only, as on the wrinkled sand which paves it. These and corresponding conditions of being are experienced principally by those of the most delicate sensibility and the most enlarged imagination, and the state of mind produced by them is at war with every base desire. The enthusiasm of virtue, love, patriotism, and friendship is essentially linked with such emotions, and whilst they last self appears as what it is, an atom to a universe. Poets are not only subject to these experiences, as spirits of the most refined organization, but they can color all that they combine with the evanescent hues of this ethereal world. A word, a trait, in the representation of a scene or a passion, will touch the enchanted chord, and reanimate in those who have ever experienced these emotions the sleeping, the cold, the buried image of the past. Poetry thus makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful in the world ; it arrests the vanishing apparitions which haunt the interlunations of life, and, veiling them, or in language or in form, sends them forth among mankind bearing sweet news of kindred joy to those with whom their sisters abide—abide because there is no portal of expression from the caverns of the spirit which they inhabit into the universe of things. Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man." This is not a description of Shelley's poetry ; how inapt the elegant prose for the lurid verse ! But it is perfectly expressive of De Vere's. Shelley, however, is not the only poet-critic whose idealism is much loftier than his poetry. We shall find Wordsworth giving to De Vere canons which he himself spontaneously ignored.

The influence of Wordsworth had much to do with the development of a hereditary gift in Mr. De Vere. His father, Sir Aubrey

hint as to their separate authorship. The list is incomplete, mentioning nothing later than 1850. In W. Davenport Adams's *Dictionary of English Literature*, "Autæ and Zara" is printed "Autæ and Rora." Parke Godwin's *Cyclopædia of Biography* does not mention father or son. Lippincott's *Pronouncing Biographical Dictionary* attributes the "Waldenses" ("The Fall of Rora") to Sir Aubrey de Vere, and does not mention the living poet.

de Vere, himself a poet of marked power, dignity, warmth, and refinement, was the contemporary and friend of the bard of Rydal; and the son relates in his *Recollections of Wordsworth*¹ that he himself made Wordsworth's acquaintance eight years before his death, and for four years saw a good deal of him, chiefly among his own mountains. "Besides many delightful walks with him, I had the great honor of passing some days under his roof." Sir Aubrey de Vere knew Wordsworth well, admired and loved him, apparently with fervor, and inscribing to him a volume of poems printed in 1842 (*A Song of Faith, Devout Exercises, and Sonnets*), closes his dedication with, "I may at least hope to be named hereafter among the friends of Wordsworth." Thus did he describe a day with the poet at Rydal in 1833:

"What we beheld scarce can I now recall
 In one connected picture, images
 Hurrying so briskly their fresh witcheries
 O'er the mind's mirror, that the several
 Seems lost, or blended in the mighty all.
 Lone lakes; rills gushing through rock-rooted trees;
 Peaked mountains shadowing vales of peacefulness;
 Glens echoing to the flashing waterfall.
 Then that sweet twilight isle! with friends delayed
 Beside a ferry bank 'neath oaks and yews;
 The moon between two mountain peaks embayed;
 Heaven and the waters dyed with sunset hues:
 And he, the poet of the age and land,
 Discoursing as we wandered hand in hand."

Sir Aubrey de Vere,² in the ardor of his personal attachment, doubtless overestimated Wordsworth's power and art. "He taught me when a boy of eighteen years old to admire the great bard. I had been very enthusiastically praising Lord Byron's poetry. My father calmly replied: 'Wordsworth is the great poet of modern times.' Much surprised I asked: 'And what may his special merits be?' The answer was, 'They are very various; as, for instance, depth, largeness, elevation, and, what is rare in modern poetry, an entire purity. In his noble *Laodamia* they are chiefly majesty and pathos.' " When the youth took up *Laodamia* afterwards, "some strong, calm hand seemed to have been laid on my head," he says. "As I read, a new world, hitherto unimagined, opened itself out, stretching far away into serene infinitudes. The region was one to me unknown, but the harmony of the picture attested its reality. . . . I had been translated into another planet

¹ Catholic World, vol. xvii.

² The poetical works of the baronet include (1.) *Mary Tudor: an Historical Drama*; (2.) *Julian the Apostate, and the Duke of Mercia*; (3.) *A Song of Faith, Devout Exercises, and Sonnets*.

of song, one with larger movements and a longer year. A wider conception of poetry had become mine, and the Byronian enthusiasm fell from me like a bond that is broken, in being outgrown." The influence of Wordsworth upon Mr. De Vere, thus begun, manifestly grew by study and association. The four years covering his personal intercourse with the venerable poet afforded him many opportunities for appreciating his personal character, comprehending his philosophic views, and studying the science of his strongly individualized verse. "There was in his nature," he writes, "a veracity which, had it not been combined with an idealizing imagination not less remarkable, would to many have appeared prosaic; yet, had he not possessed that characteristic, the products of his imagination would have lacked reality. They might still have enunciated a deep and sound philosophy; but they would have been divested of that human interest which belongs to them in a yet higher degree." He insisted on severity of truthfulness in all descriptions of nature; an untrue description was to him a heavenly message sophisticated and falsely delivered. He complained to Mr. De Vere that a certain poet went out with his pencil and notebook and jotted down whatever struck him most—a river rippling over the sands, a ruined tower on a rock above it, a promontory and a mountain ash waving its red berries; "he went home and wove the whole together into a poetical description." This aroused Wordsworth's indignation. "Nature," he exclaimed, "does not permit an inventory to be made of her charms! He should have left his pencil and notebook at home; fixed his eye, as he walked, with a reverent attention on all that surrounded him, and taken all into a heart that could understand and enjoy. Then after several days had passed by, he should have interrogated his memory as to the scene. He would have discovered that while much of what he had admired was preserved to him, much was also most wisely obliterated. That which remained—the picture surviving in his mind—would have presented the ideal and essential truth of the scene, and done so, in a large part, by discarding much which, though in itself striking, was not characteristic. In every scene many of the most brilliant details are but accidental. A true eye for nature does not note them, or at least does not dwell on them." Mr. De Vere is too loyal to the memory of his father's friend and his own to point out that no poet has erred oftener than Wordsworth against this principle, so correctly by him laid down. He almost habitually failed to discriminate between the essential and accidental in nature. His confusion of the broadly ideal with mere prosaic detail has rendered much of his loveliest composition incapable of just popular admiration. His reader's entranced fancy is lifted into an empty-

rean of delight and, suddenly, with no note of warning, dashed down upon some hard grotesque littleness on the flat earth. It was his failure to separate the ideal from the insignificant actual which made him for so many years the butt of a circle of blind and clever wits, whose vision could not get into his superb and gorgeous words because of the trivial and incongruous obstacles with which he ornamented his doors and windows. It was this radical fault, not in his science of imagination applied to literature, but in the Wordsworthian art, which handed over *Peter Bell* to unmerciful parody. It is this which Lowell characterizes so happily when he says that Wordsworth did not know the difference between truth, which is the breath of the muse's nostril, and fact, which suffocates her; and it is this which compels so devoted an admirer as Matthew Arnold to admit that new *Laodamia* is "not wholly free from something artificial;" and, in his eager endeavor to make Wordsworth better known, compels him, as a judicious critic, to omit in a special edition many of the poems most highly praised by the Wordsworth school. What Mr. Arnold calls an "ample body of powerful work" remains; it is enough to secure, in the slow but inevitable verdict of mankind, the immortality of its author.

Mr. De Vere certainly has striven to apply to his own verse the sound caution which he heard from Wordsworth's lips. I do not venture to say that, even in his best work, he has succeeded so well as Wordsworth in his better (not in his best). The future, which will read De Vere's poetry unaffected by the shadows which come between it and the general public now,—shadows of which something remains to be said,—may rank him very near and only a little below Wordsworth in what Matthew Arnold calls the successful balance in poetry,—“profound truth of subject with profound truth of execution.” Judged by the moral test, he has everything to expect of the future,—not the moral in the didactic, much less the exhorting sense, but in the sense of the “profound application of ideas to life,”—in the sense of living, eternal, actual, and lovely truth, expressed in a noble, chaste, stately, living manner. It goes without saying that there is no sensationism in his verse. But it is imbued with that which is infinitely superior to sensationism; with that which abides where sensationism withers and decays; with that which is to poetry what the spirit of man is to his body; with that which endures after the artificial and tricky and fantastic has been contemptuously forgot; with that which survives in tranquil majesty and unimpaired strength when all that is perishable in thought has perished,—with moral and artistic life.

It is not remarkable that no complete edition of Mr. De Vere's poems has been published in this country. It is mechanical, not

poetic, invention which interests Americans now. The singers must linger in their groves while the machinists fill the cities with their clangor. Poetry, according to a living critic, is merely "metaphor and music;" but the period in music is one of blare. The nightingale warbles unheard on the distant bough; the brass band bellows in the streets. The courageous Catholic Publication Society printed a collection of Mr. De Vere's poems more than a decade ago; it contains a number of the poet's odes, many of his finest sonnets,—*"The Fall of Rora," "The Sisters,"*—his most powerful and pathetic Irish poems, and a thoughtful collection of his miscellaneous poems. Mr. Kehoe had previously favored American readers with the devout and delicate *"May Carols."* Nor is there a complete edition in England, if I am rightly informed. Indeed, strange as it may appear, it is probable that Mr. De Vere has been read more in the United States than in the British Islands, since most of the poetic efforts of his later years have adorned the pages of the *Catholic World*. The sympathy between him and his Western friends he is himself conscious of, and in the preface to *Irish Odes* he gracefully and finely acknowledges it. "No one who has written in the English language," he says, "whether with the lower or the higher aims of literature, can fail to desire that his works shall have a circulation in America. That country must ere long contain far the larger number of those who speak English." "For me," he adds, "the question is not merely one of literature. There now exists in America more of my Irish fellow-countrymen than remain in their native country, and I cannot but wish that my poetry, much of which illustrates their history and religion, should reach those Irish 'of the dispersion' in that land which has extended to them its hospitality." It is not easy to classify Mr. De Vere's poems within rigid lines; but that the reader may become acquainted with his predominant characteristics, in their typical forms, the body of his poetry (not including the dramatic works, which call for consideration by themselves) may be divided into descriptive, religious, national, classic, and those relating to home and affection. In all of these, however, will be discovered "the profound application of ideas to life." He never mounts the pulpit; he never writes homily; he never moralizes nor ambuscades his reader into an essay; of course he never harangues. He is always just a poet; but a poet who always has his soul with him when abroad with his muse, and whose muse kneels with him when he worships and when he prays. Never jocose, but ever jocund; never frivolous, ever cheerful; descending into the depths of sorrow, never sinking into the abyss of despair; rising to the glorious mountain-tops of happiness, but never passing upward into transcendental insanity; in all his words reverent; in all his pas-

sionateness noble; seeing God (not sermons) in stones and running brooks; never mistaking Nature, the creature, for God, the creator, but ever conscious of the power, the majesty, the love, and the gentleness of God, while enjoying with pure ecstasy the beauty of His material world,—such a poet is Aubrey de Vere.

To show how just is such a characterization, and to give the reader a glimpse at once of the poet's elegance, feeling, grace, and power, I shall quote immediately, before proceeding to a fuller examination of his work, one sonnet and two short poems, essentially different in subject. The first is entitled

SORROW.

Count each affliction, whether light or grave,
God's messenger sent down to thee; do thou
With courtesy receive him; rise and bow;
And, ere his shadow pass thy threshold, crave
Permission first his heavenly feet to lave;
Then lay before him all thou hast. Allow
No cloud of passion to usurp thy brow,
Or mar thy hospitality; no wave
Of mortal tumult to obliterate
The soul's Marmoreal calmness. Grief should be,
Like joy, majestic, equable, sedate;
Confirming, cleansing, raising, making free;
Strong to consume small troubles; to commend
Great thoughts, grave thoughts, thoughts lasting to the end.

The second is

THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES.

I saw the Poet standing by himself
At old Colonus (now, alas, no more
With dewy laurels fenced, or lit by streams
That gush o'er beds of crocus; lulled no longer
By that dark choir of quick-winged nightingales
That soothed the Eumenides :) he stood in trance,
Resting his forehead 'gainst an olive stem
Round which one arm hung idly—
At last he moved; his head sank slowly back;
On his Olympian brow the invisible air
Rested serene; his eyelids slowly drooped,
Till their dark lashes met with softest touch:
At last a rapture swelled his breast, and rising
Increased upon his face.
As one that inland stands on high-arched downs
Pierced by sea-caves, and wondering hears the sea
Working beneath—half hears it and half feels,
So looked he for a moment; then arose
Bright as a God—around his temples wreathed
A light of sun-fed locks! Silent he stood:
It was his hour of immortality!
Even at the moment of that trance he saw
A glorious vision from his own deep spirit
Emerged—a perfect form! o'er earth's dark ball
Hanging he saw it, as the Thunderer sees
That great creative Thought, mankind's one law—
He said; and cried aloud—Antigone!

And the third, no eyes that have read a page of Irish history of the seventeenth century will read without suffusion, or willingly dismiss from the memory forever after. It is a dirge in uniquely appropriate symbolism, for the brave Irish leader O'More. The expression "Silk of the Kine," was one of the bard's mystical names for Ireland:

Up the sea-saddened valley at evening's decline
A heifer walks lowing; the "silk of the kine;"
From the deep to the mountain she roams, and again
From the mountain's green urn to the purple-rimmed main.

Whom seek'st thou, sad mother? Thine own is not thine!
He dropped from the headland, he sank in the brine!
'Twas a dream; but in dream at thy feet did he follow
Through the meadow-sweet, on by the marish and mallow!

Was he thine? Have they slain him? Thou seek'st him not knowing
Thyself too art theirs, thy sweet breath and sad lowing!
Thy gold horn is theirs; thy dark eye and thy silk!
And that which torments thee, thy milk is their milk!

'Twas no dream, Mother Land! 'Twas no dream, Inisfail!
Hope dreams, but grief dreams not—the grief of the Gael!
From Leix and Ikerren to Donegal's shore
Rolls the dirge of the last and thy bravest—O'More!

It has seemed to me that the influence of Wordsworth is perfectly apparent in Mr. De Vere's descriptive verse. It is reasonable to look for the truth of this in his sonnets:

A wild swan and an eagle side by side
I marked, careering o'er the ocean plain,
Emulous a loftier zenith each to gain,
Circling in orbits wider and more wide.
Highest, methought, through tempest scarce descried,
One time the bird of battle soared; in vain;
So soon, exhausted 'mid their joy and pride,
Dropped the bright rivals, vanquished, to the main.
Then, o'er the mighty waves around them swelling,
That snowy nursling of low lakes her song
Lifted to God, floating serene along;
While she that in the peaks had made her dwelling
Struggled in vain her wings to beat and quiver,
And the sea closed o'er that bright crest forever.

Here is a night on the Genoese Riviera:

Fanned by sweet airs the road along the cliff
Wound in the moonlight, glistening now, now dim;
So winds a silver snake in pale relief
Around a sacrificial beaker's brim:
Black rocks loomed forth in giant hieroglyph
O'er silken seas amid their shadows grim.
From lonely down dim lit, or dancing skiff
At times the song was borne, at times the hymn.

Star after star adown the blue vault sliding
Their bright hair washed successive in the wave,
Till morning, from her far purpureal cave
Issuing, and o'er the foamless billows gliding,
Leaped, as the bells rang out from tower and shrine,
Up from her sea-bath to the hills of pine.

“A Morning at Salerno” makes this exquisite picture:

Our hearts heaved slowly as that deep blue flood
Along whose marge we paced. More darkly blue,
Through lines of poplars gleaming on our view,
The violet crescent of the mountains stood.
Unblemished morning, shy as Maidenhood,
Rose blushing from the waves, and round us threw
A gradual halo, reddening through its dew
The silvery greenness of the willow wood.
Small clouds unnumbered, swollen with golden glories,
Swam in succession long of lucent fleeces
O'er all the ocean-isles and promontories,—
That old-world Faith, which sees whate'er it pleases,
Had deemed Saint Agnes up the heavenly Eden
Her mild immaculate flock was gently leading!

Mr. De Vere is fond of going to Latin roots for liquid syllables. The fault,—and it is warm criticism that will chide its severity,—is that of the artists who, after trying their throats on our rough compounds, insist that our ears will enjoy their Italian better. Music has a daintier sense than common speech.

One more sonnet, one that Wordsworth would have smiled with deep complacency in writing. It is XXXVIII. of those “Written in Travel:”

THE BLUE GENTIAN.

With heart not yet half rested from Mount Blanc,
O'er thee, small flower, my wearied eyes I bent,
And rested on that humble vision long:
Is there less beauty in thy purple tent
Outspread, perchance a boundless firmament,
O'er viewless myriads which beneath thee throng,
Than in that Mount whose sides, with ruin hung,
Frown o'er black glen and gorges thunder-rent?
Is there less mystery? Wisely if we ponder,
Thine is the mightier! Life, dread Power, in thee
Is strong as in cherubic wings that wander,
Searching the limits of Infinity;—
Life, life to be transmitted, not to expire
Till yonder snowy vault shall melt in the last fire!

It is almost unnecessary to quote any of Mr. De Vere's religious poems, as a religious spirit breathes so audibly in his every line. But to show how inevitably fidelity of description blends with his devotional mood, it is impossible to avoid this blending of the natural with the supernatural. It is “May Carol XXVI.”:

The moon, ascending o'er a mass
 Of tangled yew and sable pine,
 What sees she in yon watery glass?
 A tearful countenance divine.

Far down, the winding hills between,
 A sea, of vapor bends for miles,
 Unmoving. Here and there, dim seen,
 The knolls above it rise like isles.

The tall rock glimmers, spectre-white;
 The cedar in its sleep is stirred;
 At times the bat divides the night;
 At times the far-off flood is heard.

Above, that shining blue!—below,
 That shining mist! Oh, not more pure
 Midwinter's landscape, robed in snow,
 And fixed with frothy garniture.

The fragrance of the advancing year—
 That, that assures us it is May.
 Oh, tell me, in the heavenlier sphere
 Must all of earth have passed away?

The national poems by Mr. De Vere cover the heartbreaking history of Ireland in her most stormy and most poetic period,—*Inisfail* commencing with the Norman conquests. The first part closes with "The Ballad of Turgesius the Dane." The second part includes the dreadful story of the religious wars; among its numbers is the dirge of O'More, already quoted. The third part relates to the penal laws and the victory of emancipation. *Inisfail*, therefore, begins with Strongbow and ends with Grattan. The whole comprises a lyrical chronicle of one hundred and twenty or more poems, singularly well sustained in lyric quality, in the unity of their purpose, and in the unity and comprehensiveness of their artistic plan. They are not national woes strung on a rhyming thread. Notable alike for their spontaneousness and their finish, they are animated by a fervent but not riotous patriotism, and the fire of true liberty burns in their thrilling numbers. I am afraid to say that some of Mr. De Vere's contemplative religious powers are afflicted with a philosophic shiver,—honestly doubting my judgment or having an incorrect mean temperature for religious poetry,—the standard of heat which sacrifices no ardor of imagination to spiritual meekness. Surely nothing is more difficult to effect than the perfect mating of good poetry and good religion in the bonds of rhythm and rhyme. But the charge of frigid elegance which may lie against a portion of that part of the poet's work cannot be sustained against *Inisfail*. A few extracts—all for which room can be claimed—will amply serve. Before making

these citations, the lofty spirit which animates,—the philosophic and Christian spirit,—should not go by without a word. “As such poems,” says Mr. De Vere, “make us acquainted with the deeper springs of action, and with those imaginative instincts the might of which, like that of the imponderable agents in the material world, is at once secret and incalculable, history forgets party politics in human interests. It is thus that poetry exercises her high moral function in connection with history. She deepens our sympathies with those who contended for the right; yet she reminds us also of the allowance to be made for those who were unhappily ranged on the opposite side, whether by necessity, by custom, or by that vain and aggressive patriotism to which must be assigned a place among the illicit affections. Her spirit is comprehensive. She takes large views of things, discerning and confessing upon which side, *on the whole*, has been the right, and on which the wrong; for as regards mere detail, it is obvious that, so long as retaliation remains an attribute of our fallen nature, there must, in every prolonged struggle, be much of incidental wrong at both sides. But her spirit is also penetrating. She recognizes the force of hostile traditions and distinguishes between the individual and the cause.” Passing over the prologue and the dozen fine poems which follow it,—“The House Norman,” “The Legends,” “The Bard Ethell,”—one in which the poetic insight is brightly displayed, passing by King Malachi and Saint Patrick, and O’Donnell’s answer, and the battle of Athunree, fought in the fourteenth century, in which the Normans gained so decisive a victory over the Earls and became thereafter Irish chiefs, we find the dirge of Edward Bruce :

I.

He is dead, dead, dead !
 The man to Erin dear !
 The king who gave our Isle a head—
 His kingdom is his bier.
 He rode into our war;
 And we crowned him chief and prince,
 For his race to Alba’s shore
 Sailed from Erin, ages since.
 Woe, woe, woe !
 Edward Bruce is cold to-day ;
 He that slew him lies as low,
 Sword to sword and clay to clay.

II.

King Robert came too late !—
 Long, long may Erin mourn !
 Famine’s rage and dreadful Fate
 Forbade her Bannockburn !
 As the galley touched the strand
 Came the messenger of woe ;

The king put back the herald's hand—
 "Peace," he said, "thy tale I know!
 His face was in the cloud;
 And his wrath was on the surge"—
 Maids of Alba, weave his shroud!
 Maids of Erin, sing his dirge!

"The Irish Norman" and "The Statute of Kilkenny" are fittingly treated, and then we have "The Days of Outlawry," when Edward I. refused to grant the protection of English law to the Irish, and refused to recognize the Brehon law which did protect them.

I.

A cry comes up from wood and wold,
 A wail from fen and marish,
 "Grant us your laws, and take our gold;
 Like beasts dog-chased we perish"—
 The hunters of their kind reply,
 "Our sport we scorn to barter!
 We rule! the Irish enemy
 Partakes not England's charter."

II.

A cry comes up forever new,
 A wail of hopeless anguish,
 "Your laws, your laws!—our laws ye slew;
 In living death we languish"—
 "Not so! we keep our hunting-ground;
 We chase the flying quarry.
 Hark, hark, that sound! the horn and hound!
 Away! we may not tarry!"

III.

For Scotland England's King with glee
 Forsakes his court and palace.
 O Erin, if that hour in thee
 A Bruce had risen—a Wallace!
 For conquests new King Edward burns
 In Scotland's farthest highland;
 The forest lord the offal spurns
 Of one subjected island!

IV.

Sad isle, thy laws are Norman lords,
 That, dowered by Henry's bounty,
 On cities sup 'mid famished hordes,
 And dine on half a county!
 A laughing Titan, Outlawry,
 Strides drunk o'er hill and heather;
 Justice to him is as a fly
 "Twixt mailed hands clasped together.

V.

O memory, memory, leaves the graves
 Knee-deep in grass and darnel!
 Wash from a Kingdom, winds and waves,
 The odor of the charnel!

Be dumb, red graves in valleys deep,
 Black towers on plains blood-sloken :--
 Dark fields, your thrilling secrets keep,
 Nor speak till God hath spoken !

"The War Song of Nicconnell's Bard at the Battle of Blackwater" is a faithful expression of bardic art and national ardor. That and "The Suppression of the Faith in Ulster" are the most elaborate poems in the second part of *Inisfail*. "In the Battle of Benburb" the poet seems to me deficient in presenting the *ensemble* of war ; but as he aims at writing such an ode as the bards of the time wrote, it is easy to judge him by an improper criterion. Nowhere, however, has he the martial splendor of Thomas Davis, nor as an inspirer of high feeling and impetuous action is he comparable with such a popular poet as T. D. Sullivan ; but De Vere is not a poet of the people in the sense that Davis and Sullivan are. He never loses sight of the *moral* purpose in his verse, whatever the theme of the lines, and the nature and scope of that moral purpose have already been more than suggested in his own words. "Under the tumults with which poetry deals there is ever an inner voice of peace," he quotes from Keble. In the third part of *Inisfail* the notable numbers are "The Curse of Cromwell," the "Ballad of the Lady Turned Beggar," the widow of Lord Roche, who fought for Charles I., and was left to starve in the streets by Charles II., "The Irish Slave in Barbadoes," which seems to me inadequate in passion, but it is meltingly plaintive. And this is the story of Sarsfield's capture of the Dutch cannon :

A BALLAD OF SARSFIELD, OR THE BURSTING OF THE GUNS, A.D. 1690.

Sarsfield went out the Dutch to rout,
 And to take and break their cannon ;
 To Mass went he at half-past three,
 And at four he crossed the Shannon.

Tirconnel slept. In dream his thoughts
 Old fields of victory ran on ;
 And the chieftains of Thormond in Limerick's towers
 Slept well by the banks of Shannon.

He rode ten miles and he crossed the ford,
 And couched in the wood and waited ;
 Till, left and right, on marched in sight
 That host which the true men hated.

"Charge !" Sarsfield cried ; and the green hillside
 As they charged replied in thunder ;
 They rode o'er the plain and they rode o'er the slain,
 And the rebel rout lay under !

He burned the gear the knaves held dear,—
 For his King he fought, not plunder ;
 With powder he crammed the guns and rammed
 Their mouths the red soil under.

The spark flashed out—like a nation's shout
 The sound into heaven ascended;
 The hosts of the sky made to earth reply,
 And the thunders twain were blended!

Sarsfield went out the Dutch to rout,
 And to take and break their cannon;
 A century after, Sarsfield's laughter,
 Was echoed from Dungannon.¹

This is the "Ballad of Athlone, or How They Broke Down the Bridge."

Does any man dream that a Gael can fear?
 Of a thousand deeds let him learn but one!
 The Shannon swept onward, broad and clear,
 Between the leaguers and worn Athlone.

"Break down the bridge!"—Six warriors rushed
 Through the storm of shot and the storm of shell;
 With late, but certain, victory flushed,
 The grim Dutch gunners eyed them well.

They wrenched at the planks 'mid a hail of fire,
 They fell in death, their work half done;
 The bridge stood fast; and nigh and nigher
 The foe swarmed darkly, densely on.

"O who for Erin will strike a stroke?
 Who hurl yon planks where the waters roar?"
 Six warriors forth from their comrades broke,
 And flung them upon the bridge once more.

Again at the rocking planks they dashed,
 And four dropped dead, and two remained;
 The huge beams groaned and the arch dome crashed,
 Two stalwart swimmers the margin gained.

St. Ruth in his stirrups stood up and cried:
 "I have seen no deed like that in France!"
 With a toss of his head Sarsfield replied:
 "They had luck, the dogs! 'Twas a merry chance!"

O many a year upon Shannon's side
 They sang upon moor and they sang upon heath
 Of the twain that breasted the raging tide,
 And the ten that shook bloody hands with Death!

The third part of *Inisfail* contains a large number of strong ballads and melodious songs; the key is that of the beautiful "Parvuli Ejus."

In the night, in the night, O my country, the stream calls out from a far:
 So swells thy voice through the ages, sonorous and vast;
 In the night, in the night, O my country, clear flashes the star:
 So flashes on me thy face through the gloom of the past.

¹ It was in the parish church of Dungannon that the volunteers of 1782 proclaimed the constitutional independence of the Irish Parliament.

I sleep not; I watch; in blows the wind, ice-winged and ice-fingered;
My forehead it cools and slakes the fire in my breast;
Though it sighs o'er the plains where oft thine exiles look'd back and long linger'd,
And the graves where thy famished lie dumb and thine outcasts find rest.

For up from those vales wherein thy brave and thy beautiful moulder,
And on through the homesteads waste and the temples defiled,
A voice goes forth on that wind, as old as the islands and older,
"God reigns; at His feet earth's Destiny sleeps 'like a child.'"

Besides *Inisfail* Mr. De Vere has written many tender and touching poems on Irish woe, which, were the English heart susceptible to the most agonizing appeal that ever arose on earth, would have reached its core. It is true that he has not been formally identified with any division of the national parties in Ireland, a fact which may account for his being loved much less than he should be at home. It is true, too, that some of his patriotic verse is not written in the revolutionary key, and that a "God Save the Queen" will be found in his miscellaneous poems. But Tom Moore degraded the air of "St. Patrick's Day" into a toadying song to the Prince of Wales and trolled, in loyal glow,

"A curse on the minion who calls you disloyal;"

for he was quite sure—while drinking the Prince's health in the Prince's presence—that on the Prince's birthday, all Irishmen and women loved the Prince and his crown:

"Oh, my life on your faith! were you summoned this minute,
You'd cast every bitter remembrance away,
And show what the arm of old Erin has in it,
When roused by the foe on her Prince's birthday!"

And some Irishmen were celebrating Tom Moore the other day, although the Persians, the Greeks, and the English ignored his festival, notwithstanding his claims upon them. Those of his countrymen who found the occasion gracious to their feelings celebrated it with propriety—in that same giddy cup in which Tom was wont so lightly to drown the sorrows of his country—the Bacchic cup whose rim has never touched the lip of Aubrey de Vere's muse. When the thoughtful patriot reads to the end De Vere's "God Save the Queen" he will find that, after all, he has nothing to forgive, for this is the closing stanza, and did Her Majesty heed it we should have heard less of the famine cry in '47 and '80:

"God save the Queen! From chiefs of yore,
Who left for Alba's mountains,
Dalbrida, Ireland's northern shore,
Her life-blood tracks its fountains:

Ring out, strong voices, and be glad!
Make answer, tower and steeple!
God save the Queen! But let her add
Her prayer—"God save my people!"

It is true, too, that Mr. De Vere has dedicated one volume of his poems "To the Memory of the Faithful and True; of those among the Sons of Ireland who, during the ages of her affliction, sustained a just cause in the Spirit of Loyalty and Liberty, and sullies that cause by no crime," which may be construed as an implied reflection on the rash but heroic souls who spilled others' blood and caused their own to be spilled in vain for poor Ireland; but Tom Moore dedicated his complete works to the Prince of Wales. De Vere preferred his Irish countrymen. Besides, if he need apology, he may ask Daniel O'Connell to repeat for him two famous phrases which need not be mentioned here. There is another of De Vere's poems which calls for special allusion. With some conspicuous exceptions, the "nobility" of Ireland have been the most embarrassing obstacles in the way of her liberty. The few who had been able to retain their titles and estates with their faith were so conservative in their political principles and so aristocratic in their social ideas as to lack true sympathy with the masses of the people. Those whose ancestors had thrown their consciences up to the crown in order to preserve the land at their feet from confiscation became, generally, malignant or, at least, stupid bigots. The Irish Parliament of 1782, in which no Catholic sat, was patriotic enough to recover the right of originating legislation in Ireland, lost by Poyning's Law; it was so bigoted that it would not grant Catholic emancipation, although the passage of that measure then might have saved the Parliament forever, because it would have had new and powerful incentives against listening to the Act of Union. The Parliament which sold out the country for gold and promises in 1800 had no Catholic in it. But when the eloquence and energy of the patriot Protestants and the patriot but still unemancipated Catholics began to make England fear that emancipation could not be forever postponed, the infamous device of the "veto" was conceived, and the Catholic nobles of Ireland were its most efficient promoters. Is it necessary to recall what that proposition was? Those who are not familiar with it will find it almost incredible. English politicians professed to be willing to give four-fifths of the people of Ireland a voice in the management of their own affairs provided that the management of the religion of four-fifths of the Irish people was handed over to Protestant English politicians. Did such a proposition receive support among Irish Catholics? Aye, for years and years, and for years and years it postponed Catholic emancipation.

In form the proposition was comparatively mild and unoffending. Rome was to fill vacant Irish bishoprics as usual; but the English Crown was to exercise a veto upon the nominations. In other words, no ecclesiastic should become a bishop in Ireland who was not or would not speedily be a servile political tool for maintaining English oppression in Ireland. The Irish and English nobility, Protestant and Catholic, supported this almost to a man. Castle-reagh and his adroit agents shrewdly pressed it at Rome. For a time it was kindly heard there. But O'Connell and Bishop Doyle, and the then young but even then valorous John MacHale, Archbishop of Tuam, succeeded in winning or shaming away from it its most persuasive advocates. Bishop Doyle declared that, were the veto to become a law, he would lay down his mitre and crozier never again to place the one upon his head nor take the other in his hand. The sinister attempt to strangle Irish religious liberty at the very moment of its birth had finally to be abandoned, chiefly because the Irish hierarchy had become practically unanimous against it, and because the Pope, as soon as he was restored to his political independence after his imprisonment by Napoleon, refused to entertain it at all. There are Catholic "nobles" and commoners in Ireland who, in their blind folly, may be willing to adopt that compact to-day for the sake of aggrandizing themselves and silencing the anxious beating of the national heart; and many of these "nobles" have only Irish blood in their veins. How some of them obtained their titles it would be too painful, too humiliating to inquire. He who can bear the pain with equanimity may satisfy his curious desire by examining Burke's *Peerage*, Lodge's *Peerage*, and the "black list" and "red list" of the members of the Irish Parliament, who voted upon the Act of Union in 1800. It may be found in the appendix to Mitchell's *History of Ireland*. Aubrey de Vere, although the son of an Irish baronet, is of clear English extraction, and might surely be pardoned for glorying in England's glory, and for wishing sincerely that Ireland, forgetting the past and recking not of the future, should accept the destiny so persistently and cruelly thrust upon her for six hundred years, and lose her identity in English absorption. But no such thought has found a welcome in his sturdy Irish heart. Writing of the refusal of the Irish Parliament of 1782 to grant Catholic emancipation, he exclaims:

" Nobles of Ireland, that would fain be free,
Set free your Irish helots! From that hour
Nation and people equalled shall ye stand
With England, side to side, or hand to hand!
Boast not till then a freedom void of power:
A laughing devil mocks such liberty!"

Nor does he hesitate to pour out an honest soul's loathing on the base betrayers of their country's independence.

"Amid a people's curses deep,
Or silent execration,
The men that readiest proved to creep
Were pitchforked into station."

There are Irish patriots, boastful of their lineage, who can learn duty and honor and patriotism from this son of a Cromwellian planter!

The founder of the Irish De Veres was Vere Hunt, who went to Ireland as an officer in the Cromwellian army, and settled in the year 1657 at Currah, Limerick, and Glangoole, Tipperary. He was a grandson of Henry Hunt, who had been high sheriff of Essex County, and Jane de Vere, of the house of Oxford. His heirs intermarried with the families of Sir William Piers, Bart., and Lord Kerry. Vere Hunt was created a baronet of Ireland, December 4th, 1774. He married Elinor, daughter of Lord Glentworth, and sister of the Earl of Limerick. Their son Aubrey was the second baronet, who was returned to the Irish Parliament in 1797. He died in 1818, and was succeeded by his son, Sir Aubrey, who assumed, by letters patent dated March 15th, 1832, the surname and arms of De Vere only. His wife was the daughter of Stephen-Edward Rice, Esq., of Kerry. The poet is their third son, and was born in 1814. Sir Aubrey died in 1846.

It is impossible, for want of space, to take a line from the classic or affectional poems of Mr. De Vere; and it is hard to resist the temptation of the very beautiful and intensely human and realistic "Search for Proserpine." I can only hope that an American publisher will feel encouraged to give us a complete edition of the poet's works, in order that his singular merits and genuine beauty may become a part of the enjoyment of our cultivated and sincere people. Earlier in this article I alluded to the shadows which have hid Aubrey de Vere from the general knowledge and just appreciation. They will disappear in time. Wordsworth had to wait more than forty years. Aubrey de Vere may have to wait longer, but his day will come. One of those shadows I have endeavored to make as palpable as possible, for to me it is all luminous,—he is Irish. The other—need it be named? He embraced the Catholic faith in the profound earnestness of his manhood. Wordsworth declared Frederick William Faber a better poet of nature than himself, and he acknowledged no other superior; yet when the amiable Faber became a Catholic, Wordsworth, not always so great a soul as the De Veres deemed him, cast the convert out from the pale of his friendship. Had Aubrey de Vere remained in Heber's

and Keble's company, his name would resound to-day in many a stolen fane. He can wait. And whenever one with poetry and purity in his own breast takes up these poems and reads, no matter what the theme of the many-worded muse, no matter what the humor of the reader or what his lot in life, he will say, when he lays the volume down, anxious soon to take it up again, this is "a true poet soul, for it needs but to be struck and the sound that it yields will be music."

THE RECENT MINISTERIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND.

THE sudden change in the political character of the British ministry and the House of Commons is one of the surprises of the year. The Tories were not defeated in any great measure deliberately brought before Parliament, but the ministry seemed to think their majority not in good working order, and Lord Beaconsfield in all gayety of heart determined on a dissolution and an appeal to the country, his own self-satisfaction whispering that the new House would be fresh and strong, and better suited to his purpose.

He had been a blind prophet; he had miscalculated the increase of strength in the Irish Home Rulers; he had ignored the discontent of English voters with members who had neglected them and their interests; he had made light of Mr. Gladstone's great popularity in Scotland. All these influences operated in the three kingdoms; the anti-Tory party gained strength in Ireland and Scotland, and the Tories were lukewarm in England.

The Liberal party is an aggregation of dissentients rather than an organized body. As Mr. Gladstone admitted, with the exception of a small minority, "they could not reckon on the aristocracy; they could not reckon on what was called the landed interest; they could not reckon on the clergy of the established Church, either in England or Scotland, subject again in this case to a few honorable exceptions; they could not reckon on the wealth of the country, nor on the rank of the country, nor on the influence which rank and wealth usually brought."

Yet with all these disadvantages to contend with, the Liberals, to the surprise of friend and foe, apparently as much to Mr. Gladstone's surprise as to Lord Beaconsfield's, carried seat after seat, till it was evident that the Tories would sustain a crushing defeat, and be decisively in the minority in the new Parliament. The

ministry might have waited, and opened the new Parliament, and proceeded till its votes distinctly showed its opposition; but the precedent had been established in 1868, followed in 1874, that when a ministry appeals to the country by a dissolution of Parliament, and the nation speaking through the elections declares that a new House unfavorable to the ministry shall legislate for the land, that ministry must resign, just as though the nation had spoken by its representatives in the hall of the Commons of England. The precedent set by Disraeli made the resignation of his ministry inevitable. Only one course was left. The Beaconsfield ministry resigned and a new ministry was formed, after one ineffectual attempt, under Mr. Gladstone.

The acknowledged leader of the Liberals was Mr. Gladstone, who perhaps more than any other had changed the tide of opinion, and made the public censure some of the weightier acts of the Beaconsfield administration, especially its management of the Turkish question and the affairs in South Africa and Afghanistan. He was not personally popular with the Queen, who summoned Lord Hartington to form a ministry. A man of recognized ability, he could not undertake the delicate task, and pointed to Mr. Gladstone as the one whom the voice of England really called to the high and responsible position.

Mr. Gladstone thus came into power during a recess, and found it necessary to select a cabinet. The men who had retired from office with him six years before were still all alive and in their mental vigor. He could therefore find men versed in the management of public affairs, and in whom the country could feel confidence from their known ability and experience, and others who, trained in the same school, had evinced a recognized capacity. Earl Granville became Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Hugh Childers, Secretary of War; the Marquis of Hartington, Secretary for India; William E. Forster, Secretary for Ireland; the Earl of Kimberley, once Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Colonial Secretary; Sir William Vernon Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Home Department; Lord Northbrook, First Lord of the Admiralty; John Bright, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; James Stanfield, President of the Local Government Board; Earl Spencer, President of the Council; and the Duke of Argyll, Lord of the Privy Seal.

The Marquis of Ripon, well versed in India matters and of great diplomatic and administrative force, was sent to solve the difficult knot in Asia, and Mr. Goschen dispatched to Constantinople.

There was in the cabinet ability to guide the country well. There had been what to Englishmen generally must have seemed a sudden revolution, but it was one which brought no revolutionary

characters to the helm. The men placed in power had before controlled the destinies of the kingdoms, and not wrecked them.

But evidence was almost instantly forthcoming that some electors at least repented their course. An election in Scotland where the Liberals seemed certain of success resulted in their defeat. With the extension of the suffrage in England they are learning the lesson that we have learned in America and that is, that where, as the normal condition, there are two parties pretty equally balanced, the destinies of the country are after all decided, not by the active party men, but by the sudden decision just before election of a large class, who take little interest in public affairs and politics, who often remain away from the polls, and when they vote do so from no sound reason, but on an impulse created by some momentary influence of pulpit or press.

At the moment of the Liberal accession to power, three great questions called for the ablest and soundest statesmanship,—the condition of Turkey, the state of affairs in Afghanistan, and the relief of Ireland.

The late government had buoyed up Turkey with false hopes of English support as against other European powers, and the false security thus given had enabled the reactionary party at Constantinople to nullify virtually much that had been promised at Berlin in the way of reform. It became evident that Turkey was steadily drifting to her utter ruin. Lord Beaconsfield's government failed to obtain any influence for good over the Turks. Mr. Gladstone pledged himself to put an end to this trifling course, and to bring the Porte under the authority of Europe, and to carry out the parts of the Berlin treaty which were most obnoxious to the Sultan and the Pachas. To carry out his plans he dispatched Mr. Goschen to Constantinople to replace Sir Henry Layard. The Sultan, foreseeing danger, hesitated to receive Mr. Goschen, conscious that every point to be pressed by that envoy touched him vitally, and if he yielded he would be monarch only in name.

Afghanistan was in a state of anarchy; an English army had overthrown the Ameer; no recognized government was yet established. Candahar had, without any authority from England, been set up as an independent state, and the English were in such a position that they dared neither to hold the country by arms nor to retire. The course to be taken by Lord Ripon is, of course, not yet known, but Gladstone entertains no extravagant fears of Russian aggression in Central Asia, and will not continue the military occupation of Afghanistan beyond the moment when he can with honor and with no loss of prestige withdraw the troops, and leave the natives to settle their affairs to their own liking.

During a recess, with no real business going on, no debates in

Parliament to act as a safety-valve for the public opinion which is concentrated at Westminster, there was nothing to be done by the party secretly in power, but to criticise the formation of the ministry, and the acts of the Premier. The apologetic correspondence of Gladstone in the Karolyi matter excited strong disapproval, as no Englishman likes anything that resembles a backdown. Then the appointment of a Catholic, Lord Ripon, to be Viceroy of India, and another Catholic, Lord Kenmare, to be Lord Chamberlain, though perfectly consistent in a party professing to be in fact as well as in name liberal, roused the fanatical spirit of Englishmen. As no Catholic has ever been returned to the House of Commons by any English constituency for the last two centuries, nor will be probably for a century to come, their inherent bigotry received a shock in these appointments. The average British mind could view with serenity the election of Bradlaugh, an atheist, to Parliament, but the conferring of any high dignity on a Catholic was intolerable. Lord Oranmore and Browne, and the British Reformation Society, at once presented to the Prime Minister a protest against these appointments. The Presbyterian Church of Scotland was not slow to follow the example, and officially censured the Premier. Neither English nor Scotch bigot adduced any charge that either nobleman was unfitted for the position assigned to him, or hinted that the interest of England or its crown would suffer in the least. Silly and groundless, this protest, nevertheless, weakened Mr. Gladstone's government and lost him some supporters.

Ireland, desolated with famine, with its people fleeing by thousands from its shores, demands an extended franchise, a limitation of landlord power, means to enable the agriculturist to become owner of the soil he tills, and, in fine, Home rule. The wife of the last Viceroy of Ireland had won a respect beyond example by her zealous and noble efforts to relieve the distress of the people, but no change could be made in the growing strength of the Home Rulers, who came into Parliament stronger than ever, and who contributed to the overthrow of the late administration. Mr. Gladstone proposes to extend the franchise, but as to the land question seems, as yet, to have decided definitely on no line of policy. To conciliate the island, however, he proposes to let the Irish Peace Preservation Act lapse.

Parliament met, but many of the ministry had not yet been returned; the speech from the throne was vague; the new ministry seemed groping blindly and almost ineffectually to collect and grasp the reins, and gave signs of weakness and irresolution. Denouncing the Irish members as obstructionists, the Liberals seemed themselves to have been these last few years really obstructionists, opposing, checking, thwarting the projects of the late administra-

tion, but evidently without any clearly conceived idea of the proper course to pursue, or ability to initiate and conduct the proper line of policy.

A series of petty defeats and humiliations almost at the outset lowered them in the general esteem. Austria took offence at some of Mr. Gladstone's utterances, and a letter of explanation followed; Mr. O'Donnell asked information in the House of Commons as to the antecedents of Challemeil Lacour, the newly appointed minister from France, and Mr. Gladstone, reviving an antiquated power, prevented a member of Parliament from doing what had been done thousands of times; then among the Liberals returned to Parliament was Bradlaugh the atheist, and that worthy, reluctant to acknowledge by taking an oath the existence of the Deity whom he had so often denied, asked to affirm instead of swearing, but when he found that he had excited a storm, faltered. Then Mr. Gladstone, unwilling to risk the cause of his ministry on such an issue, declared the case to be a constitutional and not a party question. The vote of the House then declared that Mr. Bradlaugh should not be allowed either to swear or affirm; and when he persisted in his demand for admission he was arrested and imprisoned.

The symptoms of weakness and of weakening support make the existence and work of this administration precarious. It has, however, an opportunity to render England excellent service, and if there is among the members real political wisdom the opportunity will not be lost. An able statesmanlike project is required for the amelioration of Ireland. Suffrage must be placed on a uniform basis in all parts of the United Kingdom; great modifications must be introduced in all the laws regarding land, and the relation of landlord and tenant in Ireland; and the fact must be recognized that titles based on confiscations by government should not be maintained when they become a menace to the very existence of government. The claims of Ireland must be recognized that higher education should receive the same fostering care as in England or Scotland, and no bigotry in those countries should be allowed to thwart it in the sister island.

The Irish Home Rulers helped to defeat the Tories, but are not Liberals. Their representatives in Westminster Hall will annoy the present administration as they did the last, and will show that if they cannot secure for Ireland the legislation which she deems vitally important, they can at least interfere with England's quiet. They may even go further, and, seeking out local grievances in England, foster them and become their mouthpieces, rallying around them the more powerful discontents of that island, and increasing still more the difficulties of every administration.

The recent change of trade by which America pours not only

breadstuffs but butcher's meat into England, strikes directly at agriculture and grazing in Great Britain and Ireland, and, reducing the profits to the lowest point, makes a failure of crops in any part the precursor of famine. Provision must be made for this new order of things, and the public mind be prepared for sacrifices, with a view to reaching a safe and healthy course.

In regard to Turkey the Gladstone administration can do little but insist on the carrying out of the treaty of Berlin. A European conference has assembled; but there are already indications that some powers will hold that the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin were designed to reform not to annihilate the Moslem rule in Turkey. Already the Sultan shows an inclination to rouse the fanaticism of the Mohammedans rather than yield all but the nominal sovereignty. Greece must obtain the Greek provinces; Montenegro be contented, and the Albanian revolt accepted or crushed.

At best little can be done to give such a solution of the Turkish difficulties as a master mind might in the first instance have dictated. Turkey has been and is frittering away into weak petty states. While the tendency elsewhere is to do away with such autonomies, and make larger and more powerful bodies politic, the clashing of interests has led to the opposite course in Turkey. Greece was made a petty kingdom under foreign rule that never takes root. With a smaller population than some European cities, it ranks as a kingdom; other parts of the Turkish empire are made into half-independent principalities, some under native, some under foreign princes, thus creating diverse interests, rivalries, and jealousies among parts of what were once, and what should be still, a single empire.

While Disraeli sought only to prop up the Sultan, Gladstone will endeavor to advance the interests of the Christian states, and Christian inhabitants of the portion where Turkish rule is still intact. There is now no question of any further attempt on the part of Russia to extend her power over Turkey. That danger seems for the present removed, and the only thing to be done is to foster the wellbeing of the new states, and secure their progress in national prosperity.

In spite of strong opposition Mr. Gladstone announced that Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, would be retained as one necessary to carry out the plan of confederation originated by him. The ministry all concur in regarding his recall as an injury to the colony, and in this light they treat it as a national and not as a political question.

Their views in regard to India have not been explicitly stated, but the Gladstone ministry are evidently influenced by no exaggerated fears of Russian encroachments in Central Asia. So far

as they can effect it, a stable government is to be obtained in Afghanistan, which is to be left independent, and there seems to be no disposition to add to the territory and dangers of British India.

Some minor questions come up, such as our Fortune Bay fishery, but as the new ministry are free from the responsibility of their predecessors, the way is easy to an honorable and final settlement of a question more productive of bad blood and bitter feeling than of any substantial advantage to either party.

There are indications of healthy, honorable action on the part of the new administration, but it must do something promptly to rivet public confidence. The party is made up of incoherent elements, and a tendency to dissolution is already manifest.

Mr. Gladstone may retire and leave control to hands not committed so fully by past acts and deeds, and more free to shape a course; but if he holds his place, the ministry will go down with him.

SUICIDE, CONSIDERED IN ITS MORAL BEARINGS.

SUICIDES are of daily occurrence, as the columns of our newspapers plainly show. The *British Encyclopædia* contains the following statistics, whose data are furnished by Quetelet. In Russia the proportion of suicides is one to every 49,182 inhabitants; in Austria it is one to every 20,900; in France it is one to every 18,000; in the State of Pennsylvania it is one to every 15,875; in Prussia it is one to every 14,404; in the city of Baltimore the proportion is as one to every 13,656; in Boston there is one case for every 25,000 inhabitants, and in New York one for every 7797. These figures show that, in spite of the repugnance which man naturally has for death, a large number accept this unreasonable alternative, hoping thus to find "surcease from sorrow."

The frequent occurrence of this crime, so singular in its nature, has induced some persons to conclude—rather hastily it is true—that all such disorderly action springs from insanity, thereby eschewing moral accountability. Now, in this matter, as in all other moral affairs, it is hazardous to logic to deal in universal propositions; for instance, to affirm that every suicide is fully and entirely an insane act is manifestly untenable; on the other hand, to assert that all suicides proceed from a mind that is perfectly

aware of the moral character of such action, and from a will that is then and there free either to act or not to act, or, in other words, to maintain with sweeping universality that suicide, or self-murder, is never the result of disease, but is always the effect of a will that is morally perverse, is equally as untenable as the previous position. Our conclusion, then, is that the truth lies between these positions. We admit, on the one hand, that there are cases of self-destruction which spring from insanity; but we affirm, on the other, that self-killing is not unfrequently an action which is criminally responsible; and this is suicide properly so called.

The proportion of cases occurring in each of these classifications it is not our purpose here to determine. The scope of this paper includes those cases only which have a moral bearing; and it is in this sense, as coupled with responsibility, that we will use the term suicide.

Suicide we define thus: The unauthorized taking away of one's own life. The reason and explanation of this definition will shortly be given.

Before proceeding to consider the moral turpitude of the act, it is well to premise a remark, the truth of which—although enunciated in the language of Revelation—is, nevertheless, a proximate conclusion from natural law; it is this: "It has been appointed unto all men once to die." This proposition does not need the sanction of a special revelation to render it certain; it is immediately manifest to every one's natural reason, and it is expressed in trite sayings among the people in various ways; *v. g.*, a man wishing to present something very true to his dubious neighbor, tells him that two things are supremely certain: "death and taxes." It is also a platitude among the poets. Horace says:

"Pallida mors æquo pulsat pede, pauperum tabernas
Regumque turres."¹

Death, then, is a sentence which in the general providence of God has been pronounced upon every man. This being true we can now examine the nature and guilt of suicide. Is it something which is of itself evil, or is it evil because it is forbidden? To answer these questions comprehensively, we will place our views in the form of a proposition, *viz.*: Suicide, as before defined, is a grave violation of natural law. The same truth may be stated in a different manner when viewing the subject under another aspect; thus, self-killing, apart from circumstances or in the abstract, is

¹ "With equal pace impartial fate
Knocks at the palace as the cottage gate."—*Francis*.

not, of itself, evil, and it really becomes evil only when it is duly forbidden.¹

The definition we have given of suicide is, we think, so worded as to present the manner in which an intelligent mind naturally and truly conceives this action; for when attention is directed to the act of self-killing, the question at once occurs: Why is such action wrong? to which the true answer is, because it is a violation of a law imposed by one vested with authority, *i. e.*, because it is unauthorized. Hence, it is the unauthorization which determines its guilt.²

It remains now to be shown that suicide, as thus explained, is a grave violation of natural law, and that on no occasion is it justifiable.

To consider the subject more thoroughly we will view man under three aspects: first, as related to himself; second, as related to society; and third, as related to God. And first, of man as related to himself.

Is it true that man can owe to himself a duty properly so called? Can he be the person both by whom and to whom a debt is owed? To this the answer would seem to be that man's duties towards himself are, like his duties towards his fellow-men, founded on a primary duty to God. But if—*per impossibile*—man owed no

¹ Observe that we distinguish between self-killing and self-murder or suicide; we regard the former (self-killing) as an action that is indifferent in its species or in the abstract, and hence requires the addition of circumstances to determine its moral nature; but self-murder or suicide is something already determined morally, and is used by the best English writers to convey the idea of a grave moral evil.

² This definition is, we think, the one to which the teaching of the best metaphysicians reduces. Layman (lib. iii., De Just., trac. iii., par. iii., cap. i.) says that it is never lawful to take one's own life, "*nisi Deus ita jubeat*," which is tantamount to saying that it is unlawful except when duly authorized. Sporer (tom. ii., trac. v., in V. Præcep. Decal., § ii.) says that it is wrong to take one's own life even indirectly, "*nisi justa causa ita agendi excuset*." And Lacroix (Theol. Mor., tom. i., lib. iii., trac. iv., par. i.) states that taking one's own life is unlawful, "*absque divina auctoritate*."

The words of St. Thomas on this subject are given farther on in this article.

Although Blackstone afterwards pronounces a *felo de se* one "that deliberately puts an end to his own existence," yet his reasoning shows, and in reality he admits, the point in question; for he says (vol. ii., book iv., p. 189), "that no man hath a power to destroy life but by commission from God." To place the quality of premeditation or deliberation as an essential constituent of the definition of suicide would not seem to meet the issue so exactly as to make the specific note consist in unauthorization, since we might suppose as intrinsically possible a case of self-killing which would be deliberate or premeditated, and yet guiltless. The same reasoning holds true of murder, since the guilt consequent upon the taking of another's life depends in the last analysis and absolutely upon the answer which we give to the following question: Was the taking of life duly authorized or not?

The killing we may even suppose to be premeditated or deliberate, and still the action will not necessarily be evil.

duty to God, then he would absolutely owe no duty to himself, at least none properly so called; for that is no duty strictly which can be disregarded with impunity. However, as things are actually constituted, man can owe a real duty to himself, though, as we saw, its fundamental reason is extrinsic to himself, and rests in God. The essential difference between a right and a wrong would not, *cæteris paribus*, be destroyed even in the absurd case supposed above, because it is from the very nature of things; and in no just sense is it dependent on a will,¹ the notion of which arises only when we are considering the sanction set upon the observance of the line discriminating between the right and the wrong, *i. e.*, when we are considering the return due to the good and the evil, or the reward for the one and the punishment for the other. The practical importance of the moral order is, however, chiefly dependent upon its sanction. In brief, then, it may be said that if man, under the absurd supposition made above, were absolute master of himself, then we could with no propriety of language admit that he owed a duty; there might be an abstract norma of right and wrong, but it would be *vox et præterea nihil*.

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is this: Man owes duties to himself, strictly such, not absolutely, but conditionally, *i. e.*, dependently on his primary duty to God; and if the latter were removed, the *raison d'être* of the former would likewise vanish.² Suicide would not, even in the rationally unwarrantable case previously stated, commend itself to reason, since it would be an action not in conformity with that standard of morals which we might conceive as still remaining in the human mind; for even in such extreme case, other things remaining the same, man would still feel a repugnance to death, would cling to existence as a precious boon, and, finally, he would still be a member of society, and, as such, would not be permitted ruthlessly to withdraw himself from those having a claim upon his existence. This consideration brings us to the second aspect of suicide, which has much weight in exhibiting its wrongfulness.

Viewing the individual as placed by nature within the pale of society, with his personal wellbeing so dependent upon his fellow-men, his best interests so closely interwoven with those of the persons around him, and, in fact, encompassed by such a network of

¹ For then we might conceive an interchange as inherently possible between the right and the wrong.

² Observe in this connection the application of the metaphysical principle: Justice regards another person. Quia sicut justitia semper est ad alterum ita et injustitia. St. Thom., 2.2æ, quæst. lix., art. iii. ad 2.

We must introduce the notion of God to give vitality and strength to our idea of man's duty to himself.

relations; viewing man as thus situated, as the correlated term of so many rights and duties, we must fail to see the justice and the propriety of a course that would arbitrarily sever these manifold ties. If the individual were free thus arbitrarily to separate himself from the social body, the destruction of society would be a mere question of time, since it would be cherishing in its bosom the principles of dissolution and certain decay.

If it should finally be asked what value, philosophically, can we, as against those who might uphold suicide, place upon the arguments drawn from a consideration of man as having duties both to himself and to society, we will be forced to answer that the logical cogency of such reasoning depends, in the last analysis, on man's duty to God, which is primary and is the basis of all his other duties. God alone has the right primarily and *par excellence* to exact duty at our hands, since He alone gave us that which has the sufficient reason and foundation of a first duty, viz., being, personal existence. Society confers on us no such boon as this. Though in the order of second causes it has done much for us, yet its favors are but supplementary and conservative of our first gift by creation.¹ God alone, as the absolute master of each individual, has the supreme right over life and death; and this right, as is plain from natural reason, is reserved, not delegated even to the individual himself. Herein is to be found the final reason why suicide bears the impress of guilt, since it is a grave and unjustifiable usurpation of another's right; it is an act of injustice in violation of the established order of relations between creature and Creator.² Hence we formulate this grave evil as an action done in violation of the natural law. As there is no reason ulterior to the one just adduced, so there is no reason short of it by which the mind is satisfied that it has fathomed the subject to its lowest depth; here we have the metaphysical and final, not the scientific and proximate, cause why self-murder is wrong.

¹ Observe that a duty is of its nature a debt, and implies a previous value received—a right,—which is the cause and foundation of the duty. It would be illogical to attempt a philosophical explanation of man's duties, or debts, without first considering his rights, or the value received, which is the measure of his obligations, and to which they must be directly proportioned.

² However, since the relation referred to is not essential and necessary in its nature, but is, in the last analysis, contingent and voluntary, we cannot, in a univocal sense, apply the terms "intrinsically evil" to suicide and, *z. g.*, to blasphemy, which is at variance with an essential and immutable relation. The moral nature of the criminal act—suicide—is determined by the contingent circumstance of authorization; but blasphemy is so directly opposed to the natural law, that we can add no circumstances to it—considered objectively—which would change its moral character. Suicide is not of this class of evil actions, and does not possess the same necessity, since its nature is, in a true sense of the term, contingent.

We might notice here by way of a short digression, that some minds are too prone to think all attempts to view a subject in a metaphysical light are trivial and useless; but this is surely not the more intelligent mode of thought to adopt, since the human intellect was created to have truth for its object; and truth of the highest and most perfect kind is that in which the human understanding acquiesces with most satisfaction. Now, genuine metaphysics is nothing else than the highest and noblest truths, ordered and systematized; it is their complexus or synthesis, as informing the mind, that furnishes wisdom most properly such. For those who would consign metaphysics to the regions of erratic thought there seems to be no consistent answer possible when asked, for instance, by the man who, realizing the inadequacy of earthly things to satisfy the end of an intelligent being, sincerely and earnestly puts the question: "Is life really worth living?" If we are unable, in such case, to grapple mentally with the exact issue, and to show the person the real "prize of life," the only true reason why life is worth living, the inevitable consequence of this sheer insufficiency of the present life to fill up the natural capacity of a reasonable being for happiness, will be a disgust and aversion for life, will eventually be suicide. To this extreme pass, logically at least, would the doctrines of the present school of positivists reduce their consistent upholders. Indeed the whole attitude of positivism towards the problems of life is that of doubt and solution unsuccessfully attempted. Prescinding absolutely from a hereafter, life is of no great value; it is, indeed,—as Mr. Mallock ably shows in his lately published work,—not worth living. In considering what is great in dramatic art he has the following sentences: "The grand relation of man is not first to his brother men, but to something else that is beyond humanity, that is at once without and also beyond himself. To this first, and to his brother men through this. We are not our own, we are bought with a price."

Without recurring to a hereafter, wherein is the adequate sanction of the present moral world, our lives would—to use a trite metaphor—be like a ship without anchor adrift in a storm. Unless the moral bearing of suicide be thoroughly examined in a genuine metaphysical light, the impediment which we could place to such a step might be characterized as "impediens," but certainly not as "dirimens."

Self-destruction was countenanced by some of the ancient philosophers, though the wisest amongst them regarded the action in its true light. The Stoics held that the only course left for the morally courageous man to escape wretchedness and ignominy was to take his own life; a theory which Seneca and his nephew Lucan the Poet, at the command of the Emperor Nero, reduced to prac-

tice. Nero would seem to have been influenced in regard to the termination of his life by the views of the Stoics, although the manner in which he compassed his own destruction was as illicitous as his previous life was iniquitous. The wisest of the ancient philosophers, however, did not, as was just remarked, view self-murder in the light of a final remedy left to the brave man for "all the ills that flesh is heir to." Aristotle, the great light of antiquity, teaches plainly that although "the infliction of death upon one's self to avoid misery presents an appearance of fortitude, on which account some have taken their own lives thinking they were acting courageously, yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a species of cowardice in a mind unwilling to bear up under oppressing ills."¹

Although Socrates died by his own hand, yet the act was not performed in virtue of a conclusion drawn from premises which he by any means admitted; and his death was not properly suicide, since it would appear to be wanting in that essential note of self-murder, unauthorization, which is indispensable to its character of guilt.² Cicero with his usual eloquence and depth of philosophy has the following passage: "Tibi, Publii, et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus a quo ille est vobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est."³ Virgil gracefully embodies the opinions current in his day to the effect that those who,

"Repining at their wretched state,
And loathing anxious life suborned their fate,"

would occupy in the regions of Tartarus a place appropriate to the peculiar character of their guilt:

"Proxima deinde tenent mæsti loca qui sibi letum
Insontes peperere manu; lucemque perosi
Projecere animas. Quam vellent æthere in alto
Nunc et pauperiem et duros perferre labores."

Aen., lib. vi., ver. 435 *et seq.*

It is evident, even to an ordinary observer of the views of the

¹ Arist. apud Sanct. Thom., 2.2æ quæst. lxiv., art. v., ad quint.

² It would seem more correct to view the death of Socrates as happening under some authorization, since, as a fact, the civil government, without entering into the question of its right to condemn him, empowered him to be his own executioner. This procedure, however, would not now be tolerated in a Christian community, the moral sense of which would be shocked by making even the capitally sentenced criminal perform the acts proximate to his own execution.

³ "You, Publius, and all upright men must keep the soul in watch over the body; and you must not depart this life except at the behest of Him who gave it."

Observe the use of the term "injussu," which we might render almost literally by the word unauthorized; and in fact the essence of the definition of suicide given in this article is contained in this passage from the gifted Cicero.

representative characters of antiquity, that at least the wisest of the ancients looked upon self-murder as contrary to right reason and deserving of reprobation.

We shall next consider briefly those cases in which persons have, without incurring the guilt of suicide, been the authors of their own destruction; and here it will be well to call attention again to the fact that we are not defending the proposition that all self-killing is wrong, but that it is wrong only when the quality of unauthorization enters into the nature of the action.¹

If the example of Samson be adduced to show that suicide may in certain cases be allowed, we would reply that the term used to characterize this act is ill chosen; and that Samson's conduct on this occasion can be justified only on the supposition that he was authorized from above, or was acting under supernatural inspiration.²

Instances are known in which a person from noble motives sacrifices his own life to save that of another; in which, *v. g.*, parental affection, proving more powerful than the instinct of self-preservation, impelled the mother to give up her own life rather than see her child perish. If it be asked, on what principle this and similar cases can be justified, we would answer by stating briefly what we believe to be the doctrine of the best authorities in this matter.

An action may have two effects, only one of which is in the intention, and the other beside the intention and accidental;³ to per-

¹ When it is said that a human or moral action is authorized, it is meant that the authorization must in the last analysis come from God; ordinarily it comes proximately from right reason; *v. g.*, homicide is authorized, and hence is not murder, in the case of the person who kills his aggressor "*cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ*." The person is then authorized proximately from upright reason, but ultimately from God.

² This reasoning is not a violation of Horace's precept.

"Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit."

For here is a difficulty which can be explained only by introducing supernatural agency. Hence St. Thomas has the following: "*Ad quantum dicendum quod sicut Augustinus dicit in primo de Civit. Dei, 'Nec Samson aliter excusatur quod seipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quod latenter Spiritus Sanctus hoc jusserrat qui per illum miracula faciebat,' et eandem rationem assignat de quibusdam sanctis feminis quæ tempore persecutionis seipsas occiderunt, quarum memoria in Ecclesia celebratur.*"—2.2æ quest. lxiv., art. v.

"In the fourth place we must say with St. August. de Civ. Dei that 'Samson is not otherwise excused for destroying himself together with his enemies by the overthrow of the temple, unless it was thus commanded by the Holy Ghost, who wrought a miracle in the case;' and he reasons in the same manner regarding certain holy women who killed themselves in time of persecution, and whose memory is celebrated in the Church."

³ "*Nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum sit in intentione, alius vero, præter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur. Potest tamen aliquis actus ex bona intentione proveniens, illicitus reddi, si non sit proportionatus fini.*"—2.2æ q. 64, art. 7.

form such an action is lawful, provided the secondary or accidental effect be not intrinsically evil. The action may be legitimately done even then when the unintentional effect is wrong, if its wrongfulness be on account of a prohibition, *i. e.*, a "malum quia prohibitum," not a "malum in se."¹

In the case above alluded to, wherein the mother prefers her child's life to her own, is the accidental effect of her action, *viz.*, the loss of her own life, something that is intrinsically wrong? It surely is not, since then not even God himself would be allowed to take life. We may justly infer then, that the mother may act in the manner previously described without the guilt of suicide inhering in her action, which certainly would be the case if the accidental and merely permitted effect of her act was intrinsically and unconditionally evil.²

The so-called arguments by which the advocates of suicide defend their position are found methodically stated in the book called *Le Système de la Nature*, which was published near the middle of last century under the fictitious name of Mirabaud. The author of this book³ was so bitter an assailant of Christianity that even Voltaire thought himself called upon to reply to certain of its tenets. The reasoning employed by Holbach in his attack upon Christianity is substantially as follows:

"Suicide is at variance with no obligation; it does not clash with the duty to one's

¹ Sporer has the following on this subject: "Quandocumque aliquod opus directe facere illicitum est, etiam per se illicitum erit illud indirecte facere scilicet aliquid agendo vel omittendo voluntarie, unde illud sequatur, nisi justa causa ita agendi vel omittendi excuset ac morale voluntarium ad illud opus tollet."—Tom. ii., trac. v., in *V. Præcep. Decal.*

This is the major premise of his argument; and he lays down in the minor that since it is unlawful to take one's own life directly, it is, *per se*, unlawful to take it also indirectly. The unlawfulness of the action is, of course, qualified by the limiting conditions expressed in the major premise.

"Life is given only for a good end, and it follows from the preceding arguments that no case can arise under the natural law in which man is authorized directly to terminate his own life; consequently man can never intend his own death as an end directly to be sought by him."—Hill, *Ethics*, p. 205.

² St. Thomas thus states the principle bearing on this matter: . . . "Si aliquis det operam rei licitæ debitam diligentiam adhibens, et ex hoc homicidium sequatur, non incurrit homicidii reatum; si vero det operam rei illicitæ, vel etiam det operam rei licitæ non adhibens diligentiam debitam, non evadit homicidii reatum si ex ejus opere mors hominis sequatur."

"If any one do something which is lawful, using due diligence to accomplish the result, and if from this act homicide ensue, the person does not incur the guilt of homicide; but if one do that which is unlawful, or do even that which is lawful without using due diligence, he does not escape the guilt of homicide if the death of a man results from his action."

³ Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach, baron, a French philosopher, who died in Paris in 1789. His book was entitled "Le Système de la Nature, ou des lois du monde physique et moral."

self, since 'volenti non fit injuria,' and besides a man may be so 'overwhelmed with clouds of distress' that life is really a burden instead of a boon; and as we are physically enabled to take life there is strong indication that nature intended us to have recourse to the remedy, at our option. Conduct, then, in conformity with these principles does not surely violate the law of nature. We have, moreover, been invested with authority and dominion over matter, and it is really no more than an exercise of such power when death comes by our own hand. Again, the liberty to decline acceptance is the peculiarity or characteristic of a gift, and such life is admitted to be; and this the more so when we consider that in the origin of things our consent was not given. Finally, the *felo de se* need not necessarily aim a blow at the rights of society; since, on the one hand, he may have become an unprofitable and useless member, or, on the other, society may not extend to the individual that protection and safety which it should afford. To sum the matter up, suicide is rather an advantage than a disadvantage to society, since it promotes the virtue of fortitude by affording an example of unequalled courage evinced in contempt for death."

As opposing the last remark, however, we might, after the manner of St. Thomas, before formally replying to objections, refer again to the words of Aristotle previously given, viz.: "Although the infliction of death upon one's self . . . presents an appearance of fortitude, . . . yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a species of cowardice in a mind unwilling to bear up under oppressing ills." The real solution of these objections, however, becomes an easy task in the light of the principles we have already laid down. To affirm that suicide interferes with no duty is surely the reverse of the truth, since man's life is not his own, but belongs absolutely to another; and, hence, in disposing of it as if it were simply his own, he is violating his duty duly to regard the eminent right of his Creator. This is the demonstrative reason why self-murder is wrong; the other arguments used in defence of the truth may be, and are, in their character, highly suasive of the wrongfulness of the action in question, but apart from the main proof they would fail to furnish convincing certainty. The axiom "volenti non fit injuria" is not true if wrested into a wrong sense. The meaning is "*rationabiliter* volenti non fit injuria," or, no injury is done in the case of a person who is *rationally* willing to sustain what otherwise would be an injury.

There really can be no injury inflicted so far forth precisely as

¹ "Actio de sui ratione procedit ab agente, passio, autem, secundum propriam rationem, est ab alio. Unde non potest esse idem secundum idem agens et patiens. Principium autem proprium agendi in hominibus est voluntas, et ideo illud proprie et per se homo facit quod volens facit. Et, e contrario illud proprie homo patitur quod præter voluntatem suam patitur, quia in quantum est volens, principium est ex seipso. Et ideo in quantum est hujusmodi magis est agens quam patiens. Dicendum est ergo quod injustum per se et formaliter loquendo nullus potest facere nisi nolens, nec pati nisi nolens. Per accidens autem, e quasi materialiter loquendo, potest aliquis id quod est de se injustum vel facere nolens (sicut cum quis præter intentionem operatur), vel pati volens, sicut cum aliquis plus alteri dat sua voluntate, quam debeat."—2æ qu. 59, art. 2.

the term of the action is one who is willing; or conversely, no injury can be sustained except under the respect in which the recipient of the injury is unwilling.

We can illustrate this matter by a simple example borrowed from the civil law. Suppose that a trustee named in a deed of trust should be willing to dispose of his charge in a manner different from that contemplated in the deed. It is plain that the axiom "*volenti non fit injuria*" would afford but slender justification to the trustee to apply the axiom for the purpose of vindicating his conduct in the contingency mentioned, would be inept, and an evasion of the question; since the issue at stake is not whether he is willing thus to dispose of his trust, but whether he has a right to make such disposal. The position of man with reference to his existence and its preservation is analogous to that of the trustee. His life has been given to him in trust for certain purposes, and to sanction any other disposal of the charge in his keeping would violate his trust and defeat the end intended by Him who is principal and proprietary.

To conclude, with Holbach, that since we are enabled physically to put an end to our existence, we therefore have the moral right to do so, is invalid illation; the conclusion has greater logical extension than the premises. If this reasoning were true, we might infer that since we are physically capable of killing an innocent person we may lawfully do so when desirable. To affirm therefore as a consequence that action consistent with the above stated premises is not contrary to the law of nature, is a predication unfounded in fact, and contradicted by the first experience of mankind; since all have naturally a repugnance and horror for death.

That we have been invested with authority and dominion over matter is true; but the authority and dominion must be regulated by right reason. As a fact, man's dominion over anything is not absolute but relative, and consequently his conditional tenure of things is subject at all times to the unconditioned proprietorship of his Creator. That exercise of authority over matter, then, which conflicts with the eminent domain of the Supreme Being is a usurpation and a wrong. That the liberty to decline acceptance is the peculiarity of a gift may be admitted with some restriction: if the one who gives and the one who receives are both equal and independent, the proposition is simply true; but if the one who gives is the Creator of the one who receives, and if, as a consequence, the recipient is inferior and absolutely dependent upon the Giver, then the previous enunciation would require much qualification to be interpreted in a true sense. As the Maker has the right duly to exercise his efficiency in producing an effect, and also to impose upon his production conditions which its subsequent action

must verify, so the first and purely efficient cause possesses pre-eminently the right externally to actualize his efficiency, and to impose upon his creatures conditions which they must realize in their ulterior state. To state the issue briefly, if life were *merely* a gift the position assumed in *Le Système de la Nature* might be tenable; but there is another aspect under which life must be viewed: it is indeed the best gift, but inseparably connected with it is the obligation to possess it agreeably to the conditions imposed by the Giver,¹ and these conditions are the offspring of the truth that we are not simply our own, but are unconditionally in the hands of our Creator.

Finally, it is urged that an individual may become an unprofitable member of society, and hence it cannot be said that he does an injury to the community by withdrawing himself from its pale.

Were it to be granted that an individual may become an unprofitable member of society, it still would not follow that he could arbitrarily separate himself from the community. He would not then be the minister authorized of society to define the individual's attitude towards the community. To society itself, or its representatives, belongs the right to take cognizance of the relation of the individual to the common good, and, this ascertained, to sanction the decision pronounced by the execution of just law. The other alternative of the argument put forth to show that the rights of society are not invaded, does not determine the point which it was introduced to establish; for, conceding still that society in extreme cases is unable to afford in the ordinary manner due protection to the individual, it does not follow that self-murder is either a right or a remedy. In such rare instances the right of self-preservation still remains to the individual, and he is empowered by the natural law to protect himself, even at the cost of an unjust aggressor's life. The conclusion, then, drawn by the French philosopher, viz., that instances of suicide rather promote the good of society by setting an example of courage, must fail to convince.

There is another aspect in which we may regard the argument built by Dr. Holbach upon the supposition that an individual may

¹ "Tertio quia vita est quoddam donum divinitus homini attributum, et ejus potestati subjectum qui occidet et vivere facit. Et ideo qui seipsum vita privat, in Deum peccat, sicut qui alienum servum interficit peccat in dominum cujus est servus. Et sic peccat ille qui usurpat sibi judicium de re sibi non commissa."—2.2æ quæst 59, art. 5, Conclus.

"In the third place because life is a gift divinely bestowed upon man and subject to the power of him who gives life and who takes it; and hence he who deprives himself of life sins against God, as the one who kills the servant of another sins against the master to whom the servant belongs; thus sins the person who usurps unto himself judicial authority in a matter not committed to his charge."

become a useless member of society. Paley treats the matter under consideration thus :

“ For shall we say that we are then only at liberty to commit suicide when we find our continuance in life becomes useless to mankind ? Any one who pleases may make himself useless, and melancholy minds are prone to think themselves useless when they really are not so. Suppose a law were promulgated, allowing each private person to destroy every man he met whose longer continuance in the world he judged to be *useless*. Who would not condemn the latitude of such a rule ? Who does not perceive that it amounts to a permission to commit murder at pleasure ? A similar rule regulating the right over our own lives would be capable of the same extension. Besides which, no one is *useless* for the purpose of this plea, but he who has lost every capacity and opportunity of being useful, together with the possibility of recovering any degree of either, which is a state of such complete destitution and despair as cannot, I believe, be predicted of any man living.”—Bk. 4th, chap. iii., *Suicide*.

Were the individual the judge of his usefulness to society, it is manifest that the permanence of this institution would be imaginary rather than real ; and since the matter weighed “ in so corrupt a balance as the parties' own distempered imagination ” is fraught with consequences of such a nature, the conclusion must be that the principle from which they flow cannot be founded in justice or truth.

Some writers have proposed a system called Euthanasia, in which a man is instructed to supplement the natural and oftentimes painful mode of death by resort to artificial and painless methods productive of dissolution. Such theory is identical in principle with that of the Stoics of old, and it differs in merely unimportant particulars from the other systems that have been put forth to defend self-murder.¹ The arguments advanced in support of this theory are answered in the refutation of those systems which we have already considered. The characteristic fallacy underlying this set of notions, rather fanciful than philosophical, consists in assuming that man has the right to dispose of his life as something, the absolute tenure of which is vested in himself alone. If this were really the case, if man's existence, its preservation, and extinction were simply in his own hands, then a proper adjustment of his final issue would be both lawful and important. But as a fact this is not so ; the truth is, indeed, so evident that we should be safe in affirming no sane man ever entertained a doubt (1), first, that a natural death awaited him, and (2), second, that in the present order of providence, he must not abridge the term of his natural life.

That mankind have always regarded self-murder as wrong is a fact that admits of no dispute. If the teaching of the Stoics be alleged as at variance with this view, the answer is that even the

¹ “ This conception of suicide as a euthanasia, an abridgment of the pangs of disease, and a guarantee against the dotage of age, was not confined to philosophical treatises. We have considerable evidence of its being frequently put into practice.”—Lecky, *Hist. of Europ. Morals*, vol. i, chap. ii., *Stoicism*.

Stoics admitted the general truth that self-murder was wrong; but they erred in the application of the general principle to particular matter. They cannot be censured for maintaining that there can be cases of duly authorized self-killing; their error consisted in holding that self-killing was legitimate, even when unduly authorized, *v. g.*, when miseries oppress one.

The course of reasoning by which they endeavored to make evident the lawfulness of taking one's own life in adverse circumstances only serves to show that they recognized a superior law, whose prohibition they were attempting to prove inapplicable to the matter in question. They knew that their theory was an exception to the general opinion, "*hinc illæ lachrymæ.*" An example from history will serve to explain the foregoing. Cleopatra, according to Rollin, "not doubting that Cæsar intended to make her serve as an ornament to his triumph, . . . had no other thoughts than to avoid that shame by dying." Her death is thus narrated by the historian: She "asked for a basket of figs, which a peasant had lately brought. She placed it by her, and a moment after lay down, as if she had fallen asleep; but that was the effect of the aspic, which was concealed among the fruit, and had stung her in the arm which she held to it. The poison immediately communicated itself to the heart, and killed her without pain, or being perceived by anybody." The motive which prompted this action is described thus:

"That princess was too haughty and too much above the vulgar to suffer herself to be led in triumph at the wheels of the victor's chariot. Determined to die, and thence having become capable of the fiercest resolutions, she saw with firmness and indifference the mortal venom of the aspic glide into her veins."—*History of Egypt.*

This is an example of self-killing on account of motives which render it difficult to see any reason why guilt should not attach to the deed. To avoid shame and ignominy is a good motive to inspire an action; but even a good end may not be subserved by unlawful means,—"*non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona,*"—and directly to take life to escape ignominious exposure is a means that is not duly proportioned to its end, and is, in the present order of providence, always wrong. It surely does not accord with right reason to avoid one evil by choosing another which is the greatest that can befall us. Cicero, for reasons which seem to have no foundation in the actual facts, vindicates the conduct of Cato in terminating his own existence, for "he says that the occasion was such as to constitute a divine call to leave life."¹ "Cæsar, Ovid,²

¹ Lecky, *Hist. of Europ. Morals*. These words show that Cicero entertained a just conception of suicide, since he has recourse to the only plea which in the nature of things could justify this act.

² "*Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam
Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest.*"—*Ovid.*

and others," according to Mr. Lecky in his *History of European Morals*, "urged that in extreme distress it is easy to despise life, and that true courage is shown in enduring it." The following passage from the same careful writer contains much historical information respecting the view taken of suicide by some of the Greeks and Romans :

"It is indeed true that the ancients were by no means unanimous in their approval of the act. Pythagoras, to whom so many of the wisest sayings of antiquity are ascribed, is stated to have forbidden men 'to depart from their guard or station in life without the order of their Commander, that is, of God.' Plato adopted similar language, though he permitted suicide where the law required it, and also when men had been struck down by intolerable calamity, or had sunk to the lowest depths of poverty. Aristotle condemned it on civic grounds as being an injury to the state. The roll of Greek suicides is not long, though it contains some illustrious names, among others those of Zeno and Cleanthes. In Rome, too, where suicide acquired a greater prominence, its lawfulness was by no means accepted as an axiom. The story of Regulus, whether it be a history or a legend, shows that the patient endurance of suffering was once the Roman ideal. Virgil painted in the darkest colors the condition of suicides in the future world. Cicero strongly asserted the doctrine of Pythagoras, though he praised the suicide of Cato. Apuleius, expounding the philosophy of Plato, taught that the wise man never throws off his body except by the will of God."—*Ibid.*

The main feature noticeable in the aphorisms current among the ancients, and in the classical extracts which fall oftenest under observation, is the truth that self-murder is a crime against nature. The ancients, as has been remarked, were not in error as to the general principle that self-murder was wrong; their mistake lay in the application of the universal truth to particular matter. The exact statement of the attitude of antiquity in regard to criminal self-destruction may, we think, be adequately summed up in the following propositions :

(1.) The universal judgment of mankind has declared suicide or self-murder to be wrong.

(2.) Coextensive with this judgment is another to the effect that self-killing was not then an evil action when it was duly authorized.

(3.) The error into which some of the ancient philosophers fell in regard to suicide was not owing to ignorance of its criminal nature in general, but to indeterminateness of thought respecting those cases in which one is authorized to take his own life.

These propositions, it appears to us, place the position of the ancients respecting suicide in a true light; and if this statement be correct, it becomes manifest that the view taken by the ancients of this crime against nature does not differ essentially from that taken by Christian nations. The same arguments now used by the Christian teacher to make manifest the illicit nature of self-murder were employed centuries ago by the pagan philosopher to demonstrate the same truth; and the reason why such is the case is manifest,

since the truth that self-murder is wrong is one of those evident dictates of natural law which affirms itself to the upright reason of every man. Such truths do not change, and the voice of mankind is unanimous in their recognition. There may be different views taken in different ages concerning the more remote conclusions from these truths, and the definitive settlement of matter that is more concrete and particular in its character; but unless we wish to suppose gratuitously that there is a flaw in the nature of things, that the supreme and wisest of lawgivers has enacted for his creatures' observance a law the due promulgation of which He has failed to effect, we shall be compelled to acknowledge that the *principles* of natural law are engraven upon the human heart.

If the reasoning developed in this article be true, it becomes evident that the definition which we have given of suicide is such as to include on the one hand every case of self-killing which is criminal, and to exclude on the other hand those guiltless acts the result of which, whether direct or indirect, is the loss of one's own life. To urge that this definition is vague and indeterminate, that it would, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to almost every crime in the decalogue, since, *v. g.*, we might say that even blasphemy was wrong because it is an unauthorized action; to argue thus in dispute of the position herein assumed will, upon reflection, appear inconclusive. The solution of such argumentation is found in the following considerations:

(1.) There are some evil actions, and some only, the wrongfulness of which is entirely dependent upon the circumstances of authorization, and in defining such action due regard must be paid to this fact.

(2.) There are other actions which are intrinsically and absolutely wrong, and which no authorization can render legitimate; *v. g.*, we might suppose, *per impossibile*, blasphemy to be authorized by the same source which permits self-killing; the peculiarity then is that the one action is still wrong while the other is not.

If we have understood aright the words of those whose opinions are of greatest weight in this matter, the definition proposed of the crime under consideration is a logical deduction from the teaching, not only of the wisest philosophers of pagan antiquity, but also of the mediæval scholastics, who are, at least upon this and kindred subjects, the writers whose thought has been most profound, and whose expression most accurate.

With truth as the object of our investigation, we cannot upon the whole conceive of any other definition which is philosophical and absolute.

SOME OF THE USES OF THE MICROSCOPE IN SCIENCE.

IT is surprising to find how few there are, even of those who have received a *liberal education*, so called, who can afford to regard a microscope as anything more than a costly toy. Whether it is to be found in the physical cabinet of an institution of learning or in the private collections of individuals, it is equally looked upon as destined to help pass an afternoon agreeably by showing the coarseness of a hair, the rays on a diatom, or the impurities of a drop of water. Its uses, its destiny is, as it were, ignored. And why is this? Is it because the laws of optics are too difficult for men to understand? Is it because the time of study is not sufficiently long to enable students to acquire a practical knowledge of anything except languages? We are of opinion that the fundamental laws of optics are not beyond the range of comprehension of the average student, and our experience, both as pupil and as teacher, has proven beyond a doubt that the difficulty does not arise from the quantity of matter to be seen by students, but rather is it to be found in the manner in which they see it. The study of science is begun too late in most of our colleges, and, partly on this account, it is made to consist, almost wholly, in a mechanical use of a textbook, with the drill and memorizing inevitable in all elementary studies. The results of such a method are easily conjectured; not only are there no scientific studies deserving the name, but students are deterred, by this first contact, from engaging seriously in them afterwards.

Our object in the present paper is to describe briefly *some* of the useful results obtained from microscopical studies. For this purpose we have chosen our illustrations from two departments only; from biology, namely, and geology; and in these branches we have limited ourselves to special sections, as will be seen from what follows.

It may not be amiss to say a word here about some of the kinds of microscope in use. We will suppose our readers acquainted with the parts and working of an ordinary microscope, and will, therefore, omit its description. It is, however, necessary to call attention to the fact that the instruments used in biological and geological analyses differ somewhat from each other; the former being fitted to work with plain, ordinary light, whilst the latter is so constructed as to admit of being used with either plain or polarized light. There are other differences of detail, but they need not be described now; neither do we think it useful to give such a description of polarized light as the present limits will allow; these points can, for the present, be best understood by consulting some complete work on optics.

The illustrations from biology are taken from an interesting article published by Dr. E. Ray Lankester in *Nature* of March 11th, 1880, and entitled "The Destruction of Insect Pests: an Unforeseen Application of the Results of Biological Investigation." In the first place the writer shows in general terms that surgery is entirely reformed by our knowledge of the minuter fungi; that by avoiding the access of bacteria to wounds we avoid a large destruction of human life. Already we see our way to avoiding some deadly diseases caused by these same bacteria, now that we know them to be the active cause of such disease. He also points out that silk is cheaper in consequence of our knowledge of the bacteria of the silkworm disease; that already better beer is brewed and better yeast supplied to the baker in consequence of Pasteur's discovery of the bacterian diseases of the yeast-plant.

To this same knowledge of diseases produced by bacteria is due the novel design of destroying such pests as the Colorado beetle by propagating the disease-producing bacteria which are known to be fatal to such insects. Professor Hagen, of Cambridge, Mass., advised the use of yeast for the destruction of these pests, believing that the yeast-fungus enters the body of the insect on which it is sprinkled, and there produces a growth fatal to the insect's life.

Professor Metschnikoff, prompted by the labors of De Bary, Pasteur, Cohn, and others, who have shown that the most deadly ravages amongst insects are due to bacteria, cultivated some of these minute parasitic fungi by passing them from one insect to another, and has experimentally proved their very deadly character to insects exposed to infection. His next experiment was to endeavor to cultivate them apart from the insects, so as to obtain their spores in great quantity in a liquid that might be applied to places attacked by injurious insects. The experiment was successful; the cultivation is rapidly effected in beer-mash. It now only remains for us to cultivate these organisms in quantity, and we have at once the simplest, safest, and most certain means of destruction of all insect pests. This is one of the benefits due to the study of microscopic organisms.

Another branch of microscopical study, though not so beneficial directly to the human family as the one just mentioned, yet having its uses, is the microscopical study of rocks. The first use made of the microscope for the purpose of examining rock sections was in 1850, or 1851, by Henry Clifton Sorby, a wealthy citizen of Sheffield, in England, who is much devoted to the study of geology. In 1858 he published a paper in one of the scientific reviews describing the manner of preparing the sections for study, and gave the results of such analysis as he had then made. Some young students then at the University of Bonn took up the idea, applied themselves to the study of certain groups of rock, and so great was

their success, so marvellous the revelations resulting from their analyses, that in a very few years microscopical petrography became an established branch of the science of geology. Previous to Sorby's discovery the only methods of examination to which a rock specimen could be subjected, besides a chemical analysis, were such as could be made with the aid of a loupe or pocket lens, or with a microscope on a portion of the rock specimen reduced to a very fine powder. This latter is the method still pursued by many French scientists. It is now well known that the greater part of the rocks composing the crust of our globe are a mere aggregation of mineral elements; and almost all attempts to classify rocks have been based upon a knowledge of the elements present, and also on the quantities in which they are present. Now a chemical analysis cannot discover what *minerals* are present in a given specimen; the only assistance it can give is to show what simple, chemical elements constitute the mineral aggregate, and the proportions in which they are present. It is only for very coarse-grained specimens that the naked eye or the loupe could make definite determinations, as experience shows that even after the most careful examination in this way, features and elements are discovered with the aid of the microscope that necessitate a change of classification. If the specimen be fine-grained the difficulty is at once evident, and can be overcome by a microscopical analysis only. Before a rock specimen can be examined under the microscope it must be polished on an emery plate, or wheel, and ground so thin as to become transparent. In general the thickness of such sections varies between $\frac{1}{8}$ th and $\frac{1}{10}$ th of a millimeter. When the section has become so transparent that printed matter placed under it may be read through it, then it is ready to be transferred to a small square of glass, to which it is attached by some Canada balsam, and on which it is preserved for future study. A thin section of this kind, examined with the microscope in polarized light, is an object of marvellous beauty. The crystalline elements present a mosaic of most fantastic forms; and the play of colors, depending, of course, on the nature of the minerals present, on their thickness in the specimen, and on the direction of their section with regard to their crystalline faces, is so wonderful that Professor Rood, in his work on *Modern Chromatics*, in his endeavor to describe it from an artistic standpoint, calls it "the audacious pencillings of nature." It is impossible to describe this feature; there is nothing in art that can compare with it; nothing that could faintly recall it. In one of these sections is sometimes seen not only *all* the colors of the spectrum, but these colors blending, one with another by infinitesimal gradings. But we have not yet mentioned the most interesting discoveries of microscopical petrography. Not only can the elements of composition of each speci-

men be determined, but also the mode of origin. Sedimentary and eruptive rocks are now no longer to be confounded; they are recognizable by features that cannot be mistaken. In the case also of metamorphic rocks, so called, and of such rocks as have undergone any change of internal structure or composition, not only do we see that such a change has taken place, but it can be traced through all its stages, from the moment of inception to the close. Some thin sections examined under the microscope show large individual crystals imbedded in a sort of matrix, fine-grained, and of composition different from the crystals they inclose. The constituent elements of the matrix appear to be arranged in parallel lines running in the same direction, which, when they meet with one of the imbedded crystals, make the detour of its circumference and reunite beyond, preserving in a most perfect manner, both in the deflected and reunited courses, their mutual parallelism. This feature is so constantly met with in rocks that are certainly known to have been molten, in lavas also, and in furnace slags, that wherever it is met with it is unhesitatingly taken as a proof that the rock in which it is found was formed from a fluid mass. Another feature revealed by the microscope is, that crystals, such as quartz and feldspar, that, to the naked eye, appear clear and limpid, and perfectly free from the presence of any foreign matter, are yet filled with innumerable inclusions, some of which are minute crystals, some are water-bubbles, and some are cavities containing gas. Let us see to what use this discovery is turned. We perceive in our specimen a large section of quartz, which with the aid of our microscope we find perfectly studded with minute crystals and needles of apatite and hornblende, and in some parts with countless bubbles of watery or liquid carbonic acid. If the diamond's degree of hardness be represented by 10, the hardness of quartz will be 7; that of apatite and hornblende will be about 5. From this it will appear that if the quartz was formed first, the hornblende and apatite inclusions could never have penetrated it; the water certainly never could. To account, therefore, for the phenomenon, microscopists suppose that the minute crystals were already formed while the quartz was yet in a liquid state, under one chemical form or another, and were floating in it; therefore, when the latter, by cooling, contracted and solidified, it held them prisoners within its grasp. The liquid inclusions are sometimes so numerous that Sorby concluded that a cubic inch of granite must contain many millions of them. These are but a few points hastily chosen to illustrate the practical use of the microscope in geology, yet they are sufficient to show what a revolution this little instrument has caused in that science. By a right use of it the history of the genesis of most of our rock systems is already known; the completion of the entire record is only a question of time.

BOOK NOTICES.

MIND IN THE LOWER ANIMALS. By *W. Lauder Lindsay, F.R.S.E., F.L.S.*, etc. In two volumes: I. Mind in Health; II. Mind in Disease. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1886.

This work is a striking instance of the extravagant lengths to which an author, apparently sincere, may be led in the maintenance of a favorite theory. Its object is to prove that the intellect of man differs from the cognoscitive powers of brutes, not in kind, but merely in degree; in other words, that human reason is a modified, improved, and developed form of "animal reason," and nothing more. It is needless to say that this proposition, if once admitted, would destroy every distinction between man and the brute, and undermine the chief natural argument in favor of the immortality of the soul.

It might perhaps be expected that when an author sets out to prove so weighty a proposition, he should define with great exactness the meaning of the principal terms he is about to use, or at least that he should state precisely what he means by that "mind" whose presence in the lower animals he claims to prove; and there may even be persons so old-fashioned in their notions as to suppose that unless the author knows what he means by "mind" he is not likely to demonstrate anything clearly with regard to it. This, however, is far from being Dr. Lindsay's view of the matter. He says in the introduction: "So far as I can judge, after a special study of several of the fashionable modern systems of psychology,—of mental or moral philosophy,—such as those of Herbert Spencer and Professor Bain, I do not think anything would be gained by attempting, in such a work as the present, the strict *definition* of these or similar terms, or their restricted use, solely in a metaphysical, psychological, or other purely scientific or technical sense. I do not, therefore, here attempt psychological definition or classification, preferring to permit each reader to define and classify according to his own favorite system of nomenclature and arrangement." A little further on he speaks of "the propriety, as it seems to me, of avoiding when possible, in such a work as the present, all strictly metaphysical terms, or at least of avoiding, where they must be introduced, all pedantic definitions thereof, and of employing such popular designations as mind, reason, intellect, instinct, consciousness, and so forth, in their *ordinary*, albeit vague and comprehensive acceptations."

Could one say in plainer terms: "I really have no idea of what I am talking about, but it is consoling to think that no one else knows a bit more about it than I myself; so I shall just blunder on in a loose sort of way, and allow my reader to put what order and sense he may into my words?" We sympathize with the doctor in his despair of finding anything satisfactory in the systems of Spencer and Bain; but would it not have been well, in default of obtaining fixed and clear ideas on a fundamental portion of his subject, to refrain from inflicting two bulky octavo volumes on the public? Not knowing the real import of his subject, he has swollen these two volumes with an immense and somewhat disorderly mass of matter, which, besides being often puerile and worthless in itself, has no bearing on the question at issue. Such, for instance, are the laborious proofs of imagination, affections, emotions, and individual differences of character in animals; attributes which no one, we presume, at the present day, thinks of denying to them. The only question at issue is whether there is in man, besides all these, something

above and beyond them all, which the brute does not possess ; the power, namely, of complete generalization, of mental abstraction from all material limits and conditions, the capacity of apprehending the universal, and of abstract reasoning—in a word, what is called the human intellect or reason. In treating this important question the author proceeds from an essentially wrong principle. He says: "In an investigation in which comparison is constantly being made between *human* and animal mind, it is all-important that man's standard, ideal, or type of the human mind should not be too high. It is much safer and sounder to form his ideal or average from the mental condition or phenomena of the *lowest* races, and most degraded classes of man, than from those of the highly cultured Englishman or American, German or Frenchman." Of course, if we were to go on this principle, systematically comparing the most degraded men with the most highly trained animals (and this is what is done throughout the entire work), it would not be difficult to cause the boundary line between reason and instinct, intellect and sense, to become obscure or even entirely to disappear from the eyes of the unthinking reader. We say the *unthinking* reader, because even here, as we shall show, patient investigation and labor will prove that the light of reason is only dimmed, not extinguished. But the true method of comparison is directly opposed to Dr. Lindsay's. St. Thomas indicates it in speaking of another question, the nature of life. It is from those creatures which *manifestly* are endowed with life, argues the Holy Doctor, that we must determine the distinctive characteristics of living things. The reason is plain ; since, as the schoolmen put it, the highest members of a lower order in nature always participate to a certain extent in the characters of the lowest members of the next higher order, it would be impossible, from a consideration of these contiguous extremes alone, to draw a sharply defined line of demarcation. We must, therefore, go to animals in which vital operations are manifest and indubitable ; and having determined what in them constitutes life, we may return to the boundary and apply our test to the distinction of the lowest forms of animate nature from non-living objects. The same holds good in the present case ; instead of having recourse, as Dr Lindsay does, to the lowest races of savages, and even, incredible as it may seem, to *idiots*, in order to determine the essential characteristics of the human mind, it is precisely to the "highly cultured Englishman or American, Frenchman or German," that he should have gone. In the latter it would have been easy to distinguish the characters of intellect, and to determine whether or not the human intelligence differs essentially from the mental powers of brutes, because in them these characteristics are most manifest. Then he would have been prepared to turn to the most degraded human beings, and to ascertain whether in them, also, the characteristics of intelligence could be detected, even though it were but as glimmerings through the cloud of their depravity and ignorance.

Not satisfied with taking the most degraded portions of mankind as the term of moral and intellectual comparison with animals, our author adopts a most exaggerated and prejudiced opinion as to the depth and hopelessness of their degradation. For instance, the following are some of the kind things he says about the native Australians. We quote entirely from the first volume, "Mind in Health." The Australian "knows almost no other sensation than that of the need of food, which he . . . makes known to the traveller by means of grimaces (Buchner)." N. B.—*i. e.*, when the traveller does not understand the language, and is forming his judgments in great part by guesswork. "The Australian blacks, on account of their unbounded stupidity, cannot be used

as slaves." "Dogs, wives, and children are possessed in common by the Australian aborigines (Houzeau)." "There are many worthy people . . . who, in the face of facts to the contrary, persist in believing that a 'potentiality' for culture and civilization exists in all races of mankind, however primitive, however degraded. That intelligence, reason, morals, are frequently so low in their stage of development, where they can be said to exist at all, as to sink man in countless instances below the psychical level of many other animals, is what even the unbiassed student will not at first be prepared to believe. . . . But his skepticism—when it exists—may be converted into belief by a careful study of the intellectual and moral condition of the following savage races. . . . The Australian aborigines, especially the 'black fellows' of Western Australia." "We are told that mentally the Australian aborigines are 'mere children,' finding 'amusement only in childish tricks and trifles.' . . . They cannot be taught any principles. . . . They know no sentiment, . . . but only unbridled passions and the sense of their own nothingness against the white races (Madame Bingmann)." "The Australian has no words to express the ideas of God, religion, righteousness, sin. . . . (Büchner)." "The Australian aborigines, according to Madame Bigham, (?) are incapable of civilization. 'The missionaries have long given up any attempt to civilize them.'"

We mean no discourtesy to Dr. Lindsay when we say that the above assertions are a mass of falsehood, in which he has been deceived by the testimony of prejudiced or incompetent observers, and perhaps quite as much by his own eager desire for facts which would harmonize with his theory. Catholic missionaries are even now engaged in converting and civilizing the "black fellows of Western Australia" with marked success, and these people, so long looked upon as the extreme of hopeless degradation, show an astonishing intelligence, aptness, and industry. A perusal of the simple account of the mission of New Norcia, near Perth, in Western Australia, which was published in the *Messenger of the Sacred Heart* during the whole of the year 1879, must be sufficient, in any candid mind, to justify to the utmost that confidence of the "worthy people," at whom Dr. Lindsay sneers, in a "potentiality" for culture and civilization existing even in the lowest savages. It gives a direct contradiction, of *facts*, be it remembered, to every one of the reckless assertions we have quoted above. For instance, with regard to their intelligence and capacity for improvement, Mgr. Salvado, Bishop and Superior of the Mission, writes: "One day, whilst I was teaching some little natives to read, one of them learnt in ten minutes forty letters of the alphabet, large and small. I believe that few scholars of the same age in Europe would do the same. Another mastered in a few weeks the four rules of arithmetic. A third, seeing a captain of the navy taking the meridian with a sextant, watched him closely, and then taking up the instrument, repeated the operation with perfect exactness." Nor are these isolated cases. "Mr. Thomas, the present official in charge of the aborigines in the district of Victoria (South Australia), who has carefully studied the subject, says that the children easily learn to read and write, that they readily commit to memory some lines of poetry or short songs, that they are very fond of oral lessons in geography, and perfectly understand the use of maps. A young native took, two years in succession, the prize for geography in the normal school at Sydney." A still more decisive instance is the following: "A young Australian woman, who with her father and mother had ranged the woods in the most degraded state of barbarism, was a few years ago received at the

mission. She was instructed, baptized, and, because she showed more than ordinary talent, educated with special care, and finally advantageously married. She now superintends the post-office and telegraph station of our department. The government of the English colony gives her, besides lodgings, seven hundred and fifty francs a year. All the Protestant journals in Australia have recorded the appointment, and passed the highest encomiums on the mission where Ellen Cuper, that is the name of the young woman, received her education." The above account is confirmed by an official dispatch from the Governor of West Australia to the Earl of Carnarvon, Minister of the Colonies.

No. 9. WEST AUSTRALIA, GOVERNOR'S HOUSE, PERTH, January 20, 1876.

MY LORD: It will probably interest you to know that the present director of the post-office and telegraph station is a native woman, who, a few years ago, was brought to the Roman Bishop Salvado. She performs the duty to the complete satisfaction of the postmaster-general. We have, moreover, a more recent example of the happy influence exercised on the natives of West Australia by this bishop. . . . A few weeks before my arrival Ellen Cuper, the postmistress mentioned above, was obliged on account of ill-health to absent herself for a short time from New Norcia, and I began to look about for some one to supply her place. The bishop at once informed the postmaster-general that he had at his house a young native girl, named Sarah Cann, quite intelligent and able, after a few lessons, to take care of the telegraph station. I willingly agreed to give her a trial. During my visit to the mission I found her at the office. She was already quite at home in her new position. On my return to Perth I sent her my congratulations by telegraph, and she at once returned thanks in the most courteous terms. . . . I have the honor to subscribe myself, your lordship's very devoted servant,

WILLIAM ROBINSON, Esq.,
Governor of Perth.

Even in the freedom of their native forests the Australian blacks are by no means the senseless beings, lower than the brutes, nor even the children, that Dr. Lindsay would fain have us believe them. The testimony of Sir Thomas Mitchell on this point leaves no doubt on the question.

The frequent intercourse I had with the inhabitants enables me to speak with full knowledge. I must say that the individuals we come across in the cities are unfair specimens of the race. Those we meet in the forests and immense solitudes of the interior are handsome in appearance and lead a free and happy life. The first one I saw was tall and well-proportioned. His grave demeanor and penetrating look inspired respect. Two white-bearded old men were seated near him before a fire. One of them was most dignified, almost diplomatic, in bearing. He was so observant of decorum that when one of the children spake a word while I was asking for directions, he admonished him with a slight tap of his long lance. . . . The man who consented to be our guide was smaller and less robust than the others, but he was full of resolution and courage, while his acuteness and rare judgment made him so useful that I always kept him by my side. . . . He spoke little and always in maxims, which made his sayings easily remembered. This Australian rendered us great services. . . . I should add that his countrymen are not at all so void of intelligence as is generally given out. To me, who saw them in their natural condition, they seemed at least equal, in this respect, to the peasants of England. They are even in advance of these in a certain politeness and reserve of manner and language that makes a very favorable impression.—*Three Expeditions into the Interior of Eastern Australia*, by Thomas Mitchell, Esq., quoted in the *Messenger*.

With regard to their asserted ignorance of the very idea of a God, we think the following passage from the published narrative so important, and the remarks made thereon so judicious, as to deserve quotation in full, despite its length:

"It is exceedingly difficult," says Bishop Salvado, "to ascertain with accuracy the religious notions of the Australian savage." And yet we hear certain tourists speak of them as matters well known to all. These travellers, without knowing anything whatever of the language of the natives, spend a few days, nay, perhaps only a few hours,

among them, and then come home and tell us that they are perfectly conversant with the manners, customs, and religious ideas of savages who, either through a spirit of mischief or reserve, have always been most reticent with strangers on these points. I am well aware how these truthful travellers pursue their quest for unpublished notes upon the Australian race. We may imagine one waiting for his prey; along comes a poor native. Our knowledge-seeker pounces upon him. "Have you a soul?" he asks. The child of the woods is disgusted and shakes his head, as if to say, "I don't understand your jargon." Our friend, the tourist, is delighted. He has made a discovery, and down goes the following note in his memorandum-book: "The Australians do not believe they have souls." You see the thing from beginning to end is simply a mystification. As soon as he returns home his notes, with interesting illustrations, are given to the public, and, sad to say, by such truthful writers as our friend are the majority taught. Bishop Salvado, moreover, adds that the Australians, who are easily inclined to joke, often amuse themselves at the expense of the innocent traveller. One of them being asked the Australian word for water, replied *cona*, which in their language meant *excrement*. At another time they gave the generic name of the object, instead of its own specific one.

Dr. Lindsay, by the way, asserts that "the language of the Australian blacks contains no word 'to express a general idea' or abstraction. It has no word, for instance, for the notion 'tree.'"

But from Bishop Salvado they concealed nothing. . . . They believe in a being all powerful, who created heaven and earth, whom they call *Motogon*. This *Motogon* is a man of very great strength and wisdom, a native of the country, and has the same dusky complexion as they have. When creating heaven and earth, and the waters, and plants, and kangaroos, he breathed and said: "Heaven and earth, and waters, and plants, and trees, and kangaroos, come forth;" and they came forth and were created. It is interesting to notice the close similarity between the formula of creation, this breathing, and the words of Holy Scripture, "Let there be light, and there was light," as the book of Genesis says in describing the creation. The Australians also believe in an evil spirit, whom they call *Cienga*. It is he who excites the fury of the tempests; he causes the destructive equinoctial rains; he whitens their children with leprosy and kills them. Thus the savages believe in two principles, the one good, the other bad. But, strange as it may appear, *Cienga* is as much worshipped as *Motogon*. "I have seen them," writes the missionary, "in times of dreadful storms curse *Cienga* as the author of them, then run and put themselves under the shelter of their great eucalyptus trees; but when, despite their cloaks of kangaroo-skin, they get drenched by the deluging rain, they become furious and stamp the ground with rage, forgetful of *Motogon* and *Cienga*."

We have said enough to show the gross inaccuracy of the idea of the Australians which is given by *Mind in the Lower Animals*. The same, did time and space allow, could probably be done with regard to many other races of whom he gives a no more favorable character. We cannot, however, leave this interesting subject without quoting the following passage from the latest works of an eminent French anthropologist, M. de Quatrefages, relating to the community of wives, asserted by our author of the Australians:

We ought, perhaps, to refer to the idea of property, the manner in which adultery is regarded by some peoples. . . . Nevertheless, even amongst the most savage tribes, a more elevated feeling, and one which is connected with moral or social ideas, as we ourselves understand them, may be proved often in the clearest manner. The gravity of the punishment incurred by the culprit scarcely permits a doubt that it is so. The Australian, uncorrupted by the vicinity of the white and brandy, never forgives one who has destroyed the purity of his wife, and kills him on the first occasion.

If Dr. Lindsay exaggerates to an unwarranted degree the degradation of certain savage races, he is even more extravagant in magnifying the capacities of many animals. He not only credits them freely with an understanding of man's language, and in the case of parrots, etc., with the faculty of using articulate speech with perfect understanding of its import, but he repeatedly attributes to animals in general a language of their own, "quite as eloquent and efficient in the eyes of those who have

studied, and consequently understand it, as can be the mere spoken or written language of vain man." Again, "Man is in the habit of désignating the lower animals 'poor dumb creatures.' The fact is, however, that they possess a language much more comprehensive than, and quite as eloquent as his own—much more generally intelligible than is his *verbal* language, which is merely *one* form of language or expression, that only with which he, in his pride and prejudice, is most familiar." That such sentiments should be seriously expressed, outside of the *Arabian Nights*, may seem to most of our readers incredible. Yet we see no reason to suppose that the learned doctor is not in perfect earnest. After this, of course, there is nothing left for us but to establish chairs in our universities to instruct our young folks in dog-talk and the language of birds and fishes, as the Arabian prince in the tale was by his preceptor. This accordingly we find our author earnestly advocating. "A chair or professorship of comparative language should exist in all our great universities, and due attention should be given to those rudimentary forms of expression that are common to other animals with man, and that are much more practically important than that limited form of language which is spoken, written, or printed." But, in spite of himself, Dr. Lindsay is unable to adhere to absurdities so childish, and we find him, in other parts of the work, explicitly contradicting every assertion quoted above as to the comparative merits of animal language.

Much interest has been excited of late by the really remarkable observations of Sir John Lubbock and other naturalists, on the habits of ants. Since Thoreau wrote his admirable accounts of ant-battles, observed in his philosophic hermitage of Walden (descriptions which have escaped notice, so far as our observation extends, in any scientific work), ants have been the mark for hundreds of scientific eyes. On this subject Dr. Lindsay gives without note or comment, as though it had never been challenged or disputed, the testimony of Dr. Lincecum, that the harvesting ants of Texas *sow the seeds of Aristida stricta* or ant-rice, on which they live. We call his attention to the following passage in Sir John Lubbock's late lectures on the habits of ants: "Dr. Lincecum, who first gave an account of these insects, maintained not only that the ground was carefully cleared of all other plants, but that this grass was intentionally cultivated by the ants. Mr. McCook, by whom the subject has been recently studied, fully confirms Dr. Lincecum that the disks (of ground around the entrance to the nest) are kept carefully clean, that the ant-rice alone is permitted to grow on them, and that the produce of the crop is carefully harvested; but he thinks that the ant-rice sows itself and is not actually planted by the ants."

Dr. Lindsay also makes much of the supposed power of ants to communicate detailed information to each other. For instance: "In ants on the march there is communication of intelligence throughout the troop. They show their mutual understanding in asking aid, issuing invitations, and giving advice. (Figuier)." This is an instance of a fault which occurs throughout the whole work; in a great number of cases Dr. Lindsay gives *his own interpretation* of phenomena and motives in the lower animals or those of other authors, instead of the facts on which those conclusions are based. Yet no one can dilate with more energy than the same writer on the danger and absolute uncertainty of such interpretations when they happen to be adverse to his own peculiar ideas.

It will be enough merely to refer here to the experiments made by Sir John Lubbock to test the power of ants to direct one another to localities, even at very short distances, where food is to be found. The re-

sults of these experiments are summed up by Sir John himself in these words: "I conclude, therefore, that when large numbers of ants come to food, they follow one another, being also to a certain extent guided by scent. The fact, therefore, does not imply any considerable power of intercommunication. There are, moreover, some circumstances which seem to point in an opposite direction. For instance, I have already mentioned that if a colony of *Polyergus* (or slave-making ants) changes the situation of its nest, the masters are all carried to the new nest by the slaves. Again, if a number of *F. fusca* are put in a box, and if in one corner a dark place of retreat be provided for them, with some earth, one soon finds her way to it. She then comes out again, and going up to one of the others takes her by the jaws. The second ant then rolls herself into a heap and is carried off to the place of shelter. They then both repeat the same manœuvre with other ants, and so on until their companions are collected together. Now it seems to me difficult to imagine that so slow a course would be adopted if they possessed any power of communicating description. On the other hand they certainly can, I think, transmit simple ideas." Our author also passes over in discreet silence the fact that those of Sir John's experiments which were intended to test the intelligence of ants and their ingenuity in devising expedients resulted only in developing an unexpected amount of stupidity. (See *Scientific Lectures*, p. 79.)

After systematically depreciating the capacity of the human mind, and as systematically exaggerating the mental powers of brutes, it is not, perhaps, surprising to see Dr. Lindsay reach the following climax of absurdity: "The most promising of all animals on whom to try the effects of *moral education* are the anthropoid apes, such as the orang and chimpanzee. . . . I believe that, could they only be induced to bestow them, the patient efforts of our missionaries in this direction, on our anthropoid 'poor relations' instead of on their fellow-creatures and countrymen, the negro, might produce results of a startling character." Here is an opening, indeed, for Anglican Church labor! Would it not be a good idea to ship a thousand or two of Bibles for distribution among the orangs of Borneo and the African chimpanzees? And why should their cousin, the gorilla, be excluded from this comprehensive charity? Is he not a brute and a brother?

Another consequence flows from Dr. Lindsay's principles which it is interesting to note. He says: "Many individual animals—dogs, horses, elephants, parrots—are both morally and intellectually *higher* than thousands of men even in the very centres of Western and modern civilization." Yet a few pages further on he mentions, with apparent approval, the practice of vivisection of animals. But if these animals are both morally and intellectually higher than certain men, it does not appear why the vivisection could not with equal right be inflicted on these men when the interests of science seem to require it. Dr. Lindsay may not accept this conclusion, but it is the only logical inference from his principles; and, in view of this fact, we at least would not like to be the poor negro, Irishman, or German who should happen to fall under the learned doctor's care in an interesting case.

We have probably said quite enough to show the prejudiced and one-sided character of *Mind in the Lower Animals*. We should not omit to mention that Dr. Lindsay recounts, in different portions of his work, several anecdotes of extraordinary animal sagacity (most of them not new, we believe), which, in common with many others equally striking and long familiarly known and commented upon by philosophers from St. Thomas down to the present day, should warn us that, while restrict-

ing animal sagacity to its proper sphere, we should not be too ready to limit arbitrarily the perfection to which it may attain in the apprehension of particular and concrete things.

We are glad also to meet with the following sentence: "We must henceforth regard the true site, seat, or organ of the mind as the whole body; and this is the only sound basis on which the comparative psychologist can begin his studies." We believe that this indicates the beginning of a return to sound philosophy, and that, little by little, modern philosophy may be led to the idea of the essential presence of the soul in the whole body and in every part of it. One by one the old Scholastic truths are returning to the field of science, albeit dressed in new costumes and introduced by unconscious patrons. They alone can give that solid metaphysical substratum which must underlie all sound science.

THE HISTORY OF ST. CATHARINE OF SIENA AND HER COMPANIONS. By *Augusta Theodosia Drane*, author of "Christian Schools and Scholars," etc. Compiled from original sources. London: Burns & Oates, 1880.

Though there already exist some sixty lives of St. Catharine of Siena, in various languages, the volume before us may be said to be first in the English language that can be regarded as approximating completeness. Most of the others are little more than translations, or abridgments, of the original narrative by Raymond of Capua, the Saint's confessor; they furnish no new facts, and do not attempt to restore the chronological order of events which Raymond neglected. There are several exceptions to this remark, but they are Italian or French, and are not available, therefore, to persons who are unfamiliar with those languages. Moreover, they are defective in one or another respect. The present work, therefore, supplies a real want to English readers, not met by any previous publication. Its object is to give the facts of St. Catharine's life as recorded by other biographers, restoring their chronological order, and at the same time supplementing them with additional matter drawn from original sources, hitherto either partially or entirely neglected. Ample use has been made of those wonderful compositions, St. Catharine's letters, a knowledge of which is essential to any real acquaintance with the saintly writer. Yet the letters themselves cannot be understood without some explanation of the history and circumstances of those to whom they were addressed; and this naturally introduces us to the members of the spiritual family of which St. Catharine was the Mother and Head.

The author of the work before us thus states her estimate and idea of St. Catharine: "The position of St. Catharine was an exceptional one. She was never a member of a religious community, yet neither was she a secular, nor a recluse. She appears before us surrounded by a group of disciples bound to her by no other ties than those of personal affection, and numbering among them men and women of every variety of age, station, and character. Blessed Raymond himself, and her other confessors; her three secretaries, Neri, Stephen, and Barduccio; Mother Matthew, whom she cured of the plague, and the English Hermit William Fleete; her sister-in-law Lisa, and Alexia, her chosen friend; with all these we make acquaintance in a passing way in the pages of the Legend; and the wish must have occurred to many readers that we could know them better, and interrogate them concerning their intercourse with her to whose daily life it was their privilege to be thus associated. To respond in some measure to this wish the writer has

endeavored to include in the history of St. Catharine such notices of companions as can be gathered from authentic letters and records still preserved ; and at the same time to gather up in their own words the testimony which they have borne to the sanctity of which they were so long the eye-witnesses."

Incidentally the author brings before us many historic personages, chiefly, yet not exclusively, of the Church, though, to use her own words, "The object aimed at was less to present the reader with a complete history of the age of St. Catharine than to make him better acquainted with the Saint herself. It is her character as a woman that most requires to be made known, for it has hitherto been partially concealed by the very splendor of her historical reputation. Stupendous as is the history of her life, it has, nevertheless, a side which brings her within the reach of our ordinary sympathies. Catharine, the Seraphic Bride of Christ, espoused to Him at Siena, stigmatized at Pisa, supported on the Bread of Life, the Pacificator of Florence, the Ambassadors of Gregory, the Councillor of Urban, the Martyr for the Unity of the Holy See,—this is indeed a character that overwhelms with its very greatness. But Catharine, the Lover of God and man, who gave away her will with her heart to her Divine Spouse ; the tender mother of a spiritual family ; the friend of the poor ; the healer of feuds ; the lover of her country ;—Catharine with all her natural gifts of prudence and of womanly tact ; with her warm affections and her love of the beautiful ; with her rare genius, refined, spiritualized, and perfected by divine illumination ; surrounded by men and women like ourselves, with whose infirmities she bore, and whom she loved in return ; Catharine, with her wise and graceful words, her gracious smile and her sweet attractive presence ;—this is indeed a being to be loved and imitated ; we open our very hearts to receive her within them, and to enshrine her there, not as a saint only, but as a mother and a friend."

From these quotations the reader will gather the author's idea of St. Catharine, and the plan and scope of her book. The author lays down as a rule, and she strictly adheres to it, to rigidly exclude all imaginary details, and to introduce nothing for which there do not exist unimpeachable authorities.

The work, therefore, is in the highest degree reliable, the marks of untiring research are everywhere discernible in it, and the result is a graphic and faithful delineation of this glorious Saint.

THE REFUTATION OF DARWINISM, AND THE CONVERSE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. By T. Warren O'Neill. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1880.

We gladly welcome this addition to current Darwinian literature. The author does not advance any new facts, but admitting all those adduced by Mr. Darwin in his *Origin of Species and Animals and Plants under Domestication*, he endeavors to show from them that *varieties* can never develop into *species*. Varieties, according to Mr. O'Neill, are due not to "an innate tendency to vary" without limit, but to a natural tendency to *revert* to a primitive perfect type of the species, which has been departed from by the degeneration incident to the hard conditions of the struggle for existence. This variation therefore has a limit, and ceases when the species has recovered all its lost characteristics, and hence it can afford no basis for the assumption that mere races will ever give rise to new and distinct species. This is confirmed from the well-known fact that distinct species are extremely infertile when mated together, whereas unions between different races of the same species are noted for exceptional fertility, and the more widely the races differ the

greater is the fertility of their union. On the other hand, races in which any one or a few features are disproportionately developed, do not long remain fertile unless crossed with new blood. This is easily explained by the idea that the race suffers in general vigor, and especially in the power of reproduction (which is the reflex of all the forces of the organism, since it must reproduce all), by the departure from the proportionate development of the organs in the perfect type of the species. The same fact cannot be explained on Mr. Darwin's hypothesis, as he himself repeatedly admits, and indeed it is notoriously in direct contradiction with the requirements of that hypothesis. This is in brief the main idea of the work, and it is skilfully developed in several chapters on the crossing and close interbreeding of various domestic animals. Mr. O'Neill also argues, and to our mind with considerable reason, that the result of natural selection and the struggle for existence will be the survival, not precisely of the strongest and most vigorous, but of the least injured and the least degenerate. The natural tendency of a species of animals in the free state, subjected to those conditions of insufficient food and the other elements of the struggle for existence which are required by Mr. Darwin's theory of natural selection, must be to degeneration in the survivors, not to improvement. Hence there can be no development from this cause into a more perfect species, but the degenerate species, like an india-rubber ball distorted by pressure, is ever ready to revert to the normal form, as soon as the pressure is relieved, that is to say, when the conditions become favorable; and this reversion will take place in those characters only to which the particular conditions existing at the time are favorable.

We believe that Mr. O'Neill has made out a very strong argument against Darwinism. In addition to an able statement of some of the chief difficulties commonly brought against that system, he has substituted for it a theory which explains and co-ordinates many facts which the former does not so much leave unexplained as contradict. We think, however, that although reversion is undoubtedly a most important factor in variations, sufficiently so, indeed, to afford good grounds for the author's deductions, it cannot be considered, as he insists, absolutely their sole and exclusive cause. For instance, we can hardly suppose that the six-fingered and six-toed families which sometimes occur in the human species are reversals to a primitive and perfect characteristic. The same may be said with greater reason of the double babies, united in various manners, of the double-headed calves, and other similar monstrosities, once decided as the handiwork of the taxidermist or exhibitor, but now universally admitted to be the work of nature. In these cases some other force has evidently been at work, of which, as Mr. Darwin truly says, we are entirely ignorant; and if it be sufficiently powerful to produce these results there certainly can be no improbability involved in crediting it with an appreciable fraction of those less decided variations which are taken advantage of in order to produce distinct races. We also notice, in one or two matters of detail, what seem to us inaccuracies. For instance, Mr. O'Neill implies that the cause of the extinction of the famous short-legged Ancon sheep, once bred on the banks of the Charles River, in Massachusetts, was the disproportionate development of the different portions of the organism, which, removing the race widely from the normal type, impaired its general physiological vigor, and especially the power of reproduction. Mr. Huxley, in his essay on the *Origin of Species*, published in April, 1860, informs us that the true reason for the extinction of this remarkable breed was that "the introduction of the Merino sheep, which were not only supe-

rior to the Ancons in wool and meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to the complete neglect of the new breed." But such an oversight as this does not affect the general force of Mr. O'Neill's argument. What is perhaps more blameworthy is the constant attack which the author makes, not in the gentlest language, upon Mr. Darwin's candor and sincerity. We believe that such charges, even when true, serve only to introduce into the contest a spirit of personal bitterness which ought not to have its origin on the Catholic side.

THE STUDY OF ROCKS: An Elementary Textbook of Petrology. By *Frank Rutley, F.G.S., H.M.* Geological Survey. New York: Appletons.

Although the microscopical study of rocks has made rapid advances both in England and the United States within the last few years, yet, strange to say, the only textbooks deserving the name published on the subject are German. The present little volume, published simultaneously at New York and London, is the first attempt in this direction that has been made in English. The author's position on the staff of the Geological Survey of England gave him many advantages for the execution of his task that could not readily fall to the lot of others. Some of these, a few, he made good use of. The volume is divided into two parts. In the first part there are ten chapters, viz.: 1. On Methods of Research. 2. Rocks Defined and their Origin Considered. 3. Disturbances of the Earth's Crust. 4. Mode of Occurrence of Eruptive Rocks. 5. The Collecting and Arrangement of Rock Specimens. 6. Preliminary Examination of Rocks. 7. The Microscope and its Accessories. 8. Method of Preparing Rock-sections for Microscopical Examination. 9. Phenomena of Polarization. 10. Megascopic and Microscopic Characters of the Principal Rock-forming Minerals.

Chapter i., is very meagre, and in no way deserves the comprehensive heading prefixed to it. Chapters ii., iii., iv., belong rather to dynamical geology than to petrology, and can be more advantageously studied in works devoted to that particular branch of the science. The only excuse that could be offered for their insertion in the present volume, would be either better treatment of the subject than is usually found in textbooks in general use, or, at least, treatment from a purely petrological standpoint. But neither of these ends is attained; for, on the one hand, the definitions are sometimes vague and loose, and are thus deficient of even the merit of being descriptive; and, on the other hand, some of them are even implicitly contradictory. Examples of the first kind are to be had in the definitions of *plutonic* and *metamorphic* as applied to rocks; the definitions of *metamorphic* in chapters ii. and iv. are examples of the second class. The beginner will find many useful hints in cc., v., vi., vii., viii. Chapter vi., however, is sadly deficient in description of chemical analyses now employed by microscopists. These may have been excluded because of the elementary character of the volume; but we are of opinion that these methods of treatment are now so elementary in the daily work of the petrologist as to need being inserted as a matter of course. Chapter vii. is very full, and contains much useful information for the young lithologist. Chapter viii. is full of useful matter, but the young student must be cautioned at the start against the mania of amateurs for grinding-lathes, and other such costly, cumbrous instruments. The instrument figured for the author on page 62 has been abandoned by not a few as a very inconvenient and costly piece of machinery. The microscopist who does not intend to prepare rock-sections for the trade, will find it to his advantage to

grind by hand with several grades of emery. He will not need a coarser grade than No. 40, but will require FF. with which to finish for transferring. Chapter ix. is very useful, but, perhaps, somewhat too condensed for beginners. The author gives a remedy for this defect in a very full list of the literature relating to the subject. Chapter x., devoted to the description of the microscopic characters of the rock-forming minerals, although the most important part of the work, yet appears to be the part prepared with least care, so glaring are the inaccuracies sometimes met with in it. The sections from pp. 160 to 173 are very well done, and will repay careful study.

The second part of the volume, devoted to descriptive petrology, contains four chapters, in which a new classification of rocks is attempted. The author considers rocks as either eruptive or sedimentary; and the eruptive rocks he subdivides into vitreous, crystalline, and metamorphic. The method of treatment in this part of the work is evidently original, as the classification is unlike that proposed by any lithologist we have yet read. That the classification is anomalous and unscientific is the least that may be said. As long as the author followed the German authorities, he did well; but the moment he steered independently of them he became lost. Others before him have shared the same fate; it is not unfrequently the recompense of a desire to be merely original. Zirkel and Rosenbusch have made microscopical petrography what it is; whoever desires to become proficient in this branch of science must study their works,—and as matters are at present, their works exclusively.

ERASMUS DARWIN. By *Ernst Krause*. Translated from the German by *W. S. Dallas*. With a preliminary notice by *Charles Darwin*. 12mo. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1880.

This work purports to be a translation of an article published in the German scientific journal *Kosmos*, on Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles Darwin, and author of the *Zoonomia*, *Botanic Garden*, and other works. The "preliminary notice," however, constitutes the major portion of the work. It alone gives the history of Dr. Darwin's life, while Dr. Krause's brief essay is entirely concerned with the analysis of his works, and the vindication of his claim to be the true founder, in great part at least, of that system of evolution through natural selection of which his grandson is the exponent in our own day. To Mr. Charles Darwin the preparation of this sketch has evidently been a labor of love, and we, of course, should be the last to carp at his filial piety. At the same time it must be said that there was little either in the character or pursuits of Erasmus Darwin which is calculated to arouse any very general interest in the details of his life. An eminent member of the medical profession, a keen observer and bold speculator in natural history, he undoubtedly was; but even these qualities will hardly suffice to fascinate the general public with the humdrum life of an English provincial doctor of the last century.

Dr. Darwin was a poet also, of sufficient ability to draw from Byron the epithet of "mighty master of unmeaning rhyme." In his long didactic poems, as well as in his prose writings, he indulged in those speculations on the development of living creatures which caused his contemporaries to use the term *Darwinizing* "nearly as the antithesis of sober biological investigation." Dr. Krause shows that in these works are found the doctrines of evolution, reversion to primitive types, rudimentary organs, the struggle for existence, sexual selection, and in fact nearly all of those ideas which Charles Darwin and Alfred R. Wal-

lace have elaborated into the modern theory of evolution. A fact which seems to have escaped Krause's notice is that in another question also, the government of the universe, Charles Darwin apparently holds the same position which was held by his grandfather. "That there exists a superior ENS ENTIVM," says the latter, "which formed these wonderful creatures, is a mathematical demonstration. That he influences things by a particular providence is not so evident. The probability, according to my notion, is against it, since general laws seem sufficient for that end." This, if we are not mistaken, is precisely the view expressed of late years by Mr. Darwin in several places. "The birth, both of the species and of the individual, are equally parts of that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance. The understanding revolts at such a conclusion, *whether or not we are able to believe that every slight variation of structure, the union of each pair in marriage, the dissemination of each seed, and other such events, have all been ordained for some special purpose*" (*Descent of Man*, vol. ii., p. 378).

The same view is maintained much more expressly in the *Origin of Species*. Its fallacy has been ably pointed out by St. George Mivart in his *Genesis of Species*, and we draw attention to it here only to suggest that ancestral prejudice may perhaps have more to do with at least one of Mr. Darwin's scientific opinions than he, in his philosophic deliberations, would be disposed to imagine.

THE TEXT OF THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS. Translated from the original Spanish. London: Burns & Oates. 1880.

The *Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius* have borne such abundant fruit that the preservation of the original text in its integrity may well be a matter of the utmost care. And of little less importance is it to those who, from their unfamiliarity with the Spanish or the Latin, cannot avail themselves of the original Spanish text or of the approved Latin version, to possess a perfectly faithful English translation. Experience everywhere has proved that their use is in the highest degree salutary for the edification and spiritual advancement of the faithful. And of this there is the highest testimony in the Brief *Pastoralis Officii Cura* of Pope Paul III., in which His Holiness, by his Apostolic authority and "of his own certain knowledge, approved, praised, and by the Brief protected the Exercises and all and everything contained in them, strongly exhorting in our Lord all the faithful of both sexes, wherever they may be, to use those pious documents and *Spiritual Exercises* and devoutly to be instructed by them."

Previous to the sending forth of this Brief two versions of the *Exercises* in Latin had been submitted to the Censors appointed by the Pope, and both were approved without the alteration of a single word. Of these two versions, the one chosen for printing was that which was the better Latin, and therefore the freer translation. It bears the name in the Society of Jesus of the Vulgate Edition, and was approved by the Fifth General Congregation, which showed its respect for it by placing the chief variations between it and the Spanish autograph in footnotes, so that the Vulgate text might remain unaltered. The translation thus received was made by Father Andrew Desfreux.

The original copy of the *Exercises* is no longer in existence. But in the archives of the Society a very precious manuscript is preserved, which consists of a Spanish copy, having on its margin some corrections in the handwriting of St. Ignatius. This was called, in the Fifth General Congregation, *The Autograph*. The late Father-General John Roo-

thaan made a new and literal Latin translation from the original Spanish, adding notes which were suggested mainly by the differences between the Spanish which St. Ignatius wrote and the free Latin translation of Father Desfreux. Since the publication of Father Roothaan's translation in parallel columns with the Vulgate text, no one has attempted to wander from the exact form in which the *Exercises* were bequeathed by St. Ignatius to the Society he founded.

The first translation of the *Spiritual Exercises* into English was printed at St. Omers in 1736, by Nicolas Joseph Le Febvre. It contains, however, some meditations, which St. Ignatius has not given, and the order of the whole book has been greatly changed. In 1847 Mr. Charles Seagre published a translation from the Vulgate Latin text, with some of the variations, as given by Father Roothaan from the Spanish. This has an interesting preface by Cardinal Wiseman. Another and briefer translation was published in 1870 by Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A. But some omissions (called "trifling") have been made in it, as the Preface states, "in order to bring the work more into unison with the doctrine and discipline of the Anglican Church, for the members of which the translation is specially intended."

The translation before us is taken directly from the Spanish *Autograph*, but the translators state that they have had Father Roothaan's Latin version constantly before them.

BOSTON NATURAL HISTORY SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS: Guides for Science Teaching. Boston: Grim & Heath. 1879.

Six of these guides have already appeared, viz.: 1. About Pebbles; by Alpheus Hyatt. 2. Concerning a Few Common Plants; by Professor Goodale. 3. Commercial and Other Sponges; by Alpheus Hyatt. 4. A First Lesson in Natural History; by Mrs. E. C. Agassiz. 5. Corals and Echinoderms; by Alpheus Hyatt. 6. Mollusca; by Alpheus Hyatt. "They are issued by the Boston Society of Natural History," and have been "designed to supplement lectures given to teachers of public schools of Boston." "They are intended for the use of teachers who desire to practically instruct their classes in natural history. Besides simple illustrations and instructions as to the modes of presentation and study, there are in each pamphlet hints which will be found useful in preserving, preparing, collecting, and purchasing specimens."

If we except the numbers by Professor Goodale, and Mrs. Agassiz, we think the little guides will afford little assistance to teachers "to practically instruct their classes in natural history." Professor Hyatt has not the happy faculty of presenting natural history subjects clearly and orderly; so, instead of helping the teacher (who we here suppose did not attend Mr. Hyatt's lectures) by an enumeration of problems, or difficulties, accompanied by hints as to where, or how, the solutions may be found, he launches at once into *medias res*, and permits the devoted pupil-teacher to follow as best he or she may. We are of opinion that the teachers for whom these little volumes, with the exceptions made above, are a necessity, or to whom they can be of great assistance, are not of such ability that they can follow them readily or to advantage. How different is the character of the little pamphlets by Professor Goodale and Mrs. Agassiz. What simplicity, what order, what fulness; and all with such a charm that one regrets the whole series did not fall to just such hands for preparation. The little volumes are replete with matter, and cannot fail to produce much good, if they only help to turn the attention of teachers to the study of the common objects of everyday life, so that, understanding them, they may be able to render an

account of them to the young minds committed to their training. How few of our school-teachers, and, in consequence, how few of the many generations that fall to the school-teacher's charge, have even the most elementary knowledge of the commonest plants that grow in our fields and gardens, of the birds that frequent the neighboring woods, the fishes to be found in the ponds or brooks; of the commonest and simplest natural phenomena, etc. These little volumes are intended, not to supply the lacking information, but rather to call forth a habit of observation in teacher and pupil alike, which, if properly directed and trained by those to whom this duty belongs, will be more useful, and a means of more solid instruction, to our young students than all the formulated science of all our libraries, were it possible to make each little student's head the depositary of it all.

ONE OF THE JESUITS—ALEXIS CLERC, SAILOR AND MARTYR. By *Rev. Charles Daniel, S. J.* With a preface by *Very Rev. Thomas S. Preston, V. G.* New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1880.

We cannot too highly commend to all who wish to know what manner of men the members of the Society of Jesus really are, or who love to read and think of generous, self-sacrificing, heroic characters. Born in Paris in 1819, educated at the University, the spirit of which was almost entirely irreligious and infidel, he yet had from childhood, probably through the prayers of a pious mother, strong religious inclinations. He entered the French navy as midshipman, and quickly won the confidence and esteem of his superior officers by his energy and decision of character. He remained in the navy thirteen years, rising to the rank of first lieutenant, acquiring the character of a skilful, energetic officer, a thorough navigator and engineer, and securing the respect and esteem both of his inferiors and superiors. During this time he was constantly engaged on long voyages along the coasts of Africa, and in the Chinese seas and the Pacific Ocean. He resisted the temptations which beset a sailor's life, and kept himself free from the vices to which seamen are specially subject. Religion was always prominent in his thoughts, and finally he determined, contrary to the wishes of his father and most intimate friends, to turn his back upon the world and his own brilliant prospects in it, and seek admission into the Society of Jesus. After passing his novitiate he was appointed Professor in the School of St. Genevieve, which position he occupied eight years, exerting a powerful influence for good upon his pupils, many of whom attained high positions in the French army, navy, and civil administration, and also upon his old comrades, whom he frequently met. When the Commune obtained ascendancy in Paris at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Father Clerc was seized, along with other Jesuit Fathers, at St. Genevieve and cast into prison. There he rejoiced that he was permitted to suffer for Christ's sake, and succeeded in making several converts. Finally, along with Archbishop Darboy, M. Deguerry, M. Bonjean, M. Ducoudray, and M. Allard, he was murdered—martyred.

The work is intensely interesting throughout, and edifying.

THE CRAYFISH: An Introduction to the Study of Zoology. By *T. H. Huxley, F.R.S.* International Scientific Series. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1880.

Mr. Huxley's latest book will not tend to diminish his reputation as a biologist. His intention in the work is to exemplify and inculcate the general truths of zoological science by the study of a particular case. For this end he has selected the common crayfish, and under the heads

of the natural history, physiology, morphology, distribution, and etiology of this animal he teaches the elements of all these sciences in the most agreeable and thorough manner. Indeed, he is so thorough that few, we imagine, but students, will follow him through all his details. Regarded from the standpoint of natural science the greater portion of the work merits nothing but praise. With some of the assertions on philosophical or semi-philosophical subjects, which are incidentally made, we should be disposed to quarrel, but most of these questions are hinted at rather than developed, and do not affect the accuracy of the zoological descriptions. We recognize the work as practically the development of a lecture on the study of zoology, delivered by Mr. Huxley in the year 1861. In the present book, however, he has introduced a feature which was not included in the plan of the original lecture; that is to say, he gathers together in the end all that has been said in the preceding portions of the work, and brings it to bear, with all the skill of which he is capable, in favor of the doctrine of evolution. In substance, however, he merely repeats, with regard to a particular case, the stock arguments, advanced by all adherents of the theory, and insufficient, in our opinion, to prove it even for a single species.

THE ELOCUTIONIST. A Practical Method of Teaching and Studying Elocution. Adapted for Schools and Colleges. By a *Member of a Religious Order*. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1880.

The need for a work of this kind is well set forth in the preface. The author well says: "Its conception originated from the conviction that in the whole range of English literature there can scarcely be found a single humorous piece or dialogue which does not contain something objectionable, reprehensible, or profane, and consequently detrimental to the virtue and morals of youth." The Christian parent and conscientious teacher cannot be overscrupulous in a matter of such vast importance. Under this entirely correct conviction the author has with great industry and in most cases with just discrimination searched and sifted English literature for material from which a work suitable for purposes of declamation and public exhibitions in schools might be compiled, which would be free from objectionable matter. In this a high degree of success has been attained, yet not entire success. There are several selections which we would be glad to see excluded from future editions. We indicate among others the selections entitled: "Wounded," "The Polish Boy," "Rienzi's Address to the Romans," "Union of Church and State," "The Slaughter of the Waldenses," and several others whose omission would in no wise detract from the merits of the work, and would make it more in accordance with its own design. Preceding the selections are judicious directions respecting articulation, enunciation, accentuation, inflection, emphasis, and gestulation.

THE MIRACULOUS MEDAL. Its Origin, History, Circulation, Results. By *M. Aladel, C.M.* Translated from the French, by *P. S.*, graduate of St. Joseph's, Emmitsburg, Md. Illustrated. Baltimore: John B. Piet. 1880.

The previous editions of the history of the *Miraculous Medal* presented but a very condensed account of the apparition of the Blessed Virgin, in 1830, to Sister Catharine Labouré. Grave reasons induced her director, M. Aladel, to suppress many facts, as inexpedient, at the time, to be published. Among these reasons was his unwillingness to attract special attention to the humble Sister who had transmitted

heaven's orders, and who, it was best, should remain unknown to the end of her life. The death of the Sister has removed this obstacle, and allows the publication of all that the Sister revealed, at least of all that is still possessed of these communications. At the time, too, of the last edition, M. Aladel understood imperfectly the import of the vision of the *Medal*, but events of subsequent occurrence have placed this important revelation in a clearer light, and fully established its connection with the past and the future.

The work is highly interesting and edifying.

HYMNS. By *Frederick William Faber, D.D.* First American, from the author's last edition of 1861. Baltimore: Printed and published by Murphy & Co. 1880.

Messrs. Murphy & Co. have done a good work in giving us an American edition of Father Faber's hymns. Heretofore those of the Catholic public who desired to possess a full collection of these beautiful and edifying poems have been dependent on English editions, which they could only procure at a higher price.

In the volume before us the hymns are arranged under seven titles, as follows: Part First, God and the Holy Trinity; Part Second, The Sacred Humanity of Jesus; Part Third, Our Blessed Lady, St. Joseph, and the Holy Family; Part Fourth, Angels and Saints; Part Fifth, The Faith, and the Spiritual Life; Part Sixth, Miscellaneous; Part Seventh, The Last Things. There is also an index of the first lines of each hymn, for convenience of reference.

Prefacing the volume there is a valuable and only too brief introduction by Brother Azarias, treating of the distinguishing characteristics of Father Faber's writings, with some interesting statements respecting his relations to Keble and Wordsworth.

NATURAL SCIENCE AND RELIGION. Two Lectures delivered to the Theological School of Yale College. By *Asa Gray*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1880.

The learned author insists that there is not necessarily any conflict between revealed religion and the developments of science. He firmly maintains his own hold on revelation, while he eagerly presses forward in the pursuit of new truths in science, or of new developments of old truths. He holds hypothesis at its proper value, and, does not insist that hypothesis should be accepted in lieu of certified facts. He recommends his hearers not to adopt an attitude of jealousy and suspicion in regard to scientific developments, and on the other hand, he warns the scientists not to form rash conclusions to the detriment of religious belief. He considers his subject in the light of details, which are not the less interesting to the ordinary reader on account of the profound and far-reaching scope they embrace. Professor Gray has done his work as well as it is possible for a non-Catholic to perform it.

BIBLE HISTORY; to which is added A Short History of the Church. For the use of schools. By the author of *Lessons in Bible History*, etc. With the approbation of His Eminence, John Cardinal McCloskey, Archbishop of New York. New York: P. O'Shea, 37 Barclay Street. 1879.

This is one of the best books of the kind we have seen for a long while. It is a model textbook; concise, yet clear and distinct in its statements. It is no dry skeleton of history; but, though brief, is, nevertheless, an interesting connected narrative of the leading events in Old Testament history, and the history of the Christian Church.

THE ENGLISH POETS. Selections with Critical introductions by various writers, and a General Introduction, by *Matthew Arnold*. Edited by *Thomas Humphrey Ward, M.A.*, late Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1880. Two 8vo. volumes.

Among works of this kind, this is the latest and one of the best. It extends from the time of Chaucer to that of Dryden. It is to be regretted that, as usual in such works, Catholic poets and poetry receive scant treatment and appreciation.

GREAT TRUTHS. By *Monsignore de Ségur*, author of "Frequent Communion," "Confession," etc. Translated from the French by a Catholic Priest. New York: P. O'Shea, 1880.

The works of Monsignore de Ségur are so well known and highly esteemed that commendation of them seems needless. Their charming style and power of direct presentation of important truths are equalled by the thoroughly Catholic and deep devotional spirit that pervades them.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF GRACE. A Tale of the Days of Henry VIII. Translated from the French of *M. Emes*. New York: P. O'Shea. 1880.

This is one of a series of *Tales from Church History*. It graphically depicts the times of Henry VIII., and brings vividly before the reader's mind many of the most prominent historic personages of those times.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A COMPENDIUM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANCIENT HISTORY. With an Appendix containing a Dissertation, by *E. von Lasanlx*, on the Study of the Classics, translated from the German. By the *Rev. Henry Formby*, author of "Monotheism the Primitive Religion of Rome," "Sacrum Septenarium," etc. London: Burns & Oates, 17 Portman Street. New York: The Catholic Publication House, 9 Barclay Street. 1878.

THE LAMB OF GOD; OR, REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE OF OUR DIVINE LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST. By *Rev. T. H. Kane, P.P.*, author of "The Dove of the Tabernacle," "The Angel of the Altar," "Mary Immaculate, Mother of God." With a Preface by the Most Rev. Dr. Croke, Archbishop of Cashel and Emly. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1880.

THE DIVINE SANCTUARY. A Series of Meditations upon the Litany of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By *Very Rev. Thomas S. Preston, V.G.*, Pastor of St. Ann's Church, New York. Second Edition. New York: Robert Coddington, 1879.

SHORT AND FAMILIAR ANSWERS TO THE MOST COMMON OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST RELIGION. From the French of L'Abbé de Ségur, formerly Chaplain of the Military Prison of Paris. New and Revised Edition. New York: P. O'Shea, 1880.

A CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION. Translated from the German of *Rev. Joseph Desharbe, S. J.* Revised, with Additions, by an American Ecclesiastic. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1878.

THREE ROSES OF THE ELECT. By *Monsignore de Ségur*. Twelfth Edition. Translated from the French by a Priest of the Ancient Order of Mount Carmel; *Permissu Superiorum*. Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son, 1880.

AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE SO-CALLED PROPHECY OF ST. MALACHY REGARDING THE SUCCESSION OF POPES. By *J. O'Brien*, Catholic Priest. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1880.

PRIMARY ARITHMETIC, ELEMENTARY ARITHMETIC, AND COMPLETE ARITHMETIC. (Baker's Improved Series.) By *Andrew H. Baker, A.M., Ph. D.*. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher. 1878

AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. For the Use of Schools. Arranged on the Catechetical Plan. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1878.

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES. By *J. W. Cummins, D.D., LL.D.*, of St. Stephen's Church New York City. New Edition. New York: P. O'Shea.

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FREE THOUGHT IN ENGLAND.

THREE causes postpone in England the triumph of wild ideas over such as are traditional and decorous. The first is the long habit of Constitutionalism, which gives free play to individual opinions, and so dissipates their energy and extravagance. The second is the "respectable" Established Church, which being interwoven by clerical marriages with the middle classes, keeps up the sentiment of Christianity throughout the country. And the third is a certain staidness of natural character which objects to being disturbed by mere chimeras. It is undeniable that in England there is just as much free thought as there is in Germany, in Russia, or anywhere else; but there is no distemper of revolt, no rudeness of irreligion, still less any combination to upset. Tranquillity of indifference is the prevailing phase. "There may be, or there may not be, infallible truth, but it is too difficult an inquiry to be gone into," is the popular English phase of free thought. In conversation there is immense energy of dispute, but the energy is dissipated by conversation. What Tcherniscerski said of the Russian modern temperament is perhaps equally true of the modern English: "The rising generation shows a great tendency for idleness, and a great liking for conversation and discussions. It has two defects: it is too easily excited, and never thoroughly investigates a subject." But the excitement in the English temperament seldom goes beyond words; it does not take form in blows or in conspiracies. This is, perhaps, as much due both to political and religious accidents—that is, to the institutions of the country—as it is due to the normally British dislike for being disturbed

without practical gain. Nor does any fact in English history shake this estimate. Thus, we must not look upon the Reformation as being English in tone, for it was purely political and compulsory. Nor must we regard the Cromwell outbreak as being English in tone, for it was evanescent in spirit and circumstance. Besides, both these wild epochs were quasi-Christian. It must be remembered, to the great credit of the English people, that their revolutions have been professedly religious. Professed skepticism has never once made a revolt. There has been always the affectation of religious conviction at the bottom of the most disorderly absurdities. No section of English people has ever put forth such a programme as that which Herzen presumed to promulgate in 1848: "Liberty will have no peace till all that is religious and political has become simply human, and submissive to criticism and negation. . . . Our work is to demolish all faith, to remove existing hope in what is old, and to destroy all prejudices without concessions or mercy." The truth is that it would be impossible for such a programme to find approvers unless Socialism and Nihilism had joined hands. Political Nihilism could not possibly prevail unless Socialism had first prepared the way. It is invariably the Nihilism of the moral order which develops the Nihilism of the political order. Victor Hugo has called French Socialism Nihilism, and no doubt he is to a certain extent right. The death of the moral order is the death of every other order. But in England there has never been the death of the moral order. There have been frantic outbursts of anti-Catholicism and Puritanism; there have been hideous politico-religious persecutions; but there has never been revolutionary Socialism. This is a grand gain to English credit. It is also a grand promise for the English future. Modern thought, as it pompously styles itself, may loosen the links of the religious life; but the past shows that, though the English may become crazy, they are not likely to renounce Christianity.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the growth of free thought in England is due to greater study, greater learning. It is due, to tell the truth, to simple laziness. Free thought is not intellectual, it is slothful. It is the cutting the intellect loose from nine-tenths of those restraints which even the natural laws of creation prove divine. This disposition necessarily involves pride and vanity, and therefore a diseased moral state. The two great restraints which the Catholic Church has always supplied against the wayward conceits of free thought are ecclesiastical authority and "supernaturalism," the latter being indeed the *raison d'être* of the former, and the two being divinely inseparable. But though free thought has not dared to do away with authority,—in certain

abstract or theoretical forms,—it has stripped authority of that one only sovereign grace which rendered it at once dignified and beautiful. If we recognize authority as conferred by the Creator, we feel honored in submitting ourselves to it; but if we recognize authority as conferred only by ourselves, we look down on it with paternal complacency. This is what the Socialists do; what all freethinkers do, more or less; what every class of Protestant Christian must always do, though in a very different sense to the freethinker. Protestantism is only free thought in regard to interpretation, for it admits the infallibility of Revelation; it accepts the authority of the lawgiver, but insists on interpreting His law; and though logically such free thought leads to skepticism, happily few Protestants are logicians. Those Protestants who have the misfortune to be logicians, develop necessarily more or less into skeptics. This development has now ripened in the higher classes, that is, in the classes which are educated; and since few men have the energy to become Catholics, they fall back on the indolence of freethinking. At Oxford there is quite as much free thought as there is at Berlin, or St. Petersburg; but the refinements of education, and the interests of social life, keep it scholarly, tranquil, well-bred. This is equally true of the teachers and the taught. What Dr. Jowett, the Master of Balliol, meant by that sentence (which he preached to the undergraduates at St. Mary's): "The time is coming when we must be Christians indeed, if we are to be at all; for conventional Christianity is beginning to pass away," was simply this,—that all ecclesiastical authority might be rejected by every member of his Church. He affirmed this, when he added: "I think therefore we had better put aside this vexed question of miracles, as not belonging to our time, and also as tending to raise an irreconcilable quarrel between revelation and science;" and he further affirmed it by speaking of God, less as a person than as an abstraction; resting content with the exquisite beauty of the divine idea; precisely in the same way as the Buddhist or the Parsee might speak of the beauty of holiness. This is the rankest degree of free thought which is even possible for a "Master," who professes to be also an Anglican clergyman. Yet it is as common among the clergy as among the laity. It is rampant among the Oxford undergraduates. Huber, who tells us that our English Universities were "a bequest from Catholic to Protestant England," and who adds that "later times cannot produce a concentration of men, eminent in all the learning and science of the age, such as Oxford and Cambridge poured forth in the ninth century, mightily influencing the intellectual development of all Western Christendom," would probably have thought that modern masters of Balliol were hardly worthy of their Catholic

predecessors. But the "conventional Christianity," which Dr. Jowett disesteemed, but which was the only Christianity he understood, has not only passed away from Oxford life, but has been replaced by a cold, heartless skepticism. The Oxford Commissioners told us several years ago that the tendency of Oxford philosophy was skepticism; and that happy was he who, after three years of residence, could still believe in the divinity of Christ. This is indeed inevitable, when the Oxford heads of houses may preach that "the question of miracles should be put aside," that God is a beautiful idea, and that the only way to make sure of being a Christian is to judge all Christian doctrines for oneself.

It is not easy to find anything to admire in the intellectual or moral aspects of free thought. Perhaps its least inviting phase is its love of ignorance. When Goethe said, "I know not myself, and God forbid I should," he probably meant that he did not wish to know the littleness of even the highest intellectual achievements. But the formula in which most freethinkers would express their sentiments would be: "I know little of myself; and as to God, I am content to know less." Free thought is not the product of the passionate longing to know God, but the desire to remain in tranquil ignorance of Him. It is a combination of indifference and pride. If a man is a Catholic he must conform to certain duties; he must obey both with his mind and with his body; he must submit his mental and moral being to a certain discipline of habit, which habit is just a little above nature. But if he is a freethinker he may sit in his armchair, never go to early Mass, or to confession, never bridle his interior thought or interior yearning, but may live like a gentlemanly heathen. And it is obviously affectation to affirm that such free thought is either aspiring or sincere. As was said just above, free thought is simply laziness; it is not intellectual, it is slothful. For even when it takes the Rationalist form, such form is the gratification of vanity; it is not the hard work of the subjection of the will, the hard work of the contemplative or the ascetic; nor is it the hard work of the true Christian philosopher, who aims at synthesis of every branch of true knowledge; it is the indulgence of the caprices of the intellect, without the faintest moral object, nor any charitable one. No good was ever done by the writings of a freethinker, no heart was ever rendered less unhappy, no sorrow was ever solaced, no character uplifted, no immortal aspiration implanted. Grovelling, burrowing, undermining, and wrecking are the unlovely aspirations of the freethinker. He has no care if, in the presence of young persons, he says things which may shatter Christian hope, and sow the seeds of a life's loosening or misgiving. He has no care if, to show off his superior knowledge,—about some fragment

of material lore,—he writes a book which half-educated young men will adopt as their apology for heathenism. He is brutally unthinking, inhumanly selfish, without instinct of love or compassion. Slothfulness in the moral nature, and vanity in the intellectual, with cruelty towards the whole world save his own sect, are the unlovable characteristics of his vocation. Individually there are amiable freethinkers ; but collectively they are the enemies of mankind.

They are also the enemies of their own happiness. It is totally impossible for any man to be happy whose mind is disjointed or out of harmony. And it must be said that want of harmony is the most conspicuous of the defects of every man who professes to be a freethinker. Such men see only bits of creation, *disjecta membra* of the unities of the universe, isolated purposes and judgments ; they do not consider the whole, nor even a half. It is perfectly true that the Catholic Christian alone can enjoy the appreciation of perfect harmony ; because he alone knows the fitness of the supernatural to the wants of the natural life. Catholicism is the sublime fulness of reparation for all the injuries wrought by sin on the natural order. Yet freethinkers are to blame for not studying the Catholic philosophy so as to master its intellectual harmony. They will persist in judging the things that are of God by their own meagre standard of human evidence. Take one example—that of recent magazine articles, written to cast doubt on the Resurrection. The writers speak of the evidence as insufficient ; wholly ignoring the perfect harmony of its spirit with the spirit of the whole Gospel teaching. They complain that the supernatural is not natural, and that Divine faith is not made easy as human credence. In short, they ignore the harmonies of the supernatural. In the same way the freethinkers write on what they call the Petrine claims ; and muddle together the accidents of purely natural disorder with the divine unity of institution and story. This comes from want of appreciation of harmony, from a natural preference for fragments to unities ; whereas, the Catholic, knowing the harmony of the Christian philosophy, can put the fragments of human disorder into their proper place. In private life it is not easy for a Catholic to make answer to the objections of the free talker, because the Catholic has to explain that there are three laws,—or rather three lines of different effects of different causes,—those of nature, of sin, and of grace ; and that these three run concurrently yet transversely, and are to be harmonized solely by Catholic philosophy. It is the fragmentary state of mind of the freethinker which it is so difficult to argue with or to influence ; not the philosophy which is built on the whole, but the philosophy which is built on little bits. Yet the freethinkers always argue as if they

alone knew all science ; as if St. Augustine and St. Thomas, St. Ambrose and St. Bernard, and all the hosts of canonized intellects and wills had been infants and sucklings in reach of thought, and without knowledge of what the freethinkers can suggest to them. This is an assumption quite as baseless as it is vain. What is called modern thought has not supplied a single novelty to the well-worn armory of the revolt of the conscience; it has only acquired greater boldness by the license of a free press, and by being permitted to publish blasphemy—without the pillory.

The most recent of the examples of this boldness in England is the election of the atheist, Mr. Bradlaugh, to a seat in the British House of Commons. "The Free Thought Publication Company" has published a pamphlet by Mr. Bradlaugh, of which the title is *A Plea for the Atheist*; and yet this gentleman is invited to be a counsellor of the Queen, who reigns "by the Grace of God," who is "Defender of the Faith," and who took an oath at her coronation to maintain religion. The necessary sequence of this election, if the principle were worked out, would be that every member of both Houses, as well as the reigning Sovereign, might be now, and evermore, professed atheists. And since the extreme of unbelief would be pronounced to be "constitutional," so would be the extreme of any belief. There could not be invidious distinctions. So that we might look to see, in the House of Commons, an altar reared to Venus, or to Minerva, or to the genial Bacchus, as a substitute for the "afternoon prayers," which hitherto a Christian chaplain has read. This would be the proper development of free thought. But the English, it may be replied, are only "generous" in their free thought; they only permit the same liberty which they claim; they are not, as a people, inclined to wickedness, but only magnificently liberal or concessive. And this is undoubtedly true. Yet, a few weeks ago, the most dangerous of all the freethinkers who have ever been begotten of modern license, Monsieur Ernest Renan of French celebrity, was invited to give lectures in London, and gave them to "crowded and appreciative audiences." This writer and lecturer is perhaps the most offensive of all the modern assailants of Christianity, for the very reason that he applauds Christianity, and patronizes its spirit and good points. He is much given to such adjectives as "charmant," "delicieux," "ravissant," "exquis," "enivrant;" and speaks of our Blessed Lord with the kindest admiration, being quite sorry that His disciples misunderstood Him. His arguments against the Resurrection give a clue to his tone of mind (or to what is certainly his very conspicuously "free" thought); for he assumes what he wishes to believe, and dismisses what is unfavorable to his preconception. The Resurrection was not true, because M. Renan dislikes it, and, there-

fore, the disciples must have been deceived. "But love and enthusiasm," says M. Renan, "know no such thing as situations without an issue. They laugh at the impossible, and rather than abandon hope will do violence to reality." *Ergo*, there was no Resurrection. Q.E.D. The *Riforme Intellectuelle et Morale*, though intentionally political sketches, might certainly have included some suggestions for reform in M. Renan's and in his disciples' freedom of thought. Yet this kind of licentiousness is not unwelcome to many Englishmen, who like liberty provided it is decorous. And M. Renan is exquisitely decorous. He is, too, so imaginative and poetical. His cloudy Utopias, his elegant language, his emotional and sentimental religiosity are exactly what suit that very large class of Englishmen who are quite ready to feel but not to believe. M. Renan's lectures in London were much admired. "We cannot quite agree with him," was the normal newspaper criticism, "but there can be no doubt that he has a scholarly mind." So the impiety must be condoned by its pretty dressing. And, after all, M. Renan only goes just one step further than some of the most distinguished Anglican preachers. It would puzzle any one, for example, to draw the exact distinction between M. Renan and the Dean of Westminster. This last dignitary has recently published a work, of which the object is to show that the "variations of Catholicism" have at least equalled the variations of Protestantism; and that it is all the better that they should have done so, since, as the *Saturday Review* expresses it, in language of which the satire is well merited: "How great a blessing it is to the world that Christianity should be split up into some hundreds of conflicting sects, and that all of them—the Roman Communion included, if she could only recognize her true blessedness—are habitually inconsistent, not only with each other, but with themselves." The Dean of Westminster, notwithstanding what the *Saturday Review* calls his "ineradicable confusion of thought," is much admired, like M. Renan, for his "scholarliness;" yet between the two perhaps the most marked of all distinctions is that the one is a clergyman, the other is not.

It seems invidious to call any Protestant a freethinker, since Protestantism is essentially free thought—up to the point of rejection of Church authority. Take two very different types, the poetical Mr. Matthew Arnold, and the controversial High Churchman, Dr. Littledale. Between Mr. Arnold and M. Renan there is doubtless a wide gulf, though we would rather not have to measure its exact compass. Mr. Arnold's great objection to theology is that "there is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve." The only hope for the Christian is "poetry;" "for poetry the idea is everything; the

rest is a world of illusion, of divine illusion. Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea *is* the fact. The strongest part of our religion to-day is its unconscious poetry." This makes free thought very pretty; for we can think in stanzas about our possible salvation. Belief is emotion, and piety is sentiment, and sin is bad verses and false quantities. Dr. Littledale, on the other hand, is a stern, unflinching critic, who smashes authority to pieces—while believing (theoretically) that there is authority; and shows that there cannot possibly be dogma—though his Church (theoretically) teaches it. Both these gentlemen are heroes of free thought; quite as much as is M. Hyacinthe Loyson, Rector of the Gallican Church, Paris; or Dr. Riley, Old Catholic Bishop of Mexico; or Dr. Plunket, Bishop of the Irish Episcopalian Church; which three gentlemen have just been conducting an Old Catholic Synod at Geneva, with the sole object of increasing schism and heresy. What is, or what is not, free thought, in this enlightened and very progressive age is a question which no non-Catholic could answer. It seems impossible to give any other reply than that it is disloyalty to the authority of the Church.

And this estimate seems to be justified by the "loyalty" of all freethinkers to *some* authority, *some* substitute for principle—provided that the divine Church be ignored. Socialism, Nihilism, Communism, Collectivism—from the hideous extremes of the Carbonari to the gentle (first) intentions of the International—were all founded on some theory of union, and all worked on some promise of allegiance. The young Russian who took an oath to kill the Czar was loyal to his sect and to its headquarters. So that the Catholicism of revolt (for, as Father Faber has expressed it, "The devil has his Catholic Church") has certain principles in common with divine Catholicism, though it uses those principles to oppose the Church. Freethinkers believe both in union and in authority, provided only that Christian dogma be left out. They believe even in what they call natural laws. Nay, they go so far even as to admit that such laws *may be* divine; while they assert of all the laws as to religion, that they are not and cannot be divine. Let us take an illustration of our meaning. Freethinkers may agree with Father Secchi, that the billows of the sea of flame which surround the sun, to a depth of at least five thousand miles, rise to many thousand miles in height; and that the waves in that sea of fire rush continuously with a swiftness of about a hundred and sixty miles per second; and they would even be disposed to allow that such natural phenomena *may be* controlled by a divine will; but they scoff at Father Secchi when he tells them that the spiritual laws, which are to regulate man's conduct on earth, are quite as exquisite, quite as terrible, as are any natural laws. In short, free-

thinkers will let God have His way in the natural order, but will not hear of His interfering with created reason. God may be possibly recognized in such an endowment as, say, natural foresight, which bids us not to run our head against a brick wall, but He must be ousted from every attempt at interference with our right to live as heathens, if we prefer it. And because this estimate of the creature's freedom is found convenient,—suited the “sloth,” to which we have attributed free thought,—therefore the freethinker assumes it for a postulate: “There is not a divine teacher on earth.” Just as Monsieur Renan argues against the Resurrection, on the ground that the pious disciples naturally wished it, so the freethinkers argue against divine authority, on the ground that they naturally do *not* wish it. Divine authority would interfere with free thought, therefore divine authority must be a myth. “I think it better,” said an English gentleman, a few days ago, to the present writer, “to let my children grow up without any religion, and then, when they are old enough to judge for themselves, they can adopt any religion they like best.” This paternal liberality takes it for granted, first, that there is not a divine religion; secondly, that, if there were one, it would be as easy to “adopt” it after twenty years of animal indifference as after twenty years of earnestness of life; thirdly, that a father owes no duty to his son in the way of directing his aspirations. It moreover reverses the dictum of St. Augustine, that “faith is a condition of knowledge,” and affirms that knowledge is the one condition of faith. It proposes to feed the intellect, the heart, the intuition, during the seedtime of impressionable youth, with what Charles Lamb called “the innutritive phantoms of unbelief,” and then, when long habits have bred paganism, to say, “*now* you are quite fit to find out God.” It ignores the whole moral side of the intelligence by which mainly the intelligence receives truth. “There seems to be no reason,” wrote Butler, in his *Analogy*, “why we may not be in a state of moral probation with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior in common affairs.” But freethinking ignores moral probation. It prefers to let the intelligence develop itself, “subject,” as Kant expressed it, “to inevitable delusion;” and then, when the intelligence has become defiled, to say to it, “Truth is now reflected in your pure mirror.”

Indeed, the most cruel part of freethinking is its slaughter of the innocents, its downright brutal disregard of youthful souls. Whereas the Catholic Church takes a child from its cradle and pursues it with winning love to its deathbed; freethinking cares nothing if the very earliest blossom be nipped by its unnatural philosophy. And when just at the age in which vanity or passion,

indolence or misdirected zeal, play most easily on the impressionable heart, freethinking bids the young to postpone all religion as being too "scientific" for mere tyros. It fills youthful heads with the idle babble about agnosticism, and with the big words of so-called modern science, and never tells them that, as Pascal said, "it is grace and not reason which enables the intellect to find truth." It dismisses the study of the synthesis of the divine laws,—of what Kepler called the *harmonia mundi*,—and chatters before young people about "osmosis" and "protoplasms," as if these were the foundations of eternal knowledge. Mistaking scientific "assumptions," as Owen and Faraday have pointed out, for the truths which immense experience can only demonstrate, it will not let children learn wisdom from the Catholic Church,—which, as all the greatest historians have borne witness, "saved letters and learning from the barbarian, founded universities in all lands, and made her cloisters the sanctuaries both of divine and human philosophy,"—but prefers to let them pick up garbage on the roadside of worldly life, from battling sects, from injurious books, from secular newspapers. In England the publication of skeptical literature has reached a point which could with difficulty be surpassed; and it would be far better if immoral literature were permitted to be disseminated, than the literature which "poisons the wells." Destroy faith, destroy reverence for holy things, destroy the sentiment of religion in any young heart, and you have cut away the roots from which, in after days, a fresh spring of saving religion might have sprung up. The horrible purpose of the freethinkers is to tear religion out by the roots, so that young persons cannot possibly recover themselves; but, having lost their first love, must be compelled to fall back on some purely Rationalistic invention. This is what we see now in England. Not only young men, but young women, chatter free thought; and, while knowing absolutely nothing of Christian philosophy, pretend to assail it with ripe wisdom.

OUR GREAT GODDESS AND HER COMING IDOL.

De Dea Libertate, Ejusque Cultu apud Romanos et de Libertinorum Pileo, Dissertatio Rodulphini Venuti. Romæ, MDCCLXII.

THE government of the United States has assigned one of the islands in the waters of New York Bay, over which it has exclusive jurisdiction, for the erection there of an idol of a heathen goddess. The idol is the work of a French sculptor, and ere long the idol of the goddess "Liberty enlightening the world" will be set up on Bedloe's Island, doubtless as was Nabuchodonosor's great statue of old, with sound of harp and sackbut and psaltery, and woe will betide the man who does not at the sound fall down and worship. The Masonic bodies will doubtless,—representing the craft which is to be the coming religion, and by reviving ancient paganism supersede Christianity,—be the chief pontiffs of the rite, as at Truro Cathedral and the inauguration of the New York obelisk.

Some antiquated person with mediæval ideas may choose to believe in One who proclaimed His doctrine eighteen centuries ago in Palestine, and look up to Him as "the true light that enlighteneth the world," and believe that men can be really free only "with the freedom wherewith He hath made us free," but as their voices are not likely to be heard amid the general joy, and the shouting, and the music, we may in advance enter our protest.

This is not the only mark of the honor which we as a nation pay to this goddess. She has been for more than a century the tutelary deity of the United States, and the honor paid her has been open and undisguised. Her emblems are familiar to all, and though a slight rod has become a pole that calls for one of the Titans of the forest, and we have replaced her ancient cap by that of a French convict of the last century, we have preserved enough of the original type to make the meaning beyond doubt.

When Christ, after bidding His enemies show him the coin of the tribute, asked: "Whose is this image and superscription?" the haughty Pharisees could answer without a blush of shame, "Cæsar's." The coin bore the head of the Roman emperor and his title. But though we profess to be a Christian people and boast of our enlightenment, the same question coming from those lips as to the coins of our country would embarrass us sadly. We should be compelled to hang our heads and remain silent, or to admit with shame and humiliation that our coins bore the head, or the image, and the name of an obscure goddess worshipped in pagan Rome at the very time the question as to the tribute was put to Him.

It is a very curious fact that we thus bear constantly the badges

of paganism, and keep alive one at least of the deities of old Rome. Nor is this confined to our coins. A hundred years ago the acknowledged symbols of the goddess Liberty, her rod or pole and cap, were set up throughout the land as a rallying-point for all who favored American freedom. They became identified with the rights we claimed, and were objects of hatred to the English forces and to all who sided with the mother country during the revolutionary struggle. Our flag floated out to the breeze of heaven beneath the cap that crowned these liberty poles in every city and town. These tributes to the goddess Liberty were maintained throughout the country for nearly a century, but have now gradually and insensibly vanished; few remain, the liberty pole and cap live only in recollection, and as they are preserved on some of our coins.

Even the revived patriotic feeling of the Centennial year did not show itself in erecting liberty poles though but in miniature; the demand of the telegraph company for gigantic poles and the growing scarcity have perhaps contributed to the result.

But the goddess holds her place on our coins. When the government was finally organized under the Constitution of 1787, and the matter of a coinage was seriously taken up, the first proposition was to place on our money as issued by the mint the head of the President of the United States for the time being. This would have made our coins keep alive the history of the succeeding administrations, but it looked like an imitation of royal precedents, and at once excited alarm. Congress refused to place the head of the President on the coins of the republic. Then, without exciting any scruple, the heathen goddess Liberty received the honor and she has maintained it to this day, although we sometimes attempt to conceal her heathenism under a feathered coronet, that makes her resemble rather an ideal Indian queen than a classic deity.

At this time, when many good people are very earnest about putting God into the Constitution, the position of this goddess is worth examining, when we remember how the Scripture classes all the gods of the gentiles. Who and what was this goddess? Now, though most points of our history have been elucidated with pen and pencil by the diligence of antiquarians, and our flag has had its history written, no one tells anything of this goddess. Even numismatists, though they catalogue and describe our coins and thus come face to face with the deity, tell us nothing of the goddess Liberty, and leave us in the deepest ignorance as to her, and as to the meaning of her symbols with which we are so familiar.

Liberty was not one of the greater deities of ancient Rome. She plays so little and inconsiderable a part in Roman history that scholars can quote from the classics scarcely a line that does her reverence. It is, therefore, a strange revolution that a deity of little account on the Tiber should have been taken up far beyond

the western foaming ocean, and raised to a mythological rank far above your "Junos, Joves, Apollos."

She was essentially a Roman goddess, for though the Greeks recognized a goddess Eleutheria, she was even more shadowy and obscure than the Libertas honored in Italy. As the bestower of freedom Greece bent her knee in reverence to Zeus Eleutherios, whose stately portico at Athens is commemorated in the writings of Plato. This god and goddess of freedom had their solemnities called Eleutheria, celebrated with great pomp and rejoicing, not only in Greece, but in those lovely lands of Southern Italy and Sicily to which Greece imparted her language, her arts, and her institutions.

Rome worshipped the goddess Libertas, and in the genealogical history of their deities she enjoys the somewhat rare privilege of being recorded as the daughter of Jupiter and Juno, and she can, therefore, not be logically honored without recognizing the great deity of Olympus. Libertas had several temples, but they were not of the greatest and most elaborate. Her honor seems to have arisen or at least developed after the expulsion of the Tarquins. She was honored especially by the Junia family, to which Brutus belonged, and her head became the ensign of that house. Though no remarkable statue or bust of Libertas has been preserved among the relics of ancient art, the Junii must certainly have had them in their shrines as the goddess of their race. When they began to strike their coins her head graced them, while the reverse showed the guilty sons led to execution by the lictors, doomed to die by the sentence of a stern father, who preferred liberty and country to the ties of blood.

The worship of Liberty and the attributes which distinguish her from the host of other goddesses all have reference to this famous episode in Roman history. It may be fabulous, but it was certainly a story believed and admired in Rome, and interwoven in the history and ideas of the people.

When the house of Tarquin by acts of tyranny and oppression had exasperated the minds of the people to the highest point, Sextus Tarquin filled up the cup of his family's enormities by the outrage he committed on the pure and beautiful Lucretia. Death freed her from a life that had become a burden, and Rome rose in an instant. Not only was the unworthy king expelled with all his house, but royalty was abolished, and the government was committed to two consuls who were to be elected annually. Brutus was one of the consuls to whom Rome confided her destinies, having, with the wronged husband, been the great popular leader in the revolution.

But there were some who regretted the pomp and the license of the tyrannical court. Young nobles chafed under the stern virtues

and staid simplicity of the new rule. A conspiracy was formed to restore the family of Tarquin, and set up the royal throne once more in Rome. Even the sons of Brutus, allied by blood to the deposed royal family, entered the conspiracy aimed at their father's life and their country's good.

The plot was detected by Vindex or Vindicius, a slave of the Vitellii, and on his denouncing it to the Roman Senate that grave body granted him his freedom and all the rights of Roman citizenship. The conspirators were arrested, and the sons of Brutus were arraigned before their own father. The guilt was proved, and the inflexible patriot condemned to an ignominious death the erring sons who had been his hope and pride.

Such is the legend of early Rome that the Junius family commemorated, holding up as a model the judge who could be deaf to all ties of blood, though overwhelmed with sorrow he soon sought death on the battlefields of his country.

With the establishment of the republic the worship of the goddess Liberty began, and, in honor of the part played by Vindex, the manumission of slaves was the ceremony placed under her special care. The worship paid her was not one of the whole people on appointed days; no processions like the Greek Eleutheria seem to have moved through the streets of Rome; nor did the Forum echo to the eloquent tributes to civil liberty poured forth in the ceremonies in her honor. Her worship was obscure and limited.

Temples were indeed raised to the goddess Liberty. There once apparently stood a fane of this kind on the Palatine Hill; but so little regard was paid to the goddess we honor so grandly that in time it crumbled to ruin, and the site in later ages was occupied by the house for which Cicero pleaded with such convincing eloquence, and where Clodius, his bitter enemy, had obtained a decree that a new temple should be erected to that goddess; but it was, as Cicero declared, a temple rather of license than of liberty, and apparently a building of no merit. But the best-known temple of Liberty stood on another of Rome's seven hills. Upon the Aventine, where a double summit rose amid primeval groves of laurel,—a commanding position that looked majestically down on the almost deified Tiber, which washed its northern base, and on the valley of the Circus Maximus,—stood the most famous temple of our goddess. Nothing has survived to modern times to show its extent or its form. We know, however, that it was erected by Tiberius Sempronius, the father of Tiberius Gracchus, with money proceeding from fines. His celebrated son continued the work by having the finest artists of the day paint upon its walls a battle scene representing Hanno's Carthaginian army defeated at Beneventum. The temple must have been a noble one; and we know that it was adorned with columns and statues of bronze, and had a grand por-

tico and an atrium or court frequently mentioned by ancient writers. Some modern antiquarians suppose it to be marked by ruins not far from the well-known tomb of Caius Cestius, and others place the atrium of Libertas near the Forum. As it yielded to the influence of time and civil commotions, this temple was from time to time restored, most nobly of all by Ælius Pætus and Cornelius Cethegus, the censors. When Roman liberty was tottering the external honor to the goddess was maintained; and we find that after Cæsar defeated Pompey, the Senate declared Cæsar the liberator of his country, and ordered a temple to be erected to Liberty; but to all appearance this order was like those for erecting monuments to our revolutionary worthies,—an enactment that remained a dead letter.

Yet even after Augustus had made himself master of the Roman world, great respect was professedly paid to the goddess. At the suggestion of Augustus himself Asinius Pollio restored the temple on Mount Aventine, which had been destroyed by fire, and set up in or near it a free public library, adorning the hall with bronze busts and statues of famous writers. It was the first attempt of the kind to diffuse and popularize learning. But if books were preserved here, it is also recorded that soldiers were always on guard there. How the goddess Liberty was represented in this her greatest Roman shrine we do not know. Her statue has not survived, and does not seem to have been copied like many others that have come down perpetuated in marble and in metal. She is said to have been attired as a Roman matron, holding in one hand a broken sceptre, and in the other a pole surmounted with the pileus or cap. A cat, the symbol of watchfulness, crouched at her feet. But her representations on the coins that have reached us do not agree with this account. And the numerous types of Libertas on Roman coins must be taken as the best evidence. The goddess was honored not so much as the patroness and protector of civil liberty as she was under the aspect of the deliverer of the slave from bondage. All her attributes, the pole and cap, refer to the manumission of slaves. One form of emancipation took place at the office of the censors by the Temple of Liberty, and this shrine was under their especial care; but the more common form of emancipation was this: The master took his slave whom he designed to free before the consul, prætor, or proconsul, and while he held his bondman by the head or some part of his body, the lictor, or in earlier times the master himself, said: "I wish (or I declare) thee free after the manner of the Quirites" (Romans). Then the prætor laid on his head the rod called vindicta, in honor of Vindex, the slave who informed the Senate of the conspiracy of young Brutus and the other nobles to restore the Tarquins to the throne in Rome. Laying the vindicta on his head the prætor pronounced: "I say that he is free according to the custom of the Romans," and

handed the rod to the lictor, who struck the freedman on the head, face, and back with his open palm, making him turn around before him. The act was then recorded, and the freedman, after receiving a white robe from his late master, cut his hair and assumed the felt or woven cap of white wool, shaped like an old-fashioned beehive. The form of this pileus or cap is shown on coins and gems, and does not vary. It appears between two swords on a fine gem bearing the head of Brutus, and on the reverse of a coin bearing the head of Liberty, in some cases with the words *EID. MART.*, showing the allusion to be to the assassination of Julius Cæsar on the Ides of March, the swords being those of Brutus and Cassius. The liberty pole and cap were therefore the symbols of the liberation of a slave, not of civil liberty.

Under the republic, while Rome was free, the head of *Libertas* appeared on the coins of the Junia and Lollia families. The head on these family coins is beautiful in conception and execution, and has no symbol, the legend alone tells us who she is. *Libertas* had her worship, her priests, and her sacrifices on the Aventine, but the symbols were not made typical of Roman freedom. In Sylla's time, however, and in other civil wars and outbreaks, when any revolutionist wished to rally the slaves to his side he set up a pole with the pileus, and this was called summoning the slaves to the cap. This liberty pole was a promise of emancipation to all who joined the movement; and the first use of the liberty pole was thus against Roman liberty rather than for it.

Under the emperors *Libertas* frequently appears on coins, and it is somewhat strange that, as if in mockery, we find it on the money struck by those whose tyranny left the degenerate Romans scarce a shadow of the liberty their ancestors had so long enjoyed. Think of a Nero, an Elagabalus, a Vitellius, a Claudius, a Caracalla sending from their mint coins bearing their head on the obverse, and *Libertas* with all her symbols distinctively displayed on the reverse. It was indeed a reverse. During the whole imperial period the simple head of *Libertas* appears only once on a coin, and that was during the interregnum after the death of Nero, and before Galba grasped the reins of power. Then the Senate struck a piece with the head of Liberty, resembling the beautiful one used on the coins of the Junia family, and the words: "*Libertas restituta*,"—Liberty restored.

The manner of representing the goddess at full length varies. On one coin of Elagabalus, bearing his star, of which there is an engraving in Venuti, she is perfectly naked, holding a scarf in the right hand, which floats behind and crosses in front at the knees. The legend "*Libertas Augusti*," however, leaves no doubt as to the intention of the artist, who omits the usual attributes of the goddess altogether.

On most coins *Libertas* is robed as a Roman matron, and holds the hive-shaped cap either upright, as on the coin of Claudius, or dependent, as on another of that emperor, and on coins of Geta.

The form of the cap never varies, whether it appears alone or upheld.

The rod is sometimes short and held in the hand, but on coins of Vitellius and Antoninus Pius is long and rests on the ground.

On a coin of Hadrian, which bears the legend, "*Lib. Pub.*,"—Public Liberty,—the goddess meets our view as a noble Roman matron seated on a chair, holding an olive branch with three twigs in her right hand, her left grasping the usual symbol, the *vindicta*, which is here an upright rod, apparently forming a back to the chair. No cap appears, and but for the legend she might be taken for Peace. But while on this coin she is depicted without the cap, on another of Elagabalus she is without the rod. There the matron stands holding the cap in her right hand, but in the left a cornucopia, as if to intimate that abundance was one of the fruits of liberty. All our research among writers on Roman coins, and examination of pieces themselves, after years of collecting, have failed to detect a single coin on which the cap is placed on the rod, or on which the cat, said by some to be a symbol of the goddess, is introduced. From the time of Constantine the goddess *Libertas* disappeared from the coins of Rome. Her temple in the Eternal City crumbled to the dust, her altar was broken down, her priests vanished, and for ages she was forgotten with the other deities of pagan Rome.

The revival of her honor seems to be due to Holland, though a fine medal is said to have been struck in Florence after the assassination of the tyrannical Alexander de Medici, when the figure and emblems of Liberty were again used. The struggle of the United Provinces against Spain, and the fact of their assuming a republican form of government, led them to look for classic types, and Liberty appears on coins and medals.

France, under the reign of one of the last and weakest of the house of Valois, is said to have used the same types, and Liberty was honored on coins and medals when least respected in reality.

But the name had little charm in days when monarchs exalted arbitrary power and despised the rights of the people. James II. did indeed on the seals for New York use as a motto the line from a Latin poet:

"Nunquam Libertas gratior extat
Quam sub rege pio,"

so that the first introduction of the goddess to America is due to that last king of the Stuart line; but the seal bears no figure of the goddess herself.

Our struggle with England brought the goddess Liberty and her emblems into prominence. As early as 1766, on the reception of the news of the repeal of the Stamp Act, a mast was erected in the Park opposite Warren Street, New York, inscribed: "To his most gracious majesty George the Third, Mr. Pitt, and Liberty." This emblem of the goddess was soon known as the Liberty Pole, and became odious to the British garrison in the city, who finally cut it down in August. A new liberty pole was reared, but met the same fate. The struggle began in the streets of New York around the symbols of the deity honored on Mount Aventine, and the people triumphed; the liberty pole was planted permanently, and remained till the British troops occupied the city in 1776.

In that year the Roman deity received new honor. Paul Revere, of Boston, fond of classic allusions, struck a coin, which, like the Roman *as*, bore on one side the head of Janus and on the other Liberty seated on the globe holding her rod in one hand, and it is said the scales in the other. A cat appears at her feet. Around are the words, "Goddess Liberty," and the date, 1776. This was not forgotten, and in 1783, and subsequent years, she appears on the *Immunis* (or *Immune*) *Columbia*, the *Connecticut* and *New York* pieces, generally seated, holding her rod and cap in one hand and in the other a branch or the scales of justice; though on the *Talbot*, *Allum*, and *Lee* piece she stands erect, holding the rod and cap, or liberty pole. She appears also standing on the *New York arms* on the *Excelsior* piece. On a *Washington* piece of 1783 she appears seated on a rock, holding the liberty pole and a branch, with simply the words: "United States."

A beautiful French medal, struck to commemorate the victory at Yorktown, had a bust to represent the Goddess Liberty, the hair streaming in the wind, the rod appearing behind the head, above and below, and surmounted by a small cap nearly of the ancient type, with the inscription "*Libertas Americana*." The head was imitated on a token in 1792, and on the first pattern pieces of our mint, after the adoption of the Constitution. The head with the flying hair was adopted on the cent of 1793 without emblems, and also with the rod and cap, the latter much larger than on the French medal, and departing still more from the ancient model, assuming the form since common on our liberty poles. After 1798 the cap and rod disappear, but from 1808 to 1814 the goddess wears the cap. The half cents show the liberty pole till 1797. On the silver coinage Liberty at first had no emblem, but for many years wore the cap. The gold coinage, began in 1795, had the head of the goddess wearing the conical cap, exchanged early in this century for the lower form, and finally giving place to a fillet with the word "Liberty." The more recent three-dollar piece has an Indian head with a feather crown.

In 1840 the whole type of the silver coins was changed. The head and bust gave place to the figure of the Goddess Liberty seated, holding the liberty pole (rod and cap) with averted face, the other hand and long bare arm resting on the shield inscribed "Liberty." Like our earlier State pieces, the figure seems an adaptation from the seated Britannia on English coins. But it lacks dignity, vigor or meaning. It has a languid, indolent air that is utterly inconsistent with the idea of liberty. The goddess should be erect, alert, vigilant, or, if seated, enthroned majestically. Our Spanish-American neighbors do better. Peru represents her erect; while Mexico shows the cap, and Buenos Ayres the liberty pole upheld by two hands.

The French at their revolution, though reviving enthusiastically the classic names, ideas, and types, made the *bonnet rouge* the emblem of liberty. This was not the old Roman pileus or cap, which Vindex received at his emancipation. It had a far less noble origin. It is the cap worn by French convicts in the last century.

In one of the outbreaks of the early movements of the French Revolution a number of the rioters were arrested, tried, and sent to prison. The tumult increased and the men became popular martyrs. Their release was demanded and was finally granted.

When these men were set at liberty, to appease the popular clamor they came out wearing the red prison cap, and in this guise were led in triumph through the streets. From this time that part of a convict's attire became the symbol of liberty in France. The goddess *Libertas* was not restored to worship there, nor the new symbol given to her. French coins have never borne the head of Liberty, but that of France. It was left to us to give this honor to a heathen goddess, and to place on her rod the cap of a French convict, no more appropriate than the striped clothing would be. On our earlier cents the rod or pole was so faint that it soon wore off, leaving the coin in a queer state, Liberty apparently allowing the cap to fall off her head as though in a state of intoxication. Then the French convict's cap was placed full on the head of the Roman goddess, making a strange combination of ideas, and associating us with the worship of a heathen deity and with the orgies of the French Revolution.

Then the cap was discarded, and, as we have said, after a time the goddess, growing weary, sat down, and holds the pole with the *bonnet rouge*, on which she is evidently ashamed to look. On some of our coins we have simply the head of the goddess; on the trade dollar we follow Hadrian and give her the olive branch, but seat her on a bale of goods. In some form we retain the goddess as the tutelary deity of the nation.

But why should we retain the heathen deity at all?

Our coins in representing the goddess *Libertas* are far removed

from the ancient type. The dainty figure, bare-armed and in no matron's dress, averting her face from the very symbols she holds, while one hand rests feebly on the lowered shield that bears her name, is but a mockery of what Liberty should be, pure, dignified, erect. Well does Bryant indignantly exclaim :

“ Oh, Freedom ! thou art not, as poets dream,
 A fair young girl, with light and delicate limbs,
 And wavy tresses gushing from the cap
 With which the Roman master crowned his slave
 When he took off the gyves. A bearded man,
 Armed to the teeth art thou ; one mailed hand
 Grasps the broad shield, and one the sword ; thy brow,
 Glorious in beauty though it be, is scarred
 With tokens of old wars ; thy massive limbs
 Are strong with struggling. Power at thee has launched
 His bolts, and with his lightnings smitten thee ;
 They could not quench the life thou hast from heaven.
 Oh ! not yet
 Mayst thou embrace thy corselet, nor lay by
 Thy sword ; nor yet, O Freedom, close thy lids
 In slumber ; for thine enemy never sleeps.”

We might hope that some action would be taken to rid our national coinage of this official heathenism. If we are a Christian nation why should our coins bear so anti-Christian a character, and our sin has found imitators in the Spanish republics of our continent? Not indeed that they are servile imitators, for they arm *Libertas* like *Minerva*, and artistically make her as an emblem much nobler than the lackadaisical figure which our mint of late years has given us.

But the goddess apparently is entering on a new phase. Just when every old heathen idea is coming forth again, when paganism, under the form of ethical culture, agnosticism, etc., with its votaries reviving cremation and heathen rites, and going to India to seek in Hindoo paganism something to attract American craving for novelty, just at this time a French sculptor, Bartholdi, devotes himself to elaborate from the reflection of God's beauty in his soul a new and beauteous form of the old goddess, and to portray her as the source of human light and knowledge. She may not wear the convict's cap,—that would be a parody indeed, to make a course of crime the training from which we are to look for intelligence and light ; but when our government enters into the sculptor's project and assigns a portion of the national domain for the erection of the colossal statue on which Bartholdi has devoted his genius and his skill, it accepts the idea and rejects Christ. There seems no hope of a speedy deliverance from this state worship of *Libertas*. She is to remain on our coins, and the gigantic bronze figure will soon tower on

the little island in the beautiful bay of New York, massive and grand, beautiful in outline and in pose, holding her torch to proclaim that mankind receives true light, not from Christ and Christianity, but from heathenism and its gods.

HOW TO FIND THE TRUTH.

I WOULD like to find the truth." The truth referred to in this brief but pregnant sentence was divine or spiritual truth. We were anxious at the time of its utterance, by a few pointed questions, to sound its full meaning in the view of the speaker, and thus test it, in order to ascertain whether or not it was earnest or real, and if so, in what form and to what extent; but circumstances forbade. It may not be improper now, and in a general way, to try to do what we could not then; and this is the purpose and scope of the present article.

The remark is not limited to him who made it. Thousands are ready to say, if they are not actually uttering the words: "We would like to find the truth of God in such a way as to be certain that we have it—pure, simple, and inerrable—and thus put to rest our troubled minds;" but who, though they imagine they are in full earnest, are nevertheless, in the way of fact, really deceiving their own minds. Not all searching is a true searching, and therefore not all searching is rewarded. There are often—most generally indeed—many obstructing and diverting errors in the way. Some result from early training and false education; some lie in our immediate surroundings, and frequently in our own independent thinking. These, however they have come to exist, and whatever may be their nature, are hindrances to our success, and must be removed. To do this is exceedingly difficult, and often just as tedious. The work of eradicating error is always hard and slow. It is sometimes necessary to retrace the whole of one's past life, and undo all that has been done in the way of an inwrought education.

To such a degree, besides, has the subtle spirit of falsehood penetrated and vitiated our moral nature, and so steadily and strongly are we held by it in the direction of error, that it requires, in addition to divine grace, the most continuous and painful self-probing to give to our own minds even a glimpse of our actual condition in this view. The instinctive tendency is to hide the ugly fact from

our conscience, and first to feign, and then actually believe, that however severe the demand which it might make upon us, we yet have an earnest desire to find the truth. This is all frequently a pure deception. We really desire no such thing. The facts may, however, easily be brought to light, if we are truly sincere. Those who really desire to find the truth in its full, whole, round character,—the truth as God revealed it for the guidance and salvation of men,—will be cheerfully ready to put themselves in such condition as will make this ordinarily possible. This will certainly be so, unless there should be, in fact, though perhaps unconsciously to them, a still stronger motive to do something else, by which this would be prevented.

To search for the truth so that the searching may carry in it the promise of reward, there must, of course, be a proper and sufficient motive; otherwise, there would be nothing to stimulate the search or sustain the effort it requires. This motive must be found primarily in the truth itself. Its own intrinsic excellence must in some way be brought forcibly before us; its divine majesty must be made to rise to our view, and its dread tones of authority must be distinctly heard. The truth being from God, is the bearer of His own moral image, and therefore nothing can be more majestic. It is eternal, and, in its nature, like God, it is unchangeable. Being from God, it leads to God, as the highest end of created existence, without whom it were better that man had never been born. It is the source of all beauty, and is beauty itself in the highest perfection. Harmony, wherever found throughout the whole moral world, results immediately from its presence. It is lovely in itself, and makes all else lovely that is seen actually to be so, and must, in turn, be loved with a corresponding love for its own sake. When in its full and rich nature the truth opens itself to the mind, even through a glass, or dimly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remain entirely indifferent to it. As the moral horizon widens, and grander and clearer disclosures are made, our feeling of interest in it deepens. No grander idea can fill the soul. Man was made for the truth, and he begins to realize that he can be happy only as by some means he is put consciously into it. With this disclosure of its nature and charms our moral nature is aroused and quickened. We really stop on our busy way and admire. A sacred awe steals into and fills our being. Sometimes we stand in mute wonder, literally overwhelmed by the sense of the grand, beautiful, and sublime. What can we compare with it? All else seems to dwindle and disappear, even as the stars go out when the effulgent sun arises. Verily, we exclaim, "The truth is the grandest thing in the universe,—greater than all worlds,—like God himself!"

In this high appreciation the proper search after the truth begins.

But this abstract view, however complete, is not of itself sufficient. To give to our motive the proper nerve, or to infuse into it a proper genius, so to say, we must see that the truth is practically connected with our good. It is difficult to be really earnest with a mere abstraction or speculation. Few men are so in fact. We may stop for a few moments before a beautiful ideal painting, and very warmly admire it, but, passing on, it is very soon forgotten. It is easy to conceive, but hard to express in the way of detail, how the truth is related to our interest. The subject is too extended. That it is so related, and at every point, and vitally, we must all instinctively feel. Nothing can be truly promotive of our well-being that comes from error, or that may itself be a falsehood, and all the real good that we experience must be mediated by the truth. The whole objective kingdom of grace,—what is it? The grand projection of the truth. How may we know, either in whole or in part? Only through the truth. And how may we understand the subjective graces necessary to introduce us into it? Again, only by the truth. Who is Christ? What is the Church? What the nature of the holy sacraments? How shall we know these correctly, either in themselves or in their offices? All by means of the truth. Is this so? Then what can be practically more important for us than the truth? Here the motive to search after it receives its necessary quickening spirit and moral energy. All this must not only be seen theoretically, but also realized practically, which is a much more earnest thing. We must feel that our highest good in this and also in the coming world, is absolutely dependent upon the truth and our relation to it; and that we, through this relation, may be apprehended by it. Not to cultivate this deep sense—the truth of which, theoretically, is so clear, even self-evident—is to fail to furnish the motive to search after the truth with its proper vitality and wisdom, and to that extent it must become unworthy of success.

But the truth, in itself considered, is a certainty,—a fixed, unchanging, and unchangeable certainty. Otherwise it would not be truth. It is not what each may honestly conceive, or otherwise desire it to be, or that which accommodates itself to the varying modes of human thinking, or to the changes produced by time. Can it be found and known in this, its own fixed nature? At this point are exposed some of the false notions which lie in the way of this search after the truth, and prevent its being found. If the truth, as truth, cannot be found or known, then where is the motive to search for it? It cannot exist. To believe that the truth is not findable, and yet to search for it, would be simply to attempt the impossible. No contradiction could be more complete. Just here our Protestant friends find great trouble, and many of them are

sorely perplexed. They profess not only to be specially attached to the truth, to make the greatest account of it, to hold it in the highest estimation—as being, indeed, the thing upon which all else hangs—but also to be first, in the way of zeal, in searching after it; and yet, in the same breath, they say it cannot be certainly known. That they are actuated by a zeal, and a very ardent one, there is indeed, no room to doubt. Further on in this article we shall take pains to point out the motive of this zeal. Whatever the object animating it may be, it certainly cannot be the truth, as such, or the certain finding or possession of it; since the same zeal leads them with equal fervor to declare that the truth cannot be found or certainly known. Is it to be wondered at then that our dissenting friends, if they are searching at all, are ever searching but never finding; ever learning but never coming to a *knowledge* of the truth! Even if they were really to find and possess it, retaining their erroneous idea that it cannot be found, they would not believe it; for they could not persuade themselves that they had accomplished that which, according to their belief, is impossible. They would hold it, if they would hold it at all, as an uncertainty, and consequently not as truth. In such case there can be, of course, no sufficient motive to search for the truth; and our protesting brethren must, in the nature of the case, be simply deceiving themselves when they speak of their ardent attachment to, and search for, the truth itself.

But the truth, though it can and may be found—that is, known or apprehended in its certainty, according to its own nature—can only thus be known through the divine aid of infallibility. To search for it and deny this is, clearly enough, to search in vain. Indeed the word search itself, in such case, could have no meaning, since its object, as our Protestant friends say, and here they are clearly right, would lie wholly beyond its reach. This false opinion, grown into a conviction, that truth cannot be found, must, if seeking is to be successful, give place to the true idea that it can; and the dogma of infallibility, as the condition of this, however numerous and strong the prejudices against it, must be humbly and thankfully accepted; for if this be not true, then the truth can never be truth for the mind; we can never actually find it, or consciously rest in it, but must ever be driven about without any hope of a better moral condition by “every wind of doctrine,” and subject absolutely to the “cunning craftiness” of the prince of error or “father of lies.” To say, in such case, that we desire to find the truth, or that we are earnestly seeking after it, is simply a practical, though rather a serious, joke, we are attempting to play off upon our own consciences. It is a delusion, full and complete.

But the principle once adopted that the truth cannot be certainly

found, theories must be devised by which its fatal consequences may be avoided, else these consequences would themselves refute and blast the error. The fallacy of these theories must be detected, if the way is to be fully opened for the search after the truth, otherwise the truth cannot appear in its own true value. If the truth itself cannot be known, how can anything in the kingdom of grace come to be known?

The first and general effect of this error has been to turn the mind away almost entirely from the objective in Christianity, and to confine its view to the same exclusive extent to the narrow department of individual experience. But even this is found to be shrouded in the same darkness and pervaded by the same uncertainty. For instance, since the truth cannot be known, how can it become an object of faith? What, in this case, becomes of faith itself? What are or what ought to be its contents? Is there not room here for fatal error if these things cannot be known? Has not this, in the way of fact, been one of the prime sources of the various forms of wild fanaticism? Here clearly is great confusion. Now, to save the grace of faith in this view, our Protestant friends have been driven to the theory that Christ, not the truth, a living, divine person, not a dogma, is the object of faith. By this shift they hope, at least as far as faith is concerned, to avoid the fatal consequences of their false position in relation to the truth. But do they really escape the difficulty by this means? Nay, it follows them like their shadow. Let us see. Who and what is Christ as he is made the exclusive or abstract object of faith? Is it the Christ as seen by the Ebionites, simply human, or by the Gnostics, divine only, or by the followers of Eutyches, a confused blending of humanity and divinity, or by the disciples of Nestorius, a dualistic Christ? Or is it the Christ as conditioned and modified by any of the various and variously erroneous notions of modern times? Who is to answer this question? Each has the same right, and each may have the strongest reason. Who can know? But it is claimed that Christ, being a living person, authenticates himself for this purpose, and thus renders correct knowledge on our part unnecessary. If this were true, then there would at least be a definite Christ, in regard to whose nature all would agree, and how in such case could we account for the differences and contradictions in equally pious minds in regard to this point? Besides, how can they be sure that Christ does thus authenticate himself? Since, according to Protestant thinking, the claim of infallibility is not sustained, and the truth, which determines everything else, is itself undetermined and undeterminable, how and by what means is the mysterious nature of Christ to be determined for the mind, so that He may be, in His absolutely correct character, the object of faith?

Clearly the question cannot be answered. In these circumstances each may have a different Christ as the object of his faith, and all may have a false Christ. Again, who can know? But this is only one of the interests entering into the experience of men which, by this false opinion, is thus confused and destroyed. Thousands of others are left by this theory in the same condition of absolute uncertainty. How prevent a complete chaos in the whole kingdom of grace if the assertion must be accepted that the truth cannot be certainly known? These errors, and all others of kindred character, as the candid mind must readily see, are fatal not only to all real search after the truth, but also to every substantive interest which it is the office of the truth to define. All theories which affect to render any feature of Christianity for us independent of the truth necessarily detract from its dignity and value, and to that extent not only vitiate and weaken the motive-nerve which urges to the successful pursuit after it, but also, and to the same extent, confuse and confound the object of the search itself. For, as we have already said, it is not enough, in order to fill out and render this motive proper and sufficient, simply to have a theoretical view of the truth, even though in its full harmony, beauty, and grandeur, as something afar off, or as a grand picture æsthetically even playing directly on our moral nature; but it is necessary besides all this that we realize it to be, in some way, essentially and vitally interwoven with our proper destiny. It must be felt that not to find the truth in the way now described, that is, in its own certain nature, is to sustain a loss and a damage in our moral being, the broad extent and dreadful character of which, it is perhaps impossible, in our present circumstances, properly to estimate or measure. Whereas, on the other hand, to find it, to be consciously in the centre of it and freely governed by it, is to be in harmony with ourselves and with God, and to feel certainly that we are connected with the only legitimate and highest end of human being.

Such, then, being the nature and dignity of the truth, and such its practical importance for us, to really find and obtain it, what effort should we shrink from making, what deprivations in other respects should we be unwilling to suffer, and what sacrifices should we deem too costly or painful to make? And just this is, in the way of fact, the earnest spirit which the successful search of the truth involves. It can be nothing less high and heroic. The motive, to be worthy, must be grand, like its object. He who is really seeking this great good, the good practically comprehensive of all other forms of good, and without which nothing can have this character, is willing, and must be, to give up freely all that he possesses, sever the tenderest earthly ties, enter in imitation of his

Master, who is the truth itself, the most humble and abject condition, submit to the keenest shafts of derision, and meekly bear the most cruel persecution. This is not merely a necessary inference arising out of the nature of the truth itself, as something whose value and dignity are incomparable, but no one carefully reading the gospels can fail to perceive that this is the uniform demand of Christ. Throughout, and at almost every point, we hear the words, "If any man would be my disciple, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me." Not to have this motive is plainly to be unworthy both of Him and of His truth.

Turning now from the motive essential to the successful seeking after the truth, we may fix our attention, in the next place, upon the proper attitude of the searcher and the method generally by which it must be conducted. And first of all, he who would find the truth, must, in addition to what has already been said, when speaking of the motive, be humble. Perhaps, at least so far as the intelligent searcher is concerned, this injunction may be deemed unnecessary. The contrast between the everywhere present and grand majesty of divine truth, and the littleness of man, with the feebleness of intellectual powers, these too, darkened by sin, might be sufficient to induce the proper sense of humility. It is said, when men stand and gaze at the mighty torrents of water rushing over the falls of Niagara, and hear the roar which is thus produced, causing the earth to tremble, they instinctively find themselves exclaiming, "What puny things are we!" But what is this compared with the full grandeur of the truth, the whole truth, beaming forth from God? All men, however, are disposed to vanity, and all therefore need the injunction, and need to have it frequently repeated, and especially when they are searching for the truth, "Be humble."

There is good ground for this. For it is not by any superior excellence of mental gifts, sharpness of wit, boldness of imagination, or clearness or strength of reason, that we are led into the truth, or enabled to take it into ourselves. The naturally great or highly endowed have, in this department, no advantage over the poor in spirit. There are no privileged classes in Christianity. Here, at least, even if nowhere else, all have the same chances. If the inclination of divine benevolence is in any direction, it is in favor of the weak and helpless. "Not many mighty are called." Whilst it is hidden often from the "wise and prudent," it is revealed unto "babes." Reason: "For even so, Father, it seemeth good in thy sight." The truth, in the sense in which we have been using the word all along, is, as to its origin and character, supernatural; therefore, it belongs not to the order of nature in any form, but it everywhere, though in and through nature, transcends

it. It is not for the natural mind, however great its powers or keen its perceptions, to reach and fathom the truth.

Nor can science be of any material aid in this regard. Grand as it has been in its own proper sphere, both in its nature and results, and greatly as it may properly be lauded for what it has accomplished, it has no power to move amid the far-reaching laws of the supernatural realm, and determine what is or ought to be the truth. The verities here, with which it sometimes essays to grapple, are entirely above its reach, and the effort thus to find the truth always results in terrible disaster. Those modern scientists, as well as those who may be called ancient, from whom the error has been borrowed, who have been determined to be guided strictly by science and by this alone, in their search through this department, have all been led, some against their will, into radical infidelity. This result could not be avoided. What has science to do with truth so infinitely transcending its scope and power? To become confused and confounded, and be led to the most puerile and even ludicrous consequences, as in the case of Tyndall, Huxley, and Darwin, the results of whose speculations are all, just now, fresh in the public mind, is precisely what any mind, having a true perception of the supernatural, would naturally expect. Not to the wise, in this sense, is it given to find the truth of God. The disastrous consequences of every effort heretofore made of this character, should be sufficient, one would think, to rebuke the arrogant fancy, that spiritual truth can be found in this way, and to aid in leading the mind up (for this is the proper term) to that state of real humility which the case requires.

Philosophy, as a means of finding the truth, has had very little better success, although the possibilities here are much greater. Separated however from faith, or de-christianized, it can only, like science, flounder in confusion. Reduced to rationalism, it is wholly inadequate. Even in its best form, simply as philosophy, it can never reach or comprehend the truth of God. Led by faith it may indeed very grandly enter the supernatural sphere, and find just what the untutored but believing child already possesses. Nothing more. Such a philosopher may indeed see more clearly the relation of the different truths, their reason, and the results which flow from them. But as to the truth itself in its substantial and saving power, the believing child and the believing philosopher occupy the same grand level. Indeed, the believing philosopher is but a believing child. Richness of intellectual gift and greatness of mental attainment, though always admirable, are never essential to the finding of the truth. These, relied on, are always in the way. But used and not abused, they may in many, though

not material, respects, facilitate the process and give a more refined and detailed appreciation of the truth when found.

Moral talent, here, is more important than mental. The heart is greater than the head. Sympathy (*συμπάθος*) with the truth—real warm, glowing love of it, and thus an inward and sincere aspiration after it, is always surer to find and understand it, than a more cold effort of the reason, however mighty this may be. The little girl who, with very ordinary mental endowments, feels herself secretly drawn to the piano by her native love of music, will, ordinarily, in attaining a knowledge of it, greatly surpass her more gifted companion, who must be driven to her practice. And we are not sure that this is not true, to a very great extent, at least in relation to even some of the more exact sciences. Even in mathematics, which is the strictest of all, there have been many notable examples of persons otherwise but very ordinarily gifted, yet who, because of their deep sympathy with abstract formulas, have been able to move, with most wonderful ease and rapidity, through the most complicated problems. But in the department of supernatural verity, this is true in the highest degree; thus illustrating, even from ordinary and natural experiences of everyday life, the reason why love and faith, and not mere understanding and reason, are so frequently and positively demanded in the sacred Scriptures.

But this spiritual truth is also Catholic in its character, and this shows still further the peculiar nature of the method by which the search is to be conducted, if it is to be successful. In this character it is a unit, and from one common centre in its own being it spreads through the whole universe of moral and spiritual being, touching, like the sun, upon every object, great and small, and defining all it touches. It cannot be broken and scattered into independent parts. However extensive the region through which it permeates, and however infinite the variety of its parts, it is still, in the strictest sense, but one, grand, indivisible system. "Guilty of one, guilty of all," was the teaching of Christ himself, and nothing can more clearly show the unity of spiritual truth. It can be found only as a whole and not as separate fragments. It must, therefore, be sought in a broad and liberal spirit, a spirit approximating, at least, its own grand nature in this view; for he that is not willing to take the whole is not worthy to have a part.

We once heard a distinguished Protestant theologian in one of his most fervid sermons, describing the rich, full heritage of the Christian commonwealth in this view, exclaim, "I am a Christian, and all that is Christian is mine." We felt then that the sentiment was noble, but did not at that time see that it was far too noble for the narrow sect in which the preacher stood. A sect, if anything,

is but a small part of the whole and can never reach and embrace the whole in any form. Each one of the sects rejects, by an inward necessity, what is peculiar to the other; and all combined, if such a combination were possible (which it is not), could not be broad enough to comprehend the whole body of supernatural truth under this, its Catholic form. The sect, therefore, not having the truth, can of course never give it. Protestant churches are not like loving children, dwelling together harmoniously in the same family, each of whom receiving the benefit of the wealth which affectionate parents have gathered. Rather they are like discontented and quarrelsome children, who, not being able to live together in peace and harmony, have angrily torn themselves from the family commonwealth, each taking with him a separate moiety, which is afterwards found, in its isolated form, to be utterly insufficient to maintain a healthful existence. What was a great wealth and amply sufficient in its united form and under the wise management of the family head to furnish even a royal support for all, is now found, in its separation, not to be enough to procure even the common necessities of life. Or to present the point, perhaps, in a still more striking figure; they are not like the happy crew on board the strong and majestic ship, gayly sailing over the heaving billows of the ocean, laughing at the storm, but like the unfortunate crew that have suffered shipwreck, where each has hastily seized a shattered plank, on which he is vainly struggling to save his wretched life. A part, thus sundered from the whole, is found to be much less, for any purpose, than when in its proper place and in union with all the other parts.

But there is still another fact in this connection which our Protestant friends have not, as yet, sufficiently considered and laid to heart. This disrupting of the whole and depending upon any of the parts, in a separate and independent way, has not only this serious quantitative, but also an equally serious qualitative, effect; that is, the quantity is not only thereby diminished but the quality also is changed. A branch, sundered from the tree, does not thereby become a small tree. It is in fact no longer even a branch, but only a dead, dry piece of common wood. It has taken, in other words, a different character, become an entirely different thing. Just so, when a portion of the Church is cut by schism from the whole body, or the Church Catholic. It is no longer a Church, but a sect, namely, a part cut off; and in precisely the same manner, when a part of the truth is sundered from the whole or Catholic system of truth, it is no longer a truth but a heresy. Heresy, strictly, is born of schism. In a certain sense, indeed, heresy may be said both to precede and to succeed schism—to precede, as a restless, bubbling fanaticism, and to succeed as a fixed

and stubborn determination to maintain the false private opinion against all authority. Properly, however, heresy is the perverse holding of the error after this is authoritatively condemned.

That the fragment of the truth, thus cut from the whole system, is of this character is clearly seen in the fact, that the part taken is at once arrayed against that from which it was taken. The harmony is at once broken, and it and the residue are of different natures and at variance, not because the last, but the first, has changed. Instead of bearing the sense or meaning which it had when in union with the whole, and thus be in inward accord with the whole, it is now made to bear a sense or meaning just the opposite, and one which puts those who hold it in perpetual and violent antagonism with the truth under its whole form. Indeed, the part is made to exclude the whole from which it is taken. In the very act of sundering the part from the whole, the part thus sundered becomes changed in its nature, and, instead of remaining a truth, it becomes, in fact, a lie. This may not be so, absolutely, in all cases. But human prudence is a poor safeguard against it. It is certainly not intended to be this by those who adhere to it in this separate form. Individually, Protestants may be better than their sect, and most generally are so. But they cannot avoid this result. It is a matter which lies beyond their power to control. The great mass of Protestant men and women do not even know this dreadful fact. They have never themselves taken time to study it, and have none to teach it to them. On the contrary, they honestly believe, in their simplicity, not only that they have the truth in spite of the doctrine of their leaders, who maintain that truth of this supernatural character cannot be certainly known, but also that they have it under its purest possible form, and that when they are contending against the great Catholic body from which their faint ray has been taken, they are only fighting error with truth. While this false conviction may, under certain circumstances, greatly diminish the personal responsibility of those who hold it, or rather, who are held by it, it can never, however honestly entertained, alter or change the fact itself. The sundering of the truth, which is the result of schism, is, when once accomplished, an objective fact, and the change of the portion sundered into a falsehood, is wholly beyond the control of the individual will. It is converted into error by the very incision of the schismatic knife, and the only way to change it for ourselves is to escape from it.

Every portion of the sect system has by its movements demonstrated this heretical character from the very moment of its abnormal origin in the sixteenth century. From that day steadily on to this has its great effort been to prove that the whole body of truth,

from which a small portion was then rudely torn, is a gigantic falsehood, although it remains precisely what it was in the beginning. Indeed, the sect system all along has had but one real issue, and that is fierce opposition to the Church Catholic and her dogmas; thus proving, at every point in its history, in a most practical manner, the proposition, that a part sundered from the whole in a system in which unity is an essential and controlling fact changes its character. This opposition to Catholic truth is, moreover, an inward necessity on the part of the sects. They could not otherwise continue their being. They started in the spirit of antagonism, and this is found the whole content of internal make-up. It is the nature of heresy to be restless and to fight the truth, and when this fighting shall cease, heresy itself must die. Who can fail to see that sectarianism, in this view, as in all others, is an abnormality, a perverted and perverting existence—a veritable monstrosity? To find the truth, therefore, it is clearly not enough to find a part of it only, for this may but deepen the moral darkness; but it is necessary that we should, in a real way, compass the whole. Only in the whole, and conditioned by the whole, can the parts be seen and understood in their true nature. Lying outside of the modifying and controlling laws of the whole system, and being independent of them, there are no laws of hermeneutics in the hands, especially of the private judgment, that are able to hold it steadily to its original meaning and purpose. Therefore not to find the whole truth is, in fact, not to find any part of it, as it does not and cannot exist in fragments, and no part thus sundered and rendered independent of the rest can serve the purposes of the truth. It is but one immense whole, and as such, in all its fulness, it must, if ever, be found and embraced.

The Greek Church may indeed seem to look, and, in the minds of some, does actually look like a contradiction to the foregoing; but when examined closely it will be found to be this rather in appearance than in fact. No one at all familiar with the history of this separation in the eleventh century can fail to see a vast and substantive difference between it and the sect system as this arose in the sixteenth. But even with all this difference in favor of the Greek Church it still remains a fact that the Greek Church is comparatively dead, and that to keep the truth which it has all along enjoyed and to resuscitate the life by which it has thus far been sustained, it must come back in a still freer and fuller form into the broad bosom of the only true Catholic Church. Or if the schism was really complete and radical, the case can only be regarded, so far as its effect upon the truth is concerned, as an exception proving the general rule. The truth is, therefore, not to be found in, through, or by means of the sect system. Abandonment

of this is an unyielding necessity. This system, in the finding and practical embracing of the truth, is always transcended, no one being able to remain in it after actually embracing the whole truth. Indeed, he would not be allowed thus to remain, because of the antagonism which such a position would necessarily develop. No mind actually in possession of the whole truth could, by the narrow sense of any sect, be considered orthodox. The case demands a higher and broader method and one in greater harmony with the truth itself under its own Catholic form.

But how about the Bible in its relation to the sect-mind? Surely this is the revelation of God, and is, moreover, so far as its outward character is concerned, in the possession of Protestant sects, fully as much as it is in that of the Catholic Church; and do they not love and cherish it, and in the spirit of its own command (?) "search" its pages? Behold the vast numbers of copies which they have annually printed and circulated, and the millions of money they are thus expending, and hear, besides, how enthusiastically they are dwelling upon its charms, depicting its attributes, attributing to it, as a book, even magical powers! It is the only rule of faith and the almost exclusive means of converting the nations of the earth. Yes, verily, there is here an incontrovertible proof of zeal, and zeal under an exceedingly lively form. Yet in this holding to the Bible, or to the truth under this printed form they wholly deny, in the same enthusiastic manner, the truth under its spoken form, existing in the character of sacred tradition, whilst the same Bible, in so many words, and printed in the clearest type, declares that if all had been written which was spoken by *Christ Himself*, "the world itself could not contain the books which should be written." All this truth, spoken by Christ Himself, rejected and denied, if not spurned, simply because, as it would seem, the "printer" had no hand in it. Here again is a part only sundered from the whole truth, which, by this sundering, has become changed in its character and made, in the minds of those who hold it, to lead immediately into error. Thus the "the truth of God is turned into a lie." For it will be observed that the part itself which is thus held is used for the express purpose and as the means itself of excluding all the rest and residue of Revelation, the books of which, had they all been written, the world itself would not contain. In other words, the truth itself is put in conflict, God made to contradict Himself. Can it, therefore, be true, in view of a fact like this, that the sects, though with the printed Bible in their hands, are really in possession of its truth? Could they understand the great "commission" as they do, if this were so? In the very eulogy they bestow upon the Bible in this separate form they give it a false character, making the mere reading of this the

great means of converting the world? But for this false character, would they be so zealously attached to it? In this separated and abstracted form what book has been more prolific of strange vagaries and contradictory teachings? Is there anything contained in it in regard to which the sects, each led by its own separate ray, regard it in the same light or receive in the same sense? And why this strange want of unanimity, this continuous clashing and contradiction? The answer is obvious. It is the same reason which has made the part to contradict the whole from which it is taken, because, by a holding of a part, by which the residue is denied, the general laws pervading the whole system are lost, and there remains no rule by which the sundered part can be held to its original and true meaning, or, indeed, to any one meaning for any considerable length of time. Hence the truth of God itself, thus deflected and perverted, is made even the source of a bewilderment and confusion equivalent to darkness itself; and well may the divine question be asked, "If, therefore, the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness." We need not here enter this printed Bible itself, so much gloried in by our Protestant friends, with a view to point out how much therein contained is wholly excluded by their sect-creeds, though as to its claims of inspiration it rests upon the same basis as all other parts; how much is violently wrested from its manifest original meaning and held in unrighteousness; how much is spiritualized and transcendentalized to such a degree as to leave very little tangible body behind, and how much, because it is either mysterious in its nature, or, if naturally interpreted, would radically break up the very foundations of the sect system, is allowed to remain an absolutely dead letter. All this could be easily done in the way of detail, but it would lead us too far from our direct purpose. We submit here, in view of these and similar facts, that the mere possession by the sects of the printed book called the Bible does not sustain the inference, which they are so ready to draw from it, that, therefore, they possess the truth; nor yet that, depending upon this part only, as and for the whole, and glorying in it, they are even in condition to find the truth. The part thus deflected and perverted, or, in the strong language of the Bible itself, "wrested," constitutes, in many cases, and perhaps the vast majority, the very obstacle in the way, preventing the finding of the truth.

But still, how account for this special zeal which, by Protestant sects, is everywhere manifested ostensibly for the truth—the fierce conflicts among themselves and against each other—if they are not earnestly searching for the truth? But, on the other hand, why all this fierce contention and contradiction, if it is a fact that they have found it and are now really in possession of it? In account-

ing for this special zeal, we may ask generally why are errorists usually actuated by a special zeal? This, too, is a fact, not strange, however, when thoroughly sifted. All persons are specially interested in and for their own children, and, in like manner, each new offspring of the fertile imagination will create, as is everywhere seen, a new and special enthusiasm in the parent. And it matters not how unsightly, ill-shaped, or even monstrous, or how puerile, silly, and jejune, these children of the fancy may be, as seen, for example, in the recent developments of Huxley and others. It is enough that they spring actually from our brain, or that we are their author; and the more exactly they are the expression of our own perverted mind, the greater will be our fondness for them. Indeed, the more monstrous and often the more helpless and puny this brood of the misled brain may be, the more fondly will they be cherished by their parent; and if connected with some degree of bewitching genius, and, by means of sophistical reasoning, are made to appear to stand upon apparently solid ground, the greater will be the interest in them also by others. It is the new which is always hoped to be true; something free, which it is expected will liberate from the irksome and unpleasant authority of the fixed and staid. How could man be more zealous than those who are now striving to prove that man has come, through some mysterious gradations and transformations, from the ape or monkey, or that the Bible itself is but a magazine of falsehood, or that God Himself is a mere fancy of the mind, and that the Church is the deadly foe of human progress and mental emancipation and enlargement? Why should error amongst Protestant sects inspire less zeal?

But Protestant sects are active and zealous in contending for truth as they hold it, because it can be kept up and alive only by this means. Being heretical, it is out of its order and harmony, and, therefore, is constantly attacked from all sides. This requires constant contention. Each sect is fighting the other just as vigorously as all are fighting the Church Catholic; and each, to maintain its own ground, must prove that the other has no right to exist. This restlessness is the very proof that the sects do not consciously possess and calmly rest in the truth. Each, besides, is in competition with the other as to the outlying population. The principle of competition is adopted by them as a necessity. For how else, they ask, can we maintain our separate rights, or how else can poor human nature be made earnest? Here comes to light the real inspiration of the motive creating this practical activity. The great question with each is, not how to bring men to "the truth," but how to bring them to our truth? who can draw the largest crowds, and which of the sects can in this way swell

into the largest bulk, and become, in other respects and for other ends, not of them the most spiritual, the most influential or controlling? Nothing, however, in all this acknowledged zeal, necessarily looks to the truth in its own broad wholeness as the inspiring object of it. True, it does involve the truth, but only as they hold it, a small fragment abstracted from the general sum, and thereby changed as to its original nature, meaning and end, and arrayed against all other truth equally divine. Would they otherwise have this zeal for it? Is not this miserably narrow eclecticism in a region so immense, and where all carries on its face the same stamp of divinity and speaks with the same authoritative tones, not manifestly fatal to the vaunted boast of special zeal for "the truth" on the part of the sects? Clearly, this is neither the attitude nor the method by which to find "the truth."

There is a reason for this lying in the moral constitution of those who seek in this partial way after the truth. Why take one part and reject the other? Whatever this reason may be, it must have regard to that portion of the truth itself which such persons reject. But the part they desire to embrace is, if seen properly, of the same nature and tenor as that which they do not wish to embrace. How, if the part, in the act of culling it from the whole, were not changed to some other nature, or made to wear some other aspect for them, could they make this difference? Clearly, this is neither honestly to desire either the whole or a part of the truth. In some form or other the end, in fact, is always error, with which it is sought in this fragmentary way to connect the truth, in order to give the error a more open field and greater force. How can it be otherwise? All such effort after the truth, instead of leading to the full, broad light of day, can only conduct to the denser darkness of moral night; for all the parts of the truth are, in themselves, and must of necessity be of the same nature, arising as they do from a common centre, and to be worthily sought for must, therefore, be loved, as already said, for their own sake. And this they will be, if, in fact, they are all equally regarded as truth. Where this is so actually, no one part can be thus preferred to another, and certainly never to the rejection of the other; for the rejection of the one part conclusively shows that the other part is held not in the spirit of truth, but in that of "unrighteousness." This spirit is itself an absolute disqualification for finding the truth.

Moreover, truth of every description and in every form, has, in some shape, a keeper, or, in other words, it becomes embodied, by which means it is preserved and perpetuated in its own proper character. Natural truth has the various forms of nature; historical truth has history; civil truth has the state; domestic truth has the family, and legal truth, the forms of jurisprudence. Truth

lying in the region of the fine arts assumes the forms of poetry, painting, sculpture, and music. So we may travel all through the various forms of mundane truth, and in the case of each we will find that it has crystallized itself in some outward visible form or institution, which becomes in turn its keeper or preserver, by means of which it is continued in its own proper character. Now, can it be supposed that spiritual truth, which is infinitely more important than all these combined, forms an exception to this otherwise universal fact? Surely it cannot. But what, precisely, is the keeper of this truth? Prior to Christianity, as will be generally conceded, this keeper was the Jewish Church. To it were the divine oracles given. The Jewish people were raised up for this special purpose; and in order that they might be able to carry it out more effectually, they were not only specially blessed with extraordinary gifts, but were also carefully separated from all other surrounding peoples and nations. Upon them all other tribes were dependent for the truth. Jewish history, in connection with the Bible itself, makes it too clear to leave any doubt with regard to this general fact.

But what became the keeper of the truth when Judaism faded away, or dissolved into Christianity? Did this truth, at this point and all at once, become independent of a keeper, and has it been allowed, from this time on, to float loosely and vaguely in the mind of all succeeding nations? Surely no one would be willing to take such a position. If not, what was its keeper? Were any of the Protestant sects on hand at this time to take this office? What institution other than the Catholic Church, which, by divine authority itself, is said to be the "ground and pillar of the truth," could be this keeper? Upon her the burden passed from the Jewish Church, which itself became merged into her broad bosom, with the command from the Almighty, made only tenfold more solemn, because the revelation itself is more precious, "Keep my truth." The keeper here was, as to its nature, as we can readily see, in full harmony with the truth itself. If the truth was divine, so was the Church; if the first was supernatural, so was the second. The truth, being infinitely broad and high, the Church, to be its competent keeper, was Catholic, which involves both attributes, and approximately commensurate. If the truth was inspired, and, therefore, fixed and unchangeable, the Church was infallible, and constantly the same through all the ages. The last, therefore, was meet to be the keeper of the first. In her is the written word just as it was penned in the beginning, and here also is the spoken word, which, if it had been written, would have filled the world with books; and these, in perfect accord and harmony with each other, are but the two different forms of the same grand, whole system. Acting as this keeper, the Catholic Church, feeling the sacredness

of its obligation, carefully selected the genuine from the spurious productions claiming to be inspired, and formed the Canon of Sacred Scripture ; and but for this, where would be the Bible now in the hands of our Protestant friends, and of which separately they so zealously boast? Could any of the sects have the attributes above enumerated, corresponding with the truth itself, fitting it or them to be this keeper of the truth?

Besides all this, the Catholic Church has the truth embodied in still another way. It has one altar, which, when properly understood, is rich in this view, beyond all power of imagination ; a priesthood, who, in their persons and various robes, impressively symbolize much of the most sacred truth connected with Christ himself and his atoning work ; images and paintings, bearing vividly to the eye almost the whole circle of practical truth essential to salvation. In a word, the whole Church, including its architectural structure, outside as well as within, with its music and its ritual growing out of the real presence, is, in every particular and throughout, the striking symbol for the eye and ear of the grand truth of God, which, besides, it proclaims daily throughout all the world, with the unerring voice of infallibility.

But our purpose is accomplished. We can go no further. We have reached not the mount that "burneth with fire, and a whirlwind, and darkness, and storm," but we are come to "Mount Sion, and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and the company of the many thousands of angels, and to the Church of the first born, who are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of the just made perfect, and to Jesus the Mediator of the New Testament, and to the sprinkling of blood which speaketh better things than that of Abel." Bowing at her altar we deeply realize that though the physical eye sees it not, yet to the eye of faith the transfigured glory of the scene enacted eighteen centuries ago on Mount Tabor still glows with undiminished brightness. Amidst the condensed rays of the whole truth thus streaming directly upon us, we come to know what is meant by "not apprehending," but "being apprehended," by the truth. Hitherto, and on the outside, the movement in searching the truth was from the human side aided by the divine ; now and here, it is from the divine side aided by the co-operation of the human. This is not only to find the truth, but to be found by it ; not only to have the truth in us, but for the truth to have us in it, which is much richer, deeper, and grander. It is for the single individual to be centrally in the whole, and not for a mere ray of this truth to be separately in the individual. Here also is the truth in its own certainty, for here still sounds the great commission : "Go ye into all the world and preach my gospel to every creature," and preach

it, not as something doubtful or uncertain, or that cannot certainly be known, but as the absolute verity of God. "So I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." "He that heareth you, heareth Me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me."

There are many still on the outside who have more than a dim inkling of all this. Still they allow themselves to be tossed about by endless and angry controversies, hoping that something hereafter may be developed which will bring to them the truth in its wholeness without the necessity and humiliation on their part of going to the Catholic altar for it. Longingly they are looking forward to a coming Church, which they call the "Church of the future," which, as they hope, may be the union of all. Vain hope! Can it be supposed by the rational mind that God would set aside his own wonderful creation, the Catholic Church, which is so perfectly adapted to, and commensurate with, the nature and requirements of the truth itself, for the purpose of making room for another? And what other could be greater and broader, and endowed with grander gifts? And can the imagination conceive anything more capable of comprehending all kindreds and nations, than the Church Catholic? What such persons need, in addition to their present conviction, is the divine grace of faith, and with this the equally divine gift of moral courage, by which they may be able to sacrifice pride of intellect, worldly position and consideration, and realize that in the truth, and through the truth, only, can anything be of real good. Having this, we have all things; without this, *what* have we?

NOTES ON SPAIN.

(CONCLUSION.)

FULL ninety out of every hundred travellers who visit Spain will find Granada the most agreeable of all their halting-places, and when they come to look back upon their past wanderings, its snowy mountains and fruitful plains, its picturesque ruins, its babbling streams, and its refreshing glades, will stand out on the field of memory as pleasurably as vividly. Nor is it only its charm for ear and eye that should be noted, but also the invigorating, health-giving action of its mountain air—its elevation equals that of the summit of Skiddaw! In spite of a bedroom much like a prison cell, with tiled floor and straw mattress, a refreshing sleep was enjoyed the first night, and in the morning my companion had lost all those unpleasant symptoms which the damp and heavy atmosphere of Seville had induced. The house we stayed in was the "Fonda de los Siete Suelos," which takes its name from an adjacent tower of the Alhambra, called the "Torre de los Siete Suelos," or the Tower of the Seven Floors. It, and the Washington Irving Hotel opposite it, are situated in the so-called "gardens" of the Alhambra, which are, in fact, not gardens in our sense of the word, but extensive plantations of elm trees, through which steep roads wind in various directions. The hotel charges are sufficiently moderate, *i. e.*, eight shillings and nine pence a day for a bedroom on the second floor, with meals and attendance. The other hotels are down in the city, and should be made use of by those who care more for convenient access to the churches and other monuments of Granada than for the Alhambra with its purer atmosphere.

Although it was the second of November, the trees still preserved their leaves, which showed, however, the tinge of autumn. The sun was hot enough to make us gladly seek the ample shade, while butterflies were numerous and lizards darted over the walls or hid amongst the multitude of arums which clothed the ground. Scarcely any rain had fallen here during the recent deluge at Seville. Yet the air was perfectly transparent and the distant mountains stood out in perfect distinctness against the blue sky, which was for the most part cloudless, though black clouds and pouring rain could be seen far off to the northwest.

Granada is built upon three hills on the outskirts of the mighty mountain chain called the Sierra Nevada, from its cap of perpetual snow—now of wide extent. Beneath is the fertile plain, the Vega (still kept fruitful by that irrigation from the mountain streams

which the Moors established), and surrounded on all sides by more or less distant mountains.

The Alhambra is like the Alcazar, but larger and more elaborate, though without the brilliant coloring of the latter. Its situation is lovely in the extreme (overhanging as it does the valley of the Darro), and when in the possession of Boabdil, must have been a terrestrial paradise. No description of it, however, is needed here; is it not in all the guide-books? The guide-books, however, are apt to mislead in these respects. Some of them declare that a fee of one dollar is necessary on each admission to the palace, and also that it is only open at certain fixed hours. Both these assertions are untrue. The Alhambra is open throughout the day, and nothing is easier than to arrange to see it by moonlight also. The civil and obliging guardians of course expect something for showing you over on your first visit (and your guide is sure to *deserve* something for his civility and the pains he takes to show you all), but that once over, you can enter and stroll about wherever you like, without any further payment being *expected*. With the exception of the picturesque external walls and towers, however, "all the beauty of the 'king's palace' is *within*," and the external aspect of the halls and chambers which so delight you by their interiors, is poor and mean in the extreme.

After returning from an early stroll through the Alhambra, to breakfast at the hotel, we descended to the city for the Mass of "All Souls."

The Cathedral of Granada practically consists of three churches united. The oldest of these is the royal chapel of Ferdinand and Isabella, where the remains of these sovereigns are interred. Connected with this and directly opposite (due west of it, supposing the whole church to stand east and west) is the parish chapel or *parroquia*. On the gospel (or ecclesiastically "north") side of these royal and parish chapels, is the true Cathedral itself, into which they both open—the parish chapel into the western part of the Cathedral nave; and the royal chapel at what would be the transept, were these transepts, *i. e.*, opposite the interspace between the sanctuary and the choir.

The royal chapel is of the richest and latest Gothic, and it has a complete ecclesiastical establishment of its own. The other buildings are classical. Nevertheless, the Cathedral itself is one of the most delightful churches I have seen in Spain. Like that of Bourges in France, it consists of a nave with double aisles, which continue on all round the apse. As to its proportion and style, it is like a smaller Seville Cathedral dipped in a classical bath of late Renaissance. Over the altar itself is an enormous cupola or dome (called the *cimburio*) rising to a height of 220 feet, and rich with stained

glass and gilding. The effect of this dome is very fine, save that its great weight has necessitated the blocking up of the arches and interspaces, which would otherwise exist between each of the inner pillars round the apse and the corresponding pillar of the external series—great stone piers taking the places of such interspaces. The consequence is that, seen from the “west” end, while the view up the centre nave is, of course, unimpeded (save by the choir screen), and while that up each outer aisle continues to the end of the church, the view up each inner circle is obstructed by a stone wall, which is the side of the first of these great stone piers thus supporting the cimborio.

Here (as in other places in Spain) it is in the parish chapel that late Masses are to be got. In the Cathedral proper there were no Masses after the High Mass. The latter service is impressively performed, but I noticed no peculiarities, save that the serving boys wore curious ornamental collars standing up round their necks. Unlike Seville, apparels were not worn upon the albs. Here, as at Seville, I found much irregularity as to the bell-ringing at Low Mass, there sometimes being none whatever. Mass was also said with the protecting dark cover over the subjacent linen cloths.

In the royal chapel are the magnificent marble tombs (in early Renaissance Italian work) of Ferdinand and Isabella, and also of their daughter, “Crazy Jane,” and her handsome, unfaithful husband Philip. Very beautiful is the face of Jane. Strange was the contrast produced by descending from the royal chapel, with its marble statues, its elaborately ornamented roof, and sides in Gothic Renaissance, its gilded escutcheons, the brilliant colors of its walls and windows, with all the stateliest ensigns of regal magnificence, into the small, dark, low vaults, wherein repose the plain, iron-bound coffins of the royal dead. Those of the conquerors lie together on a low platform in the centre. Their daughter and her husband repose against each lateral wall. These coffins have never been opened, and it was with a feeling of deep reverence and tender sympathy that I respectfully laid my hand upon that of the good and great Isabella, and on that of her once lovely and love-distracted child.

From the Cathedral I proceeded with a young and agreeable Brazilian gentleman to visit the Cartuja (or old Carthusian monastery) in the suburbs. This gentleman, professing himself a Catholic, showed, by gestures no sign of respect to the Blessed Sacrament, and by conversation no belief in dogma. Professing himself a “liberal,” he could not be made to see that freedom required that those citizens who chose to live together as monks at their own expense ought to be free to do so, and he rejoiced at the imprisonment of Brazilian bishops. He declared himself a Catholic Free-

mason. Returning from the sad sight of the suppressed monastery, the visitor should drive to the hospital founded by St. John of God, over the door of which is his statue, and within which his most precious relics are religiously preserved—the saint being revered by men who would deny to others liberty to follow in his footsteps.

The Redemptorist Fathers have, however, now managed to obtain a footing here, and have the care of a small church, and I hear the Jesuits are expected. The religious condition of the city indeed needs such help, being little better than that of Seville. Not but what the churches are sometimes well filled. At a handsome church in the Alameda, when the Exposition was going on, there was a large attendance. At the door of this church was a very characteristic Spanish beggar. A sturdy, well-built fellow held out his right hand for alms, while his left hand held his cigarette, between his puffs at which he omitted occasionally a plaintive whine.

Here the picturesque old streets and curious Moorish remains still exist in Granada. Thus, not far from the Cathedral is a perfect Oriental bazaar of Moorish work, but unfortunately its shops are all shut up and it is not used. The so-called charcoal house, "*Casa del Carbon*," is really an old Eastern caravanserai, with galleries and rooms in tiers all round, for occasional occupants. On the side of the Darro Valley opposite to that on which the Alhambra is situated, may be found a more curious than attractive collection of "cave-dwellers" of our own day. Here is the Gypsy quarter, and more savage dwellings, in Europe, than the caves which they inhabit it would be difficult to imagine. We saw some fifty dances (by previous arrangement with the king of the Gypsies), but they were little worth seeing, either for curiosity or grace, though they showed us that the dancing which had excited our surprise at Madrid, was really dancing of the Gypsy kind. The Gypsy dances executed were called *chochas*, *vingete*, *fandango*, *palanea*, and *moscas*. The head of the Gypsies played on the guitar with great style and dexterity and with a very pleasing effect.

By the road which ascends between the *Siete Suelos* and Washington Irving Hotels, the visitor gets easy access, first to the *Generalife*,—or summer residence of the old Sultans of Granada,—and then to the nearest mountains. There is little to see at the *Generalife* save the outlook from its summer-house at the top, and a pleasant little garden in which, were a swarm of large vegetable-eating bugs, walking or flying about. By continuing on the road towards the mountains the cemetery is reached, which at the time of our visit was being enlarged. The dead are buried either in ordinary graves or inclosed in recesses which line the walls. In

the dead-house were one or two corpses dressed in dark costumes and fully exposed though lying in their open coffins. They were thus exposed because the coffins are so constructed that while the lid is very large and convex, the other part is so shallow as to be nearly flat, so that the body lies on a sort of disk to which a large cover is subsequently applied. These coffins are often brightly colored, and those of the more wealthy classes are generally profusely gilded.

From the cemetery a turn to the left soon brings you to the highest summits in the immediate vicinity of Granada; and they should certainly be ascended, for the ascent is most easy and the view magnificent. Beneath, in the Valley of the Darro, is an old suppressed monastery, now used as the seminary of the archdiocese. The mountain sides were redolent of thyme and similar perfumes, for here every herb seems to be aromatic, though at this season almost all are dried to chips. There are many sister shrubs (of course not now in flower) with euphorbias, a very thorny furze, and a broom. Many large grasshoppers—like small birds—were disturbed by us in our walk, while two birds of two kinds were frequent; one with a very conspicuous white patch on the lower part of the back, and other smaller ones, the note of which was between the quack of a duck and a pig's grunt. Here and there, by little rills, near the city, the traveller from the North rejoices once more to see the rare sight of a few blades of grass, which is especially to be found, with peppermint and a white-flowered solanaceous plant, in the lane which runs down between the hills on which the Generalife and the Alhambra respectively stand.

A carriage excursion, which ought certainly to be made, is that to the rounded eminence on the road to Motril, whence the last view of Granada is to be obtained before plunging between the first spurs of the mountains. This eminence is called The Last Sigh of the Moor, "*El ultimo sospir del Moro*," from the well-known anecdote of Boabdil's plaint and his mother's reproach, "*Weep like a woman over what you could not defend like a man.*" The road crosses at one point the dry bed of a river, and traverses two villages, the cottages of which are very superior to many I have seen in Scotland. As, usual, the road in the vicinity of the city is execrable, but the country once gained becomes admirable, a change due to the difference between municipal and state supervision. Late as was the season many flowers of mullein and dipsacus, and many wild pinks bordered the road, every here and there, and we overtook several characteristic strings of muleteers bound for the coast.

We greatly regretted that the fearful floods which had just taken place rendered a visit to Murcia impracticable. For poor horsemen there is a magnificent road (magnificent for picturesque-

ness) to Murcia by Guadiz, Baza, and Lorca. Another fine view of the Sierra Nevada (its Alpujarras portion) is to be obtained by a journey to Lanjaron, to which latter place there is a diligence. To the botanists and naturalists these mountains are a field of great interest. Amongst the animals is an ibex, believed to be of a different species from that of the Pyrenees, and called *Capra Hispanica*.

Reluctantly we had to leave this charming place to visit the hottest place in Spain, Malaga. Before starting I went to hear Mass in a church within the Alhambra grounds, said by a poor old Dominican friar in the last stage of decrepitude. Although the only Mass of the day, only four persons besides myself attended it. A sacristan ascended to the organ loft and kept up a most vexatious, tuneless, and inharmonious jingle during the whole of the service.

We started from Granada at half past eleven A.M., in order to arrive at Bobadilla station at six to catch the train from Cordova, which is due at Malaga at half past eight. Having, as usual, secured a comfortable first-class to ourselves as professed non-smokers, we journeyed comfortably along till we began to ascend the very long rise which carries you over outskirts of the great mountains which separate the Valley of Granada from that of the Guadalhorce, along which runs the line from Bobadilla to Malaga. Before long our pace began sensibly to relax, and as we rounded one interminable mountain slope after another, became slower and slower, till at last, to our horror, in the wildest part of the route, not far from the summit of the pass, our train came to a dead stop. Certain news lately received from England made us extremely anxious to get letters waiting for us at Malaga, and this made the fine scenery odious, and the always cold and formal-looking olive trees hateful in our eyes. Exasperating in the extreme was the coolness with which we were told that there was not enough pressure, and that we want half an hour or an hour to get up steam. None of the native passengers were disturbed. They got quietly out and smoked with the most perfect indifference to the delay. There are several matters which are trying about Spanish railways. The officials take little trouble. If you get out they will go on without you quite readily, and at the various junctions we found no one to tell us which train to get into, or where to change carriages, so that the passenger must ask and find out all for himself, or go wrong. Again, there is no warning given to bystanders when an engine is putting to, and one may easily be knocked down or injured by an open door, or in getting in or out at such times. In less than an hour we began once more to creep up the incline, and the summit once reached we began to descend merrily enough. In spite

of the delay we reached the junction punctually, and we noticed that though trains were sometimes an hour late at intermediate stations, they were generally punctual at junctions and terminations, feats after all very easy of accomplishment, considering the slow rate at which trains travel.

The line from Bobadilla to Malaga is one of the finest bits of railway scenery in Spain, and ought certainly to be traversed by daylight, as we subsequently traversed it. Having reached the most distant city of our trip, we put up at the Fonda de la Alameda (on the Malaga promenade), where we were entertained at the rate of 7*s.* 6*d.* a day. The busy, thriving city of Malaga, of prehistoric antiquity, is shut in by mountains, except on the west, where is a small but fertile plain, about nine meters wide. On the hills about the city are scattered the white country-houses of the merchants. Arid, treeless, and desolate in the extreme, are the mountains of varied and fantastic shapes which inclose Malaga, but lovely and picturesque beyond description must they have been two thousand years ago when they were clothed with ample chestnut forests. A little rivulet (the Guadaluredina) divides the city into two unequal portions, winding its tiny way through a wide expanse of stones. A sudden rain of four hours will soon change it into a roaring torrent overflowing its banks and largely submerging the city. Very different must this streamlet, now either noxious or contemptible, have been in the time of the Romans, seeing that the adjacent Guadalhorce, now also so small, was then navigable by their galleys as far as Cartama. Such have been here the melancholy effects of that reckless destruction of forests which has desolated the whole of Southern Europe.

After a night somewhat disturbed by mosquitoes, the first place to be visited (on the morning of November 7th) was, of course, the Cathedral, a peep at the Mediterranean being taken on the road. I know no beach in England as unpleasant-looking as that of Malaga, covered as it is with a coarse blackish sand, over which broke the waves of a rough sea. The Cathedral is the least attractive I have seen in Spain, large without grandeur, lofty without grace; its interior has a painfully stilted appearance, due to the fact that the arches which support the roof spring from a series of columns, which are perched on the top of subjacent columns like the magnified petrified erection of a child from its box of toy bricks. It is mainly an eighteenth century structure, and looks like a church of the period of pigtails! The population of Malaga is, we were told, about the worst in Spain; and villainous swarthy faces, not a few, are to be seen at the port. Even in our few strolls there we saw enough of truculent, quarrelsome manners to dispose us to believe what we heard as to the free use of the knife. Their

horrible excesses in the late revolution will not soon be forgotten. I was not edified by the priest whose Mass I heard, who, though in no way decrepit, dispensed himself from all genuflections.

In the afternoon our courteous banker, Señor Huelin, drove us out to see his sugar plantation in the adjacent plain. The day was very hot, and the surface of our carriage became covered with flies when we halted near the sugar mill. The canes were now only about five feet high, but looked thriving. Growing amongst them were quantities of the large purple convolvulus, which is a garden flower in England. We were also shown sweet potatoes or yams, the taste of which is like that of mashed potatoes, with a very slight flavor of apricot jam. The sugar plantations are profitable enough now, thanks to the protective duties which cause so much natural discontent in Cuba; but as soon as the liberal party controls that important colony, their cultivation will have to be abandoned, and the capital sunk in the mills be lost. Hence much of the support which conservatism now finds in Malaga!

A capital club—the *Circulo Malagueño*—is an agreeable lounge for the stranger. There may be found plenty of English, American, and French newspapers. One of the richest merchants in Malaga is Señor Heredia, through whose charming country-house, with its magnificent garden, we were obligingly conducted. The only road to it (unless by a very long detour) is up the bed of the river, a journey only to be accomplished with joltings indescribable. The heat of the climate was made manifest by the costumes, or want of them, of the country children we passed. One urchin had nothing on but a white shirt, consisting principally of holes. To any lover of nature, however, a visit to Señor Heredia's garden would be a welcome treat, even if real trials had to be encountered to reach it, instead of only amusing vicissitudes as to the centre of gravity, such as those we experienced. In this garden are a variety of magnificent palms and a perfect grove of bamboos, thirty or forty feet high, growing luxuriously, the first shoots coming up on all sides like gigantic young heads of asparagus. Also, magnificent specimens of the great lace-leaved arum (*Tornelia pergasus*) were flowering freely, and huge poinsettias in full flower, forming great masses of glorious color. In strong contrast with the beauty of this terrestrial paradise is another place which should be visited before Malaga is left. This is the castle on the western side of the town. Permission (which is readily granted) must certainly be obtained before viewing it, in spite of what may be said (as was said to us) to the contrary. The ascent is easy, as far as climbing is concerned, but trying from the extreme filthiness of the streets below it. Beneath it, yet connected with it, is an old Moorish building, the Alcazaba. From the castle walls you have a mag-

nificent view bounded on all sides by mountains or by the sea. To the west the mountains advance seawards to the very shore, and their general outline is very picturesque, but all are dry, arid, and treeless. Only on the tract of flat land to the east is there any verdure to be seen, and there a stretch of the brightest green indicates the fields of sugar cane. The fortification and fort are, like so much else in Spain, apparently on the road to ruin.

Amongst the fruits to be got at Malaga is the custard apple (*chirimoya*), which are sold at stalls in the Plaza de la Constitucion at about $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ each. It is the custom to drive at sunset along the western side of the port out to the lighthouse and back. To us Northerners it was a singular sight to see, in such an atmosphere, close carriages driving up and down, the inmates of which kept every window hermetically closed. One evening a visit was paid to the Theatre of Cervantes, to hear the old favorite of the London Opera, Tamberlik, in the "Trovatore." He had an enthusiastic reception, as befitted such a veteran tenor, now of 67 years of age or upwards. He was amazingly well preserved. The floor of the theatre is all stalls, each of which costs $4s.$ and $2d.$ They are conveniently arranged, with a passage down the centre as well as one on each side. The music was pretty good, but the *mise en scene* very poor. The private boxes are separated only by low partitions, and there is, therefore, very little privacy in them. One drawback to the pleasure of Spanish theatres is the great length of time allowed between the acts. On Monday, the 10th of November, we left Malaga, not altogether with regret, on account of sleeplessness which a few mosquitoes occasioned. Fortunately it was still light about 6 A.M., so that we could write quite well by daylight at a quarter past six. A visit to a neighboring church for an early Mass on Sunday produced an unfavorable impression of the devotion of the place. About six men and thirty women formed the congregation, none of whom were communicants. Funny little dressed-up dolls of all sizes, in glass cases, were placed over the altars, with heaps of rubbish. Other churches also showed but scanty congregations.

The roughness of the sea, combined with the sad state of Murcia, induced us to change our plans and to go to Valencia by rail direct. Under other circumstances, however, another route would be preferable, so before proceeding to mention our experiences further, it may be well to point out to travellers, more venturesome and more favored, what might be well to do, though by us left undone.

To begin with, then, if there should be a desire to see Gibraltar, it had better be visited by sea from Cadiz, and then Malaga can be reached by another short sea trip. From Malaga, Granada, and

also Ronda, can be visited, and then the traveller, having returned to Malaga, may go by sea to Almeria and Cartagena, and thence by rail to Murcia. This I should strongly advise. Murcia should by no means be omitted by the travellers who really desire to see Spain at all thoroughly, and it should be visited all the more, because it lies out of the ordinary lines of travel, and is therefore the less modified and modernized. My friend, Mr. Howard Saunders, the zoologist, who knows Spain far better than many Spaniards (and to whom I am indebted for many useful premonitory hints, and for my knowledge of that part of the Peninsula not visited by us), declares it to be one of the gems of Spain, the city lying in a fertile valley, studded with date palms, and filled in with orange groves in a lovely setting of mountains. In its market-place are to be seen, on Sundays and holidays, characteristic costumes beyond anything to be seen elsewhere in the country. Again, the voyage from Malaga to Almeria (the first stage of the voyage to Cartagena) is charming from the wonderfully picturesque outlines of the southern mountains, which descend so closely to the shore along the whole of this part of the coast. Almeria itself has a Gothic Cathedral embattled like a castle to resist piratical assaults. There is also a club, where foreign newspapers may be seen. It will be well, then, to stay one day at Almeria, and then go on to Cartagena, one of the arsenals of Spain, so memorable for its tenure by the revolted Intransigentes. From this city by rail a convenient train starts at a quarter to 1 P.M., and arrives at Murcia at a quarter past 3.

Once at Murcia, the best way to go to Valencia is by the diligence, which goes in one day by Orilmela to Alicante through a country of many palm trees, which attain their maximum of perfection at Elche, where they form perfect palm forests, and such a sight as Europe does not elsewhere afford. According to the advice supplied by my friend before referred to, the best plan is to stay at Elche and send on a message to the landlord of the Fonda Bossio or to the Fonda del Vapor at Alicante to send out a conveyance to fetch you in. The road between Elche and Alicante is uninteresting, and it would be a waste of time to go on to Alicante in the diligence (for there is not time to see the palm groves whilst the team is changing, and, besides, during part of the year the diligence arrives at night), and then drive out to Elche and back; whilst to be near Elche and not visit it would be too serious an omission. There appears to be nothing to see at Alicante, so the best thing is to go on as quickly as possible to Valencia, either by rail or steamer. If by rail it is necessary to wait for a longer or shorter time at the junction station, La Encina. The best plan is to take the mail train at 4.20 P.M. from Alicante, arriving

at La Encina at 7, then dine and sleep there, and go on by the train from Madrid, which train leaves La Encina at 7.39 and gets to Valencia at 11.

We did nothing of all this, but went direct from Malaga to Valencia by rail, thus going an eminent round in twenty-nine hours, without stopping anywhere. But we ought to have stopped on the way and visited Ronda, and in the hope that my readers may do better than we, I will give, as I received them, the following hints how best to make that interesting excursion. The absolutely best way is to ride up from Gibraltar, by which the finest scenery comes under observation, the road skirting Alpine precipices. The journey on horseback takes two days, a night being passed at Gaucin, where there is a comfortable Posada Inglesa. The most comfortable way to reach Ronda is by rail and diligence from Malaga. The office to take places in the diligence is at No. 5 Calle de la Alhondiga at Malaga, and the fare is 16s. (80 reals) for a first-class railway ticket and an outside seat in that part of the diligence which in France is called the *banquette*, but which in Spain is called the *cupé* (the part called *coupé* in France is called *berlina* in Spain). The train leaves the Malaga station at 7.15 A.M. for Gómbantes station, which is reached about 9. There the traveller will find waiting the diligence, which carries him, with the help of eight horses and mules, to Ronda. The road was a short time ago bad and the driving is careless; an upset, therefore, is a thing not to be left out of the calculation. The scenery on the road, however, is fine, and the traveller may be cheered by the sight of a pair of bearded vultures (*Gypæctus barbatus*). The badness of the road before reaching Ronda is, however, as usual, nothing to the vile ways within it, and the traveller should enter and leave the city on foot, descending from or ascending to his diligence at the entrance to the city.

It is much to be regretted that the travelling is not better, as Ronda is one of the great sights of Spain. There is an excellent hotel (Grand Hotel Rondeño), and the air is pure and most exhilarating. The sight of Ronda is its renowned Tajo, or chasm, an abyss spanned by a bridge, whence a grand view is obtained of the boiling torrent beneath, the cliffs of which are frequented by chuyles, kestrels, and large Alpine swifts.

All these sights, Ronda, Almeira, Cartagena, Murcia, and Elche, were postponed by us to some more propitious occasion, and starting from the hotel at Malaga at half-past 6 in the morning we reached our inn at Valencia at half-past 11 on the morning following, having a first-class carriage to ourselves the whole way. After leaving Malaga the first object of interest was Cartama on the Guadalhorce, which river was, as before mentioned, formerly

navigable by Roman galleys to this point, as has been proved by a bronze tablet of river dues which was recently found. Alora is also worthy of note for its beautiful orange groves, the abundant golden fruit of which is very striking to a visitor from the North. Then after crossing the river, the palms, aloes, oranges, and olives grow rare and rapidly disappear, and we enter upon the most grand and savage scenery to be seen in Spain. The railway traverses tunnel after tunnel, and between each wonderful glimpses are obtained of gorges, in the depths of which are to be descried the foaming torrents of the Gaudalhorce and its tributaries. In the midst of this chaos of rock and foam there is a small station, El Chorro, which does not appear in the railway guides. This is the station where any one who desires to explore this wonderfully picturesque region should alight and spend the day, returning to Malaga by the evening train. The next station is Gobantes, already mentioned as being the one whence the diligence starts for Ronda. The next station was the already twice-visited Bobadilla (the junction both for Seville and Granada), where the traveller can get a good breakfast. Beyond Bobadilla this railway was as yet untraversed by us. It presents no special features of interest till it terminates at Cordova, which is reached at a quarter past 1. Here we had to wait till nearly half-past 2 (with the consolation of a good buffet), at which time we started in the train which came up from Seville to go to Madrid, so returning over ground already traversed till we reached Alcazar de San Juan at about half-past 12 o'clock at night. Great was the change of temperature experienced (after hot Malaga with its sugar canes in the morning) in alighting at this uncanny hour on the lofty table-land of Central Spain. There is nothing for it, however, but to wait for the train from Madrid to Valencia, which, arriving at about the same time, starts again on its way at a little after 1 o'clock in the morning. At half-past 4 Albacete was reached, famous for its daggers, and in another half hour we pulled up for rest and a welcome cup of chocolate at Chinchilla. The dawn showed us that the ground was covered with white frost, soon to be dispersed by the glorious sunrise, which was a most beautiful and welcome sight, although good hot-water bottles had secured us from any ill effects which might be due to cold. At twenty-five minutes past 7 La Encina is reached, when a little more refreshments can be got, but with little time to eat it, as the train for Valencia starts at 7.39. Here the railway enters a long tunnel, and we come upon a very picturesque country, with curiously shaped limestone hills. After passing Montera station an interesting castle is to be noticed. At a quarter past 9 o'clock Jativa is reached, the original home of the Borgias and the birthplace of Pope Alexander VI. Here

also, sad sign of modern degeneracy, a vast bull-ring has been raised on the ruins of a Carmelite convent. At Jativa palm trees once more begin to appear, and soon hundreds of palms and wide stretches of orange groves, with large quantities of growing rice, bespeak our return to a warm southern clime. As we traversed the plain (the fertile *huerta*) and approached Valencia, the cottages reminded me of pictures of certain African villages, each cottage having very low walls, but with very tall, high-pitched roofs of thatch. There was always a cross at the gable of either end. The blue Mediterranean was now in view, and Valencia (the City of the Cid) was reached at 11 A.M. We drove to the Fonda de Madrid in the Plaza de Villarosa, where we were sufficiently well entertained at a cost of about 10s. 6d. a day. Here men and boys took the place of housemaids. Valencia is a city in many ways preferable to Malaga. Like the last-named city it is thriving commercially, but it is a brighter and much cleaner-looking place, and while less hot has a deliciously soft and warm climate; but it is not picturesquely situated, lying as it does on a plain, quite distant from the hills, and yet being miles from the sea, there being a railway to the port.

Our first visit, of course, was to the Cathedral, a fine old church. Modernized (in 1760) in the most frightful manner, the ancient Gothic work having been everywhere overlaid with plaster,—columns, pilasters, and cornices, up to the very groined roof,—so that nothing worth seeing is left. There is, however, a very fine lantern or cimborio (over the interspace between the transepts). It is an octagon of two similar stages, with beautifully traceried Gothic windows. There is also a very wide Gothic doorway to the north transept, with highly ornate Gothic wheel windows over it. Amongst the relics of the church are preserved an arm of St. Luke, and a Bible of St. Vincent Ferrer, with his own manuscript marginal notes. Very interesting to English-speaking Catholics are some altar hangings and vestments which belonged to old St. Paul's (in London) before the Reformation, and which, at that frightful catastrophe, were bought by two Valencian merchants, Andrea and Pedro de Medina. They are richly embroidered with representations from the life of our Lord.

In Valencia the visitor is in a part of Spain where Spanish is not spoken, and which, in some other respects, is not Spanish like the greater part of the country, but seems to show the influence of adjacent Catalonia, the most Gaulish part of the Peninsula. Here the clergy, instead of wearing the large Spanish cloak, wear veriolas. Many of the shops have glazed fronts, instead of the open Eastern-looking fronts of the shops in Andalusia; yet very many are still open. They wear, instead of a hat, a silk handkerchief tied over

their heads,—a rather becoming headdress. The poorer men often wear no stockings or socks, but a sort of sandal, with a sort of finger-stall at one end (to catch the extremities of the great and next toes), whence two long strings pass back to join one embracing the ankle, from which two others pass straight down, one on each side, to the sole near the heel. Very few bonnets were to be seen, and no wonder, as this is the place to purchase mantillas and fans. On leaving Valencia I felt I had now seen the Spanish people of various provinces, and I can say warmly that I like them. I like especially the peasantry. Their honest countenances speak strongly in their favor, and such intercourse as I have had confirmed the impression made by their faces. The townspeople are not so nice as the countrymen. Why is it that men always deteriorate when collected together in masses? Still the townspeople are nice. They look well at you, both men and women, but never *rudely*. The eye if met is instantly averted. The men never stare impertinently, nor do the women ogle. They take your measure very quickly, and as quickly look away. They are a far more polite people than are the French. They have not the trick of taking off the hat,—as to this guide-books deal in much exaggeration,—but they are generally ready to go out of their way to guide you in yours. They have often a rough, gruff manner at first, which might impress a stranger unfavorably; but if you are only able to speak their language a *very* little, this rougher manner gives way to a courtesy which impresses you as being *heartly*. The most pleasant impression I have brought away from Spain is that produced by what I saw of the women. Of social inferiors and superiors, one to another, there was a great deal of equality between them of a nice kind. The superior did not forget his self-respect, neither did he “condescend” to the poor man; and the inferior showed no symptoms of oppressive assumption,—no air of “I’m as good as you, and a good deal better,”—but the social interval seemed bridged over by real tenderness of heart on both sides, such as I have never seen exhibited elsewhere. This is one of the triumphs of Catholic influence in Spain. Another is to be found in the national literature. Translations of bad books from the French are now unhappily common enough; but the grand fact remains that Spanish “literature” is the purest in Europe. As to the religious state of Valencia, there is much consolation compared with that of Seville. Out of a population of 144,000 there are 60,000 who go to the sacraments every month, and at one retreat recently given there were as many communicants. I went to visit the Jesuit Fathers, at No. 1 Calle de Valdiqua, and found among them a Father Francisco de A. Llopert, who had been at St. Benno’s, and spoke English excellently. With great kindness he

came in the carriage of some secular friend, and took me to see the sights of the city. The Jesuit Church was destroyed at the last revolution, but they have bought the ground over again, and are just about to rebuild it. There are both Capuchins and other Franciscans in the vicinity of the city. One of the places visited was the Patriarch, a sort of house of canons, whose special business is to perform church functions with more than usual solemnity. They chant the office with extreme slowness, and every Friday there is a special service at ten o'clock, which the visitor should witness. I heard a Low Mass here one morning, and found that the acolyte comes out of the sacristy with a thurible and offers incense during the elevation at every Mass at every altar. The church is dark, but solemn, and its paintings should be examined. The churches generally present little of interest within, having been so disfigured with modern alterations. The hexagonal tower of Santa Catalina is a striking object. I found one morning the Church of St. Martin full of mothers and nurses, with infants in arms, as well as with children somewhat older. On inquiry I was told that a confirmation was to be held, and that the infants were to be confirmed. The good priest who told me would not believe me when I informed him that infants were not thus confirmed by the Catholic clergy in England. This case of the survival of an ancient custom, once universal, struck me as interesting.

The cabs in Valencia (called *tartanas*) are peculiar. Though built for four passengers inside, who sit face to face, they have but two wheels. The driver sits on a little cushioned seat placed on one of the shafts.

The University is a large building, with many students. Its zoological collection is not worth much. The Jesuits had formerly a collection of specimens from the Philippine Islands, but these were disgracefully destroyed in the madness of the last revolution.

The Alameda, or Hyde Park of Valencia, is, as usual in Spain, visited for drives, after sunset, instead of during the delicious temperature of the afternoons of this season. It has many flowers, some new to me, with large bamboos, beautiful *Vunsetha* shrubs, and magnolias in full fruit. On to the port, or *grao*, is a long drive, with little at its termination to repay the visitor who is not particularly interested in shipping; but it is a magnificent port, with a minimum depth of twenty feet. Returning thence to the hospital, we passed through the magnificent mediæval gateway,—the *Puerta de Serranos*,—built in the middle of the fourteenth century, with two grand polygonal towers flanking a crooked and rather stately pointed archway in the centre, with beautifully traceried panelling above it.

The hospital is a very large and solid structure, more than two

hundred years old, which was built for its present purpose. It consists of four very long and wide halls, which meet at a central point, where there is an altar. Each hall is like a church, with a nave and side aisles, two rows of round stone pillars, with gilt capitals, supporting a groined roof, and separating off the aisles. Over these halls are four other similar ones,—those below being for the men, and those above for the women. One portion of the women's space is partitioned off for those who have come for their confinement. In addition to all this there is a foundling hospital for infants. The infants are not placed in a turning box as formerly, but the mothers have now to enter with them at night, but their children are taken in at once, and no questions are asked. There were many little infants lying in tiny beds, arranged all round a large room. Most of them were lying perfectly still, but one or two were crying a little. In an adjoining apartment were wet nurses at work. The whole establishment is under the care of Spanish Sisters of Charity, who are somewhat differently dressed from the French sisters. Everything was very clean and neat, the kitchen especially, the walls of which were covered with glazed tiles to about six feet. There are several chapels in different parts of the building. Each of these belongs to one of several confraternities of Valencian ladies, who respectively undertake to look after different departments of the whole institution. The shops of Valencia are noted for their mantas, silver goods, fans, and mantillas; but the stranger should not venture to buy without the advice of a knowing friend,—*experto crede*. The living at the hotel is very fair, but saffron is a very favorite flavor. A dish of rice with saffron is one which appears daily at the table d'hôte, and a great business is done by large saffron merchants in the city. Saffron is the threefold stigma of a crocus (*crocus sativus*), which is plucked and dried just when the flower is fully expanded. No one should omit to see the *Casa Lonja*, one of the finest civic buildings in the world. It is situated on the market place, opposite the Church of St. John. It contains a magnificent hall, 130 feet long and 75 feet wide, with stone pillars and groined roof like a church, with nave and aisles. It was built in 1498.

On November the 13th we left Valencia and went to our last resting-place in Spain,—Barcelona. Much to our regret circumstances did not allow us to linger to see Tarragona. Every visitor who can see it should, however, do so, for it is one of the most interesting cities in Spain, with a mild, delicious climate (which is said to be dry and bracing), and with excellent sea bathing, and a clean and comfortable hotel. There is a magnificent old Cathedral, as to which Mr. Street says: "This is certainly one of the most noble and interesting churches I have seen in Spain. It is one of

a class of which I have seen others upon a somewhat smaller scale (as, *e. g.*, the Cathedrals of Lerida and Tudela), and which appears to me, after much study of old buildings in most parts of Europe, to afford one of the finest types, from every point of view, that it is possible to find. It produces, in a very marked degree, an extremely impressive internal effect, without being on an exaggerated scale, and combines in the happiest fashion the greatest solidity of construction with a lavish display of ornament in some parts, to which it is hard to find a parallel."

We left Valencia at half an hour after noon and reached Tarragona at half-past eight in the evening. The railway mainly skirts the sea, and the traveller has many charming views of the coast. Castellon, where there is a buffet, is reached about half-past two. It is noted for its picturesque costumes; and here the painter, Francisco Ribalta, was born. This is the spot to embark for a visit to the group of small volcanic islands—the *Columbres*—so called from certain snakes once there found, but which seem to have fallen a sacrifice to the indiscriminating voracity of pigs, which had been introduced by the lighthouse-keepers.

At Alcalá there is a fine church tower, and opposite it a noticeable castle. Palaces by degrees become less and less frequent, and the last we noticed was near the next station, *i. e.*, Benicarlo. Here let Peñíscola be looked out for, a miniature Gibraltar (three miles to the east of the line), only connected with the mainland by a narrow strip of sand. Here Pope Benedict XIII. took refuge after his censure by the Council of Constance.

At Vinarez the railway quits the sea, and so avoids the aguish swamps of the delta of the Ebro, but it returns to the seaside after reaching Tortosa. This whole coast is wonderfully bright and *riant*, and it is with much regret that one sees the daylight fade. Very noticeable were the little country churches that we passed, which were cruciform, with five short and equal arms, and a central dome. They were, therefore, quite Byzantine in character, an interesting sign of the past history of this region; for the seacoast of this part of Spain belonged to the Eastern Empire long after the rest of the country, and to this fact, no doubt, the form of these churches is due. After half an hour's stay at Tarragona, darkness made the rest of the journey a blank to us till we reached Barcelona at midnight. The very comfortable quarters at the excellent Hotel de las Cuatro Naciones on the Rambla del Centro, were most welcome. As might be expected, the terms here were more expensive, 12s. 6d. a day, all included, but a well-furnished room and an excellent bed with good fare made us contented, and we went to sleep with pleasurable anticipations of much enjoying our last Spanish city, and one at once so thriving and progressive, con-

taining so many interesting antiquities, and where a friend expected me, bent on showing us a warm hospitality. Alas, the next morning my friend called to say that his sister, his parents' only girl, had just died of typhoid fever, of which there was an epidemic in the city. It was so indeed. Every church we entered was draped in black, and everywhere funeral Masses were being celebrated. In addition an attack of neuralgia which had endured for some twelve hours, became violent, and caused a longing for a change of climate. The climatic effect on neuralgia, I found to be singularly and strongly marked in Spain, but as yet I had suffered from it only at considerable altitudes,—at Avila and Madrid,—with a slight recurrence at Granada. But now it had suddenly seized me on arriving at Tarragona, and thenceforth remained with me steadily and strongly till I reached the very different climate of Bordeaux. Such marked climatic effects appear to me to be worthy of record.

Barcelona is traversed (from northwest by north to southeast by south) by a wide street called the *Rambla*, with a broad central park, with an avenue of trees for foot passengers, and a carriage road on each side of this shady promenade. Two hundred years ago this was the ditch for the city's drainage. Barcelona has finer shops than any other city in Spain, and has a very French aspect. It is prosperous and thriving, with a great deal of active piety and religious zeal, and with a great deal of revolutionary opposition to religion also. Here the best lace is to be bought, with fine blankets, scarlet and white, or blue and white, and handsome curtains for windows and doorways. There is but little of national or provincial costume, but the men wear a peculiar kind of cap, something like the Jacobin cap of liberty.

The Cathedral of this powerful warlike city, for so many centuries free and commercially prosperous, this modern Spanish Manchester without the Manchester smoke, is a rather small one. Yet from its skilful and artistic construction it looks much larger than it really is—thus reversing the absurdly praised effect of St. Peter's at Rome, which is so dwarfed by the gigantic human figures which are depicted within it. There is a very wide nave, the west end of which is roofed by a lofty and elegant octagonal lantern. Beneath the high altar is the shrine of St. Eulalia (the patroness of the church), and a flight of steps leads down into her cryptlike chapel. The east end is apsidal. The multitude of altars is one great peculiarity of this church, for not only are there chapels round the apse and on each side of the nave for its whole length, but there are chapels round three sides of the cloister, those on the side of the cloister which is next the church being back to back with the lateral chapels of the nave, a window over each dark chapel giving light into the adjoining chapel in the nave of the

church—an altogether peculiar arrangement. Very fine and interesting churches are Santa Maria del Mar and Santa Maria del Pilar. The latter, with a wide nave, without aisles, but with lateral chapels, and with a terminal apse, is quite in the style of the churches of the South of France, at Carcassonne and its neighborhood, and the general similarity of the ecclesiastical buildings of these two regions bespeaks a common influence. Indeed, in this Catalan-speaking part of the Peninsula you are no longer really in Spain. The town-hall is an object of much interest to the lover of Gothic; especially the Casa Consistorial, on the north side of which are fine Gothic windows, with a large image of St. Michael, with metal wings. The University has a large attendance of students, and should also be visited. In the Rambla is a very fine Jockey Club, handsomely furnished and provided with every convenience, even with an excellent riding-school and a stable for the horses of the members. At the moment of my visit a fine young Spaniard was exercising in the school, who on seeing an Englishman (he was a friend of my introducer) began to praise the visitor's country, and above all Stonyhurst and its good fathers, who had completed his education. Our intention was next to visit the far-famed Montserrat, which can be visited in one day, taking the morning train on the Zaragoza line to Monistrol, and thence ascending on foot with a native guide—for (as I learn from my well-instructed informant before mentioned) the windings of the carriage road are such that the diligence to the monastery does not allow you time to get to the top before it departs again for the 5.40 return train. The visit can better be made in two days, going up from Martorell and coming down by Monistrol, or vice versa, and the accommodation is clean and good. This unhappily we could not see, for a letter received by my companion compelled us to start home by the next train. Accordingly we left Barcelona at 2.20 P.M. on November 16th, taking tickets for the express to Paris *via* Bordeaux. Those who have no need to hurry would do well to stop at Gerona, with its early, very peculiar Cathedral, also at Narbonne, Carcassonne, and Toulouse. But I would advise no one to stop at Perpignan, on account of the unspeakable horrors of its hotel. Our journey to Paris ought to have been accomplished in twenty-eight hours. The Spanish part of it was punctually performed, but the French express, which ought to have arrived at Bordeaux one hour and twenty minutes before the departure of the express from Bordeaux to Paris, was more than that late, so that we had to continue on thence by a slow train, the journey occupying in consequence one and thirty hours!

The carriages between Barcelona and the frontier are most excellent, but here for the first time we had at first a little difficulty

in getting a carriage reserved for non-smokers, because just before two Englishmen had asked for such a carriage, and having got it proceeded to smoke, as the indignant station-master (Gefé) told me, "Not cigars, señor, but pipes!" However, his severity relaxed, and we left Spain with our usual Spanish luxury of a first-class carriage to ourselves. We reached Cerbere, the frontier, at a little after 8. The French authorities examined our luggage very slightly, but rigorously demanded passports or visiting cards, and, in spite of all that is often said, no stranger should travel without his passport, which is very often useful and sometimes necessary. At the buffet we found the meat as tough as anywhere in Spain, and the bread certainly inferior to the Spanish bread. We also had much less comfortable railway accommodation. On asking for a non-smoking carriage we were told, as usual, that smoking was forbidden everywhere. A delectable plan, which throws all the unpleasantness of objection upon the traveller who objects to nicotin. Accordingly, our first French guard addressed a French soldier saying: "The law forbids you to smoke, sir, but take notice, please, it is not I who object, but these English gentlemen!"

On waking with daybreak as we got towards Bordeaux the change of climate was very evident. Our windows were coated inside with ice and all the ponds we passed were frozen. Nevertheless, the late persistent neuralgia had departed. From Bordeaux to Paris we had again an unpleasant journey from the crowding of the carriages, owing to the custom of putting third-class passengers for whom there is no room into first-class carriages. However, Paris and the welcome Hotel Continental were at last happily reached. Here my notes in Spain terminate, but I wish to record one visit paid in Paris before starting for England. This was to the now famous Jesuit school at 18 Rue Lhomond (formerly Rue des Postes), and to its most estimable rector, the Reverend Père du Lac, one of the most charming men it has ever been my fortune to meet. On the wall of the courtyard of the college are a number of marble tablets, each inscribed with the name of a student who fell fighting for his country in the war of 1870, and also with the name of the engagement in which he fell. The contrast shown by the courage of the Catholic troops, compared with the disgraceful behavior of the Paris reds,—who though eager for murder had no taste for fighting Germans,—ought never to be forgotten. But it is not only in the field that such a contrast has been shown.

The excellent religious and moral effects of the education here given were witnessed not only by those who appreciated them duly, but also by others who complained that these sour men were not

such as *they* used to be when they were young—" *nous étions autrefois plus gais !*" The threatened break-up of these noble establishments in the prostituted name of liberty is an outrage on the human race. Surely now all men of equitable minds, whatever may be their religious views, ought to unite in vigorous protest in favor of freedom (as understood in the United States and England, and as understood by such men as M. Jules Simon) against the passionate and sectarian Jacobinism which has managed to usurp the fair name of "liberal" on the continent of Europe, and threatens to ruin civilization by an invasion of barbarism and brutality, not, as in the days of the breakdown of the Roman Empire, by incursions from without, but from beneath. Spain gives to the Catholic visitor many signs of promise and many signs of fear. It is a land full of interest, which I am thankful to have seen once, and which I pray to be allowed to see again. I am satisfied with what I have done, and I would conclude this paper as I commenced it, by saying to Americans, and especially Catholic Americans, "Go and do likewise."

AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN EUROPE.

The Nineteenth Century. By Robert McKenzie. London, 1880, Nelson & Son.

The History of Our Own Times. By Justin MacCarthy. Vol. I. New York, 1880, Harper Bros.

THE nineteenth century will go into history as the century of the democracy. With it disappeared forever from civilized peoples the old sense of the divinity of kings and the irresponsibility of rulers. The people moved up and resolutely laid their hands on thrones and seats of power that had hitherto been considered sacred. They did not do this easily or at once. It was a long and bitter struggle, and a struggle that is not yet ended. It is impossible, however, for any man to shut his eyes to the fact of the wonderful advance in popular rights and liberties, and in representative forms of government made in European nations since the century began. There is yet much to be acquired in this sense, in some nations more, in some less. Monarchs have still great power, though they dare not exercise it with the freedom from responsibility that they once did. The most absolute ruler

in Europe to-day would be rash to look upon his empire as his personal property to do with as he pleased. The wars of the future will not be waged for royal whims or personal fancies. The area of power is widening daily and absorbing classes who through all the centuries had rested in dumb content outside and in the shadow of the magic circle. How the wonderful change came about, how the struggle between the peoples and the rulers was waged, forms the most interesting as well as most instructive chapter of modern history.

The War of Independence in North America and the establishment of the Republic of the United States gave shape and method to the feelings of the oppressed peoples. The example was followed in France, but in a way that was almost fatal to the democratic movement. The French Revolution culminated in Napoleon Bonaparte, himself a revolutionist in principle. Though he aimed at quelling it he really carried on its work. The world saw with amazement this soldier of fortune playing fast and loose with all the Powers, and using monarchs like puppets. The lesson was not lost. When Napoleon fell, the monarchs, who had each in turn been his creatures, stepped back to their shattered thrones and resumed their old sway. But the illusion of absolutism had been forever broken, and, as Napoleon predicted, Europe henceforth was to be either Cossack or Republican—republican in fact if not necessarily in form.

To men nowadays, reading affairs by the light of over half a century, the action and attitude of the monarchs toward their subjects, subsequent to the fall of Napoleon, seem foolish in the extreme. They refused to recognize the signs of the times and set their faces to the past. Repression and paternal government of the most minute and excruciating kind was the general order of the day on the continent of Europe from 1815 to 1830 and on to 1848. Public meetings were prohibited; the press was muzzled; men dared not give free vent to their opinions; they could not move about or shift their quarters without being subject to surveillance. The result was that they met in secret and plotted the overthrow of the systems of tyranny under which they lived. It was the tyranny of governments as well as their own volition that threw men into the secret societies.

The monarchs and statesmen who, according to a recent declaration of Lord Beaconsfield, govern the world, seemed to have things pretty much their own way, when there came another thunder-clap from Paris, that capital of revolution. Another king was gone, turned out of doors, and allowed to run with his life this time (1830). Charles X. was not an ill-meaning man, but his "ordinances" dissolving a newly elected chamber even before it had met, arbitrarily

changing the electoral law to suit the court influence, and suspending liberty of the press, was about as insane a piece of legislation at the time as could possibly have been devised. In signing the ordinances he simply signed his own expulsion. The people, still experimenting, chose another king, a "citizen king," the adroit, supple, plausible, supremely grasping, and stingy Louis Philippe. They grew weary of their citizen king, who in the end attempted weakly to coerce them, so he was driven out in his turn (1848).

The revolutionary leaven was working in all Europe. Millions who were panting for liberty looked to France as to their leader. France made short work of its kings when they displeased the people; the people rose up and turned them out. Here was the second gone within eighteen years, and both for unwise and oppressive measures against popular liberty. Why should not they in Austria and Germany do the like? In England the same battle was being fought out in Parliament and through the country. The point of the struggle was this: An adequate representation of the governed in the government. Government, it was proclaimed, was no longer to be a monopoly of kings and a few privileged classes, a snug and close corporation for an exalted few. The men who paid the taxes to carry on the expenses of the government insisted that they should have something to say as to the disposal of their own moneys, of their own lives and fortunes. Previous to the Reform Bill of 1832, the Government of England was representative in little more than name. It was a thing of purchase or royal favor, and Parliament was a centre of political corruption. Horace Walpole carried the British Government and Constitution in his pocket.

Thus England and France had secured for themselves, each in its own way, the right of the people to be represented in the government. In England the work had been slow, and strenuous, and peaceful. Public opinion had been sounded and educated; the agitation had struggled through long years; men knew exactly what they were striving for, what it was worth, and what to do with it when they had it. So that in England the extended franchise slipped at once into easy and familiar working order. France, on the other hand, made for the same object by a series of flashes and explosions. It undermined the existing order of things, and at a touch of popular powder it was gone, and everything had to be begun anew, there being no solid and familiar ground to work on. Government had to be invented, a difficult task among a people where every travelling tinker imagines himself a born legislator, as every private soldier was supposed to carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

The influence of England and the second revolution in France, which this time (1848) experimented in the direction of a republic,

set the rest of Europe aflame. All the petty German kingdoms and principedoms were shaken to their rickety foundations. The princes hastened to grant constitutions to their people. The barricades of Paris reached to Berlin and Vienna. Frederick William IV. of Prussia, who so resolutely forgot his promises of reform granted in the fever of "the hundred days," suddenly found his memory again. Young Otto von Bismarck was at this time beginning to take an active part in public affairs. He was a conservative of conservatives, and a monarchist after the King's own heart. "The Prussian sovereigns," he maintained, in one of his speeches in 1847, "are in possession of a crown, not by grace of the people, but by God's grace; an actually unconditional crown, some of the rights of which they have voluntarily conceded to the people—an example rare in history." The King, however, became painfully alive to the altered condition of things. All Germany was granting constitutions, and he followed suit. He changed his conservative ministry for a liberal one. Since he could no longer resist it he astutely resolved to float securely on the full tide of the popular flood. He assured his people that he was anxious above all things to secure to them their liberties. He proposed a new constitution, in which household suffrage was to figure as a plank in the platform. In fact, he was ready to do or concede anything that could save his crown.

Then ensued one of those events that so often paralyze and neutralize a great popular movement. Political doctrinaires, a troublesome brood, in which Germany seems particularly prolific, got at affairs. To men of this type a speech is always more precious than a cause. The minute German professional mind was brought to bear on every detail of the constitution, and while they argued interminably on infinite nothings, public business was at a standstill, and the heated country was resting on its arms. They ruled out of the royal title the phrase "by the grace of God," as though that made any difference one way or the other. They abolished the nobility by decree. And so they went on *ad infinitum* arguing and disputing where acts were needed.

The King had still some powers. He had a well-organized army, with resolute and capable generals at his back. The assembly was rapidly losing the confidence of the people. Frederick William called in his soldiers to restore order. General von Wrangel entered Berlin at the head of a formidable force. In a twinkling he turned the garrulous assembly out of doors. The President refused to stir, so the soldiers placidly raised him, chair and all, and set him out to cool in the street. The liberal constitution was withdrawn, and one more conservative substituted for it. Nevertheless the King had realized the situation, and the people were admitted to a representation that they had never before en-

joyed. Parliamentary government in Prussia became henceforth an actuality.

In Vienna much the same scenes were witnessed. Prince Metternich had been guide, philosopher, and friend to the Emperor Francis Joseph, for more than a quarter of a century. He had been a great instrument in conducting the negotiations and forming the final coalition that overthrew Bonaparte. To him popular government, or even anything approaching an adequate representation of the people, was a political heresy, much as it was to the Duke of Wellington. It was only natural that in the uprising of the people he should be made the first object of attack. His palace was sacked by the populace. The Emperor changed the ministry. The press was allowed to say what it pleased. Prisoners confined for political offences were set free; universal suffrage was decreed, and the people were promised whatever they demanded. Nothing, however, seemed to satisfy them. Vienna revolted; the Emperor fled; Lombardy and Venetia rose; Hungary asserted its independence; Bohemia and Silesia caught the fever, and were up in arms. The very existence of the empire was in danger. The Emperor resigned in favor of his nephew, and the insurrections were only subdued by foreign interference. The end was again attained. Henceforth Austria entered on parliamentary government, the parliament being elected by household suffrage.

Such are some of the broad outlines of the struggle of the people up to power, that make the history of Europe for the first half of the present century. Something had been attained that had never been fully known or recognized before in the conduct of human affairs, and that could never again be forgotten or taken away, for any length of time at least. The people had invaded the seat of government, and claimed their inalienable right to sit there side by side with the monarchs, and the monarchs found themselves compelled to succumb. In all Europe there were only two powers that still maintained the old absolutism,—Russia and Turkey. Turkey maintained it with the consent of a people whose religious and political system is a dead fatalism, though Turkey's Christian subjects were forever wrestling against it. Russia was still too far aloof from the current of European thought and life to feel to any large extent the movements of the time, and the fierce throbbings of the pulse of an awakened and armed humanity. Little by little, however, the knowledge of what was going on abroad and over their borders crept into the Russians, making them restive and uneasy under the despotism that crushed them. But owing to the strong power of tradition, the difficulty of upsetting or materially altering an organized and accepted system of government, the great obstacles the people had to overcome in bringing their

thoughts and aspirations to the knowledge of the government, and above all, the general ignorance of the population,—Russia's day of relief was as yet far off. Nevertheless the irresistible influence of the popular will had been awakened, and no imperial edict nor any number of knouts, nor all Siberia could bid it die, or swallow it up.

While Europe through half a century was thus fretting itself into a fever of life, over across the ocean all that it was striving for had long since been quietly and satisfactorily accomplished by the colonists of North America. The surrender of Cornwallis and his army on the 19th of October, 1781, was the surrender of their lands, lives and liberties, to the colonists, by the King of Great Britain, once and forever. George III. would fain hold out to the last. But his people were weary of the war, and the three million colonists who rose in arms against the exactions of the home government, were left with an undeveloped continent on their hands, without a king or settled order of state, and with the problem of establishing and organizing a government which should reconcile the completest liberty of the individual with perfect order. It was a problem fraught with vast moment to the world. It was the fairest yet most fearful test of the issue of the new ideas regarding the rights of manhood as opposed to the absolutism of the past. It was the supreme test of the competency of the people to do without kings and to govern themselves.

Those who recognize a divine movement and guidance in human affairs, can hardly fail to discern the hand of Providence in the issue of the War of Independence, in the ground chosen for the struggle between the people and absolutism, in the formation of the Republic of the United States, and in the Constitution that bound those States in union. It is not claimed that that Constitution was either perfect or complete. Such a claim would be preposterous and absurd. What may be claimed for it is, that never before in human history did a system of law and government so completely fit in, not only with the peculiar requirements of the moment, but with the growth and development of a vacant continent teeming with resources, and offering itself freely to the world. Nor this alone; but the same Constitution cut the Gordian knot of the chain that had held nations captive for three centuries. The men who fought for it had very clearly before their minds what they were fighting for. The Declaration of Independence was a new political gospel to all the world, and destined, from the principles and self-evident truths it contained, to convert the world in due time. It was carrying into the political order the principles of charity and mutual forbearance proclaimed in the Gospel of Christ. The Saviour of mankind did not interfere with or direct human gov-

ernments. He left them to human hands and human methods. But He laid down divine and unyielding principles for human action and conduct. And the germ of charity, peace, and mutual good-will in human government is contained in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

That is the corner-stone on which the Constitution of the Republic of the United States was built. A clear comprehension of its meaning, worth, and significance led to all the rest. The native dignity of manhood was recognized and insisted upon. Man's full and free rights were established and provided for, so far as it was possible for human laws to provide for and guard them. The colonists were men of all classes and creeds. The religious separation in Christendom that began in the sixteenth century had introduced a new and most bitter element of strife among Christian peoples. The founders of the Republic recognized the evil of this, and struck at the root of it by declaring in the sixth article of the Constitution: "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." To make assurance doubly sure, this declaration was amplified into the amendment, adopted in 1791, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This put an end, so far as the United States were concerned, to the distressing and harassing religious conflicts arising from the division in the Christian camp that came in with the Protestant Reformation. In a government that proclaimed the equal rights of all its citizens, it is hard to see what other provision was open to guarantee and protect the rights of men who differed in creed. So bitter and deep-grained was the spirit of religious intolerance, handed down from father to son, that the various States, with their reserved rights, only slowly yielded to the wisdom and noble spirit of this enactment. It forced its way, however, by the double right of necessity and justice to all, until it has become a cardinal principle of the American nature.¹ Individuals may have their petty jealousies and sometimes seek to indulge in them; but any attempt to engraft these on the Constitution of the country or the States is a hopeless failure. As a fitting and necessary complement to the establishment of religious

¹ It is not claimed here that absolute religious freedom is the ideal state for mankind; since this would be to place truth and error on the same plane. If all men were of the same religious belief, their religion would necessarily be the religion of the state. It is only upheld as the best way out of the interminable difficulties that originated with a divided Christendom.

freedom, was the establishment of civil freedom in the same article of the Constitution: Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

It was impossible to stop here and draw a color line. It was, in the nature of things, impossible to maintain slavery as an institution, or in any shape or form, while the Constitution proclaimed the natural equality of man, and as among his "inalienable rights," "liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." So long as a slave existed in the United States in so far was the Constitution false to itself. Slavery was doomed in principle; it was simply a matter of time when it should be doomed in fact. Its abolition might have come sooner, it might have come later than it did; but it was destined to come, and it came.

Here then was something new in the world; a rounded and complete system of government of the people, for the people, and by the people. It was content to rest there peaceably at home, severely minding its own business, and leaving other nations and governments to mind theirs. It was happy to let alone and be let alone. It preceded the first French revolution, and undoubtedly gave an impetus to that movement; but it stopped there. Despite the clamors of a strong party the government refused to give any material aid to the French revolutionists, who were far from civil in their method of demanding that aid. The French made the mistake of at once attempting to embroil everybody in their own quarrel. They proclaimed the abolition of all kings and the formation of a universal republic, before they had fairly established their own, or consulted other people as to their opinion. They proclaimed universal fraternity, which other people sturdily refused to accept, and exemplified their interpretation of it by vigorously cutting each other's throats at home. Liberty, equality, fraternity, is not a bad motto, but death as an alternative of non-acceptance of the doctrine spoils the whole. The French revolution failed to erect a republic, save in name, because it wanted to go too fast and too far; because it frightened and coerced people instead of winning them; because it never commended itself wholly to or gained the confidence even of its own people; because, finally, the masses of the French people were by tradition and education still monarchists at heart. Nevertheless, the French revolution did a great work in a very rough and uncouth way, and gave a terrible lesson to be remembered by both sides, the revolutionists and the democracy.

In the various movements enumerated at the beginning of this article, the Republic of the United States took no direct part, for

the reasons given. It was quite out of the current of European affairs, and exercised little or no actual influence on them. It was not ambitious of doing so. Its relations with the European governments were strictly of a commercial nature, save a passing dispute, and the war of 1812 with England. The exploits of its soldiers at the close of that war, and of its navy throughout the struggle, as also against Algiers, raised it to some extent in the estimation of European powers. But it still remained a country and a people apart from their thoughts and outside of their calculations; less a power than a loose experiment in government as likely as not to fall to pieces at any moment. It was more than this to a few thoughtful minds; but prescience is rare in the world and generally discredited until events convert and dignify what were esteemed its guesses into veritable prophecies. It was a great shock to the English mind, for instance, that justice should be administered without a wig or gown; and for the average man an innovation of this kind had more significance and spread farther than the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

Emigration to the new country had been very gradual, up to 1844. In 1845 it suddenly rose to 114,000. In 1846 it increased to 154,000; in 1847, to 235,000; and in 1850 it was over 310,000. The famine in Ireland and the political troubles on the European Continent drove the people out. The great movement that was to people the West and develop its resources had begun. The world was destined to shift its centre. From the close of the War of Independence, up to the end of 1876, its total emigration to the United States was 9,726,455 souls. Since 1876 the movement has taken a new start, adding from one to two millions to the former recruits.

Why did these people come here? Why has the human stream, once it set in this direction, never ceased, but, with an occasional partial diminution, gone on gathering in volume and force to discharge itself on these shores, and spread over the broad surface of the land? Why do the people come from Germany, from Ireland, from England, from Italy, from the shores of the Baltic, from every land under heaven? Old landmarks, and homesteads, and historic memories, and places rich in the love and reverence of the past are deserted. Their own people rise up and shake the consecrated dust of their fathers from their feet with hardly a sigh, or with regrets that are forgotten as soon as they stand on the soil of the New World. For them this country has no history. To multitudes its very language is an unknown tongue. There is nothing in it on their first arrival to win their imagination or their personal love and loyalty. But how soon all this is changed! and how soon they become amalgamated with the people, lovers of the soil, sup-

porters of the laws and liberties of the land. An American baptism makes the speediest and most thorough political convert in the world. The deepest trained monarchist finds the influences of his surroundings, the breath of the free air, irresistible. He may entertain sentimental fancies for other times, and another order of things; but his head and his heart are won to the land and institutions which he has chosen. Of these ten or eleven millions of immigrants, how many have returned to abide in the soil of their fathers? The ever-increasing population of this country is a sufficient answer. It is only the failures who go back.

Why do they come, and why do they stay? For the simple reason set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the words of which are not idle, that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are among the inalienable rights of man. Other powers may hold this political doctrine as good enough theory; the United States hold it practically, and carry it into act. And it is this great and indisputable fact that attracts the people to these shores by preference. It was to attain this possession into which the United States moved so easily, that the people of Europe contended during half of the century. They succeeded, as has been shown, in making some advances on the past. But owing to tradition, constant international quarrels, and the construction of society and of government, which is still rooted deep down in the centuries of a bygone time, other nations are as yet far behind us in the race for freedom, and for the exercise of unfettered individual activity.

Meanwhile, though European emigration to the United States was on the increase, there were not a few drawbacks to it. There was no attempt made at systematizing the movement, as indeed there hardly is still. It was wholly individual. The country was not known. The emigrants came in blind ignorance for the most part, trusting to fortune to see them through. The discovery of gold in California excited universal curiosity, and drew all eyes to this country. It began to be more talked about and better known. The steamboat facilitated travel. Constant correspondence, too, was kept up between the immigrants and their friends and relatives at home.

On the other hand, the republican movement in Europe was not advancing very rapidly. In Italy it was made use of by Cavour and the Sardinian Government to weld all the petty Italian States into one kingdom, with the King of Sardinia at its head, and a powerful army and navy to sustain him on the throne. In France the republic of 1848 did not last long. By 1840 the woes that the first Napoleon inflicted on the country had been forgotten in his glories and military exploits. His remains were begged back from England, and amid a mourning people, laid to rest in the city

of Paris. The man still ruled the impressionable race from his grave. The old name had glamour about it for the French heart; and soon after they had turned their commercial king out of doors, they elected Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the Emperor, President of the Republic by an overwhelming majority. They received characteristic thanks for their generosity. The old game of the Consulate was played over again. In four years the republic was destroyed, and the empire restored in the person of Napoleon III. The people voted it, over and over again. If votes mean anything, it was the will of the French people to have an empire, though that empire was an actual despotism, however much it may have advanced the material interests of France. Had Napoleon III. not been the man he was, an imperial conspirator and born intriguer, whose very nature was opposed to letting well alone, his dynasty might have been peacefully ruling France to-day. This regime was another blow at popular liberty and representative government.

The Crimean war broke the heart of a much abler despot, the Czar Nicholas, and let into Russia a flood of European ideas. His successor, Alexander, found himself compelled to yield something to the vaguely forming demand of the Russian people for representation in the government. He freed the serfs, and granted something in the shape of local self-government to the provinces. On the other hand, he most cruelly crushed the uprising of the Poles for freedom and autonomy, a movement that the intolerance of Russian rule had aggravated and forced on the people in spite of them or their leaders. The other wars of the century in Italy, in Denmark, in Austria, and France, were wars of acquisition and ambition. Whatever they effected in the way of settlement in disputes about territory or power, their frequency and increasing magnitude, added to the demand they made on the people's blood and material means and liberties, created an ever deepening popular feeling against them and against the men who brought them about, as well as a restlessness and insecurity in the public mind. Men began to look about for an escape from the body of this death that was forever crushing them, and their eyes turned wistfully westwards to a land where peace and plenty, and good order reigned.

Just at this stage came the awful crash of the Civil War, and the world looked on appalled to witness the people that they had begun to envy for their security from all such struggles, rending each other to pieces. We know how the speedy end of the republic was confidently looked for, and how easily mistaken were statesmen, even the experience and keen sense of Lord John Russell and Mr. Gladstone. Well, what did the world witness in that

struggle? It saw equal bravery and devotion on both sides. It saw this nation of peaceful men quit their civil occupation with as calm heroism as history has ever recorded, to battle for their cause. It saw the national ingenuity and inventiveness applied to the science of war, and applied with equal success to that it displayed in the fields of labor and commerce. The little *Monitor* changed the navies of the world. It saw this peaceful people slowly beaten into a mighty military force, and men could not help asking each other the question: If this people could do so much when divided against itself, what could it not do when united against a common foe? There was the remarkable spectacle, too, of men of various creeds and origin as to their nationality united by the supremest patriotism and love of the cause. It was seen that the citizens of the country were heart and soul men of the soil, and men of the Constitution, who knew for what they fought on both sides, and the risk they had taken on themselves in beginning the struggle. Moreover, the war opened men's eyes to the unlimited resources of the country, which seemed the very prodigality of wealth.

At last the struggle ended after having called into requisition the services of 2,000,000 soldiers. The United States were saddled with the enormous debt of \$2,750,000,000. The Confederate debt was upwards of \$2,000,000,000. In July, 1864, the United States gold dollar cost about three dollars in paper. Repudiation or financial ruin was predicted.

When the war ended the world saw another strange sight, and one eminently characteristic of the republic. Complete amnesty to the South was at once proclaimed. With the victory the feeling of enmity soon died out. The vast armies speedily disbanded. Officers and men returned peacefully to their homes, and at once resumed their civil avocations. The old quiet life began again as though it had never been broken. The military spirit of a military people disappeared and yielded without an effort to the civil force of the republic. Then the reality of this great power of a great people stood out before the world. It was impossible any longer to regard the United States as an experiment in popular government. It *was* popular government in its completest sense, and the republic at once stepped up into the front rank among the powers. "The separation of the United States into two independent republics," said the *London Times* (annual summary, 1861), "will make the first year of the decade conspicuous in the annals of the century." The whole thing, the fact of the separation and establishment of a new and independent republic, was cheerfully taken for granted at the very opening of the Civil War. This leading organ—its leadership at that time was undisputed—of English opinion, confidently announced that "the American Constitution, either by

its own intrinsic defects, or through the feebleness and violence of its administrators, had altogether broken down." Lord Russell's statement of the case will be long remembered: "The North fighting for empire, the South for independence." There is a grim sort of amusement to be derived from tracing the variations in tone of foreign opinion as the war progressed and its results began to appear. In 1870, when President Grant, in his annual message, insisted on the unconditional payment of the Alabama claims, about the time when Russia, taking advantage of the war between France and Germany, repudiated the chief clause in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the London *Times* adopts a much more condoling vein towards the United States. "The census of the present year," it said, "will probably show that the population of the United States amounts to 38,000,000, and neither turbulence nor self-assertion is required to make the United States within a short period the most powerful nation in the world."

Whether that period has since elapsed may be left to the conjecture of the reader. The peace of the country has continued unbroken since the war, and it would be hard for the very demon of mischief to discover on what side that peace might be invaded at present. A steady adherence to the Monroe doctrine has kept the nation free from those complications that so frequently embroil other and contiguous nations in war, while the vastness of its territory, the enterprise and boldness of the people, and their readiness to adapt themselves to any emergency, and discover the best way out of it, are a sufficient deterrent to any hostile power. Moreover, the 38,000,000 of 1870 have advanced to 48,000,000 in 1880. The national prosperity has kept pace with the national growth; or, rather, the two have worked hand in hand together. The people have kept strict faith with the world, and justified the confidence that was reposed in them. They steadily set their faces to the task, by so many deemed impossible, of paying their debts to the last farthing. The public debt reached its maximum in 1866, when it amounted to \$2,773,236,173. On the first of July, 1880, the public debt was \$2,195,090,455, thus showing a reduction in fourteen years of \$578,145,718. The annual interest charge on the debt, August 31st, 1865, was \$150,777,697; on July 1st, 1880, it had fallen to \$79,633,981, a reduction of \$71,343,716. The gold dollar that, in July, 1864, cost 285 cents in currency, now costs 100 cents in the same currency. These figures are full of an eloquence of their own, telling a long story of world-wide interest in the briefest possible terms.

It is not the enterprise and activity of the people, nor the vast natural resources and mineral wealth of the country, that have produced these wonderful results, and that make this entire conti-

nient to-day a very bee-hive of profitable industry. Heaven seems to have volunteered what to Homer would appear direct interposition in our behalf. For the last three seasons rain and storm, and damp and blight, have played havoc with the crops in all or most of the growing regions of Europe, while with us nature is prodigal of her sun and her smiles, and her ripening powers. All that in Europe has been destroyed in the way of products necessary for human existence, has been lavished and continues to be lavished on us in superabundance. So much so that our merchants, notwithstanding the expense of traffic and the other difficulties attending it, can transport their breadstuffs and meatstuffs, their cheese and fruits, productions of every kind, in fact, to Europe, and sell a better article at a cheaper rate, than the producers in the home markets, while American machinery, labor-saving and other, is forcing its way through the European centres, from London to the capitals of the newly erected principalities in Eastern Europe.

In truth the Old World is witnessing, and, with the reluctance of old ways and old traditions, slowly yielding to the irresistible pressure of an American invasion. It is an invasion of peace, prosperity, and good will; but it is destined to accomplish important results. There is now a constant and growing interchange between this country and Europe. It requires no extraordinary sagacity to detect something deeper in this movement than a passing to and fro of so much gold and silver, of so much butter and cheese, of so much corn and cattle. There is a moral current accompanying the material, an ebb and flow of ideas, an interchange of thought. Americans profit by the historic wealth and monuments and literary treasures that the ages have exhausted themselves in pouring into Europe. There all that we know of the greatest in art, in poetry, in philosophy, in the divine sciences, in sculpture and painting, in whatever adorns nations, refines minds, and imparts to cultivated human intelligence its sense of taste and harmony and finish, is to be found at almost every turn. We, on the other hand, convey to them the most vivid and conquering form of actual human life and achievement, in whatever accomplishes great and speedy results in overcoming and turning to man's account the forces of nature as ministers to his personal convenience and comfort. We have a vast continent to experiment on, and invite the exercise of our activity, and it willingly yields itself to the pressure. The vastness of the territory of the United States, the completeness of the roads of intercommunication by land and water, the variety of climate and of productions, secure this country, in the order of nature at least, from ever feeling the pressure that so frequently falls on other nations, the effects of bad harvests. If our crops fail in one

region they abound in a dozen others. So that the idea of famine can hardly come to us, even in imagination.

But it is not our material prosperity alone that impresses itself more and more on the sense of observers from outside. It is the security in which we enjoy it. We are neither threatened by foreign foe nor domestic broils. The army of the United States is comparatively an insignificant body, so far as numbers and cost go. The same is true of the naval armament and national defences generally. The world knows and recognizes that the nation is warlike, and capable of protecting itself from all attacks, but secure in its own strength, it is not a nation of soldiers. In Europe, the contrary is true. Great Britain is the only European power where military service is not compulsory. The annual expenditures of all the nations for military purposes constitute the heaviest items in their budgets. Taxes go on increasing instead of decreasing, at the same time that certain national industries are threatened by the prodigality of the national wealth and advantages of the United States. In every nation there are entire sections of the people who are permanent paupers, and other sections who are very few grades above the same condition. From the contrast between the inherited wealth and privileges of the noble classes and the grinding poverty of large masses, added to the exactions of the military systems and the expenses of the courts and royal personages, spring the social disaffections that are a permanent ground of trouble and danger to European society and governments. Even England is beginning to face a land difficulty, not in Ireland alone, but on its own soil. The land is held by comparatively few persons. There is a large agricultural class. But with the changed condition of things, owing to the inroads of American and Australian products, the English farmer finds that his labor is becoming less profitable every year. Twice within a short period has Mr. Gladstone reduced, by a considerable percentage each time, the rent on his estates. But this he did of his own free will. Other landlords are not willing to follow his example. And if the course of the English agricultural class is downwards, where is the matter to end? There are not wanting men of ability and influence with the laboring classes who point to the effective manner in which the French people dealt with the land question at the time of the first revolution. The nobles suffered, but the people and the country unquestionably gained. One method of relieving the difficulty is that adopted by Mr. Thomas Hughes and his company, who have purchased land for colonial purposes in East Tennessee; but England will scarcely be willing to see her agricultural classes despair of obtaining a living in their own country.

Indeed it would not be difficult to take up the whole order and

system of government in Europe, and show the influence which this country is exerting, by contrast at least, on the minds of those who are dissatisfied with certain features of it.

To sum up a few : there is no king or court here. The President, like all officials, is paid a fixed salary. If his son or daughter happens to marry there is no portion set apart by the nation for that purpose. It is purely their private concern. The support of royalty is one very great item struck out of the national expense in this country.

There is no established church here, and no favor displayed to any particular church or form of belief. In England, for instance, the majority of the people have to support the church of the minority. There is no grievance of that kind in the United States. Those who choose to build churches do so at their own risk and expense. In the complete separation of church and state there is no possibility of the occurrence of such bitter and heated controversies and strifes as have disturbed all European nations any time these three centuries down to this very day.

The military power is altogether subordinate and secondary to the civil. Bayonets have very little to do here. This removes at once a great burden and a great menace from the people.

There are no privileged classes before the law. This does not mean that there are no persons possessing power, for such persons must always be. The most powerful class in this country is perhaps the moneyed class, and the autocracy of wealth is only saved from becoming a possible grave public danger, (1) owing to the independent character of the national institutions and people; (2) to the shifting character of wealth and absence of an hereditary class. Wealth in the individual or family has thus far in American history nothing but a passing hold.

The abundant opportunities of life and industry, the native instinct to favor push and endeavor, the comparative ease of acquiring a means of livelihood, a home, education for one's children, and complete security in possession, are the great safeguards against the social disturbances that afflict the older nations. A man here easily becomes a holder, a possessor of something worth guarding, a vantage-ground from which he may advance to wider possession. That is the secret of true conservatism ; for conservatism is nothing else than an extended sense of self-preservation. A man with a vote is a very different being from a man without a vote. A man with a vote and property, even if the property represented no more than a shanty, is, if his mind be properly organized, a pillar of the state, a guardian of public order.

The government of the United States has passed from the region of experiment into one of proved and established fact. It is the

active exposition in conduct or results of popular sovereignty. It cannot be denied that the people of this country have used the extraordinary powers and resources at their disposal with singular good sense and right instincts, and in the interest of humanity. They have always welcomed the outer world to come in and share their good fortune. They continue this policy, and the world is awakening as it never before woke to the benefits to be derived from residence and citizenship in this country. Many evils that others groan under at home, and that their fathers groaned under before them, from generation to generation, are at once removed by joining in with this great swallower of political formulas. The mighty international questions and jealousies, that to Europeans are matters of such moment, and the causes of so many wars, are to Americans petty and mean, compared with the happiness and prosperity of a people. That is the lesson that this Republic is teaching and enforcing day by day on the attention of other powers. Popular government may have its dangers, as all governments must have; but as exemplified by a hundred years of existence in the United States, it at least guarantees to all honest citizens the inalienable right of a man to his own life and liberty, which implies a free pursuit of happiness. It does not make him a soldier against his will; it does not injure him by inventing hereditary privileges for a few; it leaves him at liberty to act and think and speak as he pleases, subject to the widest public law. It prescribes no church for him, and proscribes none. It offers every possible exercise for whatever activity is in him, with no drawbacks of class, or caste, or creed. It is to this that all civilized governments must come if they would command the universal allegiance of their subjects. There must be complete civil and religious liberty; there must be less wars, less armies, and less taxes for such purposes; there must be more restraint on the actions and ambitions of individual statesmen and monarchs; there must be more room for human life and activity, and more security in its possession. Until this be accomplished, widespread disaffection, occasionally breaking out in the feverish and fitful forms described at the opening of the article, will continue. The Republic of the United States is the best exponent of how to avoid the extremes of tyranny—the tyranny of the many or of the few, and to steer safely between the revolution from above and the revolution from below.

CATHOLICITY IN KENTUCKY.

THE ELDER FAMILY OF MARYLAND AND KENTUCKY.

IN these days, when to be exalted in the eyes of men is but too often to be suspected of infidelity to God, it is not to be supposed that the ordinary mind will be able to find any of the essentials of greatness in characters such as I profess to depict. And yet there was not one of those who are mainly to claim the reader's attention in this article, who was wanting in those characteristics and qualities of heart and mind, which combine to make the just and true, and therefore the truly great man. They were alike faithful to God and to right reason, to the Catholic traditions of their race and to truth, probity, and honor. Their sympathy was equally assured, whether the sentiment was elicited by human suffering, or by the gropings of a soul after verity in religion. Even as they prayed for mercy to themselves, they ceased not, while they lived, to scatter in the way of others, the seeds of mercy garnered in their own souls.

The surname *Elder* is not uncommon in the United States; neither is it in England and Ireland. Singularly enough, however, while the patronymic is owned in England almost exclusively by Catholics in religion, it adheres, very generally, at least, to Protestant dissenters in Ireland. In the United States, and so far as it is Catholic, the name is represented by the descendants of one, or, as some say, of two individual Catholics, who emigrated from Lancashire, England, to the colony of Maryland, not earlier than the year 1720.¹

Of members of the family now living in the United States, by far the greater number would seem to be impressed with the idea that the patriarch of their race in America was one William Elder, an Englishman, born in Lancashire in 1707, who emigrated to Maryland, not earlier than 1728, and not later than 1732. Without stopping here to record my own doubts of the correctness of this notion, and for the reason that the patriarch referred to has

¹ I am unable to agree with certain members of the family who assert that their American progenitor was a fellow-voyager with Cecil Calvert, and one of the original colonists of St. Mary's. It is well known that the three heads of families of this name who emigrated to Kentucky claimed no more distant relationship with each other than that of second cousin, and that the father of the most conspicuous amongst them was a native of Lancashire, England, born in 1707, who had reached his majority before he came to America. As a question of fact, it is difficult to determine whether or not all Catholics in this country who bear the name of Elder, have descent from a single or from two parent founts on this side of the Atlantic. This point will be found treated in a note further on.

a defined history, wanting in the case of another, if there was really another source of descent for some Catholics who bear the name in this country, I propose to begin my series of personal sketches with one of

WILLIAM ELDER, 1707-1775.

William Elder, so to say, was a born Catholic. His descent was from those who had kept the faith when its rejection would have insured their worldly prosperity. Before his birth, and long after his expatriation, indeed, there was little freedom for Catholics in England. They were not then subjected, to be sure, to such remorseless persecutions as had distinguished the days of their fathers; but they were still sufficiently hampered in the exercise of their liberty, civil and religious, to render their situation one of great trial and of constant annoyance.

No one who is familiar with the history of the Church of God has failed to discover that the noblest examples of fidelity to the law of conscience are to be found precisely where Divine Wisdom has taught us to look for them: "Blessed are you when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake." It was in an atmosphere of hostility to his religion that William Elder first drew breath, and in which he lived and moved from infancy to early manhood. Well for him, possibly, and well for his posterity, that such was the case. As self-reliance is most readily learned in the school of adversity, so devotion to principle has its greatest expansion where its suppression is sought through the medium of persecution.

It was most likely soon after he had reached his majority that William Elder left his native land and came to America. As early as the year 1733 we find him living with his first wife, Ann Wheeler, who had already borne him several children, in St. Mary's County, Maryland.¹ In the year 1734, as is supposed, he removed to Frederick County, where he bought and cultivated a farm, upon which he built for the occupancy of the family a comfortable residence. To this house, which stood in close proximity to the site now occupied by the College of St. Mary, is attached an interesting history.

Upon leaving England, William Elder had not left behind him, as he had fondly hoped, the proscriptive laws enacted by the home government in contravention of the rights of its Catholic subjects. The old colonial laws giving to all men unrestricted liberty to worship according to conscience, to which Catholics in religion had

¹ I am inclined to the belief that the marriage of William Elder with Ann Wheeler took place in England, and that, soon after that event, the pair took passage for America.

given form and shape, force and effect, were now abrogated in Maryland, and in their stead a law was in force by the terms of which Catholics were forbidden to build, hold, or occupy structures, designed for public religious worship. In order to acquit themselves of their religious obligations, the proscribed Catholic people of the colony were obliged to resort to the expedient of fitting up chapels in private houses. In constructing his dwelling, William Elder had in view the anomalous situation in which himself and his co-religionists were placed by the law referred to. His parlor chapel was not only the largest room in his house, but its area was equal to the aggregate of all the other rooms in the house. Here it was that the Catholic residents of the district were wont to meet for divine service, and here they were shriven, and afterwards fed with bread from heaven, until the dawn of a brighter day witnessed their release from civil degradation and official espionage.¹

In 1739 death invaded the home of the pioneer, taking from him the mother of his children. The pair had been very happy together, and the survivor naturally felt deeply the great loss he had sustained. Ann Wheeler Elder is represented as having been a woman of rare good qualities, faithful to every duty pertaining to her state of life, diligent in the management of her household, and of singular piety.²

Having remained a widower for several years, William Elder

¹ The Elder mansion, near Emmetsburg, though then tottering to its fall, was still standing as late as the year 1850. For many years before, it had been an object of interest to the Catholics of the State, and especially to such of them as were able to claim descent from its builder and first proprietor. There is scarcely a trace of it to be seen at the present day.

² Ann Wheeler Elder bore to her husband five children, four boys and one girl. These were named: William, Guy, Charles, Mary, and Richard. Of the first named I have been able to learn nothing beyond the fact that his wife was a Miss Wickham. Guy Elder was twice married. By his second wife he had thirteen children, viz., Joseph, Judith, James, Polly, Benjamin, Patsey, Ellen, Rebecca, Guy, Priscilla, Edward, Thomas, and George. "The four first named," a Maryland correspondent writes me, "all went to Kentucky." The wife of Charles Elder was Julia Ward, of Charles County, Maryland. The descendants of the pair are very numerous, and they are scattered all over the West and South. Their immediate off-spring numbered twelve children, eleven sons and one daughter. One of the sons married Catharine Mudd, of Maryland, and one of their children was the late Rev. Alexius I. Elder, a most estimable priest, who was long identified in an official capacity with the Sulpician College of St. Mary, Baltimore. The only daughter of Charles Elder intermarried with Charles Montgomery, who removed with his family to Kentucky about the year 1795. Two of their sons, Samuel H. and Stephen Montgomery, were ordained priests of the Order of St. Dominic by Bishop Flaget, at the Seminary of St. Thomas, in Kentucky, in September, 1816. Mary Elder, the only daughter of Ann Wheeler Elder, intermarried with Richard Lilly, of Maryland, and through her children the family became connected with that of the McSherrys of Virginia. Of Richard, son and youngest child of William and Ann Elder, I have been able to learn only that his wife was a Miss Phoebe Deloyzier.

took to wife, most likely in 1744, Jacoba Clementina, daughter of Arnold Livers, Esq., *gentleman*. This Arnold Livers, an Englishman by birth, had been an active and noted partisan of James II. Upon the collapse of that weak and unfortunate monarch's cause, he had been obliged to fly his native land, and now he was the proprietor of a large estate in Maryland.¹ Of this second wife of William Elder, the traditions preserved in the family speak nothing but praise. She bore to her husband four sons and two daughters, and not by these was her motherly influence felt more beneficially than it was by her step-children. While her husband lived she shared with him the respect and confidence of all to whom they were known, and during her long widowhood of thirty-two years she was venerated as a true mother in Israel.² The names of her children were Elizabeth, Arnold, Thomas, Ignatius, Ann, and Aloysius. It was from the second named that title came to the ecclesiastical authorities of Maryland for the farm upon which now stands the structure known as Mount St. Mary's College. With the exception of Thomas Elder, who removed to Kentucky in 1799, the writer has no knowledge concerning the after lives of her other children.³

¹ It is said of Arnold Livers, in explanation of the singular name given by him to his daughter, that he had registered a vow that his first child, whether boy or girl, should be called *James*. The good priest to whom the child was presented for baptism found no difficulty in complying with the father's wishes, and so the babe was christened *Jacoba Clementina*. The Livers family of Maryland was afterwards represented in Kentucky by quite a number of the latter's leading Catholic citizens. Among these were Robert and Henry Livers, of Nelson, and Thomas Livers, of Washington County.

² In the old Catholic cemetery, about half a mile below St. Mary's College, and near the town of Emmetsburg, three stones mark the graves of William, Ann Wheeler, and Jacoba Clementina Elder. The inscriptions, which are still distinct, record their names, and dates of birth and death: William Elder, born in 1747, died April 22d, 1775; Ann Wheeler Elder, born 1709, died August 11th, 1739; Jacoba Clementina Elder, born 1717, died September 19th, 1807.

³ Through the kindness of Mrs. Mary Howell Dawson, a great-granddaughter of the writer, I was recently permitted to examine a letter written by Jacoba Clementina Elder, and addressed to her granddaughter, Nancy Elder, who, a short while before its date, had accompanied her father to Kentucky. The letter bears date, "Maryland, at Harry Spalding's, November 21st, 1800." She begins complainingly, first in respect to her own bodily infirmities, and then of her inability to do certain things for lack of money. "Nevertheless," she goes on, "I would have gone in debt for five pounds of snuff to send you, could I have found a conveyance for it. I saw Rev. Mr. Smith yesterday," she continues, "and I gave him your message. He was glad to hear from you." (This Rev. Mr. Smith was none other than the Prince Priest, Rev. Demetrius A. Gallitzin, who, for some time previous to her father's removal to Kentucky, was charged with the mission of the district in which the family resided.) From what follows it would appear that Miss Nancy Elder, in writing to her grandmother, had instituted a comparison between her then Kentucky pastor and the one who had discharged the duties of the office for her in Maryland, which was not especially favorable to the former. "I do hope," she writes, "that you will all learn to

THOMAS ELDER, 1748—1832.

The merits and demerits of men are rarely recognized to their full extent while they are yet living. Good and evil dispositions and habits are not only transmissible, but they are ordinarily transmitted to one's children. Hence it is that the stream of human being that has its source from a pure fountain is very generally found to be pure throughout its reaches. We have already seen what manner of man was the father of Thomas Elder. Equally admirable was the character of the son, and equally upright in the sight of God and men was his walk in life.

Of the very many former Catholic citizens of Maryland who emigrated to Kentucky at an early day in the history of the State, there was not one who left to his posterity the record of brighter virtues practiced in life than did Thomas Elder, of Cox's Creek settlement. Writing to the compiler of this history, an aged priest of the Diocese of Louisville thus refers to him: "Of course you have heard good things of Thomas Elder." Regarding others of the same settlement, he speaks in detail of their good qualities, and of the special characteristics which entitle them to commendation and Christian remembrance. Of this patriarch only he has nothing to say beyond his words quoted. He was evidently unable to conceive that any Catholic born and raised in the county of his residence should be less familiar than he was himself with whatever was distinguishing in a character so elevated as was that of Thomas Elder.

The subject of this sketch was born at the Elder homestead, near Emmettsburg, Maryland, on the 4th day of January, 1748. His childhood and youth were passed with his parents, by whom he was trained in love of knowledge, especially of that knowledge which is necessary in the service of God. In the year 1771 he took to wife Elizabeth Spalding, a sister of Basil Spalding, Esq., of Charles County, and shortly after that event he removed to and occupied a farm in Harbough's Valley, Frederick County, where he lived for twenty-eight years, and where his family of eleven children had their birth.¹

have the same opinion of that Father (Rev. Stephen Theodore Badin, no doubt) that you did of Rev. Mr. Smith." After giving her correspondent much grandmotherly advice, she thus concludes her epistle: "You are the only one who is good enough to write to me. Write often, dear Nancy, and never do you forget me in your pious prayers. With my blessing to you, I remain your ever affectionate grandmother,

"CLEMENTINA ELDER."

¹ The names of these, in the order of their birth, were:

1. Anne or Nancy, born July 1, 1772; lived single, and died in Bardstown, Ky., in 1844.

2. Basil Spalding, born October 29, 1773; married Elizabeth Snowden, November

It was most likely in the year 1799, that Thomas Elder broke up his establishment in Harbough's Valley and removed to Kentucky. He was doubtless moved to this step by his solicitude for his children's temporal interests. His own worldly circumstances had hitherto barely enabled him to live in comfort, and he was naturally anxious regarding the future of his large family of sons and daughters. He had already friends in Kentucky, and it is to be presumed that these had written to him glowing accounts of the wholesomeness of the climate, the fertility of the soil, the cheapness of the lands, and of the reasonable assurance he would have, should he conclude to follow them to the West, that he would be enabled thereby to give to his children at least a start in life. They told him something else, without the knowledge of which, it is fair to say, he would have remained a fixture in Maryland for the remainder of his life. He learned from them that they were provided with a pastor of souls, whose visits to the settlement were not less frequent than once in the month. With the exception of his eldest son, Basil S., who was already engaged in business in Baltimore, Thomas Elder was accompanied to Kentucky by his entire family. He was also accompanied by Mrs. — Spalding, a widowed sister-in-law, and her infant daughter. In due course of time, and without disaster by the way, the travellers reached Gardiner's Station, on Cox's Creek, where they were warmly welcomed by their former neighbors of Maryland, and where the father of the family set up his tabernacle for life.

The traditions of the times, still preserved in the congregation of Saint Michael's, Fairfield, are filled with references to Thomas Elder. They represent him as a man whose every appearance was

18, 1801; died in Baltimore, October 13, 1869. (The death of his wife occurred February 20, 1860.)

3. Catharine, born March 7, 1776; was the second wife of Joseph Gardiner, Esq., of Nelson County, Ky.; date of death unknown. (Three of her step-children became Sisters of Charity of the Nazareth Community. One of these, the late Mother Frances Gardiner, was for many years Superior of the Sisterhood.)

4. William Pius, born May 4, 1778; died in Baltimore, August 22, 1799.

5. Clementina, born June 16, 1780; married Richard Clarke; died in Nelson County, Ky., on the 21st of August, 1851.

6. Ignatius, born July 21, 1782; married Monica Greenwell; date of death unknown.

7. Theresa, born March 1, 1785; died unmarried, in Nelson County, Ky., December 19, 1816.

8. Thomas Richard, born June 14, 1789; married Caroline Clements; died July 11, 1835.

9. Christiana, born October 30, 1791; married John B. Wight; date of death unknown.

10. Mary Elizabeth, born May 15, 1794; married John Tarboe; date of death unknown.

11. Maria M., born April 29, 1791; married John Howell; died ———

suggestive of the idea of sanctity. In his face there were no hard lines to index the workings of a passionate nature; no expression that was not attractive of love and confidence. He was an austere man, but his austerities were practiced in the privacy of his own house. With those who knew him best he was most remarkable for his mildness and amiability, and for his habits of practical goodness. It was his delight to take little children by the hand and to lead them in the ways of holiness. So conspicuously upright was the whole tenor of his life that he was held in almost as much esteem by non-Catholics as he was by his own co-religionists. Sixty years ago there were few Catholics in Kentucky who had not "heard good things of Thomas Elder;" and to this day his name is blessed by thousands because of his transmitted virtues—virtues derived from the parent fount by the children, and by them transmitted to their offspring to the present generation. To make this idea clear, it is but necessary to point to the lives of two of his children, and to that of his adopted daughter, the late Reverend Mother Catharine Spalding, of the Nazareth Community of Sisters of Charity.

For more than sixty years, and to the date of his death, there was not in the entire country a Catholic citizen who was more widely known or more deservedly esteemed, than the late Basil Spalding Elder, of Baltimore. From the days of Dr. Carroll to those of Dr. M. J. Spalding there was not an occupant of the Metropolitan See of Baltimore that did not recognize in him a power for the general good of the entire Catholic body of the United States. He was not alone an example for Catholics in the performance of specific duty, but he led them through his own earnestness to the heights beyond, where the virtues of the Christian grow lustrous in the light shed from heaven. Like his father and grandfather, he sought to train his children in knowledge and virtue, to the end of their welfare for eternity. The survivors of these are scattered now, but wherever they are, not one of them is to be found who has abandoned his faith, or has ceased to walk in the selfsame way of salvation that was traced by the feet of his fathers.¹

¹ Basil S. Elder and his wife, Elizabeth Snowden, were the parents of thirteen children, three of whom died in infancy. One of his daughters, Eleonora, became a Sister of Charity. She still survives at the mother house of the order, Emmetsburg, Md. Another daughter, Mrs. Jenkins, died in Havana, in 1846; another, Mrs. Baldwin, in Baltimore, in 1872. Of their male children seven survive to the present day, viz.: Francis W., in Baltimore; Basil T., in St. Louis; James C., in Baton Rouge, La.; Joseph E., in Denver, Colorado; Thomas S., in New Orleans; William Henry (late Bishop of Natchez, and now Coadjutor Bishop of the See of his residence), in Cincinnati, and Charles D., in New Orleans. Basil S. Elder lost his wife in February, 1860, when he had himself reached the eighty-seventh year of his age. He felt the bereavement keenly, and a little later, when the late civil war was at its height,

Clementina Elder, so named from her grandmother, was as remarkable for her intelligence as she was for her filial devotion, and for the exactitude with which she performed every duty of her state of life. Her religion was for daily and hourly wear, and from childhood to old age she was a pattern of Christian piety and meekness. About the year 1807 she became the wife of Richard Clarke, whose father, Clement Clarke, had emigrated from Maryland, and settled on Simpson's Creek, Nelson County, about the year 1788.¹

When she was fairly settled in her new home, Mrs. Clarke induced her father to transfer to her care and guardianship his adopted daughter, Catharine Spalding, whose mother was now dead. It is beyond doubt that the latter was indebted to her foster mother for the training by which she was prepared for the important work of charity to which her life was devoted after her nineteenth year. Among the many of the gentler sex in Kentucky who gave up their whole lives to the service of God and their neighbors, not another has lived and died in peace whose name is held to the present day in greater reverence than is that of Mother Catharine Spalding. From the day she vowed herself to God, and was named Superior of the little religious community which has grown in our day into one whose influence for good is coextensive with the State and reaches far beyond its borders, to that upon which, reclining upon ashes, she surrendered herself to her Heavenly Bridegroom, she appeared to have no other object in life but to render faithful service to her divine Lord and Master, and to *His* afflicted representatives in the world, the poor and the fatherless.²

Of Clementina Clarke's children, most of whom were known to the writer, reference here need be made but to one, the late Rev. William Elder Clarke, of the diocese of Louisville. The most

the old gentleman happened to lose the time-piece he had been in the habit of carrying for more than sixty years. While making an ineffectual search for the missing article, he was heard to exclaim: "I have lost my precious wife, I have lost my good old watch, and I have lost my country! It is time I was myself called home." His death, as stated elsewhere, took place on the 13th October, 1869.

¹ One of their descendants tells me that immediately after their marriage the pair set out for the home that had been prepared for their reception, near the residence of the groom's parents. The cabin was new, but neither had it been finished nor furnished. Upon reaching their destination the husband thus improvised their bridal bed: upon the bare earthen floor he laid three rough slabs, or puncheons, of the requisite length. On these he spread a layer of flexible withes, cut from the undergrowth of the forest by which the place was surrounded, and upon these he laid his tow-linen straw-filled bed. Their covering was a buffalo robe. On awaking in the morning they found themselves under a mantle of white—two inches of snow having fallen upon them in the night.

² Mother Catharine Spalding died on the 20th of March, 1858, at the St. Vincent's Orphan Asylum, Louisville, which institution she may be said to have founded.

lovable character that has hitherto adorned the holy ministry in Kentucky was this fourth remove from the American patriarch of his family. So free was he from asperities that he was loved of every one, and so pure was his life that there was an element of reverence intermixed with the love he incited in the breasts of all who were happy enough to be of the number of his acquaintances. He was not unfrequently referred to as "the pet of the clergy of Kentucky." He was much more than that, however. He was for them an exemplar of piety unaffected, of purity that was angelic, and of goodness that was limitless. His entire character was a reminder to those who knew him intimately, and especially to his associates of the clergy, of that given by sacred history and tradition to "the beloved disciple." He lived a life that was useful to thousands, and when he died strong men wept like children.¹

Ripe for heaven, and leaving behind him the record of a life that was as remarkable for its social amenities as it was for its near approach to the perfection of Christianity, Thomas Elder passed to his reward in the eighty-eighth year of his age, December 27th, 1832.²

JAMES ELDER, 1761-1845.

James Elder, the first Catholic of his name to emigrate to Kentucky, was born in Frederick County, Maryland, in 1760. The name of his father was Guy Elder, and that of his grandfather William Elder. But, by some of the descendants of the latter named patriarch, a sketch of whose life has already been given to the reader, it is regarded as doubtful whether his paternity is to be properly traced to their American progenitor.³

¹ The death of Father Clarke took place at St. Mary's College, Marion County, Kentucky, on the 5th day of March, 1850. He was at the time in the 41st year of his age.

² The widow of Thomas Elder and her oldest daughter, Nancy, passed the last years of their lives in Bardstown. I remember them well, and of wondering, as I saw them creeping with feeble steps to and from church, which of the two was the older. They were greatly venerated, as much by the clergy as by the laity, and the peaceful deaths which they had hoped and prayed for from childhood to extreme old age, came to them at length. The daughter died in 1844, aged 72 years. The death of the mother, at the advanced age of 98 years, took place on the 30th day of August, 1848.

³ In the United States, where, it is safe to say, not one in ten of the population knows anything about his ancestry beyond the names of his grandparents, the attempt to designate degrees of consanguinity between families of a common origin in the long past cannot be otherwise than a work in which the compiler of family history is beset with doubts at every stage of his inquiry. But for a single well-attested fact I could readily believe with the majority of Catholics who now bear the name in the United States that they are all the descendants of the patriarch already referred to. That personage, it will be remembered, had a son by his first wife to whom was given the name of Guy. He had also a son by his second wife who was called Thomas. These two were, consequently, half brothers, and the relationship between either and the children of the other was certainly that of *uncle* and *nephews*. James and William Elder, reputed sons of Guy,

In 1791 James Elder, who had shortly before taken to wife Ann Richards, a non-Catholic, of Frederick County, emigrated to Kentucky, and settled on lands bordering on Hardin's Creek. For several years before the date mentioned there had been a stream of emigration from the Catholic counties of Maryland to the same district of country, and now the colony was considered one of the most prosperous in the State. Young and energetic, and more than ordinarily intelligent, the new-comer soon came to be regarded by his fellow colonists as a most valuable acquisition to their ranks and society; and sooner still he became endeared to them on account of his extraordinary civic and Christian virtues. His residence was only a few miles removed from St. Stephen's, the nominal home of Father Badin, and between the two there was not only fixed friendship, but unity of purpose in everything having for its object the exaltation of the Holy Church in the eyes of men.

As has been already said, James Elder's marriage had been with a non-Catholic. Very shortly after his removal to Kentucky, however, he had the happiness of witnessing the reception of his wife into the Church by baptism. From that day until the one upon which the aged woman, then a disconsolate widow, knelt beside the lifeless form of her husband and besought God's mercy in behalf of the departed soul, the wife and the husband were equally noted for their devotion to Catholic truth, and for their correspondence with the sublime laws of morality and charity established by the Church and its divine Head.¹

and grandsons of William, removed to Kentucky in 1791. Eight years later their reputed uncle, Thomas, emigrated to the State and settled on Cox's Creek, in Nelson County. They were well known to each other, and unless their relationship was very distant, it is not to be supposed that they were not aware of its exact degree. But it is quite certain that the two first were in the habit of referring to the last named as their cousin, and he to them in like manner. The inference naturally arises that the acknowledged patriarch of one branch of the Elder family of the United States was not the first of his race and religion to come to America. It is my conviction that he was preceded to the colony of Maryland by a cousin, older than himself, whose Christian and surnames were identical with his own, and that it is from this now unknown progenitor that numbers of Catholics bearing the name in this country have their descent. I am strengthened in this opinion by the testimony of the surviving children of James Elder. One of these, J. Reason Elder, of Spencer County, Kentucky, writes me: "My father and Thomas Elder, of Fairfield, were *cousins*." The venerable Sister Emily Elder, of the Nazareth Community, writes: "My father and Thomas Elder were distantly related. I think they were *second cousins*."

¹ The children borne to her husband by Ann Richards Elder were named, in the order of their birth: Ellen, George, Guy, Thomas, Benedict, J. Reason, James, and Ann. The second named became a priest, and the last a Sister of Charity. Two only survive to the present day, viz., J. Reason Elder, of Spencer County, Kentucky, and Ann (Sister Emily), of the Nazareth Community. To both of these I am indebted for much valuable information touching their family history. Sister Emily be-

Though there were certainly shades of difference in the characters of the two, James Elder resembled in much his relation of the Cox's Creek settlement. In a no less degree than was the case with that earnest Christian, he was a lover of the truth and a faithful son of the Holy Church. Like him, too, he was indefatigable in his efforts to imbue the minds of his non-Catholic neighbors with correct notions respecting religion. He was like him in the devotion he made of his time and knowledge to the religious instruction of Catholic children. He was more excitable than Thomas Elder, much fonder of controversy, and had a readier wit. He was an incessant reader, especially of the Bible, and so exact was known to be his knowledge of Holy Writ that even Protestants, not unfrequently, were in the habit of making him the arbiter of their disputes regarding the proper application that was to be attached to certain of its passages. He was never known to decline an overture to discuss points of doctrine with any leader of Protestant opinion in his neighborhood, and it is to this day a tradition in the congregation of Saint Charles, that he was never worsted in any one of his polemical combats. His zeal, too, was ordinarily governed by prudence, and it is doubtful if there was another Catholic in the State who rendered more efficient service to religion by preparing converts for baptism.

Writing of her parents, Sister Emily, of the Nazareth Community, thus refers to their manner of life: "My father was regular in his habits. He arose every morning at 3 o'clock, and he called the family an hour later. The interval was given to his private devotions. When the family was assembled he gave out morning prayers, and from this exercise, as well as that with which the labors of the day were closed, he would permit none to be absent without a valid excuse. I shall never forget the short admonition he was in the habit of addressing to us every night after prayers. 'My children,' he would say, 'let your last thoughts before you go to sleep, and your first when you awake be of death, judgment, heaven, and hell.' In Lent he was in the habit of adding to our evening devotions the Litany of the Saints and a chapter from the Sacred Scriptures. Night and morning, before retiring to rest and before going about our usual occupations it was a custom with us children to kneel and ask the blessing of father and mother. Even after his ordination to the priesthood our elder brother never omitted this formulary when he visited his parents. My father

came a pupil of the Nazareth school at its formation in 1814. She afterwards entered the community, of which she has been a most useful and deserving member for nearly sixty years. That will be a sad day for the sisterhood when her pleasant face and cheery voice shall have become but memories of the community's recreation-hall at Nazareth.

used to say that he was 'proud of his children, proud of his stock, and proud of his fame.' I think it was the opinion of all those who knew him best that he was still more proud of being a Catholic Christian."

James Elder died on the 15th day of August, 1845. His widow survived him twelve years, her death having taken place, in the 96th year of her age, on the 8th day of January, 1857.¹

¹ The above sketch would be incomplete without reference being made to James Elder's eldest son, the late Reverend George A. M. Elder. I knew him when I was a child, and much better after I had grown to manhood; and I can say that to depict his character, virtues, and services to the church and society, even were I capable of presenting them in a proper manner, would require more space than has been given to this entire article. He was born at his father's place, on Hardin's Creek, on the 11th day of August, 1794. His first educators were his parents. He was afterwards sent to the college of St. Mary, Emmetsburg, from which institution, several years later, he was transferred to the seminary of the Sulpician Fathers, Baltimore, where he finished his theological studies. Conjointly with the late Reverend William Byrne, founder of St. Mary's College, Kentucky, he was raised to the priesthood by Right Reverend John B. David, in the then new Cathedral of Saint Joseph, Bardstown, on the 19th September, 1819. Soon afterwards, by the direction of his Ordinary, he undertook the seriously difficult task of founding an institution of learning at Bardstown. The result of his labors in this direction was the establishment of the since well-known college of St. Joseph. With the exception of three years—1827-30—spent by him on the mission of Scott County, Father Elder's entire life as a priest was devoted to educational work in this institution. His death took place at Bardstown on the 28th of September, 1838.

Father Elder was tall and sparely built, affable in manner and graceful in all his movements. His friends were of all classes of society, and of enemies he had none. Though occupying, during almost the entire term of his ministerial life, the difficult post of president of an institution in which were domiciled from one hundred to two hundred and fifty young men—a large proportion of whom were natives of Louisiana and Mississippi, and consequently, if there be any truth in the generally accepted saying, "a hot sun breeds a hot temper," may be supposed to have been difficult of control—I really do not think he ever had an enemy in the college. He had evidently studied human nature to some purpose. He won hearts by making it clear to the perception of all that he was himself possessed of the most loving of hearts. As a preacher, too, Mr. Elder more frequently addressed himself to the sensibilities of his hearers than to their reason. He seemed to be convinced of the fact that a cold heart is little fitted to perceive either the beauties or the sublime truths of the Catholic faith. His voice, whether in reading or speaking, was irresistibly pathetic. He was in the habit, on the evenings of Holy Thursday, of preaching the passion sermon, and on these occasions few among his auditors were enabled to restrain their tears. In 1836 I began the publication, in Bardstown, Ky., of the *Catholic Advocate*. The editors appointed to conduct the paper were Reverend M. J. Spalding, Reverend H. De Luynes, Reverend William E. Clarke, and Reverend George A. M. Elder. The articles written by Mr. Elder were principally addressed to parents, and referred to the training and education of children. He had an idea that children were susceptible of moral guidance at a very early age, and he urged his views on this and other matters relative to parental obligations in a series of well-written and exceedingly interesting papers. He continued to write for the *Advocate* until he was seized with his last illness. I shall ever remember the gloom which the report of his dangerous illness spread throughout the entire community. I was seated, on the evening of his death, in the parlor of a friend, since deceased, and was conversing with several members of his family, when suddenly the tolling of the Cathedral bell hushed our voices into

WILLIAM ELDER, 1757-1822 (SUPPOSED).

Together with his wife and several children William Elder came to Kentucky in 1791, a few months after the arrival in the State of his brother James, and settled near the latter's residence on Hardin's Creek.¹ In the year 1804, he removed to what is known as Flint Island, Breckinridge, now Meade County, where he passed the remainder of his life, and reared a large and interesting family of children.² A number of Catholic families had previously settled in the county, on or near a stream known as Long Lick, but these were too far removed to admit of close association with their coreligionists, whose solitary cabin overlooked the Ohio at Flint Island. The isolated family was not neglected, however, by Father Badin, and in the course of time, the house of Mr. Elder became a Church-station for that ubiquitous missionary priest, and a little later, for his younger associates, Fathers Nerinckx, Schaffer, and Abell. William Elder did not live to see the organization of the now large and flourishing congregation of St. Theresa, Flint Island, but he is justly regarded as its patriarch. Like the others of his race of whom it has been the writer's privilege to speak, he lived an earnest Christian life; he was held in the highest esteem by his neighbors, and his children, one and all, were representative Catholics in the localities in which their lives were passed.³

awe. Not a word was spoken until the iron clang again thrilled through our ears, when, with a choking sob, one of the ladies present exclaimed, "O God, he is dead!" Few were the homes, indeed, wherein was heard that tolling bell in which tears and sighs and prayers were not the fitting accompaniment.

¹ Lafayette Elder, Esq., of Owensboro, Kentucky, writes me that William Elder, who was his grandfather, was a cousin, and not the father, to James Elder; but both of the latter's living children assure me that this is a mistake.

² Four of his sons grew to manhood, married, and had families. These were: Arnold, who died in 1830; William, whose death took place in 1854; William, who died in 1843, and John, who lived near Hardinsburg, Kentucky, and whose death took place as late as 1876. The descendants of these are numerous in Breckinridge, Daviess, and Meade counties. Of William Elder's family of daughters I have only learned that one became the wife of Peter Tarboe; that another married Walter Read, and a third, Peter Bruner.

³ One of these, Samuel Elder, married for his second wife Susan McGill, a daughter of David McGill, a most estimable Catholic resident of Breckinridge County. Their second son, born in 1829, was the late Rev. Joseph Elder, of the Diocese of Louisville, who was raised to the priesthood by Dr. M. J. Spalding, then Bishop of Louisville, in 1855. Almost immediately afterwards he was commissioned by his Ordinary to organize a congregation of English-speaking Catholics for the Eastern wards of the city of Louisville. The older members of the congregation of St. John, Clay, and Walnut streets, of which Rev. Lawrence Bax has been pastor for a quarter of a century, will remember with what earnestness he labored to establish the parish, and the gratifying results that followed his efforts. In 1856 Father Elder was transferred to St. Mary's College, of which institution he was for several years the vice-president. It was in 1861, if I mistake not, that he was named pastor of the Church of St. Francis

BISHOP STEVENS ON AURICULAR CONFESSION AND PRIVATE ABSOLUTION.

Auricular Confession and Private Absolution. Address of the Rt. Rev. William Bacon Stevens, D.D., LL.D., delivered at the Annual Convention of the Diocese of Pennsylvania, Tuesday, May 11th, 1880. Published by order of the Convention. Philadelphia: McCalla & Stavely, Printers, 1880.

BEFORE the appearance of our last number, a friend sent us a copy of this pamphlet, with a request that we should make it the subject of an elaborate review. This we declined to do, as neither its theology nor its polemical style was such as to entitle it to serious or respectful consideration. Besides, in the main issue were involved domestic differences, about which Catholics, as such, do not care to trouble themselves.

Bishop Stevens, so far as his teaching authority goes, which is no great length, distinctly affirms (and we think in this he is correct) that the American Episcopal denomination does not believe in confession and absolution, and has given practical evidence of its disbelief by suppressing all that had survived in the English prayer book or ritual that might possibly be tortured into a faint lingering shadow of belief in those prominent features of the Catholic Sacrament of Penance, oral confession, and priestly absolution. From this it would clearly follow that American Episcopalians, if their church possessed any authority to teach, are either forbidden, or at least not required, to believe in the value or necessity of confession and absolution. But neither Bishop Stevens nor his church can go a step beyond giving their opinions. And their opinions, like their enactments, can secure at best some show of outward respect, outward conformity. They have no power, like the decisions of the true Church, to reach the soul and bind the conscience. The Episcopal denomination in this country is behind no other sect in holding strictly to the "sacred right" of private judgment, and avows it by her official name, "the *Protestant* Episcopal Church in the United States." Hence the whole question remains exactly where it was before the publication of Bishop Stevens's pamphlet, and where it ever will remain. The bishop has his opinion which he shares with the great majority. The scanty minority think differently;

Xavier, Raywick, where the remaining eight years of his life were passed, and where he endeared himself to his parishioners, as much by his amiability as by the interest exhibited in their spiritual advancement. Father Joseph Elder died of consumption in the 39th year of his age, June 29th, 1868. The Elder Homestead, near Flint Island, is now owned and occupied by Samuel T. Elder, Esq., a grandson of the original proprietor.

and both, as usual, find their warrant in Scripture. Instead of each holding peaceably to his interpretation, they prefer to fight about it, the majority endeavoring to force its opinion, or conjecture, for it is nothing more, on the reluctant minority. What can Catholic outsiders do but grimly smile, as they behold the predictions of our fathers and theologians of three hundred years ago so fully verified in the history and workings of private judgment, which is the cardinal principle of heresy, and which, nevertheless, heretics will uphold only against the Church, but despise and disown when dealing with one another! Otherwise, the bishop's pamphlet and his troubles with St. Clement's Church are matters which concern us very little. It is simply domestic warfare, a quarrel between two factions of a sect, one of which angrily denounces, the other timidly adopts, some faded remnants of Catholic doctrine and practice; both starting from the principle of private judgment, even if it be not honestly and consistently carried out. And with this illogical faction-fight we have perhaps no right, certainly no disposition, to interfere.

Another reason why we were unwilling to notice this pamphlet was its loose, undignified, un-Christian talk about the immorality of the confessional. Bishop Stevens holds a high and honored position in the denomination to which he belongs, and we should be unwilling to class him with the men in whose wake he is following. But it is simply impossible for any one who has been a reader of theological controversy in England and this country for the last forty or fifty years to shut his eyes to the fact, that all or nearly all that has been alleged and is current amongst us about the immorality of the confessional, comes originally from wicked and immoral men, who were expelled from the Catholic Church because of their immorality, and yet were enabled—such is the incredible blindness of bigotry—to find their way not only into the communion, but into the ministry and pulpit of the various Protestant sects, and, amongst others, of the Episcopal Church. Some of these men are yet living; one of them known to few and almost forgotten, in this very State of Pennsylvania. Need we recall the names of the Smiths, Hogans, Connollys, Leahys, Achillis, Leonis, Gilberts, among many others of lesser note, whose writings excited the disgust of all honest Protestants, and whose public lectures at times gave occasion to riot and bloodshed? What has been the subsequent fate of such men? Their end has been in most cases the jail or penitentiary; in all the utter neglect and contempt into which they were hurled or allowed to sink by their former admirers. Is it in connection with these base, unprincipled adventurers, who use the same language in attacking the Catholic Sacrament of Penance that Bishop Stevens wishes to have his name remembered hereafter by

his descendants, his State, and his country? We hope not. He can scarcely be so old as to have forgotten those wandering pests of society; but he should not forget that it is neither safe nor becoming to ally oneself with such an unholy set, or choose for imitation such knavish models. Even were the confessional a faulty human institution, instead of a divine ordinance and a great blessing as the Church holds it to be, no theologian who has a particle of Christian decency or self-respect should, in impugning it, condescend to re-echo the words of such men. No honest Christian should sing even praise to God in the company of this vile, lewd crew.

Such were our reasons for judging the bishop's production totally undeserving of refutation, and not entitled even to bare mention in this REVIEW. And if we now give it the benefit of a mere passing notice, it is because we have since learned on good authority that this insulting pamphlet has not only been thrust into Catholic hands by some of its blind admirers, but has also been made to find its way surreptitiously into Catholic families. This may be zeal, but it is neither good taste nor good manners. The spirit of bigotry, however, is not disposed to stick at such trifles.

It is no part of our purpose to take up for confutation the arguments (if courtesy can be stretched so far as to allow such a name to bare assertions) of the bishop in his pamphlet; it will be enough to give a specimen or two of his theology. Speaking of the doctrine in question (priestly absolution) he says:

"After all, what we want to know, what the Church wants to know, what the world wants to know, is not what the fathers said, what the councils decreed, what synods ordained, what bishops enjoined, but 'what saith the Lord.' Is the doctrine fairly and honestly in the Bible? Stands it there on unquestioned or on doubtful authority? Can it be proved by 'sure warranty of Scripture,' or only by 'handling the Word of God deceitfully?' This is the point to be decided. One clear solid verse of Scripture; one sentence of the Divine will, fairly interpreted, in matters like this, outweighs all the parchments of the fathers, all the decrees of councils, all the injunctions of prelates." (Page 20.)

This is plain language, and has the true Protestant ring. It would be natural to suppose, after this loyal outburst, that the bishop would take hold of the texts (Matt. xvi. 19, xviii. 18; John xx. 23) to which Puseyites and Ritualists, following in the footsteps of Catholic theologians, generally appeal; would examine them seriously at least, if not learnedly; would give some reasons derived from common sense, if not from recondite hermeneutical lore, to show how wrong is the traditional interpretation that all ages have attached to these texts. Nothing of the kind. Not a word of

proof, not a syllable of argument. He gives us his bare assertion, and to uphold it, forgetful of his own words, appeals to—authority. And what authority! Of the ancient Church, of the early fathers, or even of his fellow-heretics, the Novatians, who can boast at least of a respectable antiquity? Not at all. His only authority is that of two partisan writers of our own day, Dean Mansell and Canon Westcott! And on his own bare word for it and the testimony of these interested witnesses, his diocesans are expected to believe that, when our Lord promised first to Peter alone, then to all the Apostles collectively (Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18), the authority to bind and loose on earth, with an additional promise that their sentence should be ratified in heaven; and when after His resurrection He bestowed on them the power of forgiving and retaining sins (John xx. 23), He simply did not mean what He said! He *only* intended thereby to give the Apostles authority to admit converts into the fold, or to repel and exclude them; He *only* empowered them to *declare* remission of sins, and that not to individuals, but to classes of mankind! And this is the way in which the bishop and his Mansells and Westcotts find their doctrine, to use his own words, “fairly and honestly in the Bible!” How profitably might he here recall to mind what he wrote on the preceding page of his pamphlet? Nothing could be more appropriate, or better illustrate how “a clear solid verse of Scripture” can be “handled deceitfully.”

“All errors and all heresies have not only claimed antiquity, but Bible authority; and the Bible and the fathers can be, as they have often been, so manipulated as to appear to support opinions which in fact they really condemn. This way of ingeniously perverting a man’s meaning (how much worse of an inspired author!), as has been unscrupulously done in this case, is very common, and is a part of that falsifying system which stoops not at any assertion or any twisting of truth to bolster up its pretensions.” (Page 19.)

Bishop Stevens has no authority to teach his flock; he claims none, nor could he claim it in virtue simply of his quality of Protestant Episcopal Bishop. If, then, after eliciting his private opinion from the Scriptures, even by straining of texts and “twisting of truth,” he but held it quietly and peaceably, content at most to recommend it to his hearers in pulpit discourses and convention addresses, we could have no fault to find. But when he goes out of these legitimate bounds, and has the boldness (we are using a very mild word) to denounce as ignorant and dishonest the Holy Fathers, with the entire body of theologians and sacred interpreters of the Catholic Church, that existed full fifteen hundred years before his petty sect came into existence, one scarcely knows whether to

be indignant at the reckless presumption,' or to laugh outright at the silly extravagance of such language. Here are his own words :

"A careful study of each text quoted by its defenders (*i. e.*, the Scripture argument for auricular confession and priestly absolution) shows that it is only by gross perversion, false interpretation, and unfair dealing, that any one of them can be forced into the unnatural duty of sustaining such teaching. The uniform testimony of *every honest and well-learned interpreter of God's Word* is that private auricular confession to a priest as a duty of Christians, with a view to sacerdotal absolution, is nowhere taught in the Scriptures; but, on the contrary, its whole tone and teaching thoroughly condemns it as foreign to, and derogatory of, the work and person of Christ as the one Mediator of the New Covenant" (pp: 4, 5).

In the bishop's opinion, therefore, there has not been in the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles down to the present, among all her fathers, doctors, theologians, even one "honest and well-learned" interpreter. They are all, without exception, guilty of "gross perversion, false interpretation, and unfair dealing." Is the bishop aware that this sweeping condemnation involves some of the best and most learned of his own denomination? As regards the fathers and doctors of the Church, even were they not viewed as guardians and exponents of her traditional understanding and teaching of Scripture, but as standing solely on their own merits, any sensible man would reckon it safer to take his chance of erring with the Augustines, Jeromes, Hilarys, Leos, and Gregorys, than to trust to the novel interpretation of a Protestant bishop in the nineteenth century and his partisan witnesses, Mansell and Westcott. And as we intimated, the Ritualists can, in support of their opinion, produce from among theologians of the Anglican communion interpreters as "honest and well-learned" as Bishop Stevens, names as weighty as those of Mansell or Westcott, to prove that Christ left really and truly to His Church the power of forgiving sins by priestly absolution in individual cases. They can appeal, to mention only a few, to Bishop Pearson, Dr. Hammond, his own predecessor, Bishop White, of Pennsylvania. They can appeal to the great King James I., to whose spiritual omnipotence Bishop Stevens and with him the Episcopal Church owe it, that the very word *bishop*, whence she derives her name and character, has not been expunged from her Bible. They can finally appeal to one of the founders of their Church, the "Saint and Holy Martyr" Cranmer, who acted as Father Confessor to the unhappy Ann Boleyn.

It does not by any means enter into our purpose to allege here the Holy Fathers in support of the Catholic doctrine of oral confession and priestly absolution. One of them, however, has a few words to the point, which it may not be amiss to quote. Bishop Stevens seems to think that the adoption of confession and absolution would "un-Protestantize our (the Anglican) Church and

turn it back into the Dark Ages of the Faith" (p. 24). The bishop either forgets or passes over with wilful slight what constitutes the very essence of the creed he professes. The adoption of any and every opinion, whether it be well-founded doctrine or idle vagary, provided it be not adopted out of deference to church authority but evolved out of the depths of private judgment, far from *un-Protestantizing*, but renders one more thoroughly and consistently *Protestant*. The bishop speaks of un-Protestantizing "OUR Church." Is the Church, to which he belongs, and of which he calls himself bishop, a church at all? Most assuredly not, unless it be the true Church. For Christ built not many churches, but One True Church. And how is the bishop or any one else to make sure whether his Church be the True One, or only a false pretender to the name? Here is precisely where our quotation comes in. Lactantius in the fourth century tells us how to decide without danger of error. "THAT (he says) is the True Church, in which there is to be found confession and penance." He might, as other fathers do, have assigned other marks and characteristics, by which to distinguish the True Church, her unity, apostolicity, indefectibility, and the like. But he considered her title sufficiently established by the possession of that sacrament, which includes confession and penance. His words deserve to be given in full:

"Sola igitur Catholica Ecclesia est, quae verum cultum retinet. Hic est fons veritatis, hoc domicilium fidei, hoc templum Dei; quod si quis non intraverit, vel a quo si quis exiverit, a spe vitæ ac salutis æternæ alienus est. Neminem sibi oportet pertinaci concertatione blandiri. Agitur enim de vita et salute; cui nisi caute ac diligenter consulatur, amissa et extincta erit. Sed tamen quia singuli quique coetus hæreticorum se potissimum Christianos et suam esse Catholicam Ecclesiam putant, sciendum est ILLAM esse veram in qua est confessio et poenitentia quæ peccata et vulnera quibus subjecta est imbecillitas carnis, salubriter curat." (Divin. Inst., lib. iv., cap. xxx. Inter Opera Lactantii ed. Le Brun et Langlet. Du Fresnoy, Paris, 1748. Tom. I., p. 354.)

"It is, then, the Catholic Church alone that retains the true worship. In Her is the source of truth, in Her the dwelling-place of faith, in Her the temple of God; into which if one enter not, out of which if one depart, he forfeits his hope of life and everlasting salvation. Let no one attempt to soothe his conscience by stubbornly disputing this point. For it is a question of life and salvation, for which one must provide with cautious diligence, or it will be hopelessly lost. But since every heretical conventicle imagines itself Christian and its Church Catholic, it is necessary to know that the Catholic Church is THAT, in which are to be found CONFESSION and PENANCE, which is the wholesome remedy for the sins and sores to which weak flesh is liable."

What would Lactantius think of the Church (so called) in which Bishop Stevens is a dignitary, who rails at confession as immoral and scouts the idea of penance as a relic of mediæval darkness? The answer is plain from his words above quoted. It is no church, but an assemblage of heretics who are not Catholics nor even Christians, and have forfeited their title to everlasting salvation.

Were this only the private opinion of Lactantius, it would be entitled to some weight, and should induce prudent men to pause and reflect. But it is not his private opinion. He is only a witness to Catholic doctrine in point. He is only the echo of what the Church taught in his day, and what she taught from the beginning of Christianity.

And now a word to those who are in the same church with Bishop Stevens, but do not share his ultra-Protestant views on confession and absolution. They differ from him *toto calo* on these, and approximate to the objective belief of the Catholic Church. They accordingly fancy themselves to be Catholics, and occasionally presume to usurp that sacred name, whereas in the stern language of Lactantius, they are not even Christians. We speak in logical rigor, and of those only who have opportunities of knowing, who have studied the question, and who, unwilling to yield, attempt by perpetual striving and pertinacious arguing, as the same holy Father says, to still their troubled conscience. God forbid that we should include those, and we hope they are many, around whom invincible ignorance will throw its protecting mantle on the last day! We speak of those who, pretending to be Catholic, are as thoroughly Protestant as Bishop Stevens, because they have no other principle of belief than he has. They only differ in the tortuous roads, into which the private judgment of each has strayed and the discoveries it has made by the way. If some happen to light on a remnant of Catholic truth and take it up ever so fondly, it avails them nothing, for they adopt it on Protestant or anti-Catholic grounds. No one can be a Catholic, who does not accept revealed truth on the testimony of the Church, or who does not believe *all* that she teaches. Whoever picks and chooses even out of her rich store of divine truth is a heretic, as the very word (*ἁρесь*, *hæresis*) plainly implies. Nor will it help any one to say that, while rejecting the Catholic Church of to-day, he is nevertheless willing to believe all that the primitive Church believed and taught, and believe it solely on her authority. To him who is honest and right-minded a moment's reflection must make it appear how closely akin to blasphemy is this wretched shift, since it severs the unity of the Church by placing the primitive Church in contradiction with that of to-day; and virtually gives the lie to her Divine spouse, who promised to be with His spotless Bride, not for a century or two, but all days, even to the consummation of the world.

In the whole extent of Bishop Stevens's diocese the only Episcopal congregation, so far, that in its rambles by the road of private judgment has picked up some few scattered fragments of Catholic truth and primitive discipline, is that of St. Clement's in Philadelphia. St. Clement's! How, in the name of Protestant consistency,

did they ever come by this appellation? What possessed them to give their sacred edifice this strange, unmeaning title? They must have known that the name has necessarily an ugly, suspicious sound in orthodox Protestant ears. For, though St. Clement seems to have been a great saint and apostle, yet he labors under the misfortune of having been chosen to be St. Peter's vicar in the government of his Roman See, and after the apostle's martyrdom at Rome his successor in that chair, which Protestant courtesy is fond of styling the Chair of Antichrist. Why then was this odious name made choice of by the congregation or its building committee? For some, perhaps, who have visited the insular birthplace of their modern creed, the name may awaken memories of a handsome temple in London, successor to an ancient shrine which once bore his name and perpetuated his honor, but which, since the coming in of a new religion, has been defiled, desecrated by sacrilegious hands and torn away from its old legitimate worship. But to any one whose travels have led him, whether in a spirit of loving faith or of idle curiosity, to the great centre of European Christianity and cradle of European civilization, the name of "St. Clement's" cannot fail to recall that of a venerable temple, one of the most remarkable in the Eternal City, dating from the earliest age of the Church, and remaining in great part unchanged to this day. There it yet stands at the foot of the Cœlian Hill, still bearing the name of the holy Roman Pope and martyr, St. Clement, in whose honor and under whose invocation it was built up by other Popes, long before private judgment in its pride had invented sectarian bodies under the name of state or national churches, whether their name be Chaldee, Syrian, Greek, Anglican or American Episcopal. Indeed, St. Clement's of Rome is older than any form of heresy or error, either in the Old World or the New. Its massive walls resting on the old agger of Servius Tullius, its graceful columns, its Christian frescoes are all so many eloquent protests against heresy, both ancient and modern. The humble *memoria* that first marked the resting-place of this holy Pope's martyred remains had grown into the lordly basilica ere it saw the rise of those heresies that yet linger in the Eastern or Western world. It saw their birth, and (with God's blessing) will yet survive to witness their downfall and extinction.

If St. Clement could reappear on earth, whom would he recognize as his clients or (not to shock prejudice), we will say, his fellow-worshippers of the same Divine Master? Those who worship at his altar in the Roman basilica, or those who have given his name to an empty edifice, where the Holy of Holies, the sacramental Presence has been never known or has been banished, and where the saint's intercession is either ignored or derided?

His Roman worshippers most likely. For, Rome's faith, praised of old by St. Paul, is such that it bids defiance to all temptation of wavering or faithlessness, as St. Cyprian says ("Eos esse Romanos . . . ad quos perfidia habere non possit accessum"). Could he possibly recognize those who make use of his name, but dishonor it by avowing themselves rebels and enemies to his successors in the Roman See, and scoffers at the greater part of his doctrine? It is most unlikely.

But enough of this. The clergy and parishioners of the Philadelphia St. Clement's have renounced their (so-called) Catholic peculiarities of faith and worship. They have shaken off their attitude of independence and have patched up a treaty of peace with Bishop Stevens, or his convention. It may be a cordial agreement by which they make an honest surrender of their former belief, or it may be (and probably is) a mere cessation of hostilities, a hollow truce, by which they merely pledge themselves, for peace, sake, to outward conformity with the creed of the bishop and his convention. In either case they have surrendered their Protestant principle of private judgment, and have handed themselves over to be led and taught by others, who neither possess nor claim any more authority to teach than their own scholars. They aspired to the impossible height of being Catholics inside of a Protestant fold; and now they have fallen below even the Protestant level. Some of them must be alive to the fact and feel it keenly; and we shall not add another word to aggravate their misfortune and their shame.

ENGLISH FICTION.

IN the year 1740, less than a century and a half ago, Richardson gave to the world *Pamela*, the first English novel—as the term “novel” is now understood—ever written. Like many other useful discoveries and inventions, this new style of fiction owed its origin partly to accident, as is evident from the account Richardson, in a letter to his friend Aaron Hill, gives of the circumstances which suggested both the story itself and his adoption of it as a theme for his pen. After premising that “a gentleman with whom he was acquainted met with such a story as that of *Pamela* in one of the summer tours which he used to take for his pleasure,” and repeating the details, “which the relater of the story told with transport,” he goes on :

“This, sir, was the foundation of *Pamela*’s story; but little did I think to make a story of it for the press. That was owing to this occasion :

“Mr. Rivington and Mr. Osborne, whose names are on the title-page, had long been urging me to give them a little book (which they were often asked after) of familiar letters on the useful concerns of common life; and at last I yielded to their importunity, and began to recollect such subjects as I thought would be useful in such a design, and formed several letters accordingly, and, among the rest, I thought of giving one or two as cautions to young folks circumstanced as *Pamela* was. Little did I think at first of making one, much less two volumes of it. But when I began to recollect what had so many years before been told me by my friends, I thought the story, if written in an easy and natural manner suitable to the simplicity of it, might possibly introduce a new species of writing that might possibly turn young people into a course of reading different from the pomp and parade of romance writing, and, dismissing the impossible and marvellous with which novels generally abound, might tend to promote the cause of religion and virtue.”

While the above explanation shows that chance had something to do with the striking of this original vein of writing by Richardson, the last paragraph embodies an undoubted inspiration of genius,—the idea of substituting true pictures of nature and healthful moral teachings for the pasteboard and goblin shades, with their wearisome rant and impossible adventures, which had until then made the romance of literature. And the fact that substantially the same idea had already occurred to Le Sage and Cervantes seems to prove that the birth of the fiction of the present day as distinguished from the romance preceding it was the result of one of those general movements of the human mind which, by an invariable law of nature, culminate in the genius of some man or men, whose strong individual inspiration concentrates to form and life the vague aspiration or yearning of the many. In a word, the intelligence of the general reader having advanced beyond that point of development which may be called the period of mental childhood, could no longer be amused and satisfied with the unreal imaginations that

are accepted by minds immature either in age or culture,—the minds of children and half-educated men,—but demanded a more rational intellectual entertainment,—the delineation of character which should reflect instead of exaggerating and caricaturing life, and the relation of incident probable as well as diverting. And so there came into existence that which has grown to be such a prominent feature of the nineteenth century,—the modern novel.

The newspaper press of Great Britain was long ago called the fourth estate or political power of the realm; and in a different, yet somewhat similar sense, the novel is to-day a power, or, at least, a powerful influence, throughout the civilized world. It is an all-pervading influence, multiform in character, universal in range; appealing to the sympathies, meeting the literary requirements, and gratifying the taste of every reader, be he gentle or simple, learned or unlearned, in morals strait-laced or unbridled, in politics aristocratic or leveller, in religion "devout" or "liberal." Each of these classes, and all of the numerous shades of opinion into which each one of them is divided and subdivided, has its appropriate style of fiction. There is the novel of high life, the novel of low life, the novel of middle-class life; the sentimental, the society, the historical, the moral, the immoral, the sensational, the religious, the humorous, the satiric, the metaphysical, the psychological, the fantastical, the materialistic, the socialistic novel,—of which, taken altogether, hundreds or more are published annually; while, again, every separate book of every separate order is issued by thousands,—in the case of particularly popular novels by tens of thousands; and each copy of each book of each order has, at the most moderate reckoning, an average of a dozen or so readers. By computing roughly the number of volumes thus pouring in a continuous stream from the literary press, and multiplying it by the number of readers, some approximate idea may be obtained of what the novel, as an entity, is.

To estimate the full extent of its influence, especially with the young, is almost impossible. It is not only the instinct but the necessity of mankind in the mass to adopt ready-made opinions. Time and intellectual effort must be devoted to the study of any subject, however apparently simple it may be, in order to understand and form a judgment concerning it; and as the vast majority of men and women have neither inclination, capacity, nor leisure for such study, they are compelled to accept the *dicta* of the comparatively small minority of thinkers and writers who are the professional exponents of opinion. Now, as an advocate of opinion, the novel possesses peculiar advantages.

Very little exertion is required to read a novel. It does not argue,—it asserts; it does not task, but amuses the faculties; it

affords a pleasure, passive yet exciting, often intense, without disturbing that mental indolence which is the rule rather than the exception with all but a very trifling proportion as to numbers of the reading world even. The mind must put on its armor to cope with science in the simplest of her many forms; it must be in full dress to pay due homage to the pomp of verse; but it may sit down comfortably in dressing-gown and slippers to read a novel.

And sitting thus at ease, what an *olla podrida* of fancy, sentiment, wit, satire, humor, irony, philosophy, and ethics is set before it! For another recommendation of this, the most unpretentious species of literature, is the number and diversity of qualities by which it suits itself to the needs and tastes of both the moral and the intellectual man. It combines in some sort the attractions of music, painting, poetry, and the drama. Like music and poetry it speaks in its pathos and passion to all those mystic emotions of the heart which are as much a part of youth as flowers are of springtime, and which often last, in the memory at least, through life. Like painting and the drama its descriptions present—only to the mind's eye, it is true, but yet with astonishing vividness and power—pictures innumerable and in endless variety. Pictures of the real world of nature and of man in its fairest forms and brightest coloring, thus delighting that sense of the beautiful which, existing to some extent in the rudest hearts, becomes a positive passion as the mind advances in culture; and pictures or revelations of that inner world of thought, imagination, emotion, the delineation and analysis of which constitute the charm of the highest order of dramatic writing and representation. Furthermore it addresses itself to the love of the marvellous, one of the strongest as well as most universal characteristics of the human mind.

To sum up thus the general qualities of the novel is merely to show what it is in itself; what its effect on the world has been, is, and must continue to be, is another question—in fact, bears the same relation to its individualism, so to speak, that the career of a man bears to his personal character; and fiction, considered from the last point of view, makes no exception to the rule that there is a good and bad side to everything of natural or human origin. It has its uses and it has its abuses, and for a long time the world inclined to the opinion that of the two the latter predominated. Richardson's novels were welcomed with acclamation, not only by the public, but by the strictest moralist of his day,—the character of *Sir Charles Grandison* in especial being commended even from the pulpit as the model of the perfect man. But following fast the stately tread of this irreproachable hero came *Tom Jones* and *Roderick Random*, portraiture of a very different description, and which were very differently received; and the disapproval excited

by these books, and the crowds of similar productions from the same authors and their many imitators, soon attached itself, in the estimation of most of the world, to the very name of novel. Miss Edgeworth's works, succeeded as they were almost immediately by the wonderful romances of Scott, caused the first movement towards a reaction of opinion in favor of this class of writing; but so strong was the then existing prejudice against it, that the progress of a less condemnatory feeling, from either a literary or moral standpoint, was very gradual.

Gradual but steady. It is still very much a custom to inveigh against romances and the pernicious influence they exercise; and it must be confessed that, properly qualified, this censure is just,—nay, that the most confirmed pessimist could not well exaggerate the capacity to do harm which lurks in the pages of many novels. Nevertheless, fiction in its broad sense is now neither ignored by the Republic of Letters, nor sweepingly condemned by the voice of Morality. With both these tribunals each single novel rests on its own merits, is judged discriminatively, and ranks according to such judgment. Some few works of imagination are admitted by the sternest critics to be important contributions to literature; others of later date than Richardson's have proved themselves valuable auxiliaries on the side of right in that contest between good and evil which is unceasing in human action and human thought. No inconsiderable number are unequivocally bad in every respect, while the majority may be called negative in character, showing, necessarily, checkered pictures of life, from which the reader deduces benefit or hurt to himself precisely in the ratio that his nature sympathizes with and inclines to good or to evil.

It is worth while to examine the subject impartially and consider the relative proportions of the evil and the good which can be traced to their influence.

The evil which is or can be effected by the reading of novels may be comprised under four heads: first, by the temptation to an inordinate waste of time over their pages; secondly, by fostering in weak and undisciplined minds a sickly sentimentality, with extravagant expectations of life; thirdly, by exciting, it may be said cultivating, the passions, corrupting the morals, and undermining the principles in a dangerously insidious manner; fourthly, by the inculcation of false ideas and erroneous opinions, and by the misstatement of facts.

A large class of people, women particularly, and more especially young women, are addicted to novel-reading in what may be called an opium-eating spirit. They take novels as at once stimulant and narcotic,—as producing a pleasant mental excitement while also abstracting consciousness from surrounding dulness or annoyance;

and the pleasure and relief thus obtained are often purchased by a serious neglect of duty ; by spending time that ought to be devoted to other purposes in this fruitless amusement, the indulgence of which, in addition to waste of time, begets impatience and fretfulness when it is broken in upon, with a general languor and indifference about the affairs and in all the relations of real life. When possessed by the mania for romance-reading daughters become peevishly undutiful, wives selfishly indolent and unamiable, mothers criminally indifferent and careless, and even men, though in general not such devotees to the charms of fiction as are women, occasionally indulge the taste for it until they fall into unmasculine habits of dreamy inaction. In fact, this craving for mental stimulant and the effect produced by its indulgence are the same in character, though happily by no means the same in degree, as the appetites and their gratification of the drunkard and opium-eater ; and, like the passion for brandy and morphine, the harm which results is altogether disproportioned to the seeming trivialness of the temptation.

Another class of readers turn fiction into a mischief by accepting it too literally ; that is, by regarding it as fact instead of fiction, and expecting to find in the world about them all the fine people, fine things, and fine sentiments with which their favorite romances have made them, in imagination, familiar. Disappointed in this expectation, they give way to maundering discontent, not unfrequently to chronic ill-temper, making themselves nuisances to their family and friends. As, however, this class is, comparatively speaking, small,—composed principally of idle young ladies, with an inconsiderable proportion of the adolescent of the other sex,—and as this pseudo-sentimentalism seldom survives the period of extreme youth, the harm produced cannot be counted very serious, unless it is complicated with one or more of the other evils enumerated.

The third and fourth of these evils almost invariably go together, since, though different in themselves—one affecting the moral and one the intellectual sense of man—they act so reciprocally upon each other that it is scarcely possible for them to exist apart. Thus, when the moral sense is clouded and destroyed by appeals to the passions and imagination, it rarely fails to seduce the intellect into faith in its own delusions ; and when the judgment has been deceived and led astray by false assertion and sophistical argument, it is supported in its error by all the strength of passion and imagination. While infinitely more grave in nature, they are not so apparent on the surface as the two already touched upon. It is, indeed, an evident fact that when a vicious novel has a large circulation it must be extensively read—is attractive to a great many people, that is to say. But so far as the individual book is

concerned, this attraction may be based on other ground than that of its objectionable morality. If it has exceptional literary merit, or if it happens to illustrate and support some temporary sensation of the day, or even if, without any very marked claim to ability, the interest of the narrative is so well sustained that the attention of the reader does not flag from the first page to the last, its popularity is assured. It will be read by everybody who reads anything. Men knowingly consume poison in the form of absinthe and chloral, and women knowingly eat poison-tinted bon-bons and wear poison-dyed dress fabrics; and on the same principle, the best intentioned people often read bad novels, tolerating their immorality in consideration of the agreeable qualities by which it is accompanied, and forgetting, while countenancing such works in the eyes of more careless moralists, that though cause must inevitably be followed by effect, effect is not necessarily immediate. Grain which is cast into the ground does not spring up in a day; the vital germ must have time to fructify. And so with books; their influence does not show itself at once, but it is in process of growth, and in due time its harvest appears.

In how much the lax morality and false theories now so prevalent may be attributed to the present efflorescence of fiction, it is not easy to determine, as other causes exist which have been more potent than the influence of the novel, in moulding the character of the age, fiction itself, moreover, as before remarked, being but the outcome and expression of the spirit of the age. But to prove what a weighty and corrupting influence an able writer may exert in leading public opinion, it is only necessary to borrow a single example from German literature. To Goethe's idealization of the crimes of self-murder and adulterous love is certainly attributable in a degree—and no small degree—two of the worst evils of the time,—the frequency of suicide and the laws of divorce. It is no new thing to say this. It is an often acknowledged fact that in *The Sorrows of Werter* and *Elective Affinities* Goethe was the eloquent and successful advocate of suicide and divorce, as shown by statistical results in Germany; from whence, in the course of years, both the one and the other have spread so universally, that there is everywhere a large and growing percentage of suicides in all mortuary lists, and in the whole civilized world the law of divorce finds now but one uncompromising enemy,—the Catholic Church. It may further be remarked in passing, that fiction has latterly done much in Germany to propagate and popularize materialistic opinions; and whether the long list of moral and mental poison-venders in France, beginning with Rousseau and coming down to Dumas fils and Zola, have done most to foster licentious morals, or to

implant and develop communistic principles in the national character, who can say?

English fiction, fortunately, does not present a parallel case among its writers of note, at least, to that of the great German poet. No English novelist of ability and character has ever yet appeared openly as the champion of vices condemned by the Decalogue. But it is unquestionable that many romancists of eminent talent and reputation, while professedly moral in sentiment, have, perhaps unintentionally and unconsciously, made vice familiar and attractive to the minds of their readers, by dwelling upon it too much, and putting into the mouths of their most admired characters too specious arguments in its defence. In the case of Miss Brontë's novel, *Jane Eyre*, for instance, the freshness of style, graphic power of character-painting, and vividly exciting interest of the story, cause most readers to excuse if not to overlook the coarseness and (to use a mild expression) strong sensualism with which its pages abound. The writer, according to the testimony of her friend and biographer, Mrs. Gaskell, was both astonished and shocked when another author said to her incidentally one day, "You know we have both written naughty books." She could not see the matter in that light; but the justice of the allegation has been fully vindicated by the result. The book was read eagerly, achieved an immense success, and became the model of a school of sensual writing which, equally with the highly wrought pictures of licentiousness and crime that now flood the literary market, under the title of "sensational novels," has undoubtedly had a tendency to tarnish in the minds of the young that purity of thought which is the best safeguard to purity of heart and life.

Now, as opposed to all these evils, what compensating good does fiction confer upon the world?

First, there is its recreating power. As wine, brandy, and opium, used reasonably and medicinally, are advantages, even blessings to the physical man, so novels, if judiciously selected, and read in moderation, are enlivening, beneficial, and medicinal to his spirit. To the victim of *ennui*, the hard-worker, the overworked, and the invalid, they are a resource which no other kind of book, nor any other kind of amusement can afford. How many idle hours that might be worse employed are spent in reading novels? How often when the brain is too tired for the slightest exertion, yet too restless to remain quiescent, does the passive entertainment of a romance lull, refresh, and reinvigorate its energies! Above all, does not a novel, often as really as opium, deaden the consciousness of pain, enabling anxious watchers to give to the weary sufferers bound down upon sick beds a pleasure which nothing else can bestow? Who has not many times felt that the novel which possesses the magical

spell to soothe and charm the hours of illness, is more precious than gold and jewels; is, indeed, like Mercy itself, "twice blessed;" in that "it blesses him that gives and him that takes." Fiction is the middle ground in the world of books, where every mental rank may meet and fraternize a little. The shallowest capacity can appreciate, the most profound intellect rarely disdains them. The mediocre intelligence is elevated from the dead-level of commonplace real life, its native element, by a short range in the fields of fancy, and the mind which dwells habitually on empyrean heights of thought needs to descend sometimes and relax its overstrained faculties in a lower and warmer atmosphere.

Secondly, there is the information and instruction which are almost insensibly acquired by the most careless reader from the pages of even the poorest novels. Thousands of men and tens of thousands of women who never touch works of grave tone, who have no inclination for general literature, and do not so much as read newspapers, are insatiable devourers of novels; and from these much-maligned volumes learn many things of which they would otherwise remain ignorant—many things in the way of useful as well as literary information, which it is next to impossible for much better-read people than the class in question to become acquainted with through any other channel. For it is the specialty of the novel that it covers broader ground, is at once more versatile and more practically homely—in the favorite art-term of the day, more realistic—in detail, than all other books; and also, that it teaches by illustration and deduction, a mode of imparting knowledge which is adapted to the comprehension of the dullest, and at the same time is agreeable to the quickest intelligence.

With regard to the more serious evils enumerated, which, undeniably, are dark enough, it is gratifying to look at the other, the bright side of the picture, and find that while each one of them has what may be called an antithetical good, there are several very substantial benefits resulting to the world from the writing and reading of novels which, so far as can be perceived, are not neutralized by any counterbalancing evils.

Of these benefits an important one is the amount of employment which this branch of literature affords in many different ways to many different classes of workers as a means of living. It is not an exaggeration to say that in a material point of view it constitutes one of the industries of the world. To the writer it is a liberal profession that ranks very fairly both in credit and profit with most professions; to the publisher, booksellers, paper-manufacturer, and type-founder, it is a commercial interest of no small value; to the compositor, journeyman printer, and bookbinder, it is daily wages;

to the news-vender it is often daily bread. A computation of the net profit accruing to everybody concerned in the production, issue, and sale of a single novel would probably present a surprisingly large total; and that of the aggregate monetary worth per annum of all the fiction published—including the periodical literature coming under that head—would certainly show immense proportions.

Nor is it only in the sense of barter and sale that fiction has been useful in promoting the material prosperity, not merely of individuals, but of countries. The crying evil of Irish landlord absenteeism was checked, and in a considerable degree corrected, for the time at least, by the startling presentment of its enormity, in a novel from the pen of Miss Edgeworth; and the wish expressed by Sir Walter Scott, that he could do as much for Scotland as she had done for Ireland, has been more than fulfilled. His writings poured through the hills and dales of his native land a river of Pactolus, which continues to flow even to the present day in the stream of tourists who go to visit the places made classic by his genius. On different ground still, Captain Marryat rendered excellent service to *his* country, by showing up in his novels many conventional wrongs and necessities in naval matters which needed redress. The value of the information and suggestions thus communicated was proved conclusively by the attention they received from the English Admiralty.

The instances just cited are prominent examples of the good which has been effected by novels, but there is a much more widespread influence which, like the counter-influence already noticed, while little perceptible on the surface of social life (taking that term in its broadest significance), acts strongly and directly upon individual character. Many writers have chosen to apply fiction as a vehicle for the dissemination of evil teaching; but a greater number of English writers have employed it in the beneficent spirit of its originator, to give innocent amusement, to convey wholesome instruction, and to correct certain abuses that cannot be dealt with so effectually in any other way. Drawing up a balance-sheet between the evil and the good, it may reasonably be considered that, on the whole, the good predominates.

INFLUENCE OF THE SUN ON TERRESTRIAL
MAGNETISM.

AMONG the many branches of natural science as studied in our day, few are more interesting than that of physical astronomy. Our globe, with its thousand secret marvels, revealing themselves to a skilful and untiring investigation, the earth's crust and the history of the successive changes wrought upon it, the threefold kingdom of nature with its endless beauty and variety in mineral, vegetable, and animal species, all these cannot fail to strike the curious, wonder-seeking mind, and command it to pause and admire.

But that is a limited and unsatisfying branch of natural science which confines itself to our globe only, mere speck as it is in the universe of heavenly bodies. The mind covets a wider field to range in, and such a field it enters when, from the well-known principles of physics which it has verified on this earth of ours, it seeks to detect and account for what is taking place in other spheres, tries to determine their mutual relations, and to describe, in a measure, their physical constitution. From the subtilty of such investigations, and from the results obtained, we derive a pleasure like that we feel when we recall to mind Leverrier's wonderful discovery of Neptune, or Newton's proof of the identity of terrestrial with universal gravitation. Take, for example, the intense interest aroused by the study of spectral analysis, once we have passed from mere laboratory work to the observation of heavenly bodies. To be able to scan the utmost limits of the heavens, to examine daily the strange transformation of solar spots and protuberances, and calculate with almost mathematical precision the force of the sun's eruptive streams, and the velocity of the stars in their movements toward and away from us, and all this with so small and unpretending an instrument as the spectroscope, is beyond doubt fascinating to the mind.

Foremost among the studies that promise to make us better acquainted with certain striking phenomena of the heavenly bodies, and the close relation they bear to like phenomena on our globe, is Terrestrial Magnetism. Of this study the late English scientist, James Clerk Maxwell, in his treatise on electricity and magnetism, says: "The field of investigation into which we are introduced by the study of terrestrial magnetism is as profound as it is extensive. We know that the sun and the moon act on the earth's magnetism;" and, a little further on, speaking of the variation of this agent, he adds: "When we consider that the intensity of the magnetization of the great globe of the earth is quite comparable with

that which we produce with much difficulty in our steel magnets, these immense changes in so large a body force us to conclude that we are not yet acquainted with one of the most powerful agents in nature."

The object of this article is to present to the reader as complete an account of the results achieved in this branch of science as can be given without entering into the mathematical treatment of the subject. Science has not perhaps made so many advances in this as in other fields, but still, besides offering a glimpse of some remarkable phenomena to our view, it has shown that terrestrial magnetism depends upon solar, and probably also on planetary, influences. Moreover, the earth's magnetism maintains close relations with the thousands of meteors daily passing through our atmosphere; so that with the progress of investigation we may hope to arrive at a more intimate knowledge of the connection existing between cosmical phenomena, especially as regards their influence on our own atmosphere.

A knowledge of magnetism, though a vague and incomplete one, dates from ancient times. The early poets and historians speak of the attraction of magnets, which were so named from the province of Magnesia in Lydia, where the Greeks first obtained them. Owing to their property of attraction the French call them *aimants*, that is, *love stones*; but they are more commonly known by the old Saxon term, *lode* or *leading* stones. The property first noticed in them seems to be identical with that possessed by the common compass-needle. It is related by Humboldt that an apparatus of this kind, that is to say, a compass, was presented during the reign of Techew, 1100 B. C., to the ambassadors of Tonquin and Cochin China, to guide them over the vast plains they would have to cross on their homeward journey. Though first used on land, the compass was eventually adapted to nautical purposes, and in the fourth century of the Christian era Chinese vessels visited Indian ports and the eastern coast of Africa under the guidance of a compass. Whatever may be the value of this narration, which is given by only a few historians, we know from most trustworthy sources that Europeans were acquainted with the use of the compass before the twelfth century. By subsequent investigations the properties of magnets became better ascertained; especially from the time that Coulomb examined magnetism after a purely scientific method.

With all his research, however, Coulomb did not discover that magnetism was connected with other physical agents of nature; nor was any such connection established until, in 1818, the action of electrical currents on the needle was shown by Ørsted. In the hands of Ampère and Faraday this discovery became afterwards the origin of a new branch of Physics, Electro-magnetism, "the

study of which," says Maxwell, "in all its extent, has now become of the first importance as a means of promoting the progress of science." Facts prove the truth of this remark, for this branch of physics is intimately connected with the latest and most useful discoveries in electricity, with the telegraph, with magneto-electric machines, with the electro-motor, and with other inventions of which our century is so justly proud.

It is not intended to explain here the general principles of magnetism, or the steps by which it has been raised to its actual position in science. Mention shall merely be made of what may serve to explain the influence of the sun on the magnetism of our globe, or, rather, it will be attempted to show how from the observation of the phenomena of terrestrial magnetism, we can proceed to a study of the influence exerted on our globe by the sun, and in all likelihood by the planets.

Here, as in many other points of scientific investigation, we must carefully distinguish at the outset between well-established facts, and theories or hypotheses deduced from them, which are sometimes advanced before a complete induction gives them a perfect certainty. To start, then, with a thing certain, the earth is a great magnet. This fact, suspected all along to be such from the time of the invention of the compass, was over three centuries ago proved by scientific arguments. Not to mention others who turned their attention to demonstrating it, Dr. W. Gilbert, physician to Queen Elizabeth of England, published towards the year 1600 a book entitled *De Magnete*, in which we find it as fully proved as facts then known might allow. More ample testimony, however, is in our possession from the latest developments in terrestrial magnetism, as may be seen from the three following experiments.

If we take a small needle, capable of oscillating in a vertical plane, and move it to and fro above a powerful magnet, in such a way that the plane of oscillation passes through the magnet, the needle will be perfectly horizontal when over the middle of the magnet. As we move it, however, towards either extremity, its angle with the horizon is seen to vary, owing to the attraction of the magnet, until, when directly over the extremities, the needle is wholly vertical. Of course each end of the magnet attracts the pole of contrary name in the needle. If now we make the plane of oscillation perpendicular to the former oscillating plane, the needle remains vertical over the first half of the magnet, becomes astatic when over the middle of it, and is vertical again when passing over the other half, only changing the position of its poles. Now this experiment reproduces exactly what occurs to the dipping needle or inclination compass as we carry it along the same magnetic meridian from one hemisphere to another. In both cases the

phenomena are identical, so that, substituting the term earth for magnet, we can express in the very same words as those used above the various positions taken by the dipping-needle with regard to the earth. Thus the first position of the needle with regard to the magnet corresponds to the position of the dipping needle oscillating in the magnetic meridian; and the second, corresponds to the position of the dipping-needle oscillating in a plane perpendicular to it.

A similar argument could be deduced from what happens in the case of the declination-compass. It is better, however, to consider other sources from which proofs are drawn of the similarity between the earth and magnets. The most ordinary of these sources are magnetic and magneto-electric inductions. By magnetic inductions is meant the influence exerted by a magnet on a magnetic substance, as for instance, soft iron, whereby the latter, when influenced by the magnet, acquires properties similar to those of the magnet itself. Now, soft iron is influenced in the same way by the earth. A bar of perfectly soft iron placed parallel to the dipping-needle becomes a temporary magnet; if not perfectly soft, it may be made a somewhat temporary magnet by striking it when it is in this position, in the same way as if you were to strike it when it is under the influence of a magnet. It is this property which turns so many iron columns, railings, and car-rails into magnets; and a similar influence often changes the iron on ships into powerful magnets, which would prove a serious hindrance to navigation, by preventing a right use of the compass, if not compensated for by some expedient.

But a still better proof of the earth's magnetism is obtained from a comparison of magneto-electric with telluric induction. The principles by which electric currents are developed in magneto-electric machines, such as Clarke's, Gramme's, Siemens's, Weston's, Brush's, and others resembling these are generally known. In Clarke's, for instance, by revolving a couple of bobbins before a magnet, we obtain at each revolution four induced currents, running two and two in opposite directions, which, by means of the well-known commutator, may be afterwards turned in the same direction, and thus be made to produce the effects of galvanic currents. Now, Palmieri, in Italy, and Delezenne, in France, have invented, independently of each other, an apparatus in which currents are produced by the earth's influence, similar in quality, number, direction, and efficiency, to those of Clarke's machine. The ordinary form of this machine is that known under the name of Delezenne's Circle, which, when turned in such a way that its axis of revolution is in the magnetic meridian, perpendicular to the dipping-needle, produces the same four currents as Clarke's machine. When received

by a commutator these currents are capable of producing the same physical, chemical, luminous, calorific, and physiological effects as any electro-magnetic machine.

These, and other proofs that might be adduced, show beyond doubt that the earth is a magnet. We may add that it is a very great magnet, so great and so powerful that, according to the investigations of Gauss, the absolute magnetic intensity of each cubic meter of the earth must be equivalent to that of eight saturated steel magnetic bars, each of a pound in weight. There is a difference, however, between our ordinary magnets and the earth. The magnetic power of the former, as far as observation goes, is constant; it may be lost gradually, but it is by no means vacillating or subject to increase and decrease. In the earth, on the contrary, magnetism is variable, according to difference of place, and is subject, besides, to a variety of changes in each place. These changes have all along attracted the attention of scientific observers, and are now followed and studied more closely than ever before. How such observations are recorded is too well known to need explanation. Suffice it to add that these changes occur, some accidentally, some regularly, both annually and daily, and regard not only the declination of magnetic force, but also its inclination and intensity.

On examining these annual and daily variations, we find our first direct proof of the sun's influence on terrestrial magnetism. On this influence, so widely admitted by physicists and astronomers, we have already quoted the words of Maxwell. Father Secchi, speaking on the same subject, says that evidences of this influence may be found in the investigations made in all countries, for the most part by English observers, during the last half century. He himself infers its existence from several special facts regarding the above-mentioned annual and daily variations, of which we need instance but two. And first, on the daily variation, Father Secchi remarks that "the extremity of the declination-needle which is directed toward the sun, that is, the south-seeking pole in our hemisphere, moves westward, as though repelled by the sun, from sunrise until noon, and moves back again to the east from noon until sunset. A like phenomenon takes place at night, when the sun again passes the meridian, with a slower oscillation," owing, of course, to the greater distance from the sun. Concerning the annual variation, he observes that "the annual maxima and minima are dependent upon the apogee and perigee of the sun." These facts certainly show that terrestrial magnetism is influenced by the sun.

But a new proof, a very good one, is derived from the periodical changes of the earth's magnetic variation, either regular or irregular. Of late years careful observation has revealed that their

increase or decrease takes up a cycle of little over eleven years, so that nine such cycles occur within each century; and that, furthermore, these cycles are common to other phenomena, coinciding with the cycle of the maxima and minima of solar spots, with the number and size of solar protuberances, and probably with some periodical change in the apparent diameter of the sun. A similar cycle has been found common to polar auroras, to cyclones, and to other atmospheric phenomena; and as these coincidences are not merely a proof of the existence, but a clue also to the nature of solar influence, we must give a more detailed account of them.

The existence of these unsuspected coincidences, especially in the cycle of the solar spots, has become a scientific fact since the close investigation devoted of late to this subject, chiefly by Messrs. Fritz and Wolf, the latter the director of the Munich observatory. This discovery, like so many others, is due to the combined efforts of several skilful observers, prominent among whom were Carrington, Spörer, Secchi, De la Rue, Balfour Stewart, Loewy, Young, and the Kew observers; but the first statement of it must be attributed to the work of three other able scientists. In 1826 Hofrath Schwabe, of Dessau, Germany, began his daily observations on the number, size, and position of the spots, which are often visible on the solar disk, and these observations, with the perseverance of his countrymen, he kept up for nearly half a century. His long studies at last made manifest that the above-mentioned cycle does really correspond with the times for increase and decrease in the solar spots, and that it extends somewhat beyond eleven years, though at first it seemed a little shorter. About the same time it was announced by Professor Lamont, of Munich, that the daily range of the needle's variations passed through the same cycle; and shortly after General Sabine, of England, discovered this identical fact from a study of the magnetic observations taken at stations so far apart from each other as the English observatories of St. Helena, of Hobart Town in Tasmania, of Toronto in Canada, of Madras in India; as well as from those taken at Washington, Rome, St. Petersburg, Prague, and Vienna. In fact, so apparent is this coincidence from a comparison of the tabular statements in both cases, that we readily agree with Father Secchi in saying that "astronomers unanimously admit such a coincidence." There have been, it is true, some few scientists who ventured to doubt it; but their own explanations of the matter lead us to the discovery of another cycle, about five times longer than the former, in which the maxima and minima of solar spots are more pronounced. To this second period we shall presently advert again.

This cycle of eleven years, we remarked above, measures also

the maxima and minima of solar protuberances. At this no one will be surprised who is acquainted with the latest discoveries made by spectrum analysis, since, even apart from all observations, we might conclude that it is so. For solar spots, as well as solar protuberances, proceed from gaseous eruptions of the photosphere, whose effect is to throw to great distances enormous masses of vapors of different substances, especially of hydrogen. When these vapors go beyond the chromosphere they appear under the form of protuberances; when, after cooling and condensing, they sink into the photosphere, they form the solar spots. Both phenomena, therefore, depend upon solar activity. Now, this activity has increases and decreases measured by a period of eleven years, as appears from the cycle of the solar spots, and also from the periodical variation in the apparent diameter of the sun, "a phenomenon," says Father Secchi, "which, according to the investigations of Mr. Wolf and Father Rosa, of the Society of Jesus, coincides with that of the solar spots."

No wonder, then, that the protuberances and magnetic variation take place at synchronous intervals. Direct observations on this synchronism cannot date very far back, since it was only in 1868 that Lockyer and Janssens discovered their wonderful method of observing these protuberances outside of the time of eclipses; such as we have, however, strongly confirm it. These were made chiefly by Lockyer, Secchi, Respighi, and Young. One observation made before this epoch seems to show this coincidence very closely. We shall give an account of it in the words of Sir John Herschel: "So late as September 1st, 1859, when the spots were very large," he says, "two observers, far apart and unknown to each other, were viewing them with powerful telescopes, when suddenly, at the same moment of time, both saw a strikingly brilliant luminous appearance, like a cloud of light far brighter than the general surface of the sun, break out in the immediate neighborhood of the spots and sweep across and beside it. It occupied about five minutes in its passage, and in that time travelled over a space on the sun's surface which could not be estimated at less than 35,000 miles. A magnetic storm was in progress at the time. From August 28th to September 4th many indications showed the earth to have been in a perfect convulsion of electro-magnetism." And it may be added that at Kew, where there are self-registering magnetic instruments, it was found that the magnetic needles had made a strongly marked jerk from their former positions at the very moment when the bright light had been seen crossing the solar spot, thus showing that the magnetic influence had reached the earth at the same time as the light. Herschell thus continues: "By degrees accounts began to pour in of great auroras seen on the nights of those days,

not only in these latitudes, but at Rome, in the West Indies, on the tropics, within 18° of the equator (where they hardly ever appear), nay, what is still more striking, in South America and in Australia, where, at Melbourne, on the night of the second of September, the greatest aurora ever seen made its appearance. These auroras were accompanied by unusually great electro-magnetic disturbances in every part of the world. In many places the telegraphic wires struck work. At Washington and Philadelphia, in America, the telegraph signal men received severe electric shocks. At a station in Norway the telegraphic apparatus was set fire to; and at Boston, in North America, a flame of fire followed the pen of Bain's electric telegraph, which writes down the message on chemically prepared paper."

In these last words of Herschel there is mention of another coincidence, of that coincidence existing between solar magnetic variations and electrical atmospheric phenomena, so that the same cycle which represents the increase and decrease of solar spots, protuberances, and magnetic variations, represents also the increase and decrease of polar lights or auroras, and of all other phenomena which are either electrical themselves, or closely connected with atmospheric electricity. And rightly so, since it is now fully ascertained that the only cause of atmospheric electricity is solar calorific action. At the equator, and within the tropics, this action excites a great aqueous evaporation. Now, it is well known that, when water with salts in solution is changed into vapor, the vapors are positively electrified, the liquid remaining in negative electricity. The calorific action, therefore, of the sun is the source of atmospheric electricity, and accounts besides for facts so well ascertained as that of the regular electrical state of the atmosphere (which is ordinarily positively electrical), for that of lightning, and chiefly for that of polar auroras. These latter, indeed, are nothing more than a discharge, under the form of snow or ice, of the positively electrified vapors brought to the pole by the upper currents of our atmosphere. Now, since the activity of the sun, and consequently its calorific action, is greater during the prevalence of the solar spots, it follows that during the maxima of these latter, auroras, and electrical meteors in general, will be more frequent. And so close is the connection between auroras and magnetic variations that, as experiments prove, the appearance of auroras in lower latitudes, where they are seldom visible, has been detected on occasions of magnetic perturbation.

All other phenomena connected with electricity seem also to have maxima and minima corresponding with those of the solar spots; for, since the investigations of Mr. Meldrum, it would seem that cyclones, especially those of the Indian Ocean, and, in all like-

lihood, rainfalls also, have the same cycle as magnetic variations; while even earthquakes and volcanic phenomena, which the study of late years has shown to be connected with electricity, have their increase and decrease measured by the same period of years.

Before leaving this subject it may not be amiss to refer briefly to another class of cosmical phenomena connected with the cycle of all these changes. By some late observations, made mostly in England, it has been found that the location of spots on the sun's surface is apparently dependent upon the position of the planets Mercury, Venus, Jupiter, and Saturn.¹

Now, three different facts seem to connect the eleven years' cycle with the planet Jupiter. First, the time of its synodic revolution coincides within a few days with the length of the period; again, if we compare the curve expressing the variation of the solar spots with that representing the distances of the planets from the sun, we shall find, as Wolf did, that they agree very closely; lastly, Schwabe and others believe that the appearance of the well-known periodical spot on Jupiter's surface is connected with the same

¹ Treating this subject in his "Solar Physics," Lockyer says: "It is an astounding but apparently well-proved fact, that the birth and behavior of spots are regulated by the position of planetary bodies, so that we may cast the horoscope of a sun-spot with some approach to truth. In order to obtain grounds for this conclusion, the Kew observers have laboriously measured the area of all the sun-spots observed by Carrington from 1854 to 1860, and they find, as the result of their inquiries, that a spot has a tendency to break out at that portion of the sun which is nearest to the planet Venus. As the sun rotates, carrying the newly born spot further away from this planet, the spot grows larger, attaining its maximum at the point furthest from Venus, and decreasing again on its approaching this planet. We here speak of Venus, as it appears to be the most influential of the planets in this respect. Jupiter appears also to have much influence; and, more recently, it has been shown that Mercury has an influence of the same nature, although more difficult to discuss on account of his rapid motion. Should, therefore, any two of these planets, or still better, should all three be acting together at the same place upon the sun, we may expect a very large amount of spots, which will attain their maximum at that portion of the sun most remote from these planets." (p. 81.) And in another paper he thus comments on a fuller explanation of the same fact given by the Kew observers: "In a paper communicated to the Royal Society, these observers show that the average size of a spot would appear to attain its maximum on that side of the sun which is turned away from Venus or from Mercury, and to have its minimum in the neighborhood of Venus or of Mercury. In other words, dealing with the part of the sun-spot action which is due to Venus, if you lived on the planet Venus you would never see a sun-spot; and dealing with that portion which refers to the planet Mercury, if you lived on the planet Mercury you would never see a sun-spot, so that, as the maximum is to be found on the side of the sun which is turned away from Venus or from Mercury, naturally a minimum is seen in the neighborhood of Venus or Mercury, as seen from the earth; and the appearance and behavior of this kind is so decided in regard to Venus that the Kew observers have been able to take the observations *en masse*—that is to say, all the observations taken by Carrington, and all the observations taken by themselves; and they have been able to divide them into the Carrington observations and the Kew observations, and they lead absolutely to the same result, namely, that Venus and Mercury have something to do with the birth and death of the spots on the sun." (L. S. P., 380.)

period. Similar indications may be noticed with regard to the other three planets. Thus Balfour Stewart has remarked that the time of two synodic revolutions of Saturn coincides very closely with that of five of Jupiter, a fact which seems to be connected with the fifty-six years' period observed in sun-spots.

So much for the enumeration of facts. Let us only remark in passing that the results already obtained explain the constantly increasing endeavors of both private and public corporations, and the enormous expense incurred, to establish in every quarter stations for observing these phenomena. In so important an undertaking the English government was the first to set an example, and it was quickly followed by Germany and France. Almost everywhere observatories have been erected where solar and planetary phenomena are most carefully studied in all their bearings by means of photography, and where meteorological phenomena are not less attended to. Meteorology is cultivated chiefly in America, and it is gratifying to add that Catholic institutions are everywhere active in making observations. Thus, not to mention the observatory of the Roman College, of Stonyhurst, and of Moncalieri, under the eminent meteorologist, Father Densa, the Barnabite, and many other well-known European stations, there are missions in Chili, Havana, Manila, and Shanghai, from which Jesuit Fathers are constantly contributing very useful observations. In the last-mentioned station, in particular, Father Deschevrens has attracted much notice from scientists by his remarkable observations on cyclones and zodiacal lights, which were lately noticed in the *Compte-rendu* of the French Academy.

Returning to our subject after the consideration of so many wonderful coincidences, we may repeat our statement that the variation of the earth's magnetism gives us a very good proof of the solar influence over it. How can we have any doubt of this fact? General Sabine ended the account of his investigations above-mentioned by these remarkable words:

"The coincidence of the maxima and minima of solar spots and those of the magnetic perturbations, demands a cosmical cause depending upon the sun."

His conclusion was undoubtedly a good one; and still, he considered only one coincidence, while we now can compare many, all of which depend upon the sun's activity. With all reason, then, we can repeat our statement, especially if we call to mind that these phenomena show a perfect coincidence even in the minutest details. To mention but one example out of many, we may state that from a series of observations running through a period of seventeen years, Father Ferrari, of the Society of Jesus, has found that magnetic storms coincide precisely with the times of the

appearance of solar spots, times at which solar activity, and consequently solar influence, is at its maximum. Rather than doubt this influence of the sun on the earth's magnetism, let us admire so wonderful a connection between cosmical phenomena, a connection which recalls to our minds the words of an eminent modern writer :

“ There seems to be a great molecular delicacy of construction in the sun, and probably also, to an inferior extent, in the various planets, and the bond between the sun and the various members of our system appears to be a more intimate one than has hitherto been imagined. *The result of all this will be that a disturbance from without is very easily communicated to our luminary, and that, when it takes place, it communicates a thrill to the very extremities of the system.*”

Thus far we have been establishing the existence of solar influence on terrestrial magnetism, by considering the various phenomena that go to prove it. We are now ready to proceed a step further, and study more closely the nature of its influence. We assert that the sun is very probably the principal, if not the only, cause of terrestrial magnetism. To substantiate our statement we must first recall to the reader's mind the general theory of magnetism, and prove that there are electrical currents running round the earth.

Some forty years ago, after a careful study of electro-dynamics, Ampère published his celebrated theory of magnetism, which is now accepted without reserve by all scientists. As the steps by which he arrived at his conclusion are generally known, we shall confine ourselves to a bare statement of it. The molecules of magnetic substances, he assures us, are each surrounded by electric currents moving in different planes, and free to rotate about the molecules as centres. When any such substance is magnetized, these currents are rendered all parallel and allowed to move in planes perpendicular to the axis of the magnet. Now the coercitive force, which is little in iron, but great in steel, opposes the rotation of these currents, and tends to keep them in any position in which they happen to be. In steel, therefore, and other substances possessing great coercitive force, the parallel direction given to these currents by magnetization will remain; whereas, in soft iron, owing to the slight coercitive force, the primary direction is resumed as magnetization stops.

There are few physical theories so firmly established as this, since it not only explains all the facts hitherto observed regarding magnets, such as poles, the neutral line, the distribution of free magnetism, poles in broken magnets, lines of forces in the magnetic field, etc., but perfectly agrees with the mathematical treatment of the subject, which, however, when pursued according to our modern methods, is wholly independent of physical theories. Besides,

it is confirmed by all the late developments in electricity, and, as we before remarked, all the new inventions, are only so many applications of principles involved in it. But perhaps the best confirmation of it is obtained from what we know to be a fact in the case of terrestrial magnetism. For close observation has shown that the earth as a magnet has its own electric currents circulating around it, like those of solenoids, in precisely the same direction, too, as that indicated by the theory. But how can we observe such currents? In the first place, if these currents exist at all, their direction must be from east to west, so that to an observer placed outside of our globe and looking at them from a point situated north of it they would appear to move in the direction of the hands of a watch. Now, the existence of such currents has been ascertained by direct experiments, which were made for the first time, between Paris and Strasburg, several years ago. By allowing a telegraph wire between these two stations to come in contact with the earth, and introducing into the circuit thus formed one or more galvanometers, currents were found running from east to west, even without applying a battery. This experiment was tried with the same result by Father Secchi in the Papal States, and the existence of the currents was verified by the same process in other localities, especially in our own country.

We may be allowed to mention here, as bearing upon the subject, an experiment of our own made at Woodstock.¹ At the distance of an eighth of a mile from the college building an insulated copper wire was laid, stretching north and south in one of the experiments, in others, east and west, and in others, between intermediate points. The extremities of the wire had no connection with the building; but they were inserted in the earth, thus forming a closed circuit, into which a delicate bell telephone was introduced. Within the building an ordinary Ruhmkorff's coil was worked in the usual way, whilst the extremities of its secondary wire were placed in contact with the earth in spots far distant from the circuit of the telephone. Now, every time that the current was allowed to pass through the primary wire the characteristic noise of the spark was heard in the telephone; and by turning the commutator, whether for a longer, or a shorter period of time, signals could be sent to a distance by means of an alphabet similar to that adapted to Morse's telegraph. But what was the cause of this transmission? Those who are acquainted with the sensitiveness of the Bell telephone know that when a wire

¹ This experiment was tried towards the latter part of 1879. Since these pages were written we have seen in the number of the American Journal of Science for August, 1880, an article by Professor J. Trowbridge, of Harvard, giving an account of similar experiments.

connected with it is made to cross an ordinary telegraphic line, any message sent on the latter can be heard in the telephone. The currents, while passing in the telegraphic wire, act by induction on the wire of the telephone, and thus produce the sounds perceived in it. And so, in our case, the current of the Ruhmkorff coil produced a disturbance in the earth's currents which was extended to some distance. This disturbance, acting by induction on the wire connected with the telephone, produced currents in it, which, in turn, reproduced the noise of the spark given by the instrument.

As a conclusion to our proofs of the existence of electric currents around the earth, we shall introduce here the words of Father Secchi :

"The existence of these telluric currents is now fully established. They produce in telegraphic wires derived currents, capable at times of giving sparks; and for the five years we had at our disposal a telegraphic wire fifty kilometers long, we found that such currents always existed, and were greatly intensified during magnetic perturbations."

Ampère's theory is verified, then, in the case of our globe; and the earth's magnetism comes from electric currents, whose existence has been ascertained by direct proof. In fact, as De la Rive justly remarks :

"Mr. Barlow has shown, that neither the presence of one magnet (whatever be its nature) at the centre of the earth, as Gilbert maintains, nor yet the combination of two such magnets, as Holley and Hausten suppose, can account for terrestrial magnetism, which must be attributed to currents circulating round the earth."

Again, from observations taken at Greenwich, the royal astronomer Airy arrived at the same conclusion, namely, "that this magnetism is due to electric currents going round the earth." We may add, that these currents account not merely for terrestrial magnetism in general, but also for every one of its features. Regular magnetic variations, for example, are due to currents oscillating from their mean path, and varying regularly in intensity at different hours of the day. The cause of this regular variation in intensity we shall presently point out. Thus, also, magnetic storms are due to the greatly increased intensity of the currents, as in the case of lightning and discharges following auroras. Besides, the mean path of the currents depends, partially, at least, on the unequal conductivity of the earth's crust; and in this fact we may find an explanation of the irregularity of the isogonic and isoclinic lines.

But how shall we explain the cause of these currents themselves? This brings us to the last part of our article, in which we are to show that telluric currents are in all probability produced principally, if not solely, by the sun. In the first place, among the

various terrestrial causes assigned to explain them, we look in vain for anything satisfactory; and as we turn to the sun for light and heat, so, too, we must go thither for an explanation of these currents, especially since they are evidently connected with the earth's rotation, which is regularly affected by solar influence. We hold, therefore, that they are caused by the sun, whether directly by electro-dynamic and magnetic induction, or indirectly from terrestrial phenomena produced immediately by the sun. That there is at least an indirect solar action at work in the case of the currents, is very easily proved, and is admitted by all physicists, though they differ somewhat in their particular explanations. Aimé considers the currents as thermo-electric, and generated by the uneven heating of the earth's surface due to its rotation, and in this way he accounts very securely for the regular annual and daily variations, which are symmetrical on both sides of the equator. This opinion, which at least partially explains the cause of terrestrial magnetism, is substantially the same as Faraday's, who attributes magnetic variations to magnetic properties in atmospheric oxygen, which suffer increase and decrease from the heating and cooling of the atmosphere. De la Rive admits the fact of indirect polar action, and thinks that it accounts very well for regular, but not for irregular variations. These latter he thereupon attributes to the electric currents coming from polar discharges, which, as we have seen, must occur very frequently, and result in polar auroras. Nor does he leave his theory unsupported by successful experiments, prominent among them being one, in which, by means of an electro-magnet, he shows the rotation of inductive currents to be very much like the rotation observed in polar lights. If to all these influences we add the endless number of chemical actions and physical changes constantly taking place on the earth's surface, we shall have ample reason to maintain the indirect production of telluric currents by the sun.

But now the question arises, whether, besides this indirect action, there is any direct or inductive action on the part of the sun. Such action would suppose magnetic properties in the sun, or, in other words, that the sun as well as the earth has electric currents of its own circulating around it. We may ask, therefore, whether there is any ground for such a supposition. De la Rive, with others, thinks there is, and supports his opinion by remarking that General Sabine's inquiries into observations taken at stations far apart from each other, prove that magnetic variations follow not only the sun's relative position for each station, but that they correspond also to its absolute position, which would not happen if the solar action were merely indirect. Besides, he finds it impossible to account for the facts mentioned above as proving—what according to Secchi

they do prove—a solar influence on the earth's magnetism, without admitting some magnetic polarity in the sun. And he adds :

“The sun appears to have electro-dynamic properties (powerful enough to produce telluric currents), for it is very probable that light is due to energetic electric currents which surround it. . . . Astronomers, too, on account of very different phenomena, are disposed to admit magnetic polarity in the sun. Lamont notices that Bessel had already proposed the hypothesis of such a force to explain certain phenomena presented by Halley's comet.”

These reasons, though not fully conclusive, have been considered weighty enough by several eminent astronomers to justify them in believing that universal attraction is, after all, one and the same thing with magnetic attraction. Still, however specious this opinion may appear, it is not as yet supported by any sterling scientific proof, so that we must rest content with referring telluric currents to the indirect influence of the sun, and continue to look upon this influence as the principal cause of terrestrial magnetism.

Before closing this article it may be well to say a word or two on the probable influence of the planets on terrestrial magnetism, regarding which we have already heard Lockyer's opinion. It is needless to remark, that if some of the theories just mentioned are not borne out in such a way as to constitute certainty, those that follow must be much less so; and in truth they are, for the most part, mere conjectures, though not wholly groundless.

To exert any magnetic influence the planets should be magnets themselves; that they really are magnets is very probable from what we have seen of the cause of terrestrial magnetism. Indeed the earth under every respect in which it is known is exactly like the other planets. In common with them it is acted upon by universal gravitation, and also by the sun's calorific and luminous radiations; why, then, as a result of these radiations, should not thermo-electric currents like those of the earth be found in the other planets also? Besides, we have the opinion of Clerk Maxwell and many others, that the moon really acts on terrestrial magnetism. But the moon may be looked upon not only as a satellite, but also, according to Proctor and others, as a twin planet of the earth; and as it is as much a magnet as the earth, why may not other planets also be magnetic? That they are so, is not a mere probability, and to confirm us in this position, we have only to recall what has already been said on the relations between Venus, Mercury, and Jupiter, and the spots on the sun. Let us recall, too, the apparent connection of Jupiter and Saturn with the cycle of eleven years and the cycle of fifty-six years observed in the case of auroras and solar spots. At the close of a paper on this subject the Kew observers remark: “The following question may occur to our readers: How is it possible that a planet so far distant from the sun as Venus or Jupiter can cause mechanical changes as vast as

any the sun-spots exhibit?" And in answer, while assuring us that they lay no claim to having as yet determined the exact nature of the influence exerted by the planets on the sun, they attribute it to a solar luminous and chiefly calorific radiation producing changes in them that react upon the sun. This opinion, already well founded as it is, becomes far more worthy of attention if, instead of referring the reaction caused by the planets to a general calorific radiation, we account for it by one of the principal effects of this radiation, that is, by the thermo-electric currents which it produces in the planets.

Of course this general calorific radiation might well explain the solar influence on Venus and Mercury, and the reaction in turn of these planets on the sun; but it can by no means explain the reaction of Jupiter and Saturn. For these planets are very distant from the sun, and yet they apparently exert a greater influence over it than any of the others do. Now as the radiation of the sun varies inversely as the square of the distance, it is altogether too slender a cause to explain changes so great as those which operate in producing solar spots and other stupendous effects. Not so with our thermo-electric currents. These, in the planets in question, must be very intense, since they proceed from the heat of the sun in connection with planetary rotation. Now, since Jupiter's volume is 1500 times greater, and Saturn's 800 times greater, than that of the earth, and since each of these two planets has a greater velocity about its axis than our planet, their days being respectively ten and ten and a half hours long, it follows that the velocity of their every point must be enormous (in Jupiter it reaches eight miles a second), and quite sufficient to account for very powerful thermo-electric currents, and consequently for a reaction capable of producing solar spots. Under this aspect it is plain that the nature of the reaction above mentioned must be purely electrical. The changes, therefore, which Jupiter and Saturn and the other planets produce in the sun must be electrical also. This agrees with the modern view held by many able astronomers, which considers solar spots and other phenomena merely as cyclones and eruptions in the gaseous solar atmosphere, precisely similar to terrestrial cyclones and eruptions which are of undoubtedly electrical origin.

The insight thus obtained into planetary magnetism, though not fully satisfactory, is still of great value in explaining the action of the planets on our earth. If they act upon us as magnets should act, we must certainly be sensible of their action; and that we are sensible of it, appears very probable from certain late indications, which seem to show that meteorological phenomena depend upon the position of the planets. Some modern writers, among others Mr. Rice, basing their conclusion upon an historical investigation, go even so far as to assert that these phenomena have some con-

nection with the passage of the planets at the nodes. This assertion, however, is not yet fully verified; and it will be very difficult to verify it, since account should be taken of the influence of all the planets, and since investigations should be based on longer and more accurate observations than have as yet been made. But, without granting the deductions drawn from these inquiries, we must acknowledge that facts are not wanting to support this view. At all events, it is certain that many facts find a ready explanation in the hypothesis of planetary magnetism. According to such a theory the planets as magnets must act upon each other by induction. A change, therefore, in the position of the inducing poles must effect a corresponding change in the nature of their mutual influence; and, in the case of the earth, such a change would be marked by an unusual disturbance of the atmosphere, accompanied by many extraordinary meteoric phenomena. The importance of such a disturbance would, of course, increase, if it were to occur while two or three planets are passing at the nodes. Our assumption is much like the opinion which attributes the regular occurrence of equinoctial storms to a change in the inductive action of the sun while the earth is passing at the nodes.

Thus, from the nature of the earth's magnetic perturbations, and their connection with the periodical variations in solar activity, we have shown that terrestrial magnetism depends in great part, if not entirely, upon the action of the sun. We have furthermore shown the relation which planetary magnetism very probably bears to this solar influence. Owing to the very practical results which a knowledge of these last-named relations must afford, we cannot place too high a value on the study of them, and we look forward with great interest to the more constant and successful observation of them promised by the recent foundation of several physico-astronomical observations. Speaking of the results of Mr. Meldrum's observations concerning the eleven years' cycles of rainfalls and cyclones, Lockyer says:

"Surely here is evidence enough, evidence which should no longer allow us to deceive ourselves as to the present state of meteorology. A most important cycle has been discovered, analogous in many respects to the *Saros* discovered by the astronomers of old."

He then goes on to suggest closer observations of the sun and other heavenly bodies, and also of terrestrial magnetism, as the most likely means of arriving at a thorough knowledge of its nature—"observations," he says, "which demand the united efforts of astronomy and of meteorology both as a physical science and as a mere collection of weather statistics. When these demands are met . . . we shall have a *Science of Meteorology* placed on a firmer basis, the *Meteorology of the Future*."

BEZA AS TRANSLATOR AND PERVERTER OF
GOD'S WORD.

The Holy Bible according to the Authorized Version (A.D. 1611). With an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. *New Testament*, Vol. I., St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1878. Royal 8vo.

The same. Vol. II., St. John and Acts of the Apostles. Same publishers. 1880.

Novi Testamenti Libri Historici Graeci et Latini perpetuo Commentario ex antiquitate, historiis, philologia illustrati, quem præter venerabilis *Bezae* undique conquisitæ doctissimorum virorum lucubrationes ac præ cæteris insigniores explicationes suppeditarunt, adornante *Balduino Walæo*, etc. Amstelædami (apud Joannem Ravensteinium). MDCLXII., 4to.

Η Καινή Διαθήκη κ. τ. λ. Novum Testamentum, D. N. Jesu Christi Graeco-Latinum, Theodoro Beza interprete. Tiguri (ex typographeo Bodmeriano) 1671.

SINCE our last article on Beza, the announcement has been made that the new English, or rather the improved, corrected, and amended version of King James will be ready for printing, if not immediately, at least early in the coming year. Some of the corrections are supposed to be foreshadowed in the notes to Scribner's two volumes, which are quoted at the head of this paper. But many more, both in verbal criticism and doctrinal meaning, are necessary, before the English Protestant Church can have a faithful translation, the pure unadulterated Word of God, which by its own confession and complaint it has not possessed for the last three hundred years and more. As soon as the new edition appears we will give some account of it to our readers, and shall be happy to make a faithful note of all the passages in which they shall have purged the Anglican version of its glaring errors and corruptions, and of those especially which have been derived from Beza. For, that his influence was very great over all English Protestant translators, those of King James included, admits of no doubt. Nor is this a mere assertion or idle fancy, as some have pretended, but the deliberate statement of eminent Protestant writers. Our object, then, in proving Beza's bad character as an interpreter, was to show how ruinous must have been his influence to the honesty and fidelity of the Anglican version. Having said this much we resume our theme.

Proof enough has been already alleged¹ to show that Beza used translation as a means of corrupting the sense of God's word; and that he did not do this timidly and shrinkingly, like other false interpreters, but avowedly and not unfrequently with an elaborate attempt to justify his boldness by what he considered the sound doctrinal gain that was to be gathered from his innovations. Of this wicked perversion of Scripture he has been not only accused, but found guilty and condemned, not by Catholics alone, but by Anglicans, Lutherans, and even by Presbyterians, as we may afterwards show. If, therefore, we now add further specimens of his deliberate mistranslations, it is not to prove what is already acknowledged by writers outside of the Church, but simply to give our readers, Catholic and non-Catholic, a more thorough insight into the character of this crafty interpreter, who (after Luther) has exercised the most noxious and fatal influence over all Protestant English translators of the Bible, not excluding those of King James's version of 1611.

The closing paragraphs of our last article exposed some of Beza's mistranslations of the sacred text, by which he sought to injure the Catholic theory of tradition. We must add another example. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (verses 21, 27, 33) our Saviour, laying down the morality of the Gospel, says: "You have heard that it was said *to* them of old," etc. Beza, either misconceiving or caring little for the true sense of our Lord's words, thought he found here a good chance to turn Scripture against the Church and her traditions. Altering the Greek dative into a Latin ablative, he translates the original *ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις* by "*dictum esse a veteribus*" (that it was said *by* them of old), as if it had been in Greek not a dative, but *ὡπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων*. Beza's line of thought (which he hoped would creep into the mind of his readers) was evidently somewhat of this kind: "These Catholics are ever annoying and embarrassing us by their perpetual appeals to tradition and Christian antiquity. When we condemn and denounce as of human invention and later growth their superstition and idolatry, their worship of dead men (such was the vile term by which he called our Apostles, Martyrs, and Confessors) and of stocks and stones, their masses and purgatory, their sign of the Cross and other tokens of their Baalite worship, they are ever ready with their Justins, Tertullians, Jeromes, Augustines, and other ancients raked up from the dust of ages. They will parade these old champions of an effete superstition, and try to shelter themselves under cover of these venerable names. But what is the authority of these ancients worth? See how our Lord disowns them and even holds

¹ See article on Beza, in the July number of the REVIEW, 1879.

up to reprobation what was taught by "them of old," and how He opposes to it His own teaching, "But I say to you," etc. This, no doubt, is an outline of what was in Beza's mind and what he wished to convey to his readers. But all this, as Beza himself on sober reflection afterwards discovered, was idle trifling. For, any one who calmly examines the context will see clearly that in these passages our Lord neither condemns the ancients nor what was said *by* or *to* them. He merely reiterates, with the sanction of a Divine Lawgiver, the commandments already given through Moses, and crowns and supplements them with the more perfect teaching of His Gospel. And when He comes afterwards to condemn the glosses, either false or added without divine warrant by Pharisaical interpreters (verses 38, 43), lest He should seem to condemn the legitimate use of tradition, He purposely avoids the use of the words "to them of old," and introduces His new teaching by a general allusion to errors that were current as popular maxims, "You have heard that it was said (*not* to them of old, but simply that it has become a saying), an eye for an eye," etc. And again, "You have heard that it was said (leaving out 'to them of old'): Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thine enemy," etc.

Beza himself became so sensible of the worthlessness for any dogmatic purpose of this innovation, that he quietly dropped it in all subsequent editions.¹ Yet, to secure this paltry advantage, as he originally imagined it, he had not scrupled to be the first who dared in all Christendom deliberately to set aside the authority of all existing versions, the *consensus* of all the Greek and Latin Fathers and of all antiquity, and the undeniable *usus loquendi* of the original language of the New Testament.² But the evil that Beza did, though he became ashamed of it and flung it away with contempt, lives after him. For King James's translators have deliberately, with open eyes, adopted this corruption, as wicked as it is worthless.³ Will it be corrected in the New Revision? It is hard to

¹ In the Zurich edition of 1671, it reads in all three verses "*dictum fuisse antiquis*." In the edition of Waleus it is (with an insignificant variation) "*dictum fuisse veteribus*" (vv. 21 and 33). But in v. 27 it reads *a veteribus*, whether purposely or by error of print we cannot determine.

² Spanheim and other Protestants (see Matthew Pole's *Synopsis Criticorum*, Francofurti ad Mœnum, 1694, vol. iv., col. 131), who freely express themselves against this outrageous attempt of Beza, allege a number of parallel passages from Rom. ix. 12, Gal. iii. 16, Apoc. vii. 11; ix. 4, in which the same Greek phraseology occurs. And all these have been correctly translated by Beza, because it was not his interest to pervert them. Dr. Campbell, a Presbyterian minister, but who still does not think that sectarian affinities should bind him to indorse every anti-Catholic perversion of God's Word, has adduced many others from the Gospel of St. Matthew itself (*Four Gospels*, vol. ii., p. 39).

³ They had not even to plead in justification the authority of the miserable English Bible of Geneva. For it has correctly enough, "it was said to them of olde time."

foretell. This change so recklessly made by Beza, and accepted by the royal translators out of blind deference to him, as was their habit, has positively no dogmatic significance either in favor of Protestantism or against the Catholic Church. Beza, unfortunately, in a hasty moment, thought he saw some way to use it against Catholic tradition, and made the bold venture to pervert the text in defiance of all antiquity and even of the Greek Fathers, who might reasonably be supposed to know as much of their own language as a popinjay songster, born at Vezelay, in Burgundy, more than a thousand years after Athanasius, Basil, and Chrysostom had been worshipped on our altars. Beza, to give him his due, acknowledged his mistake. Will the Anglo-American Board of Revision be equally honest? Or will it be too hard for them to reject a false interpretation, which their spiritual ancestors adopted for Beza's sake, scarcely a score or two of years after his own edition, in which he rejected it? Dr. Mansell in his note to Matthew v. 21,¹ after giving the Anglican version in the text, "*by* men of old time," coldly adds in the note "*Rather* to men of old time." If this edition, which is supposed in some way to be a prelude to the New Revision, can speak in no bolder tone, the promised labors of the new Board are not very encouraging.

If there was anything that Beza, in common with his Calvinistic brethren, disliked in the Catholic Church and teaching, it was her hierarchy, with its divinely appointed rights and powers; its constituted gradations; its bonds and obligations of holy life, by which, no less than by its character, the priesthood was to be sundered and set apart from the Christian laity. By definition of the Council of Trent the Catholic Church has set down as an article of faith, what had been believed by the Church of all ages, that there is amongst Christians a divinely established hierarchy, consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers. But the anti-Catholic faction,² which

Their only precedent, after their idol Beza, was the Genevese French edition, which reads in all three places "*PAR les anciens.*" Ostervald, Diodati, and the anonymous Italian translator of Geneva, with the Spanish La Reyna, all follow the true reading of the Vulgate. See Elias Hutter's Polyglot New Testament, Nuremberg, 1599, vol. i., pp. 34-37. For Diodati and Ostervald, see Dr. Lee's Folio Polyglot, published at London by Baxter (no date, but, as appears from the dedication, printed in the reign of William IV.), vol. ii., p. 149 (3). Dr. Campbell, in his Four Gospels (vol. ii., p. 39), says that Diodati translates in imitation of Beza "*dagli antichi.*" It is likely enough that Diodati's additions, like those of most Calvinist interpreters, who were not translating *bona fide*, but for a sectarian purpose, have undergone repeated changes. But, as printed in Dr. Lee's Polyglot, it now reads correctly in the dative "*agli antichi.*"

¹ See the Holy Bible (quoted at head of this article), New Testament, St. Matthew, p. 27.

² They were not a Church, though their children, in our day, forgetting their fathers, pretend to the name. They hated, disowned, and rejected the word out of hatred of that "Church," against which they had rebelled. They banished the very term out

in the first half of that century ruled and ravaged a great part of Europe, pretended to find in Scripture that there was no hierarchy, no bishops, no priests, but merely an order of ministers or public servants, who had some vague right to teach the laity and lead the way in preaching doctrines and morality. These same ministers, when questioned, were unable accurately to define their own position, and were constantly shifting their ground. When called to account by Catholics, they gave themselves out as mere servants and nominees of the civil power, to whose breath they owed their life and being. Thus the Cranmers, Ridleys, and Latimers acknowledged their ministerial office to be simply the creation of English royalty, and openly confessed it by taking out new faculties or episcopal powers on the accession of a new sovereign, implying that their office of bishop had ceased with the death of him who gave it. But at other times, when called to account, not by captious Catholic theologians, but by stubborn laymen of their own persuasion, they could plead their clerical dignity to an extent unheard of in the Catholic Church, and claim for themselves even the rights and immunities of the Old Testament priesthood. But, as a general rule, against Catholics they uniformly maintained that there was no real difference between cleric and layman, and that the "royal priesthood" of the New Law belonged by right to the laity as well as the clergy of Christendom.

The title and the office of a Christian bishop are set forth more or less clearly in the New Testament, it not being a catechetical book for instruction of the faithful, but an historical record, in which doctrine is occasionally mentioned. Beza (to give him the credit that is his due) never has sought to obliterate or disfigure the name or dignity wherever it occurred in the New Testament, though he might have done it very safely and very creditably in his atmosphere of Geneva. Whenever he meets the words "bishop" and "bishopric," he invariably renders them by "episcopus" and "episcopatus." And on one occasion (Acts i. 20), where he might have

of the Scriptures so effectually that it does not occur even once in the English Bible of 1562, but is perpetually replaced by the word "congregation." Thus Christ is made to say to St. Peter: "On this rock I will build my congregation." This Bible was one of those known as the Geneva ("Breeches") Bible, which began in 1560, and "from that date until 1612 no year passed without one, two, or more editions being issued from the press" (Dore, *Old Bibles*, London, 1876, p. 65). And this was the Bible used almost exclusively in our Presbyterian Churches of Colonial times, so that if the word "Church" has survived in the Bible and language of English-speaking non-Catholics, no thanks are due to the Puritan translators, who did their best to exterminate the word; but all the credit of saving the term must be given to the royal Solomon (as his flatterers called him), James I., who peremptorily commanded his translators to restore the word "Church" wherever it had been corrupted into "congregation."

¹ Ἐπίσκοπος and Ἐπισκόπη are found eight times in the New Testament.

dispensed with the latter term, he takes pains in a note to inform the reader that he has purposely retained it: "Nos vocabulum illud (*episcopatum*) libenter retinuimus, quia de ecclesiastica et ea quidem Apostolica functione hic agit Petrus." Nor did he so far forget himself as to pervert or disfigure the word in the famous passage (Acts xx. 28), where, in spite of King James's positive orders, his translators replaced the Greek term "bishops" by "overseers," as a sop to the Presbyterian Cerberus.² If in another place (I. Pet. ii. 25), where St. Peter, by figure of speech, calls Christ the "Shepherd and Bishop" of our souls, Beza did not stick to the

¹ "We have chosen rather to retain this word (*Bishoprick*) because Peter here treats of an ecclesiastical office, yea the very office of an Apostle" (Beza apud Walæum, op. cit., p. 1026).

² These precious words of St. Paul establish conclusively more than one Catholic dogma and overthrow more than one heresy. The Anglican bishops of King James, as we have seen, magnanimously flung away the Apostles' words in the interest of Puritanism. Their lineal spiritual descendants of the Bible Society in the heretical (heretical, because the deutro-canonical books, received by the Syrian Church, are left out by Presbyterian authority) version of the Syriac Scriptures, which they disseminate in the East, pretending that it is the pure Bible, without note or comment, take pains to pander to the Nestorian heresy by adding in this very text to the words "Church of God which He hath possessed (or acquired) by His blood" this marginal note in Syriac, "Basshohhe (a) hhrone it horco DAMSHIHHO" (in other copies it here reads of CHRIST). Now of what possible interest could it be to a good Christian, be he Maronite, Jacobite, Antiochene, or Chaldee (if he be a Catholic), to get the information that, according to some copies of Scripture, it was not "God" but "Christ" who purchased the Church by His blood? These poor innocent Syrians have always believed with the Catholic Church that God became man to redeem us, that He was born of a virgin, that Mary is truly His mother, that He shed His blood on Calvary, etc. And is not this attempt to unsettle their faith by means of Scripture notes simply *dishonest*, in a book that pretends to be published as God's Word, without note or comment? Judging them, not by this incident alone, but by their whole course, it would seem that these Bible Society editors are not only Presbyterians but thorough Nestorians, who believe in the double personality of Christ, and hold that He who suffered on the cross was only Mary's son, not True God of True God. Yet in their Syriac title-page they call themselves "believers in Christ Jesus," and describe their book as printed "in LANDAN (Chaldee for London; and here, too, we may see a most unwarrantable pandering to Chaldee-Nestorian usage, which substitutes the vowel *a* for *o*), the city strong in God, which is the metropolis of the land of England, and by expense of men, believers in Christ Jesus, who are partakers (partners or associates) for the printing of the Holy Books for their own people and for strangers. And this Holy Book was printed for the Eastern Syrians, believers in Christ Jesus, and has been corrected on some Syrian ancient copies, etc." Of this Bible Society edition of the Syriac Testament we have lying before us two copies, one printed in 1816 and the other in 1826. The note on passage of Acts xx. 28 may be found in the former at p. 296, in the latter edition at p. 195. Dr. Murdock has the decency to put in his note to this passage that the "*Nestorian MSS. read of the Messiah*" (N. T. from the Peshitto, p. 258). By printing the wicked note in Syriac, the sacred language of the liturgy, instead of Karshuni or the vernacular Chaldee, one is almost tempted to believe that they wished to have this malicious interpolation read at Mass in this portion of Scripture, which is marked as an Epistle *de communi*, or especially for the festivals of "the Holy Fathers."

original term, no fault can justly be found with him. He translates "Pastorem et Curatorem animarum vestrarum."¹

Speaking of priests, or the second order of the hierarchy, we must again give Beza the due credit to which he is entitled. In all places of the New Testament where *πρεσβύτερος* is found, he has invariably rendered it, as St. Jerome did, by the Latin word *presbyter*. And in I. Tim. iv. 14, with the same holy Father, he gives *presbyterii* as the correct rendering of the original *τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου*,² which has been since so barefacedly rendered by Anglican and Presbyterian translators. Of course Beza, writing in a learned tongue, ran no risk by thus translating, nor did he compromise his Calvinistic theories. He was only, though he did not know it, carrying out the principles laid down for his translators (which, however, they did not follow) by James I., when prescribing rules for his revised version or translation of 1611. As he laid down the law "the old ecclesiastical words were to be kept. When any word has divers significations, that to be kept which hath most commonly been used by the most eminent Fathers, being agreeable to the propriety of the place and the analogies of faith." If King James's bishops and ministers had only carried out his law they would have made a good translation. But the royal bishops and divines trampled on this sensible rule of translation just as the translators of the Geneva and Bishops' Bible had done, and likewise their predecessors, the Tyndales, Coverdales, and others by whom the Bible was done "out of Douche and Latyn into Englyshe."³ Nor can it be said that their true object was to give their countrymen the genuine "Word of God" in English. Some wished to palm off on them the counterfeit Gospel of Wittenberg,

¹ Rev. Dr. Murdock, who seems uniformly to have had his eye on Beza, translates the Peshitto here "shepherd and *curator* of your souls." What idea does this inflated Latin word present to an ordinary English reader? The Syriac interpreter did not use here the term *Episkupo*, which he had used in Acts xx. 28, but *sohuro* (with *ain* for *h*). This word has only two meanings in Syriac. It is either one who *acts* or one who *visits* in the scriptural usage of that word (Hebr. *pakad*). *Curator* may be good Latin but poor English. The word *Bishop* might have been very well retained without any violence to heretical instincts. And so it reads in King James's version. The Anglican translators, it seems, were unwilling enough to have the successors of the Apostles looked on as anything more than "overseers," but they had no difficulty whatever in allowing Christ to be called the "Bishop" of our souls.

² Cranmer's Bible gives the text in a most unmistakably Catholic sense: "With the laying on of hands by the authoritie of priesthode." This is very like our old Douay: "With the imposition of the handes of priesthood" (New Testament, printed at Rhemes by John Fogny, 1582, p. 574).

³ This open acknowledgment on the title-page of their early version sufficiently discloses the scant honesty of these translators. They would have the world believe that they were giving to English readers the genuine word of God, whereas they were giving a translation from the Latin Vulgate, but disfigured and depraved by the help of Martin Luther's German mistranslations.

while others wished to teach them that of Geneva. And it is to these unworthy "gospellers," as they chose to call themselves, that we owe the introduction into our New Testament language of such words as "elders" and "eldership," words utterly unknown to the Christian people of Europe, and which could only be dragged into deliberate use for the purpose of degrading and obliterating, if possible, the old hereditary Catholic idea of priesthood.

But if Beza did not condescend in his Latin translation to adopt and sanction those wicked corruptions that were so rife in the versions that issued from Geneva in his lifetime, and of which not a few have crept into the Anglican Bible of 1611, it is undeniable that the whole crew of apostate refugees at Geneva, French, English, Spanish, and Italian, looked up to him as their master and teacher, and were guided by Beza's *dicta*, which, especially after Calvin's death, were the law and gospel of that city. And he unquestionably allowed himself a good deal of liberty in adapting, or perverting, the words of the New Testament to the defence of his master's theory concerning the priesthood, its dignity, and those safeguards of holy life with which it was invested even from the days of the Apostles. According to the Presbyterian theory (though in practice they can be theocratic enough), clerics and laymen are all alike priests and kings; the clergy does not differ intrinsically from the laity; churchmen derive their being as a class, not from Divine institution, but from the civil government, or from the congregation of Christian worshippers. This theory was, of course, as all religious systems of human invention usually are, modified by places and circumstances. As long as this Presbyterian doctrine was the state creed of the Anglican Church, as it happened to be in the days of the Cromwells, Cranmers, Riddleys, Hoopers, and Latimers, bishops and priests were merely, by their own confession, the creatures of royal authority. On the will and breath of the king depended their very life, being, and authority, as far as they were to be considered churchmen or ecclesiastics. But in Geneva and the Low Countries, and everywhere else out of the range of monarchy, the Presbyterian theory asserted itself very differently. Monarchical, Papal, and Episcopal rule were declared to have something in common; they were relics of Baalite idolatry, and were put under the same ban. The clergy derived their power from the "congregation" (not the church), which had elected them to office, and conferred on them all rights of teaching and spiritual ministration. There was evidently no warrant for all this in the Scripture or in the history of the Apostles, who ordered all Christians to obey their prelates, and denounced whoever would not hear the authoritative voice of the Church as a heathen and publican, and

deserving of anathema.¹ But Beza had made up his mind to put some at least of this Calvinist theory into his amended New Testament, in order that his Presbyterian readers, if they could not find their notions in the original Greek, might be gratified by seeing and hearing them in his own Latin and in the French or other vernacular tongue of his disciples.

So, without rejecting the mere name of *priest* (presbyter) in order to substitute for it *ancient* or *elder*, Beza had fully made up his mind that the "presbyter" of the improved version should not be the "priest" of the Catholic Church, who has a sacred character that comes of divine appointment and is imparted by sacramental rites. The "presbyter" of his new religion became such, not in virtue of any sacrament or religious rite, but by the good-will of the congregation and of his fellow-presbyters. Beza seems to have been aware that this new doctrine was not laid down with sufficient clearness in the New Testament, and accordingly he introduced it now and again into the sacred text to remedy the omissions, or gently reprove the forgetfulness of the inspired writers. Thus, in Acts xiv. 23, St. Luke relates that the Apostles ordained priests (or elders, as the Anglican Bible under Genevan inspiration gives it) for the faithful in every Church. This Beza translates: *Quum per suffragia creassent presbyteros*, "Having chosen presbyters by election" (or votes). The words "*per suffragia*" (by votes), are a gratuitous interpolation designed to give a Calvinistic coloring to the text. Nor does Beza make any secret of his motive. For in his note to the Greek word, which he has diluted into three, he says: "The force of this term should be remarked, that we may learn how Paul and Barnabas did nothing of their own caprice and used no tyranny over the Church; in a word, did nothing of what is done at this day by the Pope of Rome and his adherents, whom they call Ordinaries."² His object in perverting the text was to show how unscriptural are the Pope and his bishops in using their authority to appoint and ordain clergymen, instead of leaving them to the choice of the laity. The absurdity and worthlessness of the perversion are further apparent from the context, which shows that the voting (if there were any), no less than the ordaining, must have been altogether on the part of the two Apostles, Saints Paul and Barnabas, to whom the word *χειροτονήσαντες* exclusively belongs. By his note Beza would in-

¹ Heb. xiii. 17; Matt. xviii. 17.

² "Est notanda vis hujus verbi ut Paulum ac Barnabam sciamus nil privato arbitrio gessisse nec ullam in ecclesia exercuisse tyrannidem; nil denique tale fecisse quale hodie Romanus Papa et ipsius asseclæ, quos Ordinarios vocant." This insolent note was omitted by Walaeus (see his edition, p. 1170), and one less offensive, though redolent enough of the Presbyterian theory, by Quistorpius, substituted in its place.

sinuate, if he could, that the voting was done by the disciples, the ordaining by the two Apostles. But this is a sense of *χειροτονειν* so extravagant, that it would be vain to seek a precedent for it in sacred or profane antiquity. Beza's example was generally followed, sometimes improved upon, by his Geneva scholars. The English has "and when they had ordeyned them elders *by election* in every church;" the French, "et apres que *par l'advis des assemblées* ils eurent etablis des Ancients par chacune eglise." The anonymous Italian is not a whit less democratic: "E poi che *per l'avviso de la congregazione* (by advice of the congregation) ebbero costituiti loro de' seniori per ciascuna chiesa." The Spaniard, La Reyna is less bold: "Y aviendo les *constituydo Ancianos*" (appointed elders for them) in cada una de las Iglesias.¹ Ostervald, likewise, is cautious, and contents himself with saying: "Et apres avoir prié et jeuné ils etablirent des anciens dans chaque Eglise." But Diodati allows himself the widest liberty, and adds an adjective that fully explains what his master had intended by "per suffragia." He translates: "E dopo ch' ebbero loro per ciascuna chiesa ordinati *per voti comuni* degli Anziani" (ordained elders for them by general suffrage).²

Again, in II. Cor. viii. 19, Beza adroitly introduces his "votes" into a text which knows nothing of them. The Vulgate has "Ordinatus ab ecclesiis comes peregrinationis nostræ" (ordained by the churches as our fellow-traveller). The Anglican version gives: "Chosen of the churches to travel with us." This Beza translates with his usual boldness: "*Suffragiis* delectus ab Ecclesiis socius peregrinationis nostræ" (chosen by *vote* of the churches as the companion of our journey). The Apostle is speaking of St. Luke, or more probably (as St. John Chrysostom observes) of St. Barnabas. Now, it is very unlikely, or rather most absurd, that Paul and Barnabas, who were set aside for the apostleship by divine command and inspiration, should in the exercise of its highest functions be dependent on the will of this or that congregation, so that their preaching in this or that given quarter and their choice of a travelling companion should be determined by popular suffrage. The inspired writer says nothing about vote or suffrage; he merely intimates that Barnabas was sent with him as a companion or fellow-worker in the apostolic field, and with special reference, it would seem, to one journeying in particular. But in the language of Scripture, as well as in other human speech, *sending* does not always necessarily imply the use of authority. It may presuppose only counsel, or even mere petition.

¹ See Hutter's Nuremberg Polyglott, Vol. I. (Acts), p. 168.

² Lee's London Polyglott, Vol. II., p. 172.

This is evident from many passages of the Old and New Testaments.¹ Thus, in Acts xiii. 3, it is related how, after laying hands on them, the heads of the Church at Antioch *sent away* Saul and Barnabas. "And so (adds immediately the sacred text) being *sent* by the Holy Ghost, they went to Seleucia," etc. Surely the meaning of the word "to *send*" cannot be the same in both places. Again, in Acts viii. 14, setting aside for a moment all reference to Catholic truth, and admitting the absolute equality of the Apostles, no one can suppose that their "sending" Peter and John to Samaria could involve anything beyond advice or request. If the people's "sending" their priests and princes (as narrated in Jos. xxii. 13, 14) to remonstrate with the tribes of Reuben and Gad must be strictly taken for an exercise of legitimate authority, then Israel, instead of being a theocracy, as is generally supposed, must have been a pure democracy in church and state even from the days of Josue. Beza's disciples seem here to have deserted their master. Diodati and the anonymous Italian refugee use the ambiguous word "eletto," which is the "chosen" of the Genevese English and of King James. Ostervald is the only one who has stuck faithfully to Beza: "Il a été choisi par les suffrages des Eglises, pour nous accompagner," etc.²

St. Luke, in the last verse of the first chapter of Acts (i. 26), says, that St. Matthias, by divine disposition, "was numbered with the eleven." This is the translation of the Vulgate, Rhemish, and King James. But this does not suit Beza's theory. He will have the choice of the Apostle brought about by "voting," and his adoption into the Apostolic body the result of an election by the assembly of believers! Could human boldness go farther in tampering with the text of the inspired historian? The Apostles, acting under divine impulse, place two names (Barsabas and Matthias) in the urn. They beseech God "to show which of the two He has chosen to take the place of the ministry and apostolate," from which Judas has fallen. God hears their prayer and causes the lot to fall upon Matthias. And we are coolly told by Beza in his version that this decision of heaven was duly voted on and graciously ratified by the "elders" of that first Christian assembly. Such language would be ludicrous were it not for its impiety. But it is quite characteristic of the source whence it comes.³ The word

¹ See, for example, Josue xxii. 13, 14; Acts viii. 14; xiii. 3, 4; and v. 2.

² Apud Lee, Vol. II., p. 181.

³ It was a saying of Frederick II. that "while Catholics reverently look up to God as their Creator, the Lutheran treats Him as an equal, the Calvinist as an inferior." There is truth as well as wit in the remark. And it must not be forgotten that the royal free-thinker (whom a recent Evangelical Sunday-school paper holds up as a model prince) was not only a keen observer, but had enjoyed the advantage of a thorough Calvinistic education.

used in the text is *συγκατεψηφίσθη*, which Beza expands into three "communibus calculis allectus est," "he was chosen by unanimous vote." In this he is followed by the old English Puritan Bible, that reads, "by a common consent;" by the Geneva French and Ostervald, who both have "d'un commun accord," and finally by Diodati, who has "per comuni voti." Luther is more honest with his "er ward zugeordnet;" so is King James's version, which is ashamed to follow its Puritan predecessors in this perversion of truth, and takes the true word from the Vulgate (*et annumeratus est*), "and he was numbered with," etc. Even the Geneva Italian here abandons Beza and translates correctly "fù aggiunto al numero;" so, too, the Spanish of Geneva "y fue contado."

If Beza, like King James's translators, could see nothing but a "messenger" in the "Angel of the Testament" foretold by Malachy (iii. 1), and in the "angel" who was to prepare His way before His face, we must give him credit at least for recognizing "angels" in the bishops of the seven Churches of Asia (Apoc., chapters ii. and iii.). Hence the *servum pecus* that followed at his heels, while refusing the title of "angel" to St. John the Baptist and even to the Son of God who claimed it (Matth. xi. 10; Luc. vi. 27), has no difficulty in granting it to the seven bishops of Asia.² But the Presbyterian Bibles of England had such a hatred of prelacy, that in spite of Beza, and their Puritan English prototype of Geneva³ they (in their editions of 1562, 1577, 1579) translate "messengers" for "angels." Of course, according to their theory the "seven stars" (Apoc. i. 20), or seven bishops of the Apostolic era were not bishops at all, but only "ministers" or "elders." In translating, it no doubt very probably occurred to them, that in the Presbyterian laity, who had daily to look upon the long, sour, grim visages of their spiritual rulers, it would sound like irony, or at least occasion a quiet smile to hear them designated as "angels." The most uneducated Catholic has some idea of the reason, why bishops should be called angels in Holy Writ. But how many Presbyterians could listen to such a term applied to their ministers and elders, without some consciousness of its incongruity? Hence it was wisely dropped and "messengers" substituted.

Beza could not bear, in his Calvinistic zeal, that even an Apostle should give himself out as Christ's representative in imposing cen-

¹ Hutter's Polyglott, Act. Apostle, vol. i., p. 10. Lee's Polyglott, N. T., p. 83.

² So too the Bible of King James, in a sudden freak of respect for the Episcopal office here elevates into "angels" those whom it had degraded into "overseers" (Act. xx.). Murdock also has "angel" in the Apocalypse for *malaco*, though he calls it "messenger" in Matth. xi. 10, and Luke vi. 27 (Syriac Testament Translated, pgs. 19, 117, 444). Such is his blind devotion to Beza!

³ See Hutter's Polyglott, Apoc., Tom. ii., p. 947.

tures on members of the Church, and absolving them from the same, when in his discretion he judged fit to temper rigor with mercy. This recalled too forcibly to his mind the anathemas to which the successor of St. Peter, acting as Christ's vicar, subjects delinquent princes and peoples, and from which he absolves them on repentance, in the name and by the authority of Christ. When, therefore, he came across the fact of St. Paul, who in Christ's name excommunicated the incestuous Corinthian, and restored him when repentant to communion, he did what he could to nullify all that in the Apostle's action might serve as a precedent to the rulers of the Church. St. Paul distinctly states (2 Cor. ii. 10) that he acted "in the person" of Christ, *εν προσώπῳ χριστου*. This Beza wickedly translates by "in conspectu Christi," "in the sight of Christ." All the Fathers, Greek and Latin, explain the passage in a Catholic sense; even the Presbyterian, Dr. Macknight,¹ confesses that the phrase means "in the name and by the authority of Christ." Even the version of King James, out of pure shame, corrected the corruption found in previous English editions, and for "in the sight" substituted "in the person of Christ." Beza's perversion has been imitated by all of his disciples. The French version has "devant la face de Christ," and Ostervald "en la presence de Christ;" the Italian refugee "in presentia di Cristo," and Diodati, "nel cospetto di Cristo." The Spanish, however, is correct, "en persona di Christo;" and so is Luther, who reads, "an Christi statt." Murdock, thorough Bezaite as he is, translates, "in the presence of the Messiah." He cannot bear the word "person" in the mouth of St. Paul. Why then did he, with a squeamishness uncalled for by grammar or propriety, intrude it amongst our Saviour's words (Matth. xii. 50), "Every one that doeth the good pleasure of my Father who is in Heaven, *that person* is my brother and my sister," etc. The Syriac original has only the word *huyu* (ipse est) "he is."²

That the clergy should be distinguished from the laity not only by their sacred character, but by their withdrawal from worldly cares and married life, was very distasteful to Beza and all like him,

¹ Vid. Macknight *in locum*.

² Calvin translates *in conspectu*, but does not object to its being translated *in persona*. Schleusner, in his Greek Lexicon of the New Testament (Edimburgi, 1814, vol. ii. sub. voc. n. 10), says that *εν προσώπῳ* is a form of swearing, as nearly all interpreters are agreed, "Formulam jurandi in his verbis latentem agnoverunt omnes fere interpretes." We wish he had quoted one or two out of that great crowd. Any and every thing to avoid the fact that St. Paul condemned or absolved in the name of Christ! Yet what is more natural than that he, who had imposed the penalty in the name and by the authority of Christ (1 Cor. v. 4) should remit it in the same name and by the same authority? In Bass's Greek Lexicon appended to Scrivener's New Testament (New York, 1879), the correct meaning of the passage is given.

who pretended to reconcile their character of divine envoys with what St. Jude calls "walking after the flesh." Hence they undertook to pervert or disfigure the sacred text, so as to drag out of it some approval of marriage amongst the clergy. Beza, with incredible boldness, translates *γυναῖς* in the first chapter of Acts, v. 14, by *uxoribus* (wives), as if the wives of the eleven Apostles (and Judas's widow, too, it may be supposed) were with them in the supper-room, awaiting the descent of the Holy Ghost. In this shameful perversion Beza stands alone;¹ not even one of his Genevan crew of interpreters has dared to follow him. It is needless to speak of the "sister and wife" of 1 Cor. ix. 5, for this is common to all Protestant translators with Beza. Yet, an exception must be made in favor of the two Italian interpreters, and the Geneva French and Spanish. "Une femme soeur," "una donna sorella," and "una muger hermana" reproduce exactly the "mulierem sororem" of our Vulgate.²

More remains; but we are at the end of our allotted space. Our next article will examine Beza's standing amongst Protestant students of Scripture and his influence on the English versions.

¹ Matthew Pole's *Synopsis of the Critici Sacri* (Francofurti, 1694, vol. iv., col. 1321) adds the name of Piscator. Beza is not ashamed to defend his translation in a note, and to add that in a very ancient manuscript in his possession (*vetustissimus codex meus*) these other words *καὶ τέκνους* (and their children) are added. Let who will believe this, for Beza's word is not Gospel.

² Murdock here surpasses his master Beza in forcing his false gloss into the text. He translates "to carry about a sister AS a wife." This he learned from Luther's "eine Schwester ZUM Weibe." Both seem to have forgotten what St. John has threatened at the end of his Apocalypse (xxii. 18).

DANTE.

"WHEN a people is in a transition state," writes the author of *The Philosophy of Literature*, "when old forms and landmarks are breaking up, speech becomes a confused mass; and at these 'plastic moments,' a man, a genius appears." This lesson has been taught us by the experience of centuries. We have found it to be true for Greek and Roman, for the light-hearted Troubadour of Provence, and the sturdy Puritan of the English revolution. This truth it is that has served to explain why, amid the dim and misty past, when poetry lived only in the rude hymns of the minstrel, as he sang in the halls of the kings, the poet appeared whose music has filled the world; it points out to us Shakespeare suddenly looming up as the greatest name in a literature that before his coming could boast of no master minds; and, what is more to our purpose, it reveals Dante grasping, by one gigantic effort, the laurel wreath of song, at a time when Italy, shaken by the struggle between the Pagan and the Christian spirit, was filled with anarchy and confusion. If we acknowledge this principle, the appearance of Dante at such a period will excite no wonder. The land which he has so honored was the scene of perpetual strife. Dissensions and civil war prevailed in every district. Guelph and Ghibelline, the partisans of Pope and Emperor, forgot the duty they owed to their country, and sought, not the blessings of peace, but the momentary triumph over a rival faction. Language, too, was in a strange state. The pure speech of Cicero and Horace had sadly degenerated; all its spirit and polish, all its condensed elegance had fled. Ennodius had debased the chiselled verse and majestic rhythm of the Mantuan bard; the chaste diction of the Augustan age had become coarse and unmusical beyond all recognition in the hands of Cassiodorus and Isidore. Nor was the destruction to stop here. The barbarian had yet to do his work. Not alone the precious manuscripts hoarded up in the monasteries, and the priceless remains of Roman art did Attila and Alaric destroy; their savage hordes brought with them many a harsh and guttural language, which in a few score years filled the land with rude and uncouth dialects. Throughout France and Italy it seemed as if a second Babel had sent forth a new confusion of tongues. Thus was it that the times were ripe for the appearance on the horizon of a star whose brilliancy was to increase with the ages, and whose lustre was destined to be the wonder of men. The century was, indeed, a "plastic moment." The Christian principle, teeming with the strength of a divine origin, was fast driving out the spirit of paganism that still held sway in the land; the violent

partisan and the selfish leader were beginning to see beyond the limits of their own narrow sphere, and to acknowledge that there was something higher to be striven for than a short-lived victory in the streets of some petty provincial town.

Such, then, was the condition of the age in which was destined to appear the genius demanded by the circumstances of the times. The middle of the thirteenth century was the auspicious moment. On the 8th of May, 1265, Dante entered into that life which was to bring with each succeeding year nothing but bitter disappointment and cynical despair,—the life, which, in a worldly point of view, was to end in disastrous failure. On the day of his birth the sun was in Gemini; and, although he himself puts all astrologers in one of the lowest circles of the *Inferno*, and punishes them by turning their heads in a direction contrary to that which Nature intended, a horoscope of his life was drawn by Brunetto Latini, his future teacher. What destiny the stars foretold, we do not know. But we cannot help thinking that, howsoever wild and exaggerated Brunetto's predictions may have appeared at the time he never could have dreamed of the fame which was to be the portion of the child. The family of Dante, or Durante contracted, was descended from the Frangipanni, one of the oldest houses of Italy. But in spite of this descent, Dante was classed only among the gentry of the land; and it was to his marriage with a daughter of the powerful family of the Donati that he owed the social rank which he afterwards attained. Of all the Frangipanni who sauntered or hurried through life from the establishment of the house until the thirteenth century, the name of Cacciaguida has alone been rescued from oblivion; and to posterity he will descend as the great-great-grandfather of Italy's famous poet. In the *Purgatorio* he is introduced addressing Dante:

“ I am thy root, O leaf! whom to expect
Even, hath pleased me,”

and appears in the character of a “*laudator temporis acti*,” praising the ancient virtue and probity of the Florentines. But, although the names and history of the great man's ancestors are lost in the past, the memory of their stern devotion to the cause of the Popes has been handed down from century to century. In an age of bitter partisanship, they were the bitterest partisans. They were Guelphs in the face of every imaginable danger. This unwavering allegiance to the Pontiffs does not appear to have contributed to the material prosperity of the family; for we find that they were several times banished from Florence, once in 1248, at the instance of Frederick of Antioch, and again in 1260, after the battle of

Montaperto. Dante was destined to be the only one to abandon the party of his fathers, and to show in the interests of the Ghibellines the same stern fidelity and vindictive spirit that his ancestors had displayed on the side of the Guelphs.

His father, Alighiero degli Alighieri, held a respectable position in Florentine society, his profession of advocate placing him at the head of the middle class. But although he was undoubtedly an earnest pleader and an educated man, his talents scarcely merit for him the notoriety which he has acquired in Italian letters. A most bitter quarrel has been fought by the commentators over the orthography of the family name; and that the participators in this literary battle were decidedly in earnest may be inferred from the emphatic language of one Scolari, who speaks of "l'erroneo, storpio, illegitimo, ingiusto e detestando Alighieri!" Whatever be the correct spelling, we know that Alighieri had been expelled from the city some time before the birth of the poet, but had returned when the Ghibelline power had lessened by the advent of Charles of Anjou.

He was twice married, the first time to Lapa di Cialuffi, the second to Dante's mother. The name of the latter has never been discovered by the commentators. As simple Bella she has become known to posterity as the one who bore the great poet of the Middle Ages. With a strange persistency which we cannot understand, Dante has refrained from making any mention of his mother, his wife, or his family relations. The friends of his youth and of his weary exile, the great men of the day with whom a similarity of tastes brought him in loving contact, the enemies who pursued him with unrelenting hate, the princes who shielded him and gave him a home, when a wanderer in his native land, have all found a place, more or less honorable, in his *Commedia*; but about his own domestic joys and sorrows he remains strangely silent. To this do we owe the scarcity of information respecting his youthful days. From the time of his birth until he reached his ninth year there is a space which must be filled up by the imagination of the student of Dante, for history refuses to do her part. The year 1274 contained two events of importance,—it was then that his father died, and that he obtained the first vision of Beatrice Portinari.

This chance meeting turned the current of his life. When, at the May-day festival of Folco di Portinari, his eyes first lighted upon the beautiful child, clad in crimson and decked with golden ornaments, a new vista opened before him, a new emotion sprang up in his soul, a new life commenced. "Incepit vita nova," he himself tells us. What to other children would have been a passing fancy, to be forgotten amid the pleasures of a strange toy, or lost in

the excitement of a lately invented game, became the one great influence of Dante's life. Throughout all his future career, whether poring over the pages of the Stagyrite amid the halls of the famous universities, or straining every nerve to bring back the spirit of peace to his native city; whether fighting in the ranks at Campaldino, or storming the walls of Florence; whether wandering a homeless exile through the land, or seeking peace and quiet in the palace of the Malaspine, the one face was always before him, the same beautiful eyes burned into his soul. But let Dante himself tell the story of his love. "At this point I can truly say," he writes in the *Vita Nuova*, "that the spirit of life, which dwells in the most secret chambers of the heart, began to tremble so strongly, that even the lesser pulses of my body partook of the commotion; and tremblingly it uttered these words, 'Ecce Deus fortior me, qui veniens dominatur mihi.' Whereupon the animate spirit that dwelleth in the high chamber, to which all the sensitive spirits convey the perceptions, began to marvel greatly, and, speaking especially to the spirit of the eyes, uttered these words, 'Apparuit jam beatitudo vestra.' Whereupon the natural spirit that dwells in that part which ministers to our nourishment, exclaimed, weeping, 'Heu, miser! quia frequenter impedibus ero deinceps!' I say that from that time love ruled my mind so completely and with such sovereign rule, that, by virtue of my strong imagination, I was compelled to do his pleasure continually. He often commanded me to try and find out the youngest of the angels, and in my boyhood I often sought her and found her so praiseworthy, that I could say of her in the words of Homer, 'She seemed to be, not the daughter of a mortal man, but of a god.'"

In this beautiful passage he describes Beatrice's first appearance, when the "youngest of the angels" was yet among the living. He is to see her again amid the splendor of the terrestrial Paradise, and in his "high song divine," to give a still more beautiful account of his vision. He has passed through the fiery snow and the angry winds of the Inferno, and climbed the steep ascent of Purgatory with the souls seeking a glimpse of the celestial light. He has entered the realms of Paradise; and there, amid the solemn chantings of the glorified spirits and the triumphal songs of the blessed ones, half-hidden in a shower of never-dying lilies, clad in the mystical colors of Faith, Hope, and Charity, Beatrice appears before him. In that moment all the past is forgotten. The life of pain and anguish is as if it had never been. In that moment he thinks no more of the unrequited love of his youth, the disappointed passion of his manhood, and the idealized devotion of his later days. He lives but in the present, elevated beyond himself by

"That heavenly influence, which, years past, and e'en
In childhood thrilled me."

Although Dante had so completely lost his heart, he did not follow the example of our modern youth, and give himself up to a course of sonnetteering "to his mistress' eyebrow."

Thoroughly imbued with a true desire for knowledge, he spared no labor to become master of all that was to be learned at the time. To Brunetto Latini was intrusted the task of training the boy's mind; and although, for a shameful crime, he is placed by Dante himself in the seventh circle of the Inferno, where

"O'er all the sand fell slowly wafting down
Dilated flakes of fire, as flakes of snow
On Alpine summit,"

he appears to have discharged the duties of preceptor carefully and well. The usual studies at the time were grammar, dialectics and rhetoric, comprising the trivium, and music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy, forming the quadrivium. Carlyle has well summarized the great poet's acquirements: "Dante's education was the best then going—much school-divinity, Aristotelian logic, some Latin classics, no inconsiderable insight into certain provinces of things; and Dante, with his earnest, intelligent nature, we need not doubt, learned better than most all that was learnable." He not only mastered the more serious branches, but also became passionately devoted to music and drawing. Throughout his poem every friend who seems nearest to his heart is a painter or musician. Giotto, who designed the magnificent Campanile at Florence; Oderigi, the illuminator; Casella, whom Dante represents amid the sad scenes of Purgatory singing a canzone with such tender pathos,

"That within
The sweetness thrills me yet,"

all bear witness to the poet's fondness for the sister arts. But he seemed to consider these pursuits as mere pastimes, while the real objects of his labors were philosophy and theology. To Aristotle and Boëthius he became devotedly attached.

The subtle Greek and the profound Roman obtained a hold upon his mind that grew stronger with each succeeding year; and so strenuously does he maintain their doctrines, not only in the *Divina Commedia*, but also in his prose works, that he has become known to the world as the poet of Scholasticism. Whole cantos of his poem are taken up with the exposition of the principles of the Angelic Doctor. The system of matter and form, the origin of

morality, the connection between intellectual and sensible cognition, are all fully explained. The theory of an ideal world which Plato introduced, and which Wordsworth has embodied in the lines,

“Hence in a season of calm weather,
 Tho’ inland far we be,
 Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
 Which brought us hither,”

is refuted with as much care and precision as if Dante were defending, in the halls of the great universities, the philosophy of the schools against the subtlest metaphysicians of the age.

The institutions in which he acquired his learning have been the subject of as much dispute as the birthplace of Homer. Almost all the universities that flourished at the time lay claim to the honor of having held within their walls the most famous poet of the Middle Ages. Bologna, Padua, Naples, Paris, and Oxford aspire to this distinction. To the first three little objection has been raised. It is quite within the range of probability that a man like Dante should have taken advantage of every institution of learning in his own land. But the jealous Italian mind could not brook the thought that the greatest name in its literature had acquired its priceless treasures of science and culture in a foreign country. They have, accordingly, denied that Dante pursued his studies at Paris, but, above all, at Oxford. Their opponents, however, have a rather strong case. Intrinsic and extrinsic evidence seem to confirm their position. The seventh canto of the *Inferno* opens with these words,

“Pape Satan, Pape Satan, aleppe;”

and among the attempts which commentators have made to explain the line, we find a confirmation of the view that our poet studied at Paris. Benvenuto Cellini tells us that the expression, “Paix, paix, Satan ! allez, paix !” was quite common in the courts of justice of the French capital, and it was while Dante and his friend Giotto were residing in the city that the former heard and adapted the words. Boccaccio, in one of his Latin poems, speaks of Dante as having visited

“Parisiis dudum, extremosque Britannos.”

But to Giovanni di Sarravalla, Prince Bishop of Fermo, do we owe the most conclusive evidence on this point. In one of the notes to his Latin translation of the *Commedia* he says: “Dantes in juventute sese dedit omnibus artibus liberalibus, studens eas Paduæ et Bononiæ, demum Oxoniis et Parisiis, ubi fecit multos actus mirabiles, in quantum quod ut aliquibus dicebatur Magnus Theo-

logus, ab aliquibus Magnus Philosophus, et ab aliquibus Magnus Poeta." In another passage, he writes: "Dantes dilexit Theologiam sacram in qua diu studuit in Oxoniis, in regno Angliæ." In the face of these proofs, the impartial mind cannot fail to conclude that at least the halls of the University of Paris resounded with the voice of the modern Homer.

Thus the life of the youth went on, each day bringing its new store of knowledge, and each day just as surely increasing his hopeless love. The spirit that had been moved so intensely on that bright May morning was asleep, but not dead. It needed only a glance from the eyes of Beatrice to send his blood coursing back upon his heart, and to make him stand enraptured, as if favored with a vision from heaven. He rose above all that was "of the earth, earthy;" his heart warmed in that happy light, and he felt nothing but charity towards all men. In one of his sonnets he declares,

"On him who's worthy, meekly she bestows
Her salutations with a look benign,
So that his heart with goodness overflows.
She surely comes from heaven, a thing divine,
And for our good, on earth has her abode,
So blest is he who near her may remain."

But this overmastering love was to lose its dominant influence for awhile. The poet lived in stirring times. From his early days he had seen around him "the pomp and circumstance of glorious war." The spirit of youth and the promptings of party feeling urged him to the field. It is not surprising, then, that we find him fighting, in 1289, at the battle of Campaldino, in which the Ghibelline forces were routed, and their leaders compelled to fly. But fate evidently had not destined him to be a soldier. From his own lips we have the naïve declaration, that at first he experienced great fear, and afterwards great joy at the issue of the contest. The opening of the twenty-second canto of the *Inferno* is evidently a description of this battle:

"It hath been heretofore my chance to see
Horseman with martial order shifting camp:
Light-armed squadrons and fleet foragers
Scouring thy plains, Arezzo!"

In the autumn of the following year he took part in the siege of Caprona, and with the surrender of the castle his soldier-life ceased for a time. When he again took up the sword, it was against his own native city, in a last desperate attempt to regain a home amid the friends of his youth.

When the struggle was over, Dante returned to Florence, where

the troops were greeted with the enthusiasm inspired by a brilliant victory. But there was no victory for our young warrior, only the remembrance of a crushing defeat. Before he had enrolled himself under the banner of the Guelphs, Beatrice had become the wife of Simeoni dei Bardi. After all his tender devotion, she had crushed whatever hopes he might have entertained, by placing between the ardent lover and herself a barrier which the hand of death alone could remove. Nor can we blame her in aught that she did. If Dante's heart had been enthralled, it was not her fault; she had never, in the slightest degree, encouraged his suit. Although he must have sought eagerly for some faint signal of hope, for some tiny white flag to show that the citadel had surrendered, yet he has never declared that she manifested for him any preference, howsoever slight. In the *Paradise*, she tells us the part she played in his life:

"I showed
My youthful eyes, and led him by their light
In upright walking."

But if the news of her marriage had been a cruel blow, there was a still crueller one in store for him. Hardly had the wedding flowers begun to wither than they were replaced by the immortelles of the grave. On the 9th of June, 1290, Beatrice passed away. She had reached "the threshold of her second age," and "changed the mortal for the immortal." And although we know what bitter anguish must have rent his soul, there was no sign of unmanly sorrow, no giving way to the despair of grief. He felt that the "youngest of the angels" had gone to join her sisters, and that, after his life should be over, he might see her again in heaven. The high purpose, the lofty aim that glowed in his breaking heart, has been registered in these beautiful lines: "I beheld a marvelous vision which has caused me to cease from writing in praise of my blessed Beatrice, until I can celebrate her more worthily, which that I may do, I devote my whole soul to study, as *she* knoweth well; insomuch, that if it please the Great Disposer of all things to prolong my life for a few years upon this earth, I hope hereafter to sing of my Beatrice what never yet was said or sung of woman."

It is probable that, at this period, Dante, inspired with the hope of making her name famous, and prompted by the whisperings of love and grief, began the sublime poem on which his reputation rests. His mind would naturally seek out some effective means of accomplishing the one wish of his heart, and of raising Beatrice high above those fair women who have won the devotion of the world's great poets. Poetry must have seemed to him the fittest instrument for attaining his end. No other career offered such

advantages. As a soldier, he knew that little fame was to be gained by the petty wars of the Florentine factions. As a philosopher, he felt that, in the dazzling splendor which the genius of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus had shed upon the age, all lesser luminaries would appear dim and pale. To the Muses, then, he turned for assistance in his self-imposed task. That he has succeeded beyond his fondest wish, that he has sung of Beatrice as no other woman has ever been celebrated, the verdict of five centuries will prove. Other poets have made their lady-loves sharers in the brilliancy that glows round their own names. Petrarch had his Laura, Sydney his Stella, Spenser his Rosalind, Waller his Sacharissa; and many a beautiful Castara or Chloe, but for the sprightly verse of a Lovelace or a Carew, would have

“ In the forgotten crowd
Of common beauties lived unknown.”

But to Beatrice has fallen the high honor of having inspired a magnificent poem, and of figuring throughout it as the one pure soul, whose influence directed the footsteps of the poet in the path of right.

It is at this period that some writers claim that Dante joined the order of the Franciscans. Although but a few years had elapsed since their foundation, these devoted followers of Christ had already gained universal esteem by the purity and sanctity of their lives. Thomas of Acquin, St. Bernard, Sylvester, and Bonaventure had shed the glory of wisdom and piety around the rough habit of the humble monks, and made the name of the Mendicant orders known throughout all Christendom. The Popes had shown them unusual marks of favor. Innocent III., and Honorius, his successor, had showered privileges upon them. It is not to be wondered at, then, if Dante, still smarting under the pain of his great sorrow, and wishing to escape from the world which had given him nothing but Dead Sea fruit, should have enrolled himself among the followers of St. Francis. Indeed, he himself seems to acknowledge that he became a religious. In Canto XVI. of the *Inferno*, when describing the journey through the seventh circle, he says:

“ I had a cord that braced my girdle round,
Wherewith I erst had thought fast bound to take
The painted leopard.”

But he did not long enjoy the peace and quiet which he had sought. His active, earnest spirit urged him to take part in the nervous and throbbing life that was around him. He entered the world again, and plunged with his usual energy into the politics of

the day. Happy would it have been for him if he had remained in the company of his holy brothers.

We now come to a part of Dante's life which it is difficult to explain. Beatrice had passed away forever. The love which her beauty had awakened in his soul, had inspired every line of that tender revelation of self—the *Vita Nuova*. He had given to the world the touching history of his love; he had told all men how the "youngest of the angels" had completely subdued his heart, and how her glorious eyes had been the guiding-star of his life. But scarcely a year had passed away when we find him married. In 1291 Gemma dei Donati became his wife. What motives induced him to take this step we do not know. Whether, yielding to the solicitations of his family and friends, he sought to smooth his path to political distinction in the future, by an alliance with one of the most powerful houses of Florence; or whether, as a writer in the London *Quarterly* suggests, he sought to find balm for his wounded spirit in the companionship of one who had shown him sweet sympathy in the hour of his trial, remains alike unknown. That the marriage proved unhappy Dante himself has confessed. He found that the place which Beatrice had held in his heart could not be filled by any other woman, and he must have shown this feeling in his conduct towards his wife. That she was the Xantippe some writers represent her to be has not been proven. In after days, when her husband was in exile, and her children reduced to want, she showed herself a true and loving mother. But if she displayed any bitterness towards the poet the fault lay with him. Although we can scarcely admit that his life was "conspicuously licentious," as Boccaccio observes, still it seems not to have been the purest. His devotion to Beatrice, his strong and far-seeing intellect, his warm and earnest religious spirit, were not powerful enough to keep him in the right path. He himself pleads guilty to the charge. With what deep sorrow and shame does he hear the reproaches of Beatrice, when, in the presence of the Heavenly Host, she tells him :

" His steps were turned into deceitful ways,
Following false images of good, that makes
No promise perfect ;"

and with what profound humiliation does he answer :

" Thy fair looks withdrawn,
Things present with deceitful pleasures turned
My steps aside."

But, notwithstanding the unhappiness of their lives, they remained together for twelve years, until Dante's banishment in 1302. In the

meantime she had borne him six children, five sons and one daughter. When the dreadful blow fell, and her husband was sent forth a homeless wanderer, Gemma stayed in Florence. The parting between Dante and his wife was final; the next time they were to meet he would be lying cold and silent in his lonely grave at Ravenna.

The four years from 1291 to 1295, which preceded his entrance into public life, were given up almost entirely to the study of philosophy. Perhaps he found in the lofty thought and penetrating genius of the Angelic Doctor a refuge from the petty trials and annoyances that awaited him at home. It was during this period that he laid up the immense store of metaphysical knowledge that shines forth so brilliantly in the *Paradiso*, and that clears up with apparent ease the knottiest questions of the schools. Hitherto he had been debarred from holding any office by the law of Florence, which required that the candidates should have reached the age of thirty years. But when once the long-desired time had arrived his advancement was sure and rapid. His talents seemed destined to receive from the Florentines the appreciation which they so well deserved. We find him taking part in the deliberations of the Council of One Hundred, and going on embassies to the various princes that held sway in Italy at the time.

To our mind these years appear the happiest of his life. As yet his loving heart had not become hardened, nor his gentle nature embittered by ingratitude and wrong. He had not yet lost that taste for the companionship of kindred spirits that delight in the association of congenial minds, which makes the world so pleasant. Although his home life was not happy, he found peace and enjoyment in the company of his intimate friends. With the cultured Guido Cavalcante he could discuss some subtle distinction of Duns Scotus; or, what perhaps was more delightful still, could ascend with him the heights of Parnassus, and inhale the pure atmosphere of the Muses' shrine. With the witty and light-hearted Giotto he could dwell upon the beauties of that art to which they were both devoted, or could listen to the great painter's merry tales while sitting for that famous portrait which has had so strange a history. If, like Socrates, he had to take refuge in flight from the sharp tongue of the angry Gemma, the jests of Giotto and Forese Donati, at the expense of each other's ugliness, would soon bring back the smiles to his face. These four gifted men, with Cino da Pistora and Lapo degli Uberti, remind us of another famous assemblage of modern times, when Reynolds, Goldsmith, Burke, Garrick, and Beauclerc sat round the hospitable board of Mrs. Thrale, listening to the weighty periods and sonorous phrases of Doctor Johnson, while the indefatigable Boswell noted down the utterances of his

patron for his future work. Dante's delight in these meetings is expressed in the following sonnet, which he addressed to Guido Cavalcante, and which Shelley has translated. It is almost needless to say that the "Bice" referred to in the poem is none other than Beatrice:

"Guido, I wish that Lapo, you and I,
Led by some strong enchantment might ascend
A magic ship, whose charmed sails should fly
With winds at will, where'er our thoughts might wend;
And that no change or any evil chance
Should mar our joyous voyage; but it might be
That even satiety should still enhance
Between our hearts their strict community:
And that the beauteous wizard there should place
Vanna and Bice, and your gentle love,
Companions of our wanderings, and would grace
With passionate talk, wherever we might rove,
Our time! and each were as content and free
As I believe that you and I should be."

But these happy days were not to last. For a few years more was he to enjoy the pleasures of a home. The sword of Damocles was hanging over his head. That dreadful blow was about to fall—the blow that severed all the ties which bound him to the scenes of his early love, and sent him forth into the world "without a place to lay his head." But in order to understand the causes which led to his banishment, it becomes necessary to unravel, as far as possible, the network of political complications which at the time was spread over Florence.

For many years the unhappy city had been the theatre of the famous quarrel between the Ghibellines and Guelphs, a quarrel which has furnished to the world perhaps the strongest example of the extremes to which men will go when urged on by party feeling, and of the constancy of hatred with which they will pursue to the bitter end an apparently trifling dispute. Its origin has been the subject of much contention. The true cause, however, seems to have been the disagreement which arose as to the rightful successor of Henry II., Emperor of Germany, a disagreement in which the followers of Guelfone, Duke of Bavaria, supported the claims of Lothario, Duke of Saxony; while the rights of young Frederick, of the royal house of Hohenstaufen, were upheld by the family whose hereditary seat was the castle of Warblinger. Springing from the differences of a few nobles, the quarrel soon spread over all Italy, and Florence appears to have been the scene of the bitterest partisanship and the most determined hate. Gradually widening their influence, the two parties became at length the representatives of the two great classes in Italian politics; those whose

sympathies were with the Popes joined the ranks of the Guelphs, while the Ghibellines numbered among their adherents those who upheld the interests of the emperors. During the years that preceded the opening of the fourteenth century, fortune seemed to favor the Guelphs. When, in 1265, Manfredi, grandson to the Queen Costanza, was defeated by Charles of Anjou, there began for the Ghibellines a series of reverses which soon took the power from their hands and drove them from their native soil. In vain did the brave young Conradino draw his sword in their defence. The tide of misfortune swept them along, and every attempt which they made to regain their former prestige appeared only to render their situation more deplorable. After the overthrow which they sustained at Campaldino, it looked as if they had given up all hope of getting back the supremacy. The government was in the hands of the Guelphs, and all things were favorable for a lasting peace.

But for the unhappy Florence there was no cessation of tumult and fratricidal quarrels. Private disputes and family enmities kept the inhabitants in a continual state of alarm, and frustrated every measure conducive to the welfare of the state. The nobles, under the leadership of Corso Donati,

“He whose guilt is most,”

and the middle class, headed by the Cerchi, only sought for an occasion to gratify their pent-up hatred by an appeal to the sword. They had not long to wait. In 1295 an encounter between two members of the rival factions, fierce and savage recriminations, an attempt by some well-disposed citizens to quell the disturbance, and the streets of Florence are filled with armed men, and her palaces re-echo with the shouts of the combatants. As if to render the struggle still fiercer, a nobleman, Giandella Bella by name, abandoning the cause of the Donati, puts himself at the head of the Cerchi party and strives with all his energies to effect the ruin of his former leader. But after the conflict has raged for some time, Della Bella goes into voluntary banishment rather than bring upon his country all the horrors of civil war. For the space of five years peace reigned supreme. A happy future seemed in store for the city by the Arno. The rancor and bitterness of the past, if they had not disappeared from the hearts, at least did not manifest themselves in the actions of the rival factions. But in the early part of the year 1303 the town of Pistoia is stirred to its depths by a cruel deed. Two young men of the Cancellieri family, named respectively Geri and Lore, happen to meet, enter into conversation, and before their friends can interfere are involved in a quarrel. Hot words follow, then Lore wounds his kinsman. In fierce anger

they part and prepare to settle the dispute by the sword. In the meantime Lore's passion cools down, and with genuine sorrow he reflects on the cruel insult he has offered to Geri. Full of generous impulses he goes to Gentnecis, the father of his opponent, and asks forgiveness for the wrong he has done. The enraged parent, furious at the affront which his child has received, is not to be softened by gentle speeches; with a terribly significant look he replies that "wounds inflicted by iron are to be healed by iron and not by words." The young Lore is seized and carried into the palace, and in a few moments the hand that struck the blow lies bleeding at his feet. He hurries back to his friends and shows them his mutilated arm. They snatch up their arms and sally forth, and when night comes down upon the narrow streets of the town the peaceful sounds of evening are drowned by the cries of the wounded, and the darkness lit up by the flashing of swords in the light of the dim-burning lamps. Before long the feud spread abroad. The descendants of Branea, the first wife of Cancellieri, become known as the Branchi, while their adversaries take the title of Neri. Every day the quarrel grows fiercer and fiercer; it assumes larger proportions, and threatens to destroy completely the prosperity of the town. Desirous of putting an end to so disastrous a contest, the Florentines summon the leaders of the factions to their city; but instead of this measure restoring peace and tranquillity, it only serves to bring on another war. The violent party spirit of the Donati has only been slumbering. No sooner does the slightest pretence, the faintest shadow of an excuse, offer itself for attacking their enemies than they hasten to take advantage of it. Without stopping to consider the consequences of the rash move they are about to make, they declare themselves in favor of the Neri, and prepare to defend their cause by political intrigues or by force of arms. There is no alternative left for the Cerchi but to arrange themselves on the side of the Branchi. Thus the feud goes on, with its heartless treachery, its vindictive spite, its pitiless desire for revenge, its total sacrifice of everything near and dear to the demon of party hate, until it seems as if the hapless city by the Arno is doomed to everlasting strife. With no hand powerful enough to crush the quarrel in its birth, it grows and flourishes to an alarming extent; it arrays the nobles against the middle classes, and finally widens its lines until again Guelph and Ghibellines stand face to face in a deadly struggle. The former side with the Neri, the latter with the Branchi. After a fruitless attempt to gain the upper hand, both parties appeal to the Pope. The Ghibellines swallow their anger at being forced to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pontiff. The Guelphs hope for a decision in their favor. To restore peace to the distracted city, Boniface VIII. sends a bishop. All in vain;

the Augean stables, he exclaims, cannot be cleaned. A cardinal, Acquasparta by name, undertakes the herculean task. He, too, gives it up in despair. He is only human, and nothing human can quell that storm of blind selfishness and passionate hate. He returns to Rome, "after adding," says Lowell, "the new element of excommunication to the causes of confusion." Then the Florentines, hoping no longer for aid from without, look for some strong arm at home to strike down the beast that is gnawing at their vitals. That strong arm was raised and the beast driven from the land. But many a day of bitter grief and impotent wrath was to be the fate of him who dared to perform the deed.

Dante, at this time, was one of the Priori. With his usual clear perception he saw that the crisis had arrived, and that something would have to be done if Florence was to be saved. A secret consultation is held, and before the astonished leaders of the two parties have time to protest they are hurried off into banishment. That Dante acted in this matter from the purest motives is proved by the sternness with which he set aside the ties of kindred and of affection. Among the exiles whom his unbending justice confined in the Castello della Pieve was Corso Donati, a kinsman of his wife; while his cherished friend, the companion of his happiest hours, Guido Cavalcanti, was hurried off to Sarrazzano with the other chiefs of the Cerchi faction.

These strong measures brought a storm of wrath upon our poet's head. He had punished both parties, and both parties united in their hatred of him. Corso Donati, the iron-willed, unscrupulous leader, was not one to forget an injury done him. From this time Dante dates the beginning of that series of misfortunes and sorrows which fortune seemed to have delighted in heaping upon him. From this time an implacable Nemesis pursued him through life, hardening his tender heart, poisoning all his joys, and ever holding the cup of grief to his lips. But fortunate has it been for the world that he was doomed to wander an *exul immeritus* through his native land. Perhaps, if fate had been kinder to him, and showered upon him wealth and political distinctions, he would have settled down as a successful merchant, and we would have one song of the ages less. Carlyle tells us "what might have been:" "Florence would have had another prosperous Lord Mayor, and the ten dumb centuries continued voiceless, and the ten other listening centuries (for there will be ten of them more) had no *Divina Commedia* to hear."

When once the civil strife was over, Dante retired from office. His colleagues then permitted Guido Cavalcante and some others of the Bianchi to return, on the ground of ill health. The Neri, not long afterwards, appeared in the city, and accused Dante of

having shown undue partiality to their opponents, although he was out of office at the time. In the meanwhile he had gone on an embassy to Rome. During his absence the Neri held a conference and decided to call in Charles of Valois, brother of Philip the Fair, to settle the affairs of the republic.

The French prince accepted the invitation. Hurrying into Italy, he reached Florence on the 31st of October, 1301, and took possession of the city in the interests of the Neri. The discomfited Bianchi were expelled from office and sent into exile. Dante, although still at Rome, did not escape. His enemies had him in their grasp, and they determined to crush forever the one who had so recently almost destroyed their power. Like many another illustrious man he was granted a mock trial. The farce of Florentine justice was carried out for his benefit. On January 27th, 1302, he was tried by the Priori, under Cante de Gubbio, on two charges, the first being corrupt dealing during his tenure of office; the second, opposition to Charles and the Guelph faction. We need not tell the result. Pronounced guilty of both charges, he was fined 5000 florins; and if this was not paid within two months it was decreed that his personal property was to be destroyed, and his lands confiscated. To this was added the sentence of banishment for the space of two years, and of exclusion during life from all public office. These punishments were surely severe enough, but his enemies did not think that their measure of vengeance was yet full. On March 10th, of the same year, a decree was passed in which it was declared that Dante and his companions should be burned alive if found within the limits of the republic. A noble reward this for the blinded city to confer upon one who, above all her other sons, has made her name famous.

Driven from his home, a wanderer and an exile, Dante now began that life of misery, prolonged for nineteen years; that life filled with impotent wrath and baffled revenge, with cruel wounds to his haughty spirit from the princes who gave him bread, and with a passionate yearning for that happy day which was to gladden his eyes with a vision of

"The light, whose goodly shine
Makes the Creator visible to all
Created, that in seeing him alone
Have peace."

"From this time," says Lowell, "the life of Dante becomes semi-mythical, and for nearly every date we are reduced to the 'as they say' of Herodotus. He became now necessarily identified with his fellow exiles (fragments of all parties united by common wrongs in a practical if not theoretical Ghibellinism), and shared in their

attempts to reinstate themselves by force of arms." But obscure as are the traditions of his wanderings, we can trace him here and there by means of his own works. Upon hearing of the overthrow of his friends at Florence he hurried from Rome and joined them at Sienna. Here, in the castle of the Ubertini, a regular party was formed with Count Alessandro di Romana at its head. That Dante hoped, by means of this organization, to regain his old position in Florence and take vengeance upon those who had banished him, we gather from the fact that he became one of the Council of Twelve, and took an active interest in its proceedings. In the meantime Benedict IX., who at the time occupied the Pontifical throne, had endeavored to settle the contest in a peaceful manner. The Neri, however, rejected all overtures. They held the power for which they had sought so long, and they meant to keep it. The exiles then decided to attempt by force of arms what they could not obtain by moderate measures. Florence was attacked with nine thousand infantry and six hundred horse, but the Neri were too powerful, and the assailants were driven off.

Dante now saw that his fate was inevitable. Restless and unhappy he wandered from town to town, from hamlet to hamlet, now brooding over his wrongs, now thinking out the details of the great poem, "which," as he says with genuine pathos, "has made me lean for many years." With his haggard face and drooping figure he seemed a spectre hurrying through the land, and it is said that when the women of Verona saw him striding along the streets, with his eyes fixed, perhaps, on a vision of Beatrice, they exclaimed, "Eccovi l' uom ch'è stato all' Inferno,"—"See, there is the man who was in Hell!" Arezzo, Casentino, Montefeltro, Forli, and Bologna, all claim the honor of the great poet's residence. The author of *Among my Books*, tells us that, "in certain districts of Northern Italy there is scarcely a village that has not its traditions of him; its sedia, rocca, spelonca, or torre di Dante."

Another writer relates that Dante, while wandering through a little hamlet one day, heard the strong and unmelodious voice of the rustic Vulcan chanting forth some garbled version of his poem; and that the angry author, hurrying into the smithy, laid his staff over the shoulders of the unfortunate singer as a punishment for such irreverence.

But there are few anecdotes of his weary exile calculated to raise a smile. They are all tinged with the sadness of his life; they all tell the same story. "I have gone about like a mendicant showing, against my will, the wounds with which fortune has smitten me." The same dreadful fate seemed to pursue him everywhere. Hardly had he settled down in Bologna and devoted himself to his favorite studies, when, at the request of his old enemies, he was

expelled from the city. In 1307 he took refuge with the family of the Malaspina, at Lunigiana. Returning thence to Casentino, he seems to have forgotten the pure teachings of his ideal love, and to have "fallen from his high estate." He became acquainted with a lady named Gentucca,—a "slight girl," Beatrice calls her,—and appears to have lived with her for some time. Of his life during this period it is better to remain silent. Although Dante, himself, tells us that he became attached to her only on account of similarity of tastes, and although Lowell exhorts us to "dismiss at once and forever all the idle tales of Dante's amours, of La Montanina, Gentucca, Lisetta, and the rest, to that outer darkness of impure thoughts, *la' onde stoltezza dispartille*," we cannot forget the stern testimony which the poet has borne against himself. In that tender rebuke which Beatrice administers to him in the terrestrial Paradise, she tells him that he must "feel the edge of other swords;" she recalls how "he left me and gave himself to others," and finally reminds him that the sight of Hell's torture were alone powerful enough to raise him from the depths into which he had sunk:

"Such depth he fell, that all device was short
Of his preserving, save that he should view
The children of perdition."

With such evidence against him, it is no easy thing to "dismiss into the outer darkness of impure thoughts" the suspicion of his fall.

Thus the exile wandered from city to city, "driven by that hot blast, the breath of grievous poverty," and learning, day by day, the bitter lesson of dependence. At this time we first hear of the *Commedia*. To Boccaccio we are indebted for the information that Gemma, while looking over Dante's papers after his banishment, chanced upon the first seven cantos of the *Inferno*, and sent them to Duio di Frescobaldi, a man of no small critical taste. He immediately perceived their value and forwarded them to the Marquis Moroello Malaspina. This nobleman persuaded Dante to complete the poem. Be this as it may, we are certain that the *Inferno* was finished about 1309, for Hilarion, the abbot of the monastery of Santa Croce, writing in that year to Uguccone della Fagginola, tells how Dante presented him with a copy of the poem, accompanying the gift with these words: "Voici, mon frère, une partie le mon ouvrage que, peut-être, tu n'as jamais vue." In this same letter the restless spirit and passionate yearnings of the exile are touchingly portrayed by the gentle-hearted monk. He finds Dante wandering through the cloisters, as if seeking for some precious gem hidden within the holy walls; and when the friar

asks him the object of his search, he answers, "La paix." In search of this peace he traversed many a weary league, and even left the shores of his beloved Italy. This period is assigned as the one during which he studied at Paris, but the commentators by no means agree on the point. Boccaccio maintains that the poet, despairing of ever returning to Florence, left Italy in 1308 and repaired to the French capital, where he continued his philosophical researches under the famous Sigier of Brabant. In this view he is supported by Benvenuto da Imola and Villani. On the other hand, the Bishop of Fermo, in his preface to the translation of the *Commedia*, which has already been quoted, holds that Dante resided in Paris during the years that elapsed between 1291 and 1295. He asserts further that the great Italian became a bachelor of the university, but was obliged to return to Florence by want of money. To the Bishop's authority on this point is added that of Tiraboschi and Ozanam. When such eminent doctors so decidedly disagree, we cannot be expected to settle the question. The majority of the critics, however, seem to be in favor of the first opinion.

Hitherto the exile of the poet had been a series of overwhelming misfortunes, without one ray of joy to light up the gloomy path. But, in the midst of his disputations and earnest discussions, a new hope springs up in his breast. For a time "la donna gentil," philosophy, must be second in his thoughts. In 1308, Henry of Luxembourg succeeds to the throne of the murdered Albert, and in October, 1310, receives the Iron Crown of Lombardy at Milan. When this news reaches Dante his exile seems at an end. The fierce hatred of his enemies, the deep love of his native land, the intense desire to take vengeance on those who have wronged him, the tender longing for the scenes of his youth, now rise into new life and vigor; and Dante's ardent nature lives in the hope that Henry will quickly put an end to his banishment. His soul bursts out in a passionate letter to the emperor. He calls upon him to crush the "hydra and the myrrha;" and he gives vent to the hot anger of seven years of exile in one fierce arraignment of the city of his birth. But disappointment again becomes his portion. Henry's career, that began with such bright promises of great deeds in the future, ends in ignominy and defeat.

After wasting much precious time, through a desire to receive the crown in the Holy City, he at length attacks the Florentines, but is compelled to retreat, with great loss; and inhaling, in the meantime, the treacherous breath of the Maremma, he dies August 24th, 1310. Of this inglorious expedition Dante writes, many years after, with a bitterness scarcely lessened by the lapse of time. In the *Purgatorio* Beatrice thus speaks for the poet:

"In that proud stall . . . shall rest the soul
Of the great Harry, he who, by the world
Augustus hailed, to Italy must come
Before her day be ripe. But ye are sick,
And in your techy wantonness as blind
As is the bantling, that of hunger dies
And drives away the nurse."

The emperor's coming had brought with it no change in Dante's life; he was still an exile, and the "hydra" was still untouched. Whatever hopes he had entertained of returning to Florence were crushed forever by the failure of the attempt to drive the Neri from power. In 1311 an amnesty had been granted to some of the unfortunates who were the companions of Dante's exile, and who had been banished by the decree of January, 1302; but the most innocent of all this number, the one who had acted with the most disinterested motives, was not allowed to return. Sick with this new disappointment he again takes up his heavy burden and resumes the mournful journey that is so soon to end in the lonely grave at Ravenna.

From the time of Henry's death until the autumn of the year 1314, Dante remained at Pisa and Lucca, but was finally expelled from the latter place at the request of his old enemies. What city received him after his departure from Lucca is not very clear. Some of his biographers send him to Guido da Polenta, at Ravenna; others say that he immediately took refuge with Can Grande della Scala at Verona. The truth of this matter is not very easily gotten at; but the most probable conjecture is that, after spending two years at Gubbio and the monastery of Fonte Avellano, he began in 1318 his residence with Can Grande, whom, by the way, Voltaire seems to have looked upon as holding the same rank as did the "Kubla Khan," that lived in "Xanader."

In the meantime a ray of pity seemed to have reached the hard hearts of his enemies. In 1316 Florence opened her gates to the exile. But with a refinement of cruelty which forms a fitting climax to such a long catalogue of wrongs, she imposed conditions that she knew would break the haughty spirit of her son. For the privilege of coming home, for permission to play the part of the "Prodigal Son," he is to pay the fine imposed at the commencement of his banishment, appear in the dress of the penitent, and, with a lighted taper in his hand, go in procession to the Church of San Giovanni. Pride, so powerful an element in his finely-strung organism, revolts at such a proposal. He feels that acceptance of these terms will make him become, in the eyes of the world, not a deeply injured man, but a criminal only too willing to undergo the penalty of his crime. He writes his answer to the

Florentines "in a letter," says Lowell, "still hot after these five centuries with indignant scorn:"

"Is this, then, the glorious return of Dante Alighieri to his country after nearly three lustres of suffering and exile? Did an innocence, patent to all, merit this?—this, the perpetual sweat and toil of study? . . . Can I not everywhere behold the mirrors of the sun and stars? speculate on sweetest truths under any sky, without first giving myself up inglorious, nay, ignominious, to the populace of Florence? Nor shall I want for bread."

The Florentines, incensed still more by this fierce rejection of what they considered generous proposals, never again offered to admit the exile. Thus was the breach widened between the blinded city and her noblest son. But although she treated him with harshness and cruel severity when alive, she begged for his dead body when it lay in a stranger's grave, and envied her sister city the possession of the ashes of Italy's greatest poet.

That Dante's residence with Can Grande was a pleasant one, we may with safety assert. Some of the commentators throw out vague hints about the uncongenial atmosphere in which the exile found himself, and declare that his proud and sensitive character was not understood by the frivolous companions of the prince. To establish their position, however, they advance no certain proofs. In support of the contrary opinion we have the high praise which Dante invariably gives to his patron in the *Commedia*, and the grateful terms in which he speaks of his treatment in the palace of the young Ghibelline leader. In Canto XVII. of the *Paradiso* Cacciagneda thus speaks of Can Grande:

"Sparks of virtue shall shoot forth in him,
In equal scorn of labors and of gold,
His bounty shall be spread abroad so widely
As not to let the tongues e'en of his foes
Be idle in its praise."

Nor was the delicate consideration which he experienced at the hands of Can Grande his only source of pleasure. One of his sons came to visit him, bringing cherished memories from the home from which his father had been driven so many years before. Here, too, came his friend Giotto, in 1317. What a balm for the wounded spirit of the exile must have been the companionship of one who had been the sharer in so many joys. We can imagine them talking of other days and relating their struggles and successes, while the painter traces out on the walls of the Scrovigni Chapel the quaint allegorical fancies of the poet.

In 1320 Dante left Verona, and transferred his fallen household gods to the palace of Guido da Polenta, at Ravenna. This no-

bleman was the nephew of Francesca da Rimini, whose sad story, under Dante's tender touch, has become a cameo in the literature of the world. He remained here until 1321, when he was sent by his master on an embassy to Venice, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace. But as he was about to plead his patron's cause in an elegant Latin oration, he was interrupted, and told to proceed in the vulgar tongue. From what we have already learned of our poet's temperament, we may easily conclude that, after this slight, his mission came to an unsuccessful issue. He returned to Ravenna and attempted to resume his studies; but his long exile was at an end. As he entered his patron's palace, his haggard face seemed to say:

"An old man broken with the storms of state
Is come to lay his bones among you;
Give him a little earth for charity."

The dreadful marsh-fever had seized upon him, as he was journeying home, and this, together with the chafing of his wounded pride at the failure of his embassy, soon loosened the lofty spirit from its mortal home. The great poet died September 14th, 1321. Guido da Polenta raised a monument over his remains, on which was inscribed the following epitaph, written by Dante on his death-bed:

"Jura monarchiæ superos Phlegethonta lacusque
Lustrando cecini volverunt Fata quousque;
Sed quia pars cessit melioribus hospita castris
Auctoremque suum petiit felicior astris
Hic claudor Dantes patriis extorris ab ovis
Suam genuit parvi Florentia mater amoris."

Thus after nineteen years of disappointment and heartache, the greatest of Italian bards found that peace which the experience of his own ruined life told him was not to be obtained in this world. A sad lot had, indeed, been his. After a youth happy in its pure love and in the stir of an active, earnest life, he had to learn the bitter truth, so touchingly uttered by Francesca:

"No greater grief than to remember days
Of joy, when misery is at hand."

Gifted with a soul so tender and so high strung that its devotion to Beatrice became part of its very life, he saw the object of that devotion the wife of another, and then the spouse of the grim bridegroom, Death; with a heart only too true to the city of his birth, and with a spirit that loved to move in the nervous, stirring political world of the day, he found himself, in the strength of his intellectual powers, driven from his home and forced to wander through

the land, an exile and an outcast. Nor was this the deepest wound that fortune dealt him. He had to eat the bread of poverty, and suffer in silence the humiliations and rebuffs that have ever been the portion of the dependent. He had to feel

“ How salt the savor is of others’ bread,
How hard the passage to descend and climb
By others’ stairs.”

A sorrowful picture, indeed ! Few like it does history throw on the canvas of the past. All the world has looked with admiration on the scene enacted centuries ago in the Athenian dungeon, when Socrates, discoursing calmly on lofty themes, holds the hemlock to his lips, while the fickle crowd that condemned him wrangles and surges beneath ; men have gazed with pity on the blind old Milton, unhonored by his country, deserted by his friends, and condemned in his declining days

“ To sit idle by the household hearth,
A burd’nous drone, to visitants a gaze.”

But Dante’s face is a nobler, sadder sight, looking out from the mist of the ages ; haggard with hope deferred, seamed with the lines of misery and care, yet glowing with the light that neither grief nor wrong can ever dim. Carlyle has preserved it for posterity : “ Lonely there, painted as on vacancy, with the simple laurel-wreath wound round it, the deathless sorrow and pain, the known victory which is also deathless,—I think it is the mournfullest face ever painted from reality, an altogether heart-affecting face.”

The hatred with which Dante’s enemies regarded him must have been intense, if we may judge from the length of time which elapsed before their prejudices could be overcome by the great merits of the poet. For twenty-nine years they remained blind to the genius of the man whom they had exiled.

At length, however, the recognition came. In 1350 the republic of Florence placed ten golden florins in the hands of Boccaccio, to be given by him to Dante’s daughter Beatrice, then a nun in the convent of Santa Chiara. In 1396 the city voted Dante a monument, “and begged in vain,” as a writer on the poet remarks, “for the metaphorical ashes of the man whom she had threatened to make literal cinders of if she could catch him alive.” Similar attempts were made in 1496 and 1519, but the citizens of Ravenna would not give him up. It was his destiny never to come back, in life or death, to the home of his early days ; and fate seems to have crowned her constant persecution of the exile, by refusing his last request that “his bones might repose in the soft bosom of that

land which had nursed and borne him to the maturity of his age." A cenotaph was finally built at Santa Croce, five centuries after he had breathed his last in the palace of the Polentas. In 1373 a chair of the *Divina Commedia* was established at Florence, with Boccaccio as its first professor. Benvenuto da Imola held this high office at Bologna, while the most illustrious men of the times were chosen to lecture on the work at Pisa, Venice, Placenza, Milan, and the other cities of Italy. Manuscript copies multiplied with wonderful celerity; and translations into other languages showed that

"This high song divine,
To which both heaven and earth their hands have set,"

belonged not to Florence alone, but to the whole world.

Hitherto we have devoted ourselves to the narration of Dante's life, filled with such strange vicissitudes, and with so many "moving accidents by flood and field;" we shall now endeavor to point out a few of those qualities which have made the great Italian stand alone among the poets.

"The history of modern intellect," writes F. Schlegel, "presents scarcely anything else than a constant struggle between the old and the foreign, and the new, the peculiar and the national, which latter must be the vital spirit of all living, effective, national literature and poetry." Of this new spirit Dante was the first opponent. To him modern literature owes its present strength and power. Under the fierce light of his genius, "the old and the foreign," which had such a long lease of existence in the songs of the Provençal troubadours, withered away and disappeared.

The age had been bewitched by the magic flower of Oberon, and was wasting its love on another blossom; but Dante touched the eyes of the infatuated people, and exposed the ass's head in all its ugliness. Before his coming, poetical feeling had entirely vanished. Instead of seeking new paths of thought, the imagination of the poet was content to run in the grooves that had been worn by a multitude of predecessors. To every ambitious versifier there was open an immense storehouse from which to draw his materials, without going to the trouble of having to fashion them with his own hands. Did he wish to sing of the warlike deeds of the Northmen, the *Edda* would furnish him with all the characters—the rough old sea-king, the golden-haired, lily-faced daughter, the bold lover and his daring followers. If his poems were to have a martial ring, the battle hymns of the old Burgundian jens, and the songs of Charlemagne and of the field of Roncesvalles were ready for his use. The coming of Arthur, and

. . . . "the puissance of his Table Round,"

the glorious deeds of Lancelot and Sir Bedivere, the beauty of the false Guinevere, the mystic legend of the Holy Grail had but to be moulded in some new form, to produce a work that would acquire a fame denied to some more original composition. The troubadours all sang of tourneys and courts of love, of *cavalier sirvente* and beautiful damosel, until one is tempted to cry out with Chaucer's merry host, "No more of this, for Goddes dignitié." But this was changed by the influence of one great mind. The spirit that moved the poets who preceded Dante was the spirit of the past. The essence of their poetry was not subjective. With Dante, however, everything was real. During his long term of banishment his soul had felt the horrors of the damned, the revolt of wounded pride, the fierce glow of anger, the impotent desire for revenge. His imagination had been heated in the crucible of adversity, from which his ideas arose in rapid and uninterrupted flight. He entered a new sphere; a sphere higher and nobler than that in which his predecessors had moved. Gentleness, according to Schlegel, had been the distinguishing characteristic of the Mueniegesang and Le Gay Savoir poetry; Dante was nothing if not intense. Intensity shines forth in the cruel torments of the lost souls; it is felt in the overpowering sadness that reigns throughout Purgatory; it trembles in the brilliant light and splendor, the rolling music, and the white-robed forms of the Paradise. The burning tombs, the cruel swords of the demons, the angry winds tossing about the wretched souls in ceaseless unrest, are all as real to us, as if we had passed through the horrible scenes, and viewed them with our own eyes. At that saddest of stories ever told by the poet's pen, the tale of Francesca and her lover, Dante faints with pity; we, too, can see the unhappy pair hurried onward by the furious blasts, and can feel the same deep and tender compassion. The joy of that meeting with Beatrice amid the beauty of the terrestrial Paradise glows in our hearts with the same fervor that burned in Dante's breast, when he beheld again the face of his beloved. Even the scenery partakes of this intensity. Ruskin declares that "its most striking characteristic is intense definition."

"Dante gives us," says Macaulay, "the shape, the color, the sound, the sense, the taste; he counts the numbers, he measures the size. The ruins of the precipice which led from the sixth to the seventh circle of hell, were like those of the rock which fell into the Adige, on the south of Trent. The cataract of Phlegethon was like that of Aqua Cheta at the monastery of St. Benedict. The place where the heretics were confined in burning tombs resembles the vast cemetery of Arles." But it is not alone as the founder of modern literature that Dante holds such a high place among the world's great poets. He has another charm to be numbered

amid "that learned band," whom he meets in Limbo. He is *par excellence* the poet of Christianity. It has been well said of him that he caught and crystallized the Christian spirit. Man is the subject of his song, *subjectum est homo*. Man, not as he lived in the poems of Homer and the dramas of Sophocles, a strong-limbed, brave-hearted youth, hated by Juno and loved by Minerva, surmounting the difficulties and throwing aside the obstacles which one deity places in his path by the heaven-sent aid of another, falling amid the glitter of golden armor and the thunder of war-chariots, or being changed into a centaur by the hand of an envious Jove; then after the lower vices of his nature have been shrouded in the mist of centuries, placed amid the gods who are worshipped on the altar. This was not the inspiration of the *Commedia*. Dante caught the higher, grander spirit of the new religion. With him man was a creature whose greatest possession was freedom of the will; who relied on no assisting god or goddess in his progress through life, but who saw the two paths stretching before him: the one fragrant with budding flowers and musical with laughing streams, ending in the darkness of hell, the other dreary and thorn-covered, leading to the untold happiness of heaven. The home of Dante was not a being whose destiny was spun out by the three grim sisters who held the thread of his existence; he carries his fate in his hands, and climbs up and onwards, not to a place among the divinities carousing on the heights of Olympus, but to a throne amid the brightness of God's light, and just as "sad Electra's poet" embodied the hopes and fears, the passions and longings of that people who worshipped the carnal sins concentered in one beautiful woman, and gave shape and form to the whisperings of the woods, and

"The dreary melody of bedded reeds"

in the person of Pan, so Dante's poem is the crystallization of all that the fourteenth century thought, believed, and feared. The spirit of that age, according to Schlegel, was "an unwavering devotion to the doctrines of the true faith." It was this devotion, untouched as yet by the blight of rationalism, that inspired the *Divina Commedia*. Lowell has compared the poem to a lofty Gothic cathedral, "realized out of the faith and by the contributions of an entire people, whose beliefs and superstitions, whose imagination and fancy, find expression in its statues and carvings, its calm saints and martyrs, now at rest forever in the seclusion of their canopied niches, and in its wanton grotesques thrusting themselves forth from every pinnacle and gargyle." Some have wondered at these "grotesques," and have exclaimed against the presence of their grinning faces amid such holy company. That

so many Pagan characters should figure in the work does, indeed, appear strange. All the machinery of Hades is transported to the Inferno. Charon ferries the lost souls across the Styx; the Centaurs keep guard over the sinners in the seventh circle; the Gorgon's head towers over the battlements of the city of Dis; Cato, the suicide, is the presiding spirit in Purgatory, and the guide of Dante and Virgil in their ascent of the mountain. To explain away this discrepancy would seem at first no easy task. But a consideration of the times in which the poem was written will soon make everything clear.

In Dante's age the struggle between the Christian and Pagan elements had just come to an end. The empire had fallen nine centuries before, but its teachings and principles had taken a strong hold on the minds of men. These principles had been circled with a halo of glory by ages of military triumph and undisputed sway; they had been hidden amid the seductive beauties of a literature which to-day is the wonder and admiration of the world. It is not strange, then, that the broken fragments of the temples of Venus should yet be seen among the lofty columns of the new faith, or that the Italian people should retain the memories of the Pagan idea. These memories Dante found in the popular mind, and finding them, he placed them in his poems, just as the sculptor of his day carved on the pedestal of a statue of St. Peter the grinning head of a satyr or a faun.

Although it is to the *Divina Commedia* that Dante owes the fame which he has acquired, his other works are by no means to be despised. Had he never written the celebrated poem he would still hold a high place in the literary records of the time. His treatise *De Vulgari Eloquentia* is, perhaps, the feeblest effort of his strong and active intellect. His Latin style is said to have been harsh and unmusical; it is only in the so-called vulgar tongue that he displays his command over words and his power of concise expression. The Canzone are exquisitely sweet and harmonious, but too abstract for the modern reader. He displays in them a tendency to personification, which serves only to mystify the student, the more so when the poems are translated into another tongue. In the *Convito*, or *Banquet*, we find greater evidence of the presence of a master mind than in any of the preceding works. It marks the beginning of elegant Italian prose. Under Dante's magic touch the rude dialects of Sicily, Apulia, Romagna, and Venice were transformed into a rich and plastic form of speech.

"It is the singular fate of that language," says Hallam, "to have spared itself all intermediate stages of refinement, and, starting last in the race, to have arrived almost instantaneously at the goal." In this new and particolored dress Dante clothed the explanation

of the Canzone. "The viands of this *Banquet*," he writes in the introduction, "will be set out in fourteen different manners, that is, will consist of fourteen Canzone, the materials of which are love and virtue." But, whether interrupted by the press of official business, or by the sentence of exile which came so suddenly, he did not complete the work, only three of the fourteen poems being emanated. Irrelevant as it may seem, we cannot refrain from quoting here a passage from this book, in which he appears to have foreseen the many disastrous attempts which would be made to translate the *Commedia*. "Every one should know," he tells us, "that nothing harmonized by musical enchantment can be transmitted from one language into another without breaking all its sweetness and harmony." How swiftly and imperceptibly the delicate aroma of his genius has vanished beneath the rude hand of some modern translators the piles of forgotten volumes will amply testify. To Cary and Longfellow we owe, indeed, a meed of thanks. They have performed their task well. They have studied their master's face, and have given to the English-speaking world a most faithful portrait. But the play of the features, the warm rush of blood, the flashing of the dark eye they could not transfer to canvas. Other translators have not been so successful. We can imagine the "fiero Ghibellino's" anger at finding those intensely mournful lines written over the gates of hell losing all their strength by such a rendition as this:

"Thro' me the newly-damned forever fleet
In ceaseless shoal to pain's eternal seat;
Thro' me they march and join the tortured crew;"

or the famous warning to the lost souls:

"Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch' entrate;"

clothed in this new dress:

"Ye heirs of hell;
Here bid at once your lingering hope farewell,
And mourn the moment of repentance past."

We fear that the poet's anger would vent itself on the unhappy translator in the same manner that it did on the rural blacksmith who was singing a rude version of the great poem.

If there ever was a doubt of Dante's intensely Ghibelline spirit, a perusal of his treatise, *De Monarchia*, would soon set all uncertainty at rest. Descended from a family whose every member was an ardent Guelph, he early cut adrift from the traditions of his ancestors and became a devoted supporter of the emperors.

So fervent a believer was he in the divine right of these rulers,

that he devoted the whole work to prove that Rome had from its very foundation been intended by Providence as the mistress of the universe. He declares that its progress from a small colony on the banks of the Tiber to the lofty position it held in the time of Cæsar had been marked by miracles. From every possible source he draws arguments in support of this view. The Redemption itself, according to his theory, among the other great truths which it revealed to men, gave proof that the seven-hilled city was destined by heaven to rule the world. Pilate, to whose commands the Saviour submitted, was a Roman citizen, the representative of Roman authority, and in this act of submission on the part of Jesus Dante saw the tacit acknowledgment of the universal jurisdiction of Rome. The ideal monarch of this ideal kingdom, the sovereign who was to direct the fortunes of this new Utopia, was Henry of Luxembourg, the same prince whose unhappy expedition certainly gave no evidence of an ability to manage the affairs of the whole world. An outline of the political doctrine contained in the *De Monarchia* may be found in the following passage, quoted from the *Foreign Quarterly*:

"Unity is taught by the manifest design of God in the external world, and by the necessity of an aim. Now, unity seeks for something by which it may be represented, and this is found in unity of government. There must, then, of necessity be some centre to which the general aspiration of mankind ascends, thence to flow down again in the form of law, a power strong in unity, and in the supporting advice of the higher intellects naturally destined to rule, providing with calm wisdom for all the different functions which are to be fulfilled—the distinct employments—itsself performing the part of pilot, of supreme chief, in order to bring to the highest perfection what Dante calls 'the universal religion of human nature;' that is, empire—imperium."

To the Popes he gives the spiritual, to the emperors the temporal supremacy. All the strife and discord that have desolated Italy he ascribes to the union of the crozier and the sword. In Canto XXI. of the *Purgatorio* he exclaims:

"The sword
Is grafted on the crook, and, so conjoined,
Each must perforce decline to worse, unawed
By fear of other."

Perhaps it might be well to notice here the attacks which have been made on Dante's orthodoxy, attacks based upon his harsh treatment of the Pontiffs in the course of his poem. We are reminded by Protestant writers that Nicholas V. is expiating in the eighth circle of the *Inferno* the awful crime of simony; that Celestine V.,

"He who, to base fear
Yielding, abjured his high estate,"

wanders among those despised spirits

"Who live withouten infamy or fame;"

and that the tortures of the "livid stone" and the slow-consuming fire are waiting for Boniface VIII.,

. . . "The chief of the new Pharisees, . . .
Who his great charge nor sacred ministry
In himself revered."

What right, they triumphantly ask, have we to claim the great Italian as a true son of that Church whose visible head he so fiercely arraigns? If these hasty critics would only remember that in the age in which Dante lived, and from which he drew the materials of the *Commedia*, it was as fashionable to cry out against the abuses of ecclesiastical power as it is to rail against official corruption in the present times, they would not urge this point with so much earnestness. To the spirit of the day was also added the rancor and bitterness of a political quarrel, influence powerful enough, as we have seen, to sever the closest ties of family friendship. Boniface had called in Charles of Valois. Charles of Valois had driven Dante from Florence, and closed against him every avenue to civil distinction. It should be no matter of surprise, then, that the remembrance of a fancied wrong, and the acrimony of party strife, have colored every action of the Pontiffs in the darkest tints. And in the face of all the contumely and reproach which Dante has heaped on the head of the Popes, it must not be forgotten that it was in their capacity as temporal rulers that he held them up to the world's scorn. As the shepherds of Christ's fold upon earth, their actions and utterances were as sacred to him as if the Saviour himself were seated on the papal throne. When the poet meets the shade of Adrian V. in Purgatory, he falls upon his knees; the Pontiff asks:

"What cause
Hath bowed thee thus?' 'Compunction,' I rejoined,
'And inward awe of your high majesty.'"

When the soldiers of Philip the Fair had seized the person of the aged Boniface and subjected him to every indignity that a cruel mind could invent, Dante cried out in horror against so terrible a profanation. When our Protestant friends succeed in proving that the noble Italian's song makes discord with the solemn music of the Church, we shall be ready to acknowledge with the greatest alacrity that the book of Genesis is nothing but a record of protoplasm, and that the Scriptures cannot stand before the theories of a Darwin or a Huxley.

But to return to our consideration of the other works. The *Vita Nuova* is the "open sesame" by which we penetrate into the

most secret recesses of Dante's heart; it is the window of his soul, through which we look in upon his love for Beatrice. Ozanam has styled it "la préface de la Divine Comédie." In it he shows to the world the tender flower of his passion; he traces its growth from the day on which it sprang into life beneath the light of Beatrice's young eyes, through the warm breezes and chilling frosts of succeeding years, until, at her death, it is taken out of the earth and nourished only by the sunshine and dew from heaven. It is filled with beautiful sonnets, vibrating now with an intense joy when she smiles upon him, trembling again with a mournful sorrow at some slight rebuff. It is the saddest of all love stories; the saddest, because the most natural. The heart of the author speaks in every line; it makes us feel the thrill of joy which swept through the poet when the fairy vision of the child first greeted his eyes, and it communicates to our bosoms the bitter pangs which rent his own, when, on that bright June day, all hope of happiness fled away with the soul of Beatrice, and the future seemed

"All dark and barren as a rainy sea."

Although the *Divina Commedia* has already claimed our attention, it was the subject of a rather general examination as to the spirit that prevails throughout the poem, and the influences that affected its composition; but we have yet to consider some of the attacks which have been made on the reputation of the poet, and to answer a few of the questions that occur to every reader of the "high song divine." There is scarcely any one who does not ask, after a journey through the horrors of the *Inferno*, and the mournful scenes of the *Purgatorio*, how such a poem, filled with the very essence of tragedy, can be called a comedy. Dante himself will answer these interrogatories. In his dedication of the *Commedia* to Can Grande della Scalla he writes: "I have called my work 'Comedy,' because it is written in an humble manner, and because in it I have made use of the vulgar tongue by means of which the women of the lower classes communicate their thoughts." The title of "Divine" was first added in 1516 by some enthusiastic admirer. The fact that the poem ends happily has also been adduced by some commentators as a reason for the seemingly inappropriate title. This evidently does not please the taste of the "dilettante, delicate-handed" Leigh Hunt, who, while criticising the opinion, takes occasion to fire off the following harmless piece of bigotry: "As well might they have said that a morning's work at the Inquisition ended happily, because, while people were being racked in the dungeons, the officers were making merry in the drawing-rooms." In the dedication already quoted Dante an-

nounces the opening of his famous work in these suggestive words :
 "Incipit Comœdia Dantis Alighieri, Florentini natione, non moribus."

That the cultured and scholarly poet should have chosen the vulgar patois of the multitude, instead of the classical Latin, has also been to many a matter of surprise. It would seem, they say, the most natural thing in the world for a man of his genius and attainments to have selected that language which would be understood by the great and powerful, and which already had produced such bright stars in the firmament of literature. Good old Friar Hilarion, whose letter to Uguccone della Fagginola has already been referred to, had his doubts about the propriety of such a choice; and when he met Dante in the corridor of his monastery, he expressed his surprise that such lofty thoughts should be clothed in so plebeian a costume. The poet replies that at first he intended to employ the Latin tongue, and had even gone so far as to commence the *Commedia* with these lines :

"Ultima regna canam fluido contermina mundo,
 Spiritibus quae lata patent; quae praemia solvunt
 Pro meritis cuicumque suis."

"But," he continues, "when I considered the condition of the present age, and perceived that the songs of the famous poets were almost entirely forgotten, and that the learned men, alas! had abandoned the liberal arts to plebeian hands, it was then that I laid aside the humble lyre, and took up another attuned to the modern ear." It is fortunate for us that Dante set his music to the people's lyre; for, had he made use of the Latin, we fear the world would have missed a sweet and thrilling melody. The delicate outlines of his thought would have been lost beneath the flowing folds of the Roman toga; the strength and sustained power of his conceptions would have been weakened in the effort to animate and inform a dead language. We doubt if the praise which Riverol has given with so much justice to the Italian poem could be applied to the Latin: "Son vers se tient debout par la seule force du substantif et du verbe, sans le concours d'une seule épithète." Although at first attracted by the lost glories of the ancient tongue, Dante, with the instinct of the poet, soon threw aside its lifeless forms, and clothed his sublime ideas in the rich and bright-colored garb of the Italian.

The subject of the *Commedia*, as already has been said, is man. "The literal subject of the whole work," Dante himself writes to Can Grande, "is the state of the soul after death, simply considered; but if the work be taken allegorically, the subject is man, inasmuch as by merit or demerit, through freedom of the will, he renders

himself liable to the reward or punishment of justice." In this journey through the regions of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, Dante is led by two guides, Virgil and Beatrice. The Mantuan personifies Philosophy, or, as some have thought, Human Reason; under his guidance Dante passes through the horrible torture of the damned, and climbs the mountain on which the souls of repentant sinners are being purified. But when once dawn reveals the heights of the terrestrial Paradise, Virgil surrenders his charge with these words:

"Expect no more
Sanction of warning voice or sign from me."

To contemplate the glories of heaven something higher than philosophy is needed; the queen of the sciences alone is a fitting guide to such great things. Beatrice, in whom theology is represented, conducts him through the nine heavens and the empyrean, until at length his eyes are blessed with a vision of the Trinity.

That such a subject requires a genius of the highest order, no one will deny. All the riches of Aristotle and St. Thomas, all the wealth of imagination which is part of the true poet, are needed to decorate such an elevated theme. In the hands of a man of average talent, it would have no more claim on the attention of posterity than the "*Roman de la Rose*," or the lays of the Minnesingers. But to Dante had been given a soul in which the seeds scattered by the Angelic Doctor sprang up and flourished in luxuriant growth. Year after year, amid the misfortunes which followed him through life, he had prepared himself for his great task by a deep and penetrating study of the scholastic system. And although an ardent supporter of the philosophy of the schools, as canto after canto of his poem will testify, he displays a tendency to the Platonic theory, which has such a charm for contemplative and introspective minds. His nature was one "in which a clear practical understanding was continually streamed over by the northern lights of mysticism, through which the familiar stars shine with a softened and more spiritual lustre." But his mysticism was not that of the dreaming Greek. He knew full well the point where the motherly hand of the Church warns back the adventurous traveller into unknown lands. He shrank from that doctrine which makes the soul contemplate an ideal world from which it has been driven, and in which, according to Schlegel, "a belief in astrology and an inclination to magic arts were too often blended." In the *Inferno*, those who practice these arts are condemned to the torments

"Of the last cloister in the dismal pounds
Of Malebolge."

But Dante's soul could find peace and solace in that Christian mysticism, that uplifting of self in the contemplation of the Supreme God, that purification from all things earthly, which has found its tender expression in the words in which the poet celebrates the splendors of the saints :

" Then ' glory to the Father and the Son,
And to the Holy Spirit,' rang aloud
Throughout all Paradise ; that with the song
My spirit reeled, so passing sweet the strain.
And what I saw was equal ecstasy ;
One universal smile it seemed of all things ;
Joy past compare ; gladness unutterable ;
Imperishable life of peace and love ;
Exhaustless riches and unmeasured bliss."

Perhaps the cruelest blow to a sensitive and highly gifted man is the failure to be understood by those who are to judge him in after times. It is the keenest torture to feel that his profoundest thoughts will be but partially comprehended, and that a meaning will be drawn therefrom directly contrary to the one which he intended to convey. Above all other poets, Dante has cause to complain of such treatment. By some the *Commedia* has been looked upon as a gigantic satire on his country and his faith. To others it has appeared in the light of a fierce tirade against all who had done the poet the slightest injury. Because he punishes Guelph and Ghibelline alike, and puts Boniface, his deadly enemy, in the fiery snow, and Geri of Bello, his kinsman, amid the horrors of the lazar-house, Leigh Hunt has thought proper to inveigh against him thus : " Dante, with an impartiality which has been admired by those who can approve the assumption of a theological tyranny at the expense of common decency, has placed friends and foes in hell." Such criticism, it seems to us, only serves to show that the critic's ear can appreciate the light and catching airs of our modern poets, while it remains forever deaf to the deep and sacred music of the human heart. It places the critic at once among that class of men, who, as Lowell observes, have not meaning enough in themselves to penetrate the meaning of him whom they condemn. In the stern justice of a lofty mind, their weak gaze can see nothing but the promptings of revenge. Because Guido da Polenta gave the exile a home and a grave, they would have the poet put the sinning Francesca at least in Purgatory ; because Cavalcante Cavalcanti was the father of Guido,— " he whom I call the first of my friends,"—they think that Dante should have transferred him from the burning tombs of the heretics to some happier abode. Had he done this, had he snatched the unfaithful wife from the fury of the winds, and released his friend's father from the torture

of the dreadful tombs, not only would the world have lost two perfect pictures of unhappy love and parental devotion, but the poem would have become in reality the very thing these critics seem so anxious to make it,—a petty, spiteful work, in which are revenged the injuries that the author received during life. The charm would have been broken, the illusion dissipated. That intense reality, which makes us rejoice and weep with the poet, which measures for us the height of the spectre Nimrod by the length of three Germans, and the ascent of the mountain in Purgatory by the distance “twixt Lerice and Turbia,” would have disappeared, leaving behind a dry enumeration of facts. It is no wonder, then, that Carlyle exclaims, “Infinite pity, yet also infinite rigor of law ; it is so nature is made ; it is so Dante discerns that she was made. What a paltry notion is that of his Divine Comedy’s being a poor, splenetic, terrestrial libel ; putting those into hell whom he could not be revenged upon on earth ! I suppose if even pity, tender as a mother’s, was in the heart of any man, it was in Dante’s. But a man who does not know rigor cannot pity either. His very pity will be cowardly, egotistic, sentimentality or little better.” Those who read the great bard aright will find that in the drama of the ages his part is not that of a Thersites ; they will feel that it has been the high office of Italy’s famous poet to show to all men

“ Love, throned o’er vanquished Love and Hate,
Joy, gem-distilled thro’ rocks of Grief,
And Justice, conquering Time and Fate.”

It is not alone on the score of his mysticism and the stern rigor of his judgments that Dante’s reputation has been attacked. Those who, following in the footsteps of Voltaire, fail to see anything divine in the poem except the title, have aimed a blow at that which is the acknowledged sign of a mighty genius. His originality has been seriously questioned. To prove their point some of these men have gone to such pains that one would imagine they considered the existence of the Church staked on the fame of Dante, and her divine origin imperilled by the slightest defect in his claim to a high place among the poets. The principal source from which they say he borrowed the idea of the *Commedia* is *The Vision of the Monk Albericus*, discovered at the beginning of this century. This Albericus, while yet a child, fell into a profound trance, which lasted for the space of nine days. During his unconsciousness he dreamed that a dove lifted him up by the hair to the presence of St. Peter, under whose guidance he journeyed through Purgatory and Paradise. No sooner did he awake from his lethargy,—during which, by the way, he had been cured of a deadly disease,—than he entered the Benedictine order, in which

he soon became remarkable for the sanctity of his life. Desirous of preserving the record of so strange and mysterious an occurrence, his brother monks took care that it should be committed to writing. To Albericus himself the task was intrusted, and the result of his labors was the "vision" from which Dante is accused of having taken his plan. Nor is it to the holy friar alone that these overzealous men would give the distinction of having inspired the *Commedia*. They seek to foist this honor upon Brunetto Latini, Dante's preceptor, and point with significance to the design which this author follows in his *Tesoretto*. He finds himself lost amid the depths of an immense forest, but is conducted through its mazes by the poet Ovid, who instructs him during the journey in the secrets of nature and the principles of philosophy. They remind us, also, of an account which Sismondi gives, in his *Littérature du Midi*, of a representation of the torments of hell, given on a bridge over the Arno, May 4th, 1304; he tells us how, while the immense throng were gazing with horror on the live victims undergoing the tortures of the boiling tar, fire, serpents, and ice, which, they remark, are the principal instruments of punishment in the Inferno, the bridge gave way, and the crowd was precipitated into the stream. Another commentator makes mention of a masque entitled *The Damned Souls*, which was performed in the streets of Florence during Dante's residence there. But despite all these efforts to obscure the lustre of his fame, he stands to-day in the eyes of the world as one who raised the majestic structure of the *Divina Commedia* by the strength of his own intellect. It seems to us that the first charge furnishes about as just grounds for the suspicion of plagiarism as would the fact that a poet of our own day had weaved the Arthurian legends, already treated by Tennyson and Arnold, into a new wreath of song. In the fourteenth century these "visions" were as common as newspapers are in the nineteenth. After the lapse of so many years a large number still survive; we have *St. Patrick's Purgatory*, *The Dream of Hell*, *Voye on le Songe d'Enfer*, and many others of the same character. D'Israeli, in his *Curiosities of Literature*, mentions another of these visions, written by a monk, in which bishops and lords are huddled indiscriminately into hell amid the shouts of "Potentes potenter tormento patiuntur." They were employed universally during the Middle Ages to convey the grand truths of religion and philosophy to the minds of the people. In them was concentered the abstract knowledge of the leaders of thought for the benefit of those who could not grasp, by the force of their own intellects alone, the more subtle teachings of the schools. With what slight foundation, then, these critics have sought to attack Dante's originality, on the score of these visions, may appear from our remarks. That

he read the works of the pious Benedictine we are ready to grant, but that the dreams of a child should furnish the framework for such a sublime edifice as the *Commedia*, we cannot for a moment admit. The claims of Brunetto's admirers will, perhaps, be satisfied by the acknowledgment that Dante probably took the idea of his opening canto from the *Tesoretto* of his master. The representations of the tortures of hell he never beheld; he had been banished from Florence two years before. It was not from these sources, then, that he drew the conception of his noble song. For him there was no need of having recourse to the visions of holy friars, or to the imitations of the sufferings of the damned. His nineteen years of exile, and poverty, and wrong, had, indeed, been a very hell to him. During all that weary time his heart was laying up for itself a store of anguish, deep and broad enough to furnish materials for the wildest flights of imagination. "I found the original of my hell," he himself tells us, "in the world which we inhabit."

But if these critics were bent upon establishing some vision as the inspiration of Dante's poem, why did they not bring forward the apparition which greeted his youthful sight at the May-day festival of Faleo di Portinari? Not in the musty pages of the good friar's manuscript, but in the bright eyes of Beatrice did the young enthusiast find the spirit of the *Commedia*. We have said that Dante is the poet of Christianity, we are now going to give a title which at first sight seems a direct contradiction of our former statement. Dante is the poet of love, but in a far higher sense than the words might appear to convey. His lyre does not resound with the touching sentimental songs which sprang into favor at the beginning of the century, and in which the handsome young hero sets at naught every principle of religion and morality, and severs the dearest ties of family affection, to the intense delight of an appreciative world. The great Italian never clothed in rich and sensuous verse the visions of dead gold hair and snake-like eyes, or gave voice to the blind and passionate worship of "earth, the mother;" he never stood forth as the apostle of that love which offers to the dim silence of the woods, the murmuring of the trees, and the play of the sunlight on the springing grass, that reverence which belongs not to nature but to its God. The *Divina Commedia* rests upon another love,—that love which, first given to the world in the *Phædrus* of Plato, became a pure and elevating influence when once informed with the Christian spirit. This love was the clear and steady flame which all that was beautiful enkindled in the heart, the desire for the true, which held the whole being in subjection, and which became stronger by the contemplation of the Supreme Good. As the beautiful, in the eyes of the followers of this system,

was nothing else than "the splendor of the true," vice, with all its deformity, could never enter the soul in which the bright fire of this passion was burning. A beautiful face was beautiful only inasmuch as it raised the thoughts to the divine exemplar of all beauty, the Creator himself. It was this spirit that inspired the knight of old to draw his sword in defence of the widow and the orphan, to raise up the wronged and strike down the oppressor, to devote head, and heart, and arm, to the cause of right; and to do all this that he might be lifted nearer the level of the pure woman who held the sovereignty of his heart. Not that he hoped ever to claim her as his bride. He was content if her eyes beamed approval of his deeds, and if her voice was raised in prayer for his salvation. "Un regard, un sourire," says Ozanam, "payaient tout le prix de ses longs services." But, unfortunately for the world, and the reputation of chivalry, this chaste devotion degenerated into that system of mistress and *cavalier sirvente* which is celebrated in the licentious songs of the Provençal bards, and which has been so coarsely yet inimitably caricatured by Cervantes, in the homage paid by Don Quixote to his Dulcinea del Toboso.

It was, then, this noble and elevated love which gave the impulse to Dante's mind, and inspired the poem which has made him famous. But that he always looked upon Beatrice as a vague ideal, as an angel to be worshipped at a distance, we by no means intend to convey. From the day upon which she first came upon his sight until she lay cold and silent in the arms of death, Dante's love for Beatrice was a vigorous yet melancholy passion, becoming stronger with each glimpse of her splendid beauty. Her personal charms he celebrates in many a youthful sonnet; and Mrs. Jameson tells us with what minuteness he describes her "capegli crespie biondi," and her perfect face tinted "con un color angelica di perla." He gives, moreover, a decided sign of the earthly character of his love, when he thinks that all men see in the young Florentine girl the exquisite loveliness that was so manifest to his eyes. In the *Vita Nuova*, describing the effect which she produced upon all who chanced to meet her, he writes: "As she passed by, many said, 'That is not a woman, but one of the most beautiful angels of heaven.' And others said, 'This is a marvel! Blessed be the Lord who can work so admirably.'" But when once the sweet face and supple form are hidden in the shadow of the tomb, his love becomes idealized. He forgets the charms of the body and thinks only of the perfections of the soul. His fond thoughts no longer dwell upon her as a fair woman to be wooed and won, but as a spirit "whose virtue, humility and truth moved the Eternal Father to call her to himself, seeing that this miserable life was not worthy of anything so noble, so excellent." From this time she is the light of his intellect,

the inspiration of all his work ; she appears to him in dreams and visions, perhaps with the same splendor that surrounds her amid the celestial choirs of the terrestrial Paradise. Every incident of his constant love, every circumstance that marked his intercourse with the idol of his heart, comes back with a mysterious signification to his mind. The fire of suffering has chastened his passion, and he sees the daughter of Portinari encircled with a strange and spiritual glow. To his vision "washed clear with tears," the numbers three and nine seem connected in some hidden manner with his devotion to Beatrice. A child of nine years, his young soul had been stirred to its depths by the first vision that greeted his eyes of the saintly girl ; at eighteen, a glance at her face had fanned the flame of his devotion into new brilliancy ; on the ninth day of the ninth month, as Longfellow notices, "computing by the Syrian method," his life had been darkened by the hand of death. To these strange coincidences he ascribed some mysterious meaning ; and this strange fancy appears to have haunted him while engaged in composing the *Commedia*. A writer in *Blackwood's Magazine* has observed the following instances in which these numbers have been prominently used in the course of the poem. It is divided into three great compartments, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, each consisting of thrice eleven cantos, if we regard the opening canto as an introduction. In the Inferno three principal classes of sins, Incontinence, Malice, and Bestiality, are punished ; the Purgatorio has three divisions, the regions outside the gates, the seven circles of the mountains, and the terrestrial Paradise ; in the Paradiso we have the same number of parts in the description of the nine heavens and the empyrean. What hidden influence Dante thought was ever hanging over this number, we are at a loss to imagine. We know that at his birth he was dedicated to the Holy Trinity, and that the consideration of this grand mystery enters largely into his work. It may have been that, by the aid of the vision, "which," according to Lowell, "detects the meaning under the mask, and beneath the casual and the transitory, the eternal keeping its sleepless watch," he found some mystic link between his own wrecked life and the Triune God.

Thus far we have attempted to give an insight into the *arcana* of Dante's heart, and to trace the workings of that spirit which finds its perfect utterance in the *Divina Commedia* ; but the most difficult task remains to be performed. We have still to allot him a place among the poets who will live forever in the minds of men. And just as the little urchin, when confessing his misdeeds to the maternal ear, always puts off to the last the faults that are hardest to tell, we shall end this essay by an attempt at the solution of this much-vexed question. With that modesty which is so apparent

throughout the whole of the great poem, Dante puts himself last in the group of the famous bards of ancient times,

"And I was sixth amid so learned a band."

But, although we may admire such delicacy in one who must have known the strength of his own genius, justice compels us to give him a higher position, when once we have applied some test to his powers of poetry. This test Emerson has ready for us. "It is the best sign," he tells us, "of a great nature, that it opens out a foreground, and like the breath of morning landscapes, invites us onward." Examined by this standard, Dante's claim to a place amid the first rank of the "bards triumphant" becomes indisputable. "The breath of morning landscapes," it is true, does not exhale from the poem; but there is felt throughout it that which is grander and more affecting,—the solemn spirit of the night, with its silent darkness merging into the noisy splendor of the dawn. There is the foreground, too, stretching on and on with broad sweep, until it rises into the mountains whose summits are lost amid the clouds. The journey of a soul from hell to heaven: the horrors of the damned, the oppressive sadness of the repentant sinners on the hill of Purgatory, the glories of the celestial home, trembling with the brightness of the Trinity—what a sphere for the mind to revel in! Viewed in this light Dante becomes greater than Homer or Shakespeare. Greater than Homer, because the Italian's clear vision was not dimmed by the heavy mists of Paganism, nor attracted from its course by the false glitter of a human system of gods. Greater than Shakespeare, because Dante's enraptured gaze dwelt, not on the secrets of nature and the workings of men's hearts, but went up and onward to the contemplation of God. It may be urged that the Greek's lot was cast in times of mental and moral darkness, while the Italian lived in an age inspired with an intense yearning for the highest truths of religion; or that, while Dante was trained in those sciences which purify and exalt the soul, the mind of England's greatest poet was left open to whatever influence might chance to affect it. That this is a just and well-grounded objection we do not pretend to deny; but it brings into the comparison the circumstances of time and education, while we restricted it to the foreground which their poems open to our view. Looking at the question in this light, we must still maintain, that, in a greater degree than the *Iliad* or *Hamlet*, the *Divina Commedia* satisfies the yearnings of the soul for higher things; that it touches something deeper than does the wrath of Achilles or the sorrows of Lear; and that it may be said with more justice of Dante than of Homer or Shakespeare,—“those who love his poetry and strive to enter its high places, can still know that they breathe a pure and bracing air, and can still feel vibrating through a clear, calm sky the strong pulse of the eagle's wing as he soars with steady eyes against the sun.”

BOOK NOTICES.

FATE OF REPUBLICS. Boston: Estes & Lauriat, 1880. 12mo. Pp. 297.

This book may be supposed by some to be a campaign document in book form to help the election of Mr. Garfield. And perhaps it is. But it is something more, as the careful reader will discover.

Who the author is does not appear, for he has not given his name; and the only good trait we can discern in his character is this, that he seems ashamed of his own work and will not own it. A cursory glance at his pages might induce the belief that he is one who lives by the pulpit; for he can rant and cant with the most oily and the fiercest among them; but he is no Christian, and in his present disguise sees no longer any reason to hide his true sentiments. That he is an infidel may be gathered from many places of his book. In the first place his account of Abraham's migration westward is in direct contradiction to the Bible. Abraham left his people because called by God to come out of his house and kindred and country, and out of the darkness of idolatry, and not out of any chimerical attempt to seek "in the wilds of Palestine a home where he could enjoy the rights of political and religious freedom" (p. 1). In the next place, he will not condescend to quote Scripture; but with cold haughtiness refers to it as "the language of the times" (p. 7). The interposition of God in human affairs is for him no religious doctrine, but a matter of doubt (p. 9). He will neither deny nor affirm that the anthropoid or man-monkey of modern scientists may have flourished in America before the existence of the Adamic man (p. 118). Indeed, unless restrained by revelation and the teaching of the Church, one would be tempted to believe that all of them have not perished in "the geological drift period." Again (pp. 90-93), he describes the horrors of the French Revolution of ninety years ago. And in all that description no word to condemn, not even to mention, the proscription of Christianity, the utter denial of God and His Christ by those abominable enemies of God and man! Surely, this is enough to betray the pen of an infidel.

The author is evidently a member of the new Know Nothing society called "American Alliance" or "American Union," a secret body formed for the proscription of our Catholic citizens, which has its chief seats in New Jersey and Ohio, though its ramifications extend through every State. Our present ruler in Washington, Mr. Hayes, is said to have joined the society while Governor of Ohio. Its fold is ample, embracing Jew and Gentile, the pious Methodist and the blaspheming infidel. All are welcome if they only profess the gospel of hate. Indeed, it is stated on good authority, that the leading spirits of the secret organization are foul-mouthed infidels of the most anti-Christian stamp. It is therefore likely enough that our author is prominent amongst them.

His ostensible purpose in this book is to show what has led to the prosperity of all the republics that have existed in the world, and to trace the causes that have led to their downfall. He speaks first of the old republics, Israel, Carthage, the Greek republics, and Rome; next of the commonwealths, mediæval or modern, that are now extinct; the third section is devoted to those republics that still remain, and the fourth exclusively to the United States. His account of past times and other countries shows no great acquaintance with either history or politics. His fancy borrows too often its coloring from ignorance and

bigotry. Where did he learn that the Jews had common schools and an "instinctive love of political and religious independence?" (p. 1). The Jews were very prone to idolatry (is this what is meant by religious independence?); but this was no national instinct, as is clear from their steadfast adherence to Monotheism after the captivity of Babylon. Who told him that Samuel was a "noble republican patriot?" (p. 10). We remember reading something of the kind in the reveries of Dean Stanley and other rationalists, but not in the Bible. From what source was he led "safely to presume that the founders of Carthage were a race of freedom-loving refugees, who had suffered religious and political persecution in ancient Tyre?" (p. 28). History, legend, and song all tell a very different tale. In what history is it recorded that Greece fell a prey after the Macedonians, Persians, and Romans, "to the Goths and Vandals, then to the Popes, then to the Moslems," etc.? (p. 15). A stupid note on page 290 shows that he imagines the Roman republic to have been preceded by the Roman Empire! He knows as little of our own as of foreign history, for he talks (p. 204) of Melendez putting to death all the Protestants "within the walls of North Carolina!" And this is the man who writes historical warnings for the instruction of the American people!

But the great point of his book is its fourth section, in which he points out the perils of the American republic. Many of these are enumerated, but the chief one is Popery. He sees dreadful things in store for the country from the growth of the Catholic religion, and it is charming to see how unctuously this infidel can write on such a subject. Preaching under this mask of Protestant zeal and piety, he must, we are sure, fill the minds of all devout old women of both sexes with alternate rapture and horror. He quotes freely for his purpose, amongst other great names, those of Otto von Bismarck, Louis Kossuth, Edmond About, James Anthony Froude, Ulysses S. Grant, Secretary Thompson, Dexter Hawkins, and the notorious clerical mountebank, Joseph Cook. The quotations are singularly appropriate. Louis Kossuth is invoked (p. 243) to testify that *idiot* is a Greek word, meaning one who minds solely his own and not the public business. Gen. U. S. Grant is called to let us know that the next conflict on our soil will not be between North and South, but between Protestantism and superstition. We doubt if he could define the two terms, which were put into his mouth by one of his literary aide-de-camps. But supposing the quotations to be all correct, and we have no doubt they are so, what do they prove? In some cases they are evidences merely of shallow-minded bigotry, in others of moral dishonesty on the part of their authors. In place of quoting twenty such testimonies he might have quoted two hundred or two thousand of the same kind and with the same result; for there is no lack of knavish scribblers to take advantage of the market afforded them by the folly of anti-Catholic prejudice, and turn to good account the excessive credulity of those who are ever railing at the credulity of Catholics. Your no-Popery *gobemouche* always imagines himself most critical and independent, when he is swallowing most greedily and most blindly the *canards* of such veracious chroniclers as Maria Monk and Secretary Thompson.

But our anonymous infidel is not content to copy from our professed enemies. He pretends to quote from Catholic sources to show the wickedness of our creed and the sinister designs we entertain against the welfare of the republic. To prove the hateful nature of Jesuit morality he cites Sanchez, Escobar, and Filiutius; yet we are sure he never heard of these men before, never saw their works, and could not read or translate a line in them, were they now shown him. He cites Dr. Brownson,

Father Hecker, Archbishop Purcell, Archbishop Spalding, Bishop Spalding of Peoria, Pope Gregory XVI., and finally does for himself what Dogberry sought at the hands of others, by referring us to the Bull "*Unum Sanctum* of Pius IX." If any Protestant antiquary succeed in discovering this interesting document, it is to be hoped he will not withhold his discovery from the world. The author's style of quoting from our bishops and other writers is not a happy one. He gives only their names and their words; no book or reference from which to test the truth of his quotation, nothing but his own assertion, which is a very shaky source of credibility; no context, whereby we could explain their true meaning. This style of quotation is distasteful to honest men; but it is very convenient for our author and his evangelical compeers, who occasionally do not stick at garbling, and, what is worse, forging. It is only the other day that a Washington correspondent of the Philadelphia *Lutheran Observer* (September 24th, 1880) gives a long list of utterances by the "Papal Bishops" of Charleston, Cincinnati, and New York, Bishop O'Connor and "Priest Hecker," some of which are clearly distorted and garbled, the rest are manifest forgeries. Again within the last few weeks, as we learn from the Baltimore *Mirror*, the same thing has been done by a Methodist paper of that city. Archbishop Gibbons, in addressing his flock after his return from Rome, spoke substantially of the Pope as one to whom 200,000,000 souls throughout the world were bound by cordial ties of affection. The phrase was correctly given by all the daily secular papers, edited by profane worldings and served by unconverted reporters, whose grovelling unregenerate souls could not lift them beyond the level of taking down *verbatim*, with parrot-like stupidity, what they were sent to report, and what they hear with their ears. The "religious" paper aims higher. Consequently the bishop's phrase was borrowed from the secular papers, but improved and amended thus: "The Pope, who HOLDS IN HIS HANDS THE DESTINIES OF 200,000,000 souls." This sectarian sheet is edited by half a dozen or more Methodist ministers! And these are the men who whine or rave, as suits them, about Jesuit morality, and doing evil that good may come of it!

The same must be said of the oracles uttered by the author's anonymous friends, who are introduced respectively as "a leading politician," "a close student," "a distinguished writer and lecturer," "one of the wisest bishops of the Methodist Church," etc. (pp. 200, 210, 212). They stand or fall on his authority, which is not the best; and that he cannot or will not give names, casts suspicion and doubt over them all. Nor should he tax the credulity of his readers too far, by telling them that Jesuits have their "unguarded moments" (p. 283) in which they make dreadful disclosures to the Protestant world! The character of the Jesuit has been inalterably fixed by bigotry's traditional standard; and we cannot allow him to change it whenever it suits him.

In politics, as may be supposed, he is a fierce partisan. He waves the "bloody shirt," and considers the civil war a failure. He is a thorough *negrophile*, glorifies the Freedmen's Bureau, and mourns over its discontinuance as the greatest mistake made by any free government since the days of Abraham (p. 166). Perhaps he regrets, also, the discontinuance of the other gigantic swindle that grew out of it, the Freedmen's Bank, whose funds, the toilsome earnings of the "man and brother," might yet, if there was any honesty left in Washington, be recovered from the pockets of Christian statesmen and Methodist seminaries. He groans over "the dense illiteracy of the South" (p. 166), where he represents "the white masses" as no less ignorant than the blacks; and refuses to be comforted when he remembers that the ballot is intrusted

to such people. Let him consult the statistics of the State in which his book is printed, and he will see that by the census of 1870, while South Carolina has one in every eleven who cannot read or write, Massachusetts has one in every ten. And let him remember that in South Carolina the whole population is included, men, women, and children, while in Massachusetts the reference is only to male adults and the voting qualification. Out of a population of 312,770 male adults of 21 years and upwards in the latter State, 31,746 are excluded from the ballot because they cannot read or write. Let him remember that it was not the Southern people who forced the ballot into the hands of the ignorant black masses; and if in the interests of decency and propriety they should attempt to put the least limitation to such unworthy suffrage, he would be the first to raise the cry of outrage and persecution.

Our anonymous writer details with some candor, and even some degree of exaggeration, the perils, social and political, that environ the republic, in addition to the monster evil of Popery. He is very candid in laying bare the wounds and sores of the country. "Capital in the United States is already largely unchristian and selfish. Property, to the disadvantage of the many, is rapidly concentrating in the hands of the few. . . . The rich are growing richer, the poor poorer. Capital and labor are bitterly pitted against each other in every State in the Union. The rapidity with which a very wealthy man, even in America, can add almost without limitation to his wealth, and the ease with which he can impoverish those who attempt competition, are a peril of no small magnitude. All history shows that wealth grows more and more ambitious and greedy, poverty more and more restless and angry, with no possible cure for either except revolution" (pp. 214-15). And what is worse, "ambitious and rotten, thrice rotten politicians are found in waiting to fan into flames the bad passions of both the laboring and idle masses" (p. 219). He tells us that we have Socialism and Communism to contend with, and even Nihilism, which, "more or less pronounced, has been heard from platforms in nearly every State, East and West" (p. 227). And further, that crime is on the increase, and has actually doubled within the space of six years. For 16,000 convicts in 1872 there were 32,000 in 1878. This increase is more conspicuous in big cities, like New York, where criminal commitments in seventeen years (1860-1877) increased 300 per cent., being six times the rate of increase in population, and where "the most deplorable feature is that those who are high in office and who manage city affairs are the worst of criminals" (p. 228). The visible decrease of the American element in many communities is explained by a delicate hint of the shocking crime that has become so familiar to American mothers (p. 223).

The author's view of the political evils under which the country groans is not flattering, and were it unexaggerated might well presage a gloomy future. "Theoretically, it is a democratic representative republic; practically, it is under one of the very worst types of oligarchy ever known in history" (p. 238). "Parties now exist principally to gain and hold this wealth of spoils. Party legislation is directed, not to secure the highest interests of the nation, but to obtain the completest party triumph. The trickster in politics, if successful, is applauded and crowned" (pp. 239-40). When it is remembered that the party which has governed and legislated for the last twenty years (during which crimes, social and political, have had this fearful increase) is the author's own party, one might be surprised at this indirect bill of indictment against those of his own household. But he is still more explicit in his condemnation. "The Republican party has been abusive and corrupt,

and ought to be punished, perhaps overthrown. The State of Pennsylvania, year after year, has been carried for the Republican party by the fraudulent returns of the city of Philadelphia. Some of the Eastern and Western States have records equally disgraceful. . . . There is no question but it was through fraud that Governor Hayes was placed in the Presidential chair. There is no denying the fact that . . . the actual vote cast was overruled by a partisan Republican commission" (p. 246). Such humiliating confessions would argue great honesty and candor on the part of the penitent, if there were no reason to suspect him of interested motives.

We pass by the other perils that overhang the country, such as the coming "inevitable" (p. 193) annexation of Canada, Cuba, and Mexico, contemplated by "Popery," in order to bring about the ruin of Protestantism which the author coolly identifies with the republic. Our anonymous infidel, we allow, is full of venom and malice, but it would be doing him injustice to suppose him silly enough to believe his own words, and the few who will swallow this monstrous statement on his authority are so very few that they need not be taken into consideration.

What was the author's object in writing this book? It would be natural to suppose, and he probably intends the superficial reader so to suppose, that he wrote: first, to warn his fellow-citizens by the help of history that the evils prevailing amongst us will wreck our republic as they wrecked the republics of old; second, to suggest some timely remedy. Did he really intend the first point? No; for he tells us that "as a rule, Americans never read history, and never learn anything from it" (p. 179). For whom, then, does this new Cassandra sing? But though they do not heed the lessons of the past, they may, at least, adopt his remedy. Has he a remedy to offer? It would seem so at first sight. And he ushers it to our hearing with great pomp and pretence, first by rhetorical artifice telling us what it is not. Our safety from all these evils, he says,

"Does not consist in the triumph of the Republican nor in the defeat of the Democratic party. It is not Rutherford B. Hayes retained in the presidential chair nor General Grant restored to it, nor ex-Governor Tilden out of it, nor any named or unnamed Republican candidate elected to it that can save the republic. The only thing that can save the United States from the fatality of historic republics is Biblical Christianity among the masses of the people. Let every man love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself, and then our national woes will end, and our republic will be as enduring as the granite foundations of our continent. But without Bible knowledge and practice among the people,—the people who cast the ballot, and the people who make and execute the laws,—our country soon will not be fit to live in, nor our boasted liberties worth preserving. . . . When the great intelligent head and the great patriotic heart of Native-born Americans shall honor and cleave to Bible faith and practice, then nothing can harm us," etc. (p. 250).

Here we have the remedy. Did the author mean to propose it as such? By no means; for immediately he subjoins: "But the mass of our people will not honor Bible law and practice. Men will remain unrighteous." Now, it is plain that books are not written to give warnings from history that nobody reads, and to propose remedies which the writers themselves pronounce impossible. What, then, was the author's real intention? It is not stated expressly anywhere; but it is hinted and insinuated more than a score of times in his pages. From the very first pages of his book he begins to denounce the doctrine of State Rights, for which he entertains a strong fanatical hatred—State Rights which rightly understood are the very palladium of American liberty. He thinks no government secure that is not consolidated and centralized. And to bolster up this opinion he perverts history in a shameful way. Had

consolidation continued in the Hebrew commonwealth, he says (pp. 7, 8), transferring the cant of our own to past ages, had it not become infected with the theory of State Rights, had "love of the Union" not given way to State love, there would have been no secession, no disunion. So, too, with the Grecian commonwealth. It broke down through "a blundering States' Rights policy," and from "want of a centralized form of government" (p. 23). Carthage, he admits, "fell not through a conflict of State Rights;" but she perished (here the writer first shows his hand) because "there was no man daring enough to usurp control of the government and unite the people" (p. 34). After attributing the downfall of Rome to causes which the American reader may readily see nearer home, viz., laxity in morals, skepticism in religion, hordes of superficial and depraved lawyers, corrupt judges on the bench, extinction of the ancient reverence for the Constitution, and the possibility of violating it with impunity (pp. 42, 43, 49), he gives us the panegyric of Cæsar and Augustus, who took into their hands the supreme power "to restore prosperity to the suffering commonwealth." He would have his American readers apply the lesson that "usurpation in such an hour is not a crime; it is, upon the ground of a greater good to a greater number, positively demanded of one who has ability or power to bring order out of confusion" (p. 54). And he tacitly exhorts those to submit quietly to their coming Cæsar, by the reflection, that "a given form of government, which should be fought for under one class of circumstances, should not, under a different class, be defended by the drawing of a single sword" (pp. 55, 56).

The German Hanseatic commonwealth declined and perished, because "the government lacked constitutional centralization. The federal Union was to them a mere matter of convenience. There was no legal bond that held them together or that could punish secession or regard it as treason" (p. 77). According to the author's theory, the republic of Holland ought to have been immortal. It was founded on Bible Christianity, "on Protestantism, which is the friend of civil liberty" (p. 202), and which "had taken strong hold upon the hearts of the people" of Holland (p. 83). But our anonymous unbeliever cares no more for Protestantism than he does for God, who does not exist, but is only a name sometimes given to "the invisible forces of nature," as he lets slip in an unguarded moment (p. 251). But though believing in neither, he can use both names for stage effect. The only lesson he draws from the fate of the Dutch republic is that, "in the hands of a degenerate, selfish and brutal (!) people, a pure democracy is nothing but a mad delusion," and that it was *Romanism*, "ever a disturbing factor in national politics," that "sought and accomplished the *secession* of the *Southern* provinces" (p. 89). See how slyly and maliciously he couples these hateful names, to deceive his ignorant readers.

The author has good hopes of the immortality of Andorra and San Marino; but he forgets to add that they know nothing of his so-called "Bible Christianity," and are downright haters of his theory of the "one-man power." Speaking of Switzerland, he tells us that she is nearly ruined by her States' Rights constitution. But now she is all right, since she became a united confederacy (this is the mild name he gives it), and "the love for cantons has given place to love for Switzerland" (p. 101), converted (we suppose) to patriotism by a wholesome fear of a central despotic government. He consoles himself with the thought, that there are no Jesuits and "not one Irish Roman Catholic voter within her territory." He contrasts the enlightened policy of the Swiss with our stupid traditions. "They do not ever afterwards deprive themselves of

the presidential services of able and worthy men" because these have once or twice occupied the executive chair. For France, with her centralized government, administered by his brother infidels, Gambetta, Ferry & Co., of course, he has nothing but praise. In Liberia, the only constitutional feature that gives him delight is that "the President may be re-elected without limit" (p. 115). In fact, President Roberts has served five terms, four of them consecutively. Why will we not learn wisdom from our dusky brethren? Mexico, and the South American republics, are weighed by him in one balance and judged accordingly. If they incline to State rights, and discountenance the re-election of presidents, if they are governed on Catholic principles, they are worthless. But if they are ruled by Freemasons and infidels, who harry the citizens and rob the Church; above all, if they have strong centralized governments and Presidents "eligible for re-election" (p. 122), all is well with them. He notes with evident satisfaction that "the republic (of Venezuela) has witnessed its greatest prosperity at those times when the President has exercised almost despotic, at least dictatorial authority" (p. 133). He regrets that "some man is not found mighty enough to step forward and wipe out existing State governments and organize a strong central power which would be able to administer the affairs of the entire continent. South America needs not state or sectional rights, but national unity and might" (p. 150). What is desirable for her is "a united, consolidated, and grand republic, from Panama to Cape Horn" (p. 151). If this will not suit, let all States be absorbed into one empire, the Brazilian (*Ibid.*). Despotism alone, it seems, whether republican or imperial, can make them a great country.

That the book was written, not to draw moral lessons from the fate of deceased republics, nor to urge Bible Christianity as the remedy of our national woes, but to teach that our only salvation lies in the one-man power of a dictator, appears still more plainly from its fourth and last part. He tells us at the very beginning that, whether the present form of our government is to continue "is a serious question in the minds of some of the most thoughtful and patriotic citizens of the republic" (p. 159). There is no treason in this, says our author: For,

"As patriotic hearts as beat in America are apprehensive that the time is coming when a dictatorship, or an imperial government, shall be welcomed as a choice between evils; in that day the expressed preference for a limited monarchy would not be treasonable, but would be in the highest sense patriotic" (p. 160).

He argues, that the republican form of government ought not to be retained, because it is our present form; since "a type of government which is best for one generation may not, even in that same country, be best for another and different generation" (p. 160). Government is meant to secure the greatest good to the greatest number. "Hence, the *will* of a monarch or dictator is more likely to secure the greatest good to the greatest number, then a monarchy or dictatorship is better, for that age at least, than an aristocracy or a democracy" (p. 161). "What was best yesterday may not be best to-day; what is best to-day may not be best to-morrow." Here, he concludes, within the next twenty-five centuries (why not say at once in 1884?) our federal compact may be less desirable than French centralization, British monarchy, or even Russian and Turkish absolutism (p. 162). On a subsequent page (175) our infidel, laughing in his sleeves at his evangelical dupes, puts on a pious air, and groans piteously over the degeneracy of the day. "The people have become proud, irreligious (capital this from an atheist!) and corrupt." They no longer resemble "our fathers in the Mayflower," who began their compact with the words, "In the name

of God, Amen." We have no further claim on divine protection. "Indeed, were God strict to mark our iniquities, our doom would be already sealed." But He is merciful, and out of His great mercy will send us a monarch, though we deserve no such blessing. On the day, "when a monarchy will result in the greatest good to the greatest number," then "God will no longer interpose to save the republic, but will order its overthrow, and in mercy will permit a monarchy to be established by those who have skill and daring sufficient to undertake and accomplish it."

The mere mention of a "third term" some time ago excited the displeasure of the most intelligent in both parties, those of them at least who cling to the traditions of the republic as the fairest exponents of its Constitution. Our author laughs at these men as behind the age, and exultingly sees the day at hand, "when men will not talk of a 'third term' nor of a tenth term, but will submit to any arm for any term which can give security to person and property. There can be no dictatorship in this country until the majority of our leading citizens demand it. Then there can be, and there will be, and ought to be" (p. 229).

The "coming man," in our author's theory, is to install himself by violence in his usurped seat, and is to be a military chieftain. The "mass of our native-born and order-abiding citizens" will urgently demand and repeat their demand "for some one to seize the reins of government" (p. 248); while "every freedom-loving and patriotic Protestant the country over" will join in the demand "for some one man who will dare defy the Pope and assume a military sway over the United States of America" (p. 213).

The author has sufficiently disclosed his purposes, or rather those of the party who hired his pen. For no doubt can exist that there is in the country a party, more or less numerous, that longs for despotism under the name of a strong government. They are not all knaves, perhaps, but have their dupes, and are trying to increase the number by such books as the present. It is a matter of congratulation, that they have chosen such a silly tool as our anonymous author to work out their ends. Nor is it likely that he or they will succeed in persuading the American people to commit self-destruction in order to escape political evils.

"What? leap into the pit our life to save?"

Even the old ram of the fable knew that this was silly advice.

We have, perhaps, given too much space to this contemptible, irreligious book; but the subject is important, and the book, in spite of its blunders, artfully written. It has succeeded in thoroughly deceiving the sectarian press, who recommend it as written "in a Christian spirit!"

MEMORIES OF MY EXILE. By *Louis Kossuth*. Translated from the original Hungarian by *Ferencz Jausz*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1880. 8vo., pp. 446.

Any one who recollects the addresses delivered by the Hungarian exile in this country, and the wild but evanescent enthusiasm which he excited, will be sadly disappointed if he expects to find in this work any of the eloquence that he then possessed. The title does not profess to give much, but few readers will expect to find that nearly five hundred pages are here given to the somewhat unimportant part played by Kossuth in the events preceding and during the war of France and Sardinia against Austria. At this late day, when so much has been written on the political and diplomatical intrigues of that time, as well as of the more patent

events in camp and cabinet, Kossuth has been able to frame his account so as to place himself and the cause which he represented in its most favorable light. Napoleon III., Cavour, Victor Emanuel, Mazzini, have all passed away, and cannot controvert any statements of the Magyar leader.

In the account here presented by Kossuth, Napoleon III. appears false and treacherous to all men. False to the Italian revolutionists, he was driven to action by the attempt of Orsini on his life, and by the series of cutthroats whom (Cavour declared) Mazzini, Kossuth's friend, kept sending to France to accomplish the task in which Orsini failed. Prince Napoleon, a revolutionist of the most pronounced type, a hater of the Papacy and religion, was, according to Kossuth, the chief confidential adviser and instrument of Napoleon III. The Emperor did not trust his cabinet; he projected a war against Austria with Sardinia, and through Prince Napoleon signed a secret treaty to make war on Austria without the knowledge of his ministers, who were laboring to secure peace. He had, at Plombières, in July, 1858, agreed that a kingdom of twelve million inhabitants was to be formed in Northern Italy for the House of Savoy, that the temporal power of the Holy See was to be preserved, but on very narrow limits, and that Savoy was to be ceded to France. The secret treaty went further. Not only were Lombardy and Venice to be given to Sardinia, but also the duchies of Modena and Parma, and from the States of the Church Romagna and the Papal Legations, while the Pope's temporal power was to be confined to the city and province of Rome. Kossuth has doubts on the part relating to the States of the Church, and attempts to argue from acts and language of Napoleon III.; but of all men he is the last in regard to whom we can argue, that because he said and did this and that, therefore he could not have agreed to do something else.

As soon as it became known that war was likely to ensue, Kossuth, who had been dreaming of Hungarian independence, and plotting with Mazzini and his clan, began to entertain hopes that the moment had come when Hungary might wrest her independence from Austria. Friend as he was of Mazzini, he now, through Prince Napoleon, sought an interview with the Emperor, and on the hypothesis that the allies could not drive Austria out of Italy except by exciting a revolution in Hungary that would paralyze her power to meet the allies in Italy, Kossuth asked to be authorized to form a Hungarian army in Italy, which a French corps was to escort to its own country. In this he overrated the strength of Austria and underrated the power of the allies, if he believed that Napoleon really intended to drive the Hapsburgs entirely out of the peninsula. It is pretty clear, however, that the French Emperor really had no such intention, and that as the price of Savoy and Nice he wished Austria to cede Lombardy, which Sardinia might have secured without a war and without loss of territory, inasmuch as it had been seriously discussed in the imperial council at Vienna whether such a cession should not be made in order to secure the rest of the Austrian power.

Napoleon III., after his long preparation for a war that was to give him the prestige of military glory and secure his throne, had no intention of risking too much by a long war, or giving time for other powers to intervene. Now a Hungarian movement would not only be unnecessary, but it would entail a campaign that would evidently be seriously protracted. He could, therefore, have had no serious intention of doing anything for Hungary; but the mere step of allowing Kossuth and the Hungarian refugees to form an army corps with their own uniforms and

colors was a menace to the Emperor of Austria, who would constantly be compelled to prepare for civil war at home. There is nothing strange that one of Napoleon's crafty mind should apparently yield to the force of Kossuth's arguments and encourage him to proceed, merely with a view to divert the attention of the Austrians.

In all this Prince Napoleon is portrayed as a man sincerely a revolutionist, devoted to Italian unity, rejecting the very idea of being made king of Central Italy, and a true friend to Hungary, while the Emperor bears the character of being false and treacherous to all; professing sympathy with the Italian unity movements, the Hungarians, the Pope, and the duchies, while in reality he sought only his own ends, to insure his own popularity in France by a defeat of her old enemy, Austria; by a seeming aid to Italy; by a pretended protection of the Pope; by securing additional provinces and victories on the field of battle. All this would tell on Frenchmen, and on Frenchmen of differing religious and political views.

Napoleon is gone. His son is gone. Prince Napoleon is now the imperial pretender to the presidency or throne of France, and this work of the senile Hungarian looks like a clumsy attempt to rally around the present heads of the Bonapartes all the revolutionary element in Europe. The present moment is one when the supreme power in France is in the grasp of the man who has the boldness to seize it with a firm hold. The present government in France, with the example of Bismarck's fearful blunder before them, have plunged into the same course merely to gratify a few bigoted infidels to whom the name Jesuit is a bugbear.

When the Empire of Germany was established, and the great effort of anything like a statesmanly mind should have been to combine, mould, blend, unite all men and all minds into one nation, Bismarck, like a fool, threw into the mixture an element that at once produced a precipitate that defies all his chemistry to dissolve, and which is so intensely bitter that it will take years to remove it. Just so the French Republic, which ought to have conciliated every good element, attacks the Jesuits, whose importance in the French clergy and collegiate institutions is immensely overrated, but attacks them so as to array on their side the great body of the French hierarchy and priests, the Catholic laity—even the lukewarm and the magistracy. Having stupidly copied Bismarck's programme, they halt now at the sight of the widespread dissatisfaction which they have produced. Grévy and De Freycinet wish to draw back, or at least do no more, but the bigots and fanatics push them forward, Gambetta in the van.

France will soon tire of this system of sham presidents, who never can hold their seats during the short time for which they are elected. Frenchmen must despise these men who leap into the saddle, but are compelled to dismount before the end of the race—Thiers, McMahon, Grévy. Men like boldness and strength, and naturally despise rulers who lack both or either.

This book of Kossuth's, though not primarily issued in France, looks to us, we must avow, as though intended to serve as material for increasing the strength of Prince Napoleon in France, showing him a true friend of the revolution, as a man who was the wisest and safest counselor of Napoleon III., answerable for none of his misdeeds, the real author of his best movements.

To carry out his part of the programme concerted between him and Napoleon III., Kossuth revived the Hungarian organization, and an active correspondence between the exiles and with leading men in Hungary followed. There were plans and projects.

Besides the military preparations there was, however, a curious episode. Napoleon III. wished to be sure of English neutrality in the war with Austria, at least for the brief time he needed to carry out his plans. Lord Derby was prime minister.

"I shall not feel satisfied as long as England's policy remains in the hands of the present government," said Napoleon III. to Kossuth.

The Hungarian tells us that he replied: "Your majesty's distrust is well founded. The problem, therefore, would be to overthrow the ministry of Lord Derby, and to do so just on the question of its foreign policy. The place of the Tories should be taken by the Whigs on such an understanding as would entirely secure the neutrality of England. As your majesty wishes only this much from England, permit me to declare that I will take upon myself the task of carrying this into effect."

We may well conceive that Napoleon should have replied: "What do you mean? Do you really think that you can do this?"

Kossuth replies: "Yes, sire, I believe I can. Pray do not regard my words as mere extravagant boasting. I am only a poor exile whose sphere of action is very limited, and certainly do not dream of being able to direct England's policy, but I know the position of the parties; I am on a friendly footing with the personages who can bring this about, and I hope I shall be able to persuade them to do it."

It is rather humiliating to the English people, who think they manage their own affairs, to read Kossuth as he complacently tells us how he went to England, and by delivering speeches (which he gives us at length) in London, Manchester, Bradford, and Glasgow effected his purpose.

"With the speech at Glasgow," he says, "my round of public meetings was brought to a termination. I had reason to be satisfied with the result. The English people had come to the conclusion that in spite of the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, the impartial neutrality of England could not be considered safe in the hands of a Tory cabinet."

If all this is so, if a foreign adventurer at the instigation of a neighboring power can thus easily displace an English ministry, would it not be well for the English people to adopt a system like ours, with a prime minister and cabinet permanent for a term of years? It might entail, as it does with us, occasional collisions with the law-making bodies, where the executive defies the legislative by vetoing an act, or where the legislative defies the executive by passing the act over the veto. But even this would be a minor evil. Irish obstructionists, by playing on popular English chords, may yet, in concert with foreign powers, seat and unseat cabinets.

Kossuth then hastened to Italy, but events had marched more rapidly than his plans. Teleki and Klapka were forming the Hungarian force at Genoa. The commencement did not augur success. "We commenced our organization with 120 men," says Kossuth. It was proposed to make them a Hungarian legion in the Sardinian army, but this Kossuth and his friends resented. They demanded a Hungarian army, with its national standard and character. This was at last conceded, and to recruit it prisoners taken from the Austrians who belonged to that nationality were to be assigned to them. When Kossuth arrived this army consisted of one thousand men in two battalions, and was stationed at Acqui.

Then came addresses to the people of Hungary; negotiations in Serbia for the passage of troops on their way to Hungary; but before the army reached even four thousand men on paper, the decisive battles of the war had been fought. Magenta and Solferino showed that Austria

could be driven out of Italy by the French and Italians, and that Kossuth's fancied necessity of Hungarian aid in Italy and a diversion in Hungary was simply a delusion.

Napoleon III. was evidently surprised at the **speedy result**, and feared to go too far. He began to feel a fear of Prussia, which he had not the wisdom to feel in later years. He dispatched Prince Napoleon to the Austrian headquarters with the points for peace preliminaries. Things moved rapidly. Austria ceded Lombardy; an Italian confederation was agreed upon. France was to receive Savoy and Nice, but Hungary received no notice whatever. The prisoners who had enrolled under the Hungarian standard in Italy were indeed saved by a clause establishing a complete and plenary amnesty by both parties for all persons within their territory compromised by late events.

Kossuth's hopes were all dashed. Hungary has since submitted to the Hapsburg rule, and the empire assumes a more motley character by the annexation of Bosnia.

Cavour, with all his shrewd planning, was overreached. He had ceded two provinces, and wasted blood and treasure to secure what might have been obtained without French aid and without the cost of a dollar or a drop of blood. The proposed Italian confederation under the presidency of the Pope was but a dream. There was no power to enforce it, and Napoleon probably never expected to see it carried out. He left it as a seed of mischief.

How Cavour regarded it, Kossuth tells us: " 'This peace shall not come to pass!' he cried, striking his breast; 'this treaty shall not be executed. I will take Solaro della Margarite by one hand and Mazzini by the other. If necessary I will become a conspirator, a revolutionist! but this treaty shall not be executed. No! a thousand times no! Never, never!'"

And we all know it never was. The treaty showed Napoleon to the Catholic minds and hearts of France as upholding the temporal power of the Pope, and even placing his Holiness in a noble and fatherly position in the peninsula. In reality he knew that Sardinia would carry out the project he himself favored, of confining the Pope to the city and district of Rome.

Much as from time to time he seemed to oppose the progress of Victor Emanuel, it is clear that this result had been his project from the outset.

Victor Emanuel respected his ideas on that point as long as he had power to enforce them. When his star waned the so-called King of Italy deprived the Pope even of the Eternal City, to live and die a restless, unhappy man, feeling that his greatness was deprived of its lustre by the shadow of the Vatican.

Pietri came to Kossuth with a letter from the Emperor: "Tell M. Kossuth that I am extremely sorry that the liberation of his country must now be left alone. I cannot do otherwise; it is an impossibility. But I beg him not to lose heart, but to trust to me and the future. Meanwhile he may be assured of my friendly feelings towards him, and I beg of him to dispose of me with regard to his own person and children."

"Senator, pray tell your master that his majesty the Emperor of the French is not rich enough to offer alms to Louis Kossuth, and Louis Kossuth is not mean enough to accept them," was, he tells us, his mock heroic reply.

Kossuth's career ended; and now, twenty years after the events, comes this volume, with no motive that we can perceive except to serve the cause of Prince Napoleon.

EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL. By *Herbert Spencer*. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Mr. Herbert Spencer's book on education has been long before the public. This new and cheap edition shows that it is gaining popularity. When the book first appeared, the theories and views advocated in it were considered too radical. They were a protest against the existing modes of education. But since then the general views of education have become materially changed. The advancement of the physical sciences and the consequent large share of attention they claim, have led men to regard education on a physical science basis as of more importance than education on a literary or classical basis. The useful, so called, is considered of more importance than the ornamental; a smattering in science finds more favor than a smattering in classics. Hence we find that the new efforts to establish universities, such as Cornell and the Johns Hopkins, are all reduced to the planning of a system of special schools for specialist teaching—a system, by the way, that ignores the very idea of a university, ancient or modern. Mr. Spencer's book is calculated to foster these ideas. So far as the book is a protest against the frivolous and the superficial in education, it is good. So far, also, as it lays stress upon proper physical development in boys and girls it is worthy of a reading. The author has the rare faculty of suggestiveness, even where one must differ with him entirely. For example, speaking of classical education, the author says: "If we inquire what is the real motive for giving boys a classical education, we find it to be simply conformity to public opinion. Men dress their children's minds as they do their bodies, in the prevailing fashion" (p. 23). Now, this is partially true. Where a classical education is so superficial that it results only in a conceit for the classics without sufficient knowledge to relish them, it is simply a fashion, and, in a sense, a waste of time. For when the mental discipline has not been strong enough to enable the intellect to grasp the subject thoroughly, it is only nominal, and the same drill on a more useful subject might practically be equally beneficial. But then, there is much truth in the expression of the German poet, that he who only knows one language does not know his own. Studying the structure of the languages gives insight to the force and beauty and genius of the language one speaks. Then again, language is the key to unlock the storehouses of information among all nations. But so utterly valueless are Mr. Spencer's views upon the classics, that they have been expunged in the last French edition of this work, at the instigation of the government commissioners on the books for school-libraries, as being calculated to give a disgust for the ancient languages of Greece and Rome.

There is much rambling talk on instructing children in the laws of sociology and biology, and the sciences which are yet in embryo, and have very few laws to teach. Then girls are to be taught the duties of maternity, and what not; all of which is laid down with the dogmatism of one who lacks the educator's experience.

We like the author's protest against the pernicious habit of teaching elementary branches by abstract definitions. Whilst it is true that the developed reason sees the abstract in the concrete, it is also true that the child's mind apprehends the concrete before it distinguishes the abstract. According to the old Aristotelian maxim adopted by the Scholastics, "There is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the senses;" therefore, the child should begin with the concrete, and thence ascend to the abstract. "It has been well said," says Mr. Spencer, "concerning the custom of prefacing the art of speaking any tongue by a drilling in the parts of speech and their functions, that it is about as reasonable

as prefacing the art of walking by a course of lessons on the bones, muscles, and nerves of the legs; and much the same thing may be said of the proposal to preface the art of representing objects by a nomenclature and definitions of the lines which they yield on analysis. These technicalities are alike repulsive and needless. They render the study distasteful at the very outset; and all with the view of teaching that which, in the course of practice, will be learned unconsciously" (p. 144). And as a further illustration of this point we may remark that just now educators are growing alive to the fact that English grammar, for instance, as taught to beginners, is a complete waste of time, inasmuch as it misses its real end, which is to teach a practical knowledge of the English language. Drillings in the proper forms of expression will be more beneficial to the young mind than drillings in abstract definitions and obscure rules. It is time that all teachers realize this fact. But Mr. Spencer says truly: "The true education is practicable only to the true philosopher" (p. 116).

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN EPITOME. By *Albert Schwegler*. Translated from the first edition of the original German, by *Julius H. Seelye*. Revised from the ninth German edition, with an Appendix, by *Benjamin E. Smith*. New York: Appleton & Company. 1880.

We certainly cannot recommend this volume as a "suitable textbook on this branch of study;" for it is written from the standpoint of Germans Transcendentalism. But we feel very deeply the want of a similar work by a Catholic author, which, with equal vigor, clearness, and conciseness, shall "exhibit the content, the succession, and the inner connection of the different philosophical systems." So far as form and method are concerned, Schwegler's manual is a gem. His aim is to present each philosopher, not as an isolated individual, but as the representative of the civilization of the age and nation which produced him. "The historical and collective life of the race," he says, "is bound together by the idea of a spiritual and intellectual progress, and manifests a regular order of advancing, though not always continuous, stages of development." The idea of "one rational and internally articulated system, one order of development, grounded in the constant endeavor of the human mind to raise itself to a higher point of consciousness and knowledge," is his underlying unity. The Christian philosophical historian, admitting this law of progress, goes one step forward, and recognizes its infinite, intelligent cause. We are glad to note that the author, whilst extolling the "great law" of progress "and development," still contends for human freedom. It is certainly an inconsistency in a Pantheist; but one which we willingly condone.

His review of the ancient Greek and Roman systems is clear and concise. The only criticism we have to offer, is that he is too prone to make the Greeks speak and think like modern Germans. It is doubtful whether the ancients puzzled themselves so much over the *Ego* and the *non-Ego* as the author intimates.

The great defect of this history is its exclusion of that philosophy, which we, as Catholics, have most in esteem, the philosophy of the fathers and the schoolmen. "This is not so much a philosophy" says Schwegler, "as a philosophizing or reflecting within the already prescribed limits of positive religion. It is, therefore, essentially theology, and belongs to the science of the history of Christian doctrine." Thus, on what may be called technical grounds, some of the most interesting chapters in the history of human thought are eliminated. That so able a thinker as Schwegler proves himself to be, should have fallen into this grave error, can only be ascribed to an utter unacquaintance with the

masters of scholasticism. He was doubtless prejudiced against them from his youth. He was taught to regard them as upholders of "irrational dogmas," and he never expended time upon them. As a proof of this, take his comparison of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. He informs us that they were "the founders of two schools, into which, after them, the whole scholastic theology divides itself,—the former exalting the understanding (*intellectus*), and the latter the will (*voluntas*), as the highest principle, both being driven into essentially different directions by the opposition of the theoretical and practical. Even with this began the downfall of scholasticism; its highest point was also the turning point to its self-destruction. The rationality of the dogma, the oneness of faith and knowledge, had been constantly their fundamental premise; but this premise fell away, and the whole basis of their metaphysics was given up in principle, the moment Duns Scotus placed the problem of theology in the practical." Meaning no disrespect to our distinguished author, we must pronounce this to be arrant nonsense.

Is it true that the schoolmen confined their philosophizing "within the limits of positive religion?" Nothing can be more false. Whilst, as *theologians*, they demonstrated the "rationality of dogma," as *philosophers* they ranged far and wide beyond the "limits of positive religion." No one ever insisted more earnestly than St. Thomas upon the necessity of distinguishing carefully between *faith* and *reason*, between *science* and *revelation*. The schoolmen never adduced the authority of Scripture or the fathers to prove a philosophical thesis; hence their doctrine regarding the attributes of God, the spirituality of the soul and the freedom of the will could stand on its own merits, even though the Bible were rejected. The celebrated watchword, *Credo ut intelligam* was not construed as signifying that in philosophy faith is the basis or premise of knowledge. This is literally true in such matters as the Trinity or the Incarnation. Our only reason for believing these high truths is the fact of their being revealed. But in matters previous to the reason St. Anselm's maxim means that were it not for faith we should, probably, not have attained to perfect knowledge. The existence of God, for example, is a truth within reach of the unassisted reason; but, nevertheless, faith points out a surer and simpler path to knowledge of it. Hence the Christian is not debarred from philosophy because he clings to his "positive religion." What he *believes* as a Christian he *proves* by theological and oftentimes by philosophical arguments. Thus the mathematician can solve the same problem by different methods; and he does not forfeit his claim to the appellation of arithmetician because he has previously ascertained the solution by a process in algebra.

One fact cannot be denied, viz., that whereas our modern "philosophy" has destroyed everything and built nothing, scholasticism on the contrary—as Schwegler justly exclaims—"brought out systems of doctrine like the Gothic cathedrals in their architecture." And we may add that philosophy, as well as architecture, will make no solid progress until it shall first sit at the feet of the medieval masters. Scholasticism obeyed the law of progress because it accepted and perfected the achievements of its predecessors. "Modern philosophy," on the contrary, began and has ended in universal doubt. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*.

THE TRUE FAITH OF OUR FOREFATHERS. By a Professor of Theology in Woodstock College, S. J., Maryland. New York American News Company, 1880, 12mo., pp. 575.

Little did Rev. Dr. Stearns dream of the rod that was in pickle for him, when he came out with his boasted reply to the "Faith of our

Fathers" by Archbishop Gibbons. The author of the present treatise, one of the Jesuit professors at Woodstock, has done his work thoroughly and admirably, not only refuting everything advanced by Dr. Stearns in the shape of argument, but laying bare his many misrepresentations of Catholic doctrine and history, his garbling of quotations, his vending of spurious for genuine passages of the Fathers—in a word, the very faults of which this unscrupulous controversialist had accused the Archbishop. Without saying what is unnecessary, considering its distinguished source, that the book is splendidly faultless and excellent in its statements of Catholic doctrine, we may add that its learning, profound as the scholar will find, has been so happily adapted as to delight and instruct, without burthening, the ordinary intelligent reader. But what constitutes the chief charm of the book, to say nothing of its pleasing style, is the spirit of meekness and charity that pervades its every page from beginning to end. What makes this the more remarkable, is the provocation given by Dr. Stearns with his inuendoes, silly and offensive jokes, outrageous insulting language, etc. We called it a rod, but never before was chastising rod laid on more mildly and more effectually at the same time.

The book is a valuable complement to the Archbishop's "Faith of Our Fathers;" and inquiring Protestants will derive much benefit from reading both. To be impartial let them read Dr. Stearns's book between the two. They will soon discover that it is *between* them in another sense, viz., as bruised, flattened metal is between the hammer and the anvil.

THE CHURCH AND THE MORAL WORLD: Considerations on the Holiness of the Church. By Rev. Augustine J. Thebaud, S. J. New York, 1880.

We have been favored with a sight of the proof-sheets of this new and important work by the distinguished Jesuit whose previous writings have earned for him a high reputation in the Old World as well as in the New. It is astonishing to see how the indefatigable author, pressed by so many other occupations and duties, can find time to write so much and so well. All of his books reveal profound thought, vast erudition, and laborious study; not one of them betrays haste or hurry, though these are sometimes forced on authors by their publishers.

Two of the brightest marks of the True Church, that distinguish her pre-eminently from all sects pretending to the Christian name, are her Catholicity (or universality of time and place), and her Holiness. The former forces admiration and reverence even upon her enemies; the latter draws them submissive, loving, eager children to her mother's bosom. Thus does she, at due distance, resemble her heavenly prototype, God himself, who, as the author remarks is not only *Maximus*, but chiefly *Optimus*. His majesty inspires awe; His goodness wins irresistibly the hearts of His creatures. Having treated of the Catholicity of the Church fully in another book, F. Thebaud devotes the present volume to her Holiness. He divides it into two parts, the first of which explains the intrinsic sources whence necessarily flow the gifts of sanctity inherent in the Church. The second part shows in detail how the Church diffused her holiness amongst men, sanctifying Greek, Roman, Barbarian, and the new peoples of Europe, from her origin down to our own day.

God grant that the author may realize the object of his writing, which is to confound the false philosophy of the age, to instruct and guide honest inquirers, and to teach Catholics a proper appreciation of what they daily utter at their prayers: "Credo unam SANCTAM ecclesiam Catholicam." "I believe one Holy Catholic Church."

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